636 lines
29 KiB
Plaintext
636 lines
29 KiB
Plaintext
5 articles
|
||
|
||
** Prisoners Out: Troops out: Talk about what? **
|
||
from Workers Solidarity No 46
|
||
|
||
We welcome the cease-fire. The "peace process",
|
||
however, has little to recommend it. It represents
|
||
little more than arguments over who exactly will
|
||
administer capitalism in Ireland. On issues such as
|
||
the release of prisoners or the disbanding of the RUC
|
||
there is nothing to be discussed. Both these should
|
||
happen unconditionally. The debate over de-
|
||
commissioning of IRA weapons is meaningless. All that
|
||
the current negotiations are doing is establishing a
|
||
pecking order among the parties in the north.
|
||
|
||
In 1962 the unionists accepted the IRA's word that Operation
|
||
Harvest [the Border Campaign] was over and released prisoners
|
||
without requiring decommissioning of arms. The opposition of
|
||
the mainstream unionists to a prisoner release now is based
|
||
on their opposition to the "peace process", and it's limited
|
||
threat of power sharing. Sinn Fein says that the armed
|
||
campaign was a political struggle but the British government
|
||
classes the prisoners as common prisoners, and so will not
|
||
release them now as that would be an admission that they are
|
||
really prisoners of war.
|
||
|
||
Inhuman conditions
|
||
|
||
The refusal to transfer prisoners in Britain to the
|
||
north means that many of them remain in grossly inhumane
|
||
conditions, in particular in the isolation unit of Wakefield.
|
||
Ten of these prisoners have now spent 20 years in British
|
||
jails, 20 years of severe hardship not only for them but also
|
||
for their families. Six of these ten were convicted of
|
||
charges less serious than murder. All the prisoners should
|
||
be released immediately and unconditionally.
|
||
|
||
The continued unacceptability of the RUC - a sectarian
|
||
police force - was underlined by events around July 12th.
|
||
Earlier that week, in Belfast, a number of Catholics had
|
||
their houses petrol bombed after a loyalist march through the
|
||
Lower Ormeau Road was stopped. The RUC responded to this,
|
||
not by going after the loyalists responsible, but by putting
|
||
the Lower Ormeau under siege on the 12th to make sure the
|
||
loyalists (in the form of the Ballynafeigh District Orange
|
||
Lodge) would swagger through a nationalist area
|
||
uninterrupted.
|
||
|
||
They acted as the paid thugs of loyalism. The RUC sealed off
|
||
the Lower Ormeau at 5am, using a force of nearly 150 armoured
|
||
jeeps and over 1,000 officers in riot gear. Five hundred
|
||
nationalist protesters who tried to reach the Ormeau bridge
|
||
were attacked by the RUC, hospitalising four.
|
||
|
||
Victim's widow arrested
|
||
|
||
On the Lower Ormeau itself the RUC went so far as to
|
||
arrest Rosaline McManus, widow of Willie McManus who was one
|
||
of five men killed by the UDA/UFF at the Graham's bookies'
|
||
shop massacre on the Ormeau Road in 1992. Her 'crime' was to
|
||
ask the RUC to ensure that no bands would be playing as the
|
||
Orangemen passed the shop. The dead man's sister, who was in
|
||
a wheelchair, was pushed down a nearby side street by the
|
||
RUC. Camera crews were kept out of the area for three hours.
|
||
|
||
However the debate about creating an "acceptable" police
|
||
force is one anarchists have little interest in. The RUC
|
||
already has the harp on its cap badge. Creating a new police
|
||
force that contained many nationalists might get rid of some
|
||
of the sectarianism but this new force would still not be
|
||
acceptable.
|
||
|
||
The problem with the RUC is not just its composition but also
|
||
the primary role it shares with every other police force.
|
||
This role is the protection of the property of the rich and
|
||
the maintenance of order for the government. The southern
|
||
Garda<EFBFBD> or the British police are not dominated by religious
|
||
bigots but this has never stopped them being used against
|
||
demonstrators or strikers.
|
||
|
||
Ludicrous expectations
|
||
|
||
Sinn Fein's radical rhetoric has been dropped, joining
|
||
any pretence at 'socialist' politics in the dustbin. Their
|
||
main demand at present is not for 'Troops Out', or even for
|
||
the release of Republican prisoners. Instead we are
|
||
requested to protest for 'All Party Talks'. Who can believe
|
||
now that Sinn Fein are somehow 'different' from other
|
||
political parties? And who still believes that any group of
|
||
would-be leaders is interested in real change? Sinn Fein
|
||
is calling for Gerry Adams, John Hume, Ian Paisley, John
|
||
Alderdice and James Molyneaux, along with a few other "good
|
||
men", to sit down and decide the future for the rest of us.
|
||
|
||
It would be ludicrous to expect that anything capable of
|
||
dealing with the problems faced by ordinary people would
|
||
emerge from this cabal. In fact, no small bunch of leaders
|
||
can sort out our problems for us (and particularly not that
|
||
bunch!!). The problems shared by Catholic, Protestant and
|
||
atheist workers will only be solved when we come together,
|
||
recognise our common interests, and take over society
|
||
ourselves.
|
||
|
||
**********************************************************
|
||
|
||
** One year on: Evaluating the Ceasefire **
|
||
|
||
THE IRA CEASEFIRE is approaching its first
|
||
anniversary. That year has been striking for two
|
||
things, on the one hand the success of the 'peace
|
||
process' in turning Sinn Fein from demonised pariahs
|
||
to lauded peace makers. On the other hand, the
|
||
failure of the process to produce any substantial
|
||
gains for the nationalist community.
|
||
|
||
Although many British soldiers have been returned to
|
||
barracks, only about 800 have left Ireland. The RUC may have
|
||
exchanged their machine guns for pistols but they have also
|
||
moved into areas they previously feared to patrol.
|
||
Harassment of nationalists has continued. Sinn Fein's paper,
|
||
An Phoblacht/Republican News, now carries a Peace Monitor
|
||
instead of a War News column.
|
||
|
||
Every week it reports on beatings, threats &
|
||
intimidation directed at nationalists by various sections of
|
||
the British war machine. Although prisoners have been
|
||
released early in the Republic, no such releases have
|
||
occurred in the six counties and, indeed, the number of
|
||
prisoners allowed compassionate temporary release has been
|
||
reduced.
|
||
|
||
In this situation it's not surprising that a minority are
|
||
questioning the validity of the ceasefire strategy. Some
|
||
left republicans see the ceasefire as a sell-out of a
|
||
previous commitment to socialism and anti-imperialism. There
|
||
are other republicans who see the ceasefire as a cunning
|
||
strategy forced on the British government. They seem to
|
||
expect the Sinn Fein leadership to pull a united Ireland out
|
||
of the hat at a future stage despite obvious hints to the
|
||
contrary by the same leadership. This view fails to realise
|
||
that the peace process is a change in strategy rather then a
|
||
victory.
|
||
|
||
Some things were meant to be
|
||
|
||
When looked at in the context of the last twenty five
|
||
years the ceasefire not only makes sense but is inevitable.
|
||
All other strategies had been exhausted. Britain was not
|
||
militarily defeated in the 'years of victory' declared by the
|
||
IRA in early 1970s. Likewise, the economic bombing campaign
|
||
in Britain and the six counties failed to bring victory.
|
||
|
||
The post Hunger-Strike turn to electoral and community
|
||
politics represented by Danny Morrison's 'ballot box and
|
||
armalite' strategy ground to a halt in the mid-80's.
|
||
Although Sinn Fein had a lot of support in the nationalist
|
||
ghetto's it was unable to break out of these and attract
|
||
significant votes from Catholic working class voters
|
||
elsewhere or the Catholic middle class. In the south,
|
||
outside of a few council seats it never had any success.
|
||
|
||
Once this was realised it became not so much a question of
|
||
if, but when an IRA ceasefire would be declared. Talk of
|
||
fighting the British army to a standstill is all very well
|
||
but when translated into a yearly toll of harassment, deaths
|
||
and prisoners the need to move beyond the war of attrition
|
||
became dominant.
|
||
|
||
Military stalemate
|
||
|
||
This has been recognised by Danny Morrison (seen by many
|
||
as a hard-liner within the current republican leadership).
|
||
On his recent release from prison he told AP/RN "It was
|
||
obvious that something was going on, and it might appear
|
||
controversial, but it was tacitly understood by many people
|
||
that there was a military stalemate developing .... the IRA
|
||
had in 1992 exploded a bomb in the City of London followed by
|
||
the Bishopsgate bomb in 1993 and the Heathrow mortar attacks
|
||
early last year. Despite these prestigious attacks there was
|
||
a stalemate on the military front.
|
||
|
||
So I think people were mature enough to understand
|
||
developments even though the announcement of the cessation
|
||
came as a severe shock and ran contrary to all our
|
||
instincts."
|
||
|
||
The ceasefire was also inevitable in a broader setting. Wars
|
||
of 'national liberation' don't end with outright victory and
|
||
independence for the nationalist side. They involve a
|
||
negotiated settlement. In the Irish context this means one
|
||
acceptable to the British state. This has been the pattern
|
||
of the settlements in South Africa, El Salvador, Nicaragua
|
||
and Palestine in recent years.
|
||
|
||
All together now?
|
||
|
||
Sinn Fein's has long held a strategy of uniting the
|
||
nationalist family against Britain. In this context the
|
||
'peace process' has delivered more than any other strategy.
|
||
One year ago Sinn Fein were pariahs with virtually no
|
||
political allies nationally or internationally of any
|
||
stature. Today the man once known as John Unionist (Bruton)
|
||
is giving out about the British government stalling in
|
||
releasing prisoners. The much dreamed of pan-nationalist
|
||
alliance of Sinn Fein, SDLP, Fianna F<>il and the Catholic
|
||
Church not only exists but seems to include Fine Gael, Labour
|
||
and even a somewhat hesitant Democratic Left! Eamonn Dunphy
|
||
has argued in the 'Sunday Independent' that it is dangerous
|
||
to continue to demonise Sinn Fein! A world turned upside
|
||
down, unimaginable twelve months ago.
|
||
|
||
This national success has been matched internationally.
|
||
Gerry Adams has not only been allowed a visit to the US, but
|
||
with John Hume has sung a duet of "The town I knew so well"
|
||
for Bill Clinton. What's more both Bill Clinton and the icon
|
||
of sacrifice of the 1980's, Nelson Mandela, have publicly
|
||
given out to the British Government for dragging its heels.
|
||
All that's missing is a Noble peace prize for Adams (and he's
|
||
actually been awarded a lesser peace prize by Swiss
|
||
industrialists).
|
||
|
||
Pan-nationalist alliance
|
||
|
||
Unionism has become more fragmented and isolated. No
|
||
significant section of the Tories opposes the peace process
|
||
and no major loyalist mobilisations against the process have
|
||
been organised in the six counties. The British state has
|
||
not yet fulfilled Sinn Fein wishes, by becoming "persuading"
|
||
unionists to accept the inevitability of a united Ireland,
|
||
but they have pretty much said that as far as the peace
|
||
process goes the unionist veto is dead.
|
||
|
||
So the peace process has achieved what the armed
|
||
struggle failed to. The pan-nationalist alliance exists,
|
||
with Gerry Adams at the head of it. Britain is
|
||
internationally isolated and seen to be dragging its heels.
|
||
Unionism is isolated to the point where small sections are
|
||
willing to consider direct talks with Sinn Fein. But even in
|
||
the most optimistic forecast of its dividends there are many
|
||
republicans who are wondering, is this it, is this all? The
|
||
answer from the Sinn Fein leadership would seem to be 'yes'.
|
||
To quote Morrison's' interview again "one thing is certain we
|
||
are not going to end up with a pre-1969 Stormont solution. It
|
||
is going to be much more radical than that."
|
||
|
||
A mystic vision of a united Ireland is not what drives most
|
||
republican activists. They became activists because
|
||
circumstances which included constant harassment, high
|
||
unemployment and poor housing compel them to fight the
|
||
sectarian system that created these conditions. They are
|
||
activists because when at the end of the 60's they and others
|
||
took part in peaceful attempts to reform this system they
|
||
were first batoned and then shot off the streets.
|
||
|
||
All has changed, or has it?
|
||
|
||
But even if the peace process resulted in British
|
||
withdrawal tomorrow, few of these conditions would change.
|
||
Decent housing and decent jobs are no more likely in a 32
|
||
county Ireland with Gerry Adams as Taoiseach. The 'success'
|
||
story of South Africa illustrates this point. The most
|
||
ambitious scheme of the post-apartheid government is to
|
||
provide fresh water to a sizeable percentage of squatter
|
||
towns by the year 2000. The reason cited for the lack of
|
||
ambition is lack of money.
|
||
|
||
Yet in both South Africa and Ireland enough wealth
|
||
exists to make a massive difference to the way most of us
|
||
live. But it needs to be taken out of the hands of the
|
||
wealthy and put into the hands of the workers. Gerry Adams
|
||
may scoff at the Irish left but it is only a united working
|
||
class that can drive the British state out, and usher in a
|
||
better life for all. The all-singing, all dancing 'peace
|
||
process', sponsored by Donald Trump and Bill Clinton may look
|
||
good but at the end of the day what can it deliver?
|
||
|
||
Even the basic demand of British withdrawal cannot be met by
|
||
the peace process or any other nationalist based strategy.
|
||
This can only be won in one of two circumstances. Firstly if
|
||
the British state decides it no longer has any interest in
|
||
staying and is satisfied that it can withdraw and leave
|
||
stability behind. It is unlikely to do this in the short
|
||
term, as most northern Protestants want it to stay, and it is
|
||
wary of the destabilisation they could cause in the event of
|
||
withdrawal.
|
||
|
||
Telling lies
|
||
|
||
It is also wary of withdrawal undermining its
|
||
credibility in Britain. In the course of its 25 year war it
|
||
lied to the British working class about what was going on.
|
||
Republicans were portrayed as psycho-gangsters, terrorising
|
||
even their own communities. To admit that it lied about
|
||
Ireland means that it will be less able to convince its own
|
||
population that sections of British society that dare to
|
||
fight back are common criminals.
|
||
|
||
During the 1984 miners strikes Thatcher referred to the
|
||
striking miners as "the enemy within", and they received the
|
||
sort of media coverage familiar to Irish republicans. They
|
||
also received the attention of the SAS, often dressed in
|
||
police uniforms, although in this case they were content with
|
||
kicking the shit out of miners rather then killing them. The
|
||
anti-Poll Tax rioters were also portrayed as criminals by the
|
||
media. The rule of the British state in Britain as well as
|
||
Ireland is dependant on most of the population of Britain
|
||
trusting it. Admittance of the true facts of its Irish war
|
||
threaten this.
|
||
|
||
The only other way the British state will leave Ireland
|
||
is when it is forced out. The IRA could not achieve this, it
|
||
was incapable of defeating the British army. Withdrawal will
|
||
only happen in the face of a united working class in Ireland,
|
||
supported by vast sections of the British working class.
|
||
Creating this unity requires an entirely different strategy
|
||
than anything Sinn Fein could pursue, it requires a break
|
||
with nationalist politics.
|
||
|
||
Andrew Flood
|
||
|
||
*********************************************************
|
||
|
||
** What's happening with Unionism? **
|
||
|
||
THE 12th OF JULY, always a high point of tension, was
|
||
used this year by the 'respectable' unionist parties
|
||
to try to provoke the IRA into breaking the ceasefire.
|
||
Nothing made this clearer than the events surrounding
|
||
the attempts of Orangemen in Portadown to march
|
||
through the Garvaghy Road nationalist estate. The
|
||
ceasefire was already under strain from the release of
|
||
Lee Clegg, and unionist politicians were quick to
|
||
seize on the confrontation there as an opportunity to
|
||
push republican patience to breaking point.
|
||
|
||
Many people who tuned in to the news late on the evening of
|
||
July 10th to hear the wild rumours arising from of the
|
||
loyalist siege of Garvaghy Road must have thought they were
|
||
hearing the end of the ceasefire. It was said that a mob of
|
||
loyalists had broken through RUC lines and stormed the
|
||
estate. Unionist leaders were claiming that up to 200
|
||
republicans, some of them armed, had come from Belfast to
|
||
protect the estate. In the event neither story proved to be
|
||
true. But it was a situation very much like this that
|
||
directly sparked the current struggle.
|
||
|
||
Historical bigots
|
||
|
||
David Trimble and Ian Paisley were at the head of the
|
||
mob trying to storm the estate. They were the voices behind
|
||
the rumours. Paisley was well aware of the consequences, he
|
||
encouraged similar attacks at the end of the 1960's which
|
||
prompted some nationalists to move from civil rights marches
|
||
to armed struggle. Hugh McLean, a member of UVF who took
|
||
part in the random killing of a Catholic in 1966, said to the
|
||
RUC when he was charged "I am terribly sorry I ever heard of
|
||
that man Paisley or decided to follow him".
|
||
|
||
Paisley and Trimble are not alone, Ken Maginnis the once
|
||
'respectable' face of unionism has completely discredited
|
||
himself by predicting a definite end to the IRA ceasefire on
|
||
several occasions. The problem for the unionist politicians
|
||
is that, unlike the period of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, when
|
||
over a hundred thousand could be mobilised in demonstrations,
|
||
now they are unable to organise any significant opposition.
|
||
Even Sinn Fein's first visit to Stormont for talks with
|
||
British government representatives resulted in a protest of
|
||
only a dozen or so individuals.
|
||
|
||
Wishing for war
|
||
|
||
This failure is also seen in the North Down by-election
|
||
where "United Kingdom Unionist" Robert McCartney ran on the
|
||
basis of opposition to both the peace process and proposals
|
||
for closer ties with the South. He won (which means little
|
||
as it was a guaranteed unionist seat) but the turnout was
|
||
just 38.7 percent, the lowest in more than 20 years. When
|
||
the Unionist leaders talk of an imminent breakdown to the
|
||
ceasefire they are not expressing a fear, they are expressing
|
||
a wish.
|
||
|
||
Not only are the unionists failing to mobilise mass
|
||
opposition to the peace process but the loyalist
|
||
paramilitaries, for once, are refusing to play along. In the
|
||
week after the 12th the political wings of the loyalist
|
||
paramilitaries were put to the test by the threat of a body
|
||
calling itself the 'Protestant Defence Force' to strike
|
||
against Catholics it thought responsible for arson attacks on
|
||
Orange halls.
|
||
|
||
Far from playing along, both the PUP and UDP came out against
|
||
it. David Irving of the PUP warned against perpetuating the
|
||
cycle of sectarian violence, Gary McMicheal of the UDP
|
||
pointed out that the Combined Loyalist Military Command would
|
||
take a "dim view" of anyone breaking the ceasefire.
|
||
|
||
The tail that wags the dog
|
||
|
||
Parts of the left have got somewhat over excited by the
|
||
new prominence of the PUP and the UDP, seeing them either as
|
||
a cunning proto-fascist plot or a left-wing break with
|
||
unionism. Their emergence and willingness to talk with
|
||
nationalists and the left is significant. David Irving has
|
||
spoken at meetings with the Communist Party, Militant Labour,
|
||
and this year addressed the Dublin Council of Trade Unions.
|
||
|
||
However there is a long tradition of working class loyalists
|
||
complaining about being sold out by ruling class unionism
|
||
without breaking from sectarianism in the course of doing so.
|
||
Given, in particular, the horrific killings carried out by
|
||
some of the prominent figures in the PUP/UDP it is correct to
|
||
be cautious but their current complaints provide evidence of
|
||
the growing tensions within unionism.
|
||
|
||
Loyalty's reward
|
||
|
||
Among working class loyalists there is growing awareness
|
||
that loyalty to the British crown has delivered less, in some
|
||
cases, than the armed rebellion of the republicans. The
|
||
biggest thing the British state gave in return for their
|
||
loyalty was guns to kill Catholics with.
|
||
|
||
A Health Profile of the Greater Shankill Area, which was
|
||
published in June, showed
|
||
|
||
-> Only one third of men in the district described their
|
||
health as good compared with 60% in Belfast overall.
|
||
|
||
-> Male unemployment in the area is 40%, compared with a
|
||
Belfast average of 19%. The female rate is 35%, compared
|
||
with an average of 11% in the entire city.
|
||
|
||
-> Over 80% of pupils in the Shankill left school without
|
||
any qualifications, compared with two thirds in Belfast
|
||
overall.
|
||
|
||
-> Only 1 per cent were educated to degree level,
|
||
compared to 9% in the whole city.
|
||
|
||
-> Just one in 12 children attended a grammar school compared
|
||
with an average of one in four in Belfast.
|
||
|
||
Sinn Fein can't do it
|
||
|
||
Sinn Fein, because of their nationalist politics, will
|
||
always be unable to attract support from significant numbers
|
||
of Protestant workers. The most they can do is call on them
|
||
to "see sense". Again, to quote Morrison on his release from
|
||
prison: "...part of our analysis is that the unionist
|
||
community is more in advance of the unionist leadership which
|
||
hasn't produced a De Klerk, someone who is imaginative and
|
||
courageous enough to say, 'we're going to have to deal here,
|
||
we're going to have to settle and accept that everyone is
|
||
going to have to compromise'."
|
||
|
||
This pretty much paraphrases 1994 Ard Fheis speech by
|
||
Gerry Adams, in which he also called for a "Protestant De
|
||
Klerk". This represents the limits of republican thinking
|
||
towards the Protestant working class. They may be able to
|
||
recognise that Protestant workers have been tricked but they
|
||
are unable to appeal to them on the grounds of common
|
||
interest, as this would be a fundamental break with the
|
||
politics of nationalism. Such an appeal would also be
|
||
something that the nationalist bosses in Ireland and Bill
|
||
Clinton would not be keen on.
|
||
|
||
There can not be a loyalist socialism. Loyalism means
|
||
loyalty to the ruling class of Britain and Northern Ireland.
|
||
For this reason it is wrong to see the PUP or UDP as
|
||
socialist, or even close to socialism. A socialist movement
|
||
requires support from all sections of the working class and a
|
||
break with orange and green politics. The ceasefires have
|
||
made it a little easier to put forward this viewpoint, it is
|
||
up to all of us to make the best use of this opportunity.
|
||
|
||
Joe Black
|
||
|
||
*********************************************************
|
||
|
||
** An Anarchist strategy **
|
||
|
||
WHILE WELCOMING the ceasefire we don't expect the
|
||
"peace process" to lead to much. Sinn Fein's politics
|
||
offer little more to Northern workers, as a class,
|
||
than the politics of the fringe loyalist groups. Both
|
||
aspire to getting a better deal for the poor and
|
||
oppressed in their communities but neither are capable
|
||
of delivering, as they are limited to rhetorical
|
||
appeals to the workers of the other side to "see
|
||
sense". Neither can offer a way forward because
|
||
neither can unite workers across the sectarian divide
|
||
in a common struggle.
|
||
|
||
Anarchism, at the moment, is a very much smaller force
|
||
in Ireland then even the fringe loyalist groups, but it does
|
||
offer a way forward. We argue for working class self-
|
||
activity that appeals not to politicians or priests as allies
|
||
but to workers everywhere, in Ireland, in Britain and
|
||
internationally. But this unity cannot be based on just
|
||
'bread and butter issues'. In the past Catholic and
|
||
Protestant workers have united in common fights to get more
|
||
from the bosses. The largest and better known examples of
|
||
this are
|
||
|
||
->1919 Engineering strike when the mostly Protestant
|
||
workforce of Harland and Wolff elected a strike committee
|
||
that happened to be mostly Catholic.
|
||
|
||
->1932 Outdoor Relief strike when the unemployed of the
|
||
Falls and the Shankill rioted in support of each other, and
|
||
against the police.
|
||
|
||
Both these were broken by the unionist bosses convincing
|
||
Protestant workers that it was all a 'Fenian' trick and that
|
||
their real interests lay in loyalism. Look at the poverty
|
||
figures for the Shankill road today and you can see who was
|
||
really tricking who. But the bosses' trick worked and
|
||
economic unity crumbled, to be replaced by a vicious pogrom
|
||
and the expulsion of Catholics and left-wing Protestants from
|
||
the shipyards in 1919 and sectarian rioting in 1933.
|
||
|
||
For this reason, the idea we can wish the division of
|
||
the working class in the north away by simply talking about
|
||
wages and living conditions is a fantasy. More recently
|
||
there has been unity in support of the nurses' pay claim,
|
||
against health service cuts and against sectarian
|
||
intimidation in Housing Executive and Dept. of Social
|
||
Security offices. All of these instances are heartening.
|
||
Unfortunately little permanent unity has been built upon
|
||
these successes because of a failure to confront 'communal
|
||
politics'.
|
||
|
||
Protestant workers have to reject loyalism and unionism as
|
||
ruling class ideologies. They have to see their allies as
|
||
being workers who happen to be Catholic, north and south, and
|
||
their enemies as the loyalist bosses and the British state.
|
||
This is no easy break to make but the big benefit of the
|
||
ceasefire is that it is now easier then it was a year ago.
|
||
|
||
No to the bosses Orange or Green
|
||
|
||
Catholic workers have a similar break to make. The
|
||
politics of both the SDLP and Sinn Fein are essentially about
|
||
extending the southern state northwards. This would have the
|
||
benefit of ending rule by sectarian bigots (although the
|
||
southern Garda<64> are no more keen on the working class then
|
||
their northern counterparts) but that's about it. Many
|
||
workers in the South have spent a good part of the last
|
||
decade fighting the power of the Catholic church, from its
|
||
influence on the legal system to its covering up of child
|
||
abusing priests and enslavement of unmarried mothers in the
|
||
Magdalen laundries.
|
||
|
||
Apart from that, the recent Dunnes Stores strike
|
||
demonstrates that the gobshite Southern bosses are every bit
|
||
as mean as their northern equivalents. It also demonstrates
|
||
they can be beaten, if workers stand together.
|
||
|
||
Workers' unity against the bosses is required but the
|
||
form that unity takes is also vital. The unity must be
|
||
political as well as economic. The RUC, the border, clerical
|
||
control of schools and hospitals, and laws restricting
|
||
divorce, gay sex and access to abortion all need to be
|
||
opposed.
|
||
|
||
We cannot rely on a few "good men" to sort out the
|
||
situation for us. That is the mistake most of the socialist
|
||
movement made this century and is the reason why we had
|
||
'socialist' dictatorships like the USSR and China on the one
|
||
hand, and 'socialist' sell-outs like the Labour Party or
|
||
Democratic Left on the other. There is, however, a different
|
||
current in socialism, based not on good leaders but on the
|
||
self-organisation of the working class.
|
||
|
||
This self-organisation is what anarchism is all about.
|
||
We don't believe the way forward lies in finding the right
|
||
leader, whether it's Gerry Adams, Tony Blair or Lenin.
|
||
Instead we see the way forward lying with ordinary people;
|
||
taking control of our lives into our own hands, coming
|
||
together and starting to fight back. The role of anarchists
|
||
is not to assume the leadership of such a process but to
|
||
argue for self-activity, encourage it and seek to encourage
|
||
those fighting back to unite in an overall struggle against
|
||
capitalism and for a new society.
|
||
|
||
And that's where you come in. Unlike other left papers,
|
||
we won't end every article by telling you the only way
|
||
forward is to join the party. What we do say is find out
|
||
more about anarchism and look at ways of encouraging self-
|
||
activity in the struggles you are involved in. If you decide
|
||
you like what we say then please do get in touch and help us
|
||
in saying (and doing) it. Above all recognise that the
|
||
answer is not getting 'our' leaders into talks but in taking
|
||
back control ourselves.
|
||
|
||
****************************
|
||
|
||
CHARLIE AND BILL
|
||
|
||
"Begrudgers, throwbacks and die hards". That is what
|
||
the media called anyone objecting to the official state
|
||
visit by Prince Charles. Their consensus had decided that
|
||
anyone who would object must be "living in the past". You
|
||
would think that the British ruling class had done nothing
|
||
at all to stir up the troubles, that Prince Charles<65>
|
||
Parachute regiment had never murdered 14 civil rights
|
||
marchers on Bloody Sunday. And we were supposed to feel
|
||
privileged that a filthy rich parasite was condescending to
|
||
have a free holiday here at our expense.
|
||
|
||
Not everyone swallowed this forelock touching
|
||
embarrassment, orchestrated by the politicians and their
|
||
Dublin 4 media friends. 2,000 republicans, socialists,
|
||
anarchists and anti-royalists took to the streets of Dublin
|
||
on May 31st. The Workers Solidarity Movement played its
|
||
part by giving out 5,000 leaflets urging support for the
|
||
march, and organising a lively contingent on the night.
|
||
Demonstrations like this play a useful role. They
|
||
remind us that there are rich and poor, workers and bosses,
|
||
rulers and ruled. To recognise this and object to it is not
|
||
begrudgery but realism! We know how things are now and we
|
||
are declaring we want something better.
|
||
|
||
When Bill Clinton comes over on November 30th he should
|
||
not be able to live the high life without encountering a
|
||
protest or two. It will certainly give heart to dissident
|
||
Americans to know that in Ireland there are those who oppose
|
||
the US state<74>s intervention in other peoples<65> countries and
|
||
support for dictatorships in the third world. One question
|
||
is whether Sinn F<>in will be on the streets or at the
|
||
dinner? Will a handshake for Gerry Adams be more important
|
||
than taking a stand against injustice?
|
||
|
||
|