nixpkgs/nixos/modules/security/permissions-wrappers/default.nix
Parnell Springmeyer a20e65724b
Fixing
2017-01-26 00:32:59 -08:00

203 lines
6.7 KiB
Nix

{ config, lib, pkgs, ... }:
let
inherit (config.security) permissionsWrapperDir;
isNotNull = v: if v != null then true else false;
cfg = config.security.permissionsWrappers;
setcapWrappers = import ./setcap-wrapper-drv.nix {
inherit config lib pkgs;
};
setuidWrappers = import ./setuid-wrapper-drv.nix {
inherit config lib pkgs;
};
###### Activation script for the setcap wrappers
configureSetcapWrapper =
{ program
, capabilities
, source ? null
, owner ? "nobody"
, group ? "nogroup"
, setcap ? false
}: ''
cp ${setcapWrappers}/bin/${program}.wrapper ${permissionsWrapperDir}/${program}
# Prevent races
chmod 0000 ${permissionsWrapperDir}/${program}
chown ${owner}.${group} ${permissionsWrapperDir}/${program}
# Set desired capabilities on the file plus cap_setpcap so
# the wrapper program can elevate the capabilities set on
# its file into the Ambient set.
#
# Only set the capabilities though if we're being told to
# do so.
${
if setcap then
''
${pkgs.libcap.out}/bin/setcap "cap_setpcap,${capabilities}" ${permissionsWrapperDir}/${program}
''
else ""
}
# Set the executable bit
chmod u+rx,g+x,o+x ${permissionsWrapperDir}/${program}
'';
###### Activation script for the setuid wrappers
configureSetuidWrapper =
{ program
, source ? null
, owner ? "nobody"
, group ? "nogroup"
, setuid ? false
, setgid ? false
, permissions ? "u+rx,g+x,o+x"
}: ''
cp ${setuidWrappers}/bin/${program}.wrapper ${permissionsWrapperDir}/${program}
# Prevent races
chmod 0000 ${permissionsWrapperDir}/${program}
chown ${owner}.${group} ${permissionsWrapperDir}/${program}
chmod "u${if setuid then "+" else "-"}s,g${if setgid then "+" else "-"}s,${permissions}" ${permissionsWrapperDir}/${program}
'';
mkActivationScript = programsToWrap:
lib.stringAfter [ "users" ]
''
# Look in the system path and in the default profile for
# programs to be wrapped.
PERMISSIONS_WRAPPER_PATH=${config.system.path}/bin:${config.system.path}/sbin
mkdir -p /run/permissions-wrapper-dirs
permissionsWrapperDir=$(mktemp --directory --tmpdir=/run/permissions-wrapper-dirs permissions-wrappers.XXXXXXXXXX)
chmod a+rx $permissionsWrapperDir
${programsToWrap}
if [ -L ${permissionsWrapperDir} ]; then
# Atomically replace the symlink
# See https://axialcorps.com/2013/07/03/atomically-replacing-files-and-directories/
old=$(readlink ${permissionsWrapperDir})
ln --symbolic --force --no-dereference $permissionsWrapperDir ${permissionsWrapperDir}-tmp
mv --no-target-directory ${permissionsWrapperDir}-tmp ${permissionsWrapperDir}
rm --force --recursive $old
elif [ -d ${permissionsWrapperDir} ]; then
# Compatibility with old state, just remove the folder and symlink
rm -f ${permissionsWrapperDir}/*
# if it happens to be a tmpfs
${pkgs.utillinux}/bin/umount ${permissionsWrapperDir} || true
rm -d ${permissionsWrapperDir}
ln -d --symbolic $permissionsWrapperDir ${permissionsWrapperDir}
else
# For initial setup
ln --symbolic $permissionsWrapperDir ${permissionsWrapperDir}
fi
'';
in
{
###### interface
options = {
security.permissionsWrappers.setcap = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.listOf lib.types.attrs;
default = [];
example =
[ { program = "ping";
source = "${pkgs.iputils.out}/bin/ping";
owner = "nobody";
group = "nogroup";
setcap = true;
capabilities = "cap_net_raw+ep";
}
];
description = ''
This option sets capabilities on a wrapper program that
propagates those capabilities down to the wrapped, real
program.
The `program` attribute is the name of the program to be
wrapped. If no `source` attribute is provided, specifying the
absolute path to the program, then the program will be
searched for in the path environment variable.
NOTE: cap_setpcap, which is required for the wrapper program
to be able to raise caps into the Ambient set is NOT raised to
the Ambient set so that the real program cannot modify its own
capabilities!! This may be too restrictive for cases in which
the real program needs cap_setpcap but it at least leans on
the side security paranoid vs. too relaxed.
The attribute `setcap` defaults to false and it will create a
wrapper program but never set the capability set on it. This
is done so that you can remove a capability sent entirely from
a wrapper program without also needing to go change any
absolute paths that may be directly referencing the wrapper
program.
'';
};
security.permissionsWrappers.setuid = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.listOf lib.types.attrs;
default = [];
example =
[ { program = "sendmail";
source = "/nix/store/.../bin/sendmail";
owner = "nobody";
group = "postdrop";
setuid = false;
setgid = true;
permissions = "u+rx,g+x,o+x";
}
];
description = ''
This option allows the ownership and permissions on the setuid
wrappers for specific programs to be overridden from the
default (setuid root, but not setgid root).
'';
};
security.permissionsWrapperDir = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.path;
default = "/var/permissions-wrappers";
internal = true;
description = ''
This option defines the path to the permissions wrappers. It
should not be overriden.
'';
};
};
###### implementation
config = {
# Make sure our setcap-wrapper dir exports to the PATH env
# variable when initializing the shell
environment.extraInit = ''
# The permissions wrappers override other bin directories.
export PATH="${config.security.permissionsWrapperDir}:$PATH"
'';
system.activationScripts.wrapper-dir = ''
mkdir -p "${config.security.permissionsWrapperDir}"
'';
###### setcap activation script
system.activationScripts.setcap =
mkActivationScript (lib.concatMapStrings configureSetcapWrapper (builtins.filter isNotNull cfg.setcap));
###### setuid activation script
system.activationScripts.setuid =
mkActivationScript (lib.concatMapStrings configureSetuidWrapper (builtins.filter isNotNull cfg.setuid));
};
}