577 lines
33 KiB
Plaintext
577 lines
33 KiB
Plaintext
SUBJECT: The 1952 Saucer Wave - A Story Behind the Story? FILE: UFO2454
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(Just Cause, Copyright 1994 by Citizens Against UFO Secrecy, PO Box 218,
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Coventry, CT 06238, published bi-monthly with a subscription rate of
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$15/yr.)
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One of the most extraordinary periods in the hlstory of the UFO
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phenomena occurred during the summer of 1952. Literally thousands of
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flying saucer reports inundated the Air Force, police departments and
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newspapers with arounrd-the-clock activity. Central to this wave of
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reports were sightings over Washington D.C. Three major radar trackings
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of "unknowns" and a number of minor ones plagued Air Force and clvilian
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air traffic controllers. Jets had to be scrambled to confront the
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incasion of radar pips. In some cases pilots did detect strange 1ights
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over the city but as quickly as they would appear the objects would
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disappear, leaving officials scratching their heads over what had
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happened. During this three-week stretch banner headlines alerted the
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nation to the return of the saucers (having been in the news at various
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times since 1947).
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The Air Force statistics for this time were extraordinary. 1952
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produced 15O1 UFO incidents, the highest of any year of the Air Force's
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twenty-one year long investigtion. 303 of those were considered
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"unidentified" after investigation, also the highest of any year by a
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very large margin. The next highest was 1954, with a mere 46 unknowns
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of 487 reports (Project Blue Book Fact Sheet, 1968).
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Beginning in April and through May and June 1952, sightings
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began a steady rise. Part of this could have been due to an article
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that appeared in the April 7th, 1952 issue of Life magazine called,
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"Have We Visitors from Outer Space" by H. B. Darrach and Robert Ginna.
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The article was an oddity itself in that it was done with Air Force
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cooperation and that it came very close to endorsing the notion of UFOs
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as extraterrestrial devices. Cases were declassified and released to
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the Life writers. The magazine arranged to forward sightings to the Air
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Force from Life's readers (_The UFO Controversy in America_ by David
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Jacobs, 1975, pg. 69). The Air Force's policy prior to this had been to
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discourage such thinking, that the phenomena was under control and that
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there was nothing to the idea of visitations by beings from space. The
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Life article was a virtual invitation for saucer interest to escalate.
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Blue Book cases from April 16 - 30 totalled 54. May reports
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totalled 68 incidents. June reports increased again to 125. (Project
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Blue Book, Case Index, National Archives, 1976). When questioned by the
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press about the Life article, the Air Force did not issue the usual
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denial but instead maintained that the article was correct and the
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conclusions were Life's (Jacobs, 1975).
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Given the degree of encouragement to broadcasting saucer
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incidents the Air Force must have expected to receive a rising influx of
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sightings. There had always been elements in the Air Force interested
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in promoting an extraterrestrial explanation for flying saucers but they
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were, prior to this time, under control. One example of this was the
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"Estimate of the Situation," a Top Secret document which was said to
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have strongly supported saucers from space but was ultimately rejected
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as an Air Force policy statement (Just Cause, September 1992).
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Captain Edward Ruppelt, who became head of Project Blue Book in
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1951, was the most liberal of the Air Force's UFO investigators to that
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time. He had promoted an upscale program, was open-minded in his
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approach, and while not an alien advocate, had regarded some of the
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sightings as genuine mysteries.
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Question: If Air Force policy had been to discourage a flying
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saucer/outer space connection publicly, why suddenly open the door to a
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situation similar to that of the summer of 1947 when the press went
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absolutely wild with saucer stories and questions on what the government
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was doing about it? In other words, there wasn't a compelling reason
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for a policy shift in April 1952. The consensus of various UFO
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histories is that Ruppelt's serious approach to UFOs caused the Air
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Force's top brass to lend more support to Blue Book by being less
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secretive and more open and analytical. Ruppelt said in his book (The
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Report on Unidentified Flying Objects, 1956) that Life's pro-saucer
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statements were "unofffcially inspired" by several very high-ranking Air
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Force officers at the Pentagon, "so high that their personal opinion was
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almost policy." Was the reason for these "personal opinions" being made
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a public issue based on the possibility that an "answer" to the saucer
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mystery was evident to the Air Force, something which hadn't been proven
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to that point, or could there have been a more mundane reason which will
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lead to the core of a new explanation as to why the 1952 wave evolved as
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it did?
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JULY
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----
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July reports totalled 401, a massive increase in the monthly
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intake by Blue Book. Only 81 of those came from July 1 - 14, leaving
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320 from July 15 - 31. This huge output from the 15th on is important
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as we shall see later.
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In the process of doing historical sweeps of the press, CAUS has
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located a great deal of information on the 1952 wave. A comprehensive
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search of New England area newspapers has produced one thousand pages of
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clippings from July-August alone. Our search has taken five months of
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weekly six-hour sessions looking at microfilm in various libraries. One
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cannot get a grasp of the time without following news events day by day.
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Putting the saucer stories in context this way might reveal facts that
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were previously overlooked. "New" old sightings were found.
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Commentaries and opinions expressing the mindset of the population at
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the time were illuminating, and something else was found that was not
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anticipated.
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During July, just prior to the saucer wave becaming prominent,
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the national media showed a great deal of concern as to the country's
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preparedness for national defense. Numerous stories were noted in
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virtually every newspaper searched regarding the lack of air spotters
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for the Air Force. "Air Spotters Rally to Fill Gaps," said the Berkshire
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Eagle (Ma.) for July 15th. "Not Enough Skywatchers," said the Lowell
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Sun (Ma.) for July 14th. "Operatian Skywatch Flops: Volunteers Few,"
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said the Holyoke Telegram-Transcript (Ma.). And on and on this theme
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went in the New England press between July 14th and the 16th. The
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problem appeared to be so universal that it would be fair to project
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this nationally. CAUS has compiled forty pages of clips so far and we
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expect to see much the same elsewhere.
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What was this all about in the days before the great saucer
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wave? A fair amount of explanation is necessary.
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THE GROUND OBSERVER CORPS
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In the early 1950s the U.S. government had several basic units
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comprising its air defense system.
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Early Warning Radar Stations - The purpose being of course to
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detect enemy aircraft electronically at a distance.
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Ground Controlled Intercept - Consisted of radar stations
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designed to follow enemy aircraft and direct U.S. fighter planes
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towards them for attack.
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Fighter Interceptor Aircraft Bases - Launched U.S. fighters on
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missions.
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Another important element was the Ground Observer Corps, which
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was in essence groups of thousands of average citizens in volunteer
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service to the government for the purpose of visually spotting potential
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enemy aircraft overflying the United States. The GOC had begun as an
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experiment in September 1949, called "Operation Lookout." The results
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had been encouraging to the point the Air Force had felt a Ground
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Observer Corps could play an important role in plugging holes in the
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existing radar network. The ultimate goal of the program was to have
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24-hour sky coverage by one million volunteer spotters at 24,000
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observation posts (_The Air Force_ by A. Brophy, 1956, pg. 91). And
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with volunteers, the cost of the program would be much less than paying
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professionals who could not be employed in such large numbers.
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The GOC worked under joint control of the U.S. government and
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civil authorities. The Air Force would handle the tactical end of the
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program, such as training the volunteers and designing procedures for
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reporting. Civil authorities would take care of personnel and record
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keeping. The chain of command in a given state would begin with the
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governor. Under him would be a state civil defense director, then a
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director for the state Ground Observer Corps. The GOC director then had
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a GOC coordination officer who knew the appropriate locations and
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personnel in various counties. Within the counties would be area
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supervisors who would be responsible for the activation and operation of
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GOC posts in his/her area. Finally, there would be a post supervisor
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who would oversee the individual post and volunteer personnel assigned
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to it. The GOC post was generally a tower of sufficient height to give
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an all-sky view. A small shelter on top contained communications
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equipment, spotting equipment (binoculars; etc.) and other aids to relay
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the results of visual interception of unknown aircraft (Air Force Manual
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5O-12).
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Part of the GOC as well was the Filter Center, a facility run by
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both military and civil authorities. This is to where the individual
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ground spotter would report his/her observation of an unknown. Staffed
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mainly by civilians, the Filter Center would receive phone calls,
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record information, plot it on large table maps, and perform other
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related tasks. Since it was also part of the military chain of command,
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the Filter Center had an Air Force Officer-in-Charge who made sure
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things went smoothly.
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Until 1952, the GOC posts operated on a man-available basis.
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Rarely were posts fully staffed to provide complete 24-hour coverage of
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the sky. Generally the volunteers worked 2-3 hour shifts. The overnite,
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or graveyard, shifts were the most difficult to staff as they required
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being awake during most people's sleep time.
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It is important to know all of this because few people now know
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what the Ground Observer Corps was and how it operated. Nor do they
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know how a GOC air alert called "Operation Skywatch" raised the curtain
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on the great saucer wave.
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Operation Sktwatch was an attempt by the Air Force to put the
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GOC on a 24-hour schedule for the first time. The alert was earmarked
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for July 14, 1952. One problem with GOC operations at this point was
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the staffing at various posts across the nation. The Air Force was
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trying to push the program along to meet the challenge of completing
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24-hour sky coverage to supplement the existing radar network. It was a
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difficult task. One town Civil Defense director in Rhode Island, Judge
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James Watts, called the attempt at 24-hour coverage "asinine" (New
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Bedford Standard-Times [Ma.], July 15). He maintained that "people have
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to work for a living and don't have time," especiallt since the U.S. was
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not in a state of war.
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In fact the Air Force rallied the GOC directors to get local
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newspapers involved in getting the public to volunteer. President Truman
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made a personal call for volunteers in a statement released in
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Washington on July 12 (Springfield Union [Ms.] July 13). As mentioned
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earlier in report, it was very obvious that the GOC people were having
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difficulty everywhere.
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Operation Skywatch was carried through but the results of the
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July 14th alert were "spotty" (Providence Journal [R.I.], July 18), "a
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deplorable situation and a sad lack of interest..." (Taunton Gazette
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[Ma.], July 16), "a flop in New England," (Holyoke Telegram-Transcript
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[Ma.], July 15), "Observation Post Apathy," (Portland Press-Herald
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[Me.], July 18). The Worcester Telegram (Ma.) of July 18 called the
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public "apathetlc and fatalistic" about the danger of enemy attack.
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The Air Force said that only about thirty percent of the posts
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in New England operated (Lowell Sun [Ma.], July 16). The Eastern Air
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Defense Force at Stewart Air Force Base, New York reported that only
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slightly more than 1500 posts in the New York area were manned out of
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4OOO (New York Herald-Tribune, July 15). This after a major effort was
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launched by the Air Force to make the GOC work.
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A dilemma was now apparent. Question: How does the Air Force
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motivate the population to become involved with the GOC; to, in effect,
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stand and stare at the sky without pay for hours in anticipation of an
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enemy attack that may or may not ever occur? "Things aren't very good,"
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said Major Richard Curtis, the commander of the New Haven, Connecticut
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Filter Center (New York Herald-Tribune, July 15). The Air Force was
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committed to the GOC program, having decided in May not to reconsider
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its decision to proceed with Operation Skywatch. The request to
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reconsider came from a San Francisco meeting of the National Association
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of State Civil Defense Directors, an influential group which could not
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sway the the Air Force. The final decision had been made by General
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Hoyt Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff (New York Times, May 3, 1952).
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THE WAVE
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On July 16th, barely a day after Operation Skywatch began, the
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great summer 1952 wave was off and running. An escalation in the number
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of saucer sightings reported to the Air Force had been in progress since
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April but the press had paid little attention to them until this time.
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Two veteran airline pilots, W.B. Nash and W.H. Fortenberry, had
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reported seeing eight huge discs zipping along in formation near
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Norfolk, Virginia on July 14th while piloting their Pan American DC-4.
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At first six discs maneuvered in echelon formation below the airliner.
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Making a sharp turn, the six were then joined by two other discs, all of
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which soon zoomed upward and disappeared. Wire services transmitted the
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story nationwide with little comment by the Air Force. The accounts
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were loaded with superlatives about the credibility of the witnesses and
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the quality of the report.
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A United Press story transmitted on the 17th, and quoting
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Captain Edward Ruppelt, indicated that sixty saucer reports had been
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received in two weeks and that 1952 sightings were double the rate for
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1951. The Air Force, in effect, nudges the spiraling situation upward
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with this statement. Lt. Colonel Richard McGee, Director of Civil
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Defense for the Dayton, Ohio area (the home of Project Blue Book), said
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that he was alarmed by the increase and added, "There is something
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flying around in our skies and I wish I knew what it is." (Portland
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Press-Herald [Me.], July 18).
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Sightings continued to increase. A July 19th story (Boston
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American) indicated that sightings were received from New York, Vermont,
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Colorado and Washington. The only mention of Air Force comment was that
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they "take seriously all such reports."
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Some press sources were provided instructions on informing the
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public on how to spot and report the flying saucers (Brockton Enterprise
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[Ma.], July 19). One (Fall River Herald-News [Ma.], July 21) wondered
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why none of the sightings in those reported to that time were by members
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of the Ground Observer Corps.
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A NEW SPIN ON AN OLD STORY
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For any of this to mean something, we must explain where all of
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what we've said so far comes together. The Air Force enacted a program
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of 24-hour sky coverage. Its major problem was getting volunteers to
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man the country's observation posts. A very short time after the Air
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Force's program gets off to a poor start, flying saucers begin to creep
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into the press with little resistance from authorities. Think about it.
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If you were an Air Force Intelligence officer and a major, funded
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program of skywatching was heading for the hopper, what would you do?
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How would you motivate the public to go outside for two to three hour
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shifts and watch the skies? Answer: Flying Saucers! The lure and
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fascination of potential visitors from space would motivate most
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rational, thinking people into wanting to skywatch from an equipped
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observation post with the appropriate training. A chance at seeing one
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of these things, not to mention fulfilling a patriotic duty as well,
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would be irresistable to many citizens during the early 1950s.
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This is not an idea with easy evidence. To direct this
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situation, the government would not have to do much of anything. If
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flying saucers come along at a convenient time, let the stories get out
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- to a point. Do not react to them. Allow the press to sensationalize,
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arouse the public interest, thus getting recruitments and volunteers up.
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Once the situation appeared to be going out of control, the Air Force
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could step in, hold a press conference with the full weight of authority
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behind it, and kill the wave with convincing-sounding explanations.
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Planting mildly misleading stories cannot be ruled out either as a way
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of keeping the wave, and the interest in it, rolling along.
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The press could be fed instructions (i.e. training) to be printed
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for the public, seemingly for flying saucer spotting, but, on a more
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practical level for the Air Force in the long-term, GOC spotting. The
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whole business could be called a form of passive manipulation that would
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be hard to trace to its source, but would be highly effective for the
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Air Force in its consequences. The GOC would be better staffed, the
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saucer wave will have served a positive purpose for the Air Force, and
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when the wave had outlived its usefulness, debunk it.
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Is it plausible?
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BACK TO THE WAVE
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Press coverage of the 1952 wave exploded on July 22 with the
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information that saucers were seen visually and on radar over
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Washington, D.C. The attention given to this by the press was unlike
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anything seen since saucers began to be sighted in 1947. Hardly a
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newspaper in the country did not say anything about it. Continued
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bafflement character-ized Air Force statements in the first week of the
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wave. "A thorough investigation is being made by the Air Technical
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Intelligence Center," the Air Force told the Associated Press (Boston
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Globe, July 23).
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On the 23rd, the first GOC reports came through. Charles Buck, a
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Westfield, Maine GOC spotter saw three silver discs at high altitude.
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This was followed by another GOC observer's report from Nahant, Mass. of
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two discs (Brockton Enterprise [Ma.], July 23). Rather than keeping the
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GOC reports "within the company" and away from the press, as one might
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have expected the Air Force to do normally, they were freely gettinq out
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to the media now. No serious objection was yet apparent from the Air
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Force, thus more encouragement for volunteers to enroll with the GOC and
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potentially to report flying saucers and make headlines. More reports
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followed from Cleveland GOC spotters. And more yet from Chicago. The
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commander of the GOC Filter Center in Chicago, Captain Everett Turner,
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said he received a flying saucer report every hour from his volunteer
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spotters (Springfield News [Ma.], July 25).
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On the 24th, the Air Force, specifically Captain Edward Ruppelt
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of Project Blue Book, emphatically denied that the saucer wave had
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anything to do with putting the GOC volunteers on 24-hour duty
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(Providence Journal [R.I.], July 24). Yet in an interview with Colonel
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Richard McGee, the Dayton, Ohio Civil Defense Director in charge of the
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area incorporating Ruppelt's headquarters, he was asked whether or not
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there was a connection between Operation Sky watch and the flying
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saucers. He responded that to his knowledge no specific reason had been
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given "_but that could be the answer._" (emphasis added) (Portland
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Press-Herald [Me.], July 18). Evidently some military people were
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thinking about linkage between the two, as we are now. Without a
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smoking gun though, it could only have been unuttered speculation for
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most leaning to this idea.
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The build-up of reports and publicity continued on for the next
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few days. The reluctance of the Air Force to debunk reports continued
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as well, though civilian scientists began to object to the presentation
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of the sightings as mysterious. Dr. Donald Menzel became prominent
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during this time as a key saucer critic.
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The wave roared on at a fever pitch as press coverage on the
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28th revealed a second weekend of strange sightings over Washington. Jet
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interceptors again were foiled in attempting to identify the intruders.
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The wave coverage was now taking on an alarmist tendency and serious
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questions were being asked as to whether or not the military could
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handle the situation effectively. For example, according to the New
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York Times (July 29), the jets did not respond to the sightings over
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Washington until nearly two hours after the first radar trackings were
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reported, a remarkable admission by the military in the midst of the
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Cold War.
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Now something had to be done to douse the fire that the Air
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Force had allowed to build. A press conference was quickly convened on
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the 29th of July, led by Major General John Samford, the Air Force's
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Chief of Intelligence.
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The saucers, General Samford assured the press, were no threat
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to our national security. While conceding that some sightings were
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difficult to explain, the Air Force nevertheless balanced this with a
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variety of possible explanations for most of the reports. The
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"temperature inversion," a weather condition known to dupe radar into
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registering "solid" targets that were not really there in a physical
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sense, became the explanation of preference for the Washington radar
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trackings. Mirages and exaggerations were meted out to the press as
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further likelihoods. The Air Force was careful to protect the
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reputations of its personnel by asserting that credible observers were
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seeing relatively incredible things. The message was clear though that
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those "incredible things" were incredible as a function of subjective
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impressions, weather conditions and the fallibility of technical
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equipment.
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With the weight of authority behind it, the press conference
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effectively nullified the alarm raised by the media. Since the saucers
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had not landed on the White House lawn, nor did decidedly mysterious
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hard evidence surface, it would have been difficult for pro-saucer
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advocates to offset the official pronouncements. Some of the press
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quickly seized on this shift in attitude with headlines like "Public
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Starting to Accept Theory Discs are Illusions" (Quincy Patriot-Ledger
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[Ma], Juiy 31).
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The Blue Book report total for August was 278, a significant
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drop from July. Many did not accept the Air Force's explanations but
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the aftermath of the press conference distinctly reduced 1) the alarmist
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nature of the coverage which had begun well into the wave, and 2) the
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level of coverage which had sloped downward fram the beginning of August
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onward.
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GOC VOLUNTEERS/AIR FORCE RECRUITMENTS
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Reports towards the end of July appeared indicating that not
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only had GOC volulnteers increased but that the Air Force enlistments
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were up. The Springfield Union (Ma.), July 3O said, "Air Force Tops its
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July Quota," with the enlistment allotment "far over" its goal. In the
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month after the wave, GOC volunteers in Massachusetts increased from
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3500 on July 14th (the first day of Operation Skywatch ) to 7600
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(Springfield Union [Ma.], August 25). Several hundred new recruits
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signed up in Rhode Island (Providence Journal [R.I.], August 17). By no
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means was the GOC up to its goals but a valiant upward trend had begun.
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Another remarkable admission was made by the Air Force's Vice
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Commander of the Eastern Air Defense Force, Brigadier General George
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Smith, that low-flying aircraft could easily avoid radar detection
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around the United States "and must be observed and plotted by ground
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observers" (New York Herald-Tribune, August 1). One would not expect
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publicly-admitted clues by the Air Force, then actively at odds with a
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powerful Soviet Union, on how to defeat our national defenses, unless of
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course the Air Force regarded a depleted GOC as a more serious national
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security issue. Equally remarkable was an admission two days before as
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to the inability of Air Force radar at Andrews Air Force Base in
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Washington to detect the unknowns reported on radar by the civilian
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scopes at Washington National Airport (Attleboro Sun [Ma.], July 29).
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Of what possible good would these admissions be unless they were for a
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higher purpose - to encourage support for a stronger Ground Observer
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Corps.
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DISCUSSION
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----------
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It is folly to be absolute about anything relating to UFOs.
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Examples abound to support this. We can only follow a trail of
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information left in the wake of the 1952 saucer wave to see if there was
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a reason for why it happenned the way it did. We are suggesting that
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the problems with the Ground Observer Corps program were serious enough
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that using publicity about flying saucers as a tool to enhance the
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program seemed not to be such an outrageous ideas as it sounds. The
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wave has been a strange loose end demanding clarification. There is as
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yet no smoking gun but many hints are on the record.
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It would be difficult to say whether the government had planted
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altogether false stories with the press to encourage the interest to
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continue in flying saucers, therefore in skywatching, therefore in
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volunteering with the Air Force. We can't point any fingers but we
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can't rule it out either. The true anomalies, besides the saucer
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reports themselves, lie in the lack of timely Air Force response to the
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wave that was consistent with previous policy; the seemingly scandalous
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admissions by the military of gaping holes in the technical aspects of
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U.S. national security, admissions for which the ultimate resolution
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appeared to be boosting the Air Force's pet program by whatever means
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available; and the amount of immediate, behind-the-scenes information
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coming from the government during the wave, the result being an
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enthralled public excited about what was going on in our skies.
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Do not underestimate the effect of the 1952 wave on popular
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culture either. While it can be shown to have had long-term influence
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on the military (the wave led directly to the Robertson Panel of the
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CIA, setting the future debunking policy on flying saucers by the Air
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Force), the influence on the population may have been more profound.
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For example, one report (Boston Globe, September 7, 1952)
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indicated that toy manufacturers preparing for the 1952 Christmas season
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had taken note of an "unprecedented and furious upsurge of demand for
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rocket ships, space helmets, flying saucers and other playthings of an
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interplanetary nature." The children of America it seemed were weary of
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cowboy an western paraphenalia, which had dominated toy manufacturing
|
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for many years, and had switched their attention to extraterrestrial
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travel and visitations. The reason for this? According to the Boston
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Globe account, "The pre-occupation with space toys is of fairly recent
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origin. It started with the mid-summer revival of news stories about
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flying saucers. Now it has taken on such terrific proportions that it
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threatens to upset the industries carefully laid plans for the Christmas
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shopping rush."
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Some television shows had dealt with space themes to this time,
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the most notable being "Captain Video," debuting in 1949. But a
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rippling effect on the popular culture wasn't there until the summer of
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1952. Premiering in 1953 were three new space shows: "Atom Squad,"
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"Rocky Jones, Space Ranger," and "Rod Brown of the Rocket Rangers"
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(Fantastic Television by Gary Gerami and Paul Schulman, Harmony Books,
|
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N.Y., 1977). The aim of this is not difficult to fathom, to satisfy the
|
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new craze over space initiated by the great wave. Three more pioneering
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space TV shows, "Commando Cody," "Captain Z-RO," and "Captain Midnight"
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|
premiered in 1955. The cinema contributed films like "Invaders from
|
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Mars" in 1953, loaded with flying saucer imagery and with allusions to
|
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actual saucer reports that had appeared in the press. "Earth vs the
|
|
Flying Saucers" was another release in 1955. It can be easily argued
|
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that these developments had an impact on young minds to the extent of
|
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enticing them in later years to becoming involved in the blossoming
|
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space program in the United States.
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Optimism for space travel certainly wasn't fostered by the
|
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scientific community or the clergy during the time of the sightings.
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"Trip from Mars Would Take Three Years" (Quincy Patriot-Ledger [Ma.],
|
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August5). "Only Vegetables Can Live on Mars" (Boston Globe, August 1).
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"Trips to the Planets Doomed" (Boston Post, September 6). "Pope Doubts
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Man's Ability to Resolve All Mysteries" (Hartford Courant [Ct.],
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September 8). "Space Flights Put Many Years Away" (New York Times,
|
|
September 5). If the authorities in science and religion were actively
|
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discouraging thoughts that space travel was imminent or that visitations
|
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by aliens was ongoing, what else could have fueled the mania for space
|
|
at this time? Not much except the flying saucer wave. Whatever one
|
|
thinks of the phenomena, it is inarguable that it has had a major impact
|
|
on the culture, in books, in the press and just about every other medium
|
|
of mass communication. Even today, during ratings sweeps by television
|
|
and radio, two prime topics are used to garner ratings points: sex and
|
|
UFOs. Observe broadcasting during the months of November, February and
|
|
May and one will see an increase in UFO programs on talk shows. Perhaps
|
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we could call this the modern version of passive manipulation - this
|
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time by corporations seeking larger profits than by the government.
|
|
(see TV Guide, January 31, 1981, "Teen Sex! UFOs! Male Models! Details
|
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at 11!").
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A theory of passive manipulation would by its nature tend to be
|
|
subtle in its origin and execution, allowing the perpetrator to do
|
|
nothing but sit back and permit situations to evolve that would have
|
|
reasonably predictable outcomes. With regard to the flying saucers of
|
|
1952 it was not hard to predict how the press and the public would
|
|
react. Much like more recent years, it was a reaction of intense
|
|
interest and substantial publicity that for a time progressed in a
|
|
useful direction for the government. When it passed the point of being
|
|
acceptable to accomplishing the goals in mind, i.e. relieving the GOC
|
|
volunteer problem, a quick press conference deflated the ballooning
|
|
wave.
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Whether by serendipity or by design, the saucer reports were
|
|
there when needed by the military. Once used in this manner, and
|
|
recognizing that such manipulation of the phenomena could create bigger
|
|
problems than it was worth later, flying saucers were reburied by the
|
|
Air Force as far as the public was concerned. The debunking policy took
|
|
over again in 1953 and stood until the end of the Air Force's official
|
|
investigations in 1969.
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|
Many will recall the recent blockbuster film by Oliver Stone,
|
|
"JFK." During one scene the film's star, playing Attorney Jim
|
|
Garrison, meets with a shadowy figure calling himself "X." A former
|
|
military officer, "X" described a series of strange coincidences which
|
|
led him to believe that President John Kennedy had been killed by an
|
|
internal government conspiracy. One of the coincidences was that the
|
|
intelligence service of the Army was told to "stand down" during the
|
|
president's visit to Dallas, Texas in 1963. "Stand down," meaning not
|
|
to react, not to place operatives in the normal security locations to
|
|
protect the president, not to be alert to potential problems, to go on
|
|
as if nothing were happening. The result of course was that the
|
|
president was placed in harm's way, a form of passive manipulation
|
|
that, if true, helped to change history in a dramatic way.
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We aren't going to revive the controversy over the JFK
|
|
assassination here. It is simply to emphasize that there are probably
|
|
many more examples of such passive manipulation on record, that the new
|
|
spin on an old story isn't such a new spin after all. The answer to the
|
|
intense publicity surrounding the 1952 saucer wave may have been there
|
|
all the time, it just took us forty-one years to wake up.
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(Just Cause, Copyright 1994 by Citizens Against UFO Secrecy, PO Box 218,
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|
Coventry, CT 06238, published bi-monthly with a subscription rate of
|
|
$15/yr.)
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**********************************************
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* THE U.F.O. BBS - http://www.ufobbs.com/ufo *
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