It's impossible to move two major-versions forward when upgrading
Nextcloud. This is an issue when comming from 19.09 (using Nextcloud 16)
and trying to upgrade to 20.03 (using Nextcloud 18 by default).
This patch implements the measurements discussed in #82056 and #82353 to
improve the update process and to circumvent similar issues in the
future:
* `pkgs.nextcloud` has been removed in favor of versioned attributes
(currently `pkgs.nextcloud17` and `pkgs.nextcloud18`). With that
approach we can safely backport major-releases in the future to
simplify those upgrade-paths and we can select one of the
major-releases as default depending on the configuration (helpful to
decide whether e.g. `pkgs.nextcloud17` or `pkgs.nextcloud18` should be
used on 20.03 and `master` atm).
* If `system.stateVersion` is older than `20.03`, `nextcloud17` will be
used (which is one major-release behind v16 from 19.09). When using a
package older than the latest major-release available (currently v18),
the evaluation will cause a warning which describes the issue and
suggests next steps.
To make those package-selections easier, a new option to define the
package to be used for the service (namely
`services.nextcloud.package`) was introduced.
* If `pkgs.nextcloud` exists (e.g. due to an overlay which was used to
provide more recent Nextcloud versions on older NixOS-releases), an
evaluation error will be thrown by default: this is to make sure that
`services.nextcloud.package` doesn't use an older version by accident
after checking the state-version. If `pkgs.nextcloud` is added
manually, it needs to be declared explicitly in
`services.nextcloud.package`.
* The `nixos/nextcloud`-documentation contains a
"Maintainer information"-chapter which describes how to roll out new
Nextcloud releases and how to deal with old (and probably unsafe)
versions.
Closes#82056
Make it clear that the warning is that updatedb will run as root, not
that locate will only run as root. Also explain how to silence the
warning.
Fixes#30864.
Signed-off-by: Anders Kaseorg <andersk@mit.edu>
Dropbear lags behind OpenSSH significantly in both support for modern
key formats like `ssh-ed25519`, let alone the recently-introduced
U2F/FIDO2-based `sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com` (as I found when I switched
my `authorizedKeys` over to it and promptly locked myself out of my
server's initrd SSH, breaking reboots), as well as security features
like multiprocess isolation. Using the same SSH daemon for stage-1 and
the main system ensures key formats will always remain compatible, as
well as more conveniently allowing the sharing of configuration and
host keys.
The main reason to use Dropbear over OpenSSH would be initrd space
concerns, but NixOS initrds are already large (17 MiB currently on my
server), and the size difference between the two isn't huge (the test's
initrd goes from 9.7 MiB to 12 MiB with this change). If the size is
still a problem, then it would be easy to shrink sshd down to a few
hundred kilobytes by using an initrd-specific build that uses musl and
disables things like Kerberos support.
This passes the test and works on my server, but more rigorous testing
and review from people who use initrd SSH would be appreciated!
Running the manual on a TTY is useless in the graphical ISOs and not
particularly useful in non-graphical ISOs (since you can also run
'nixos-help').
Fixes#83157.
* Removed the use of gnome-screensaver (https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-flashback/issues/18)
* Flashback's menu-related environment variables are now set in the gnome3.nix module instead of gnome-panel to resolve dependency conflict.
While renaming `networking.defaultMailServer` directly to
`services.ssmtp` is shorter and probably clearer, it causes eval errors
due to the second rename (directDelivery -> enable) when using e.g. `lib.mkForce`.
For instance,
``` nix
{ lib, ... }: {
networking.defaultMailServer = {
hostName = "localhost";
directDelivery = lib.mkForce true;
domain = "example.org";
};
}
```
would break with the following (rather confusing) error:
```
error: The option value `services.ssmtp.enable' in `/home/ma27/Projects/nixpkgs/nixos/modules/programs/ssmtp.nix' is not of type `boolean'.
(use '--show-trace' to show detailed location information)
```
Previously, the NixOS ACME module defaulted to using P-384 for
TLS certificates. I believe that this is a mistake, and that we
should use P-256 instead, despite it being theoretically
cryptographically weaker.
The security margin of a 256-bit elliptic curve cipher is substantial;
beyond a certain level, more bits in the key serve more to slow things
down than add meaningful protection. It's much more likely that ECDSA
will be broken entirely, or some fatal flaw will be found in the NIST
curves that makes them all insecure, than that the security margin
will be reduced enough to put P-256 at risk but not P-384. It's also
inconsistent to target a curve with a 192-bit security margin when our
recommended nginx TLS configuration allows 128-bit AES. [This Stack
Exchange answer][pornin] by cryptographer Thomas Pornin conveys the
general attitude among experts:
> Use P-256 to minimize trouble. If you feel that your manhood is
> threatened by using a 256-bit curve where a 384-bit curve is
> available, then use P-384: it will increases your computational and
> network costs (a factor of about 3 for CPU, a few extra dozen bytes
> on the network) but this is likely to be negligible in practice (in a
> SSL-powered Web server, the heavy cost is in "Web", not "SSL").
[pornin]: https://security.stackexchange.com/a/78624
While the NIST curves have many flaws (see [SafeCurves][safecurves]),
P-256 and P-384 are no different in this respect; SafeCurves gives
them the same rating. The only NIST curve Bernstein [thinks better of,
P-521][bernstein] (see "Other standard primes"), isn't usable for Web
PKI (it's [not supported by BoringSSL by default][boringssl] and hence
[doesn't work in Chromium/Chrome][chromium], and Let's Encrypt [don't
support it either][letsencrypt]).
[safecurves]: https://safecurves.cr.yp.to/
[bernstein]: https://blog.cr.yp.to/20140323-ecdsa.html
[boringssl]: https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/e9fc3e547e557492316932b62881c3386973ceb2
[chromium]: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=478225
[letsencrypt]: https://letsencrypt.org/docs/integration-guide/#supported-key-algorithms
So there's no real benefit to using P-384; what's the cost? In the
Stack Exchange answer I linked, Pornin estimates a factor of 3×
CPU usage, which wouldn't be so bad; unfortunately, this is wildly
optimistic in practice, as P-256 is much more common and therefore
much better optimized. [This GitHub comment][openssl] measures the
performance differential for raw Diffie-Hellman operations with OpenSSL
1.1.1 at a whopping 14× (even P-521 fares better!); [Caddy disables
P-384 by default][caddy] due to Go's [lack of accelerated assembly
implementations][crypto/elliptic] for it, and the difference there seems
even more extreme: [this golang-nuts post][golang-nuts] measures the key
generation performance differential at 275×. It's unlikely to be the
bottleneck for anyone, but I still feel kind of bad for anyone having
lego generate hundreds of certificates and sign challenges with them
with performance like that...
[openssl]: https://github.com/mozilla/server-side-tls/issues/190#issuecomment-421831599
[caddy]: 2cab475ba5/modules/caddytls/values.go (L113-L124)
[crypto/elliptic]: 2910c5b4a0/src/crypto/elliptic
[golang-nuts]: https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/golang-nuts/nlnJkBMMyzk
In conclusion, there's no real reason to use P-384 in general: if you
don't care about Web PKI compatibility and want to use a nicer curve,
then Ed25519 or P-521 are better options; if you're a NIST-fearing
paranoiac, you should use good old RSA; but if you're a normal person
running a web server, then you're best served by just using P-256. Right
now, NixOS makes an arbitrary decision between two equally-mediocre
curves that just so happens to slow down ECDH key agreement for every
TLS connection by over an order of magnitude; this commit fixes that.
Unfortunately, it seems like existing P-384 certificates won't get
migrated automatically on renewal without manual intervention, but
that's a more general problem with the existing ACME module (see #81634;
I know @yegortimoshenko is working on this). To migrate your
certificates manually, run:
$ sudo find /var/lib/acme/.lego/certificates -type f -delete
$ sudo find /var/lib/acme -name '*.pem' -delete
$ sudo systemctl restart 'acme-*.service' nginx.service
(No warranty. If it breaks, you get to keep both pieces. But it worked
for me.)
* nixos/nixpkgs.nix: Allow just using config in system
This assertion requires system to work properly. We might not have
this in cases where the user just sets config and wants Nixpkgs to
infer system from that. This adds a default for when this happens,
using doubleFromSystem.
* parens
`$toplevel/system` of a system closure with `x86_64` kernel and `i686` userland should contain "x86_64-linux".
If `$toplevel/system` contains "i686-linux", the closure will be run using `qemu-system-i386`, which is able to run `x86_64` kernel on most Intel CPU, but fails on AMD.
So this fix is for a rare case of `x86_64` kernel + `i686` userland + AMD CPU
Previously, systemd.network.links was only respected with networkd
enabled, but it's really udev taking care of links, no matter if
networkd is enabled or not.
With our module fixed, there's no need to manually manage the text file
anymore.
This was originally applied in 3d1079a20dafd82fac7ac857e63c91e787f4eaaa,
but was reverted due to 1115959a8d4d73ad73341563dc8bbf52230a281e causing
evaluation errors on hydra.
This mirrors the behaviour of systemd - It's udev that parses `.link`
files, not `systemd-networkd`.
This was originally applied in 36ef112a477034fc6d1d9170bf1bcda0140a8d1d,
but was reverted due to 1115959a8d4d73ad73341563dc8bbf52230a281e causing
evaluation errors on hydra.
