Previously we just applied a very minimal set of restrictions and
trusted unbound to properly drop root privs and capabilities.
With this change I am (for the most part) just using the upstream
example unit file for unbound. The main difference is that we start
unbound was `unbound` user with the required capabilities instead of
letting unbound do the chroot & uid/gid changes.
The upstream unit configuration this is based on is a lot stricter with
all kinds of permissions then our previous variant. It also came with
the default of having the `Type` set to `notify`, therefore we are also
using the `unbound-with-systemd` package here. Unbound will start up,
read the configuration files and start listening on the configured ports
before systemd will declare the unit "running". This will likely help
with startup order and the occasional race condition during system
activation where the DNS service is started but not yet ready to answer
queries.
Aditionally to the much stricter runtime environmet I removed the
`/dev/urandom` mount lines we previously had in the code (that would
randomly fail during `stop`-phase).
The `preStart` script is now only required if we enabled the trust
anchor updates (which are still enabled by default).
Another beneefit of the refactoring is that we can now issue reloads via
either `pkill -HUP unbound` or `systemctl reload unbound` to reload the
running configuration without taking the daemon offline. A prerequisite
of this was that unbound configuration is available on a well known path
on the file system. I went for /etc/unbound/unbound.conf as that is the
default in the CLI tooling which in turn enables us to use
`unbound-control` without passing a custom configuration location.
The test relied on moving `initrd` secrets from the store into the
`initrd` which was fine here as it's only an integration test and not a
production environment.
However, this broke in 20.09 when support for this was dropped[1]. To make
sure that the snakeoil key used as hostkey for `sshd` here actually gets
copied into the VM, I added a small script for this that takes care of
this process while building the initial ramdisk.
[1] d930466b7728e5515991cb73c060fc3f32bdc001
This test allows to ensure the systemd-journal-gatewayd service is
responding correcly when the NixOS option `enableHttpGateway` is set.
The test has not been added into the main systemd test because a
graphical stack is not required (and rebuilding the graphical stack on
systemd change is huge).
Upstream has apparently changed the configuration format and is now
throwing an error when the `encrypt_sse` option is set. According to the
current version of the documentation encryption moved to the
`sse_config` option that (is optional and) offers all the features we do
not use or care about for this test.
This adds modules for the icecream scheduler and daemon.
Icecream can be used for distributed compilation, especially in
environments with diverse toolchains, since it sends the complete build
environment to the daemon.
Unfortunatley the daemon can't be run with DynamicUser = true, since the
daemon requires to be started as root in order to accept other build
environments, see [1].
[1]: https://github.com/icecc/icecream#using-icecream-in-heterogeneous-environments
For the same reason Alertmanager supports environmentFile to pass
secrets along, it is useful to support the same for Prometheus'
configuration to store bearer tokens outside the Nix store.
These were broken since 2016:
f0367da7d1
since StartLimitIntervalSec got moved into [Unit] from [Service].
StartLimitBurst has also been moved accordingly, so let's fix that one
too.
NixOS systems have been producing logs such as:
/nix/store/wf98r55aszi1bkmln1lvdbp7znsfr70i-unit-caddy.service/caddy.service:31:
Unknown key name 'StartLimitIntervalSec' in section 'Service', ignoring.
I have also removed some unnecessary duplication in units disabling
rate limiting since setting either interval or burst to zero disables it
(ad16158c10/src/basic/ratelimit.c (L16))
* nixos/postgresql: fix inaccurate docs for authentication
We actually use peer authentication, then md5 based authentication.
trust is not used.
* Use a link for mkForce docs
Co-authored-by: aszlig <aszlig@redmoonstudios.org>
Co-authored-by: lf- <lf-@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: aszlig <aszlig@redmoonstudios.org>
