2854 lines
152 KiB
Plaintext
2854 lines
152 KiB
Plaintext
The following was downloaded from the SNAFU BBS (202) - 547 - 6238
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***** HELP ***** Call Greg Williams, (202) 543-0883, with any questions
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Greg is the "SYSOP" or system operator
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The main sections of SNAFU are as follows --
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Input / Output - No-nonsense access to Project files. Uploads and
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downloads in a few keystrokes. A list of recent releases is
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provided. For more complete lists of our files, and search
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functions, see library section.
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Latest News / Hot Tips - Tips on possible stories, including safety and
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quality allerts we receive directly from industry and
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government.
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Whistleblower Survival Guide - Access to the Project's 50 page advice
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handbook for those who see things going awry in the
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workplace. Includes sections on the law, the press, Congress
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and Federal agencies.
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Message Center - Public and private messages can be left and received.
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You can address questions or special requests to "SYSOP".
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Libraries - This is where SNAFU holds the most information. One can
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either "Browse" files by subject heading, or "Research" by
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keyword searches. Searches will list Project materials
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available on SNAFU, as well as citations of all
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defense-related GAO reports from 1987 on.
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Entering Commands:
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When deciding on what to type next, look carefully at the bottom of the
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screen. One of several types of prompts will appear:
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More [Y]es, N)o, C)ontinuous, A)bort?
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This means the computer has more information than can fit
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on one screen. Type one of the letters in parenthases, and
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press ENTER. ("No" is essentially the same as "abort")
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Choose a letter and press ENTER
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This refers to the menu given above. Type the letter
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corresponding to the item you want, and press ENTER
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Search for (in file name/desc, wildcards name only, [ENTER] quits)?
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This relates to the search function. Type one word. The
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computer will then search for this word in all the titles
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under the list(s) you have selected.
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As a rule of thumb, read the prompt carefully to see what kind of
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response is required. If there is any doubt, ENTER will often return
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you to the previous menu. If the computer informes you of an "INVALID
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RESPONSE", read the directions again to see if you have misunderstood
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something. If instructions seem unclear, please call me (Greg) or
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leave a message to the "SYSOP".
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<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>ͻ
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<20> "Courage Without Martyrdom:" <20>
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<20> "A Survival Handbook for Whistleblowers" <20>
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<20> (For a hard copy, download WBSG.WP5) <20>
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<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>
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<20> Blowing the Whistle...............................1 <20>
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<20> <20>
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<20> Getting Prepared..................................2 <20>
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<20> <20>
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<20> Levels of Whistleblowing..........................3 <20>
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<20> <20>
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<20> The Downside of Whistleblowing....................4 <20>
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<20> <20>
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<20> Neutralizing Dissenters...........................5 <20>
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<20> <20>
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<20> Neutralizing Dissent..............................6 <20>
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<20> Q - Previous Menu M - More Whistleblower Handbook <20>
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<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>ͼ
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<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>ͻ
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<20> <20>
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<20> Whistleblower Checklist..................7 <20>
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<20> <20>
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<20> Whistleblowing Outlets.......8,9,A,B,C,D,E <20>
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<20> <20>
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<20> Defending Yourself...................F,G,H <20>
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<20> <20>
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<20> Security Clearance.......................I <20>
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<20> <20>
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<20> The Promised Land........................J <20>
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<20> <20>
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<20> Choosing an Attorney.....................K <20>
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<20> <20>
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<20> Conclusion...............................L <20>
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<20> <20>
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<20> M - Top of Handbook Menu <20>
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<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>ͼ
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This handbook was prepared by the staff of the Project on Military
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Procurement and the Government Accountability Project. Special thanks
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to Julie Stewart for her work.
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Authors
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Julie Stewart Thomas Devine Dina Rasor
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BLOWING THE WHISTLE
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This handbook is designed to help you decide whether and how to
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blow the whistle on fraudulent or wasteful activities in the
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government or industry. You may want to remain anonymous when you
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blow the whistle or you may want to go public. We want to help you
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make that decision and find the most successful way to do it. We will
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tell you what your rights are under the law but also about the
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realities of trying to obtain those rights.
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This handbook will show you the many pitfalls of whistleblowing
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and what the system usually does to individuals who attempt to tell
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the truth. If you decide to blow the whistle, we want you to do it in
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a smart and informed way that will give you a chance for success.
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This is a decision that will affect your future, your family, and your
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career. A well-planned strategy has a chance of succeeding, but
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unplanned or self-indulgent dissent is the path to professional
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suicide.
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In theory, whistleblowers have the same set of rights of free
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speech and the right to petition Congress as any other American --
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these rights are guaranteed in the Constitution. However, our
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government institutions have whittled away effective remedies for
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these rights. One example is demoting federal whistleblowers to a
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minor league and bureaucratic law system rather than having the right
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of redress in our Federal court through a jury trial before their
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peers.
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This handbook has several sections on how to blow the whistle and
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attempt to protect yourself in the current inequitable system and also
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has a section that tells you what must be done to make the system
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truly work for the whistleblower. We want people to understand how
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the system must change to be effective but if you want to blow the
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whistle now, we will let you know the realities of the current system,
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so you can make a clear-eyed decision about doing it.
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GETTING PREPARED
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Blowing the whistle is a high stakes game with a winner and a
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loser. You may not believe your employer is your adversary, but the
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record shows that employers often do not want to be told what is wrong
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with their operations. They often greet the bad news by trying to
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silence the messenger to avoid any bad publicity. Whistleblowers
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often are harassed, socially ostracized, and fired from their jobs.
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Those who aren't fired often are not given meaningful work again.
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That is why a carefully planned and executed strategy is crucial to
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winning. To protect yourself from employer harassment after blowing
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the whistle, these basic survival strategies are recommended.
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* First, before taking any irreversible steps, you should talk to your
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family or close friends about the decision to blow the whistle. One
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of the most serious risks of whistleblowing is family breakup. The
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entire family will suffer the resulting hardships. If you choose to
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challenge the system without your family's knowledge or approval, you
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may lose them in the aftermath -- a sacrifice greater than the
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professional consequences.
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* Second, before breaking ranks, you should consider whether there is
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any reasonable way to work within the system by going to the first
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level of authority. It is crucial, however, that you do it in a way
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that does not sound the alarm to trigger a coverup or expose yourself
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unnecessarily. Surprise attacks are not taken as seriously compared
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to showing that authorities responded to notice by ignorance or
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attempted to coverup the problem. It is very hard to do this
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successfully, especially if you are exposing serious wrongdoing. In a
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low-key, non- accusatory manner, you could, in writing, make it clear
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what is wrong and what you position is on the matter. You should not
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be pushy or demanding if you try this but it might be useful to your
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credibility to see if anything can be done internally before risking
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your career. Unfortunately, if you reveal yourself as a threat, you
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may be setting yourself up or letting them have time to cover up the
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problem. But if there is no record of your prior objection, the
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system may respond by making you the scapegoat for the misconduct that
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you have attempted to expose. Then your effort would be diverted to
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proving that you were not responsible for the wrongdoing.
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In many situations it is unwise or impossible for the
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whistleblower to complain internally, especially if you are exposing
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serious fraud and waste. It is hard to decide how far to protest in
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the system if you plan to remain an anonymous whistleblower. The
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decision not to inform anyone internally must carefully be made on a
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case by case basis. If you make a record of protest in the system and
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then the problem is exposed publicly, you may draw suspicion to
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yourself. You must weigh the risks and decide what is the best way to
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go in your unique situation. This decision could be one of the
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hardest judgment calls for you to make and we suggest that you talk to
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the Project on Military Procurement or the Government Accountability
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Project if you are unsure what to do.
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* Third, you should be alert and discreetly attempt to learn of any
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other people who are upset about the wasteful or fraudulent activity.
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Through strategic, but casual, questioning and discussions with
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co-workers, you can learn whether your objections are credible among
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colleagues and whether you see enough of the whole picture to make
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sure that your suspicions are well founded. Your colleagues may be
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important witnesses in the future and may know more about the
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situation or confirm that the problem is more widespread than you know
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about. However, again you should be careful not to expose yourself in
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the process as a threat to the organization's policies or be labelled
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as a troublemaker.
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* Fourth, you should be on best behavior with the administrative and
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support staff. Managers who respond to dissent with harassment and
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repression may use that same approach routinely with secretaries,
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clerks and other assistants. These people can be a great help to you
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in the future by providing you with discrete warnings or later on,
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with testimony as to management motives.
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* Fifth, before and after you blow the whistle, it is very important
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to protect yourself by keeping a careful record of events as they
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unfold. Not keeping good records of harassment and other activities
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is one of the biggest mistakes that whistleblowers make. There are
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several good ways to do this and the time you take now could be very
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valuable in any investigation or court proceeding.
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Keep a diary -- Keep a factual log of your work activities
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and what is happening around your workplace. Try to keep this diary
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as straightforward as possible, leaving out any speculations, personal
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opinions, or any animosity you may have towards the situation you are
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in or towards your fellow workers. The diary does not have to be kept
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on a daily basis, but it is important to write down events that relate
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to the fraud and waste you are planning to report or any harassment
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you are receiving because of your objection to it. Make sure that
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each entry is dated and initialed by you.
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Memoranda for the Record -- When you have an important event
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or conversation about which you want to make a permanent record, you
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should make a memorandum for the record. Place the title, Memorandum
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for the Record, at the top and then write down everything you can
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remember from the conversation or event. Then you should sign the
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memorandum, date it, and if possible, have someone witness it. If you
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need to write a memorandum for the record about a conversation or
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event where it will be your word against someone else's, the safest
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way to proceed is to write the memorandum, make a copy, seal it well
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in an envelope, and mail it to yourself. Once it is sent through the
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mail it will be postmarked and you should store it in your records
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without opening it. Then when you need to prove your claim, the
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sealed envelope will show that you wrote the memorandum on the
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postmarked date.
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* Sixth, you should identify and copy all necessary supporting records
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before drawing any suspicion to your objections. Access to
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information could be cut off once the exposure of potential waste or
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fraud is identified as a threat to the organization. Even if you plan
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to remain anonymous, it is important to have a copy of all relevant
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documents because once the problem is exposed, documents may be
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destroyed or hidden. Either way, it is very hard to blow the whistle
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successfully without credible documentation to back up your claims.
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Documentation that is generated by the organization itself is the best
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documentation. Written explanations by you are not considered good
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documentation. Look around and you will find that many managers, when
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forced to do something that could later blow up in their faces, will
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keep a "Pearl Harbor file" to show that they were only following
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orders. Those files can be very valuable in trying to prove fraud and
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waste. If you cannot copy all the documents, make copies of the best
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supporting ones and then make a list of the rest so that you can tell
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an investigator or a court exactly where to go to get the rest of your
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supporting documents. Be warned, however, that some employers such as
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the Department of Justice and certain companies will accuse you of
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"stealing" their "property" when you make copies of the evidence
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incriminating them. So far this claim has been a repressive bluff,
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except when the information's secrecy is specifically protected by
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law. This reaction by the bureaucracies and the companies has had a
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chilling effect on obtaining documentation by dissenters but you need
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to have documentation to be credible to people outside the
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bureaucracy.
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* Seventh, you should research and identify elected officials who have
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proven their sincerity, journalists, and relevant non-profit
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organizations who can help expose the fraud. To have any realistic
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hope of survival, you have to go on the offensive. For whistleblowers
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as much as any other form of conflict, the best defense is a good
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offense. It is essential to develop a support constituency whose
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interests coincide with your career survival. Regardless of legal
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rights, whistleblowers usually win when they successfully communicate
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their message to the majority of citizens who should be benefiting
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from their dissent. When they don't, they lose. Truth is still the
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most powerful political weapon in our society -- unless it is a
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secret, in which case it can be dangerous.
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However, it is important not to contact the press or the Congress
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until you have definitely decided to blow the whistle, and decided
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whether you plan to be anonymous or public. Whistleblowing is not
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||
something you want to try to do alone without help outside the
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bureaucracy.
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When you have made the decision, it is critical to remember that
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you must be on the offensive and not just react to the bureaucracy's
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or company's efforts. Once you are reduced to responding passively
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and once you have stopped setting the agenda, you will probably lose.
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When the wrongdoing is exposed, the system should be reacting to the
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press, the Congress, the courts, and the public. Having your support
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constituency informed and working with you will help you remain on the
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offensive. Don't underestimate their advice and support.
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* Eighth, you should either invest in the funds to get a legal opinion
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from a competent lawyer or talk to a non-profit watchdog organization
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about the potential retaliation you could incur, the odds for a
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successful defense, how much it could cost to defend your rights, and
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||
whether there are truly legal restrictions on any of the evidence you
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||
may be considering for disclosure. The Project on Military
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||
Procurement (PMP) and the Government Accountability Project (GAP) can
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||
give you advice, help you plan a legal strategy, help you decide about
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||
reporters and members of Congress as well as advising you about legal
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counsel.
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||
One way to help your credibility is to make sure that you do not
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||
embellish your charges. It is far better to understate rather than
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||
overstate your case because the bureaucracy can leap on every slight
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||
exaggeration and use it to discredit you. We usually advise
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||
whistleblowers to tell the Congress and the press 80 percent of your
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||
knowledge of the fraud and waste and give them ways to discover the
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last 20 percent themselves. The less you skate on thin ice with your
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||
information, the more credible you will be to people who can help you.
|
||
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||
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||
Although this list may seem overwhelming, you will appreciate its
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||
value after learning the techniques used in organizational reprisals
|
||
against whistleblowers. Taking on the system can be the best or worst
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||
decision of your life. If you intend to win, you might as well
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||
prepare and be smart about blowing the whistle.
|
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LEVELS OF WHISTLEBLOWING
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You need to consider at what level you want to blow the whistle.
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||
You can go public with your knowledge or remain an anonymous source.
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||
This decision depends on the amount and type of documents you have and
|
||
your willingness to take intense public scrutiny. Some potential
|
||
whistleblowers imagine that there is some glamour in becoming the
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||
public crusader for truth, but most will tell you that the mental
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||
anguish tarnishes any ego boost that you may anticipate. If your main
|
||
motivation is revenge, fame and recognition, you are doing it for the
|
||
wrong reasons and the system will be very effective at smashing your
|
||
ambitions. Do not forget that today's news is tomorrow's fishwrap.
|
||
Long after the public has forgotten that you were a hero, your
|
||
superiors and the system will remember what you did to them.
|
||
|
||
Also, you should not be deluded that if you just get up and tell
|
||
the truth that everything will be fine. We have been brought up with
|
||
the idea that no matter how bad the circumstances, if we just tell the
|
||
truth, we will not get spanked. There is often no justice for a
|
||
public whistleblower, just the internal satisfaction that you did the
|
||
right thing, and that you lived your values instead of stopping at lip
|
||
service. If you approach your whistleblowing with the idea that this
|
||
is all you will receive, everything else will be a bonus.
|
||
|
||
Once you become a public whistleblower, you must accept the
|
||
responsibility of following through on your charges. Besides the
|
||
social responsibility, it is almost impossible to stop mid-stream and
|
||
have any hopes of surviving the ordeal mentally or professionally.
|
||
Remember the quote from Admiral Hyman Rickover, "If you must sin, sin
|
||
against God, not against the bureaucracy. God will forgive you but
|
||
the bureaucracy never will."
|
||
|
||
The positive side of being an anonymous whistleblower is that you
|
||
may protect your career. However, you often are limited in what you
|
||
can expose because you have to make sure that the documentation that
|
||
you leak is self-explanatory and can stand on its own merit since you
|
||
cannot go public with an explanation. You may, as an anonymous
|
||
whistleblower, be able to tell another source, a reporter or your
|
||
representatives at a non-profit organization the explanation behind
|
||
the documentation. You also have to be careful that it cannot be
|
||
traced to you. Sometimes the substance of the charges can have your
|
||
"signature" because, due to your job, you are the only person who
|
||
could be aware of a problem or have unique access to the important
|
||
records. The Project on Military Procurement and the Government
|
||
Accountability Project have devised some successful ways to avoid
|
||
having a document traced back to a whistleblower, but it is virtually
|
||
impossible to guarantee that the documents cannot be traced back to
|
||
you.
|
||
|
||
Another good thing about being an anonymous whistleblower is that,
|
||
since you are not known, you are in a position to watch from inside
|
||
how the bureaucracy tries to coverup the fraud and waste once the
|
||
problem is public. We have had whistleblowers on the inside who have
|
||
leaked information and then were actually on the "damage control" team
|
||
that was intent in covering up the fraud. Public whistleblowers
|
||
usually are isolated from the bureaucracy once they are exposed.
|
||
After the flow of information dries up, it is hard to rebut whatever
|
||
the system claims it is doing to solve the problem or if they deny
|
||
that there is a problem.
|
||
|
||
To be a successful anonymous whistleblower, you must have a good
|
||
way to leak the documentation. If you decide to blow the whistle,
|
||
this handbook lists potential outlets and the best way to approach
|
||
them.
|
||
|
||
The worst thing you can do as a whistleblower is to remain
|
||
semi-anonymous. If you are suspected of the leak but are not publicly
|
||
known, you have the worst of both worlds because the system will begin
|
||
to retaliate without you having the benefit of outside resources to
|
||
blunt that attack. It takes a certain personality to leak information
|
||
anonymously while remaining cool enough not to draw suspicion. If you
|
||
don't have a good poker face and you think that there is no way to
|
||
leak the documents without it being traced to you, you are better off
|
||
going totally public or not blowing the whistle at all.
|
||
|
||
The decision over whether or not to be a public whistleblower is a
|
||
judgement call on your part. You can get advice but you know the
|
||
circumstances better than anyone else.
|
||
|
||
|
||
THE DOWNSIDE OF WHISTLEBLOWING
|
||
|
||
|
||
Another consideration before you blow the whistle is to understand
|
||
and expect the downside of your actions. Besides the obvious problems
|
||
of whistleblowing such as losing your job and unresponsive agencies
|
||
that often don't protect you, there is also an emotional and mental
|
||
price to pay for whistleblowing. People who have been lifetime
|
||
friends may turn against you and the people who work with you may
|
||
treat you as an outcast. Often, in communities that depend on the
|
||
industry or government money for its livelihood, people will ostracize
|
||
you and perhaps your family.
|
||
|
||
This kind of constant, negative pressure can color your judgement
|
||
and make you paranoid about every event. This works in the
|
||
bureaucracy's favor if it wants to paint you as an unreasonable,
|
||
possibly deranged, person whose charges should not be taken seriously.
|
||
To succeed you must be able to rise above this trap and most
|
||
importantly, keep a sense of humor about life and your situation.
|
||
|
||
It also helps to have another job or a hobby that takes a good
|
||
portion of your time so that your whistleblowing activity does not
|
||
totally dominate your life. Doing this will help you keep your
|
||
perspective that there is more to life than whistleblowing.
|
||
|
||
It is true that whistleblowers often face some type of
|
||
surveillance from either the government, the industry, or some other
|
||
private investigator. This experience can be very troubling and can
|
||
add to the misery of blowing the whistle. While it is important to
|
||
document any suspected surveillance through a diary or a memorandum
|
||
for the record, it is also important not to let suspicious activity
|
||
get to you. We often advise that if someone is watching you, he or
|
||
she wants you to become affected by the surveillance and to act
|
||
irrationally about it. It is to the benefit of your detractors for
|
||
you to sound crazy to the general public by saying that your phone is
|
||
tapped without having proof. Remember, if you have nothing to hide,
|
||
there is nothing to fear about being watched. It is very hard to
|
||
prove that you are being watched or that your phone is being tapped,
|
||
so the best way to deal with this problem is to be careful about
|
||
information you give over the phone and don't become paranoid about
|
||
it.
|
||
|
||
Another important personal consideration in your attempt to blow
|
||
the whistle is to make sure that you do not have any hidden skeletons
|
||
in your closet that you do not want to be made public. It is fairly
|
||
typical that the people who are the object of your whistleblowing will
|
||
work very hard to find some flaw in your past or in your character and
|
||
attempt to exploit it. So, a major consideration in blowing the
|
||
whistle must be your ability to withstand intense personal scrutiny.
|
||
If you haven't paid your taxes or are having an extramarital
|
||
relationship, you must be prepared for this to become public. In the
|
||
words of the famous reporter Clark Mollenhoff, you must be prepared to
|
||
live with the whole record.
|
||
|
||
If you decide to blow the whistle, you will be taking on a very
|
||
large bureaucracy or company that has a large pool of resources to
|
||
attempt to discredit you. The odds can be against you but if you have
|
||
good solid documentation and a network of people helping you, you may
|
||
be able to expose the fraud and waste and still survive
|
||
professionally, financially and emotionally. Don't underestimate the
|
||
forces against you when large sums of money and political influence
|
||
are involved. The decision to blow the whistle is ultimately yours,
|
||
even after you have prepared your case and received good advice.
|
||
|
||
The following is a list of how the bureaucracy can try to
|
||
neutralize public whistleblowers. (See next section,
|
||
"Neutralizing Dissenters").
|
||
|
||
|
||
Neutralizing Dissenters
|
||
|
||
-- Make the whistleblowers, instead of their message, the issue
|
||
|
||
The first commandment for this tactic is to obfuscate the dissent
|
||
by attacking the source's motives, professional competence, economic
|
||
credibility, sexuality, or virtually anything else that will work to
|
||
cloud the issue.
|
||
|
||
For example, when Three Mile Island engineer Richard Parks
|
||
challenged sloppy cleanup practices that could have rivaled the
|
||
accident, his employer's first reaction was to brush aside the safety
|
||
issues and place Parks under investigation for alleged financial
|
||
conflict of interest. Parks was not vindicated until he went public
|
||
and sought help from the Department of Labor, Congress, and the
|
||
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). All three supported him, and the
|
||
NRC ordered cleanup procedures to be rewritten and extensive tests to
|
||
be conducted. Over a year later the challenged cleanup was conducted
|
||
lawfully.
|
||
|
||
- Isolate the whistleblower
|
||
|
||
One technique is to transfer the whistleblower to a bureaucratic
|
||
Siberia, both to make an example of the whistleblower and to block the
|
||
employee's access to information. After Food and Drug Administration
|
||
quality control chief Dr. Joseph Settepani protested introduction of
|
||
well-known carcinogens and mutagens into the food supply, he was
|
||
reassigned to long-term research in a trailer on an experimental farm.
|
||
|
||
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) engineer James Pope served
|
||
as the agency's ombudsman for the general aviation constituency, until
|
||
he pursued the wrong issue -- FAA suppression of an industry-developed
|
||
backup device to warn pilots of impending midair collisions. The FAA
|
||
reasoned that certifying the private device, which had passed all
|
||
agency tests for feasibility and reliability, would obviate the
|
||
agency's own budgeted long- term research and development program for
|
||
a backup to the Air Traffic Control system. After Pope dissented, his
|
||
superiors reassigned him to Seattle, Washington, where his duties
|
||
vanished, except for tasks such as selling bonds to local Boy Scout
|
||
troops.
|
||
|
||
-- Put them on a pedestal of cards
|
||
|
||
Another technique involves appointing the whistleblower to solve
|
||
the problem and then making the job impossible through a wide range of
|
||
obstacles undercutting any realistic possibility of achieving reform.
|
||
The finale is then to fire the employee for incompetence when the
|
||
problem is not solved.
|
||
|
||
Engineer Bertrand Berube was a victim of this tactic at the
|
||
General Services Administration, where Administrator Gerald Carmen
|
||
assigned Berube to correct serious building code violations --
|
||
numerous fire and occupational safety hazards Berube had identified at
|
||
several federal facilities. Unfortunately, Berube was denied the
|
||
staff authority and even access to information necessary for his
|
||
mission. Later, he was fired for his failure.
|
||
|
||
-- Display chutzpa in selecting charges
|
||
|
||
One principle is that it is important to go well beyond merely
|
||
defeating a whistleblower. In order to prove to others that no one is
|
||
safe, the goal is to make the most outrageous charges possible. For
|
||
example, a whistleblower who is renowned for being a gentleman may
|
||
face sexual harassment charges. A soft-spoken, self-effacing
|
||
individual will be branded a loud-mouth egomaniac.
|
||
|
||
-- Prosecute them
|
||
|
||
The longstanding threat to attack whistleblowers for "stealing"
|
||
the evidence used to expose corruption is getting more serious,
|
||
particularly for federal employees or government- contract workers.
|
||
The foundation is similar to the premise of the British Official
|
||
Secrets Act: the government owns all the information it generates or
|
||
possesses. Employees with security clearances have to sign a
|
||
nondisclosure form accepting the government's property right as a
|
||
condition of keeping their clearances. (See BLOWING THE WHISTLE WHEN
|
||
YOU HAVE A SECURITY CLEARANCE.) In August 1989 the Justice Department
|
||
announced abandonment of a decade long policy not to prosecute
|
||
whistleblowers for unauthorized disclosures. Now the Attorney General
|
||
will try to send whistleblowers to jail for leaking information about
|
||
criminal investigations, or even for running afoul of civil statutes,
|
||
such as by allegedly violating the Privacy Act rights of culprits who
|
||
may be identified in the unauthorized whistleblowing disclosure.
|
||
|
||
-- Eliminate the job
|
||
|
||
A common tactic is to lay off whistleblowers even as the company
|
||
or agency is hiring new staff. Again for purposes of teaching others
|
||
a lesson, the more obvious the inconsistency the better. A closely
|
||
allied tactic is to reorganize away the structural independence of
|
||
particular responsibilities, such as when a nuclear engineering firm
|
||
deemphasizes the quality control department by making it a component
|
||
of the production staff.
|
||
|
||
-- Destabilize whistleblower's support base
|
||
|
||
Destabilizing a whistleblower's support base refers to withdrawal
|
||
of research privileges, data access, or most often subordinate staff.
|
||
When Anthony Morris challenged the swine flu vaccine and other
|
||
dangerous drugs, his Federal Drug Administration superiors transferred
|
||
his animal handler, a person whom Mr. Morris had relied on for many
|
||
years as a functional partner in the laboratory. The most advanced
|
||
form of this tactic then calls for overwhelming the whistleblower with
|
||
new work during the disruption, to be followed by dismissal for
|
||
incompetence when he or she fails to keep up.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Neutralizing Dissent
|
||
|
||
|
||
The point of the preceding tactics is to overwhelm the whistleblower
|
||
in a struggle for self-preservation -- of career, family, bank
|
||
account, even sanity -- until the point of dissent is forgotten or put
|
||
behind weightier survival priorities. There are specialty methods for
|
||
neutralizing dissent, some which are listed below.
|
||
|
||
-- Separate expertise from authority
|
||
|
||
The goal here is to have organization men make even technical
|
||
decisions, with limited advisory input for the experts. As a result,
|
||
all of Morton Thiokol's practicing engineers could argue against the
|
||
Challenger launch and be overruled by those with management functions.
|
||
|
||
-- Keep them ignorant
|
||
|
||
This is an extreme use of the national security "need to know"
|
||
rule that is legitimate far less often than it is employed. For
|
||
example, after whistleblower Charles Stokes and other dissenting
|
||
engineers who challenged manipulation of results in the seismic design
|
||
review of the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant were transferred away,
|
||
the company brought in replacements who were unfamiliar with the job
|
||
history and who knew better than to ask questions about unrealistic
|
||
assumptions for calculations.
|
||
|
||
-- Substitute democracy for the scientific method
|
||
|
||
When convenient, normally undemocratic organizations will
|
||
substitute the bureaucratic equivalent of mob rule, where a group of
|
||
engineers who will not challenge the status quo out vote the
|
||
whistleblower without applying the objective tests of the scientific
|
||
methods. A more subtle variation of this tactic is to misuse peer
|
||
review as a discrediting tactic by packing the panel with a particular
|
||
bias, or as a stalling tactic by instituting duplicative or
|
||
unnecessary reviews.
|
||
|
||
An example that combined both tactics involved the dissent of NRC
|
||
engineer Isa Yin, who had investigated and confirmed whistleblower
|
||
Stoke's charges at Diablo Canyon. When Yin's investigation threatened
|
||
to block approval of the plant's license, the NRC appointed a team of
|
||
fifty engineers to take over completion of the work and to engage in
|
||
peer review of his findings. At the ultimate licensing vote they all
|
||
disagreed with Yin, who was reduced to arguing the facts in isolation
|
||
and protesting that he had been prevented from access to the necessary
|
||
data. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
|
||
stayed the license for five months during 1984, in part due to doubts
|
||
on the handling of Yin's dissent.
|
||
|
||
-- Prevent a written record
|
||
|
||
When a policy is indefensible, the goal is to restrict debate to
|
||
an oral dialogue. This can be enforced through peer pressure,
|
||
overscheduling so there is not time for a record, or even a gag order
|
||
if necessary. The point is that it is difficult to accuse someone of
|
||
revising an oral history, and accountability will be diffused in case
|
||
of a catastrophe.
|
||
|
||
For example, in 1985 the NRC's internal affairs unit, the Office
|
||
of Inspector and Auditor (OIA), reexamined the peer review process
|
||
that had overruled engineer Isa Yin and Diablo Canyon whistleblowers
|
||
about design issues on which the plant's license was legally
|
||
conditioned. In its report OIA concluded that due to a lack of
|
||
available supporting information, it was "unable to assess the
|
||
validity of [peer review] conclusions" on key issues. More generally,
|
||
OIA reported that it "did not find sufficient documentation to
|
||
demonstrate that [the NRC staff] had verified the quality of the
|
||
design control program, either in a direct inspection or in licensing
|
||
review."
|
||
|
||
None of these techniques are new. Defensiveness and the instinct
|
||
to strike back when criticized are as old as the history of organized
|
||
society. But in 1973 President Nixon raised, or lowered, reprisal
|
||
techniques to a new level of sophistication. Fred Malek, his Director
|
||
of the White House Personnel Office (and, coincidentally, Chairman of
|
||
the 1988 Republican National Convention) issued the Malek Manual, a
|
||
secret report on how to purge the career civil service system of
|
||
"unresponsive" employees -- whistleblowers or Democrats -- without
|
||
running afoul of the law. The reprisal tactics above are largely
|
||
drawn from the Malek Manual and illustrated with more recent examples.
|
||
Ironically, whistleblowers exposed the Malek Manual and it was
|
||
published in the Watergate Committee's report.
|
||
|
||
Now that you have some idea of what can happen to you, a decision
|
||
has to be made on whether you still want to blow the whistle. The
|
||
following checklist can help you see if you are ready to blow the
|
||
whistle either anonymously or publicly:
|
||
|
||
|
||
WHISTLEBLOWER CHECKLIST
|
||
|
||
|
||
Things to consider if you plan to remain anonymous when you blow the
|
||
whistle:
|
||
|
||
1. Am I in the position to know that what I see as fraud really is
|
||
improper in the bigger picture?
|
||
|
||
2. Can I prove my allegations with self-explanatory documents that
|
||
don't need my public explanation?
|
||
|
||
3. Can these documents be traced to me because a small group of
|
||
people received them or my copies are uniquely marked?
|
||
|
||
4. Can I act nonchalant when these documents are disclosed so as not
|
||
to attract suspicion?
|
||
|
||
5. If discovered, do I or my spouse have the ability to support my
|
||
family outside my current profession?
|
||
|
||
6. Is my family prepared for the possibility of a negative high
|
||
public profile?
|
||
|
||
|
||
Things to consider when you are going to be a public whistleblower:
|
||
|
||
1. Are my family and I financially and mentally ready for a
|
||
protracted fight with my employers to prove the waste and/or fraud and
|
||
to try to retain my job?
|
||
|
||
2. Am I mentally ready to have my fellow workers and perhaps my
|
||
friends turn against me because of my disclosures?
|
||
|
||
3. Am I ready for personal attacks against my character and to have
|
||
my past indiscretions made public?
|
||
|
||
4. Do I have adequate documentation to prove my charges without
|
||
having to go back to my workplace?
|
||
|
||
5. Am I sure that my motivations are to expose the fraud for the sake
|
||
of the country and not just sour grapes, revenge, or public attention?
|
||
|
||
6. Am I financially and mentally ready to change my career to work
|
||
outside my current field?
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
WHISTLEBLOWING OUTLETS
|
||
|
||
|
||
Not all whistleblowing outlets are equal. Some provide greater
|
||
confidentiality than others, some are genuinely concerned about
|
||
exposing waste and fraud, some want to discourage dissent. However,
|
||
there are alternatives to the company or agency hotlines and you
|
||
should be aware of the advantages and disadvantages of each route
|
||
before you choose. We will explain how each is supposed to work and
|
||
then tell you, by past examples what really does happen.
|
||
|
||
We believe from our experience of working with whistleblowers that
|
||
non-profit groups, the press and false claims suits are the most
|
||
effective outlets under the current circumstances and climate. Your
|
||
whistleblowing situation is unique, so it is important to study each
|
||
option to find the best one for your circumstances.
|
||
|
||
We will start with Executive Branch outlets that have not had a
|
||
good track record and end with the outlets that we believe have proven
|
||
to be the most successful. Study each section carefully.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Federal Hotlines
|
||
|
||
In 1979, the Secretary of Defense established the Department of
|
||
Defense hotline as an avenue for the now Inspector General's office to
|
||
learn of potential wrongdoing or mismanagement. Today there are 17
|
||
other departments and agencies that have hotlines, and the Army, Navy
|
||
and Air Force each sponsor one. In an effort to institutionalize the
|
||
process of reporting misconduct, the President's Council on Integrity
|
||
and Efficiency (PCIE) recommended standards for receiving, controlling
|
||
and screening allegations. They direct that:
|
||
|
||
-- a simple, well-publicized way be developed for agency employees and
|
||
other interested persons to submit allegations of fraud, waste, abuse
|
||
and mismanagement while preserving anonymity when possible and if
|
||
desired;
|
||
|
||
-- a retrievable record be maintained of each allegation received;
|
||
|
||
-- each allegation be screened as soon as possible after receipt based
|
||
upon the nature, content, and credibility of the complaint, and in
|
||
light of priorities and resources, an appropriate decision on whether
|
||
or not to refer the complaint for further inquiry be made for each
|
||
allegation;
|
||
|
||
--the rationale for the decision on each allegation be documented in
|
||
the record.
|
||
|
||
With these standards as guidelines, hotlines are supposed to
|
||
operate similarly: You call the toll-free hotline and report an
|
||
allegation of fraud, waste, or mismanagement. That allegation is
|
||
reviewed to determine if followup is necessary. If the allegation
|
||
merits further review, it is sent to an investigator who goes into the
|
||
field to research the report. If the investigation verifies the
|
||
allegation, corrective action is taken and the case is closed. In
|
||
theory it sounds very straightforward and simple. In practice, it is
|
||
anything but clear-cut. There are far too many gray areas in federal
|
||
hotline investigations largely because the government agency is
|
||
investigating itself.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Problems with Hotlines
|
||
|
||
Standardization of hotline procedures has not been achieved. In a
|
||
report by the PCIE (September 1987) the DOD hotline received top
|
||
billing as the best run hotline but the PCIE admitted many of the
|
||
other hotlines do not meet operational standards. In an effort to
|
||
improve the uniform handling of hotline calls, the PCIE has set up
|
||
training courses available to federal, military and private industry
|
||
hotline operators.
|
||
|
||
Two areas of concern addressed in the PCIE training courses are
|
||
confidentiality of the source and case followup. Confidentiality is a
|
||
problem inherent in the hotline system. How does a whistleblower
|
||
provide sufficient information to support the allegation without
|
||
giving away details that identify himself? Because the balance is
|
||
hard to strike, much of the information received is either watered
|
||
down to the point that no investigation follows, or is traced back to
|
||
the only person who could have that knowledge.
|
||
|
||
At some hotlines, confidentiality is treated with outright
|
||
disdain. A spokesman for the DOD IG hotline (who asked not to be
|
||
identified) believes many military hotline operators are more
|
||
concerned about discovering who the caller is than whether the
|
||
allegation is true. In an atmosphere where discipline, conformity,
|
||
and unquestioning obedience to orders are prized above all else, it
|
||
should come as no surprise that a whistleblower could be regarded as a
|
||
traitor.
|
||
|
||
Take the case of John Kartak. After 19 years in the Army, he was
|
||
assigned to the recruiting station in Minneapolis. There he found
|
||
that unqualified applicants were recruited in order to meet quotas.
|
||
High school diplomas were forged and criminal records were concealed
|
||
so marginal recruits could be signed up. When Kartak refused to
|
||
endorse the misconduct, he called the Army hotline and blew the
|
||
whistle.
|
||
|
||
Kartak's "reward" for his integrity was repeated harassment
|
||
including two psychological evaluations ordered by his superiors and
|
||
involuntary commitment. One of his superiors told the VA hospital,
|
||
"He has lodged numerous complaints recently. . .I find his behavior
|
||
highly unstable. I am concerned that he may do something to harm
|
||
himself or others." Kartak was also ostracized, threatened, and
|
||
intimidated by his co-workers.
|
||
|
||
Kartak was vindicated when the Inspector General confirmed his
|
||
charges and found at least 58 people in the Minnesota recruiting
|
||
office guilty of engaging in illegal acts. In addition to forging
|
||
documents, one recruiter demanded sex from a female recruit, several
|
||
were dealing and using drugs and running a prostitution ring, and two
|
||
were charged with receiving stolen goods purchased from criminals they
|
||
recruited. But the price of Kartak's vindication was high and the
|
||
abuse of the hotline system's confidentiality was evident.
|
||
|
||
Case followup is another area the PCIE emphasizes in its training
|
||
courses. It would like all agencies to adopt the procedure used by
|
||
the DOD and General Accounting Office (GAO) hotlines. Those hotlines
|
||
assign each caller a case number so they can call back later to find
|
||
out what action was taken on their allegation. This system maintains
|
||
the anonymity of the whistleblower while permitting him to followup on
|
||
his case. The details of the case are not disclosed to the caller,
|
||
but he is told if the case was closed and whether it was
|
||
substantiated.
|
||
|
||
For a full report of a closed case the whistleblower must file a
|
||
request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) which can
|
||
jeopardize his or her anonymity. The problem is, in order to file a
|
||
FOIA request, the whistleblower must identify himself. The request,
|
||
with his name on it, will be sent to the IG investigating the report
|
||
and can make its way back to the very persons committing the offense.
|
||
This kind of Catch-22 can lead to serious reprisal.
|
||
|
||
Nancy Kusen discovered how the FOIA Catch-22 works. Ms. Kusen is
|
||
a contract administrator for the Defense Contract Administration
|
||
Service (DCAS). In 1985 she began complaining about overcharging and
|
||
alleged shoddy work on Navy contracts by the Elliot Company. She
|
||
complained first to her superiors and when nothing seemed to happen,
|
||
she called the DOD hotline. The call led to an investigation by the
|
||
Defense Criminal Investigating Service which substantiated many of the
|
||
complaints but found no criminality. At the same time, Ms. Kusen
|
||
became the target of reprisals ranging from lowered performance
|
||
evaluations, denials of promotion, and repeated harassment.
|
||
|
||
In October 1986, Ms. Kusen filed a FOIA request to find out the
|
||
status of her case. Records show her request was referred to the
|
||
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) which, in turn, asked United
|
||
Technologies Corporation (Elliot's parent company) if it objected to
|
||
the release of the audits. The DCAA included a copy of Ms. Kusen's
|
||
FOIA request containing her name, address and home phone number.
|
||
According to the DCAA it is "routine practice" to include the FOIA
|
||
request.
|
||
|
||
The FOIA request that disclosed Ms. Kusen's name to Elliot's
|
||
parent company provided positive identification that she was the
|
||
whistleblower, enabling them to single her out for harassment. In Ms.
|
||
Kusen's case, however, the harassment already had started shortly
|
||
after her initial call to the DOD hotline, convincing her that the
|
||
hotline disclosed her identity to DCAS. But Ms. Kusen's experience
|
||
with the FOIA request serves as a warning to other whistleblowers who
|
||
may consider filing one to find out the status of their case. Ms.
|
||
Kusen's case also contributed to the caveat now offered by the
|
||
Inspector General's office to FOIA requestors: " Your confidential
|
||
status as a hotline caller does not apply to requests under the
|
||
Freedom of Information Act." Yet, if you don't file a FOIA, you can't
|
||
tell if the government investigated your charges in a thorough manner.
|
||
|
||
Other problems with hotlines were noted in a General Accounting
|
||
Office report on the DOD Hotline (March 1986). Although the DOD has
|
||
taken steps to correct the problems, it is likely that if they exist
|
||
at the best-run hotline, they exist within all hotlines. According to
|
||
the GAO, there are four recurring problems with the hotline system:
|
||
|
||
* investigator objectivity
|
||
|
||
* insufficient documentation on case files
|
||
|
||
* incomplete investigative reports that do not comply with DOD
|
||
reporting requirements
|
||
|
||
* limited action on planned remedial follow-up
|
||
|
||
|
||
Another problem that the GAO does not mention is DOD's current
|
||
policy is that companies should govern themselves, or
|
||
"self-governance" as urged by the Packard Commission and is
|
||
downplaying the role of government investigators. Therefore, the
|
||
hotline operators realize that challenges to the present system from
|
||
within do not receive a great deal of support by DOD policymakers.
|
||
|
||
In an effort to correct the 1986 GAO report problems at the DOD
|
||
hotline, the DOD has started a Quality Assurance Review. The review
|
||
checks the files of DOD field investigations to ensure that the
|
||
summary report matches the investigative report. DOD also claims that
|
||
it is more carefully reviewing cases it refers to the services. This
|
||
is important because whether it is done advertently or inadvertently,
|
||
the hotline can buck the information back to the services who then can
|
||
send it right back to the program manager who may be involved in the
|
||
fraudulent or wasteful activity.
|
||
|
||
The record of action taken on DOD hotline allegations indicates
|
||
the system is still not operating in the best interest of most
|
||
whistleblowers. In the 1987 calendar year, the DOD hotline received
|
||
9,425 total contacts. It opened 1,186 cases from those contacts,
|
||
substantiated 226 cases and partially substantiated another 329 cases.
|
||
Not all those cases were opened in 1987. Some had dragged on from the
|
||
previous years so it is impossible to know how many of the original
|
||
1,186 cases opened in 1987 were substantiated the same year. As any
|
||
good investigator knows, if the government does not move within a year
|
||
to substantiate charges, the bureaucracies often can cover up any
|
||
fraud or waste as time goes on.
|
||
|
||
A similar GAO Fraud Hotline Summary published in April 1988
|
||
reported that during its nine years of existence, the GAO hotline
|
||
received 94,000 calls, found only 13,992 cases worthy of
|
||
investigation, and closed 11,246 of those cases. Of the cases closed,
|
||
1,589 were substantiated. Another 580 cases were not substantiated
|
||
but action was taken to prevent improper activity from reoccurring.
|
||
This means of the 94,000 hotline calls and letters reported to the
|
||
GAO, 2.3 percent were substantiated or acted upon.
|
||
|
||
These figures are somewhat misleading when one considers that not
|
||
every call received at the hotline is a report of fraud, waste, or
|
||
mismanagement. Hotlines receive callers who have personnel problems
|
||
that should be handled in-house, crank calls, people with questions
|
||
and even the occasionally lonely person who just wants to talk. But
|
||
it is doubtful that a significant number of the 94,000 GAO calls fell
|
||
into these categories.
|
||
|
||
Whether blame for the dismal record of substantiated hotline calls
|
||
can be placed on investigator objectivity, incomplete investigations,
|
||
or watered down reports from the whistleblowers, the figures speak for
|
||
themselves. The odds of reporting fraud, waste, and mismanagement and
|
||
actually having it investigated and corrected are small. The figures
|
||
above do not instill confidence in a prospective whistleblower that
|
||
the hotline system will work for them.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Incentive Suggestion Programs
|
||
|
||
After several embarrassing disclosures of spare parts costs a few
|
||
years ago, the services and the DOD claimed to be serious about
|
||
establishing suggestion programs to save money. They began to reward
|
||
individuals for suggesting ways to reduce spare parts overpricing.
|
||
According to the Navy, calls to its pricing hotline during 1987
|
||
resulted in refunds from 21 defense contractors that totalled
|
||
$1,805,271. But to put that figure in perspective, one needs to
|
||
realize that the total dollars spent on Navy spare parts during 1987
|
||
was $2,093,000,000.
|
||
|
||
A general outline of the Service Suggestion Programs follows:
|
||
|
||
* Submit your suggestion in writing to the Price Monitor/Installation
|
||
Resource Management Office at your base.
|
||
|
||
* After preliminary review, the suggestion is sent out for
|
||
investigation.
|
||
|
||
* If the suggestion is adopted, you receive a percentage of the
|
||
savings ranging from $50-25,000. Any award of $25,000 must be
|
||
approved by the President.
|
||
|
||
The nature of the programs eliminates anonymity which means the
|
||
caller may be subjected to harassment from superiors who are
|
||
comfortable with the status quo. This is especially true because
|
||
often the official policy and the rules and regulations that are
|
||
guiding the procurement of these items are set up to maximize the
|
||
amount of money that is spent. This is done for political reasons to
|
||
make sure that the budget is spent every year and to justify more
|
||
money the following year for the bureaucracy.
|
||
|
||
Airman Thom Jonsson found out the Air Force preferred the status
|
||
quo to his suggestions for saving money. Jonsson was working for the
|
||
maintenance and supply section of the C-5A cargo planes at Travis Air
|
||
Force Base in California. In the course of his duties he discovered
|
||
that many spare parts were purchased for incredible prices, including
|
||
the now infamous $7622 coffee brewer. Another example was an armrest
|
||
pad which cost $670, but Jonnson determined that it could be made on
|
||
base for $25 with no rearrangement of machinery or personnel. The
|
||
Local Manufacture Supervisor at Travis Air Force Base concurred with
|
||
Jonsson's estimate.
|
||
|
||
In January 1984, Jonsson submitted his money-saving proposal to
|
||
his base's Zero Overpricing Program representative. In April, Jonsson
|
||
received notice that his proposal was "not in the best interest of the
|
||
Air Force." He resubmitted his suggestion and waited for a response.
|
||
By August 1985 he had heard nothing and decided to contact the Project
|
||
on Military Procurement, a non- profit watchdog agency. After the
|
||
Project evaluated his situation and discussed with him what he wanted,
|
||
his information was taken to Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) who was
|
||
then the chair of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative
|
||
Practices and Procedures. The subcommittee asked Jonsson to come to
|
||
Washington and testify before the committee. Jonsson went to the
|
||
Capitol on his own time and testified in civilian clothes about the
|
||
excesses he had witnessed on the C-5A spare parts. The hearing
|
||
generated a lot of publicity which helped to keep the Air Force from
|
||
retaliating against him. He finally did get some money for his
|
||
suggestion.
|
||
|
||
A year later Senator Grassley asked Jonsson if the prices of the
|
||
spare parts, including the armrest, had gone down and Jonsson reported
|
||
that they had barely changed. When a press conference was scheduled
|
||
to expose the situation, the Air Force began to harass Jonsson. He
|
||
was denied routine leave, assigned a "babysitter" to make sure that he
|
||
"didn't get into trouble" and an attempt was made to arrest him on the
|
||
ironic charge of illegal destruction and disposal of spare parts.
|
||
|
||
Several members of Congress protested loudly, with Senator
|
||
Grassley, and Representatives John Dingell(D-MI) and Barbara Boxer
|
||
(D-CA) stepping in to protect Jonsson effectively from harassment.
|
||
|
||
Jonsson's case is an illustration of how a suggestion program can
|
||
go awry, and how sound suggestions are not always welcomed and can
|
||
lead to harassment.
|
||
|
||
|
||
IG, DOD Cash-Awards Programs
|
||
|
||
The IG, DOD Cash-Award program is different from the Service
|
||
incentive suggestion programs in several ways. It gives rewards
|
||
arbitrarily to those individuals whose disclosures save money rather
|
||
than systematically to anyone who suggests a viable way to reduce
|
||
spare parts costs. This means the program is not incentive motivated.
|
||
Calling the DOD hotline with a report of waste will not guarantee you
|
||
a cash reward.
|
||
|
||
One would like to think that after being publicly recognized and
|
||
honored for saving the government money, your superiors would not have
|
||
the motivation or nerve to harass you. But after your moment of glory
|
||
has faded and you revert back to your regular employee status, you
|
||
will be left facing perhaps the very management you accused of
|
||
wrongdoing. They may not forgive and forget.
|
||
|
||
Since the inception of the program in May 1984, 38 people have
|
||
been recognized for cash awards totalling $46,000. Their disclosures
|
||
have led to claimed cash savings of over $36 million. To put that in
|
||
perspective, the DOD will have spent $1,975,449,000,000 from FY 1984
|
||
to FY 1990. (DOD IG Semi-Annual Report to Congress, 10/1/87 to
|
||
3/31/88)
|
||
|
||
|
||
Office of Special Counsel
|
||
|
||
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 created a formal
|
||
whistleblowing disclosure channel through the Office of the Special
|
||
Counsel, which has a parallel duty separate from defending employees
|
||
against repressive personnel practices. The Special Counsel screens
|
||
whistleblowing disclosures and orders agency chiefs to investigate the
|
||
challenges that have merit. When the OSC determines that there is a
|
||
"substantial likelihood" the whistleblower's charges are accurate, a
|
||
more intensive reform process is triggered. The agency head must
|
||
investigate and reply within sixty days in a report whose contents are
|
||
specified by statute, including the issues and evidence that were
|
||
investigated, the methodology for the probe, a summary of the evidence
|
||
obtained, findings of fact and law, and a summary of corrective action
|
||
to solve any verified problems. After receiving the whistleblower's
|
||
comments, the Special Counsel evaluates the report for completeness
|
||
and reasonableness. Then the report is sent to the President and
|
||
Congress. The Special Counsel must maintain a copy of each report in
|
||
a public file, along with the employee's comments.
|
||
|
||
The purpose of the OSC whistleblowing disclosure channel was "to
|
||
encourage employees to give the government the first crack at cleaning
|
||
its own house before igniting the glare of publicity to force
|
||
correction." Indeed, if administered in good faith, the Reform Act
|
||
mechanism offers strategic benefits for a whistleblower to be
|
||
effective in his or her dissent. It could offer an opportunity to
|
||
gain the legally-binding judgment of an objective third party that the
|
||
whistleblower's charges must be taken seriously. At a minimum, it
|
||
maximizes the public whistleblower's credibility and helps to reduce
|
||
isolation. The OSC evaluation that there is a "substantial
|
||
likelihood" the allegations are well-taken is the bureaucratic
|
||
equivalent of a "Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval" for that
|
||
particular dissent.
|
||
|
||
By comparison the OSC has handled its responsibilities to screen
|
||
whistleblowing disclosures more objectively than its duties to
|
||
investigate and act against job reprisals. On occasion, the
|
||
combination of OSC support for the dissent and the knowledge of
|
||
evaluations at the end of the process also have helped to improve the
|
||
quality of agency reports in response to whistleblowing disclosures.
|
||
In both the nuclear power and safe food areas, the Nuclear Regulatory
|
||
Commission, U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Department of
|
||
Health and Human Services have confirmed the validity of employees'
|
||
dissent and taken serious corrective action. A guideline for
|
||
preparing OSC whistleblowing disclosures is enclosed as an appendix.
|
||
|
||
Unfortunately, as a general rule, this option at best produces
|
||
only cosmetic reform. Structurally, even with OSC support the agency
|
||
targeted by the whistleblower's charges is investigating itself. Good
|
||
faith responses have been the exception rather than the rule.
|
||
|
||
Further, the OSC typically accepts as reasonable and complete
|
||
whatever report the agency sends back. As a result, more likely than
|
||
not an OSC whistleblowing disclosure is merely an opportunity for the
|
||
agency to cover up the evidence, perfect its defenses and then issue
|
||
an official self-exoneration that soon will be approved by the Special
|
||
Counsel -- all before serious investigations by Congress, the media or
|
||
other outside groups that would like to ferret out the truth. This
|
||
means an OSC whistleblowing disclosure usually will be
|
||
counterproductive unless it is part of a larger strategy involving
|
||
other institutions. That was the case with all of the examples listed
|
||
above.
|
||
|
||
In some instances the OSC channel has been treacherous. On
|
||
numerous occasions the Special Counsel has ruled that the dissent was
|
||
unreasonable but then sent it to the agency chief anyway without the
|
||
employee's consent. These "informal referrals" have been a double
|
||
whammy -- advance warning to the agency of serious dissent, and an
|
||
invitation to retaliate with impunity since the Special Counsel's
|
||
ruling meant the dissent was too unreasonable to qualify as legally
|
||
protected speech. New legislation should make the OSC a safer channel
|
||
for whistleblowing disclosures, by forbidding the Special Counsel from
|
||
forwarding the employee's charges or revealing his or her identity
|
||
without consent.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Inspectors General
|
||
|
||
Whistleblowing disclosures through the Special Counsel can enhance
|
||
the quality of another conventional channel for investigation of
|
||
employee concerns -- the Office of Inspector General. Each agency has
|
||
one, either by that name or another. These offices are responsible
|
||
for investigating and reporting on alleged misconduct by the agency or
|
||
its employees. The IG's at most major agencies are covered by the
|
||
Inspector General Act of 1978 or a similar, subsequent statute.
|
||
|
||
Employees who are considering disclosures to an IG should
|
||
ascertain if it is a statutory Office of Inspector General. The
|
||
distinction is quite significant. Statutory IG's can only be
|
||
nominated and dismissed by the President. Non- statutory IG's are
|
||
hired and fired by the agency chief whose programs they are
|
||
investigating. The agency head can comment on but not change the text
|
||
of reports by statutory IG's. By contrast, agency chiefs have
|
||
unlimited censorship rights for reports by non-statutory IG's.
|
||
Statutory IG's have the authority to investigate reprisals against
|
||
their witnesses. Non-statutory IG's can investigate only what the
|
||
agency chief permits. To illustrate what this means, each year up to
|
||
10% of referrals to the Department of Justice's IG equivalent, the
|
||
Office of Professional Responsibility, are to investigate and identify
|
||
for possible criminal prosecution the source of "leaks" -- usually
|
||
anonymous whistleblowing disclosures.
|
||
|
||
On balance, IG's have a mixed track record at best of responding
|
||
to whistleblowers. Even offices with statutory independence are
|
||
staffed predominantly by employees from the "old days," when the IG
|
||
was management's eyes and ears. That meant that if the agency chief
|
||
wanted to get the facts and act against wrongdoing, the IG performed
|
||
as a law enforcement agency. If the agency leader wanted to cover up
|
||
a problem, the IG report assembled the case for the defense and the IG
|
||
acted as a hatchetman to do the dirty work of discrediting the
|
||
whistleblower. Traditionally it has not been uncommon for an IG to
|
||
investigate the whistleblower rather than his or her charges.
|
||
|
||
To some extent these traditions are changing. But whistleblowers
|
||
are well-advised to seek expert advice or retain an attorney, even for
|
||
coaching purposes, before going to an Inspector General. You should
|
||
pin down how the IG will conduct the investigation before sharing your
|
||
concerns and evidence. You should insist that all agreements, plans,
|
||
and schedules be confirmed in writing, rather than handling matters
|
||
informally or leaving anything to trust. Under some circumstances, it
|
||
might be wise to approach the IG armed with the extra credibility of a
|
||
substantial likelihood finding and an order to investigate from the
|
||
Special Counsel.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Congress
|
||
|
||
It would be nice to think that our elected officials only
|
||
represent each one of us as individuals, but members of Congress are
|
||
pulled by all types of constituent groups, including major industries
|
||
in their state or district. For that reason, it is important to do
|
||
some research before blowing the whistle to your local member of
|
||
Congress. Some questions you might ask are: Are there any
|
||
contractors in your area of whistleblowing or large military bases in
|
||
his or her district or state? Find out how the member feels about
|
||
your particular agency or company before you discuss anything and ask
|
||
about their methodology in a case load. Also investigate their past
|
||
track record in battling the system with other whistleblowers and call
|
||
those people to see if they were satisfied with the member of
|
||
Congress's tenacity in fighting the system and protecting their right
|
||
to blow the whistle. If the office does not have a strong record of
|
||
supporting whistleblowers, you may think twice about trusting that
|
||
member.
|
||
|
||
Some members of Congress simply pass complaints about the
|
||
bureaucracy back to the agency to investigate itself. This action is
|
||
rarely successful -- the matter is often bucked down to the
|
||
perpetrators of the fraud. To make matters worse, members of Congress
|
||
may not be willing to protect your identity, even if you ask them to,
|
||
because of the inexperience of the congressional staff in dealing with
|
||
the bureaucracy or the individual member's courage to stand up to a
|
||
large bureaucracy or company.
|
||
|
||
Whistleblowers often make the mistake of thinking that their best
|
||
ally to expose the fraudulent activity is the authorizing committees
|
||
in the Congress that give the bureaucracy its money. Although some
|
||
congressional committees have a vigorous oversight staff, many of the
|
||
members of the committees are captured by the same influences that
|
||
pressure the individual member of Congress.
|
||
|
||
For example, the Pentagon procurement scandals in the 1980's have
|
||
shown that cozy relationships exist between some members of
|
||
congressional committees and contractors. The Armed Services
|
||
Committees in the House and the Senate often have members appointed to
|
||
them because of the large defense contractors or military
|
||
installations in their state or district. If a member of Congress
|
||
does not have much military activity in their state or district when
|
||
they are first appointed to the committee, Pentagon money gradually
|
||
gravitates to their area because of their own efforts or because the
|
||
Pentagon and the defense contractors are trying to win influence with
|
||
the committee. In addition, in 1987, the Chairman of the House Armed
|
||
Services Subcommittee on Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems
|
||
received 80 percent of his yearly honoraria from speeches from defense
|
||
contractors. His is not an isolated case: 6 of the other 18 members
|
||
of his committee also received more than 50 percent of their yearly
|
||
honoraria from defense contractors.
|
||
|
||
It also is important to remember that as an institution, Congress
|
||
can be as unwilling to hear bad news as the Executive Branch. It is
|
||
true that some of the major scandals of the 1980's have been exposed
|
||
with the help of certain congressional committees but once the
|
||
headlines fade, it is rare that the Congress as a whole really wants
|
||
to shake up the status quo and pass meaningful reform. It was
|
||
Congress which passed the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act that
|
||
ultimately stripped whistleblowers of their constitutional remedies.
|
||
Congress has been unwilling to challenge consistently the Executive
|
||
Branch's claim to exclusive power in the area of national security.
|
||
(see DEFENDING YOURSELF IN THE BUREAUCRACY OR COMPANY) So don't forget
|
||
that Congress as a whole may be as willing to cover up problems as the
|
||
Executive Branch.
|
||
|
||
There are some members of Congress who are interested in the
|
||
whistleblower's plight and can offer you some protection. When
|
||
properly motivated members of Congress have rallied to the
|
||
whistleblower's cause. In addition, certain members of Congress
|
||
provided the clout to protect individual whistleblowers from reprisal.
|
||
It is a crime to interfere or harass a congressional witness but the
|
||
Congress has made the mistake of rarely enforcing the law thus
|
||
emboldening the bureaucracies to strike back at the whistleblower for
|
||
their disclosures to Congress. As we have seen, congressional
|
||
intervention in the Thom Jonsson case prevented the Air Force from
|
||
further harassing Airman Jonsson (see Incentive Suggestion Programs).
|
||
But congressional protection of individuals is the exception and
|
||
should not be depended on. If you plan to go to a member of Congress,
|
||
you first need to check that individual's record very closely.
|
||
|
||
If you decide to contact a member of Congress, it is important to
|
||
know what to include in your correspondence and how to package it:
|
||
|
||
* Before you write to any member, make sure that you have thoroughly
|
||
checked their track record. You need to make sure that you do not
|
||
divulge any information to them before you take this important step.
|
||
Find out if they have helped any whistleblowers before and if they
|
||
followed up once the headlines faded. You can do this by following
|
||
their past cases in the papers. If you find that they are not still
|
||
working on the problem or trying to protect the whistleblower, you
|
||
need to be wary.
|
||
|
||
* Keep it short. Most staff members won't read more than a page. If
|
||
it is impossible to condense your letter to two pages or less, it is a
|
||
good idea to prepare a one page fact sheet as well. At the beginning
|
||
of your longer letter, flag the fact sheet for the staff member.
|
||
|
||
* Make it clear early in your letter whether you want your name or
|
||
documents to be shown to anyone in the bureaucracy. Otherwise, your
|
||
letter may be processed right back to the agency where you work or
|
||
that oversees your contractor. Also, make it clear to the reader that
|
||
if you need to remain anonymous, you request that they take caution
|
||
and talk to you before they take any steps on your letter.
|
||
|
||
* In a clear and concise way, state your factual case in the
|
||
beginning. Enclose the most important documents but don't send a huge
|
||
stack. Make a list of other documents that you have and don't send
|
||
originals. Keep your story clear of government jargon and don't
|
||
assume that the staff member who will be reading the letter will
|
||
understand how your bureaucracy or company works. If you need to send
|
||
a longer statement, separate it from your cover letter which should be
|
||
no more than a two page summary.
|
||
|
||
* It is alright to talk about any harassment or retaliation that you
|
||
have received, but put it at the end of the letter and don't dwell on
|
||
it. Also, at the end of the letter, make suggestions on where to go
|
||
to investigate and get more collaborating documentation. Let them
|
||
know if there are any investigative agencies that are working on your
|
||
case and whether or not you think they are successfully uncovering
|
||
anything of value.
|
||
|
||
* Make sure that the staff member has a way to reach you during
|
||
working hours. If you can't talk to them at the workplace, find a way
|
||
for someone to take a message for you and return their call during
|
||
your lunchtime.
|
||
|
||
* If you haven't received a reply within two weeks, call the office in
|
||
Washington and ask to speak to the Legislative Assistant (LA) who
|
||
covers your area. Congressional staff members are very busy and the
|
||
most successful whistleblowers know when to keep calling a staff
|
||
member and when to wait. Don't be a pest but make sure that you do
|
||
not fall through the cracks. Don't demand attention and be polite at
|
||
all times. The Congress is also a large bureaucracy and it can be as
|
||
frustrating as any other agency.
|
||
|
||
Watchdog groups have good working relationships with various
|
||
members of Congress and you may be more successful going through them.
|
||
These watchdog groups can play the role of advocate for you and
|
||
sometimes can keep you anonymous.
|
||
|
||
|
||
The Press
|
||
|
||
One of the most obvious whistleblower outlets is the press (which
|
||
includes television news). On the surface it seems to be the easiest
|
||
and quickest way to let American taxpayers know that their dollars are
|
||
being wasted. Indeed, it can be very effective when handled properly
|
||
through a responsible reporter. But not all reporters are willing to
|
||
take the time and effort necessary to publish your allegation and
|
||
maintain the anonymity of their source.
|
||
|
||
To protect yourself, you need to choose a reporter carefully.
|
||
That involves doing some research. Find out who covers your area of
|
||
expertise for each of the major newspapers and networks and look at
|
||
their work. That means either asking reporters to send you copies of
|
||
stories they have done on your general area or going to the library
|
||
and reading back copies or the newspapers or magazines. It is
|
||
important to have an idea of how a reporter will handle your story
|
||
before you give it to him or her, so make sure you like the reporter's
|
||
approach to whistleblowing, waste and fraud, and how they cover the
|
||
agency to which they are assigned. If you find that the reporter's
|
||
stories just seem to echo what is handed out of the public relations
|
||
office of the agency or company, it is not likely that they will do
|
||
the type of questioning or investigating that you need. Keep looking
|
||
until you find a reporter whose approach closely reflects what you
|
||
hope to achieve by blowing the whistle.
|
||
|
||
You also have to decide whether to contact a local reporter or the
|
||
national press. There are advantages and disadvantages to each one.
|
||
The local reporter will be more interested in your story because of
|
||
its local implications but he or she also will have more pressure not
|
||
to print the story because the company or the bureaucracy has a
|
||
powerful economic base in the local area. Local reporters will be
|
||
able to follow up by speaking to local people who can anonymously back
|
||
up your claims and perhaps provide more documentation. You need to
|
||
read your local paper and judge whether you think they have shown any
|
||
tendencies to expose local entities. If you do have a good local
|
||
story, it gets the company's or bureaucracy's attention but the story
|
||
may then be ignored in Washington.
|
||
|
||
A national story can also be effective but it is often hard to get
|
||
the national press in Washington to pay attention to things that do
|
||
not have direct impact on the Washington political scene. Your story
|
||
needs to affect directly the agencies in Washington or involve a large
|
||
government program or corporation to be sure that a national outlet
|
||
will be interested. It is also harder for reporters in Washington to
|
||
verify your story from Washington and it is rare that they will have
|
||
the time or the money to come out to your area.
|
||
|
||
A good compromise is if your local paper is part of a national
|
||
newspaper chain that has a Washington office or on a national news
|
||
wire that gives the story outlets other than your local area.
|
||
Newspapers in a chain are less likely to be intimidated by local
|
||
economic pressure and your story will appear nationwide. Several
|
||
well-known chains include Knight-Ridder newspapers and Gannett
|
||
newspapers. Call your local papers and find out if any of them belong
|
||
to a chain that has a Washington office or are on a major newswire
|
||
such as the New York Times newswire.
|
||
|
||
Once you have chosen a reporter, it is important for you to know
|
||
how to approach the them and what the reporter can and cannot do for
|
||
you. First you should agree to the terms of working with them before
|
||
any information is given. Also, whistleblowers often have unrealistic
|
||
expectations from reporters and this can damage your working
|
||
relationship. Here is a list of what reporters can and cannot do for
|
||
you:
|
||
|
||
* Reporters can give you anonymity. A good reporter will not reveal
|
||
his sources even to a court of law. However, before you tell your
|
||
story to a reporter, you must set the rules of how you want to be
|
||
identified.
|
||
|
||
-- If you agree to speak to a reporter "on the record", he can
|
||
identify you by name and your position in the government or industry.
|
||
|
||
-- You can agree to speak "off the record" where the reporter
|
||
cannot use your name but can characterize your position (for example,
|
||
a quality engineer in the MX program). Unless you are careful, that
|
||
characterization could be very revealing to the people who are trying
|
||
to identify the source of the leak. You can agree to talk to a
|
||
reporter off the record but with the provision that you agree how you
|
||
will be characterized to protect your identity.
|
||
|
||
-- Another way to speak to a reporter is "on background", which
|
||
means that the reporter cannot characterize you in any way but must
|
||
write about the information in a generic sort of way. This way of
|
||
speaking to a reporter is the safest way but it makes it more
|
||
difficult for the reporter to write a story that will get published.
|
||
|
||
Reporters, of course, will try to get you on the record and will
|
||
assume you are on the record unless you designate differently.
|
||
WARNING: Many reporters have different definitions for the above
|
||
terms so it is important to define your terms before you tell them
|
||
your information. Make sure that the terms that you agree on apply to
|
||
your entire conversation and perhaps followup conversations. Don't
|
||
expect a reporter to honor rules after a conversation. Most will but
|
||
you should not take the risk. You must weigh your need for protection
|
||
against the need to tell the reporter enough for him or her to write
|
||
the story. This is a judgment call that you will have to make.
|
||
|
||
* It will be in the reporter's best interest for you to commit to
|
||
giving him or her the story exclusively. This means that you will not
|
||
talk to another reporter until your reporter prints the story. This
|
||
can be useful for you because the reporter will have a motivation to
|
||
work harder on it. But it can also backfire on you because the
|
||
reporter may think that by "owning" the story, he or she has all the
|
||
time in the world to work on it and your issue can wither on the vine.
|
||
When you meet with a reporter, they often will assume that you are
|
||
working with them exclusively. Ask at the beginning of your meeting
|
||
whether or not the reporter expects an exclusive arrangement. Most
|
||
reporters will say yes. To protect yourself, you should work with the
|
||
reporter to set a reasonable time period for your exclusive
|
||
relationship. The amount of time will depend on the nature of the
|
||
story, but the reporter and you should agree to a time length that
|
||
gives the reporter enough time to do the story but does not allow the
|
||
process to be stretched out until the issue becomes stale. If
|
||
something else comes up, you always can agree to extend the deadline.
|
||
Setting a time period may irritate the reporter, but you should try to
|
||
protect yourself by suggesting it in a nice and reasonable way.
|
||
|
||
* Even if the reporter is interested in writing the story and spends a
|
||
great deal of time on it, don't assume that it will automatically get
|
||
printed. Reporters have to sell their stories to their editors and
|
||
publishers and the more controversial the story, the more the
|
||
management people of the newspaper or television station
|
||
w<EFBFBD><EFBFBD>`<60>J<EFBFBD>X<>p<EFBFBD><70><EFBFBD>\N8<4E><38><EFBFBD>B<EFBFBD>"<22>A?Mӹ<4D>r<EFBFBD><72>2<EFBFBD>轁ɕmember that a reporter does not
|
||
always have control over his or her stories and there is an element of
|
||
politics in journalism as everywhere else. The owners and the
|
||
managers of newspapers and television stations feel political and
|
||
monetary pressures as in any business. However, don't give up on a
|
||
story because as long as the reporter wants to have it published there
|
||
is still a chance.
|
||
|
||
* Don't expect reporters to be crusaders for your cause. Their job is
|
||
to examine the facts, talk to people from both sides, and report the
|
||
story fairly. The majority of reporters will resent it or shy away
|
||
from you if you try to pressure them to take up your cause.
|
||
|
||
* Don't expect reporters to find a lawyer, or contact the government
|
||
for you -- although some will offer to help maintain your loyalty.
|
||
Most want to remain separate from your whistleblower activity and
|
||
report on the factual parts of your case.
|
||
|
||
* Don't assume that since you are working closely with a reporter that
|
||
he or she is your friend. Part of their job is to be very friendly
|
||
and put you at ease so that you are willing to tell them everything
|
||
you know, and preferably on the record. Many whistleblowers, who
|
||
already feel lonely and isolated, mistake this as friendship and
|
||
expose themselves by saying too much. Working with a reporter is a
|
||
business relationship and you should remember that at all times when
|
||
you are with a reporter. Also, if you meet with a reporter at a bar
|
||
or a restaurant, make sure that you don't drink too much and lose good
|
||
judgment. Negotiating your terms with a reporter should be done with
|
||
a clear head.
|
||
|
||
When you meet with a reporter, it is important to come well
|
||
prepared. That means organizing your documents in an understandable
|
||
order and making notes for you to follow so that you do not ramble or
|
||
take too long to get at the meat of your information. Try to avoid
|
||
starting at the very beginning and telling the story in excruciating
|
||
detail. Start with a basic outline of your story, showing the
|
||
documents as you go, and then go into detail in areas in which the
|
||
reporter is interested.
|
||
|
||
Don't start your conversation by reciting all the injustices that
|
||
you have had to endure. The best way to impress a reporter with your
|
||
story (and your motivations) is to give the factual information on the
|
||
misconduct you have seen and let them ask about your personal
|
||
hardships. Only volunteer the personal problems that you have had at
|
||
the end of the meeting, if the reporter has not asked, and keep your
|
||
statements brief.
|
||
|
||
Make sure that you never embellish your information to a reporter.
|
||
A common fault of whistleblowers, once they have finally convinced
|
||
someone to listen to them, is to tell the reporter 110 percent of the
|
||
story to make their point. The problem with that is the reporter or
|
||
the bureaucracy can realize that the last 10 percent that is
|
||
embellished and the rest of your story will appear to be discredited.
|
||
It is best to tell reporters 80 percent of your solid information and
|
||
give them leads to discover on their own the last 20 percent. That
|
||
way people will be impressed that the situation is really worse than
|
||
you said.
|
||
|
||
After reporters write and publish a story, you should keep them
|
||
informed about how the scandal is progressing but you should make sure
|
||
that you don't become a pest in the reporter's eyes. After they write
|
||
a story, reporters are pressured by their editors to move on to the
|
||
next story. Reporters often have to fight for the time and newspaper
|
||
space followup stories on their exposes.
|
||
|
||
If you have been anonymous in your whistleblowing, it is important
|
||
to remain calm and do not do anything that casts suspicion on
|
||
yourself. Once a story hits the media, your bureaucracy will begin
|
||
"damage control," and if you are directly involved in the problem, you
|
||
may be asked to sit in on the meetings and help plan a coverup. This
|
||
puts you in a very good position to continue to tell the reporter
|
||
about a planned coverup of the wrongdoing or if the company or the
|
||
bureaucracy are legitimately trying to solve the problem.
|
||
|
||
If you are going public with your whistleblowing, you may get more
|
||
publicity and requests for interviews after the story appears. It is
|
||
good to take advantage of the extra publicity to shed more light on
|
||
the subject of your whistleblowing, but you must approach your new
|
||
found status with caution. The bureaucracy or the company may try to
|
||
take the focus off of the scandal and make you the issue by trying to
|
||
discredit you. It is important not to take it personally and become
|
||
openly defensive. In this situation, the best defense is a good
|
||
offense. When reporters ask you about your personal fight with the
|
||
organization, turn the question around and spend time emphasizing the
|
||
subject of your whistleblowing -- the fraud and waste. When you do
|
||
talk about the retaliation against you, don't come across as bitter,
|
||
defensive, or paranoid and don't dwell on the subject. Additionally,
|
||
strive to stay unruffled and unflappable. Remember, the calmest
|
||
person in the room is usually seen as the most credible.
|
||
|
||
It becomes quite flattering suddenly to receive all this
|
||
attention, but remember: one of the ways that a bureaucracy or a
|
||
company can discredit you to others is by portraying you as a
|
||
self-glorified publicity hound. Don't give them any ammunition by
|
||
letting the publicity go to your head. A little humbleness can go a
|
||
long way in making your case.
|
||
|
||
If you cannot make up your mind about what approach you may want
|
||
to take, you can contact the Project on Military Procurement and the
|
||
Government Accountability Project for advice.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Non-Profit Watch-Dog Organizations
|
||
|
||
If blowing the whistle to a member of Congress, the press or a
|
||
hotline seem too risky or unfruitful or you aren't quite sure that
|
||
this handbook has given you enough details to make a decision, you can
|
||
call upon non-profit watch-dog organizations either for advice or to
|
||
use as your main avenue in blowing the whistle. There isn't an
|
||
abundance of these types of organizations. The Project on Military
|
||
Procurement (PMP) and the Government Accountability Project (GAP), who
|
||
produced this handbook are dedicated to trying to help whistleblowers
|
||
with their problems. PMP and GAP can help you build a coalition of
|
||
groups to help you because of their unique interest in the subject
|
||
matter. It often takes a coalition effort to overcome the political
|
||
clout of large government bureaucracies and corporations. PMP and GAP
|
||
have different goals and areas of expertise. A description of each
|
||
follows:
|
||
|
||
The Project on Military Procurement
|
||
|
||
PMP's goals are to reform the Pentagon procurement system by
|
||
exposing on-going waste, fraud and abuse to the press, Congress and
|
||
the public; to provide an effective and reliable national defense
|
||
while saving the taxpayer as much money as possible; and to assist
|
||
whistleblowers in the military establishment during their struggles to
|
||
expose abuses.
|
||
|
||
PMP has been investigating whistleblower claims for eight years.
|
||
The whistleblowers come from all areas of defense, the DOD, the
|
||
defense industry and military personnel. PMP has been instrumental in
|
||
exposing spare parts overpricing, falsification of the weapon testing
|
||
process, cost overruns in weapon systems, fraudulent procurement
|
||
processes and faulty weaponry. PMP sources choose whether to be a
|
||
public or anonymous whistleblower. No whistleblower has ever lost his
|
||
job as a result of blowing the whistle through PMP.
|
||
|
||
PMP takes the burden of ensuring the individual of confidentiality
|
||
and arranges, on receipt of documentation of his or her allegations,
|
||
for the whistleblower to meet with or talk with a researcher at PMP.
|
||
We also have a group of military sources that advise us on an
|
||
anonymous basis. We turn down some individuals because they lack
|
||
documentation or when the whistleblower decides that the risk is too
|
||
great.
|
||
|
||
Once a decision has been made by the whistleblower and PMP to move
|
||
forward, PMP helps the whistleblower decide whether to go to the
|
||
press, the Congress, the DOD, or to file a false claims suit. PMP
|
||
works with several lawyers who are looking for clients to file false
|
||
claims suits and acts as unpaid advisors to the whistleblowers and
|
||
lawyers in the investigation process of a law suit. We want to expose
|
||
and help initiate reform while providing the maximum protection
|
||
possible for our whistleblowers. PMP's policy is that no expose' is
|
||
worth a whistleblower's career and peace of mind.
|
||
|
||
PMP has been instrumental in exposing spare parts horror stories
|
||
such as the $7400 coffee brewer and the $455 arm rest. We have also
|
||
revealed, for example, an illegal lobbying plan for the C5B cargo
|
||
plane, an internal investigation report showing defects in the Phoenix
|
||
Missile, and a draft Inspector General report that found "work
|
||
measurement" an effective way of saving defense dollars. PMP is
|
||
interested in investigating and revealing all aspects of getting "more
|
||
bang for the buck."
|
||
|
||
To contact the Project on Military Procurement call or write:
|
||
|
||
Dina Rasor, Director
|
||
Project on Military Procurement
|
||
613 Pennsylvania Avenue SE
|
||
Washington, DC 20003
|
||
202-543-0883
|
||
|
||
or contact our computer bulletin board SNAFU with your personal
|
||
computer. The number for SNAFU is 202-547-6238
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
The Government Accountability Project
|
||
|
||
GAP has been providing legal support for whistleblowers since
|
||
1976. GAP helps defend whistleblowers against reprisal, assists them
|
||
in pursuing their dissent more effectively, offers informal assistance
|
||
and referral services when formal representation is not possible,
|
||
advocates stronger free speech laws and teaches the law of dissent
|
||
through scholarly works and law school clinical programs. Unlike the
|
||
Project on Military Procurement, GAP does not formally specialize in
|
||
any particular issue area. Due to the quantity of requests, however,
|
||
GAP has concentrated on certain issues such as safety hazards from
|
||
commercial and military nuclear facilities, and meat and poultry
|
||
inspection and increasingly, the false conflict between national
|
||
security and freedom of speech.
|
||
|
||
Whistleblowers who call GAP for help first consult with the Intake
|
||
Director, who prepares a short summary of the individual's objectives
|
||
and relevant facts. GAP receives from 200-500 fresh requests for help
|
||
per year and can only take around 5 new cases annually, since it often
|
||
takes years to complete service to existing clients. Additionally,
|
||
whistleblowers connected with ongoing issue campaigns receive priority
|
||
for representation, since work on those cases complements assistance
|
||
to other clients whose cases are pending. As a result, most
|
||
frequently GAP offers informal assistance such as coaching, describing
|
||
the range of options and relevant laws, finding an attorney, or
|
||
referrals to responsible congressional oversight committees, media or
|
||
constituent groups who should be aware of the whistleblower's concerns
|
||
and fate. GAP's basic strategy is to unite isolated whistleblowers
|
||
with the majority of citizens who should be benefiting from their
|
||
dissent.
|
||
|
||
If there is space in GAP's docket potentially to help an intake,
|
||
an attorney will conduct a verification study to determine whether --
|
||
1) the whistleblower's dissent is reasonable; 2) the issues are
|
||
significant enough to be worth the harassment the employee faces by
|
||
pursuing them; and 3) the whistleblower and GAP have a fighting chance
|
||
to make a difference. If the case survives the verification study,
|
||
the organization considers formal representation based on additional
|
||
factors such as whether GAP has a unique contribution to make and
|
||
whether it can be funded. GAP traditionally has not charged for
|
||
attorney time and evaluates whether representation would be covered by
|
||
an existing or potential foundation grant. But clients are expected
|
||
to cover expenses, such as telephone and travel costs. Financial
|
||
pressures are forcing a reconsideration of this policy, however,
|
||
particularly if the representation is not part of an issue campaign
|
||
that is already funded.
|
||
|
||
Successful issue advocacy campaigns have included challenges to
|
||
the Zimmer and Midland nuclear power plants, which had to be converted
|
||
to coal facilities after whistleblowers exposed systematic quality
|
||
assurance breakdowns. GAP investigations also caused extensive
|
||
re-inspections and repairs of suspect components at the Comanche Peak,
|
||
Diablo Canyon and Lasalle nuclear facilities. Whistleblowers
|
||
represented by GAP have exposed massive radiation leaks at the
|
||
Fernald, Hanford and Knolls military nuclear facilities. Dissent by
|
||
over 100 GAP clients who are federal meat and poultry inspectors
|
||
stopped various USDA plans to gut or eliminate current food inspection
|
||
programs.
|
||
|
||
GAP defends individual whistleblowers against reprisal through
|
||
serving as co-counsel for that aspect of a larger employment dispute,
|
||
authoring friend of the court briefs, and direct representation where
|
||
a case is particularly significant in terms of its chilling effect
|
||
during an issue campaign or as a civil liberties precedent. Among
|
||
GAP's more well-known, successful clients are Pentagon cost control
|
||
expert Ernest Fitzgerald and GSA National Capitol Regional Director
|
||
Bertrand Berube, the highest ranking whistleblower in the civil
|
||
service to challenge a firing successfully.
|
||
|
||
To contact the Government Accountability Project call or write:
|
||
|
||
Tom Devine, Legal Director
|
||
GAP
|
||
25 E St. NW
|
||
Suite 700
|
||
Washington, DC 20001
|
||
(202) 347-0460
|
||
|
||
To seek legal assistance, address correspondence to the Intake
|
||
Director at GAP.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
DEFENDING YOURSELF IN THE BUREAUCRACY OR COMPANY
|
||
|
||
|
||
Despite admonitions, warnings and threats you might receive, it is
|
||
your constitutional right to blow the whistle and be protected after
|
||
doing so. Government employees are protected under the first and
|
||
fourteenth amendments of the Constitution, which prohibits federal,
|
||
state and local governments from retaliating against workers who
|
||
express dissent publicly or privately to their supervisors.
|
||
Protection for the private sector employees has developed over the
|
||
past 25 years under individual state laws.
|
||
|
||
However, neither protection is comprehensive or enforced by the
|
||
government agencies and the courts. There exists a patchwork of
|
||
specific employee protection laws that cover environmental issues,
|
||
health and safety, labor relations, and civil service. Legislation
|
||
pertinent to whistleblowers is explained below.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Whistleblower Legislation
|
||
|
||
|
||
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978
|
||
|
||
The 1978 statute gave the OSC a broad mandate and almost total
|
||
discretion, in large part, to protect freedom of speech.
|
||
Unfortunately, it degenerated into what one Senate staff member calls
|
||
a "legalized plumber's unit" -- the administration's most effective
|
||
weapon to identify wounded dissenters who come in for help, and then
|
||
finish them off.
|
||
|
||
Since its creation, the OSC has turned down 99 percent of
|
||
whistleblower cases without attempting disciplinary or corrective
|
||
action. Since 1979, the Special Counsel has not pursued litigation
|
||
through a corrective action hearing to restore a whistleblower's job.
|
||
From 1981 to 1986, the total number of requests for stays, or
|
||
injunctive relief, was approximately the same as in one previous year,
|
||
1980.
|
||
|
||
This is no surprise after considering recent Special Counsels'
|
||
attitudes toward dissent. The office was created to guard against
|
||
Watergate-era techniques taught in the Malek-May Manual to harass
|
||
unresponsive employees out of their jobs. However, former Special
|
||
Counsel Alex Kozinski used the Malek-May techniques in a successful
|
||
purge that convinced nearly half his staff to resign, including
|
||
approximately seventy percent of headquarters attorneys and
|
||
investigators. Kozinski was so intolerant of criticism that he issued
|
||
a gag order to his public relations officer and ordered employees not
|
||
to speak with his predecessor, Mary Eastwood, before he attempted to
|
||
fire her.
|
||
|
||
Kozinski also shared his techniques with others. Using the OSC's
|
||
own investigative manual as a guide, he taught a course for federal
|
||
managers on how to fire employees without OSC interference. He
|
||
tutored then-Secretary of the Interior James Watt's assistants on how
|
||
to avoid conceding first amendment violations and still fire
|
||
whistleblower Jack Spadaro for exposing mine safety violations.
|
||
|
||
Kozinski is now a judge in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
|
||
Initially, as a protege of former Attorney General Ed Meese, he was
|
||
being groomed for the Supreme Court. After his record was exposed as
|
||
a hatchet man against whistleblowers, he was barely confirmed for the
|
||
court of appeals -- squeaking through 54-43.
|
||
|
||
Publicly, former Special Counsel William O'Connor was less subtle,
|
||
branding whistleblowers as malcontents and comparing them to bag
|
||
ladies and mental health patients. O'Connor aggressively disclaimed
|
||
any responsibility for reprisal victims, characterizing them as
|
||
"by-standers" and "witnesses." Mr. O'Connor explained that his job
|
||
was to serve the system, not individuals. But the merit system is an
|
||
empty phrase without human beings.
|
||
|
||
Both Special Counsels defended their track records with the same
|
||
excuse -- neither met a whistleblower who deserved or needed the
|
||
CSRA's remedial litigation. They claimed vindication from the
|
||
results, asserting that whistleblowers turned away by the OSC also
|
||
lost everywhere else. However, that is false. For example, two
|
||
successful MSPB whistleblower appeals (out of four in ten years)
|
||
vindicated employees whom the Special Counsel had turned away,
|
||
including the Spadaro case. The case of another OSC reject, Vince
|
||
Laubach, was so strong that Interior settled his grievance with
|
||
reinstatement, back pay and damages. On balance, through 1988,
|
||
whistleblowers prevailed in seventeen successful cases of
|
||
whistleblower litigation, in many instances through labor-management
|
||
arbitration, while the OSC had been dormant.
|
||
|
||
Messrs. Kozinski and O'Connor abused their discretion by
|
||
substituting new agendas for explicit statutory language and
|
||
congressional intent. For example, in 1984, the Special Counsel
|
||
honored the law's mandate to investigate reprisal allegations only
|
||
eight percent of the time.
|
||
|
||
Ernest Fitzgerald, who initially became known for blowing the
|
||
whistle on cost overruns in the Air Force's C-5A aircraft, recounts in
|
||
connection with a more recent case involving alleged defense
|
||
procurement fraud, "I kept trying to give the investigators
|
||
documentary evidence and they kept giving it back to me." Another
|
||
whistleblower reported calling the office eighty-nine times before
|
||
anyone would speak with him to tell him his case had been closed.
|
||
|
||
Fitzgerald's frustration involved the case of George Spanton, a
|
||
Pentagon auditor whom the agency tried to force into retirement
|
||
through a retaliatory transfer after he revealed systematic violations
|
||
of law at a major defense contractor, Pratt Whitney. Ironically, the
|
||
Spanton case is credited, or blamed, with preventing the OSC's
|
||
dismantling. The Special Counsel boasted that the Spanton case was a
|
||
major success, because it obtained an administrative order to fire top
|
||
Defense Contract Audit Agency officials for the retaliation.
|
||
|
||
The question is whether it was a successful prosecution or an
|
||
effective coverup. Special Counsel William O'Connor refused to pursue
|
||
evidence indicating that Pratt and Whitney was just an anecdotal
|
||
illustration of systematic corruption throughout the defense industry.
|
||
Similarly, he stopped his investigators from following up on strong
|
||
evidence that Defense Secretary Weinberger was personally responsible
|
||
for silencing Spanton, indicating a Cabinet level coverup. As
|
||
Fitzgerald later testified, the Special Counsel curtailed the Spanton
|
||
case at a point analogous to where Earl Silbert had tried to stop the
|
||
Watergate investigation -- declaring victory by scapegoating minor
|
||
league figures like Gordon Liddy and James McCord.
|
||
|
||
|
||
If the OSC hadn't stopped short, the 1988 Pentagon corruption
|
||
scandals might have emerged two years, and tens of billions of
|
||
taxpayer dollars, sooner. The Special Counsel also might have won the
|
||
case. By pulling its punches the OSC avoided the best evidence of
|
||
reprisal, and eventually the case was overturned in court. In the
|
||
end, the Special Counsel accomplished nothing in the Spanton case
|
||
except to save itself.
|
||
|
||
Perhaps those who were ignored were lucky: the OSC did not turn
|
||
on them. As Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich. commented about the case of
|
||
Bert Berube at the General Services Administration, the Office spent
|
||
more than five times as much time investigating the complainant as
|
||
investigating the complaint.
|
||
|
||
Although the OSC routinely refuses to share its closed case files
|
||
with complainants who try to continue fighting in another forum, the
|
||
office has used the files as dossiers to help blacklist whistleblowing
|
||
employees who give up on their original jobs and seek renewed
|
||
employment. For example, the OSC recommended during an Office of
|
||
Personnel Management background security check that former Treasury
|
||
Department attorney Elaine Mittleman not be hired for a new government
|
||
job, in part because her superiors suspected she had leaked documents
|
||
to Congress and the press, which in theory is protected speech.
|
||
|
||
Ms. Mittleman first lost her job after dissenting against
|
||
Treasury's failure to enforce the law requiring the Chrysler
|
||
Corporation to file reports on how it spent its guaranteed loans from
|
||
the federal bailout, charges later confirmed by the Inspector General.
|
||
The Office of the Special Counsel refused to interview her personally.
|
||
|
||
O'Connor exercised legal double-speak to transform protected
|
||
activity into offenses justifying dismissal, such as explaining that
|
||
dissent against agency policy is insubordination. This announcement
|
||
legally eliminated significant dissent. He sternly warned that his
|
||
agency would not be a haven for blackmailers, his term for those who
|
||
engage in what he labeled as "shake-downs" by threatening to exercise
|
||
appeal rights. This policy frowned on the due process clause.
|
||
|
||
The new Special Counsel, Mary Wieseman, has introduced personal
|
||
courtesy as a leadership style. In terms of track records and
|
||
techniques, however, at least prior to passage of a new Whistleblower
|
||
Protection Act of 1989, the current OSC was barely distinguishable
|
||
from the tenure of the previous two Special Counsels. After
|
||
approximately a year into Ms. Wieseman's terms, she testified that
|
||
the OSC had formally or informally obtained help for 6 out of 176
|
||
government employees, meaning that until that time over ninety-six
|
||
percent had not been assisted.
|
||
|
||
Further, frustrated complainants continued to report that the OSC
|
||
channeled evidence to the agencies that were the targets of reprisal
|
||
charges; delegated the investigatory authority for key witnesses to
|
||
the office in the target agency that was responsible for defending
|
||
against the reprisal charges; failed to create a verifiable record and
|
||
then misrepresented the position of supporting witnesses; refused to
|
||
inform the complainant of the evidence which had to be rebutted, a
|
||
charge confirmed by at least one witness as well; and generally
|
||
appeared to invest more resources investigating the whistleblower and
|
||
his or her supporters, instead of the alleged retaliation. The OSC
|
||
remains a leading agency in practicing secret law. Ironically, it
|
||
employs this approach in determining whether to defend those who
|
||
allege reprisal for exposing coverups of misconduct.
|
||
|
||
The OSC has boasted that one of "the most extended and intensive
|
||
investigations we've ever done" involved Veterans Administration
|
||
police officer John Berter, who was fired after challenging nauseating
|
||
police brutality of minorities and veterans. The question is -- who
|
||
was the OSC investigating? The OSC stood by passively until Berter
|
||
complained in Rep. Schroeder's hearings on proposed whistleblower
|
||
legislation. At that point, the OSC went to work. But according to a
|
||
House civil service subcommittee staff investigation, the OSC
|
||
proceeded to attack Berter's "motives, his allegations, his doctors,
|
||
his supporters, his witnesses, the victims, his skills and a prior FBI
|
||
report that found substance to his charges." After six witnesses
|
||
submitted affidavits repudiating the OCS's characterization of their
|
||
testimony, the office refused to tell Berter the evidence he needed to
|
||
rebut the charges.
|
||
|
||
In a closeout letter that failed to discuss any of the 27
|
||
affidavits submitted by Berter from victims or witnesses, the OSC
|
||
dismissed all of his charges, at most conceding some "peripheral"
|
||
validity. Although the OSC approved Berter's firing, two national
|
||
good government organizations -- the Cavallo Foundation and the
|
||
Giraffe Society -- honored him with awards for his courage in
|
||
exercising First Amendment rights.
|
||
|
||
Lack of enforcement, combined with the OSC's proclivity for biased
|
||
investigation, has led to an increase in fear of reprisal among
|
||
prospective whistleblowers. In 1980, 19 percent of federal employees
|
||
who witnessed but did not report fraud, waste and abuse, cited fear of
|
||
reprisal as the reason for remaining silent. By 1983, the figure had
|
||
jumped to 37 percent. In 1985, the MSPB admitted in a press release
|
||
that "[t]here has been a significant increase in the fear of
|
||
reprisals, the reason given for not having reported fraud, waste, and
|
||
abuse." Clearly, if the OSC was cracking down on offending agencies,
|
||
instead of reinforcing them, fear of reprisal would be on the decline,
|
||
rather than increasing.
|
||
|
||
The most fundamental problem with the Civil Service Reform Act of
|
||
1978 is that it took basic constitutional rights away from civil
|
||
servants and gave the job of protecting them to the Special Counsel.
|
||
By stripping whistleblowers of the right to defend themselves in most
|
||
cases, the new law left them at the mercy of a hostile bureaucratic
|
||
welfare agency for personnel disputes.
|
||
|
||
Even when they could control their cases, it was in the Merit
|
||
Systems Protection Board, a minor league, hopelessly politicized
|
||
administrative forum. Previously federal workers had access to the
|
||
courts to challenge First Amendment reprisals, where they could pursue
|
||
suits for punitive damages in a jury trial before their peers.
|
||
Although Congress had not stated it was abolishing constitutional
|
||
remedies when it passed the 1978 statute, it also did not explicitly
|
||
preserve them.
|
||
|
||
Faced with this ambiguity, in 1983 the Supreme Court leaped at the
|
||
chance to wash its hands of federal employment disputes. In Bush v.
|
||
Lucas, the Court held that whenever a Civil Service Reform Act remedy
|
||
is available, the Constitution is not. Although the Reform Act's
|
||
primary sponsors filed a friend of the court brief protesting that
|
||
they had intended no such result, Congress has not acted to overturn
|
||
Bush.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989
|
||
|
||
After 1982 Congress increasingly recognized that its 1978 free
|
||
speech shield had nightmarishly backfired, actually providing a clear
|
||
channel for increased harassment. In 1982, Special Counsel Alex
|
||
Kozinski was forced to resign after the revelations that he was
|
||
teaching a course for federal managers on how to fire whistleblowers
|
||
without getting caught. Representative Patricia Schroeder also
|
||
introduced a bill to abolish the OSC, which had become a Trojan Horse
|
||
for whistleblowers -- a legalized dirty tricks unit that identified
|
||
wounded dissenters seeking help and then teamed up with employers to
|
||
finish them off.
|
||
|
||
Although the bill and momentum to abolish the OSC died after
|
||
Kozinski's resignation, Congress went back to the drawing board. No
|
||
one could credibly claim the system was working, due to accelerating
|
||
disclosures of continuing civil service abuses and intensifying
|
||
exposures of bureaucratic corruption that typically had been
|
||
covered-up for years.
|
||
|
||
After three congressional hearings, in September 1986 the House
|
||
unanimously passed a Whistleblower Protection Act. The Senate did not
|
||
act on the legislation, however, due to time pressure and an
|
||
Administration veto threat. Two more hearings later, in October 1988
|
||
the House and Senate unanimously passed a nearly-identical bill.
|
||
After appearing to change his mind and praising the legislation in a
|
||
letter to Congress, President Reagan waited until Congress adjourned
|
||
and then pocket-vetoed it. Congress did not back down. Congressional
|
||
negotiators persuaded the Bush Administration to accept an even
|
||
stronger bill, and on March 19 it again passed unanimously. The
|
||
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 became effective July 9.
|
||
|
||
The jury is out as to whether the new legislation will be any
|
||
better than its counterproductive predecessor. On the plus side, the
|
||
new law creates the strongest language on the books affirming freedom
|
||
of speech. It also represents an unprecedented mandate for the law of
|
||
dissent. It is rare that Congress passes anything unanimously, let
|
||
alone twice in six months. It is even rarer to find a consensus
|
||
between the White House, Congress, labor and civil liberties groups.
|
||
|
||
By contrast, however, whistleblowers still are burdened by the
|
||
weakest remedies. They still are not entitled to a jury trial by
|
||
their peers, or to punitive damage remedies like all other Americans
|
||
-- even convicted felons -- can receive when the government violates
|
||
their constitutional rights. Other than the Supreme Court, they only
|
||
can appeal adverse bureaucratic decisions to one appellate court, the
|
||
Federal Circuit, which has an obsessively hostile track record of
|
||
ruling against whistleblowers and whose precedents butchered freedom
|
||
of speech. Whistleblowers will continue to be at the mercy of the
|
||
MSPB and Special Counsel, whose abuses led to passage of the new law
|
||
which they will have a monopoly to implement at the administrative
|
||
level where nearly all the action will be. In short, the new rights
|
||
will be no stronger than the will of discredited civil service
|
||
agencies to enforce them.
|
||
|
||
The new law has ten major provisions to strengthen the rights of
|
||
public servants. It -- 1) provides teeth for the Government Employees
|
||
Code of Ethics; 2) closes the loopholes in legal protections; 3)
|
||
defangs the Office of the Special Counsel; 4) gives whistleblowers
|
||
control of their cases; 5) eliminates the legal motives test; 6)
|
||
reforms unrealistic legal burdens-of-proof; 7) provides interim relief
|
||
for those who win an initial hearing; 8) gives a transfer preference
|
||
to victorious whistleblowers; 9) strengthens whistleblower disclosure
|
||
channels; and 10) saves alternative statutory remedies. Each of these
|
||
changes are discussed in more detail below.
|
||
|
||
1. Enforcing the Government Employees Code of Ethics. The law
|
||
forbids agencies from acting against any employee for declining to
|
||
engage in illegal activity. Section 4(b), 5 USC 2302(b)(9). Prior
|
||
law required employees to follow orders and protest after the fact,
|
||
which meant they could be fired for refusing to be lawbreakers. The
|
||
change gives teeth to the principles of the Government Employees Code
|
||
of Ethics.
|
||
|
||
2. Closing the loopholes in legally-protected dissent. The law
|
||
specifies that "any" whistleblowing disclosure is protected if the
|
||
contents are significant and reasonable. Section 4(a), 5 USC
|
||
2302(b)(8). This eliminates the current Swiss cheese definition of
|
||
whistleblowing. Prior law only protected "a" disclosure, which the
|
||
Office of the Special Counsel and Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
|
||
interpreted as an excuse to exclude dissent unless the whistleblower
|
||
was the first to expose a problem; could prove his or her motives were
|
||
to help the public, and not self- interest; was accusing specific
|
||
officials of intentional misconduct; first went through the agency
|
||
chain-of-command; phrased the dissent as an accusation rather than a
|
||
question or request for information, or overcame other bureaucratic
|
||
loopholes that the OSC and Merit Board created as necessary to rule
|
||
against dissenters.
|
||
|
||
3. Defanging the Office of the Special Counsel. Although created
|
||
as the government's defender of those victimized by merit system
|
||
violations called prohibited personnel practices as discussed above,
|
||
the OSC earned a well-deserved reputation as the administration's
|
||
primary weapon against whistleblowers. The new statute requires the
|
||
OSC to protect whistleblowers and not act contrary to their interest.
|
||
Section 2(b)(2)(B).
|
||
|
||
More specifically, the OSC must -- provide status reports to
|
||
employees seeking help (Section 3, 5 USC 1214(a)(1)(A) and (B)); stop
|
||
working on a case after 120 days without the employee complainant's
|
||
consent (Section 3, 5 USC 1214(a)(4)); refrain from leaking the
|
||
employee's evidence or OSC-obtained information about the complainant
|
||
to the employer or others during or after the investigation, unless
|
||
the employee consents (Section 3, 5 USC l2l2(h)); refrain from
|
||
disclosing the identity of an employee making a whistleblowing
|
||
disclosure without prior consent, even if "the Special Counsel
|
||
contends violating confidentiality is necessary for the OSC to carry
|
||
out its duties (Section 3, 5 USC 1213(g)(2) and (h)); refrain from
|
||
settling a case without including the employee's comments and gaining
|
||
legal approval (Section 3, 5 USC l2l4(b)(2)(C)); explain the evidence
|
||
supporting as well as opposing the employee's reprisal charges, in any
|
||
letter closing out a case (Section 3, 5 USC l2l4(a)(2)(A)); and
|
||
refrain from intervening in related appeals without the employee's
|
||
consent. Section 3, 5 USC 1212(c)(2). Further, any negative OSC
|
||
findings cannot be introduced in the subsequent MSPB appeal. Section
|
||
3, 5 USC 1214(a)(2)(B). These protections will shield all federal
|
||
workers from OSC abuses, not just whistleblowers.
|
||
|
||
4. Giving whistleblowers control of their cases. For many common
|
||
forms of reprisal, whistleblowers had a choice of the OSC or nothing.
|
||
In addition to piling on against reprisal victims, the OSC has
|
||
practiced "secret law," with employees unable to learn the evidence
|
||
used against them or to confront their accusers. Under the new law,
|
||
all federal workers or applicants can challenge whistleblower
|
||
reprisals through an on-the-record, due process hearing at the Merit
|
||
Systems Protection Board. Employees who use their new hearing rights
|
||
must first file complaints with the Special Counsel for 120 days, but
|
||
if there is no decision after that time the employee is free to take
|
||
control of the case by filing for a hearing. Section 3, 5 USC
|
||
1214(a)(3)(B). Similarly, if the OSC turns down the complaint on an
|
||
allegation not previously appealable, the employee can file for a
|
||
hearing within 60 days. Section 3, 5 USC 1214(a)(3)(A). Further,
|
||
employees can file their own action to seek temporary relief through
|
||
an administrative stay against a threatened or ongoing whistleblower
|
||
reprisal. 5 USC 1221(c).
|
||
|
||
5. Eliminating the legal motives test. Under prior law
|
||
whistleblowers had to prove that retaliation was a "predominant" or
|
||
"motivating" factor in order to establish an initial case. This was
|
||
the most frequently-cited reason why the MSPB ruled against
|
||
whistleblowers. It's almost impossible to prove a manager's hostile
|
||
state-of-mind without a confession. Under the new law, whistleblowers
|
||
only will have to prove that dissent was "a contributing" factor in
|
||
the job action (Section 3, 5 USC 1214(b)(4)(B)(i) and 1221(e)(1)), and
|
||
are explicitly relieved of having to prove that the agency had
|
||
retaliatory motives. Section 4, 5 USC 2302(b)(8).
|
||
|
||
The definition of contributing factor is the cornerstone for the
|
||
new legal groundrules. To underscore its mandate, congressional
|
||
leaders repeated the definition five times during the floor debate
|
||
preceding unanimous Senate and House passage of the new law. They
|
||
explained that "a" factor and "a contributing" factor both have the
|
||
same definition. The terms mean "any factor, which alone or in
|
||
connection with other factors, tends to affect in any way the outcome
|
||
of the decision." The adjective "contributing" pertains to a factor's
|
||
relevance in the personnel action, not to its significance.
|
||
|
||
6. Reforming unrealistic legal burdens-of-proof. Under past law
|
||
whistleblowers had the burden throughout their legal challenge to
|
||
prove a prohibited personnel practice by a preponderance of the
|
||
evidence. Under the new law once an employee establishes an initial
|
||
case that whistleblowing was "a contributing" factor in the personnel
|
||
action, the burden-of-proof shifts to the agency to prove by "clear
|
||
and convincing evidence" -- one of the most difficult standards in
|
||
civil law -- that it would have taken the same action anyway on
|
||
independent grounds. Section 3, 5 USC l2l4(b)(4)(B)(ii) and
|
||
1221(e)(2). This also reverses the MSPB's precedent in the Berube
|
||
decision that whistleblower firings are legal if the agency "could
|
||
have" acted on independent grounds.
|
||
|
||
7. Interim relief. Under prior law employees who prevailed at an
|
||
initial MSPB hearing stayed off the job and off the payroll while the
|
||
agency pursued an appeal to the full Board. Under the new law,
|
||
whistleblowers or others who win at the initial hearing must be
|
||
returned to the job or at a minimum the payroll during the appeal.
|
||
Section 6, 5 USC 7701(b)(2).
|
||
|
||
8. Transfer preference. Legal victories for whistleblowers have
|
||
been hollow when they were returned to hostile, vengeful supervisors
|
||
whom they had just defeated. Typically they soon were fired again on
|
||
new charges. The new law allows whistleblowers who win to get
|
||
preference for a new job and a fresh start. Section 5, 5 USC 3352.
|
||
|
||
9. Strengthened whistleblower disclosure channels. The new law
|
||
forbids the Special Counsel from leaking a whistleblower's charges
|
||
back to the target agency, unless the OSC has the employee's consent
|
||
or rules the dissent is reasonable and orders the agency to
|
||
investigate and report back. Section 3, 5 USC 1213(g)(2). When the
|
||
report comes in, the new law requires the whistleblower's critique to
|
||
be included in all public releases and files -- which is important
|
||
since most agency self- investigations produce self-exonerations. 5
|
||
USC 1213(e)(3).
|
||
|
||
10. Saving alternate statutory remedies. As discussed above, The
|
||
Bush v. Lucas Supreme Court doctrine held that an employees' right to
|
||
file suit in district court for constitutional violations was
|
||
cancelled by duplicative civil service administrative remedies -- a
|
||
horrible trade. The recent judicial trend has been to cancel out
|
||
parallel statutory remedies as well. The new law explicitly protects
|
||
all other statutory remedies that could be alternatives to the
|
||
Whistleblower Protection Act. Section 3, 5 USC 1222.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Military Whistleblower Protection Act -- 1988
|
||
|
||
In an effort to give military whistleblowers the same protection
|
||
from reprisal offered to civilians, Congress passed the Military
|
||
Whistleblower Protection Act that was introduced by Rep Barbara Boxer
|
||
(D-CA). It established formal procedures for handling harassment
|
||
claims within the Services.
|
||
|
||
Military personnel now have the right to an immediate
|
||
investigation by the Department of Defense Inspector General and a
|
||
hearing by their particular service's Board for the Correction of
|
||
Military Records (BCMR) if they are harassed for blowing the whistle
|
||
on fraud, waste, and abuse. An earlier and unsuccessful military
|
||
whistleblower bill introduced in 1986 provided for an appeal to a
|
||
civilian court if the whistleblower was dissatisfied with the BCMR
|
||
ruling. But the provision was dropped for the 1988 version of the
|
||
Military Whistleblower Protection Act and was replaced with a final
|
||
appeal to the Secretary of Defense. The bill is also useful for
|
||
military whistleblowers because it strengthens their right to
|
||
communicate directly with the Congress.
|
||
|
||
When the provision for appeal to civilian courts was eliminated
|
||
from the bill, it lost a great deal of its punch and became little
|
||
more than a stronger statement of military whistleblower's rights.
|
||
The enforcing agencies are still the service Inspectors General and
|
||
the BCMR, two groups that have been seen by military whistleblowers as
|
||
hatchet men for the services. Hopefully, Congress will review the new
|
||
policy after a reasonable period of time to see how it may be
|
||
strengthened.
|
||
|
||
In the meantime, service members should remember that current law
|
||
prohibits anyone from interfering with your right to communicate with
|
||
a member of Congress. But don't depend on the Military Whistleblower
|
||
Protection Act to provide effective protection from reprisals that may
|
||
arise due to exercising that legal right.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
State Law
|
||
|
||
Because there is no comprehensive federal law which prohibits
|
||
employers from retaliating against whistleblowers, some states have
|
||
adopted common law remedies under the "public policy exception to the
|
||
termination-at-will doctrine." What this means is private sector
|
||
employees who work without a contract can no longer be fired "at will"
|
||
for blowing the whistle. In the past, an employee at-will could be
|
||
fired for any reason or no reason. But today, 26 states offer
|
||
protection to at-will employees who are fired for exercising their
|
||
constitutional right of free speech -- such as the act of
|
||
whistleblowing.
|
||
|
||
Although each of the 26 states interpret the public policy
|
||
exception slightly differently, most states classify a retaliatory
|
||
discharge as a tort (which is a wrongful act for which a civil action
|
||
can be brought). Consequently, employees who file claims under this
|
||
cause of action are entitled to jury trials and, if successful,
|
||
punitive damages (which are damages awarded to you beyond the actual
|
||
loss, so as to punish the source of the damage). These laws give
|
||
private sector whistleblowers who have no federal protection from
|
||
retaliation, a chance to fight back in court.
|
||
|
||
|
||
The following states have recognized the public policy exception
|
||
to the termination-at-will doctrine:
|
||
|
||
Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
|
||
Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada,
|
||
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon,
|
||
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
|
||
and Wisconsin.
|
||
|
||
Fifteen states have passed statutes protecting whistleblowers:
|
||
|
||
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maine,
|
||
Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Texas, Washington
|
||
and Wisconsin.
|
||
|
||
Some of these states provide broad protection, while others
|
||
provide only narrow or limited protection. Consult an attorney to
|
||
determine what kind of protection is offered in your state and what
|
||
procedure to follow in filing a claim.
|
||
|
||
Piecemeal Protections -- The Private Sector
|
||
|
||
In states without the public policy exception, corporate employees
|
||
must contend with a confusing, piecemeal system of scattered free
|
||
speech laws. The federal government has passed whistleblower
|
||
protection provisions tucked into sixteen various federal statutes to
|
||
shield employees who help to enforce those laws. Most involve
|
||
environmental protection.
|
||
|
||
Unfortunately, while similar each law has its own peculiarities.
|
||
Further, none cover corporate employees for all public policy dissent,
|
||
only for an employer's violation of the particular statute at issue.
|
||
As a result, food industry workers are legally protected for
|
||
disclosing air and water pollution by their employer, but not for
|
||
revealing shipments of contaminated poultry or beef from cattle with
|
||
tuberculosis. A 1987 report of the Administrative Conference of the
|
||
United States attacked this irrational, patchwork approach to the law
|
||
of dissent.
|
||
|
||
In an attempt to restore coherence, Senators Howard Metzenbaum
|
||
(D.- Ohio) and Senator Grassley have proposed an Employee Health and
|
||
Safety Whistleblower Protection Act to fill the holes by protecting
|
||
private or state and local employees who help to defend any federal
|
||
health and safety law. It also would correct unrealistic provisions
|
||
in current law, such as extending the statute of limitations from 30
|
||
days to six months after the discriminatory act. Many workers aren't
|
||
even aware of their rights for the first 30 days after firing.
|
||
|
||
No government agency has opposed the bill in principle, since a
|
||
free flow of information from witnesses is essential for law
|
||
enforcement. But the Bush Administration's position is murky, the
|
||
powerful meat and poultry lobby is hysterically opposed and the
|
||
Chamber of Commerce has worked to undercut the legislation. As a
|
||
result, few co-sponsors have been recruited. The prospects for this
|
||
reform will depend on the intensity of support from constituencies and
|
||
citizens groups who would benefit. Unquestionably, there will be
|
||
increased exposure of corporate crime if private sector whistleblowers
|
||
have legal protection for trying to prevent health and safety
|
||
tragedies.
|
||
|
||
|
||
BLOWING THE WHISTLE WHEN YOU HAVE A SECURITY CLEARANCE
|
||
|
||
It goes without saying that when you have a security clearance and
|
||
access to classified documents, you should not give classified
|
||
documents to uncleared people for any reason. However, that does not
|
||
protect your clearance when you blow the whistle. There are several
|
||
new initiatives by the Executive Branch that make it easier for the
|
||
bureaucracy to retaliate against whistleblowers by taking away their
|
||
security clearances. Because it is a harder job to fire someone who
|
||
has told embarrassing truths, the bureaucracy can ruin a career by
|
||
taking away your security clearance, which often makes you unable to
|
||
work in your field.
|
||
|
||
In an apparent attempt to prevent whistleblowers from leaking
|
||
information about government fraud and waste, President Reagan
|
||
introduced Standard Forms 189 and 4193 in 1983. These forms are known
|
||
as non-disclosure agreements. The controversial forms demand secrecy
|
||
pledges from all government employees with access to classified
|
||
information.
|
||
|
||
The seeds of Standard Form 189 were sown by President Roosevelt in
|
||
1902 and further germinated under President Taft in 1909. By 1909,
|
||
civil servants were prohibited from furnishing information to Congress
|
||
directly. Taft's order provided that no federal employee "shall
|
||
respond to any request for information from either House of
|
||
Congress...." In the years following Taft's new order, Congress acted
|
||
to neutralize it by passing the Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912. This
|
||
Act provided that "the right of employees to petition Congress ... or
|
||
to furnish any information to either House of Congress ... may not be
|
||
interfered with or denied."
|
||
|
||
Allegedly or ostensibly, in response to concerns about leaks of
|
||
information, the Reagan Administration attempted to push the clock
|
||
back to 1909 by issuing National Security Decision Directive 84, which
|
||
initially expanded the use of polygraph tests and ordered
|
||
prepublication review agreements for federal employees with security
|
||
clearances. Fortunately, Congress stepped in and pressured the
|
||
administration by holding hearings on the subject. Ultimately, Reagan
|
||
withdrew the proposed expansion of polygraph tests. The
|
||
Administration agreed to withdraw the prepublication review, or prior
|
||
restraint, provisions but later changed its mind and reneged on the
|
||
commitment.
|
||
|
||
In addition to the two polygraphs and prepublication review, NSDD
|
||
84 included authorization to issue nondisclosure agreements. This led
|
||
to Standard Forms 189 and 4193. The former was for any employee with
|
||
a security clearance; the latter for employees with clearance for
|
||
access to particularly sensitive information. The forms served, in
|
||
essence, as contracts between the government and the employee. Under
|
||
the terms of these "contracts," if the employee released any
|
||
classified or "classifiable" information, he or she breached the
|
||
agreement, for which the employee agreed to loss of security clearance
|
||
and criminal prosecution. The term "classifiable" meant all
|
||
information that could or should have been classified, or "virtually
|
||
anything," in the words of the federal official responsible for its
|
||
enforcement. It left open the option for after-the-fact
|
||
classification and liability. To add insult to injury, under Air
|
||
Force regulations it is evidence of disloyalty for an employee to
|
||
exhibit reluctance about signing the form that surrenders his or her
|
||
constitutional rights.
|
||
|
||
Both forms also prohibited disclosures to "unauthorized"
|
||
recipients. This barred release unless the agency that created the
|
||
documents agreed the proposed recipient had a "need to know" the
|
||
information -- even if that person also had a security clearance and
|
||
chaired a congressional oversight committee. The net impact was that
|
||
all whistleblowing disclosures involving information that could be
|
||
classified under some circumstances had to be submitted for prior
|
||
review. This was a formula to seal coverups, since few corrupt
|
||
bureaucrats agree that Congress need to know about their misconduct.
|
||
|
||
SF 4193 reinstated the lifetime prepublication review that the
|
||
Administration had promised to remove. This is a complete system of
|
||
prior restraint, and goes well beyond prior Supreme Court decisions.
|
||
|
||
Originally, the Reagan Administration proposed a campaign to get
|
||
voluntary signatures for SF 189. In November 1986, however, just as
|
||
the Iran-Contra scandal was breaking, it issued regulations making the
|
||
agreement a mandatory condition for all employees to keep or obtain
|
||
their security clearances, a job prerequisite for some 3.5 million
|
||
people. Senator Charles Grassley went so far as to call SF 189 an
|
||
effort "to gag public servants" and "place a blanket of silence over
|
||
all information generated by the government."
|
||
|
||
In response to this threat to freedom of speech, Congress passed
|
||
section 630 of Public Law 100-202 which prohibited the use of any
|
||
federal funds for fiscal year 1988 for the implementation of SF 189 or
|
||
any similar nondisclosure forms. A similar section was included in
|
||
the continuing resolution for fiscal year 1989 as well.
|
||
|
||
Even after Congress eliminated funds for the implementation of SF
|
||
189 in December 1987, the Administration collected 43,000 signed
|
||
nondisclosure forms. In response, the American Foreign Service
|
||
Association and seven Members of Congress filed a lawsuit challenging
|
||
the Administration's refusal to obey the statute. A decision by
|
||
District Court Judge Oliver Gasch conceded that the law had been
|
||
violated but also found that Congress had acted unconstitutionally in
|
||
passing it. Judge Gasch reasoned that as Commander in Chief the
|
||
President has a monopoly of power to decide restrictions on the
|
||
disclosure of information sensitive to national security. Judge Gasch
|
||
further held that Congress' only constitutional authority is to pass
|
||
penalties to punish those who violate the President's powers. Despite
|
||
throwing out the statute, in a related decision the District Court
|
||
found the term "classifiable" to be unconstitutionally vague.
|
||
|
||
Meanwhile the Administration issued new nondisclosure forms -- SF
|
||
312 to replace SF 189, and SF 4355 to replace SF 4193 -- which remove
|
||
the controversial "classifiable" language. Unfortunately, they also
|
||
ignore the Executive Order requirement for classified information to
|
||
have markings identifying its secret status before employees can be
|
||
held liable for disclosure. If an employee is uncertain about an
|
||
unmarked document's status, the only way to comply with the new,
|
||
improved gag orders is to "ask the boss" -- a whistleblower
|
||
identification scheme that creates a Catch 22: either whistleblowers
|
||
will be exposed to reprisal, or will decide to keep quiet instead of
|
||
challenging bureaucratic misconduct. The new forms retain and expand
|
||
the requirement to identify the proposed recipient to a supervisor and
|
||
to obtain prior approval based on that individual's "need to know" the
|
||
information.
|
||
|
||
They also retain all the other repressive features of the gag
|
||
orders, including the claim that the government owns all information
|
||
covered by the forms about which an employee may learn. Ominously,
|
||
the government's property right over information is the foundation of
|
||
the British Official Secrets Act.
|
||
|
||
In 1989 the Supreme Court added to the confusion by unanimously
|
||
overruling Judge Gasch's decision that Congress acted
|
||
unconstitutionally in passing the anti-gag statute. Unfortunately,
|
||
the Court did not decide Congress had the authority to maintain open
|
||
disclosure channels for whistleblowers. Rather, the justices held
|
||
that the District Court had not adequately supported its conclusion
|
||
that SF 312 still violated the statute. The Supreme Court said that
|
||
until that issue was resolved, any rulings on constitutionality were
|
||
premature.
|
||
|
||
For the time being, the anti-gag statute is back in effect but its
|
||
future is uncertain. Enclosed as an appendix is a model addendum that
|
||
employees may find useful if they wish to modify previously-signed
|
||
nondisclosure agreements or are ordered to sign a nondisclosure
|
||
agreement or else forfeit their security clearances. The addendum
|
||
specifies that the signature does not mean the employee is agreeing to
|
||
waive any of his or her free speech rights.
|
||
|
||
In January 1989 Congress learned of still another attempt to
|
||
cancel out the constitutional rights of employees with security
|
||
clearances. A proposed Executive Order would have reverted to-
|
||
pre-McCarthy era days by eliminating all due process for decisions to
|
||
grant or deny security clearances. The employee would not be entitled
|
||
to any explanation. All an agency would have to do is "just say no."
|
||
The proposal would have allowed unscrupulous agency managers to force
|
||
employees out of the government for reasons that would be illegal if
|
||
disclosed. In short, the proposal had the potential to circumvent the
|
||
new Whistleblower Protection Act and all anti-discrimination statutes
|
||
by creating a system of secret employment law for security clearances.
|
||
After the Administration was unable to defend the proposal at hearings
|
||
chaired by Representative Gerald Sikorski (D.- Minn.), the plan was
|
||
withdrawn. A new Interagency Task Force has started work again,
|
||
however, on overhauling the system of due process for security
|
||
clearances.
|
||
|
||
Even without the new proposal, background security investigations
|
||
remain a prime weapon to harass whistleblowing civil servants and
|
||
government contract employees. Existing due process rights are little
|
||
more than token. The administrative judges at the Pentagon work for
|
||
the prosecutors seeking to yank the clearances -- the ultimate example
|
||
of anti- independence for a legal decisionmakers. Indeed, the
|
||
Pentagon's system has been plagued by "directed decisions." This means
|
||
the administrative judge receives an order to rule against the
|
||
appellant before the hearing begins.
|
||
|
||
The law of security clearances remains the Achilles Heel for
|
||
freedom of speech. Employees with clearances are well-advised to
|
||
zealously protect their anonymity if they blow the whistle, because
|
||
absent a successful political/public relations campaign they have
|
||
little chance to defend themselves.
|
||
|
||
|
||
THE PROMISED LAND -- MAKING FREEDOM OF SPEECH A REALITY
|
||
|
||
The principles to transform free speech and government
|
||
accountability from lip service to reality are no mystery. Those in
|
||
power simply prefer the former to the latter. Six basic groundrules
|
||
are obvious. Whistleblowers must --
|
||
|
||
1)have access to courts where the decisionmakers have judicial
|
||
independence
|
||
|
||
2)be entitled to a jury trial;
|
||
|
||
3)have remedies that hold individual harassers personally liable,
|
||
so that an
|
||
|
||
4)gain access to legal shields for following government or
|
||
professional codes of
|
||
|
||
5)have the ability to go on the attack against lawlessness by
|
||
restoring citizen
|
||
|
||
6)restore due process rights for all violations of constitutional
|
||
rights, even when
|
||
|
||
|
||
A model whistleblower protection statute is enclosed as an addendum.
|
||
|
||
|
||
CHOOSING AND WORKING WITH AN ATTORNEY
|
||
|
||
Whether a whistleblower's story has a happy or tragic ending
|
||
depends to a frightening degree on picking the right lawyer and
|
||
maintaining an effective working relationship. In the eyes of the
|
||
law, the attorney and client are as one. The attorney is the client's
|
||
"mouthpiece," and the client automatically gets the benefits or
|
||
liabilities of the attorney's statements and decisions. Obviously,
|
||
picking a lawyer is a very serious decision, as significant as any
|
||
other in the whistleblowing cycle.
|
||
|
||
Unfortunately, most individuals are so anxious to get their case
|
||
in the hands of an "expert" that they accept the first lawyer who will
|
||
take them on affordable terms, without truly knowing the partner upon
|
||
whom their career rights will depend. It might work out, but there
|
||
are unacceptably high risks to future happiness, financial well-being
|
||
and legal success.
|
||
|
||
Ultimately, trust and intuition are as important as a catalogue of
|
||
"do's" and "don'ts" in selecting an attorney. Like any partnership,
|
||
to be effective the attorney and client should like each other and
|
||
have a rapport based on mutual respect, at least within the context of
|
||
their professional relationship. After all, they're each relying on
|
||
each other in a high-stakes conflict where they're underdogs by
|
||
conventional measures. But the smart whistleblower will follow both
|
||
intuition, and the systematic common sense of a checklist based on his
|
||
or her own priorities and the lessons painfully learned by others who
|
||
have gone through the same experience.
|
||
|
||
Our advice to any whistleblowers who need legal representation is
|
||
summarized below. Some of the suggestions may not be appropriate in a
|
||
given case. On the other hand, these tips are not all-inclusive.
|
||
They represent a composite of experiences shared by those who have
|
||
been represented by GAP or sought help from either of our
|
||
organizations. Please let us know at GAP and PMP if you have items to
|
||
add to the list, and if you have had positive or negative experiences
|
||
with a particular lawyer. We both receive a steady stream of requests
|
||
from new whistleblowers who could benefit from lessons learned.
|
||
|
||
1. Identifying prospective attorneys. Do not overlook
|
||
word-of-mouth referrals from friends who may have had similar
|
||
experiences and enjoyed a good attorney-client relationship with a
|
||
lawyer. Contact GAP and PMP for suggestions. A routine part of our
|
||
service to whistleblowers is to provide attorney referrals.
|
||
|
||
Another approach is to contact public interest or community
|
||
organizations -- locally, or through their national headquarters or
|
||
Washington, D.C. office -- that have an ongoing interest in the
|
||
issues of concern to you. Remember, the confidential attorney-client
|
||
relationship will not apply during your discussions with lay
|
||
representatives at those groups, so unless you want to make a
|
||
disclosure to them you should avoid repeating your dissent. Just
|
||
point out that you've been retaliated against for pursuing the same
|
||
values on the job that their organization champions in the community
|
||
or elsewhere. Then ask for their help in finding an attorney with a
|
||
good track record in employment law, the topic of your dissent, or
|
||
preferably both. Third, traditional sources such as the local bar
|
||
association or relevant committees of the American Bar Association can
|
||
help identify respected specialists. Your local public library also
|
||
should have a copy of the lawyer's directory, Martindale-Hubbell,
|
||
which describes the specialties of attorneys under a variety of
|
||
cross-references.
|
||
|
||
2. Getting to know each other. Probably the most common reason
|
||
why working relationships go sour between attorneys and clients is
|
||
that they entered their partnership with differing expectations. As a
|
||
result, the primary rule in choosing a lawyer is to pin down the
|
||
details up front that are important to you.
|
||
|
||
A few suggestions apply before you even talk to a prospective
|
||
lawyer, however. Take the time to summarize your story in writing and
|
||
be concise -- preferably less than two single-spaced, typed pages and
|
||
never more than five. Take your time preparing this document.
|
||
Prospective attorneys may appreciate the time they save by reading it
|
||
before they meet with you. They can then get down to asking you the
|
||
hard questions from a foundation of knowing the basic dispute and its
|
||
context. Your case summary also will be an attorney's first
|
||
impression of your communications skills, and will be a benchmark to
|
||
test your credibility through questioning to check whether you have
|
||
exaggerated the facts.
|
||
|
||
Also take the time to identify solid candidates as supporting
|
||
witnesses, and be prepared to describe how their testimony could help.
|
||
Similarly, prepare a list of relevant documents currently or
|
||
potentially available. It takes a near- miracle to win without either
|
||
strong supporting testimony or documentary evidence.
|
||
|
||
Your primary goal at the initial interview is to sell yourself and
|
||
therefore build the attorney's confidence in your prospects for
|
||
winning. As a result, the list below of suggested questions about
|
||
groundrules for working with the attorney is probably too
|
||
comprehensive for an initial interview. Prospective lawyers may be
|
||
wary of someone who immediately cross- examines them on too wide a
|
||
range of topics. First they want to make up their minds about you.
|
||
Before you get serious about signing a retainer, however, you need to
|
||
know where you both stand on these matters. And some of the first
|
||
suggestions below obviously must occur at the initial interview.
|
||
|
||
* Find out in advance if there is a fee for the initial
|
||
consultation with the lawyer, and if so, how much it will cost.
|
||
|
||
* Before you share your life and problems with the lawyer, confirm
|
||
that the attorney-client privilege applies to what you discuss and
|
||
that the information will not be revealed without your consent.
|
||
|
||
* Even if you have confirmed the confidentiality of the
|
||
discussions, don't take any chances. Learn whether the attorney has
|
||
any other clients related to your dispute. Before your introductory
|
||
meeting, check the list of "representative clients" in Martindale
|
||
Hubbell. (Old copies may have more complete listings.) Then ask the
|
||
attorney before you disclose confidential information. For example,
|
||
one whistleblower at a poultry slaughter plant later learned that his
|
||
powerful lawyer represented the state's poultry trade association.
|
||
Not surprisingly, the lawyer allowed the statute of limitations to
|
||
lapse on the whistleblower's case. Also not surprisingly, the
|
||
employee could not find anyone to take a malpractice case against the
|
||
lawyer in the state, which was dominated by the poultry industry.
|
||
|
||
* Make clear your goals or objectives, both with respect to the
|
||
attorney's representation, as well as the larger context of the public
|
||
policy dispute about which you're blowing the whistle. For example,
|
||
some lawyers will be uncomfortable if you continue to dissent publicly
|
||
during the lawsuit. Other lawyers, who are advocates for the values
|
||
you were defending with your dissent, will be uncomfortable if you do
|
||
not. Similarly, different firms are appropriate for those who wish to
|
||
settle a dispute quietly, compared with those whose goal is to have
|
||
their day in court. For example, GAP now has a policy not to accept
|
||
clients who are willing to accept financial settlements that gag them
|
||
from cooperating with ongoing government investigations of their
|
||
dissent.
|
||
|
||
* Determine the attorney's willingness to work with groups helping
|
||
to champion your dissent, if you want to continue making a public
|
||
policy contribution. Some attorneys are unwilling to relinquish
|
||
control of valuable information they learn from depositions or
|
||
subpoenaed documents until the lawsuit is over, which might be many
|
||
years and when that evidence could have prevented needless scandals or
|
||
tragedies. There are valid reasons to keep significant evidence
|
||
secret. For example, premature disclosures may cut out future
|
||
voluntary cooperation by your former employer or colleagues in
|
||
pretrial work to discover necessary facts for the trial.
|
||
Alternatively, it may preclude settlement as an option by forcing an
|
||
employer to neutralize your newest attacks through discrediting you in
|
||
the lawsuit. These are tough choices and ultimately they are your
|
||
choices. But you should pick an attorney on a similar wave length at
|
||
the beginning, to avoid the possibility of serious conflicts when they
|
||
would be highly damaging, at a critical point in the case.
|
||
|
||
* Work out what your financial burdens and options are.
|
||
Disgruntlement with a client for failing to keep up with expected
|
||
payments is a major reason why lawyers reduce the time and energy they
|
||
put into a case.
|
||
|
||
* Pin down who will handle the case. Frequently it is not the
|
||
lawyer who discusses it with you initially. Don't make a decision
|
||
until you meet and have confidence in the specific attorney who will
|
||
be responsible for defending your rights.
|
||
|
||
* Find out how much time the attorney has and will commit to your
|
||
case. Even the best lawyers are inadequate if they are so burdened by
|
||
an overextended docket that they can't give you the priority you may
|
||
need. On the other hand, many clients have an unrealistic expectation
|
||
of how much time truly is needed in a particular case.
|
||
|
||
* Determine how much time and effort the attorney wants and/or
|
||
expects from you as a participant in preparing your case. Some
|
||
attorneys prefer their clients to be functional partners, while others
|
||
view the same client initiatives as interference. Whistleblowers,
|
||
too, range from those who can't stay away from their cases to those
|
||
who prefer to get on with their lives and not be bothered
|
||
unnecessarily.
|
||
|
||
* Get a commitment as to how much notice you will receive of
|
||
developments, information and decisions that make a difference for
|
||
your case.
|
||
|
||
* Learn the attorney's track record in handling cases similar to
|
||
yours, such as won-loss record and significant precedents or benefits
|
||
obtained for other clients. One way to find out is by reviewing
|
||
public court documents, such as briefs and relevant judicial decisions
|
||
in similar cases that the attorney has handled.
|
||
|
||
* Pin down your role in any potential settlement negotiations,
|
||
including advance notice of proposals before they are made or of
|
||
offers from the other side before any response is issued, and the
|
||
attorney's willingness to respect your authority as the final
|
||
decisionmaker in the settlement. A client is in a position of
|
||
comparative weakness if an attorney threatens to quit unless
|
||
settlement terms are accepted on the eve of trial. Be careful to
|
||
remember, though, that your lawyer is the partner on your team who has
|
||
unique expertise. Most of us have an unrealistic expectation of what
|
||
we deserve to achieve in a settlement, which definitionally is a
|
||
compromise where both parties are partially disappointed. Also,
|
||
remember that the great majority of cases settle before trial.
|
||
|
||
3. Signing the retainer. The main advice here is remember that
|
||
the retainer agreement is a contract. Treat this agreement with as
|
||
much respect as you would any other contract. It may be one of the
|
||
most important you ever sign. Read the terms carefully to make sure
|
||
its provisions match up with any informal agreements reached on items
|
||
listed above or from your own checklist. If you don't understand a
|
||
term, ask the attorney to explain it and to replace the legalese with
|
||
the English translation you understand. If the attorney balks, that
|
||
is a warning symptom to consider.
|
||
|
||
4. Maintaining the working relationship. Like any other
|
||
relationship, the attorney-client version requires regular tending.
|
||
It is liable to sour if either party takes the other for granted. The
|
||
tips below illustrate a few of the ways you can do your share to
|
||
maintain a healthy partnership.
|
||
|
||
* Pay your bills on time! If there is a financial crisis, give
|
||
your lawyer as much warning as possible and conscientiously try to
|
||
make alternative arrangements. This is a matter both of respect for
|
||
your attorney's financial needs and to preclude a common excuse for
|
||
tardiness or unenthusiastic advocacy.
|
||
|
||
* Respect your attorney's time burdens and responsibilities to
|
||
other clients. Don't cry wolf about emergencies, and don't demand
|
||
instant gratification for non-emergencies. When possible, put
|
||
developments in writing instead of demanding a phone or personal
|
||
conference with your attorney. Confirm periodically, however, that
|
||
the lawyer has read, understood and properly filed your written
|
||
contributions.
|
||
|
||
* View your lawyer as a human being who has a family, gets tired,
|
||
etc. Attorneys understandably resent being perceived only as success
|
||
objects and may get resentful periodically if they think that's your
|
||
only interest in them. It's not to your advantage for your champion
|
||
to resent you.
|
||
|
||
* Make sure that you and your lawyer continue to be clear about
|
||
your comparative responsibilities and divisions of labor. Sometimes
|
||
adjustments are necessary during the course of a case.
|
||
|
||
* Don't assume that progress is being made or that nothing has
|
||
happened if you haven't heard from your attorney for an extended
|
||
period. Communication gaps often are innocent but damaging lapses.
|
||
|
||
* Don't insist on dealing only with the lawyer running the case.
|
||
Get to know the junior attorney, administrative assistants and law
|
||
clerks who are important parts of that attorney's team. Work through
|
||
them whenever necessary. They may be putting in a majority of actual
|
||
time spent on your case anyway.
|
||
|
||
* Inform your attorney of any initiatives that you may wish to
|
||
take for getting reinforcements or additional help. That way you
|
||
won't surprise your attorney by letting the cat out of the bag
|
||
prematurely on a sensitive matter, or end up either duplicating or
|
||
working at cross purposes with your lawyer.
|
||
|
||
The attorney-client partnership unites the whistleblower's
|
||
values with the lawyer's expertise. Remember, your lawyer is working
|
||
for you. But while you're the boss, your attorney is the expert guide
|
||
to lead you through treacherous, largely-unknown territory.
|
||
|
||
CONCLUSION
|
||
|
||
This handbook is designed to tell you of all the risks in the
|
||
slippery path of whistleblowing. If we have scared you from blowing
|
||
the whistle, perhaps you weren't ready. If you are still determined
|
||
to do so, we now hope that you will do it in a careful, planned and
|
||
effective way. The Project on Military Procurement and the Government
|
||
Accountability Project are happy to give you individual advice on your
|
||
unique situation after you have read this handbook and know your
|
||
alternatives. Please contact the Project on Military Procurement for
|
||
whistleblowing about any aspect of national security, and the
|
||
Government Accountability Project for legal assistance in all areas of
|
||
whistleblowing. We hope that this handbook lets you do the right
|
||
thing for your country while trying to protect your career and your
|
||
personal life. Good luck.
|
||
|
||
<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>ͻ
|
||
<20> SNAFU - LIBRARIES <20>
|
||
<20> <20>
|
||
<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>
|
||
<20> <20>
|
||
<20> B - Browsing Library <20>
|
||
<20> <20>
|
||
<20> J - Research Library <20>
|
||
<20> <20>
|
||
<20> P - Defense Procurement, an Overview <20>
|
||
<20> <20>
|
||
<20> H - Help <20>
|
||
<20> <20>
|
||
<20> Q - Quit Options <20>
|
||
<20> <20>
|
||
<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>ͼ
|
||
|
||
Enter an above letter then press return. Your choice? B
|
||
|
||
|
||
<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>͵SNAFU BROWSING LIBRARY<52><59><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>ͻ
|
||
<20> <20>
|
||
<20> A - About This Library and its Organization <20>
|
||
<20> <20>
|
||
<20> B - Weapons Testing <20>
|
||
<20> <20>
|
||
<20> C - Secrecy Issues and Black Weapons Programs <20>
|
||
<20> <20>
|
||
<20> D - Defense Contract Issues <20>
|
||
<20> <20>
|
||
<20> E - Ethics and Conflict of Interest <20>
|
||
<20> <20>
|
||
<20> F - Readiness, Force Structure, and Budget Issues <20>
|
||
<20> <20>
|
||
<20> G - Weapons That Don't Work <20>
|
||
<20> <20>
|
||
<20> Q - Quit <20>
|
||
<20><><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD><EFBFBD>ͼ
|
||
|
||
|
||
Enter the letter of an above library category. Your choice? A
|
||
|
||
About the Browsing Library...
|
||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||
|
||
A TALE OF TWO LIBRARIES
|
||
|
||
There are two major "library" facilities available on this
|
||
computerized information system that we call SNAFU.
|
||
|
||
These are the "Browsing Library", and the "Research Library", both of
|
||
which are part of the "Library System".
|
||
|
||
The Research Library is meant for the use of journalists or others who
|
||
are already knowledgable on military procurement matters. This
|
||
library is meant to give such a user "no-nonesense" access to a large
|
||
volume of hard documentation. We know that reporters will want to
|
||
have immediate access to the actual documents without having to sift
|
||
through any layers of explanatory text written by us. Therefore, the
|
||
presentation philosophy of this library is "just the facts..."
|
||
|
||
The Browsing Library's presentation philosophy is somewhat different.
|
||
Its purpose is to make possible a sort of educational journey through
|
||
the issues of military procurement. This journey ultimately gives the
|
||
user access to the same documentation that is available in the
|
||
research library, but the documents are preceded and followed by our
|
||
own explanatory text. Often this will be an anecdotal history of the
|
||
material the user is being presented. Thus, the Browsing Library
|
||
provides a more structured tour of our material. Hopefully the
|
||
structuring will allow the uninitiated to access our material as more
|
||
of a coherent whole, or mosaic, rather than a disjoint set of
|
||
documents. We think both libraries will meet a distinct need.
|
||
|