678 lines
38 KiB
Plaintext
678 lines
38 KiB
Plaintext
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THE ELECTRONIC DISTURBANCE
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Critical Art Ensemble
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Part 6 of 7
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Published by Autonomedia
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ISBN 1-57027-006-6
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Cultural workers have recently become increasingly attracted to
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technology as a means to examine the symbolic order. Video,
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interactive computer projects, and all sorts of electronic
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noise have made a solid appearance in the museums and
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galleries, and have gained curatorial acceptance. There are
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electronic salons and virtual museums, and yet something is
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missing. It is not simply because much of the work tends to
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have a "gee whiz" element to it, reducing it to a product
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demonstration offering technology as an end in itself; nor is
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it because technology is often used primarily as a design
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accessory to postmodern fashion, for these are the uses that
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are to be expected when new exploitable media are identified.
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Rather, an absence is most acutely felt when the technology is
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used for an intelligent purpose. Electronic technology has
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not attracted resistant cultural workers to other time zones,
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situations, or even bunkers that yield new sets of questions,
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but instead has been used to express the same narratives and
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questions typically examined in activist art. This, of
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course, is not a totally negative development, as the
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electronic voice is potentially the most powerful in the
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exercise of free speech; however, it is disappointing that the
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technology is monopolized by interrogation of the imperialist
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narrative. An overwhelming amount of electronic work
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addresses questions of identity, environmental catastrophe,
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war and peace, and all the other issues generally associated
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with activist representation. In other words, concerns from
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another time zone have been successfully and practically
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imported into electronic media, but without addressing the
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questions inherent to the media itself. Again, this is a case
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of over-deployment and over-investment in a single
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spatial/temporal sector. An interrogation of technoculture
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has yet to occur, except when such investigation fits with
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more traditional activist narratives. As to be expected, a
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large amount of work is on media disinformation--the
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electronic invention of reality--but it is always tied to a
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persuasive argument about why the viewer should follow an
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alternative interpretation of a given "real world" phenomenon.
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Activists show no particular interest in questioning the
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cybernetics of everyday life, the phenomenology of screenal
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space, the construction of electronic identity, and so on.
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And why should they? In the abstract sense, if power has gone
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nomadic, then ideology will eventually follow the same course.
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As speculative as it might be, with the rapid change in
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technology, the flowing shift of the locus of reality from
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simulated time/space to virtual time/space, and the
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undetermined speed with which this is happening, those
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concerned with the development of the symbolic order must ask:
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What are nomadic values now and what will they become?
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Because of cultural lag, asking questions about the fate of
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sedentary culture is still useful, but only if other time
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zones are kept in mind. Even to formulate questions relevant
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to electronic nomadology is difficult, since there are no
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theories to exploit, no histories to draw upon, and no solid
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issues. It is so much easier to stay in the familiar bunker,
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where the issues (and the parameters of their interpretation)
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have solidified. Here the pain of leftist authoritarianism is
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most intensely felt. Even though addressing issues of
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nomadology is clearly urgent, one fears to invoke the wrath of
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sedentary liberal activists by making an "insensitive" error;
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that fear diminishes exploration into this topic, or any other
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outside the traditional activist time zone. Who is willing to
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venture on a high-risk endeavor, knowing that the result of
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failure is punishment from the alleged support group?
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On the practical level, this problem becomes even more
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complex. The hardware of everyday life cybernetics is
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beginning to merge, and in the most advanced time zone, that
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of the cyberelite, it already has. The telephone,
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television/video, the computer and its network structure--all
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these are blending into a single unit. Each of these pieces
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of hardware is from a different time zone, and each is thus
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surrounded by different sensibilities. The oldest piece is
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the most utopian in terms of its practical consequences in
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society: The telephone represents the technology closest to
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a decentralized open-access communication net. In the West,
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almost everyone knows how to use a phone and has access to
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one. There are even indicators that the process of
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decentralization that determined access to the telephone was
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framed as a free speech issue(*). During this process, the
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telephone was the best hardware for information relay
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available. While it clearly still had a military function,
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the movement to decentralize it recognized that the need for
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open access surpassed the need for control. It is this type
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of sensibility and process that must be replicated as new
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technologies begin to merge.
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(*) See Bruce Sterling, _The Hacker Crackdown_. NY: Bantam
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Books, 1992, pp. 8-12
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Just the opposite process occurred in the development of
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video/television. Although the hardware for viewing is
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relatively decentralized, and the hardware for production is
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beginning to be decentralized, the network for distribution is
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almost completely centralized, with little indication of
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change. This state of affairs must be resisted: The ideology
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that sanctions control of the airwaves by an elite capitalist
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class cannot be allowed to dominate all technology, and yet
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this is precisely what will happen if more cultural resources
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are not deployed to disturb this ideology. Cultural workers
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must insist on making access to electronic nets decentralized.
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To lose on this front is to concede to censorship in the worst
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way. Whether or not an artist loses h/er NEA grant because a
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given project is antithetical to sanctioned imperialist
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ideology is insignificant, compared to the consequences of
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merging systems of communication. This struggle will be more
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difficult than the opening of the phone network, since the
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airwaves are perceived as a means for mass persuasion. In the
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time of telephone decentralization, radio and film suffered
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defeats (access to the airwaves was perceived not as a right,
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but a business), causing repercussions which are still being
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felt. Television took the centralized form that it did partly
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because of these defeats.
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There is a wild card in this situation. The computer could go
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either way. Access to hardware, education, and networks is
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currently being centralized. Unlike the telephone or
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television, computers have not entered the everyday life of
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almost every class. This primarily elite technology has sunk
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a deep taproot down through the bureaucratic class. The
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electronic service is growing, but is far from pervasive.
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Hence those in lagging time zones already realize that
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computers are not democratic technology, nor are they
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considered an essential technology. This sensibility damages
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resistance to centralization of communication systems, since
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such indifference allows the capitalist elite to impose
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principles of self-regulation and exclusion on the technology
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without having to go before the public. The technology is
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lost before the public is even aware of its ramifications.
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One of the key critical functions of cultural workers is to
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invent aesthetic and intellectual means for communicating and
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distributing ideas. If the nomadic elite completely controls
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the lines of communication, resistant cultural workers have no
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voice, no function, nothing. If they are to speak at all,
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cultural workers must perpetuate and increase their current
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degree of autonomy in electronic space.
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There is a more optimistic side. The computer's linkage to
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the telephone is much greater than to the television. In
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fact, the computer and telephone will probably consume cable
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systems. If the sensibility of decentralization can be
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maintained, fiber optic networks will provide the democratic
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electronic space that has for so long been a dream. Each home
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could become its own broadcasting studio. This does not mean
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that network broadcast will collapse, or that there will be
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open access to data bases; but it does mean that there could
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be a cost-effective method to globally distribute complex
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grass-roots productions and alternative information nets
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containing time-based images, texts, and sounds--all
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accessible without bureaucratic permission. It will be as
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easy as making a phone call.
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Thus, developing systems of communication may provide another
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utopian opportunity. However, maintaining technological
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decentralization is crucial to exploiting this chance.
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Considering the history of utopia in ruins, the probability
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that this opportunity will be successfully used looks
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discouraging. None can predict how the technology will
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evolve, nor by what means the nomadic elite will defend the
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electronic rhizome from a slave revolt. Those snagged in
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electronic resistance may well be on a fool's errand, since
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the battle may already be lost. There are no assurances;
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there are no politically correct actions. Again, there is
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only the wager. If cynical power has withdrawn from the
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spectacle into the electronic net, then that is also where
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pockets of resistance must emerge. Although the resistant
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technocratic class can provide the imagination for the
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hardware and programming, resistant cultural workers are
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responsible for providing the sensibility necessary for
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popular support. This class must provide the imagination to
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intersect time zones, and to do so using whatever venues and
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media are available. This class must attempt to disturb the
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paternal spectacle of electronic centralization. We must
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challenge and recapture the electronic body, our electronic
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body! Roll the dice.
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Chapter 7 ]]> Paradoxes and Contradictions
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No matter which side of the political spectrum is examined, a
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generalized consensus exists on the role of the individual
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in the formation of society, although it is phrased
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oppositely by each side. According to the political right,
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the individual must surrender h/er sovereignty to state
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power. From the point of view of the left, the individual
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must submit to enriched repression. In each case the
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individual loss of sovereignty is crucial. The
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authoritarians regard this loss as positive--the beneficent
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state provides the individual with security and order in
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exchange for h/er obedience, while radical elements see this
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loss as negative, since the individual is forced to live an
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alienating existence of fragmented consciousness.
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Consequently the differences between the two stem from their
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opposite interpretations of this act of surrender. To
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determine where contingent elements fall along the political
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continuum, one must examine the degree to which the
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individual is deprived of h/er personal volition and desire.
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Unfortunately, no presocial moment free of state power ever
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existed outside the imagination, so no experiential
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knowledge can be used to identify or to measure the
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qualities of liberty. For this reason, certain arbitrary
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assumptions must be made to fix the location of liberty
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anywhere on the continuum between the noble savage and the
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war of all against all. This either/or decision cannot be
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reasoned without logical error (Goedel's paradox), nor is
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there a history (other than %state% history) from which to
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make an inductive judgment. One must just decide, or act in
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an ad hoc or random fashion. The decision to follow any
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certain idea is itself a wager.
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Throughout this book, the assumption is that extraction of
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power from the individual by the state is to be resisted.
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Resistance itself is the action which recovers or expands
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individual sovereignty, or conversely, it is those actions
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which weaken the state. Therefore, resistance can be viewed
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as a matter of degree; a total system crash is not the only
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option, nor may it even be a viable one. This is not to
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soften the argument by opening the door a crack for liberal
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reform, since that means relinquishing sovereignty in the
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name of social justice, rather than for the sake of social
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order. Liberal action is too often a matter of equal
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repression for all, in order to resist the conservative
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practice of repression for the marginalized and modest
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liberty for the privileged. Under the liberal rubric, the
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people united will always be defeated. The practice being
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advocated here is to recover what the state has taken, as
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well as what the reformers have so generously given (and are
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continuing to give).
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The issue of sovereignty brings up the first contradiction
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to be faced here. Throughout this work, two seemingly
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exclusive points have been voiced: While the current
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situation is partly defined by information overload, it is
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also defined by insufficient access to information. How can
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it be both ways? This is a problem of absence and presence-
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-the presence of an overload of information in the form of
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spectacle (presence) that steals sovereignty, and an absence
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of information that returns sovereignty to the individual.
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To be sure, information on good consumerism and government
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ideology is abundant. Data banks are filled with useless
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facts, but how can access be gained to information that
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directly affects everyday life? An individual's data body
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is completely out of h/er control. Information on spending
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patterns, political associations, credit histories, bank
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records, education, lifestyles, and so on is collected and
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cross-referenced by political-economic institutions, to
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control our own destinies, desires, and needs. This
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information cannot be accessed, nor can we really know which
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institutions have it, nor can we be sure how it is being
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used (although it is safe to assume that it is not for
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benevolent purposes). This is strategic data that must be
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claimed. We should be protected from the creation of
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electronic doubles by the right to privacy, but we are not.
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The right to privacy is yet another welfare state illusion
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in the service of the economy of desire. Specific facts
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about the policies and laws that promote information-
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gathering are not readily available, since such facts are
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carefully guarded by legions of bureaucrats. One needs
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extensive special training just to research such problems,
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when this knowledge could be readily available. Finally,
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where is the network that allows problems to be voiced on a
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mass scale? It does not exist.
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This is a peculiar case of censorship. Rather than stopping
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the flow of information, far more is generated than can be
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digested. The strategy is to classify or privatize all
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information that could be used by the individual for self-
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empowerment, and to bury the useful information under the
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reams of useless junk data offered to the public. Instead
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of the traditional information blackout, we face an
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information blizzard--a whiteout. This forces the
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individual to depend on an authority to help prioritize the
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information to be selected. This is the foundation for the
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information catastrophe, an endless recycling of sovereignty
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back to the state under the pretense of informational
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freedom.
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Dilemmas involved in the decentralization of hardware are also
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worth consideration. Where does Luddite technophobia stop
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and retrograde techno-dependence begin? This is very much a
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problem of finding the ever-elusive golden mean.
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Decentralization of the hardware invites the hazard of a
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techno-addiction that benefits only the merchants of
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technology, while centralization guarantees that electronic
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manipulation of individuals at both the macro and micro
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levels will proceed uncontested in any significant way.
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While the utopian claims made by the developers and
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distributors of new technology seem woefully transparent
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(after all, they are the ones who benefit the most
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economically), those claims are, at the same time, very
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seductive. The chance to be freed from the algorithms of
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everyday life in order to concentrate on the metaphysics of
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ideas is a wish worth entertaining, and has very often been
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vital to modern utopian theory; yet there are very
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discomforting elements in this vision. The economic
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prospects for creating such an environment are extremely
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bleak. If the technology were cheap enough to construct
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(less than labor costs), what would happen to those in the
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labor force? They might have plenty of free time, but no
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way to support themselves. To indulge the assumption that
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the future will be similar to the past suggests they would
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not fare well, since they would become an excess population.
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At best there would be a completely homogenized labor force,
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with the service sector and manufacturing sector sharing the
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same squalor. This scenario seems to be a return to
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classical Marxism in which a process of pauperization leads
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to two homogenized classes, with the bottom class unable to
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purchase the goods manufactured. The system crashes? Who
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can say; yet it does seem reasonable to assume that
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technology will not provide the utopia that corporate
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futurologists predict. Such predictions seem to function
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more in the short term, to convince people to buy technology
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that they do not really need, as well as to prepare future
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markets.
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Continued reflection on the more intelligible short-term
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prospects of the technology of desire makes it easier to see
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what is immediately bothersome about technocratic promises.
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Take the notion of the smart house. It sounds seductive.
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Here is a home that runs as efficiently as its construction
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allows. The computer monitors household activity, and acts
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in accordance with these activity patterns. Energy is never
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wasted; it is deployed only when and where it is needed.
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Security systems monitor the perimeter, to alert the
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authorities if the property is threatened. The home is
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efficient and secure; it is the manifestation of bourgeois
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value itself. But what is surrendered when all household
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activities are monitored and recorded? We know that if
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information can enter the house, it can also leave the
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house, so that the price of bourgeois utopia is privacy
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itself. With such data available, ways for outside forces
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to control the household more efficiently will also develop.
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Due to its surveillance components, this type of technology
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is another contractual trade of sovereignty for order. What
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is suspect about this techno-world is that it values
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consumer passivity and technological mediation in the most
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totalizing sense.
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This problem conjures the image of decentralization gone
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awry. Decentralization does not always favor resistant
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action; it can have a state function. For instance, it may
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be feasible for the corporate grid to provide most of the
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population with affordable smart machines as a marketing
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strategy. The more technology available to people, and the
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more it can insinuate itself into the algorithms of everyday
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life, the greater the chance that it will become a market of
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dependency. Addiction mania and hyperconsumerism are the
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basis for market maintenance and expansion. The addict
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always needs more. This is in part why there are such
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strong punishments for addictions that do not feed corporate
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bank accounts. It is intolerable to allow potential
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consumer populations to focus singularly on addictions of
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pleasure (food, sex, drugs). The empassioned consumer
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becomes inert, rather than wandering the grid of enriched
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privation. The inert consumer represents only one market of
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fixed consumption--for example, a singular desire for
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heroin. This kind of market is antithetical to one that
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remains in flux, oscillating between accumulation and
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obsolescence. The market of flux is one of entwinement--one
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product inevitably leads to another, necessitating constant
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upgrades and accessory purchases. One product line is
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interdependent with other product lines, and hence
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consumption and accumulation never stop. The final goal is
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a diversified addiction, as opposed to one that monopolizes
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its consumers.
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This discussion has not come full circle as it might seem at
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first glance. It has not gone from an apology for
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technology to an attack upon it. Rather, the problem being
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investigated is: How can technological decentralization
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return sovereignty to the individual rather than taking it
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away? Much of the answer lies in whether the technology is
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accepted as a means of passive consumption or as a means for
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active production. Passive addiction mania must be
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resisted; when corporate technocrats offer products or
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systems that seem to ride on the promises of a utopian dawn,
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one should scrutinize these offerings with the utmost
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suspicion. That which functions only "to make life easier
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(it all happens with the touch of a button)" is generally
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unnecessary. In the smart house, the computerized kitchen
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offers a data base on the recipes of the world. This is
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probably a con. Is a kitchen computer terminal really
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necessary? Does the service require a subscription? How
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often would it be used? Is it desirable to have information
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on daily life (cooking in this case) floating around the
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electronic net? Would it not be more efficient, cheaper,
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and private to simply purchase some cookbooks? This last
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question is very telling. When technology is trying to
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replace something that is not obsolete, one can be fairly
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certain that a strategy of dependence is at work. Further,
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continue using any technology that confounds the
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surveillance tactics of political economy. (In this case it
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is as simple as supporting book technology). Avoid using
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any technology that records data facts unless it is
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essential. For example, try not to use credit cards. An
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electronic record of a consumer's purchases is very precious
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data to the institutions of political economy. Do not let
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these institutions have it.
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The technological artifacts and systems worthy of support
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are geared more toward sending out information, rather than
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receiving it. Desktop publishing technology is an excellent
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example of a system in the process of decentralization, one
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designed to foster active production rather than passive
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reception. When the technology is skewed toward reception,
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avoid it. (It should be noted that the strategy of
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entwinement is always a problem regardless of the technology
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chosen. Barring the total rejection of technology, the
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power of addiction will always be present). In the case of
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interactive technology, it is wise to ask, is it centralized
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or decentralized? If it is like the phone, and allows
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access to people and the information of your choice, use it-
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-but always remember that the electronic tape could be
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recording. If it is centralized and spectacular, it is
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better to avoid it. The ability to choose an ending for a
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network TV show is not interaction; it is a device to keep
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the viewer watching. In this case, all the inventive
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choices have already been made. This is an example of a
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device designed to keep the viewer passively engaged.
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To help direct technology toward increased individual
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autonomy, hackers ought to continue developing personal
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hardware and software; however, since most technology
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emerges from the military complex and the rest comes from
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the corporate world, the situation is rather bleak.
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Although much of the hope for continued resistance in the techno-
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world rests with hackers, a contingent of resistant
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technocrats guided by the concerns of the radical left has
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yet to emerge. As mentioned in a previous chapter, this
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group is generally apolitical. While they must be credited
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for liberating the hardware and software that represent the
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first moments of sovereignty in techno-culture, thereby
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lifting the techno-situation out of hopelessness, care must
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be taken not to over-valorize them. Their motivations for
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producing technology oscillate between compulsion and
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ethical imperative. It is a type of addiction mania that
|
|
carries its own peculiar contradictions. Since such
|
|
production is extremely labor-intensive, requiring permanent
|
|
focus, a specialized fixation emerges that is beneficial
|
|
within the immediate realm of techno-production, but is
|
|
extremely questionable outside its spatial-temporal zone.
|
|
the hacker is generally obsessed with efficiency and order.
|
|
In producing decentralized technology, a fetish for the
|
|
algorithmic is understandable and even laudable; however,
|
|
when it approaches a totalizing aesthetic, it has the
|
|
potential to become damaging to the point of complicity with
|
|
the state. As an aesthetic, rather than a means of
|
|
production, it can be a reflection of the obscenity of
|
|
bourgeois capitalism. Efficiency alone cannot be the
|
|
measure of value. This is one demand that the
|
|
contestational voice has been making for two centuries. The
|
|
aesthetic of efficiency is one of exclusion; it seeks to
|
|
eliminate its predecessors. Since perfect efficiency is not
|
|
attainable, and it has yet to be shown how an ascendant
|
|
system can incorporate all of the usefulness of past
|
|
systems, obscene sacrifice becomes an ever-present
|
|
companion. Not only does excess efficiency sacrifice
|
|
elements of understanding and explanation, but it also
|
|
subtracts from humanity itself. Ideas, art, and passion can
|
|
thrive as well, if not better, in an environment of
|
|
disorder. The aesthetics of inefficiency, of desperate
|
|
gambles, of incommensurable imaginings, of insufferable
|
|
interruptions, are all a part of individual sovereignty.
|
|
These are situations in which invention occurs.
|
|
|
|
Here one stumbles upon the paradox of hacking: If hackers
|
|
must singularly commit to algorithmic thinking to be
|
|
productive, can this technocratic class be convinced to act
|
|
in a manner that, at times, will be antithetical to such
|
|
thinking? Perhaps the more utopian results of hacking--the
|
|
decentralization of hardware and information--are in fact
|
|
merely contingent elements in hacker discourse. What then
|
|
is to be done? If the hackers are dissuaded from focusing
|
|
on the aesthetics of efficiency, and thereby politicized,
|
|
production could go down; this could in turn restrict the
|
|
availability of decentralized hardware and software needed
|
|
by the contestational voice. If the hackers remain focused
|
|
on efficiency, that is more likely to strengthen the
|
|
totalizing operations of bourgeois discourse. Treating this
|
|
problem is partly a matter of redeployment. The hacker
|
|
occupies a very specialized time zone, and is involved in a
|
|
specialized labor. Anti-company technocrats must be
|
|
persuaded, by whatever available means, to enter other time
|
|
zones and address the particular situations found there.
|
|
Relocating hackers in other time zones should not be
|
|
understood literally; instead it should lead to recombinant
|
|
collaboration. That is, the characteristic of the hacker
|
|
and the cultural worker should blend and thereby form a link
|
|
between time zones, opening the possibilities for discourse
|
|
and action across the social time continuum.
|
|
|
|
It is quite likely that decentralizing hardware (technocratic
|
|
resistance) and redistributing labor (worker resistance) are
|
|
not enough in themselves to intersect time zones. As
|
|
already indicated, without frames of interpretation to
|
|
encourage the individual's capacity for autonomous action,
|
|
decentralization and redistribution could well have the
|
|
opposite effect--i.e., addiction mania. The best chance to
|
|
keep interpretation of cultural phenomena fluid lies in
|
|
manipulating, recombining, and recontextualizing signs; when
|
|
accompanied by other types of resistance, this allows the
|
|
maximum degree of autonomy. Sign manipulation with the
|
|
purpose of keeping the interpretive field open is the
|
|
primary critical function of the cultural worker. This
|
|
function separates the cultural worker from the
|
|
propagandist, whose task is to stop interpretation, and to
|
|
rigidify the readings of the culture-text. The cultural
|
|
worker's secondary function is to cross-fertilize separate
|
|
time and/or spatial sectors, but this task has met with less
|
|
success (the problem of over-deployment). The cultural
|
|
worker is obligated to ferret out the signs of freedom in as
|
|
many sectors as possible, and transport them by way of
|
|
image/text to other locations. This transference
|
|
constitutes the temporary anti-spectacle. For example,
|
|
hackers have always said that the computer can grant the
|
|
individual the ability to understand and to use real power.
|
|
Whatever the agent commands, the computer will do. Although
|
|
this may seem to be a statement of the obvious, it is
|
|
questionable whether the meaning of this observation is
|
|
really recognized outside the technocratic sector. If this
|
|
assertion is truly understood, the possibilities for
|
|
resistance dramatically increase. Populist strategies of
|
|
resistance deprived from reactions to the problems of early
|
|
capital are only an option.
|
|
|
|
Consider the following: an activist organization decides
|
|
that insurance agencies which keep records about uninsured
|
|
HIV+ people contribute to discriminatory practices, and that
|
|
such information-gathering must be stopped. This is not a
|
|
problem of early capital imperialism, but one of late
|
|
capital information codes. All the picket lines, affinity
|
|
groups, and drum corps that can be mustered will have little
|
|
effect in this situation. The information will not be
|
|
deleted from the data banks. But to covertly spoil the
|
|
information banks, or destroy them, would have the desired
|
|
effect. This is a matter of meeting information authority
|
|
with information disturbance; it is direct autonomous
|
|
action, suitable to the situation. One electronic affinity
|
|
group could do instantly what the many could not over time.
|
|
this is postmodern civil disobedience; it requires
|
|
democratic interpretation of a problem, but without large-
|
|
scale action. In early capital, the only power base for
|
|
marginal groups was defined by their numbers. This is no
|
|
longer true. Now there is a technological power base, and
|
|
it is up to cultural and political activists to think it
|
|
through. As time fragments, populist movements and
|
|
specialized forces can work successfully in tandem. It is a
|
|
matter of choosing the strategy that best fits the
|
|
situation, and of keeping the techniques of resistance open.
|
|
|
|
Although breaks in communication lines within and between
|
|
authoritarian institutions are reasonable focal points for
|
|
resistance, and it is even possible that the concrete shell
|
|
of some institutions could be completely crashed, it will
|
|
still be difficult, if not impossible, to erase all the
|
|
traces of the institution left in the rubble. Institutions,
|
|
like ideas, do not die easily. In fact, how could complex
|
|
society exist without bureaucracies? How would
|
|
communication exist without language? Irredeemable power is
|
|
ongoing. Macro institutions have autonomous existence,
|
|
independent of individual action. So what is the point of
|
|
resistance--why attack that which is undefeatable? Herein
|
|
lies the problem of agency. To what degree does freedom
|
|
exist for the individual? This is a site of continuous
|
|
turmoil with no satisfactory answer. Over the past century,
|
|
ideas on the degree of entrapment have wildly proliferated.
|
|
People are caught in the routinized pathways of work, and
|
|
are slaves to the demands of production; people are caught
|
|
in the iron cage of bureaucracy, and are slaves to the
|
|
process of rationalization; people are caught in the domain
|
|
of the code, and are slaves to the empire of signs. So much
|
|
is immediately taken, from the moment the individual is
|
|
thrown into the world. Even so, it is a worthy wager to
|
|
assume that the individual possesses a degree of autonomy
|
|
valuable enough to defend, and that it is possible to expand
|
|
it. It is also reasonable to gamble that social aggregates
|
|
similar in philosophical consensus can reconfigure social
|
|
structures.
|
|
|
|
Of these two wagers, the former is of the most immediate
|
|
concern. As the division of labor grows in complexity,
|
|
individual sovereignty fades under increasing erasure,
|
|
becoming a transparent transistor for social currents.
|
|
Agency dwindles down to mundane choices entrapped in the
|
|
economy of desire. To achieve any sense of free expression,
|
|
the individual is increasingly dependent upon the latter
|
|
wager. Power through numbers, though somewhat effective
|
|
within the situation of early capital, is less important in
|
|
late capital, as the praxis of quantity/power has hit its
|
|
critical mass. Globally, an internet of unity is needed
|
|
that at present is just not feasible. Even within national
|
|
borders, activist organizations are encountering points of
|
|
critical mass. It is a paradox; to be effective, the
|
|
organization must be so large that it requires bureaucratic
|
|
hierarchy. But due to its functional principle of
|
|
rationalization, this rigid order cannot accommodate
|
|
multiple perspectives among its members. Splintering
|
|
occurs, and the organization is consumed in its own process.
|
|
Perhaps it is time to reassess the idea of quantity as
|
|
power. Even with the best of intentions, large groups
|
|
inevitably subordinate the individual to the group,
|
|
consistently running the risk of dehumanization and
|
|
alienation. It should now be asked, can the model used by
|
|
the nomadic elite be appropriated for the cause of
|
|
resistance?
|
|
|
|
Although the nomadic elite may be a unified power, it is
|
|
more likely that this class exists as interrelated and
|
|
interdependent cells powerful enough to control segments of
|
|
social organization. The interrelationship between the
|
|
power cells develops not by choice, but by nonrational
|
|
process. These cells are often in conflict, continually
|
|
moving through a process of strengthening and weakening, but
|
|
the transcendent social current of late capital blindly
|
|
proceeds, untouched by the contingencies of conflict.
|
|
Repression and exploitation continue unabated. The
|
|
individual agents that labor within the cells enjoy greater
|
|
autonomy (freedom from repression) than those below them;
|
|
however, they are also caught in the social current. They
|
|
do not have the choice to stop the machinations of late
|
|
capital's process. The genetic code of these individuals is
|
|
also contingent; it is not essential to the process. They
|
|
could be replaced by any genetic sequence, and the results
|
|
would remain the same, since the power is located in the
|
|
cells, not in the individual. An individual may access
|
|
power only so long as s/he resides in the cell.
|
|
|
|
Technology is the foundation for the nomadic elite's ability
|
|
to maintain absence, acquire speed, and consolidate power in
|
|
a global system. Enough technology has fallen between the
|
|
cracks of the corporate-military hierarchy that
|
|
experimentation with cell structure among resistant culture
|
|
can begin. New tactics and strategies of civil disobedience
|
|
are now possible, ones that aim to disturb the virtual
|
|
order, rather than the spectacular order. With these new
|
|
tactics, many problems could be avoided that occur when
|
|
resistors use older tactics not suitable to a global
|
|
context. The cell allows greater probability for
|
|
establishing a nonhierarchical group based on consensus.
|
|
Because of its small size (arbitrarily speaking, 4-8
|
|
members), this group allows the personal voice to maintain
|
|
itself. There is no splintering, only healthy debate in an
|
|
environment of trust. The cell can act quickly and more
|
|
often without bureaucracy. Supported by the power of
|
|
technology, this action has the potential to be more
|
|
disturbing and more wide-ranging than any subelectronic
|
|
action. With enough of these cells acting--even if their
|
|
viewpoints conflict--it may be wagered that a resistant
|
|
social current will emerge... one that is not easy to turn
|
|
off, to find, or to monitor. In this manner, people with
|
|
different points of view and different specialized skills
|
|
can work in unison, without compromise and without surrender
|
|
of individuality to a centralized aggregate.
|
|
|
|
*****
|
|
|
|
The rules of the game have changed. Civil disobedience is not
|
|
what it used to be. Who is willing to explore the new
|
|
paradigm? It is so easy to stay in the bunker of
|
|
assurances. No conclusions, no certainty; only theoretical
|
|
frames, performative matrices, and practical wagers. What
|
|
more can be said? Roll the dice. End program. Fade out.
|
|
|
|
|