430 lines
20 KiB
Plaintext
430 lines
20 KiB
Plaintext
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> CPU REPORT
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Issue #109
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by Michael Arthur
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CPU INSIGHTS
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============
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RJ Mical, and the Rise and Fall of Amiga Computer Inc.
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======================================================
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Gary Oberbrunner recently provided a great source of knowledge
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about this, by writing and posting this essay on the Amiga newsgroup
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(or message base) of Usenet. It is a transcript of a talk given by
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R.J. Mical, the programmer who designed and developed the
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Intuition graphical user interface for the Amiga, before the
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Boston Computer Society in March, concerning the history of both
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the Commodore Amiga itself, and Amiga Inc., the company who created
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it. Except for modifications in its formatting, or presentation,
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and various notes placed in this text to provide more information
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on certain subjects, the content of Gary Oberbrunner's text is
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identical....
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The Early Days, Game Boxes, and the Guru Meditation
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---------------------------------------------------
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On Monday March 2, 1989, RJ Mical (=RJ=) spoke at the Boston
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Computer Society meeting in Cambridge. Fortunately I was
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momentarily possessed with an organizational passion, and I took
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copious notes. I present them here filtered only through my memory
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and my Ann Arbor. My comments are in [square brackets]. What
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follows is a neutron-star condensed version of about three and one
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half hours of completely uninterrupted discussion....
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Amiga Computer Inc. had its beginnings, strangely
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enough, RJ began, with the idea of three Florida doctors
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who had a spare $7 million to invest.
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They thought of opening a department store franchise,
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but (as RJ said) they wanted to try something a bit more
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exciting. So they decided to start a computer company.
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"Yeah, that's it! A computer company! That's the ticket!
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:-)"
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They found Jay Miner, who was then at Atari, and Dave
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Morse, the VP of sales (you can see their orientation
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right off..) they lifted from Tonka Toys. The idea
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right from the start was to make the most killer game box
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they could. That was it, and nothing more. However
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Jay and the techies had other ideas. Fortunately they
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concealed them well, so the upper management types still
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thought they were just getting a great game machine. Of
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course the market for machines like that was hot
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in 1982...
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They got the name out of the thesaurus; they wanted to
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convey the thought of friendliness, and Amiga was the first
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synonym in the list. The fact that it came lexically
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before Apple didn't hurt any either, said RJ.
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However, before they could get a machine out the
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door, they wanted to establish a "market presence" which
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would give them an established name and some distribution
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channels - keep thinking "game machine" - which they
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did by selling peripherals and software that they bought
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the rights to from other vendors. Principal among
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these was the Joyboard, a sort of joystick that you stand
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on, and you sway and wiggle your hips to control the
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switches under the base. They had a ski game of course,
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and some track & field type games that they sold with this
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Joyboard. But one game the folks at Amiga Inc. thought
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up themselves was the Zen Meditation game, where you sat on
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the Joyboard and tried to remain perfectly motionless.
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This was perfect relaxation from product development, as
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well as from the ski game. And in fact, this is where
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the term Guru Meditation comes from; the only way to
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keep sane when your machine crashes all the time is the ol'
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Joyboard. The execs tried to get them to take out the
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Guru, but the early developers, bless 'em, raised such a hue
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and cry they had to put it back in right away.
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(Note: Recently, Commodore announced that the Term, "Guru
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Meditation" would not be in AmigaDOS 1.4....)
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When RJ interviewed with Amiga Computer (he had been at
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Williams) in July 1983, the retail price target for the
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Amiga was $400. Perfect for a killer game machine. By the
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time he accepted three weeks later, the target was up to
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$600 and rising fast. Partly this was due to the bottom
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dropping completely out of the game market; the doctors and
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the execs knew they had to have something more than just
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another game box to survive. That's when the techies'
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foresight in designing in everything from disk
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controllers to keyboard (yes the original Amiga
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had NO KEYBOARD), ports, and disk drives began to pay off.
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The exciting part of the Amiga's development, in a
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way its adolescence, that magical time of loss of innocence
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and exposure to the beauties and cruelties of the real
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world, began as plans were made to introduce it, secretly
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of course, at the Winter CES on January 4th, 1984.
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CES, THE AMIGA'S ADOLESCENCE, AND "BUSINESS IS WAR"
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---------------------------------------------------
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The software was done ten days before the CES, and running
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fine on the simulators. Unfortunately when the hardware was
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finally powered up several days later, (surprise) it didn't match
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its simulations. This hardware, of course, was still not in
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silicon. The custom chips were in fact large breadboards, placed
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vertically around a central core and wired together round the edges
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like a Cray. Each of the three custom 'chips' had one of these
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towers, each one a mass of wires. According to RJ, the path
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leading up to the first Amiga breadboard, with its roll-out
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antistatic flooring, the antistatic walls just wide enough apart
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for one person to fit through and all the signs saying Ground
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Thyself, made one think of nothing so much as an altar to some
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technology god.
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After working feverishly right up to the opening minutes of
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the CES, including most everybody working on Christmas, they had a
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working Amiga, still in breadboard, at the show in the booth in a
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special enclosed gray room, so they could give private demos.
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Unfortunately if you rode up the exhibit-hall escalator and craned
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your neck, you could see into the room from the top.
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The Amiga was, RJ reminisced, the hardest he or most anyone
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there had ever worked. "We worked with a great passion...my most
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cherished memory is how much we cared about what we were
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doing. We had something to prove...a real love for it. We created
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our own sense of family out there." RJ and Dale Luck were
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known as the "dancing fools" around the office because they'd play
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really loud music and dance around during compiles to stay
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awake.
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After the first successful night of the CES, all the
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marketing guys got dollar signs in their eyes because the Amiga made
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SUCH a splash even though they were trying to keep it "secret."
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And so, they took out all the technical staff for Italian food,
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everyone got drunk and then they wandered back to the exhibit
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hall to work some more on demos, quick bug fixes, features that
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didn't work, and so on. At CES everyone worked about 20 hours a day,
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when they weren't eating or sleeping.
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Late that night, in their drunken stupor, Dale and RJ
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put the finishing touches on what would become the canonical Amiga
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demo, Boing.
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At last! ...The true story is told.
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THE COMMODORE YEARS: AMIGA FUTURES, AND BUSINESS AS USUAL
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After the CES, Amiga Inc. was very nearly broke and heavily in
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debt. It had cost quite a bit more than the original $7 million
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to bring the Amiga even that far, and lots more time and money were
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needed to bring it to the market. Unfortunately the doctors wanted
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out, and wouldn't invest any more. So outside funding was needed,
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and quick.
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The VP of Finance balanced things for a little while, and even
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though they were $11 million in the hole they managed to pay off
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the longest standing debts and keep one step ahead of Chapter
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11. After much scrounging, they got enough money to take them to
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the June CES; for that they had REAL WORKING SILICON. People kept
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peeking under the skirts of the booth tables asking "Where's the
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REAL computer generating these displays?"
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Now money started flowing and interest was really being
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generated in the media. And like most small companies, as soon as
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the money came in the door it was spent. More people were added
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- hardware folks to optimize and cost-reduce the design; software
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people to finish the OS. Even the sudden influx of cash was only
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enough to keep them out of bankruptcy, though; they were still
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broke and getting broker all the time.
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How much WOULD have been enough? RJ said that if he were
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starting over, he'd need about $49 million to take the machine from
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design idea to market. Of course Amiga Inc. had nowhere near
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that much, and they were feeling the crunch. Everybody tightened
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their belts and persevered somehow. They actually were at one
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point so broke they couldn't meet their payroll; Dave Morse, the VP
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of Sales, took out a second mortgage on his house to help cover it,
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but it still wasn't enough.
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They knew they were going under, and unless they could find
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someone quick to buy them out they were going to be looking for jobs
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very shortly. They talked to Sony, to Apple, to Phillips and HP,
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Silicon Graphics (who just wanted the chips) and even Sears.
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Finally...they called Atari. (Boo! Hiss! [literally - the
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audience hissed at Jack Tramiel's name!] Trying to be discreet, RJ's
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only personal comment on Jack Tramiel was (and it took him a
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while to formulate this sentence) "an interesting product of the
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capitalist system." Ahem.
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Apparently Tramiel has been quoted as saying "Business is
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War." Tramiel had recently left Commodore in a huff and
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bought Atari "undercover" so that by the time he left C= he was
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already CEO of Atari. Realizing that Commodore was coming out
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with their own hot game machine, Tramiel figured he'd revenge himself
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on them for dumping him by buying Amiga Inc. and driving C= down
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the tubes with "his" superior product. So Atari gave them half a
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million just for negotiating for a month; that money was gone in aday.
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Of course Tramiel saw that Amiga Inc. wasn't in a very good
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bargaining position; basically unless they were bought they were
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on the street. So he offered them 98 cents a share; Dave Morse
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held out for $2.00. But instead of bargaining in good faith,
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every time Morse and Amiga tried to meet them halfway their bid went
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down!
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Amiga Inc.: "Okay, $1.50 a share."
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Jack Tramiel: "No, we think we'll give you 80 cents."
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Amiga Inc.: "How about $1.25?"
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Jack Tramiel: "70 cents."
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And so on...
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Even Dave Morse, the staunchest believer in the concept that
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was the Amiga, the guiding light who made everyone's hair stand on
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end when he walked into the room, was getting depressed. Gloom set
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in. Things looked grim.
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Then, just three days before the month deadline was up,
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Commodore called. Two days later they bought Amiga Inc. for $4.25
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a share. They offered them $4.00, but Dave Morse TURNED THEM DOWN
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saying it wasn't acceptable to his employees; he was on the verge
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of walking out when they offered $4.25. He signed right then and
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there.
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Commodore gave them $27 million for development; they'd
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never seen that much money in one place before. They went right out
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and bought a Sun workstation for every software person, with Ethernet
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and disk servers and everything. The excitement was back.
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Commodore did many good things for the Amiga; not only
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did they cost-reduce it without losing much functionality, they had
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this concept of it as a business machine; this was a very
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different attitude from what Amiga Inc. had been working with.
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Because of that philosophy, they improved the keyboard [ha!
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- garyo] and made lots of other little improvements that RJ didn't
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elaborate on.
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What could Commodore have given them that they didn't? The one
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thing RJ wanted most from them was an extra 18 months of
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development time. Unfortunately Commodore wasn't exactly rich right
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then either, so they had to bring out the product ASAP [and when is
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it ever any different?] Also, he said, they could have MARKETED it.
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(applause!). If he'd had that extra 18 months, he could have
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made Intuition a device rather than a separate kind of thing; he
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could have released it much more bug-free.
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The Future
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----------
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RJ's advice for A1000 owners: "Keep what you've got. It's not
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worth it to trade up. The A1000 is really a better machine." This
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may be sour grapes on RJ's part, since the Amiga 2000 was designed
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in Braunschweig, West Germany, and the version of the A2000 being
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worked on in Los Gatos was rejected in favor of the
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Braunschweig-Commodore version. However the A1000 compares to the
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A2000, though, the Los Gatos 2000 would have certainly been
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better than either machine. C= management vetoed it because
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Braunschweig promised a faster design turnaround (and, to their
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credit, were much faster in execution than the Los Gatos group
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would have been) and more cost-reduction, which was their
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specialty. Los Gatos, on the other hand, wanted a dream machine
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with vastly expanded capabilities in every facet of the machine.
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The cruel financial facts forced C= to go with the Business Computer
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Group, who did the Sidecar in Braunschweig as well, and quickly and
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cheaply.
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So they fired more than half the staff at the original Los
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Gatos facility, one by one. That trauma was to some extent played
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out on the net; no doubt many of you remember it as a very
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difficult and emotional time. There are now only six people left in
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Los Gatos, and their lease expired in March, so thus expires the
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original Amiga group.
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And..that's how RJ ended his talk; the rise and fall of
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Amiga Computer Inc. The future of the Amiga is now in the hands of
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Westchester and Braunschweig, and who knows what direction it will
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take?
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Q & A Session: Boston Computer Society and RJ Mical
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----------------------------------------------------
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I'll just make this part a list of technical questions
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and answers, since that was the format at the talk anyway. This part
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is part technical inquiries and part total rumor mill; caveat emptor.
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Questions are from the audience, Answers are =RJ=.
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-----------------------------
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Q: Can you do double buffering with Intuition?
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A: Pop answer: No. Thought-out: well, yes, but it's not easy. Use
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MenuVerify and don't change the display while menus are up. It's
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pretty hairy.
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Q: How big is intuition (source code)?
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A: The listings (commented) are about a foot thick, 60 lpp, 1 inch
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margins.
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Q: Where did MetaComCo come into the Amiga story?
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A: MCC's AmigaDOS was a backup plan; the original Los Gatos-written
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AmigaDOS was done with some co-developers who dropped out due to
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contract and money hassles when C= bought Amiga. Then MCC had to
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crank EXTREMELY hard to get their BCPL DOS into the system at the
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last possible minute.
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Q: Why no MMU (support in the Amiga's Operating System)?
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A: Several reasons. Obviously, cost was a factor. MMUs available
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at the time the Amiga was designed also consumed system time [this
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is what he said- I'm just the scribe]; although newer MMUs solve
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this problem they were too late for the Amiga.
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Second, the original goal of the Amiga was to be a killer game
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machine with easy low-level access, and an MMU didn't seem
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necessary for a game machine.
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Third [get this!] with an MMU, message-passing becomes MUCH
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hairier and slower, since in the Amiga messages are passed by just
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passing a pointer to someone else's memory. With protection,
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either public memory would need to be done and system calls issued
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to allocate it, etc., or the entire message would have to be
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passed. Yecch. So the lack of MMU actually speeds up the basic
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operation of the Amiga several fold.
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Q: Why no resource tracking?
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A: The original AmigaDOS/Exec had resource tracking; it's a shame it
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died.
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Q: How is your game coming? [??]
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A: It's just now becoming a front-burner project. It's number crunch
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intensive; hopefully it will even take over the PC part of the
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2000 for extra crunch. It's half action, half strategy; the
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'creation' part is done, only the playing part needs to be
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written. Next question. :-)
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Q: Will there ever be an advanced version of the chip set?
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A: Well, Jay Miner isn't working on anything right now... [RUMOR
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ALERT] The chip folks left in Los Gatos who are losing their lease
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in March were at one time thinking about 1k square 2meg chip space
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128-color graphics, although still with 4 bit color DACs
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though...and even stuff like a blitter per plane (!!) They were
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supposed to be done now, in the original plans; the chip designers
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will be gone in March, but the design may (?) continue in West
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Chester. Maybe they'll be here two years from now.
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Q: What will happen to the unused Los Gatos A2000 design?
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A: ??????
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(Note: Reportedly, this design eventually became the Amiga
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3000's Enhanced Chip Set.)
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Q: Should I upgrade from my 1000 to a 2000?
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A: Probably not. The 2000 isn't enough better to justify the cost.
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Unless you need the PC compatibility, RJ advocated staying with
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the 1000. After all the 2000 doesn't have the nifty garage for
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the keyboard...:-) The A1000 keyboard is better built; you can
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have Kickstart on disk; it's smaller and a LOT quieter, [maybe not
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than the old internal drives!!!] and uses less power; the 2000 has
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no composite video out, plus the RGB quality is a tad worse.
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Composite video (PAL or NTSC) is an extra-cost option with the
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2000.
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Q: Have you ever seen a working Amiga-Live!?
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A: Yes, I've seen it taking 32-color images at 16fps, and HAM
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pictures at something like half that. [!!] It's all done and
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working. I don't know why it's not out. It sure beats Digiview
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at 8 seconds per image!
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Q: What do you use for Amiga development tools?
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A: DPaint and Infominder, Aztec C, Andy Finkel's Microemacs.
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Q: What's the future of the A1000?
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A: They aren't making any right now; they're just shipping from
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stock. But they do claim that they intend to continue making
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them.
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Note: Shortly after RJ Mical's talk, news surfaced that
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Commodore had decided to not make anymore Amiga 1000s, but to
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make a unified front with the Amiga 2000....)
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Q: Who is the competition for Amiga right now?
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A: The new Macs are so expensive, they're not a threat to the 2000,
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much less the 1000. Atari's new stuff "doesn't impress me."
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[that's all he said.]
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Q: Why are the pixels 10% higher than wide?
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A: The hardware came out that way, and it would have been a pain to
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do it any other way due to sync-rate-multiple timing constraints.
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-EOF
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