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2854 lines
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The following was downloaded from the SNAFU BBS (202) - 547 - 6238
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***** HELP ***** Call Greg Williams, (202) 543-0883, with any questions
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Greg is the "SYSOP" or system operator
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The main sections of SNAFU are as follows --
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Input / Output - No-nonsense access to Project files. Uploads and
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downloads in a few keystrokes. A list of recent releases is
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provided. For more complete lists of our files, and search
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functions, see library section.
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Latest News / Hot Tips - Tips on possible stories, including safety and
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quality allerts we receive directly from industry and
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government.
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Whistleblower Survival Guide - Access to the Project's 50 page advice
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handbook for those who see things going awry in the
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workplace. Includes sections on the law, the press, Congress
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and Federal agencies.
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Message Center - Public and private messages can be left and received.
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You can address questions or special requests to "SYSOP".
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Libraries - This is where SNAFU holds the most information. One can
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either "Browse" files by subject heading, or "Research" by
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keyword searches. Searches will list Project materials
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available on SNAFU, as well as citations of all
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defense-related GAO reports from 1987 on.
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Entering Commands:
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When deciding on what to type next, look carefully at the bottom of the
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screen. One of several types of prompts will appear:
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More [Y]es, N)o, C)ontinuous, A)bort?
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This means the computer has more information than can fit
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on one screen. Type one of the letters in parenthases, and
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press ENTER. ("No" is essentially the same as "abort")
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Choose a letter and press ENTER
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This refers to the menu given above. Type the letter
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corresponding to the item you want, and press ENTER
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Search for (in file name/desc, wildcards name only, [ENTER] quits)?
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This relates to the search function. Type one word. The
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computer will then search for this word in all the titles
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under the list(s) you have selected.
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As a rule of thumb, read the prompt carefully to see what kind of
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response is required. If there is any doubt, ENTER will often return
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you to the previous menu. If the computer informes you of an "INVALID
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RESPONSE", read the directions again to see if you have misunderstood
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something. If instructions seem unclear, please call me (Greg) or
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leave a message to the "SYSOP".
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<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>ͻ
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<20> "Courage Without Martyrdom:" <20>
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<20> "A Survival Handbook for Whistleblowers" <20>
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<20> (For a hard copy, download WBSG.WP5) <20>
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<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>
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<20> Blowing the Whistle...............................1 <20>
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<20> <20>
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<20> Getting Prepared..................................2 <20>
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<20> <20>
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<20> Levels of Whistleblowing..........................3 <20>
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<20> <20>
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<20> The Downside of Whistleblowing....................4 <20>
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<20> <20>
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<20> Neutralizing Dissenters...........................5 <20>
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<20> <20>
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<20> Neutralizing Dissent..............................6 <20>
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<20> Q - Previous Menu M - More Whistleblower Handbook <20>
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<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>ͼ
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<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>ͻ
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<20> <20>
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<20> Whistleblower Checklist..................7 <20>
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<20> <20>
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<20> Whistleblowing Outlets.......8,9,A,B,C,D,E <20>
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<20> <20>
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<20> Defending Yourself...................F,G,H <20>
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<20> <20>
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<20> Security Clearance.......................I <20>
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<20> <20>
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<20> The Promised Land........................J <20>
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<20> <20>
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<20> Choosing an Attorney.....................K <20>
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<20> <20>
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<20> Conclusion...............................L <20>
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<20> <20>
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<20> M - Top of Handbook Menu <20>
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<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>ͼ
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This handbook was prepared by the staff of the Project on Military
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Procurement and the Government Accountability Project. Special thanks
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to Julie Stewart for her work.
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Authors
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Julie Stewart Thomas Devine Dina Rasor
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BLOWING THE WHISTLE
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This handbook is designed to help you decide whether and how to
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blow the whistle on fraudulent or wasteful activities in the
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government or industry. You may want to remain anonymous when you
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blow the whistle or you may want to go public. We want to help you
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make that decision and find the most successful way to do it. We will
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tell you what your rights are under the law but also about the
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realities of trying to obtain those rights.
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This handbook will show you the many pitfalls of whistleblowing
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and what the system usually does to individuals who attempt to tell
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the truth. If you decide to blow the whistle, we want you to do it in
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a smart and informed way that will give you a chance for success.
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This is a decision that will affect your future, your family, and your
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career. A well-planned strategy has a chance of succeeding, but
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unplanned or self-indulgent dissent is the path to professional
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suicide.
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In theory, whistleblowers have the same set of rights of free
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speech and the right to petition Congress as any other American --
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these rights are guaranteed in the Constitution. However, our
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government institutions have whittled away effective remedies for
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these rights. One example is demoting federal whistleblowers to a
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minor league and bureaucratic law system rather than having the right
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of redress in our Federal court through a jury trial before their
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peers.
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This handbook has several sections on how to blow the whistle and
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attempt to protect yourself in the current inequitable system and also
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has a section that tells you what must be done to make the system
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truly work for the whistleblower. We want people to understand how
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the system must change to be effective but if you want to blow the
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whistle now, we will let you know the realities of the current system,
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so you can make a clear-eyed decision about doing it.
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GETTING PREPARED
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Blowing the whistle is a high stakes game with a winner and a
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loser. You may not believe your employer is your adversary, but the
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record shows that employers often do not want to be told what is wrong
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with their operations. They often greet the bad news by trying to
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silence the messenger to avoid any bad publicity. Whistleblowers
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often are harassed, socially ostracized, and fired from their jobs.
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Those who aren't fired often are not given meaningful work again.
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That is why a carefully planned and executed strategy is crucial to
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winning. To protect yourself from employer harassment after blowing
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the whistle, these basic survival strategies are recommended.
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* First, before taking any irreversible steps, you should talk to your
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family or close friends about the decision to blow the whistle. One
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of the most serious risks of whistleblowing is family breakup. The
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entire family will suffer the resulting hardships. If you choose to
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challenge the system without your family's knowledge or approval, you
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may lose them in the aftermath -- a sacrifice greater than the
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professional consequences.
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* Second, before breaking ranks, you should consider whether there is
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any reasonable way to work within the system by going to the first
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level of authority. It is crucial, however, that you do it in a way
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that does not sound the alarm to trigger a coverup or expose yourself
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unnecessarily. Surprise attacks are not taken as seriously compared
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to showing that authorities responded to notice by ignorance or
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attempted to coverup the problem. It is very hard to do this
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successfully, especially if you are exposing serious wrongdoing. In a
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low-key, non- accusatory manner, you could, in writing, make it clear
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what is wrong and what you position is on the matter. You should not
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be pushy or demanding if you try this but it might be useful to your
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credibility to see if anything can be done internally before risking
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your career. Unfortunately, if you reveal yourself as a threat, you
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may be setting yourself up or letting them have time to cover up the
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problem. But if there is no record of your prior objection, the
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system may respond by making you the scapegoat for the misconduct that
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you have attempted to expose. Then your effort would be diverted to
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proving that you were not responsible for the wrongdoing.
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In many situations it is unwise or impossible for the
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whistleblower to complain internally, especially if you are exposing
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serious fraud and waste. It is hard to decide how far to protest in
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the system if you plan to remain an anonymous whistleblower. The
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decision not to inform anyone internally must carefully be made on a
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case by case basis. If you make a record of protest in the system and
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then the problem is exposed publicly, you may draw suspicion to
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yourself. You must weigh the risks and decide what is the best way to
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go in your unique situation. This decision could be one of the
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hardest judgment calls for you to make and we suggest that you talk to
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the Project on Military Procurement or the Government Accountability
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Project if you are unsure what to do.
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* Third, you should be alert and discreetly attempt to learn of any
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other people who are upset about the wasteful or fraudulent activity.
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Through strategic, but casual, questioning and discussions with
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co-workers, you can learn whether your objections are credible among
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colleagues and whether you see enough of the whole picture to make
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sure that your suspicions are well founded. Your colleagues may be
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important witnesses in the future and may know more about the
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situation or confirm that the problem is more widespread than you know
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about. However, again you should be careful not to expose yourself in
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the process as a threat to the organization's policies or be labelled
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as a troublemaker.
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* Fourth, you should be on best behavior with the administrative and
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support staff. Managers who respond to dissent with harassment and
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repression may use that same approach routinely with secretaries,
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clerks and other assistants. These people can be a great help to you
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in the future by providing you with discrete warnings or later on,
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with testimony as to management motives.
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* Fifth, before and after you blow the whistle, it is very important
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to protect yourself by keeping a careful record of events as they
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unfold. Not keeping good records of harassment and other activities
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is one of the biggest mistakes that whistleblowers make. There are
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several good ways to do this and the time you take now could be very
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valuable in any investigation or court proceeding.
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Keep a diary -- Keep a factual log of your work activities
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and what is happening around your workplace. Try to keep this diary
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as straightforward as possible, leaving out any speculations, personal
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opinions, or any animosity you may have towards the situation you are
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in or towards your fellow workers. The diary does not have to be kept
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on a daily basis, but it is important to write down events that relate
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to the fraud and waste you are planning to report or any harassment
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you are receiving because of your objection to it. Make sure that
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each entry is dated and initialed by you.
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Memoranda for the Record -- When you have an important event
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or conversation about which you want to make a permanent record, you
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should make a memorandum for the record. Place the title, Memorandum
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for the Record, at the top and then write down everything you can
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remember from the conversation or event. Then you should sign the
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memorandum, date it, and if possible, have someone witness it. If you
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need to write a memorandum for the record about a conversation or
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event where it will be your word against someone else's, the safest
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way to proceed is to write the memorandum, make a copy, seal it well
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in an envelope, and mail it to yourself. Once it is sent through the
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mail it will be postmarked and you should store it in your records
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without opening it. Then when you need to prove your claim, the
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sealed envelope will show that you wrote the memorandum on the
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postmarked date.
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* Sixth, you should identify and copy all necessary supporting records
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before drawing any suspicion to your objections. Access to
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information could be cut off once the exposure of potential waste or
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fraud is identified as a threat to the organization. Even if you plan
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to remain anonymous, it is important to have a copy of all relevant
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documents because once the problem is exposed, documents may be
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destroyed or hidden. Either way, it is very hard to blow the whistle
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successfully without credible documentation to back up your claims.
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Documentation that is generated by the organization itself is the best
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documentation. Written explanations by you are not considered good
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documentation. Look around and you will find that many managers, when
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forced to do something that could later blow up in their faces, will
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keep a "Pearl Harbor file" to show that they were only following
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orders. Those files can be very valuable in trying to prove fraud and
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waste. If you cannot copy all the documents, make copies of the best
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supporting ones and then make a list of the rest so that you can tell
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an investigator or a court exactly where to go to get the rest of your
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supporting documents. Be warned, however, that some employers such as
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the Department of Justice and certain companies will accuse you of
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"stealing" their "property" when you make copies of the evidence
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incriminating them. So far this claim has been a repressive bluff,
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except when the information's secrecy is specifically protected by
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law. This reaction by the bureaucracies and the companies has had a
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chilling effect on obtaining documentation by dissenters but you need
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to have documentation to be credible to people outside the
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bureaucracy.
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* Seventh, you should research and identify elected officials who have
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proven their sincerity, journalists, and relevant non-profit
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organizations who can help expose the fraud. To have any realistic
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hope of survival, you have to go on the offensive. For whistleblowers
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as much as any other form of conflict, the best defense is a good
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offense. It is essential to develop a support constituency whose
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interests coincide with your career survival. Regardless of legal
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rights, whistleblowers usually win when they successfully communicate
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their message to the majority of citizens who should be benefiting
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from their dissent. When they don't, they lose. Truth is still the
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most powerful political weapon in our society -- unless it is a
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secret, in which case it can be dangerous.
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However, it is important not to contact the press or the Congress
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until you have definitely decided to blow the whistle, and decided
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whether you plan to be anonymous or public. Whistleblowing is not
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something you want to try to do alone without help outside the
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bureaucracy.
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When you have made the decision, it is critical to remember that
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you must be on the offensive and not just react to the bureaucracy's
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or company's efforts. Once you are reduced to responding passively
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and once you have stopped setting the agenda, you will probably lose.
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When the wrongdoing is exposed, the system should be reacting to the
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press, the Congress, the courts, and the public. Having your support
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constituency informed and working with you will help you remain on the
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offensive. Don't underestimate their advice and support.
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* Eighth, you should either invest in the funds to get a legal opinion
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from a competent lawyer or talk to a non-profit watchdog organization
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about the potential retaliation you could incur, the odds for a
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successful defense, how much it could cost to defend your rights, and
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whether there are truly legal restrictions on any of the evidence you
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|||
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may be considering for disclosure. The Project on Military
|
|||
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Procurement (PMP) and the Government Accountability Project (GAP) can
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|||
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give you advice, help you plan a legal strategy, help you decide about
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|||
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reporters and members of Congress as well as advising you about legal
|
|||
|
counsel.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
One way to help your credibility is to make sure that you do not
|
|||
|
embellish your charges. It is far better to understate rather than
|
|||
|
overstate your case because the bureaucracy can leap on every slight
|
|||
|
exaggeration and use it to discredit you. We usually advise
|
|||
|
whistleblowers to tell the Congress and the press 80 percent of your
|
|||
|
knowledge of the fraud and waste and give them ways to discover the
|
|||
|
last 20 percent themselves. The less you skate on thin ice with your
|
|||
|
information, the more credible you will be to people who can help you.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Although this list may seem overwhelming, you will appreciate its
|
|||
|
value after learning the techniques used in organizational reprisals
|
|||
|
against whistleblowers. Taking on the system can be the best or worst
|
|||
|
decision of your life. If you intend to win, you might as well
|
|||
|
prepare and be smart about blowing the whistle.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
LEVELS OF WHISTLEBLOWING
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
You need to consider at what level you want to blow the whistle.
|
|||
|
You can go public with your knowledge or remain an anonymous source.
|
|||
|
This decision depends on the amount and type of documents you have and
|
|||
|
your willingness to take intense public scrutiny. Some potential
|
|||
|
whistleblowers imagine that there is some glamour in becoming the
|
|||
|
public crusader for truth, but most will tell you that the mental
|
|||
|
anguish tarnishes any ego boost that you may anticipate. If your main
|
|||
|
motivation is revenge, fame and recognition, you are doing it for the
|
|||
|
wrong reasons and the system will be very effective at smashing your
|
|||
|
ambitions. Do not forget that today's news is tomorrow's fishwrap.
|
|||
|
Long after the public has forgotten that you were a hero, your
|
|||
|
superiors and the system will remember what you did to them.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Also, you should not be deluded that if you just get up and tell
|
|||
|
the truth that everything will be fine. We have been brought up with
|
|||
|
the idea that no matter how bad the circumstances, if we just tell the
|
|||
|
truth, we will not get spanked. There is often no justice for a
|
|||
|
public whistleblower, just the internal satisfaction that you did the
|
|||
|
right thing, and that you lived your values instead of stopping at lip
|
|||
|
service. If you approach your whistleblowing with the idea that this
|
|||
|
is all you will receive, everything else will be a bonus.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Once you become a public whistleblower, you must accept the
|
|||
|
responsibility of following through on your charges. Besides the
|
|||
|
social responsibility, it is almost impossible to stop mid-stream and
|
|||
|
have any hopes of surviving the ordeal mentally or professionally.
|
|||
|
Remember the quote from Admiral Hyman Rickover, "If you must sin, sin
|
|||
|
against God, not against the bureaucracy. God will forgive you but
|
|||
|
the bureaucracy never will."
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The positive side of being an anonymous whistleblower is that you
|
|||
|
may protect your career. However, you often are limited in what you
|
|||
|
can expose because you have to make sure that the documentation that
|
|||
|
you leak is self-explanatory and can stand on its own merit since you
|
|||
|
cannot go public with an explanation. You may, as an anonymous
|
|||
|
whistleblower, be able to tell another source, a reporter or your
|
|||
|
representatives at a non-profit organization the explanation behind
|
|||
|
the documentation. You also have to be careful that it cannot be
|
|||
|
traced to you. Sometimes the substance of the charges can have your
|
|||
|
"signature" because, due to your job, you are the only person who
|
|||
|
could be aware of a problem or have unique access to the important
|
|||
|
records. The Project on Military Procurement and the Government
|
|||
|
Accountability Project have devised some successful ways to avoid
|
|||
|
having a document traced back to a whistleblower, but it is virtually
|
|||
|
impossible to guarantee that the documents cannot be traced back to
|
|||
|
you.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Another good thing about being an anonymous whistleblower is that,
|
|||
|
since you are not known, you are in a position to watch from inside
|
|||
|
how the bureaucracy tries to coverup the fraud and waste once the
|
|||
|
problem is public. We have had whistleblowers on the inside who have
|
|||
|
leaked information and then were actually on the "damage control" team
|
|||
|
that was intent in covering up the fraud. Public whistleblowers
|
|||
|
usually are isolated from the bureaucracy once they are exposed.
|
|||
|
After the flow of information dries up, it is hard to rebut whatever
|
|||
|
the system claims it is doing to solve the problem or if they deny
|
|||
|
that there is a problem.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
To be a successful anonymous whistleblower, you must have a good
|
|||
|
way to leak the documentation. If you decide to blow the whistle,
|
|||
|
this handbook lists potential outlets and the best way to approach
|
|||
|
them.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The worst thing you can do as a whistleblower is to remain
|
|||
|
semi-anonymous. If you are suspected of the leak but are not publicly
|
|||
|
known, you have the worst of both worlds because the system will begin
|
|||
|
to retaliate without you having the benefit of outside resources to
|
|||
|
blunt that attack. It takes a certain personality to leak information
|
|||
|
anonymously while remaining cool enough not to draw suspicion. If you
|
|||
|
don't have a good poker face and you think that there is no way to
|
|||
|
leak the documents without it being traced to you, you are better off
|
|||
|
going totally public or not blowing the whistle at all.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The decision over whether or not to be a public whistleblower is a
|
|||
|
judgement call on your part. You can get advice but you know the
|
|||
|
circumstances better than anyone else.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
THE DOWNSIDE OF WHISTLEBLOWING
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Another consideration before you blow the whistle is to understand
|
|||
|
and expect the downside of your actions. Besides the obvious problems
|
|||
|
of whistleblowing such as losing your job and unresponsive agencies
|
|||
|
that often don't protect you, there is also an emotional and mental
|
|||
|
price to pay for whistleblowing. People who have been lifetime
|
|||
|
friends may turn against you and the people who work with you may
|
|||
|
treat you as an outcast. Often, in communities that depend on the
|
|||
|
industry or government money for its livelihood, people will ostracize
|
|||
|
you and perhaps your family.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This kind of constant, negative pressure can color your judgement
|
|||
|
and make you paranoid about every event. This works in the
|
|||
|
bureaucracy's favor if it wants to paint you as an unreasonable,
|
|||
|
possibly deranged, person whose charges should not be taken seriously.
|
|||
|
To succeed you must be able to rise above this trap and most
|
|||
|
importantly, keep a sense of humor about life and your situation.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
It also helps to have another job or a hobby that takes a good
|
|||
|
portion of your time so that your whistleblowing activity does not
|
|||
|
totally dominate your life. Doing this will help you keep your
|
|||
|
perspective that there is more to life than whistleblowing.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
It is true that whistleblowers often face some type of
|
|||
|
surveillance from either the government, the industry, or some other
|
|||
|
private investigator. This experience can be very troubling and can
|
|||
|
add to the misery of blowing the whistle. While it is important to
|
|||
|
document any suspected surveillance through a diary or a memorandum
|
|||
|
for the record, it is also important not to let suspicious activity
|
|||
|
get to you. We often advise that if someone is watching you, he or
|
|||
|
she wants you to become affected by the surveillance and to act
|
|||
|
irrationally about it. It is to the benefit of your detractors for
|
|||
|
you to sound crazy to the general public by saying that your phone is
|
|||
|
tapped without having proof. Remember, if you have nothing to hide,
|
|||
|
there is nothing to fear about being watched. It is very hard to
|
|||
|
prove that you are being watched or that your phone is being tapped,
|
|||
|
so the best way to deal with this problem is to be careful about
|
|||
|
information you give over the phone and don't become paranoid about
|
|||
|
it.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Another important personal consideration in your attempt to blow
|
|||
|
the whistle is to make sure that you do not have any hidden skeletons
|
|||
|
in your closet that you do not want to be made public. It is fairly
|
|||
|
typical that the people who are the object of your whistleblowing will
|
|||
|
work very hard to find some flaw in your past or in your character and
|
|||
|
attempt to exploit it. So, a major consideration in blowing the
|
|||
|
whistle must be your ability to withstand intense personal scrutiny.
|
|||
|
If you haven't paid your taxes or are having an extramarital
|
|||
|
relationship, you must be prepared for this to become public. In the
|
|||
|
words of the famous reporter Clark Mollenhoff, you must be prepared to
|
|||
|
live with the whole record.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
If you decide to blow the whistle, you will be taking on a very
|
|||
|
large bureaucracy or company that has a large pool of resources to
|
|||
|
attempt to discredit you. The odds can be against you but if you have
|
|||
|
good solid documentation and a network of people helping you, you may
|
|||
|
be able to expose the fraud and waste and still survive
|
|||
|
professionally, financially and emotionally. Don't underestimate the
|
|||
|
forces against you when large sums of money and political influence
|
|||
|
are involved. The decision to blow the whistle is ultimately yours,
|
|||
|
even after you have prepared your case and received good advice.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The following is a list of how the bureaucracy can try to
|
|||
|
neutralize public whistleblowers. (See next section,
|
|||
|
"Neutralizing Dissenters").
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Neutralizing Dissenters
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
-- Make the whistleblowers, instead of their message, the issue
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The first commandment for this tactic is to obfuscate the dissent
|
|||
|
by attacking the source's motives, professional competence, economic
|
|||
|
credibility, sexuality, or virtually anything else that will work to
|
|||
|
cloud the issue.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
For example, when Three Mile Island engineer Richard Parks
|
|||
|
challenged sloppy cleanup practices that could have rivaled the
|
|||
|
accident, his employer's first reaction was to brush aside the safety
|
|||
|
issues and place Parks under investigation for alleged financial
|
|||
|
conflict of interest. Parks was not vindicated until he went public
|
|||
|
and sought help from the Department of Labor, Congress, and the
|
|||
|
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). All three supported him, and the
|
|||
|
NRC ordered cleanup procedures to be rewritten and extensive tests to
|
|||
|
be conducted. Over a year later the challenged cleanup was conducted
|
|||
|
lawfully.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
- Isolate the whistleblower
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
One technique is to transfer the whistleblower to a bureaucratic
|
|||
|
Siberia, both to make an example of the whistleblower and to block the
|
|||
|
employee's access to information. After Food and Drug Administration
|
|||
|
quality control chief Dr. Joseph Settepani protested introduction of
|
|||
|
well-known carcinogens and mutagens into the food supply, he was
|
|||
|
reassigned to long-term research in a trailer on an experimental farm.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) engineer James Pope served
|
|||
|
as the agency's ombudsman for the general aviation constituency, until
|
|||
|
he pursued the wrong issue -- FAA suppression of an industry-developed
|
|||
|
backup device to warn pilots of impending midair collisions. The FAA
|
|||
|
reasoned that certifying the private device, which had passed all
|
|||
|
agency tests for feasibility and reliability, would obviate the
|
|||
|
agency's own budgeted long- term research and development program for
|
|||
|
a backup to the Air Traffic Control system. After Pope dissented, his
|
|||
|
superiors reassigned him to Seattle, Washington, where his duties
|
|||
|
vanished, except for tasks such as selling bonds to local Boy Scout
|
|||
|
troops.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
-- Put them on a pedestal of cards
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Another technique involves appointing the whistleblower to solve
|
|||
|
the problem and then making the job impossible through a wide range of
|
|||
|
obstacles undercutting any realistic possibility of achieving reform.
|
|||
|
The finale is then to fire the employee for incompetence when the
|
|||
|
problem is not solved.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Engineer Bertrand Berube was a victim of this tactic at the
|
|||
|
General Services Administration, where Administrator Gerald Carmen
|
|||
|
assigned Berube to correct serious building code violations --
|
|||
|
numerous fire and occupational safety hazards Berube had identified at
|
|||
|
several federal facilities. Unfortunately, Berube was denied the
|
|||
|
staff authority and even access to information necessary for his
|
|||
|
mission. Later, he was fired for his failure.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
-- Display chutzpa in selecting charges
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
One principle is that it is important to go well beyond merely
|
|||
|
defeating a whistleblower. In order to prove to others that no one is
|
|||
|
safe, the goal is to make the most outrageous charges possible. For
|
|||
|
example, a whistleblower who is renowned for being a gentleman may
|
|||
|
face sexual harassment charges. A soft-spoken, self-effacing
|
|||
|
individual will be branded a loud-mouth egomaniac.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
-- Prosecute them
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The longstanding threat to attack whistleblowers for "stealing"
|
|||
|
the evidence used to expose corruption is getting more serious,
|
|||
|
particularly for federal employees or government- contract workers.
|
|||
|
The foundation is similar to the premise of the British Official
|
|||
|
Secrets Act: the government owns all the information it generates or
|
|||
|
possesses. Employees with security clearances have to sign a
|
|||
|
nondisclosure form accepting the government's property right as a
|
|||
|
condition of keeping their clearances. (See BLOWING THE WHISTLE WHEN
|
|||
|
YOU HAVE A SECURITY CLEARANCE.) In August 1989 the Justice Department
|
|||
|
announced abandonment of a decade long policy not to prosecute
|
|||
|
whistleblowers for unauthorized disclosures. Now the Attorney General
|
|||
|
will try to send whistleblowers to jail for leaking information about
|
|||
|
criminal investigations, or even for running afoul of civil statutes,
|
|||
|
such as by allegedly violating the Privacy Act rights of culprits who
|
|||
|
may be identified in the unauthorized whistleblowing disclosure.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
-- Eliminate the job
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
A common tactic is to lay off whistleblowers even as the company
|
|||
|
or agency is hiring new staff. Again for purposes of teaching others
|
|||
|
a lesson, the more obvious the inconsistency the better. A closely
|
|||
|
allied tactic is to reorganize away the structural independence of
|
|||
|
particular responsibilities, such as when a nuclear engineering firm
|
|||
|
deemphasizes the quality control department by making it a component
|
|||
|
of the production staff.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
-- Destabilize whistleblower's support base
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Destabilizing a whistleblower's support base refers to withdrawal
|
|||
|
of research privileges, data access, or most often subordinate staff.
|
|||
|
When Anthony Morris challenged the swine flu vaccine and other
|
|||
|
dangerous drugs, his Federal Drug Administration superiors transferred
|
|||
|
his animal handler, a person whom Mr. Morris had relied on for many
|
|||
|
years as a functional partner in the laboratory. The most advanced
|
|||
|
form of this tactic then calls for overwhelming the whistleblower with
|
|||
|
new work during the disruption, to be followed by dismissal for
|
|||
|
incompetence when he or she fails to keep up.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Neutralizing Dissent
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The point of the preceding tactics is to overwhelm the whistleblower
|
|||
|
in a struggle for self-preservation -- of career, family, bank
|
|||
|
account, even sanity -- until the point of dissent is forgotten or put
|
|||
|
behind weightier survival priorities. There are specialty methods for
|
|||
|
neutralizing dissent, some which are listed below.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
-- Separate expertise from authority
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The goal here is to have organization men make even technical
|
|||
|
decisions, with limited advisory input for the experts. As a result,
|
|||
|
all of Morton Thiokol's practicing engineers could argue against the
|
|||
|
Challenger launch and be overruled by those with management functions.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
-- Keep them ignorant
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This is an extreme use of the national security "need to know"
|
|||
|
rule that is legitimate far less often than it is employed. For
|
|||
|
example, after whistleblower Charles Stokes and other dissenting
|
|||
|
engineers who challenged manipulation of results in the seismic design
|
|||
|
review of the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant were transferred away,
|
|||
|
the company brought in replacements who were unfamiliar with the job
|
|||
|
history and who knew better than to ask questions about unrealistic
|
|||
|
assumptions for calculations.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
-- Substitute democracy for the scientific method
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
When convenient, normally undemocratic organizations will
|
|||
|
substitute the bureaucratic equivalent of mob rule, where a group of
|
|||
|
engineers who will not challenge the status quo out vote the
|
|||
|
whistleblower without applying the objective tests of the scientific
|
|||
|
methods. A more subtle variation of this tactic is to misuse peer
|
|||
|
review as a discrediting tactic by packing the panel with a particular
|
|||
|
bias, or as a stalling tactic by instituting duplicative or
|
|||
|
unnecessary reviews.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
An example that combined both tactics involved the dissent of NRC
|
|||
|
engineer Isa Yin, who had investigated and confirmed whistleblower
|
|||
|
Stoke's charges at Diablo Canyon. When Yin's investigation threatened
|
|||
|
to block approval of the plant's license, the NRC appointed a team of
|
|||
|
fifty engineers to take over completion of the work and to engage in
|
|||
|
peer review of his findings. At the ultimate licensing vote they all
|
|||
|
disagreed with Yin, who was reduced to arguing the facts in isolation
|
|||
|
and protesting that he had been prevented from access to the necessary
|
|||
|
data. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
|
|||
|
stayed the license for five months during 1984, in part due to doubts
|
|||
|
on the handling of Yin's dissent.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
-- Prevent a written record
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
When a policy is indefensible, the goal is to restrict debate to
|
|||
|
an oral dialogue. This can be enforced through peer pressure,
|
|||
|
overscheduling so there is not time for a record, or even a gag order
|
|||
|
if necessary. The point is that it is difficult to accuse someone of
|
|||
|
revising an oral history, and accountability will be diffused in case
|
|||
|
of a catastrophe.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
For example, in 1985 the NRC's internal affairs unit, the Office
|
|||
|
of Inspector and Auditor (OIA), reexamined the peer review process
|
|||
|
that had overruled engineer Isa Yin and Diablo Canyon whistleblowers
|
|||
|
about design issues on which the plant's license was legally
|
|||
|
conditioned. In its report OIA concluded that due to a lack of
|
|||
|
available supporting information, it was "unable to assess the
|
|||
|
validity of [peer review] conclusions" on key issues. More generally,
|
|||
|
OIA reported that it "did not find sufficient documentation to
|
|||
|
demonstrate that [the NRC staff] had verified the quality of the
|
|||
|
design control program, either in a direct inspection or in licensing
|
|||
|
review."
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
None of these techniques are new. Defensiveness and the instinct
|
|||
|
to strike back when criticized are as old as the history of organized
|
|||
|
society. But in 1973 President Nixon raised, or lowered, reprisal
|
|||
|
techniques to a new level of sophistication. Fred Malek, his Director
|
|||
|
of the White House Personnel Office (and, coincidentally, Chairman of
|
|||
|
the 1988 Republican National Convention) issued the Malek Manual, a
|
|||
|
secret report on how to purge the career civil service system of
|
|||
|
"unresponsive" employees -- whistleblowers or Democrats -- without
|
|||
|
running afoul of the law. The reprisal tactics above are largely
|
|||
|
drawn from the Malek Manual and illustrated with more recent examples.
|
|||
|
Ironically, whistleblowers exposed the Malek Manual and it was
|
|||
|
published in the Watergate Committee's report.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Now that you have some idea of what can happen to you, a decision
|
|||
|
has to be made on whether you still want to blow the whistle. The
|
|||
|
following checklist can help you see if you are ready to blow the
|
|||
|
whistle either anonymously or publicly:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
WHISTLEBLOWER CHECKLIST
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Things to consider if you plan to remain anonymous when you blow the
|
|||
|
whistle:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
1. Am I in the position to know that what I see as fraud really is
|
|||
|
improper in the bigger picture?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
2. Can I prove my allegations with self-explanatory documents that
|
|||
|
don't need my public explanation?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
3. Can these documents be traced to me because a small group of
|
|||
|
people received them or my copies are uniquely marked?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
4. Can I act nonchalant when these documents are disclosed so as not
|
|||
|
to attract suspicion?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
5. If discovered, do I or my spouse have the ability to support my
|
|||
|
family outside my current profession?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
6. Is my family prepared for the possibility of a negative high
|
|||
|
public profile?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Things to consider when you are going to be a public whistleblower:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
1. Are my family and I financially and mentally ready for a
|
|||
|
protracted fight with my employers to prove the waste and/or fraud and
|
|||
|
to try to retain my job?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
2. Am I mentally ready to have my fellow workers and perhaps my
|
|||
|
friends turn against me because of my disclosures?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
3. Am I ready for personal attacks against my character and to have
|
|||
|
my past indiscretions made public?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
4. Do I have adequate documentation to prove my charges without
|
|||
|
having to go back to my workplace?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
5. Am I sure that my motivations are to expose the fraud for the sake
|
|||
|
of the country and not just sour grapes, revenge, or public attention?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
6. Am I financially and mentally ready to change my career to work
|
|||
|
outside my current field?
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
WHISTLEBLOWING OUTLETS
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Not all whistleblowing outlets are equal. Some provide greater
|
|||
|
confidentiality than others, some are genuinely concerned about
|
|||
|
exposing waste and fraud, some want to discourage dissent. However,
|
|||
|
there are alternatives to the company or agency hotlines and you
|
|||
|
should be aware of the advantages and disadvantages of each route
|
|||
|
before you choose. We will explain how each is supposed to work and
|
|||
|
then tell you, by past examples what really does happen.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
We believe from our experience of working with whistleblowers that
|
|||
|
non-profit groups, the press and false claims suits are the most
|
|||
|
effective outlets under the current circumstances and climate. Your
|
|||
|
whistleblowing situation is unique, so it is important to study each
|
|||
|
option to find the best one for your circumstances.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
We will start with Executive Branch outlets that have not had a
|
|||
|
good track record and end with the outlets that we believe have proven
|
|||
|
to be the most successful. Study each section carefully.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Federal Hotlines
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In 1979, the Secretary of Defense established the Department of
|
|||
|
Defense hotline as an avenue for the now Inspector General's office to
|
|||
|
learn of potential wrongdoing or mismanagement. Today there are 17
|
|||
|
other departments and agencies that have hotlines, and the Army, Navy
|
|||
|
and Air Force each sponsor one. In an effort to institutionalize the
|
|||
|
process of reporting misconduct, the President's Council on Integrity
|
|||
|
and Efficiency (PCIE) recommended standards for receiving, controlling
|
|||
|
and screening allegations. They direct that:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
-- a simple, well-publicized way be developed for agency employees and
|
|||
|
other interested persons to submit allegations of fraud, waste, abuse
|
|||
|
and mismanagement while preserving anonymity when possible and if
|
|||
|
desired;
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
-- a retrievable record be maintained of each allegation received;
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
-- each allegation be screened as soon as possible after receipt based
|
|||
|
upon the nature, content, and credibility of the complaint, and in
|
|||
|
light of priorities and resources, an appropriate decision on whether
|
|||
|
or not to refer the complaint for further inquiry be made for each
|
|||
|
allegation;
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
--the rationale for the decision on each allegation be documented in
|
|||
|
the record.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
With these standards as guidelines, hotlines are supposed to
|
|||
|
operate similarly: You call the toll-free hotline and report an
|
|||
|
allegation of fraud, waste, or mismanagement. That allegation is
|
|||
|
reviewed to determine if followup is necessary. If the allegation
|
|||
|
merits further review, it is sent to an investigator who goes into the
|
|||
|
field to research the report. If the investigation verifies the
|
|||
|
allegation, corrective action is taken and the case is closed. In
|
|||
|
theory it sounds very straightforward and simple. In practice, it is
|
|||
|
anything but clear-cut. There are far too many gray areas in federal
|
|||
|
hotline investigations largely because the government agency is
|
|||
|
investigating itself.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Problems with Hotlines
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Standardization of hotline procedures has not been achieved. In a
|
|||
|
report by the PCIE (September 1987) the DOD hotline received top
|
|||
|
billing as the best run hotline but the PCIE admitted many of the
|
|||
|
other hotlines do not meet operational standards. In an effort to
|
|||
|
improve the uniform handling of hotline calls, the PCIE has set up
|
|||
|
training courses available to federal, military and private industry
|
|||
|
hotline operators.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Two areas of concern addressed in the PCIE training courses are
|
|||
|
confidentiality of the source and case followup. Confidentiality is a
|
|||
|
problem inherent in the hotline system. How does a whistleblower
|
|||
|
provide sufficient information to support the allegation without
|
|||
|
giving away details that identify himself? Because the balance is
|
|||
|
hard to strike, much of the information received is either watered
|
|||
|
down to the point that no investigation follows, or is traced back to
|
|||
|
the only person who could have that knowledge.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
At some hotlines, confidentiality is treated with outright
|
|||
|
disdain. A spokesman for the DOD IG hotline (who asked not to be
|
|||
|
identified) believes many military hotline operators are more
|
|||
|
concerned about discovering who the caller is than whether the
|
|||
|
allegation is true. In an atmosphere where discipline, conformity,
|
|||
|
and unquestioning obedience to orders are prized above all else, it
|
|||
|
should come as no surprise that a whistleblower could be regarded as a
|
|||
|
traitor.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Take the case of John Kartak. After 19 years in the Army, he was
|
|||
|
assigned to the recruiting station in Minneapolis. There he found
|
|||
|
that unqualified applicants were recruited in order to meet quotas.
|
|||
|
High school diplomas were forged and criminal records were concealed
|
|||
|
so marginal recruits could be signed up. When Kartak refused to
|
|||
|
endorse the misconduct, he called the Army hotline and blew the
|
|||
|
whistle.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Kartak's "reward" for his integrity was repeated harassment
|
|||
|
including two psychological evaluations ordered by his superiors and
|
|||
|
involuntary commitment. One of his superiors told the VA hospital,
|
|||
|
"He has lodged numerous complaints recently. . .I find his behavior
|
|||
|
highly unstable. I am concerned that he may do something to harm
|
|||
|
himself or others." Kartak was also ostracized, threatened, and
|
|||
|
intimidated by his co-workers.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Kartak was vindicated when the Inspector General confirmed his
|
|||
|
charges and found at least 58 people in the Minnesota recruiting
|
|||
|
office guilty of engaging in illegal acts. In addition to forging
|
|||
|
documents, one recruiter demanded sex from a female recruit, several
|
|||
|
were dealing and using drugs and running a prostitution ring, and two
|
|||
|
were charged with receiving stolen goods purchased from criminals they
|
|||
|
recruited. But the price of Kartak's vindication was high and the
|
|||
|
abuse of the hotline system's confidentiality was evident.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Case followup is another area the PCIE emphasizes in its training
|
|||
|
courses. It would like all agencies to adopt the procedure used by
|
|||
|
the DOD and General Accounting Office (GAO) hotlines. Those hotlines
|
|||
|
assign each caller a case number so they can call back later to find
|
|||
|
out what action was taken on their allegation. This system maintains
|
|||
|
the anonymity of the whistleblower while permitting him to followup on
|
|||
|
his case. The details of the case are not disclosed to the caller,
|
|||
|
but he is told if the case was closed and whether it was
|
|||
|
substantiated.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
For a full report of a closed case the whistleblower must file a
|
|||
|
request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) which can
|
|||
|
jeopardize his or her anonymity. The problem is, in order to file a
|
|||
|
FOIA request, the whistleblower must identify himself. The request,
|
|||
|
with his name on it, will be sent to the IG investigating the report
|
|||
|
and can make its way back to the very persons committing the offense.
|
|||
|
This kind of Catch-22 can lead to serious reprisal.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Nancy Kusen discovered how the FOIA Catch-22 works. Ms. Kusen is
|
|||
|
a contract administrator for the Defense Contract Administration
|
|||
|
Service (DCAS). In 1985 she began complaining about overcharging and
|
|||
|
alleged shoddy work on Navy contracts by the Elliot Company. She
|
|||
|
complained first to her superiors and when nothing seemed to happen,
|
|||
|
she called the DOD hotline. The call led to an investigation by the
|
|||
|
Defense Criminal Investigating Service which substantiated many of the
|
|||
|
complaints but found no criminality. At the same time, Ms. Kusen
|
|||
|
became the target of reprisals ranging from lowered performance
|
|||
|
evaluations, denials of promotion, and repeated harassment.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In October 1986, Ms. Kusen filed a FOIA request to find out the
|
|||
|
status of her case. Records show her request was referred to the
|
|||
|
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) which, in turn, asked United
|
|||
|
Technologies Corporation (Elliot's parent company) if it objected to
|
|||
|
the release of the audits. The DCAA included a copy of Ms. Kusen's
|
|||
|
FOIA request containing her name, address and home phone number.
|
|||
|
According to the DCAA it is "routine practice" to include the FOIA
|
|||
|
request.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The FOIA request that disclosed Ms. Kusen's name to Elliot's
|
|||
|
parent company provided positive identification that she was the
|
|||
|
whistleblower, enabling them to single her out for harassment. In Ms.
|
|||
|
Kusen's case, however, the harassment already had started shortly
|
|||
|
after her initial call to the DOD hotline, convincing her that the
|
|||
|
hotline disclosed her identity to DCAS. But Ms. Kusen's experience
|
|||
|
with the FOIA request serves as a warning to other whistleblowers who
|
|||
|
may consider filing one to find out the status of their case. Ms.
|
|||
|
Kusen's case also contributed to the caveat now offered by the
|
|||
|
Inspector General's office to FOIA requestors: " Your confidential
|
|||
|
status as a hotline caller does not apply to requests under the
|
|||
|
Freedom of Information Act." Yet, if you don't file a FOIA, you can't
|
|||
|
tell if the government investigated your charges in a thorough manner.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Other problems with hotlines were noted in a General Accounting
|
|||
|
Office report on the DOD Hotline (March 1986). Although the DOD has
|
|||
|
taken steps to correct the problems, it is likely that if they exist
|
|||
|
at the best-run hotline, they exist within all hotlines. According to
|
|||
|
the GAO, there are four recurring problems with the hotline system:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* investigator objectivity
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* insufficient documentation on case files
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* incomplete investigative reports that do not comply with DOD
|
|||
|
reporting requirements
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* limited action on planned remedial follow-up
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Another problem that the GAO does not mention is DOD's current
|
|||
|
policy is that companies should govern themselves, or
|
|||
|
"self-governance" as urged by the Packard Commission and is
|
|||
|
downplaying the role of government investigators. Therefore, the
|
|||
|
hotline operators realize that challenges to the present system from
|
|||
|
within do not receive a great deal of support by DOD policymakers.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In an effort to correct the 1986 GAO report problems at the DOD
|
|||
|
hotline, the DOD has started a Quality Assurance Review. The review
|
|||
|
checks the files of DOD field investigations to ensure that the
|
|||
|
summary report matches the investigative report. DOD also claims that
|
|||
|
it is more carefully reviewing cases it refers to the services. This
|
|||
|
is important because whether it is done advertently or inadvertently,
|
|||
|
the hotline can buck the information back to the services who then can
|
|||
|
send it right back to the program manager who may be involved in the
|
|||
|
fraudulent or wasteful activity.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The record of action taken on DOD hotline allegations indicates
|
|||
|
the system is still not operating in the best interest of most
|
|||
|
whistleblowers. In the 1987 calendar year, the DOD hotline received
|
|||
|
9,425 total contacts. It opened 1,186 cases from those contacts,
|
|||
|
substantiated 226 cases and partially substantiated another 329 cases.
|
|||
|
Not all those cases were opened in 1987. Some had dragged on from the
|
|||
|
previous years so it is impossible to know how many of the original
|
|||
|
1,186 cases opened in 1987 were substantiated the same year. As any
|
|||
|
good investigator knows, if the government does not move within a year
|
|||
|
to substantiate charges, the bureaucracies often can cover up any
|
|||
|
fraud or waste as time goes on.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
A similar GAO Fraud Hotline Summary published in April 1988
|
|||
|
reported that during its nine years of existence, the GAO hotline
|
|||
|
received 94,000 calls, found only 13,992 cases worthy of
|
|||
|
investigation, and closed 11,246 of those cases. Of the cases closed,
|
|||
|
1,589 were substantiated. Another 580 cases were not substantiated
|
|||
|
but action was taken to prevent improper activity from reoccurring.
|
|||
|
This means of the 94,000 hotline calls and letters reported to the
|
|||
|
GAO, 2.3 percent were substantiated or acted upon.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
These figures are somewhat misleading when one considers that not
|
|||
|
every call received at the hotline is a report of fraud, waste, or
|
|||
|
mismanagement. Hotlines receive callers who have personnel problems
|
|||
|
that should be handled in-house, crank calls, people with questions
|
|||
|
and even the occasionally lonely person who just wants to talk. But
|
|||
|
it is doubtful that a significant number of the 94,000 GAO calls fell
|
|||
|
into these categories.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Whether blame for the dismal record of substantiated hotline calls
|
|||
|
can be placed on investigator objectivity, incomplete investigations,
|
|||
|
or watered down reports from the whistleblowers, the figures speak for
|
|||
|
themselves. The odds of reporting fraud, waste, and mismanagement and
|
|||
|
actually having it investigated and corrected are small. The figures
|
|||
|
above do not instill confidence in a prospective whistleblower that
|
|||
|
the hotline system will work for them.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Incentive Suggestion Programs
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
After several embarrassing disclosures of spare parts costs a few
|
|||
|
years ago, the services and the DOD claimed to be serious about
|
|||
|
establishing suggestion programs to save money. They began to reward
|
|||
|
individuals for suggesting ways to reduce spare parts overpricing.
|
|||
|
According to the Navy, calls to its pricing hotline during 1987
|
|||
|
resulted in refunds from 21 defense contractors that totalled
|
|||
|
$1,805,271. But to put that figure in perspective, one needs to
|
|||
|
realize that the total dollars spent on Navy spare parts during 1987
|
|||
|
was $2,093,000,000.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
A general outline of the Service Suggestion Programs follows:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Submit your suggestion in writing to the Price Monitor/Installation
|
|||
|
Resource Management Office at your base.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* After preliminary review, the suggestion is sent out for
|
|||
|
investigation.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* If the suggestion is adopted, you receive a percentage of the
|
|||
|
savings ranging from $50-25,000. Any award of $25,000 must be
|
|||
|
approved by the President.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The nature of the programs eliminates anonymity which means the
|
|||
|
caller may be subjected to harassment from superiors who are
|
|||
|
comfortable with the status quo. This is especially true because
|
|||
|
often the official policy and the rules and regulations that are
|
|||
|
guiding the procurement of these items are set up to maximize the
|
|||
|
amount of money that is spent. This is done for political reasons to
|
|||
|
make sure that the budget is spent every year and to justify more
|
|||
|
money the following year for the bureaucracy.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Airman Thom Jonsson found out the Air Force preferred the status
|
|||
|
quo to his suggestions for saving money. Jonsson was working for the
|
|||
|
maintenance and supply section of the C-5A cargo planes at Travis Air
|
|||
|
Force Base in California. In the course of his duties he discovered
|
|||
|
that many spare parts were purchased for incredible prices, including
|
|||
|
the now infamous $7622 coffee brewer. Another example was an armrest
|
|||
|
pad which cost $670, but Jonnson determined that it could be made on
|
|||
|
base for $25 with no rearrangement of machinery or personnel. The
|
|||
|
Local Manufacture Supervisor at Travis Air Force Base concurred with
|
|||
|
Jonsson's estimate.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In January 1984, Jonsson submitted his money-saving proposal to
|
|||
|
his base's Zero Overpricing Program representative. In April, Jonsson
|
|||
|
received notice that his proposal was "not in the best interest of the
|
|||
|
Air Force." He resubmitted his suggestion and waited for a response.
|
|||
|
By August 1985 he had heard nothing and decided to contact the Project
|
|||
|
on Military Procurement, a non- profit watchdog agency. After the
|
|||
|
Project evaluated his situation and discussed with him what he wanted,
|
|||
|
his information was taken to Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) who was
|
|||
|
then the chair of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative
|
|||
|
Practices and Procedures. The subcommittee asked Jonsson to come to
|
|||
|
Washington and testify before the committee. Jonsson went to the
|
|||
|
Capitol on his own time and testified in civilian clothes about the
|
|||
|
excesses he had witnessed on the C-5A spare parts. The hearing
|
|||
|
generated a lot of publicity which helped to keep the Air Force from
|
|||
|
retaliating against him. He finally did get some money for his
|
|||
|
suggestion.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
A year later Senator Grassley asked Jonsson if the prices of the
|
|||
|
spare parts, including the armrest, had gone down and Jonsson reported
|
|||
|
that they had barely changed. When a press conference was scheduled
|
|||
|
to expose the situation, the Air Force began to harass Jonsson. He
|
|||
|
was denied routine leave, assigned a "babysitter" to make sure that he
|
|||
|
"didn't get into trouble" and an attempt was made to arrest him on the
|
|||
|
ironic charge of illegal destruction and disposal of spare parts.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Several members of Congress protested loudly, with Senator
|
|||
|
Grassley, and Representatives John Dingell(D-MI) and Barbara Boxer
|
|||
|
(D-CA) stepping in to protect Jonsson effectively from harassment.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Jonsson's case is an illustration of how a suggestion program can
|
|||
|
go awry, and how sound suggestions are not always welcomed and can
|
|||
|
lead to harassment.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
IG, DOD Cash-Awards Programs
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The IG, DOD Cash-Award program is different from the Service
|
|||
|
incentive suggestion programs in several ways. It gives rewards
|
|||
|
arbitrarily to those individuals whose disclosures save money rather
|
|||
|
than systematically to anyone who suggests a viable way to reduce
|
|||
|
spare parts costs. This means the program is not incentive motivated.
|
|||
|
Calling the DOD hotline with a report of waste will not guarantee you
|
|||
|
a cash reward.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
One would like to think that after being publicly recognized and
|
|||
|
honored for saving the government money, your superiors would not have
|
|||
|
the motivation or nerve to harass you. But after your moment of glory
|
|||
|
has faded and you revert back to your regular employee status, you
|
|||
|
will be left facing perhaps the very management you accused of
|
|||
|
wrongdoing. They may not forgive and forget.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Since the inception of the program in May 1984, 38 people have
|
|||
|
been recognized for cash awards totalling $46,000. Their disclosures
|
|||
|
have led to claimed cash savings of over $36 million. To put that in
|
|||
|
perspective, the DOD will have spent $1,975,449,000,000 from FY 1984
|
|||
|
to FY 1990. (DOD IG Semi-Annual Report to Congress, 10/1/87 to
|
|||
|
3/31/88)
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Office of Special Counsel
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 created a formal
|
|||
|
whistleblowing disclosure channel through the Office of the Special
|
|||
|
Counsel, which has a parallel duty separate from defending employees
|
|||
|
against repressive personnel practices. The Special Counsel screens
|
|||
|
whistleblowing disclosures and orders agency chiefs to investigate the
|
|||
|
challenges that have merit. When the OSC determines that there is a
|
|||
|
"substantial likelihood" the whistleblower's charges are accurate, a
|
|||
|
more intensive reform process is triggered. The agency head must
|
|||
|
investigate and reply within sixty days in a report whose contents are
|
|||
|
specified by statute, including the issues and evidence that were
|
|||
|
investigated, the methodology for the probe, a summary of the evidence
|
|||
|
obtained, findings of fact and law, and a summary of corrective action
|
|||
|
to solve any verified problems. After receiving the whistleblower's
|
|||
|
comments, the Special Counsel evaluates the report for completeness
|
|||
|
and reasonableness. Then the report is sent to the President and
|
|||
|
Congress. The Special Counsel must maintain a copy of each report in
|
|||
|
a public file, along with the employee's comments.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The purpose of the OSC whistleblowing disclosure channel was "to
|
|||
|
encourage employees to give the government the first crack at cleaning
|
|||
|
its own house before igniting the glare of publicity to force
|
|||
|
correction." Indeed, if administered in good faith, the Reform Act
|
|||
|
mechanism offers strategic benefits for a whistleblower to be
|
|||
|
effective in his or her dissent. It could offer an opportunity to
|
|||
|
gain the legally-binding judgment of an objective third party that the
|
|||
|
whistleblower's charges must be taken seriously. At a minimum, it
|
|||
|
maximizes the public whistleblower's credibility and helps to reduce
|
|||
|
isolation. The OSC evaluation that there is a "substantial
|
|||
|
likelihood" the allegations are well-taken is the bureaucratic
|
|||
|
equivalent of a "Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval" for that
|
|||
|
particular dissent.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
By comparison the OSC has handled its responsibilities to screen
|
|||
|
whistleblowing disclosures more objectively than its duties to
|
|||
|
investigate and act against job reprisals. On occasion, the
|
|||
|
combination of OSC support for the dissent and the knowledge of
|
|||
|
evaluations at the end of the process also have helped to improve the
|
|||
|
quality of agency reports in response to whistleblowing disclosures.
|
|||
|
In both the nuclear power and safe food areas, the Nuclear Regulatory
|
|||
|
Commission, U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Department of
|
|||
|
Health and Human Services have confirmed the validity of employees'
|
|||
|
dissent and taken serious corrective action. A guideline for
|
|||
|
preparing OSC whistleblowing disclosures is enclosed as an appendix.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Unfortunately, as a general rule, this option at best produces
|
|||
|
only cosmetic reform. Structurally, even with OSC support the agency
|
|||
|
targeted by the whistleblower's charges is investigating itself. Good
|
|||
|
faith responses have been the exception rather than the rule.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Further, the OSC typically accepts as reasonable and complete
|
|||
|
whatever report the agency sends back. As a result, more likely than
|
|||
|
not an OSC whistleblowing disclosure is merely an opportunity for the
|
|||
|
agency to cover up the evidence, perfect its defenses and then issue
|
|||
|
an official self-exoneration that soon will be approved by the Special
|
|||
|
Counsel -- all before serious investigations by Congress, the media or
|
|||
|
other outside groups that would like to ferret out the truth. This
|
|||
|
means an OSC whistleblowing disclosure usually will be
|
|||
|
counterproductive unless it is part of a larger strategy involving
|
|||
|
other institutions. That was the case with all of the examples listed
|
|||
|
above.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In some instances the OSC channel has been treacherous. On
|
|||
|
numerous occasions the Special Counsel has ruled that the dissent was
|
|||
|
unreasonable but then sent it to the agency chief anyway without the
|
|||
|
employee's consent. These "informal referrals" have been a double
|
|||
|
whammy -- advance warning to the agency of serious dissent, and an
|
|||
|
invitation to retaliate with impunity since the Special Counsel's
|
|||
|
ruling meant the dissent was too unreasonable to qualify as legally
|
|||
|
protected speech. New legislation should make the OSC a safer channel
|
|||
|
for whistleblowing disclosures, by forbidding the Special Counsel from
|
|||
|
forwarding the employee's charges or revealing his or her identity
|
|||
|
without consent.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Inspectors General
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Whistleblowing disclosures through the Special Counsel can enhance
|
|||
|
the quality of another conventional channel for investigation of
|
|||
|
employee concerns -- the Office of Inspector General. Each agency has
|
|||
|
one, either by that name or another. These offices are responsible
|
|||
|
for investigating and reporting on alleged misconduct by the agency or
|
|||
|
its employees. The IG's at most major agencies are covered by the
|
|||
|
Inspector General Act of 1978 or a similar, subsequent statute.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Employees who are considering disclosures to an IG should
|
|||
|
ascertain if it is a statutory Office of Inspector General. The
|
|||
|
distinction is quite significant. Statutory IG's can only be
|
|||
|
nominated and dismissed by the President. Non- statutory IG's are
|
|||
|
hired and fired by the agency chief whose programs they are
|
|||
|
investigating. The agency head can comment on but not change the text
|
|||
|
of reports by statutory IG's. By contrast, agency chiefs have
|
|||
|
unlimited censorship rights for reports by non-statutory IG's.
|
|||
|
Statutory IG's have the authority to investigate reprisals against
|
|||
|
their witnesses. Non-statutory IG's can investigate only what the
|
|||
|
agency chief permits. To illustrate what this means, each year up to
|
|||
|
10% of referrals to the Department of Justice's IG equivalent, the
|
|||
|
Office of Professional Responsibility, are to investigate and identify
|
|||
|
for possible criminal prosecution the source of "leaks" -- usually
|
|||
|
anonymous whistleblowing disclosures.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
On balance, IG's have a mixed track record at best of responding
|
|||
|
to whistleblowers. Even offices with statutory independence are
|
|||
|
staffed predominantly by employees from the "old days," when the IG
|
|||
|
was management's eyes and ears. That meant that if the agency chief
|
|||
|
wanted to get the facts and act against wrongdoing, the IG performed
|
|||
|
as a law enforcement agency. If the agency leader wanted to cover up
|
|||
|
a problem, the IG report assembled the case for the defense and the IG
|
|||
|
acted as a hatchetman to do the dirty work of discrediting the
|
|||
|
whistleblower. Traditionally it has not been uncommon for an IG to
|
|||
|
investigate the whistleblower rather than his or her charges.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
To some extent these traditions are changing. But whistleblowers
|
|||
|
are well-advised to seek expert advice or retain an attorney, even for
|
|||
|
coaching purposes, before going to an Inspector General. You should
|
|||
|
pin down how the IG will conduct the investigation before sharing your
|
|||
|
concerns and evidence. You should insist that all agreements, plans,
|
|||
|
and schedules be confirmed in writing, rather than handling matters
|
|||
|
informally or leaving anything to trust. Under some circumstances, it
|
|||
|
might be wise to approach the IG armed with the extra credibility of a
|
|||
|
substantial likelihood finding and an order to investigate from the
|
|||
|
Special Counsel.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Congress
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
It would be nice to think that our elected officials only
|
|||
|
represent each one of us as individuals, but members of Congress are
|
|||
|
pulled by all types of constituent groups, including major industries
|
|||
|
in their state or district. For that reason, it is important to do
|
|||
|
some research before blowing the whistle to your local member of
|
|||
|
Congress. Some questions you might ask are: Are there any
|
|||
|
contractors in your area of whistleblowing or large military bases in
|
|||
|
his or her district or state? Find out how the member feels about
|
|||
|
your particular agency or company before you discuss anything and ask
|
|||
|
about their methodology in a case load. Also investigate their past
|
|||
|
track record in battling the system with other whistleblowers and call
|
|||
|
those people to see if they were satisfied with the member of
|
|||
|
Congress's tenacity in fighting the system and protecting their right
|
|||
|
to blow the whistle. If the office does not have a strong record of
|
|||
|
supporting whistleblowers, you may think twice about trusting that
|
|||
|
member.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Some members of Congress simply pass complaints about the
|
|||
|
bureaucracy back to the agency to investigate itself. This action is
|
|||
|
rarely successful -- the matter is often bucked down to the
|
|||
|
perpetrators of the fraud. To make matters worse, members of Congress
|
|||
|
may not be willing to protect your identity, even if you ask them to,
|
|||
|
because of the inexperience of the congressional staff in dealing with
|
|||
|
the bureaucracy or the individual member's courage to stand up to a
|
|||
|
large bureaucracy or company.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Whistleblowers often make the mistake of thinking that their best
|
|||
|
ally to expose the fraudulent activity is the authorizing committees
|
|||
|
in the Congress that give the bureaucracy its money. Although some
|
|||
|
congressional committees have a vigorous oversight staff, many of the
|
|||
|
members of the committees are captured by the same influences that
|
|||
|
pressure the individual member of Congress.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
For example, the Pentagon procurement scandals in the 1980's have
|
|||
|
shown that cozy relationships exist between some members of
|
|||
|
congressional committees and contractors. The Armed Services
|
|||
|
Committees in the House and the Senate often have members appointed to
|
|||
|
them because of the large defense contractors or military
|
|||
|
installations in their state or district. If a member of Congress
|
|||
|
does not have much military activity in their state or district when
|
|||
|
they are first appointed to the committee, Pentagon money gradually
|
|||
|
gravitates to their area because of their own efforts or because the
|
|||
|
Pentagon and the defense contractors are trying to win influence with
|
|||
|
the committee. In addition, in 1987, the Chairman of the House Armed
|
|||
|
Services Subcommittee on Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems
|
|||
|
received 80 percent of his yearly honoraria from speeches from defense
|
|||
|
contractors. His is not an isolated case: 6 of the other 18 members
|
|||
|
of his committee also received more than 50 percent of their yearly
|
|||
|
honoraria from defense contractors.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
It also is important to remember that as an institution, Congress
|
|||
|
can be as unwilling to hear bad news as the Executive Branch. It is
|
|||
|
true that some of the major scandals of the 1980's have been exposed
|
|||
|
with the help of certain congressional committees but once the
|
|||
|
headlines fade, it is rare that the Congress as a whole really wants
|
|||
|
to shake up the status quo and pass meaningful reform. It was
|
|||
|
Congress which passed the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act that
|
|||
|
ultimately stripped whistleblowers of their constitutional remedies.
|
|||
|
Congress has been unwilling to challenge consistently the Executive
|
|||
|
Branch's claim to exclusive power in the area of national security.
|
|||
|
(see DEFENDING YOURSELF IN THE BUREAUCRACY OR COMPANY) So don't forget
|
|||
|
that Congress as a whole may be as willing to cover up problems as the
|
|||
|
Executive Branch.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
There are some members of Congress who are interested in the
|
|||
|
whistleblower's plight and can offer you some protection. When
|
|||
|
properly motivated members of Congress have rallied to the
|
|||
|
whistleblower's cause. In addition, certain members of Congress
|
|||
|
provided the clout to protect individual whistleblowers from reprisal.
|
|||
|
It is a crime to interfere or harass a congressional witness but the
|
|||
|
Congress has made the mistake of rarely enforcing the law thus
|
|||
|
emboldening the bureaucracies to strike back at the whistleblower for
|
|||
|
their disclosures to Congress. As we have seen, congressional
|
|||
|
intervention in the Thom Jonsson case prevented the Air Force from
|
|||
|
further harassing Airman Jonsson (see Incentive Suggestion Programs).
|
|||
|
But congressional protection of individuals is the exception and
|
|||
|
should not be depended on. If you plan to go to a member of Congress,
|
|||
|
you first need to check that individual's record very closely.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
If you decide to contact a member of Congress, it is important to
|
|||
|
know what to include in your correspondence and how to package it:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Before you write to any member, make sure that you have thoroughly
|
|||
|
checked their track record. You need to make sure that you do not
|
|||
|
divulge any information to them before you take this important step.
|
|||
|
Find out if they have helped any whistleblowers before and if they
|
|||
|
followed up once the headlines faded. You can do this by following
|
|||
|
their past cases in the papers. If you find that they are not still
|
|||
|
working on the problem or trying to protect the whistleblower, you
|
|||
|
need to be wary.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Keep it short. Most staff members won't read more than a page. If
|
|||
|
it is impossible to condense your letter to two pages or less, it is a
|
|||
|
good idea to prepare a one page fact sheet as well. At the beginning
|
|||
|
of your longer letter, flag the fact sheet for the staff member.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Make it clear early in your letter whether you want your name or
|
|||
|
documents to be shown to anyone in the bureaucracy. Otherwise, your
|
|||
|
letter may be processed right back to the agency where you work or
|
|||
|
that oversees your contractor. Also, make it clear to the reader that
|
|||
|
if you need to remain anonymous, you request that they take caution
|
|||
|
and talk to you before they take any steps on your letter.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* In a clear and concise way, state your factual case in the
|
|||
|
beginning. Enclose the most important documents but don't send a huge
|
|||
|
stack. Make a list of other documents that you have and don't send
|
|||
|
originals. Keep your story clear of government jargon and don't
|
|||
|
assume that the staff member who will be reading the letter will
|
|||
|
understand how your bureaucracy or company works. If you need to send
|
|||
|
a longer statement, separate it from your cover letter which should be
|
|||
|
no more than a two page summary.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* It is alright to talk about any harassment or retaliation that you
|
|||
|
have received, but put it at the end of the letter and don't dwell on
|
|||
|
it. Also, at the end of the letter, make suggestions on where to go
|
|||
|
to investigate and get more collaborating documentation. Let them
|
|||
|
know if there are any investigative agencies that are working on your
|
|||
|
case and whether or not you think they are successfully uncovering
|
|||
|
anything of value.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Make sure that the staff member has a way to reach you during
|
|||
|
working hours. If you can't talk to them at the workplace, find a way
|
|||
|
for someone to take a message for you and return their call during
|
|||
|
your lunchtime.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* If you haven't received a reply within two weeks, call the office in
|
|||
|
Washington and ask to speak to the Legislative Assistant (LA) who
|
|||
|
covers your area. Congressional staff members are very busy and the
|
|||
|
most successful whistleblowers know when to keep calling a staff
|
|||
|
member and when to wait. Don't be a pest but make sure that you do
|
|||
|
not fall through the cracks. Don't demand attention and be polite at
|
|||
|
all times. The Congress is also a large bureaucracy and it can be as
|
|||
|
frustrating as any other agency.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Watchdog groups have good working relationships with various
|
|||
|
members of Congress and you may be more successful going through them.
|
|||
|
These watchdog groups can play the role of advocate for you and
|
|||
|
sometimes can keep you anonymous.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The Press
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
One of the most obvious whistleblower outlets is the press (which
|
|||
|
includes television news). On the surface it seems to be the easiest
|
|||
|
and quickest way to let American taxpayers know that their dollars are
|
|||
|
being wasted. Indeed, it can be very effective when handled properly
|
|||
|
through a responsible reporter. But not all reporters are willing to
|
|||
|
take the time and effort necessary to publish your allegation and
|
|||
|
maintain the anonymity of their source.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
To protect yourself, you need to choose a reporter carefully.
|
|||
|
That involves doing some research. Find out who covers your area of
|
|||
|
expertise for each of the major newspapers and networks and look at
|
|||
|
their work. That means either asking reporters to send you copies of
|
|||
|
stories they have done on your general area or going to the library
|
|||
|
and reading back copies or the newspapers or magazines. It is
|
|||
|
important to have an idea of how a reporter will handle your story
|
|||
|
before you give it to him or her, so make sure you like the reporter's
|
|||
|
approach to whistleblowing, waste and fraud, and how they cover the
|
|||
|
agency to which they are assigned. If you find that the reporter's
|
|||
|
stories just seem to echo what is handed out of the public relations
|
|||
|
office of the agency or company, it is not likely that they will do
|
|||
|
the type of questioning or investigating that you need. Keep looking
|
|||
|
until you find a reporter whose approach closely reflects what you
|
|||
|
hope to achieve by blowing the whistle.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
You also have to decide whether to contact a local reporter or the
|
|||
|
national press. There are advantages and disadvantages to each one.
|
|||
|
The local reporter will be more interested in your story because of
|
|||
|
its local implications but he or she also will have more pressure not
|
|||
|
to print the story because the company or the bureaucracy has a
|
|||
|
powerful economic base in the local area. Local reporters will be
|
|||
|
able to follow up by speaking to local people who can anonymously back
|
|||
|
up your claims and perhaps provide more documentation. You need to
|
|||
|
read your local paper and judge whether you think they have shown any
|
|||
|
tendencies to expose local entities. If you do have a good local
|
|||
|
story, it gets the company's or bureaucracy's attention but the story
|
|||
|
may then be ignored in Washington.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
A national story can also be effective but it is often hard to get
|
|||
|
the national press in Washington to pay attention to things that do
|
|||
|
not have direct impact on the Washington political scene. Your story
|
|||
|
needs to affect directly the agencies in Washington or involve a large
|
|||
|
government program or corporation to be sure that a national outlet
|
|||
|
will be interested. It is also harder for reporters in Washington to
|
|||
|
verify your story from Washington and it is rare that they will have
|
|||
|
the time or the money to come out to your area.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
A good compromise is if your local paper is part of a national
|
|||
|
newspaper chain that has a Washington office or on a national news
|
|||
|
wire that gives the story outlets other than your local area.
|
|||
|
Newspapers in a chain are less likely to be intimidated by local
|
|||
|
economic pressure and your story will appear nationwide. Several
|
|||
|
well-known chains include Knight-Ridder newspapers and Gannett
|
|||
|
newspapers. Call your local papers and find out if any of them belong
|
|||
|
to a chain that has a Washington office or are on a major newswire
|
|||
|
such as the New York Times newswire.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Once you have chosen a reporter, it is important for you to know
|
|||
|
how to approach the them and what the reporter can and cannot do for
|
|||
|
you. First you should agree to the terms of working with them before
|
|||
|
any information is given. Also, whistleblowers often have unrealistic
|
|||
|
expectations from reporters and this can damage your working
|
|||
|
relationship. Here is a list of what reporters can and cannot do for
|
|||
|
you:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Reporters can give you anonymity. A good reporter will not reveal
|
|||
|
his sources even to a court of law. However, before you tell your
|
|||
|
story to a reporter, you must set the rules of how you want to be
|
|||
|
identified.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
-- If you agree to speak to a reporter "on the record", he can
|
|||
|
identify you by name and your position in the government or industry.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
-- You can agree to speak "off the record" where the reporter
|
|||
|
cannot use your name but can characterize your position (for example,
|
|||
|
a quality engineer in the MX program). Unless you are careful, that
|
|||
|
characterization could be very revealing to the people who are trying
|
|||
|
to identify the source of the leak. You can agree to talk to a
|
|||
|
reporter off the record but with the provision that you agree how you
|
|||
|
will be characterized to protect your identity.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
-- Another way to speak to a reporter is "on background", which
|
|||
|
means that the reporter cannot characterize you in any way but must
|
|||
|
write about the information in a generic sort of way. This way of
|
|||
|
speaking to a reporter is the safest way but it makes it more
|
|||
|
difficult for the reporter to write a story that will get published.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Reporters, of course, will try to get you on the record and will
|
|||
|
assume you are on the record unless you designate differently.
|
|||
|
WARNING: Many reporters have different definitions for the above
|
|||
|
terms so it is important to define your terms before you tell them
|
|||
|
your information. Make sure that the terms that you agree on apply to
|
|||
|
your entire conversation and perhaps followup conversations. Don't
|
|||
|
expect a reporter to honor rules after a conversation. Most will but
|
|||
|
you should not take the risk. You must weigh your need for protection
|
|||
|
against the need to tell the reporter enough for him or her to write
|
|||
|
the story. This is a judgment call that you will have to make.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* It will be in the reporter's best interest for you to commit to
|
|||
|
giving him or her the story exclusively. This means that you will not
|
|||
|
talk to another reporter until your reporter prints the story. This
|
|||
|
can be useful for you because the reporter will have a motivation to
|
|||
|
work harder on it. But it can also backfire on you because the
|
|||
|
reporter may think that by "owning" the story, he or she has all the
|
|||
|
time in the world to work on it and your issue can wither on the vine.
|
|||
|
When you meet with a reporter, they often will assume that you are
|
|||
|
working with them exclusively. Ask at the beginning of your meeting
|
|||
|
whether or not the reporter expects an exclusive arrangement. Most
|
|||
|
reporters will say yes. To protect yourself, you should work with the
|
|||
|
reporter to set a reasonable time period for your exclusive
|
|||
|
relationship. The amount of time will depend on the nature of the
|
|||
|
story, but the reporter and you should agree to a time length that
|
|||
|
gives the reporter enough time to do the story but does not allow the
|
|||
|
process to be stretched out until the issue becomes stale. If
|
|||
|
something else comes up, you always can agree to extend the deadline.
|
|||
|
Setting a time period may irritate the reporter, but you should try to
|
|||
|
protect yourself by suggesting it in a nice and reasonable way.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Even if the reporter is interested in writing the story and spends a
|
|||
|
great deal of time on it, don't assume that it will automatically get
|
|||
|
printed. Reporters have to sell their stories to their editors and
|
|||
|
publishers and the more controversial the story, the more the
|
|||
|
management people of the newspaper or television station
|
|||
|
w<EFBFBD><EFBFBD>`<60>J<EFBFBD>X<>p<EFBFBD><70><EFBFBD>\N8<4E><38><EFBFBD>B<EFBFBD>"<22>A?Mӹ<4D>r<EFBFBD><72>2<EFBFBD>轁ɕmember that a reporter does not
|
|||
|
always have control over his or her stories and there is an element of
|
|||
|
politics in journalism as everywhere else. The owners and the
|
|||
|
managers of newspapers and television stations feel political and
|
|||
|
monetary pressures as in any business. However, don't give up on a
|
|||
|
story because as long as the reporter wants to have it published there
|
|||
|
is still a chance.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Don't expect reporters to be crusaders for your cause. Their job is
|
|||
|
to examine the facts, talk to people from both sides, and report the
|
|||
|
story fairly. The majority of reporters will resent it or shy away
|
|||
|
from you if you try to pressure them to take up your cause.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Don't expect reporters to find a lawyer, or contact the government
|
|||
|
for you -- although some will offer to help maintain your loyalty.
|
|||
|
Most want to remain separate from your whistleblower activity and
|
|||
|
report on the factual parts of your case.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Don't assume that since you are working closely with a reporter that
|
|||
|
he or she is your friend. Part of their job is to be very friendly
|
|||
|
and put you at ease so that you are willing to tell them everything
|
|||
|
you know, and preferably on the record. Many whistleblowers, who
|
|||
|
already feel lonely and isolated, mistake this as friendship and
|
|||
|
expose themselves by saying too much. Working with a reporter is a
|
|||
|
business relationship and you should remember that at all times when
|
|||
|
you are with a reporter. Also, if you meet with a reporter at a bar
|
|||
|
or a restaurant, make sure that you don't drink too much and lose good
|
|||
|
judgment. Negotiating your terms with a reporter should be done with
|
|||
|
a clear head.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
When you meet with a reporter, it is important to come well
|
|||
|
prepared. That means organizing your documents in an understandable
|
|||
|
order and making notes for you to follow so that you do not ramble or
|
|||
|
take too long to get at the meat of your information. Try to avoid
|
|||
|
starting at the very beginning and telling the story in excruciating
|
|||
|
detail. Start with a basic outline of your story, showing the
|
|||
|
documents as you go, and then go into detail in areas in which the
|
|||
|
reporter is interested.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Don't start your conversation by reciting all the injustices that
|
|||
|
you have had to endure. The best way to impress a reporter with your
|
|||
|
story (and your motivations) is to give the factual information on the
|
|||
|
misconduct you have seen and let them ask about your personal
|
|||
|
hardships. Only volunteer the personal problems that you have had at
|
|||
|
the end of the meeting, if the reporter has not asked, and keep your
|
|||
|
statements brief.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Make sure that you never embellish your information to a reporter.
|
|||
|
A common fault of whistleblowers, once they have finally convinced
|
|||
|
someone to listen to them, is to tell the reporter 110 percent of the
|
|||
|
story to make their point. The problem with that is the reporter or
|
|||
|
the bureaucracy can realize that the last 10 percent that is
|
|||
|
embellished and the rest of your story will appear to be discredited.
|
|||
|
It is best to tell reporters 80 percent of your solid information and
|
|||
|
give them leads to discover on their own the last 20 percent. That
|
|||
|
way people will be impressed that the situation is really worse than
|
|||
|
you said.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
After reporters write and publish a story, you should keep them
|
|||
|
informed about how the scandal is progressing but you should make sure
|
|||
|
that you don't become a pest in the reporter's eyes. After they write
|
|||
|
a story, reporters are pressured by their editors to move on to the
|
|||
|
next story. Reporters often have to fight for the time and newspaper
|
|||
|
space followup stories on their exposes.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
If you have been anonymous in your whistleblowing, it is important
|
|||
|
to remain calm and do not do anything that casts suspicion on
|
|||
|
yourself. Once a story hits the media, your bureaucracy will begin
|
|||
|
"damage control," and if you are directly involved in the problem, you
|
|||
|
may be asked to sit in on the meetings and help plan a coverup. This
|
|||
|
puts you in a very good position to continue to tell the reporter
|
|||
|
about a planned coverup of the wrongdoing or if the company or the
|
|||
|
bureaucracy are legitimately trying to solve the problem.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
If you are going public with your whistleblowing, you may get more
|
|||
|
publicity and requests for interviews after the story appears. It is
|
|||
|
good to take advantage of the extra publicity to shed more light on
|
|||
|
the subject of your whistleblowing, but you must approach your new
|
|||
|
found status with caution. The bureaucracy or the company may try to
|
|||
|
take the focus off of the scandal and make you the issue by trying to
|
|||
|
discredit you. It is important not to take it personally and become
|
|||
|
openly defensive. In this situation, the best defense is a good
|
|||
|
offense. When reporters ask you about your personal fight with the
|
|||
|
organization, turn the question around and spend time emphasizing the
|
|||
|
subject of your whistleblowing -- the fraud and waste. When you do
|
|||
|
talk about the retaliation against you, don't come across as bitter,
|
|||
|
defensive, or paranoid and don't dwell on the subject. Additionally,
|
|||
|
strive to stay unruffled and unflappable. Remember, the calmest
|
|||
|
person in the room is usually seen as the most credible.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
It becomes quite flattering suddenly to receive all this
|
|||
|
attention, but remember: one of the ways that a bureaucracy or a
|
|||
|
company can discredit you to others is by portraying you as a
|
|||
|
self-glorified publicity hound. Don't give them any ammunition by
|
|||
|
letting the publicity go to your head. A little humbleness can go a
|
|||
|
long way in making your case.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
If you cannot make up your mind about what approach you may want
|
|||
|
to take, you can contact the Project on Military Procurement and the
|
|||
|
Government Accountability Project for advice.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Non-Profit Watch-Dog Organizations
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
If blowing the whistle to a member of Congress, the press or a
|
|||
|
hotline seem too risky or unfruitful or you aren't quite sure that
|
|||
|
this handbook has given you enough details to make a decision, you can
|
|||
|
call upon non-profit watch-dog organizations either for advice or to
|
|||
|
use as your main avenue in blowing the whistle. There isn't an
|
|||
|
abundance of these types of organizations. The Project on Military
|
|||
|
Procurement (PMP) and the Government Accountability Project (GAP), who
|
|||
|
produced this handbook are dedicated to trying to help whistleblowers
|
|||
|
with their problems. PMP and GAP can help you build a coalition of
|
|||
|
groups to help you because of their unique interest in the subject
|
|||
|
matter. It often takes a coalition effort to overcome the political
|
|||
|
clout of large government bureaucracies and corporations. PMP and GAP
|
|||
|
have different goals and areas of expertise. A description of each
|
|||
|
follows:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The Project on Military Procurement
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
PMP's goals are to reform the Pentagon procurement system by
|
|||
|
exposing on-going waste, fraud and abuse to the press, Congress and
|
|||
|
the public; to provide an effective and reliable national defense
|
|||
|
while saving the taxpayer as much money as possible; and to assist
|
|||
|
whistleblowers in the military establishment during their struggles to
|
|||
|
expose abuses.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
PMP has been investigating whistleblower claims for eight years.
|
|||
|
The whistleblowers come from all areas of defense, the DOD, the
|
|||
|
defense industry and military personnel. PMP has been instrumental in
|
|||
|
exposing spare parts overpricing, falsification of the weapon testing
|
|||
|
process, cost overruns in weapon systems, fraudulent procurement
|
|||
|
processes and faulty weaponry. PMP sources choose whether to be a
|
|||
|
public or anonymous whistleblower. No whistleblower has ever lost his
|
|||
|
job as a result of blowing the whistle through PMP.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
PMP takes the burden of ensuring the individual of confidentiality
|
|||
|
and arranges, on receipt of documentation of his or her allegations,
|
|||
|
for the whistleblower to meet with or talk with a researcher at PMP.
|
|||
|
We also have a group of military sources that advise us on an
|
|||
|
anonymous basis. We turn down some individuals because they lack
|
|||
|
documentation or when the whistleblower decides that the risk is too
|
|||
|
great.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Once a decision has been made by the whistleblower and PMP to move
|
|||
|
forward, PMP helps the whistleblower decide whether to go to the
|
|||
|
press, the Congress, the DOD, or to file a false claims suit. PMP
|
|||
|
works with several lawyers who are looking for clients to file false
|
|||
|
claims suits and acts as unpaid advisors to the whistleblowers and
|
|||
|
lawyers in the investigation process of a law suit. We want to expose
|
|||
|
and help initiate reform while providing the maximum protection
|
|||
|
possible for our whistleblowers. PMP's policy is that no expose' is
|
|||
|
worth a whistleblower's career and peace of mind.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
PMP has been instrumental in exposing spare parts horror stories
|
|||
|
such as the $7400 coffee brewer and the $455 arm rest. We have also
|
|||
|
revealed, for example, an illegal lobbying plan for the C5B cargo
|
|||
|
plane, an internal investigation report showing defects in the Phoenix
|
|||
|
Missile, and a draft Inspector General report that found "work
|
|||
|
measurement" an effective way of saving defense dollars. PMP is
|
|||
|
interested in investigating and revealing all aspects of getting "more
|
|||
|
bang for the buck."
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
To contact the Project on Military Procurement call or write:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Dina Rasor, Director
|
|||
|
Project on Military Procurement
|
|||
|
613 Pennsylvania Avenue SE
|
|||
|
Washington, DC 20003
|
|||
|
202-543-0883
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
or contact our computer bulletin board SNAFU with your personal
|
|||
|
computer. The number for SNAFU is 202-547-6238
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The Government Accountability Project
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
GAP has been providing legal support for whistleblowers since
|
|||
|
1976. GAP helps defend whistleblowers against reprisal, assists them
|
|||
|
in pursuing their dissent more effectively, offers informal assistance
|
|||
|
and referral services when formal representation is not possible,
|
|||
|
advocates stronger free speech laws and teaches the law of dissent
|
|||
|
through scholarly works and law school clinical programs. Unlike the
|
|||
|
Project on Military Procurement, GAP does not formally specialize in
|
|||
|
any particular issue area. Due to the quantity of requests, however,
|
|||
|
GAP has concentrated on certain issues such as safety hazards from
|
|||
|
commercial and military nuclear facilities, and meat and poultry
|
|||
|
inspection and increasingly, the false conflict between national
|
|||
|
security and freedom of speech.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Whistleblowers who call GAP for help first consult with the Intake
|
|||
|
Director, who prepares a short summary of the individual's objectives
|
|||
|
and relevant facts. GAP receives from 200-500 fresh requests for help
|
|||
|
per year and can only take around 5 new cases annually, since it often
|
|||
|
takes years to complete service to existing clients. Additionally,
|
|||
|
whistleblowers connected with ongoing issue campaigns receive priority
|
|||
|
for representation, since work on those cases complements assistance
|
|||
|
to other clients whose cases are pending. As a result, most
|
|||
|
frequently GAP offers informal assistance such as coaching, describing
|
|||
|
the range of options and relevant laws, finding an attorney, or
|
|||
|
referrals to responsible congressional oversight committees, media or
|
|||
|
constituent groups who should be aware of the whistleblower's concerns
|
|||
|
and fate. GAP's basic strategy is to unite isolated whistleblowers
|
|||
|
with the majority of citizens who should be benefiting from their
|
|||
|
dissent.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
If there is space in GAP's docket potentially to help an intake,
|
|||
|
an attorney will conduct a verification study to determine whether --
|
|||
|
1) the whistleblower's dissent is reasonable; 2) the issues are
|
|||
|
significant enough to be worth the harassment the employee faces by
|
|||
|
pursuing them; and 3) the whistleblower and GAP have a fighting chance
|
|||
|
to make a difference. If the case survives the verification study,
|
|||
|
the organization considers formal representation based on additional
|
|||
|
factors such as whether GAP has a unique contribution to make and
|
|||
|
whether it can be funded. GAP traditionally has not charged for
|
|||
|
attorney time and evaluates whether representation would be covered by
|
|||
|
an existing or potential foundation grant. But clients are expected
|
|||
|
to cover expenses, such as telephone and travel costs. Financial
|
|||
|
pressures are forcing a reconsideration of this policy, however,
|
|||
|
particularly if the representation is not part of an issue campaign
|
|||
|
that is already funded.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Successful issue advocacy campaigns have included challenges to
|
|||
|
the Zimmer and Midland nuclear power plants, which had to be converted
|
|||
|
to coal facilities after whistleblowers exposed systematic quality
|
|||
|
assurance breakdowns. GAP investigations also caused extensive
|
|||
|
re-inspections and repairs of suspect components at the Comanche Peak,
|
|||
|
Diablo Canyon and Lasalle nuclear facilities. Whistleblowers
|
|||
|
represented by GAP have exposed massive radiation leaks at the
|
|||
|
Fernald, Hanford and Knolls military nuclear facilities. Dissent by
|
|||
|
over 100 GAP clients who are federal meat and poultry inspectors
|
|||
|
stopped various USDA plans to gut or eliminate current food inspection
|
|||
|
programs.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
GAP defends individual whistleblowers against reprisal through
|
|||
|
serving as co-counsel for that aspect of a larger employment dispute,
|
|||
|
authoring friend of the court briefs, and direct representation where
|
|||
|
a case is particularly significant in terms of its chilling effect
|
|||
|
during an issue campaign or as a civil liberties precedent. Among
|
|||
|
GAP's more well-known, successful clients are Pentagon cost control
|
|||
|
expert Ernest Fitzgerald and GSA National Capitol Regional Director
|
|||
|
Bertrand Berube, the highest ranking whistleblower in the civil
|
|||
|
service to challenge a firing successfully.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
To contact the Government Accountability Project call or write:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Tom Devine, Legal Director
|
|||
|
GAP
|
|||
|
25 E St. NW
|
|||
|
Suite 700
|
|||
|
Washington, DC 20001
|
|||
|
(202) 347-0460
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
To seek legal assistance, address correspondence to the Intake
|
|||
|
Director at GAP.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
DEFENDING YOURSELF IN THE BUREAUCRACY OR COMPANY
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Despite admonitions, warnings and threats you might receive, it is
|
|||
|
your constitutional right to blow the whistle and be protected after
|
|||
|
doing so. Government employees are protected under the first and
|
|||
|
fourteenth amendments of the Constitution, which prohibits federal,
|
|||
|
state and local governments from retaliating against workers who
|
|||
|
express dissent publicly or privately to their supervisors.
|
|||
|
Protection for the private sector employees has developed over the
|
|||
|
past 25 years under individual state laws.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
However, neither protection is comprehensive or enforced by the
|
|||
|
government agencies and the courts. There exists a patchwork of
|
|||
|
specific employee protection laws that cover environmental issues,
|
|||
|
health and safety, labor relations, and civil service. Legislation
|
|||
|
pertinent to whistleblowers is explained below.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Whistleblower Legislation
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The 1978 statute gave the OSC a broad mandate and almost total
|
|||
|
discretion, in large part, to protect freedom of speech.
|
|||
|
Unfortunately, it degenerated into what one Senate staff member calls
|
|||
|
a "legalized plumber's unit" -- the administration's most effective
|
|||
|
weapon to identify wounded dissenters who come in for help, and then
|
|||
|
finish them off.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Since its creation, the OSC has turned down 99 percent of
|
|||
|
whistleblower cases without attempting disciplinary or corrective
|
|||
|
action. Since 1979, the Special Counsel has not pursued litigation
|
|||
|
through a corrective action hearing to restore a whistleblower's job.
|
|||
|
From 1981 to 1986, the total number of requests for stays, or
|
|||
|
injunctive relief, was approximately the same as in one previous year,
|
|||
|
1980.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This is no surprise after considering recent Special Counsels'
|
|||
|
attitudes toward dissent. The office was created to guard against
|
|||
|
Watergate-era techniques taught in the Malek-May Manual to harass
|
|||
|
unresponsive employees out of their jobs. However, former Special
|
|||
|
Counsel Alex Kozinski used the Malek-May techniques in a successful
|
|||
|
purge that convinced nearly half his staff to resign, including
|
|||
|
approximately seventy percent of headquarters attorneys and
|
|||
|
investigators. Kozinski was so intolerant of criticism that he issued
|
|||
|
a gag order to his public relations officer and ordered employees not
|
|||
|
to speak with his predecessor, Mary Eastwood, before he attempted to
|
|||
|
fire her.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Kozinski also shared his techniques with others. Using the OSC's
|
|||
|
own investigative manual as a guide, he taught a course for federal
|
|||
|
managers on how to fire employees without OSC interference. He
|
|||
|
tutored then-Secretary of the Interior James Watt's assistants on how
|
|||
|
to avoid conceding first amendment violations and still fire
|
|||
|
whistleblower Jack Spadaro for exposing mine safety violations.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Kozinski is now a judge in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
|
|||
|
Initially, as a protege of former Attorney General Ed Meese, he was
|
|||
|
being groomed for the Supreme Court. After his record was exposed as
|
|||
|
a hatchet man against whistleblowers, he was barely confirmed for the
|
|||
|
court of appeals -- squeaking through 54-43.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Publicly, former Special Counsel William O'Connor was less subtle,
|
|||
|
branding whistleblowers as malcontents and comparing them to bag
|
|||
|
ladies and mental health patients. O'Connor aggressively disclaimed
|
|||
|
any responsibility for reprisal victims, characterizing them as
|
|||
|
"by-standers" and "witnesses." Mr. O'Connor explained that his job
|
|||
|
was to serve the system, not individuals. But the merit system is an
|
|||
|
empty phrase without human beings.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Both Special Counsels defended their track records with the same
|
|||
|
excuse -- neither met a whistleblower who deserved or needed the
|
|||
|
CSRA's remedial litigation. They claimed vindication from the
|
|||
|
results, asserting that whistleblowers turned away by the OSC also
|
|||
|
lost everywhere else. However, that is false. For example, two
|
|||
|
successful MSPB whistleblower appeals (out of four in ten years)
|
|||
|
vindicated employees whom the Special Counsel had turned away,
|
|||
|
including the Spadaro case. The case of another OSC reject, Vince
|
|||
|
Laubach, was so strong that Interior settled his grievance with
|
|||
|
reinstatement, back pay and damages. On balance, through 1988,
|
|||
|
whistleblowers prevailed in seventeen successful cases of
|
|||
|
whistleblower litigation, in many instances through labor-management
|
|||
|
arbitration, while the OSC had been dormant.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Messrs. Kozinski and O'Connor abused their discretion by
|
|||
|
substituting new agendas for explicit statutory language and
|
|||
|
congressional intent. For example, in 1984, the Special Counsel
|
|||
|
honored the law's mandate to investigate reprisal allegations only
|
|||
|
eight percent of the time.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Ernest Fitzgerald, who initially became known for blowing the
|
|||
|
whistle on cost overruns in the Air Force's C-5A aircraft, recounts in
|
|||
|
connection with a more recent case involving alleged defense
|
|||
|
procurement fraud, "I kept trying to give the investigators
|
|||
|
documentary evidence and they kept giving it back to me." Another
|
|||
|
whistleblower reported calling the office eighty-nine times before
|
|||
|
anyone would speak with him to tell him his case had been closed.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Fitzgerald's frustration involved the case of George Spanton, a
|
|||
|
Pentagon auditor whom the agency tried to force into retirement
|
|||
|
through a retaliatory transfer after he revealed systematic violations
|
|||
|
of law at a major defense contractor, Pratt Whitney. Ironically, the
|
|||
|
Spanton case is credited, or blamed, with preventing the OSC's
|
|||
|
dismantling. The Special Counsel boasted that the Spanton case was a
|
|||
|
major success, because it obtained an administrative order to fire top
|
|||
|
Defense Contract Audit Agency officials for the retaliation.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The question is whether it was a successful prosecution or an
|
|||
|
effective coverup. Special Counsel William O'Connor refused to pursue
|
|||
|
evidence indicating that Pratt and Whitney was just an anecdotal
|
|||
|
illustration of systematic corruption throughout the defense industry.
|
|||
|
Similarly, he stopped his investigators from following up on strong
|
|||
|
evidence that Defense Secretary Weinberger was personally responsible
|
|||
|
for silencing Spanton, indicating a Cabinet level coverup. As
|
|||
|
Fitzgerald later testified, the Special Counsel curtailed the Spanton
|
|||
|
case at a point analogous to where Earl Silbert had tried to stop the
|
|||
|
Watergate investigation -- declaring victory by scapegoating minor
|
|||
|
league figures like Gordon Liddy and James McCord.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
If the OSC hadn't stopped short, the 1988 Pentagon corruption
|
|||
|
scandals might have emerged two years, and tens of billions of
|
|||
|
taxpayer dollars, sooner. The Special Counsel also might have won the
|
|||
|
case. By pulling its punches the OSC avoided the best evidence of
|
|||
|
reprisal, and eventually the case was overturned in court. In the
|
|||
|
end, the Special Counsel accomplished nothing in the Spanton case
|
|||
|
except to save itself.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Perhaps those who were ignored were lucky: the OSC did not turn
|
|||
|
on them. As Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich. commented about the case of
|
|||
|
Bert Berube at the General Services Administration, the Office spent
|
|||
|
more than five times as much time investigating the complainant as
|
|||
|
investigating the complaint.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Although the OSC routinely refuses to share its closed case files
|
|||
|
with complainants who try to continue fighting in another forum, the
|
|||
|
office has used the files as dossiers to help blacklist whistleblowing
|
|||
|
employees who give up on their original jobs and seek renewed
|
|||
|
employment. For example, the OSC recommended during an Office of
|
|||
|
Personnel Management background security check that former Treasury
|
|||
|
Department attorney Elaine Mittleman not be hired for a new government
|
|||
|
job, in part because her superiors suspected she had leaked documents
|
|||
|
to Congress and the press, which in theory is protected speech.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Ms. Mittleman first lost her job after dissenting against
|
|||
|
Treasury's failure to enforce the law requiring the Chrysler
|
|||
|
Corporation to file reports on how it spent its guaranteed loans from
|
|||
|
the federal bailout, charges later confirmed by the Inspector General.
|
|||
|
The Office of the Special Counsel refused to interview her personally.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
O'Connor exercised legal double-speak to transform protected
|
|||
|
activity into offenses justifying dismissal, such as explaining that
|
|||
|
dissent against agency policy is insubordination. This announcement
|
|||
|
legally eliminated significant dissent. He sternly warned that his
|
|||
|
agency would not be a haven for blackmailers, his term for those who
|
|||
|
engage in what he labeled as "shake-downs" by threatening to exercise
|
|||
|
appeal rights. This policy frowned on the due process clause.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The new Special Counsel, Mary Wieseman, has introduced personal
|
|||
|
courtesy as a leadership style. In terms of track records and
|
|||
|
techniques, however, at least prior to passage of a new Whistleblower
|
|||
|
Protection Act of 1989, the current OSC was barely distinguishable
|
|||
|
from the tenure of the previous two Special Counsels. After
|
|||
|
approximately a year into Ms. Wieseman's terms, she testified that
|
|||
|
the OSC had formally or informally obtained help for 6 out of 176
|
|||
|
government employees, meaning that until that time over ninety-six
|
|||
|
percent had not been assisted.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Further, frustrated complainants continued to report that the OSC
|
|||
|
channeled evidence to the agencies that were the targets of reprisal
|
|||
|
charges; delegated the investigatory authority for key witnesses to
|
|||
|
the office in the target agency that was responsible for defending
|
|||
|
against the reprisal charges; failed to create a verifiable record and
|
|||
|
then misrepresented the position of supporting witnesses; refused to
|
|||
|
inform the complainant of the evidence which had to be rebutted, a
|
|||
|
charge confirmed by at least one witness as well; and generally
|
|||
|
appeared to invest more resources investigating the whistleblower and
|
|||
|
his or her supporters, instead of the alleged retaliation. The OSC
|
|||
|
remains a leading agency in practicing secret law. Ironically, it
|
|||
|
employs this approach in determining whether to defend those who
|
|||
|
allege reprisal for exposing coverups of misconduct.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The OSC has boasted that one of "the most extended and intensive
|
|||
|
investigations we've ever done" involved Veterans Administration
|
|||
|
police officer John Berter, who was fired after challenging nauseating
|
|||
|
police brutality of minorities and veterans. The question is -- who
|
|||
|
was the OSC investigating? The OSC stood by passively until Berter
|
|||
|
complained in Rep. Schroeder's hearings on proposed whistleblower
|
|||
|
legislation. At that point, the OSC went to work. But according to a
|
|||
|
House civil service subcommittee staff investigation, the OSC
|
|||
|
proceeded to attack Berter's "motives, his allegations, his doctors,
|
|||
|
his supporters, his witnesses, the victims, his skills and a prior FBI
|
|||
|
report that found substance to his charges." After six witnesses
|
|||
|
submitted affidavits repudiating the OCS's characterization of their
|
|||
|
testimony, the office refused to tell Berter the evidence he needed to
|
|||
|
rebut the charges.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In a closeout letter that failed to discuss any of the 27
|
|||
|
affidavits submitted by Berter from victims or witnesses, the OSC
|
|||
|
dismissed all of his charges, at most conceding some "peripheral"
|
|||
|
validity. Although the OSC approved Berter's firing, two national
|
|||
|
good government organizations -- the Cavallo Foundation and the
|
|||
|
Giraffe Society -- honored him with awards for his courage in
|
|||
|
exercising First Amendment rights.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Lack of enforcement, combined with the OSC's proclivity for biased
|
|||
|
investigation, has led to an increase in fear of reprisal among
|
|||
|
prospective whistleblowers. In 1980, 19 percent of federal employees
|
|||
|
who witnessed but did not report fraud, waste and abuse, cited fear of
|
|||
|
reprisal as the reason for remaining silent. By 1983, the figure had
|
|||
|
jumped to 37 percent. In 1985, the MSPB admitted in a press release
|
|||
|
that "[t]here has been a significant increase in the fear of
|
|||
|
reprisals, the reason given for not having reported fraud, waste, and
|
|||
|
abuse." Clearly, if the OSC was cracking down on offending agencies,
|
|||
|
instead of reinforcing them, fear of reprisal would be on the decline,
|
|||
|
rather than increasing.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The most fundamental problem with the Civil Service Reform Act of
|
|||
|
1978 is that it took basic constitutional rights away from civil
|
|||
|
servants and gave the job of protecting them to the Special Counsel.
|
|||
|
By stripping whistleblowers of the right to defend themselves in most
|
|||
|
cases, the new law left them at the mercy of a hostile bureaucratic
|
|||
|
welfare agency for personnel disputes.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Even when they could control their cases, it was in the Merit
|
|||
|
Systems Protection Board, a minor league, hopelessly politicized
|
|||
|
administrative forum. Previously federal workers had access to the
|
|||
|
courts to challenge First Amendment reprisals, where they could pursue
|
|||
|
suits for punitive damages in a jury trial before their peers.
|
|||
|
Although Congress had not stated it was abolishing constitutional
|
|||
|
remedies when it passed the 1978 statute, it also did not explicitly
|
|||
|
preserve them.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Faced with this ambiguity, in 1983 the Supreme Court leaped at the
|
|||
|
chance to wash its hands of federal employment disputes. In Bush v.
|
|||
|
Lucas, the Court held that whenever a Civil Service Reform Act remedy
|
|||
|
is available, the Constitution is not. Although the Reform Act's
|
|||
|
primary sponsors filed a friend of the court brief protesting that
|
|||
|
they had intended no such result, Congress has not acted to overturn
|
|||
|
Bush.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
After 1982 Congress increasingly recognized that its 1978 free
|
|||
|
speech shield had nightmarishly backfired, actually providing a clear
|
|||
|
channel for increased harassment. In 1982, Special Counsel Alex
|
|||
|
Kozinski was forced to resign after the revelations that he was
|
|||
|
teaching a course for federal managers on how to fire whistleblowers
|
|||
|
without getting caught. Representative Patricia Schroeder also
|
|||
|
introduced a bill to abolish the OSC, which had become a Trojan Horse
|
|||
|
for whistleblowers -- a legalized dirty tricks unit that identified
|
|||
|
wounded dissenters seeking help and then teamed up with employers to
|
|||
|
finish them off.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Although the bill and momentum to abolish the OSC died after
|
|||
|
Kozinski's resignation, Congress went back to the drawing board. No
|
|||
|
one could credibly claim the system was working, due to accelerating
|
|||
|
disclosures of continuing civil service abuses and intensifying
|
|||
|
exposures of bureaucratic corruption that typically had been
|
|||
|
covered-up for years.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
After three congressional hearings, in September 1986 the House
|
|||
|
unanimously passed a Whistleblower Protection Act. The Senate did not
|
|||
|
act on the legislation, however, due to time pressure and an
|
|||
|
Administration veto threat. Two more hearings later, in October 1988
|
|||
|
the House and Senate unanimously passed a nearly-identical bill.
|
|||
|
After appearing to change his mind and praising the legislation in a
|
|||
|
letter to Congress, President Reagan waited until Congress adjourned
|
|||
|
and then pocket-vetoed it. Congress did not back down. Congressional
|
|||
|
negotiators persuaded the Bush Administration to accept an even
|
|||
|
stronger bill, and on March 19 it again passed unanimously. The
|
|||
|
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 became effective July 9.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The jury is out as to whether the new legislation will be any
|
|||
|
better than its counterproductive predecessor. On the plus side, the
|
|||
|
new law creates the strongest language on the books affirming freedom
|
|||
|
of speech. It also represents an unprecedented mandate for the law of
|
|||
|
dissent. It is rare that Congress passes anything unanimously, let
|
|||
|
alone twice in six months. It is even rarer to find a consensus
|
|||
|
between the White House, Congress, labor and civil liberties groups.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
By contrast, however, whistleblowers still are burdened by the
|
|||
|
weakest remedies. They still are not entitled to a jury trial by
|
|||
|
their peers, or to punitive damage remedies like all other Americans
|
|||
|
-- even convicted felons -- can receive when the government violates
|
|||
|
their constitutional rights. Other than the Supreme Court, they only
|
|||
|
can appeal adverse bureaucratic decisions to one appellate court, the
|
|||
|
Federal Circuit, which has an obsessively hostile track record of
|
|||
|
ruling against whistleblowers and whose precedents butchered freedom
|
|||
|
of speech. Whistleblowers will continue to be at the mercy of the
|
|||
|
MSPB and Special Counsel, whose abuses led to passage of the new law
|
|||
|
which they will have a monopoly to implement at the administrative
|
|||
|
level where nearly all the action will be. In short, the new rights
|
|||
|
will be no stronger than the will of discredited civil service
|
|||
|
agencies to enforce them.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The new law has ten major provisions to strengthen the rights of
|
|||
|
public servants. It -- 1) provides teeth for the Government Employees
|
|||
|
Code of Ethics; 2) closes the loopholes in legal protections; 3)
|
|||
|
defangs the Office of the Special Counsel; 4) gives whistleblowers
|
|||
|
control of their cases; 5) eliminates the legal motives test; 6)
|
|||
|
reforms unrealistic legal burdens-of-proof; 7) provides interim relief
|
|||
|
for those who win an initial hearing; 8) gives a transfer preference
|
|||
|
to victorious whistleblowers; 9) strengthens whistleblower disclosure
|
|||
|
channels; and 10) saves alternative statutory remedies. Each of these
|
|||
|
changes are discussed in more detail below.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
1. Enforcing the Government Employees Code of Ethics. The law
|
|||
|
forbids agencies from acting against any employee for declining to
|
|||
|
engage in illegal activity. Section 4(b), 5 USC 2302(b)(9). Prior
|
|||
|
law required employees to follow orders and protest after the fact,
|
|||
|
which meant they could be fired for refusing to be lawbreakers. The
|
|||
|
change gives teeth to the principles of the Government Employees Code
|
|||
|
of Ethics.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
2. Closing the loopholes in legally-protected dissent. The law
|
|||
|
specifies that "any" whistleblowing disclosure is protected if the
|
|||
|
contents are significant and reasonable. Section 4(a), 5 USC
|
|||
|
2302(b)(8). This eliminates the current Swiss cheese definition of
|
|||
|
whistleblowing. Prior law only protected "a" disclosure, which the
|
|||
|
Office of the Special Counsel and Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
|
|||
|
interpreted as an excuse to exclude dissent unless the whistleblower
|
|||
|
was the first to expose a problem; could prove his or her motives were
|
|||
|
to help the public, and not self- interest; was accusing specific
|
|||
|
officials of intentional misconduct; first went through the agency
|
|||
|
chain-of-command; phrased the dissent as an accusation rather than a
|
|||
|
question or request for information, or overcame other bureaucratic
|
|||
|
loopholes that the OSC and Merit Board created as necessary to rule
|
|||
|
against dissenters.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
3. Defanging the Office of the Special Counsel. Although created
|
|||
|
as the government's defender of those victimized by merit system
|
|||
|
violations called prohibited personnel practices as discussed above,
|
|||
|
the OSC earned a well-deserved reputation as the administration's
|
|||
|
primary weapon against whistleblowers. The new statute requires the
|
|||
|
OSC to protect whistleblowers and not act contrary to their interest.
|
|||
|
Section 2(b)(2)(B).
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
More specifically, the OSC must -- provide status reports to
|
|||
|
employees seeking help (Section 3, 5 USC 1214(a)(1)(A) and (B)); stop
|
|||
|
working on a case after 120 days without the employee complainant's
|
|||
|
consent (Section 3, 5 USC 1214(a)(4)); refrain from leaking the
|
|||
|
employee's evidence or OSC-obtained information about the complainant
|
|||
|
to the employer or others during or after the investigation, unless
|
|||
|
the employee consents (Section 3, 5 USC l2l2(h)); refrain from
|
|||
|
disclosing the identity of an employee making a whistleblowing
|
|||
|
disclosure without prior consent, even if "the Special Counsel
|
|||
|
contends violating confidentiality is necessary for the OSC to carry
|
|||
|
out its duties (Section 3, 5 USC 1213(g)(2) and (h)); refrain from
|
|||
|
settling a case without including the employee's comments and gaining
|
|||
|
legal approval (Section 3, 5 USC l2l4(b)(2)(C)); explain the evidence
|
|||
|
supporting as well as opposing the employee's reprisal charges, in any
|
|||
|
letter closing out a case (Section 3, 5 USC l2l4(a)(2)(A)); and
|
|||
|
refrain from intervening in related appeals without the employee's
|
|||
|
consent. Section 3, 5 USC 1212(c)(2). Further, any negative OSC
|
|||
|
findings cannot be introduced in the subsequent MSPB appeal. Section
|
|||
|
3, 5 USC 1214(a)(2)(B). These protections will shield all federal
|
|||
|
workers from OSC abuses, not just whistleblowers.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
4. Giving whistleblowers control of their cases. For many common
|
|||
|
forms of reprisal, whistleblowers had a choice of the OSC or nothing.
|
|||
|
In addition to piling on against reprisal victims, the OSC has
|
|||
|
practiced "secret law," with employees unable to learn the evidence
|
|||
|
used against them or to confront their accusers. Under the new law,
|
|||
|
all federal workers or applicants can challenge whistleblower
|
|||
|
reprisals through an on-the-record, due process hearing at the Merit
|
|||
|
Systems Protection Board. Employees who use their new hearing rights
|
|||
|
must first file complaints with the Special Counsel for 120 days, but
|
|||
|
if there is no decision after that time the employee is free to take
|
|||
|
control of the case by filing for a hearing. Section 3, 5 USC
|
|||
|
1214(a)(3)(B). Similarly, if the OSC turns down the complaint on an
|
|||
|
allegation not previously appealable, the employee can file for a
|
|||
|
hearing within 60 days. Section 3, 5 USC 1214(a)(3)(A). Further,
|
|||
|
employees can file their own action to seek temporary relief through
|
|||
|
an administrative stay against a threatened or ongoing whistleblower
|
|||
|
reprisal. 5 USC 1221(c).
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
5. Eliminating the legal motives test. Under prior law
|
|||
|
whistleblowers had to prove that retaliation was a "predominant" or
|
|||
|
"motivating" factor in order to establish an initial case. This was
|
|||
|
the most frequently-cited reason why the MSPB ruled against
|
|||
|
whistleblowers. It's almost impossible to prove a manager's hostile
|
|||
|
state-of-mind without a confession. Under the new law, whistleblowers
|
|||
|
only will have to prove that dissent was "a contributing" factor in
|
|||
|
the job action (Section 3, 5 USC 1214(b)(4)(B)(i) and 1221(e)(1)), and
|
|||
|
are explicitly relieved of having to prove that the agency had
|
|||
|
retaliatory motives. Section 4, 5 USC 2302(b)(8).
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The definition of contributing factor is the cornerstone for the
|
|||
|
new legal groundrules. To underscore its mandate, congressional
|
|||
|
leaders repeated the definition five times during the floor debate
|
|||
|
preceding unanimous Senate and House passage of the new law. They
|
|||
|
explained that "a" factor and "a contributing" factor both have the
|
|||
|
same definition. The terms mean "any factor, which alone or in
|
|||
|
connection with other factors, tends to affect in any way the outcome
|
|||
|
of the decision." The adjective "contributing" pertains to a factor's
|
|||
|
relevance in the personnel action, not to its significance.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
6. Reforming unrealistic legal burdens-of-proof. Under past law
|
|||
|
whistleblowers had the burden throughout their legal challenge to
|
|||
|
prove a prohibited personnel practice by a preponderance of the
|
|||
|
evidence. Under the new law once an employee establishes an initial
|
|||
|
case that whistleblowing was "a contributing" factor in the personnel
|
|||
|
action, the burden-of-proof shifts to the agency to prove by "clear
|
|||
|
and convincing evidence" -- one of the most difficult standards in
|
|||
|
civil law -- that it would have taken the same action anyway on
|
|||
|
independent grounds. Section 3, 5 USC l2l4(b)(4)(B)(ii) and
|
|||
|
1221(e)(2). This also reverses the MSPB's precedent in the Berube
|
|||
|
decision that whistleblower firings are legal if the agency "could
|
|||
|
have" acted on independent grounds.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
7. Interim relief. Under prior law employees who prevailed at an
|
|||
|
initial MSPB hearing stayed off the job and off the payroll while the
|
|||
|
agency pursued an appeal to the full Board. Under the new law,
|
|||
|
whistleblowers or others who win at the initial hearing must be
|
|||
|
returned to the job or at a minimum the payroll during the appeal.
|
|||
|
Section 6, 5 USC 7701(b)(2).
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
8. Transfer preference. Legal victories for whistleblowers have
|
|||
|
been hollow when they were returned to hostile, vengeful supervisors
|
|||
|
whom they had just defeated. Typically they soon were fired again on
|
|||
|
new charges. The new law allows whistleblowers who win to get
|
|||
|
preference for a new job and a fresh start. Section 5, 5 USC 3352.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
9. Strengthened whistleblower disclosure channels. The new law
|
|||
|
forbids the Special Counsel from leaking a whistleblower's charges
|
|||
|
back to the target agency, unless the OSC has the employee's consent
|
|||
|
or rules the dissent is reasonable and orders the agency to
|
|||
|
investigate and report back. Section 3, 5 USC 1213(g)(2). When the
|
|||
|
report comes in, the new law requires the whistleblower's critique to
|
|||
|
be included in all public releases and files -- which is important
|
|||
|
since most agency self- investigations produce self-exonerations. 5
|
|||
|
USC 1213(e)(3).
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
10. Saving alternate statutory remedies. As discussed above, The
|
|||
|
Bush v. Lucas Supreme Court doctrine held that an employees' right to
|
|||
|
file suit in district court for constitutional violations was
|
|||
|
cancelled by duplicative civil service administrative remedies -- a
|
|||
|
horrible trade. The recent judicial trend has been to cancel out
|
|||
|
parallel statutory remedies as well. The new law explicitly protects
|
|||
|
all other statutory remedies that could be alternatives to the
|
|||
|
Whistleblower Protection Act. Section 3, 5 USC 1222.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Military Whistleblower Protection Act -- 1988
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In an effort to give military whistleblowers the same protection
|
|||
|
from reprisal offered to civilians, Congress passed the Military
|
|||
|
Whistleblower Protection Act that was introduced by Rep Barbara Boxer
|
|||
|
(D-CA). It established formal procedures for handling harassment
|
|||
|
claims within the Services.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Military personnel now have the right to an immediate
|
|||
|
investigation by the Department of Defense Inspector General and a
|
|||
|
hearing by their particular service's Board for the Correction of
|
|||
|
Military Records (BCMR) if they are harassed for blowing the whistle
|
|||
|
on fraud, waste, and abuse. An earlier and unsuccessful military
|
|||
|
whistleblower bill introduced in 1986 provided for an appeal to a
|
|||
|
civilian court if the whistleblower was dissatisfied with the BCMR
|
|||
|
ruling. But the provision was dropped for the 1988 version of the
|
|||
|
Military Whistleblower Protection Act and was replaced with a final
|
|||
|
appeal to the Secretary of Defense. The bill is also useful for
|
|||
|
military whistleblowers because it strengthens their right to
|
|||
|
communicate directly with the Congress.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
When the provision for appeal to civilian courts was eliminated
|
|||
|
from the bill, it lost a great deal of its punch and became little
|
|||
|
more than a stronger statement of military whistleblower's rights.
|
|||
|
The enforcing agencies are still the service Inspectors General and
|
|||
|
the BCMR, two groups that have been seen by military whistleblowers as
|
|||
|
hatchet men for the services. Hopefully, Congress will review the new
|
|||
|
policy after a reasonable period of time to see how it may be
|
|||
|
strengthened.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In the meantime, service members should remember that current law
|
|||
|
prohibits anyone from interfering with your right to communicate with
|
|||
|
a member of Congress. But don't depend on the Military Whistleblower
|
|||
|
Protection Act to provide effective protection from reprisals that may
|
|||
|
arise due to exercising that legal right.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
State Law
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Because there is no comprehensive federal law which prohibits
|
|||
|
employers from retaliating against whistleblowers, some states have
|
|||
|
adopted common law remedies under the "public policy exception to the
|
|||
|
termination-at-will doctrine." What this means is private sector
|
|||
|
employees who work without a contract can no longer be fired "at will"
|
|||
|
for blowing the whistle. In the past, an employee at-will could be
|
|||
|
fired for any reason or no reason. But today, 26 states offer
|
|||
|
protection to at-will employees who are fired for exercising their
|
|||
|
constitutional right of free speech -- such as the act of
|
|||
|
whistleblowing.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Although each of the 26 states interpret the public policy
|
|||
|
exception slightly differently, most states classify a retaliatory
|
|||
|
discharge as a tort (which is a wrongful act for which a civil action
|
|||
|
can be brought). Consequently, employees who file claims under this
|
|||
|
cause of action are entitled to jury trials and, if successful,
|
|||
|
punitive damages (which are damages awarded to you beyond the actual
|
|||
|
loss, so as to punish the source of the damage). These laws give
|
|||
|
private sector whistleblowers who have no federal protection from
|
|||
|
retaliation, a chance to fight back in court.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The following states have recognized the public policy exception
|
|||
|
to the termination-at-will doctrine:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
|
|||
|
Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada,
|
|||
|
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon,
|
|||
|
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
|
|||
|
and Wisconsin.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Fifteen states have passed statutes protecting whistleblowers:
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maine,
|
|||
|
Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Texas, Washington
|
|||
|
and Wisconsin.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Some of these states provide broad protection, while others
|
|||
|
provide only narrow or limited protection. Consult an attorney to
|
|||
|
determine what kind of protection is offered in your state and what
|
|||
|
procedure to follow in filing a claim.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Piecemeal Protections -- The Private Sector
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In states without the public policy exception, corporate employees
|
|||
|
must contend with a confusing, piecemeal system of scattered free
|
|||
|
speech laws. The federal government has passed whistleblower
|
|||
|
protection provisions tucked into sixteen various federal statutes to
|
|||
|
shield employees who help to enforce those laws. Most involve
|
|||
|
environmental protection.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Unfortunately, while similar each law has its own peculiarities.
|
|||
|
Further, none cover corporate employees for all public policy dissent,
|
|||
|
only for an employer's violation of the particular statute at issue.
|
|||
|
As a result, food industry workers are legally protected for
|
|||
|
disclosing air and water pollution by their employer, but not for
|
|||
|
revealing shipments of contaminated poultry or beef from cattle with
|
|||
|
tuberculosis. A 1987 report of the Administrative Conference of the
|
|||
|
United States attacked this irrational, patchwork approach to the law
|
|||
|
of dissent.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In an attempt to restore coherence, Senators Howard Metzenbaum
|
|||
|
(D.- Ohio) and Senator Grassley have proposed an Employee Health and
|
|||
|
Safety Whistleblower Protection Act to fill the holes by protecting
|
|||
|
private or state and local employees who help to defend any federal
|
|||
|
health and safety law. It also would correct unrealistic provisions
|
|||
|
in current law, such as extending the statute of limitations from 30
|
|||
|
days to six months after the discriminatory act. Many workers aren't
|
|||
|
even aware of their rights for the first 30 days after firing.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
No government agency has opposed the bill in principle, since a
|
|||
|
free flow of information from witnesses is essential for law
|
|||
|
enforcement. But the Bush Administration's position is murky, the
|
|||
|
powerful meat and poultry lobby is hysterically opposed and the
|
|||
|
Chamber of Commerce has worked to undercut the legislation. As a
|
|||
|
result, few co-sponsors have been recruited. The prospects for this
|
|||
|
reform will depend on the intensity of support from constituencies and
|
|||
|
citizens groups who would benefit. Unquestionably, there will be
|
|||
|
increased exposure of corporate crime if private sector whistleblowers
|
|||
|
have legal protection for trying to prevent health and safety
|
|||
|
tragedies.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
BLOWING THE WHISTLE WHEN YOU HAVE A SECURITY CLEARANCE
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
It goes without saying that when you have a security clearance and
|
|||
|
access to classified documents, you should not give classified
|
|||
|
documents to uncleared people for any reason. However, that does not
|
|||
|
protect your clearance when you blow the whistle. There are several
|
|||
|
new initiatives by the Executive Branch that make it easier for the
|
|||
|
bureaucracy to retaliate against whistleblowers by taking away their
|
|||
|
security clearances. Because it is a harder job to fire someone who
|
|||
|
has told embarrassing truths, the bureaucracy can ruin a career by
|
|||
|
taking away your security clearance, which often makes you unable to
|
|||
|
work in your field.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In an apparent attempt to prevent whistleblowers from leaking
|
|||
|
information about government fraud and waste, President Reagan
|
|||
|
introduced Standard Forms 189 and 4193 in 1983. These forms are known
|
|||
|
as non-disclosure agreements. The controversial forms demand secrecy
|
|||
|
pledges from all government employees with access to classified
|
|||
|
information.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The seeds of Standard Form 189 were sown by President Roosevelt in
|
|||
|
1902 and further germinated under President Taft in 1909. By 1909,
|
|||
|
civil servants were prohibited from furnishing information to Congress
|
|||
|
directly. Taft's order provided that no federal employee "shall
|
|||
|
respond to any request for information from either House of
|
|||
|
Congress...." In the years following Taft's new order, Congress acted
|
|||
|
to neutralize it by passing the Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912. This
|
|||
|
Act provided that "the right of employees to petition Congress ... or
|
|||
|
to furnish any information to either House of Congress ... may not be
|
|||
|
interfered with or denied."
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Allegedly or ostensibly, in response to concerns about leaks of
|
|||
|
information, the Reagan Administration attempted to push the clock
|
|||
|
back to 1909 by issuing National Security Decision Directive 84, which
|
|||
|
initially expanded the use of polygraph tests and ordered
|
|||
|
prepublication review agreements for federal employees with security
|
|||
|
clearances. Fortunately, Congress stepped in and pressured the
|
|||
|
administration by holding hearings on the subject. Ultimately, Reagan
|
|||
|
withdrew the proposed expansion of polygraph tests. The
|
|||
|
Administration agreed to withdraw the prepublication review, or prior
|
|||
|
restraint, provisions but later changed its mind and reneged on the
|
|||
|
commitment.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In addition to the two polygraphs and prepublication review, NSDD
|
|||
|
84 included authorization to issue nondisclosure agreements. This led
|
|||
|
to Standard Forms 189 and 4193. The former was for any employee with
|
|||
|
a security clearance; the latter for employees with clearance for
|
|||
|
access to particularly sensitive information. The forms served, in
|
|||
|
essence, as contracts between the government and the employee. Under
|
|||
|
the terms of these "contracts," if the employee released any
|
|||
|
classified or "classifiable" information, he or she breached the
|
|||
|
agreement, for which the employee agreed to loss of security clearance
|
|||
|
and criminal prosecution. The term "classifiable" meant all
|
|||
|
information that could or should have been classified, or "virtually
|
|||
|
anything," in the words of the federal official responsible for its
|
|||
|
enforcement. It left open the option for after-the-fact
|
|||
|
classification and liability. To add insult to injury, under Air
|
|||
|
Force regulations it is evidence of disloyalty for an employee to
|
|||
|
exhibit reluctance about signing the form that surrenders his or her
|
|||
|
constitutional rights.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Both forms also prohibited disclosures to "unauthorized"
|
|||
|
recipients. This barred release unless the agency that created the
|
|||
|
documents agreed the proposed recipient had a "need to know" the
|
|||
|
information -- even if that person also had a security clearance and
|
|||
|
chaired a congressional oversight committee. The net impact was that
|
|||
|
all whistleblowing disclosures involving information that could be
|
|||
|
classified under some circumstances had to be submitted for prior
|
|||
|
review. This was a formula to seal coverups, since few corrupt
|
|||
|
bureaucrats agree that Congress need to know about their misconduct.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
SF 4193 reinstated the lifetime prepublication review that the
|
|||
|
Administration had promised to remove. This is a complete system of
|
|||
|
prior restraint, and goes well beyond prior Supreme Court decisions.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Originally, the Reagan Administration proposed a campaign to get
|
|||
|
voluntary signatures for SF 189. In November 1986, however, just as
|
|||
|
the Iran-Contra scandal was breaking, it issued regulations making the
|
|||
|
agreement a mandatory condition for all employees to keep or obtain
|
|||
|
their security clearances, a job prerequisite for some 3.5 million
|
|||
|
people. Senator Charles Grassley went so far as to call SF 189 an
|
|||
|
effort "to gag public servants" and "place a blanket of silence over
|
|||
|
all information generated by the government."
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In response to this threat to freedom of speech, Congress passed
|
|||
|
section 630 of Public Law 100-202 which prohibited the use of any
|
|||
|
federal funds for fiscal year 1988 for the implementation of SF 189 or
|
|||
|
any similar nondisclosure forms. A similar section was included in
|
|||
|
the continuing resolution for fiscal year 1989 as well.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Even after Congress eliminated funds for the implementation of SF
|
|||
|
189 in December 1987, the Administration collected 43,000 signed
|
|||
|
nondisclosure forms. In response, the American Foreign Service
|
|||
|
Association and seven Members of Congress filed a lawsuit challenging
|
|||
|
the Administration's refusal to obey the statute. A decision by
|
|||
|
District Court Judge Oliver Gasch conceded that the law had been
|
|||
|
violated but also found that Congress had acted unconstitutionally in
|
|||
|
passing it. Judge Gasch reasoned that as Commander in Chief the
|
|||
|
President has a monopoly of power to decide restrictions on the
|
|||
|
disclosure of information sensitive to national security. Judge Gasch
|
|||
|
further held that Congress' only constitutional authority is to pass
|
|||
|
penalties to punish those who violate the President's powers. Despite
|
|||
|
throwing out the statute, in a related decision the District Court
|
|||
|
found the term "classifiable" to be unconstitutionally vague.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Meanwhile the Administration issued new nondisclosure forms -- SF
|
|||
|
312 to replace SF 189, and SF 4355 to replace SF 4193 -- which remove
|
|||
|
the controversial "classifiable" language. Unfortunately, they also
|
|||
|
ignore the Executive Order requirement for classified information to
|
|||
|
have markings identifying its secret status before employees can be
|
|||
|
held liable for disclosure. If an employee is uncertain about an
|
|||
|
unmarked document's status, the only way to comply with the new,
|
|||
|
improved gag orders is to "ask the boss" -- a whistleblower
|
|||
|
identification scheme that creates a Catch 22: either whistleblowers
|
|||
|
will be exposed to reprisal, or will decide to keep quiet instead of
|
|||
|
challenging bureaucratic misconduct. The new forms retain and expand
|
|||
|
the requirement to identify the proposed recipient to a supervisor and
|
|||
|
to obtain prior approval based on that individual's "need to know" the
|
|||
|
information.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
They also retain all the other repressive features of the gag
|
|||
|
orders, including the claim that the government owns all information
|
|||
|
covered by the forms about which an employee may learn. Ominously,
|
|||
|
the government's property right over information is the foundation of
|
|||
|
the British Official Secrets Act.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In 1989 the Supreme Court added to the confusion by unanimously
|
|||
|
overruling Judge Gasch's decision that Congress acted
|
|||
|
unconstitutionally in passing the anti-gag statute. Unfortunately,
|
|||
|
the Court did not decide Congress had the authority to maintain open
|
|||
|
disclosure channels for whistleblowers. Rather, the justices held
|
|||
|
that the District Court had not adequately supported its conclusion
|
|||
|
that SF 312 still violated the statute. The Supreme Court said that
|
|||
|
until that issue was resolved, any rulings on constitutionality were
|
|||
|
premature.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
For the time being, the anti-gag statute is back in effect but its
|
|||
|
future is uncertain. Enclosed as an appendix is a model addendum that
|
|||
|
employees may find useful if they wish to modify previously-signed
|
|||
|
nondisclosure agreements or are ordered to sign a nondisclosure
|
|||
|
agreement or else forfeit their security clearances. The addendum
|
|||
|
specifies that the signature does not mean the employee is agreeing to
|
|||
|
waive any of his or her free speech rights.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
In January 1989 Congress learned of still another attempt to
|
|||
|
cancel out the constitutional rights of employees with security
|
|||
|
clearances. A proposed Executive Order would have reverted to-
|
|||
|
pre-McCarthy era days by eliminating all due process for decisions to
|
|||
|
grant or deny security clearances. The employee would not be entitled
|
|||
|
to any explanation. All an agency would have to do is "just say no."
|
|||
|
The proposal would have allowed unscrupulous agency managers to force
|
|||
|
employees out of the government for reasons that would be illegal if
|
|||
|
disclosed. In short, the proposal had the potential to circumvent the
|
|||
|
new Whistleblower Protection Act and all anti-discrimination statutes
|
|||
|
by creating a system of secret employment law for security clearances.
|
|||
|
After the Administration was unable to defend the proposal at hearings
|
|||
|
chaired by Representative Gerald Sikorski (D.- Minn.), the plan was
|
|||
|
withdrawn. A new Interagency Task Force has started work again,
|
|||
|
however, on overhauling the system of due process for security
|
|||
|
clearances.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Even without the new proposal, background security investigations
|
|||
|
remain a prime weapon to harass whistleblowing civil servants and
|
|||
|
government contract employees. Existing due process rights are little
|
|||
|
more than token. The administrative judges at the Pentagon work for
|
|||
|
the prosecutors seeking to yank the clearances -- the ultimate example
|
|||
|
of anti- independence for a legal decisionmakers. Indeed, the
|
|||
|
Pentagon's system has been plagued by "directed decisions." This means
|
|||
|
the administrative judge receives an order to rule against the
|
|||
|
appellant before the hearing begins.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The law of security clearances remains the Achilles Heel for
|
|||
|
freedom of speech. Employees with clearances are well-advised to
|
|||
|
zealously protect their anonymity if they blow the whistle, because
|
|||
|
absent a successful political/public relations campaign they have
|
|||
|
little chance to defend themselves.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
THE PROMISED LAND -- MAKING FREEDOM OF SPEECH A REALITY
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The principles to transform free speech and government
|
|||
|
accountability from lip service to reality are no mystery. Those in
|
|||
|
power simply prefer the former to the latter. Six basic groundrules
|
|||
|
are obvious. Whistleblowers must --
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
1)have access to courts where the decisionmakers have judicial
|
|||
|
independence
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
2)be entitled to a jury trial;
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
3)have remedies that hold individual harassers personally liable,
|
|||
|
so that an
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
4)gain access to legal shields for following government or
|
|||
|
professional codes of
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
5)have the ability to go on the attack against lawlessness by
|
|||
|
restoring citizen
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
6)restore due process rights for all violations of constitutional
|
|||
|
rights, even when
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
A model whistleblower protection statute is enclosed as an addendum.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
CHOOSING AND WORKING WITH AN ATTORNEY
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Whether a whistleblower's story has a happy or tragic ending
|
|||
|
depends to a frightening degree on picking the right lawyer and
|
|||
|
maintaining an effective working relationship. In the eyes of the
|
|||
|
law, the attorney and client are as one. The attorney is the client's
|
|||
|
"mouthpiece," and the client automatically gets the benefits or
|
|||
|
liabilities of the attorney's statements and decisions. Obviously,
|
|||
|
picking a lawyer is a very serious decision, as significant as any
|
|||
|
other in the whistleblowing cycle.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Unfortunately, most individuals are so anxious to get their case
|
|||
|
in the hands of an "expert" that they accept the first lawyer who will
|
|||
|
take them on affordable terms, without truly knowing the partner upon
|
|||
|
whom their career rights will depend. It might work out, but there
|
|||
|
are unacceptably high risks to future happiness, financial well-being
|
|||
|
and legal success.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Ultimately, trust and intuition are as important as a catalogue of
|
|||
|
"do's" and "don'ts" in selecting an attorney. Like any partnership,
|
|||
|
to be effective the attorney and client should like each other and
|
|||
|
have a rapport based on mutual respect, at least within the context of
|
|||
|
their professional relationship. After all, they're each relying on
|
|||
|
each other in a high-stakes conflict where they're underdogs by
|
|||
|
conventional measures. But the smart whistleblower will follow both
|
|||
|
intuition, and the systematic common sense of a checklist based on his
|
|||
|
or her own priorities and the lessons painfully learned by others who
|
|||
|
have gone through the same experience.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Our advice to any whistleblowers who need legal representation is
|
|||
|
summarized below. Some of the suggestions may not be appropriate in a
|
|||
|
given case. On the other hand, these tips are not all-inclusive.
|
|||
|
They represent a composite of experiences shared by those who have
|
|||
|
been represented by GAP or sought help from either of our
|
|||
|
organizations. Please let us know at GAP and PMP if you have items to
|
|||
|
add to the list, and if you have had positive or negative experiences
|
|||
|
with a particular lawyer. We both receive a steady stream of requests
|
|||
|
from new whistleblowers who could benefit from lessons learned.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
1. Identifying prospective attorneys. Do not overlook
|
|||
|
word-of-mouth referrals from friends who may have had similar
|
|||
|
experiences and enjoyed a good attorney-client relationship with a
|
|||
|
lawyer. Contact GAP and PMP for suggestions. A routine part of our
|
|||
|
service to whistleblowers is to provide attorney referrals.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Another approach is to contact public interest or community
|
|||
|
organizations -- locally, or through their national headquarters or
|
|||
|
Washington, D.C. office -- that have an ongoing interest in the
|
|||
|
issues of concern to you. Remember, the confidential attorney-client
|
|||
|
relationship will not apply during your discussions with lay
|
|||
|
representatives at those groups, so unless you want to make a
|
|||
|
disclosure to them you should avoid repeating your dissent. Just
|
|||
|
point out that you've been retaliated against for pursuing the same
|
|||
|
values on the job that their organization champions in the community
|
|||
|
or elsewhere. Then ask for their help in finding an attorney with a
|
|||
|
good track record in employment law, the topic of your dissent, or
|
|||
|
preferably both. Third, traditional sources such as the local bar
|
|||
|
association or relevant committees of the American Bar Association can
|
|||
|
help identify respected specialists. Your local public library also
|
|||
|
should have a copy of the lawyer's directory, Martindale-Hubbell,
|
|||
|
which describes the specialties of attorneys under a variety of
|
|||
|
cross-references.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
2. Getting to know each other. Probably the most common reason
|
|||
|
why working relationships go sour between attorneys and clients is
|
|||
|
that they entered their partnership with differing expectations. As a
|
|||
|
result, the primary rule in choosing a lawyer is to pin down the
|
|||
|
details up front that are important to you.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
A few suggestions apply before you even talk to a prospective
|
|||
|
lawyer, however. Take the time to summarize your story in writing and
|
|||
|
be concise -- preferably less than two single-spaced, typed pages and
|
|||
|
never more than five. Take your time preparing this document.
|
|||
|
Prospective attorneys may appreciate the time they save by reading it
|
|||
|
before they meet with you. They can then get down to asking you the
|
|||
|
hard questions from a foundation of knowing the basic dispute and its
|
|||
|
context. Your case summary also will be an attorney's first
|
|||
|
impression of your communications skills, and will be a benchmark to
|
|||
|
test your credibility through questioning to check whether you have
|
|||
|
exaggerated the facts.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Also take the time to identify solid candidates as supporting
|
|||
|
witnesses, and be prepared to describe how their testimony could help.
|
|||
|
Similarly, prepare a list of relevant documents currently or
|
|||
|
potentially available. It takes a near- miracle to win without either
|
|||
|
strong supporting testimony or documentary evidence.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Your primary goal at the initial interview is to sell yourself and
|
|||
|
therefore build the attorney's confidence in your prospects for
|
|||
|
winning. As a result, the list below of suggested questions about
|
|||
|
groundrules for working with the attorney is probably too
|
|||
|
comprehensive for an initial interview. Prospective lawyers may be
|
|||
|
wary of someone who immediately cross- examines them on too wide a
|
|||
|
range of topics. First they want to make up their minds about you.
|
|||
|
Before you get serious about signing a retainer, however, you need to
|
|||
|
know where you both stand on these matters. And some of the first
|
|||
|
suggestions below obviously must occur at the initial interview.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Find out in advance if there is a fee for the initial
|
|||
|
consultation with the lawyer, and if so, how much it will cost.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Before you share your life and problems with the lawyer, confirm
|
|||
|
that the attorney-client privilege applies to what you discuss and
|
|||
|
that the information will not be revealed without your consent.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Even if you have confirmed the confidentiality of the
|
|||
|
discussions, don't take any chances. Learn whether the attorney has
|
|||
|
any other clients related to your dispute. Before your introductory
|
|||
|
meeting, check the list of "representative clients" in Martindale
|
|||
|
Hubbell. (Old copies may have more complete listings.) Then ask the
|
|||
|
attorney before you disclose confidential information. For example,
|
|||
|
one whistleblower at a poultry slaughter plant later learned that his
|
|||
|
powerful lawyer represented the state's poultry trade association.
|
|||
|
Not surprisingly, the lawyer allowed the statute of limitations to
|
|||
|
lapse on the whistleblower's case. Also not surprisingly, the
|
|||
|
employee could not find anyone to take a malpractice case against the
|
|||
|
lawyer in the state, which was dominated by the poultry industry.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Make clear your goals or objectives, both with respect to the
|
|||
|
attorney's representation, as well as the larger context of the public
|
|||
|
policy dispute about which you're blowing the whistle. For example,
|
|||
|
some lawyers will be uncomfortable if you continue to dissent publicly
|
|||
|
during the lawsuit. Other lawyers, who are advocates for the values
|
|||
|
you were defending with your dissent, will be uncomfortable if you do
|
|||
|
not. Similarly, different firms are appropriate for those who wish to
|
|||
|
settle a dispute quietly, compared with those whose goal is to have
|
|||
|
their day in court. For example, GAP now has a policy not to accept
|
|||
|
clients who are willing to accept financial settlements that gag them
|
|||
|
from cooperating with ongoing government investigations of their
|
|||
|
dissent.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Determine the attorney's willingness to work with groups helping
|
|||
|
to champion your dissent, if you want to continue making a public
|
|||
|
policy contribution. Some attorneys are unwilling to relinquish
|
|||
|
control of valuable information they learn from depositions or
|
|||
|
subpoenaed documents until the lawsuit is over, which might be many
|
|||
|
years and when that evidence could have prevented needless scandals or
|
|||
|
tragedies. There are valid reasons to keep significant evidence
|
|||
|
secret. For example, premature disclosures may cut out future
|
|||
|
voluntary cooperation by your former employer or colleagues in
|
|||
|
pretrial work to discover necessary facts for the trial.
|
|||
|
Alternatively, it may preclude settlement as an option by forcing an
|
|||
|
employer to neutralize your newest attacks through discrediting you in
|
|||
|
the lawsuit. These are tough choices and ultimately they are your
|
|||
|
choices. But you should pick an attorney on a similar wave length at
|
|||
|
the beginning, to avoid the possibility of serious conflicts when they
|
|||
|
would be highly damaging, at a critical point in the case.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Work out what your financial burdens and options are.
|
|||
|
Disgruntlement with a client for failing to keep up with expected
|
|||
|
payments is a major reason why lawyers reduce the time and energy they
|
|||
|
put into a case.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Pin down who will handle the case. Frequently it is not the
|
|||
|
lawyer who discusses it with you initially. Don't make a decision
|
|||
|
until you meet and have confidence in the specific attorney who will
|
|||
|
be responsible for defending your rights.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Find out how much time the attorney has and will commit to your
|
|||
|
case. Even the best lawyers are inadequate if they are so burdened by
|
|||
|
an overextended docket that they can't give you the priority you may
|
|||
|
need. On the other hand, many clients have an unrealistic expectation
|
|||
|
of how much time truly is needed in a particular case.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Determine how much time and effort the attorney wants and/or
|
|||
|
expects from you as a participant in preparing your case. Some
|
|||
|
attorneys prefer their clients to be functional partners, while others
|
|||
|
view the same client initiatives as interference. Whistleblowers,
|
|||
|
too, range from those who can't stay away from their cases to those
|
|||
|
who prefer to get on with their lives and not be bothered
|
|||
|
unnecessarily.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Get a commitment as to how much notice you will receive of
|
|||
|
developments, information and decisions that make a difference for
|
|||
|
your case.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Learn the attorney's track record in handling cases similar to
|
|||
|
yours, such as won-loss record and significant precedents or benefits
|
|||
|
obtained for other clients. One way to find out is by reviewing
|
|||
|
public court documents, such as briefs and relevant judicial decisions
|
|||
|
in similar cases that the attorney has handled.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Pin down your role in any potential settlement negotiations,
|
|||
|
including advance notice of proposals before they are made or of
|
|||
|
offers from the other side before any response is issued, and the
|
|||
|
attorney's willingness to respect your authority as the final
|
|||
|
decisionmaker in the settlement. A client is in a position of
|
|||
|
comparative weakness if an attorney threatens to quit unless
|
|||
|
settlement terms are accepted on the eve of trial. Be careful to
|
|||
|
remember, though, that your lawyer is the partner on your team who has
|
|||
|
unique expertise. Most of us have an unrealistic expectation of what
|
|||
|
we deserve to achieve in a settlement, which definitionally is a
|
|||
|
compromise where both parties are partially disappointed. Also,
|
|||
|
remember that the great majority of cases settle before trial.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
3. Signing the retainer. The main advice here is remember that
|
|||
|
the retainer agreement is a contract. Treat this agreement with as
|
|||
|
much respect as you would any other contract. It may be one of the
|
|||
|
most important you ever sign. Read the terms carefully to make sure
|
|||
|
its provisions match up with any informal agreements reached on items
|
|||
|
listed above or from your own checklist. If you don't understand a
|
|||
|
term, ask the attorney to explain it and to replace the legalese with
|
|||
|
the English translation you understand. If the attorney balks, that
|
|||
|
is a warning symptom to consider.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
4. Maintaining the working relationship. Like any other
|
|||
|
relationship, the attorney-client version requires regular tending.
|
|||
|
It is liable to sour if either party takes the other for granted. The
|
|||
|
tips below illustrate a few of the ways you can do your share to
|
|||
|
maintain a healthy partnership.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Pay your bills on time! If there is a financial crisis, give
|
|||
|
your lawyer as much warning as possible and conscientiously try to
|
|||
|
make alternative arrangements. This is a matter both of respect for
|
|||
|
your attorney's financial needs and to preclude a common excuse for
|
|||
|
tardiness or unenthusiastic advocacy.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Respect your attorney's time burdens and responsibilities to
|
|||
|
other clients. Don't cry wolf about emergencies, and don't demand
|
|||
|
instant gratification for non-emergencies. When possible, put
|
|||
|
developments in writing instead of demanding a phone or personal
|
|||
|
conference with your attorney. Confirm periodically, however, that
|
|||
|
the lawyer has read, understood and properly filed your written
|
|||
|
contributions.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* View your lawyer as a human being who has a family, gets tired,
|
|||
|
etc. Attorneys understandably resent being perceived only as success
|
|||
|
objects and may get resentful periodically if they think that's your
|
|||
|
only interest in them. It's not to your advantage for your champion
|
|||
|
to resent you.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Make sure that you and your lawyer continue to be clear about
|
|||
|
your comparative responsibilities and divisions of labor. Sometimes
|
|||
|
adjustments are necessary during the course of a case.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Don't assume that progress is being made or that nothing has
|
|||
|
happened if you haven't heard from your attorney for an extended
|
|||
|
period. Communication gaps often are innocent but damaging lapses.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Don't insist on dealing only with the lawyer running the case.
|
|||
|
Get to know the junior attorney, administrative assistants and law
|
|||
|
clerks who are important parts of that attorney's team. Work through
|
|||
|
them whenever necessary. They may be putting in a majority of actual
|
|||
|
time spent on your case anyway.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
* Inform your attorney of any initiatives that you may wish to
|
|||
|
take for getting reinforcements or additional help. That way you
|
|||
|
won't surprise your attorney by letting the cat out of the bag
|
|||
|
prematurely on a sensitive matter, or end up either duplicating or
|
|||
|
working at cross purposes with your lawyer.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The attorney-client partnership unites the whistleblower's
|
|||
|
values with the lawyer's expertise. Remember, your lawyer is working
|
|||
|
for you. But while you're the boss, your attorney is the expert guide
|
|||
|
to lead you through treacherous, largely-unknown territory.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
CONCLUSION
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
This handbook is designed to tell you of all the risks in the
|
|||
|
slippery path of whistleblowing. If we have scared you from blowing
|
|||
|
the whistle, perhaps you weren't ready. If you are still determined
|
|||
|
to do so, we now hope that you will do it in a careful, planned and
|
|||
|
effective way. The Project on Military Procurement and the Government
|
|||
|
Accountability Project are happy to give you individual advice on your
|
|||
|
unique situation after you have read this handbook and know your
|
|||
|
alternatives. Please contact the Project on Military Procurement for
|
|||
|
whistleblowing about any aspect of national security, and the
|
|||
|
Government Accountability Project for legal assistance in all areas of
|
|||
|
whistleblowing. We hope that this handbook lets you do the right
|
|||
|
thing for your country while trying to protect your career and your
|
|||
|
personal life. Good luck.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>ͻ
|
|||
|
<20> SNAFU - LIBRARIES <20>
|
|||
|
<20> <20>
|
|||
|
<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>
|
|||
|
<20> <20>
|
|||
|
<20> B - Browsing Library <20>
|
|||
|
<20> <20>
|
|||
|
<20> J - Research Library <20>
|
|||
|
<20> <20>
|
|||
|
<20> P - Defense Procurement, an Overview <20>
|
|||
|
<20> <20>
|
|||
|
<20> H - Help <20>
|
|||
|
<20> <20>
|
|||
|
<20> Q - Quit Options <20>
|
|||
|
<20> <20>
|
|||
|
<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>ͼ
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Enter an above letter then press return. Your choice? B
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>͵SNAFU BROWSING LIBRARY<52><59><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>ͻ
|
|||
|
<20> <20>
|
|||
|
<20> A - About This Library and its Organization <20>
|
|||
|
<20> <20>
|
|||
|
<20> B - Weapons Testing <20>
|
|||
|
<20> <20>
|
|||
|
<20> C - Secrecy Issues and Black Weapons Programs <20>
|
|||
|
<20> <20>
|
|||
|
<20> D - Defense Contract Issues <20>
|
|||
|
<20> <20>
|
|||
|
<20> E - Ethics and Conflict of Interest <20>
|
|||
|
<20> <20>
|
|||
|
<20> F - Readiness, Force Structure, and Budget Issues <20>
|
|||
|
<20> <20>
|
|||
|
<20> G - Weapons That Don't Work <20>
|
|||
|
<20> <20>
|
|||
|
<20> Q - Quit <20>
|
|||
|
<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>ͼ
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
Enter the letter of an above library category. Your choice? A
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
About the Browsing Library...
|
|||
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
A TALE OF TWO LIBRARIES
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
There are two major "library" facilities available on this
|
|||
|
computerized information system that we call SNAFU.
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
These are the "Browsing Library", and the "Research Library", both of
|
|||
|
which are part of the "Library System".
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The Research Library is meant for the use of journalists or others who
|
|||
|
are already knowledgable on military procurement matters. This
|
|||
|
library is meant to give such a user "no-nonesense" access to a large
|
|||
|
volume of hard documentation. We know that reporters will want to
|
|||
|
have immediate access to the actual documents without having to sift
|
|||
|
through any layers of explanatory text written by us. Therefore, the
|
|||
|
presentation philosophy of this library is "just the facts..."
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
The Browsing Library's presentation philosophy is somewhat different.
|
|||
|
Its purpose is to make possible a sort of educational journey through
|
|||
|
the issues of military procurement. This journey ultimately gives the
|
|||
|
user access to the same documentation that is available in the
|
|||
|
research library, but the documents are preceded and followed by our
|
|||
|
own explanatory text. Often this will be an anecdotal history of the
|
|||
|
material the user is being presented. Thus, the Browsing Library
|
|||
|
provides a more structured tour of our material. Hopefully the
|
|||
|
structuring will allow the uninitiated to access our material as more
|
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of a coherent whole, or mosaic, rather than a disjoint set of
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documents. We think both libraries will meet a distinct need.
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