{ config, lib, pkgs, ... }: let inherit (config.security) permissionsWrapperDir; isNotNull = v: if v != null then true else false; cfg = config.security.permissionsWrappers; setcapWrappers = import ./setcap-wrapper-drv.nix { inherit config lib pkgs; }; setuidWrappers = import ./setuid-wrapper-drv.nix { inherit config lib pkgs; }; ###### Activation script for the setcap wrappers configureSetcapWrapper = { program , capabilities , source ? null , owner ? "nobody" , group ? "nogroup" , setcap ? false }: '' cp ${setcapWrappers}/bin/${program}.wrapper ${permissionsWrapperDir}/${program} # Prevent races chmod 0000 ${permissionsWrapperDir}/${program} chown ${owner}.${group} ${permissionsWrapperDir}/${program} # Set desired capabilities on the file plus cap_setpcap so # the wrapper program can elevate the capabilities set on # its file into the Ambient set. # # Only set the capabilities though if we're being told to # do so. ${ if setcap then '' ${pkgs.libcap.out}/bin/setcap "cap_setpcap,${capabilities}" ${permissionsWrapperDir}/${program} '' else "" } # Set the executable bit chmod u+rx,g+x,o+x ${permissionsWrapperDir}/${program} ''; ###### Activation script for the setuid wrappers configureSetuidWrapper = { program , source ? null , owner ? "nobody" , group ? "nogroup" , setuid ? false , setgid ? false , permissions ? "u+rx,g+x,o+x" }: '' cp ${setuidWrappers}/bin/${program}.wrapper ${permissionsWrapperDir}/${program} # Prevent races chmod 0000 ${permissionsWrapperDir}/${program} chown ${owner}.${group} ${permissionsWrapperDir}/${program} chmod "u${if setuid then "+" else "-"}s,g${if setgid then "+" else "-"}s,${permissions}" ${permissionsWrapperDir}/${program} ''; mkActivationScript = programsToWrap: lib.stringAfter [ "users" ] '' # Look in the system path and in the default profile for # programs to be wrapped. PERMISSIONS_WRAPPER_PATH=${config.system.path}/bin:${config.system.path}/sbin mkdir -p /run/permissions-wrapper-dirs permissionsWrapperDir=$(mktemp --directory --tmpdir=/run/permissions-wrapper-dirs permissions-wrappers.XXXXXXXXXX) chmod a+rx $permissionsWrapperDir ${programsToWrap} if [ -L ${permissionsWrapperDir} ]; then # Atomically replace the symlink # See https://axialcorps.com/2013/07/03/atomically-replacing-files-and-directories/ old=$(readlink ${permissionsWrapperDir}) ln --symbolic --force --no-dereference $permissionsWrapperDir ${permissionsWrapperDir}-tmp mv --no-target-directory ${permissionsWrapperDir}-tmp ${permissionsWrapperDir} rm --force --recursive $old elif [ -d ${permissionsWrapperDir} ]; then # Compatibility with old state, just remove the folder and symlink rm -f ${permissionsWrapperDir}/* # if it happens to be a tmpfs ${pkgs.utillinux}/bin/umount ${permissionsWrapperDir} || true rm -d ${permissionsWrapperDir} ln -d --symbolic $permissionsWrapperDir ${permissionsWrapperDir} else # For initial setup ln --symbolic $permissionsWrapperDir ${permissionsWrapperDir} fi ''; in { ###### interface options = { security.permissionsWrappers.setcap = lib.mkOption { type = lib.types.listOf lib.types.attrs; default = []; example = [ { program = "ping"; source = "${pkgs.iputils.out}/bin/ping"; owner = "nobody"; group = "nogroup"; setcap = true; capabilities = "cap_net_raw+ep"; } ]; description = '' This option sets capabilities on a wrapper program that propagates those capabilities down to the wrapped, real program. The `program` attribute is the name of the program to be wrapped. If no `source` attribute is provided, specifying the absolute path to the program, then the program will be searched for in the path environment variable. NOTE: cap_setpcap, which is required for the wrapper program to be able to raise caps into the Ambient set is NOT raised to the Ambient set so that the real program cannot modify its own capabilities!! This may be too restrictive for cases in which the real program needs cap_setpcap but it at least leans on the side security paranoid vs. too relaxed. The attribute `setcap` defaults to false and it will create a wrapper program but never set the capability set on it. This is done so that you can remove a capability sent entirely from a wrapper program without also needing to go change any absolute paths that may be directly referencing the wrapper program. ''; }; security.permissionsWrappers.setuid = lib.mkOption { type = lib.types.listOf lib.types.attrs; default = []; example = [ { program = "sendmail"; source = "/nix/store/.../bin/sendmail"; owner = "nobody"; group = "postdrop"; setuid = false; setgid = true; permissions = "u+rx,g+x,o+x"; } ]; description = '' This option allows the ownership and permissions on the setuid wrappers for specific programs to be overridden from the default (setuid root, but not setgid root). ''; }; security.permissionsWrapperDir = lib.mkOption { type = lib.types.path; default = "/var/permissions-wrappers"; internal = true; description = '' This option defines the path to the permissions wrappers. It should not be overriden. ''; }; }; ###### implementation config = { # Make sure our setcap-wrapper dir exports to the PATH env # variable when initializing the shell environment.extraInit = '' # The permissions wrappers override other bin directories. export PATH="${config.security.permissionsWrapperDir}:$PATH" ''; system.activationScripts.wrapper-dir = '' mkdir -p "${config.security.permissionsWrapperDir}" ''; ###### setcap activation script system.activationScripts.setcap = mkActivationScript (lib.concatMapStrings configureSetcapWrapper (builtins.filter isNotNull cfg.setcap)); ###### setuid activation script system.activationScripts.setuid = mkActivationScript (lib.concatMapStrings configureSetuidWrapper (builtins.filter isNotNull cfg.setuid)); }; }