I think we had a *double* patch for the security problem CVE-2010-3856.

I had added the audit_suid.patch some time ago, and at some point niksnut added
this ignore-origin.patch. I think both fix the situation, the
ignore-origin.patch being released sooner than the audit_suid. As the
ignore-origin-patch is not in the recent glibc, it makes me think it was a quick
solution to the vulnerability, later properly fixed.

I remove, then, the ignore-origin.patch. We can check later if we remain
vulnerable.

svn path=/nixpkgs/branches/stdenv-updates/; revision=25110

pkgs/development/libraries/glibc-2.12/common.nix

@@ -77,9 +77,6 @@ stdenv.mkDerivation ({
     /* Allow nixos and nix handle the locale-archive. */
     ./nix-locale-archive.patch
 
-    /* Fix for CVE-2010-3856. */
-    ./ignore-origin.patch
-
   ];
 
   postPatch = ''

pkgs/development/libraries/glibc-2.12/ignore-origin.patch

@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
-Fix for CVE-2010-3847.
-
-2010-10-18  Andreas Schwab  <schwab@redhat.com>
-
-	* elf/dl-load.c (is_dst): Remove last parameter.
-	(_dl_dst_count): Ignore $ORIGIN in privileged programs.
-	(_dl_dst_substitute): Likewise.
----
- elf/dl-load.c |   30 +++++++++++++-----------------
- 1 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/elf/dl-load.c b/elf/dl-load.c
-index a7162eb..776f7e4 100644
---- a/elf/dl-load.c
-+++ b/elf/dl-load.c
-@@ -169,8 +169,7 @@ local_strdup (const char *s)
- 
- 
- static size_t
--is_dst (const char *start, const char *name, const char *str,
--	int is_path, int secure)
-+is_dst (const char *start, const char *name, const char *str, int is_path)
- {
-   size_t len;
-   bool is_curly = false;
-@@ -199,11 +198,6 @@ is_dst (const char *start, const char *name, const char *str,
- 	   && (!is_path || name[len] != ':'))
-     return 0;
- 
--  if (__builtin_expect (secure, 0)
--      && ((name[len] != '\0' && (!is_path || name[len] != ':'))
--	  || (name != start + 1 && (!is_path || name[-2] != ':'))))
--    return 0;
--
-   return len;
- }
- 
-@@ -218,13 +212,12 @@ _dl_dst_count (const char *name, int is_path)
-     {
-       size_t len;
- 
--      /* $ORIGIN is not expanded for SUID/GUID programs (except if it
--	 is $ORIGIN alone) and it must always appear first in path.  */
-+      /* $ORIGIN is not expanded for SUID/GUID programs.  */
-       ++name;
--      if ((len = is_dst (start, name, "ORIGIN", is_path,
--			 INTUSE(__libc_enable_secure))) != 0
--	  || (len = is_dst (start, name, "PLATFORM", is_path, 0)) != 0
--	  || (len = is_dst (start, name, "LIB", is_path, 0)) != 0)
-+      if (((len = is_dst (start, name, "ORIGIN", is_path)) != 0
-+	   && !INTUSE(__libc_enable_secure))
-+	  || (len = is_dst (start, name, "PLATFORM", is_path)) != 0
-+	  || (len = is_dst (start, name, "LIB", is_path)) != 0)
- 	++cnt;
- 
-       name = strchr (name + len, '$');
-@@ -256,9 +249,12 @@ _dl_dst_substitute (struct link_map *l, const char *name, char *result,
- 	  size_t len;
- 
- 	  ++name;
--	  if ((len = is_dst (start, name, "ORIGIN", is_path,
--			     INTUSE(__libc_enable_secure))) != 0)
-+	  if ((len = is_dst (start, name, "ORIGIN", is_path)) != 0)
- 	    {
-+	      /* Ignore this path element in SUID/SGID programs.  */
-+	      if (INTUSE(__libc_enable_secure))
-+		repl = (const char *) -1;
-+	      else
- #ifndef SHARED
- 	      if (l == NULL)
- 		repl = _dl_get_origin ();
-@@ -266,9 +262,9 @@ _dl_dst_substitute (struct link_map *l, const char *name, char *result,
- #endif
- 		repl = l->l_origin;
- 	    }
--	  else if ((len = is_dst (start, name, "PLATFORM", is_path, 0)) != 0)
-+	  else if ((len = is_dst (start, name, "PLATFORM", is_path)) != 0)
- 	    repl = GLRO(dl_platform);
--	  else if ((len = is_dst (start, name, "LIB", is_path, 0)) != 0)
-+	  else if ((len = is_dst (start, name, "LIB", is_path)) != 0)
- 	    repl = DL_DST_LIB;
- 
- 	  if (repl != NULL && repl != (const char *) -1)
--- 
-1.7.2.3