diff --git a/nixos/modules/security/wrappers/wrapper.c b/nixos/modules/security/wrappers/wrapper.c
index 7091e314bb2..af34c2f2fc5 100644
--- a/nixos/modules/security/wrappers/wrapper.c
+++ b/nixos/modules/security/wrappers/wrapper.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
@@ -161,22 +162,34 @@ static int make_caps_ambient(const char *selfPath)
 
 int main(int argc, char * * argv)
 {
-    // I *think* it's safe to assume that a path from a symbolic link
-    // should safely fit within the PATH_MAX system limit. Though I'm
-    // not positive it's safe...
-    char selfPath[PATH_MAX];
-    int selfPathSize = readlink("/proc/self/exe", selfPath, sizeof(selfPath));
+    // O_PATH | O_NOFOLLOW gives us a fd pointing to the symlink
+    int selfExe = open("/proc/self/exe", O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC | O_NOFOLLOW);
+    assert(selfExe != -1);
+    struct stat st;
+    assert(fstat(selfExe, &st) != -1);
+    size_t selfPathCap = st.st_size + 1;
+    char *selfPath = malloc(selfPathCap);
+    assert(selfPath);
+    int selfPathSize = readlinkat(selfExe, "", selfPath, selfPathCap);
 
     assert(selfPathSize > 0);
 
     // Assert we have room for the zero byte, this ensures the path
     // isn't being truncated because it's too big for the buffer.
     //
-    // A better way to handle this might be to use something like the
-    // whereami library (https://github.com/gpakosz/whereami) or a
-    // loop that resizes the buffer and re-reads the link if the
-    // contents are being truncated.
-    assert(selfPathSize < sizeof(selfPath));
+    // selfPathSize is the number of bytes readlinkat put into the
+    // buffer, which does *not* append a null byte. selfPathCap is the
+    // capacity of the buffer, which was set to the number of bytes in
+    // the link contents (again, without the null byte) plus one for
+    // the null byte.
+    //
+    // I don't think it's possible for the link contents to change
+    // between opening a symlink fd and readlinkat on it, so this is
+    // probably not necessary. Doubly so since this is /proc/self/exe,
+    // not a normal symlink. But it's trivial to check.
+    assert(selfPathSize < selfPathCap);
+
+    assert(close(selfExe));
 
     // Set the zero byte since readlink doesn't do that for us.
     selfPath[selfPathSize] = '\0';
@@ -197,7 +210,6 @@ int main(int argc, char * * argv)
     // `selfPath', and not, say, as some other setuid program. That
     // is, our effective uid/gid should match the uid/gid of
     // `selfPath'.
-    struct stat st;
     assert(lstat(selfPath, &st) != -1);
 
     assert(!(st.st_mode & S_ISUID) || (st.st_uid == geteuid()));
@@ -228,6 +240,8 @@ int main(int argc, char * * argv)
     // capabilities too!
     make_caps_ambient(selfPath);
 
+    free(selfPath);
+
     execve(sourceProg, argv, environ);
     
     fprintf(stderr, "%s: cannot run `%s': %s\n",