520 lines
31 KiB
Plaintext
520 lines
31 KiB
Plaintext
*=======================================================================*
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'The Tyranny of Structurelessness', by Jo Freeman, was first printed by
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the women's liberation movement, USA, in 1970. It was reprinted in
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_Berkeley Journal of Sociology_ in 1970 and later issued as a pamphlet by
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Agitprop in 1972. It was again issued as a pamphlet by the Leeds women's
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group of the Organization of Revolutionary Anarchists (ORA) and then re-
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printed by the Kingston group of the Anarchist Workers' Association
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(AWA). It was later Published jointly by Dark Star Press and Rebel Press
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in 1984 in a pamphlet called 'Untying the Knot - Feminism, Anarchism &
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Organization', with the printing done by Algate Press [84b Whitechapel
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High St, London E1]. This edition was taken from the AWA edition, but
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is without the additions to the text added by the AWA and ORA, or
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additional text from Dark Star/Rebel Press.
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*=======================================================================*
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THE TYRANNY OF STRUCTURELESSNESS
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by Jo Freeman
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During the years in which the women's liberation movement has been taking
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shape, a great emphasis has been placed on what are called leaderless,
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structureless groups as the main form of the movement. The source of this
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idea was a natural reaction against the overstructured society in which
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most of us found ourselves, the inevitable control this gave others over
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our lives, and the continual elitism of the Left and similar groups among
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those who were supposedly fighting this over-structuredness.
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The idea of 'structurelessness', however, has moved from a healthy
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counter to these tendencies to becoming a goddess in its own right. The
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idea is as little examined as the term is much used, but it has become an
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intrinsic and unquestioned part of women's liberation ideology. For the
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early development of the movement this did not much matter. It early de-
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fined its main method as consciousness-raising, and the 'structureless rap
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group' was an excellent means to this end. Its looseness and informality
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encouraged participation in discussion and the often supportive atmosphere
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elicited personal insight. If nothing more concrete than personal insight
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ever resulted from these groups, that did not much matter, because their
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purpose did not really extend beyond this.
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The basic problems didn't appear until individual rap groups exhausted
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the virtues of consciousness-raising and decided they wanted to do some-
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thing more specific. At this point they usually floundered because most
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groups were unwilling to change their structure when they changed their
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task. Women had thoroughly accepted the idea of 'structurelessness' with-
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out realizing the limitations of its uses. People would try to use the
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'structureless' group and the informal conference for purposes for which
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they were unsuitable out of a blind belief that no other means could
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possibly be anything but oppressive.
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If the movement is to move beyond these elementary stages of development,
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it will have to disabuse itself of some of its prejudices about organiz-
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ation and structure. There is nothing inherently bad about either of these.
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They can be and often are misused, but to reject them out of hand because
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they are misused is to deny ourselves the necessary tools to further
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development. We need to understand why 'structurelessness' does not work.
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Formal and Informal Structures
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Contrary to what we would like to believe, there is no such thing as
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a 'structureless' group. Any group of people of whatever nature coming
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together for any length of time, for any purpose, will inevitably structure
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itself in some fashion. The structure may be flexible, it may vary over time,
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it may evenly or unevenly distribute tasks, power and resources over the
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members of the group. But it will be formed regardless of the abilities,
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personalities and intentions of the people involved. The very fact that
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we are individuals with different talents, predispositions and backgrounds
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makes this inevitable. Only if we refused to relate or interact on any
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basis whatsoever could we approximate 'structurelessness' and that is not
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the nature of a human group.
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This means that to strive for a 'structureless' group is as useful
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and as deceptive, as to aim at an 'objective' news story, 'value-free'
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social science or a 'free' economy. A 'laissez-faire' group is about as
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realistic as a 'laissez-faire' society; the idea becomes a smokescreen
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for the strong or the lucky to establish unquestioned hegemony over
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others. This hegemony can easily be established because the idea of
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'structurelessness' does not prevent the formation of informal
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structures, but only formal ones. Similarly, 'laissez-faire'
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philosophy did not prevent the economically powerful from establishing
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control over wages, prices and distribution of goods; it only prevented
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the government from doing so. Thus 'structurelessness' becomes a way of
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masking power, and within the women's movement it is usually most
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strongly advocated by those who are the most powerful (whether they are
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conscious of their power or not). The rules of how decisions are made are
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known only to a few and awareness of power is curtailed by those who
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know the rules, as long as the structure of the group is informal. Those
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who do not know the rules and are not chosen for initiation must remain
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in confusion, or suffer from paranoid delusions that something is
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happening of which they are not quite aware.
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For everyone to have the opportunity to be involved in a given group
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and to participate in its activities the structure must be explicit, not
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implicit. The rules of decision-making must be open and available to every-
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one, and this can only happen if they are formalized. This is not to say that
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normalization of a group structure will destroy the informal structure. It
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usually doesn't. But it does hinder the informal structure from having
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predominant control and makes available some means of attacking it.
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'Structurelessness' is organizationally impossible. We cannot decide whether
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to have a structured or structureless group; only whether or not to have
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a _formally_ structured one. Therefore, the word will not be used any longer
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except to refer to the idea which it represents. _Unstructured_ will refer
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to those groups which have not been deliberately structured in a particular
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manner. _Structured_ will refer to those which have. A structured group
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always has a _formal_ structure, and may also have an informal one. An
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unstructured group always has an _informal_, or covert, structure. It is
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this informal structure, particularly in unstructured groups, which
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forms the basis for elites.
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The Nature of Elitism
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'Elitist' is probably the most abused word in the women's liberation move-
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ment. It is used as frequently, and for the same reasons, as 'pinko' was in
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the '50s. It is never used correctly. Within the movement it commonly refers
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to individuals though the personal characteristics and activities of those to
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whom it is directed may differ widely. An individual, as an individual, can
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never be an 'elite' because the only proper application of the term 'elite'
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is to groups. Any individual, regardless of how well-known that person is,
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can never be an elite.
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Correctly, an elite refers to a small group of people who have power over
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a larger group of which they are part, usually without direct responsibility
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to that larger group, and often without their knowledge or consent. A
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person becomes an elitist by being part of, or advocating, the rule by such
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a small group, whether or not that individual is well-known or not known at
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all. Notoriety is not a definition of an elitist. The most insidious elites
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are usually run by people not known to the larger public at all. Intelligent
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elitists are usually smart enough not to allow themselves to become well-
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known. When they become known, they are watched, and the mask over
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their power is no longer firmly lodged.
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Because elites are informal does not mean they are invisible. At any
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small group meeting anyone with a sharp eye and an acute ear can tell who
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is influencing whom. The member of a friendship group will relate more
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to each other than to other people. They listen more attentively and
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interrupt less. They repeat each other's points and give in amiably. The
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'outs' they tend to ignore or grapple with. The 'outs' approval is not
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necessary for making a decision; however it is necessary for the 'outs' to
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stay on good terms with the 'ins'. Of course, the lines are not as sharp as
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I have drawn them. They are nuances of interaction, not pre-written scripts.
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But they are discernible, and they do have their effect. Once one knows
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with whom it is important to check before a decision is made, and whose
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approval is the stamp of acceptance, one knows who is running things.
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Elites are not conspiracies. Seldom does a small group of people get
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together and try to take over a larger group for its own ends. Elites are
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nothing more and nothing less than a group of friends who also happen to
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participate in the same political activities. They would probably maintain
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their friendship whether or not they were involved in political activities;
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they would probably be involved in political activities whether or not they
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maintained their friendships. It is the coincidence of these two phenomena
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which creates elites in any groups and makes them so difficult to break.
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These friendship groups function as networks of communication outside
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any regular channels for such communication that may have been set up
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by a group. If no channels are set up, they function as the only networks
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of communication. Because people are friends, usually sharing the same
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values and orientations, because they talk to each other socially and
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consult with each other when common decisions have to be made, the people
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involved in these networks have more power in the group than those who
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don't. And it is a rare group that does not establish some informal
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networks of communication through the friends that are made in it.
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Some groups, depending on their size, may have more than one such
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informal communication network. Networks may even overlap. When only
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one such network exists, it is the elite of an otherwise unstructured group,
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whether the participants in it want to be elitists or not. If it is the only
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such network in a structured group it may or may not be an elite depending
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on its composition and the nature of the formal structure. If there are two
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or more such networks of friends, they may compete for power within the
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group thus forming factions, or one may deliberately opt out of the
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competition leaving the other as the elite. In a structured group, two or
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more such friendship networks usually compete with each other for formal
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power. This is often the healthiest situation. The other members are in a
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position to arbitrate between the two competitors for power and thus are
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able to make demands of the group to whom they give their temporary
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allegiance.
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Since movement groups have made no concrete decisions about who shall
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exercise power within them, many different criteria are used around the
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country. As the movement has changed through time, marriage has become
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a less universal criterion for effective participation, although all
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informal elites still establish standards by which only women who possess
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certain material or personal characteristics may join. The standards
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frequently include: middle-class background (despite all the rhetoric about
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relating to the working-class), being married, not being married but living
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with someone, being or pretending to be a lesbian, being between the age
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of 20 and 30, being college-educated or at least having some college back-
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ground, being 'hip', not being too 'hip', holding a certain political line
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or identification as a 'radical', having certain 'feminine' personality
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characteristics such as being 'nice', dressing right (whether in the
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traditional style or the anti-traditional style), etc. There are also
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some characteristics which will almost always tag one as a 'deviant'
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who should not be related to. They include: being too old, working
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full-time (particularly if one is actively committed to a 'career'),
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not being 'nice', and being avowedly single (i.e. neither heterosexual
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nor homosexual).
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Other criteria could be included, but they all have common themes. The
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characteristic prerequisite for participating in all the informal elites
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of the movement, and thus for exercising power, concern one's background,
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personality or allocation of time. They do not include one's competence,
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dedication to feminism, talents or potential contribution to the movement.
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The former are the criteria one usually uses in determining one's friends.
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The latter are what any movement or organization has to use if it is going
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to be politically effective.
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Although this dissection of the process of elite formation within small
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groups has been critical in its perspectives, it is not made in the belief
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that these informal structures are inevitably bad Q merely that they are
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inevitable. All groups create informal structures as a result of the
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interaction patterns among the members. Such informal structures can do
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very useful things. But only unstructured groups are totally governed by
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them. When informal elites are combined with a myth of 'structurelessness',
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there can be no attempt to put limits on the use of power. It becomes
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capricious.
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This has two potentially negative consequences of which we should be
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aware. The first is that the informal structure of decision-making will be
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like a sorority: one in which people listen to others because they like them,
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not because they say significant things. As long as the movement does not
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do significant things this does not much matter. But if its development is
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not to be arrested at this preliminary stage, it will have to alter this
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trend. The second is that informal structures have no obligation to be
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responsible to the group at large. Their power was not given to them; it
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cannot be taken away. Their influence is not based on what they do for the
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group; therefore they cannot be directly influenced by the group. This does
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not necessarily make informal structures irresponsible. Those who are
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concerned with maintaining their influence will usually try to be responsible.
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The group simply cannot compel such responsibility; it is dependent on the
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interests of the elite.
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The 'Star' System
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The 'idea' of 'structurelessness' has created the 'star' system. We live
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in a society which expects political groups to make decisions and to select
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people to articulate those decisions to the public at large. The press and
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the public do not know how to listen seriously to individual women as
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women; they want to know how the group feels. Only three techniques
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have ever been developed for establishing mass group opinion: the vote or
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referendum, the public opinion survey questionnaire and the selection of
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group spokespeople at an appropriate meeting. The women's liberation
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movement has used none of these to communicate with the public. Neither
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the movement as a whole nor most of the multitudinous groups within it
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have established a means of explaining their position on various issues.
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But the public is conditioned to look for spokespeople.
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While it has consciously not chosen spokespeople, the movement has
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thrown up many women who have caught the public eye for varying rea-
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sons. These women represent no particular group or established opinion;
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they know this and usually say so. But because there are no official
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spokespeople nor any decision-making body the press can interview when
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it wants to know the movement's position on a subject, these women are
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perceived as the spokespeople. Thus, whether they want to or not, whether
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the movement likes it or not, women of public note are put in the role of
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spokespeople by default.
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This is one source of the tie that is often felt towards the women who
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are labeled 'stars'. Because they were not selected by the women in the
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movement to represent the movement's views, they are resented when the
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press presumes they speak for the movement...Thus the backlash of the 'star'
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system, in effect, encourages the very kind of individual non responsibility
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that the movement condemns. By purging a sister as a 'star', the movement
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loses whatever control it may have had over the person, who becomes free
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to commit all of the individualistic sins of which she had been accused.
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Political Impotence
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Unstructured groups may be very effective in getting women to talk about
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their lives; they aren't very good for getting things done. Unless their
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mode of operation changes, groups flounder at the point where people tire
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of 'just talking' and want to do something more. Because the larger movement
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in most cities is as unstructured as individual rap groups, it is not much
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more effective than the separate groups at specific tasks. The informal
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structure is rarely together enough or in touch enough with the people to
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be able to operate effectively. So the movement generates much emotion
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and few results. Unfortunately, the consequences of all this motion are
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not as innocuous as the results, and their victim is the movement itself.
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Some groups have turned themselves into local action projects, if they
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do not involve too many people, and work on a small scale. But this form
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restricts movement activity to the local level. Also, to function well
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the groups must usually pare themselves down to that informal group of
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friends who were running things in the first place. This excludes many
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women from participating. As long as the only way women can participate
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in the movement is through membership of a small group, the non-gregarious
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are at a distinct disadvantage. As long as friendship groups are the main
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means of organizational activity, elitism becomes institutionalized.
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For those groups which cannot find a local project to devote themselves
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to, the mere act of staying together becomes the reason for their staying
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together. When a group has no specific task (and consciousness-raising is a
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task), the people in it turn their energies to controlling others in the
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group. This is not done so much out of a malicious desire to manipulate others
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(though sometimes it is) as out of lack of anything better to do with their
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talents. Able people with time on their hands and a need to justify their
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coming together put their efforts into personal control, and spend their
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time criticizing the personalities of the other members in the group.
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Infighting and personal power games rule the day. When a group is involved
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in a task, people learn to get along with others as they are and to subsume
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dislikes for the sake of the larger goals. There are limits placed on the
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compulsion to remold every person into our image of what they should be.
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The end of consciousness-raising leaves people with no place to go and
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the lack of structure leaves them with no way of getting there. The women
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in the movement either turn in on themselves and their sisters or seek
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other alternatives of action. There are few alternatives available. Some
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women just 'do their own thing'. This can lead to a great deal of individual
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creativity, much of which is useful for the movement, but it is not a viable
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alternative for most women and certainly does not foster a spirit of
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co-operative group effort. Other women drift out of the movement entirely
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because they don't want to develop an individual project and have found no
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way of discovering, joining or starting group projects that interest them.
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Many turn to other political organizations to give them the kind of
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structured, effective activity that they have not been able to find in the
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women's movement. Thus, those political organizations which view women's
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liberation as only one issue among many find the women's liberation
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movement a vast recruiting ground for new members. There is no need for
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such organizations to 'infiltrate' (though this is not precluded). The
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desire for meaningful political activity generated by women by becoming
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part of the women's liberation movement is sufficient to make them eager
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to join other organizations. The movement itself provides no outlets for
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their new ideas and energies.
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Those women who join other political organizations while remaining
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within the women's liberation movement, or who join women's liberation
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while remaining in other political organizations, in turn become the
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framework for new informal structures. These friendship networks are based
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upon their common non-feminist politics rather than the characteristics
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discussed earlier; however, the network operates in much the same way.
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Because these women share common values, ideas and political orientations,
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they too become informal, unplanned, unselected, unresponsible elites Q
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whether they intend to be so or not.
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These new informal elites are often perceived as threats by the old
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informal elites previously developed within different movement groups.
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This is a correct perception. Such politically orientated networks are
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rarely willing to be merely 'sororities' as many of the old ones were, and
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want to proselytize their political as well as their feminist ideas. This
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is only natural, but its implications for women's liberation have never been
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adequately discussed. The old elites are rarely willing to bring such
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differences of opinion out into the open because it would involve exposing
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the nature of the informal structure of the group. Many of these informal
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elites have been hiding under the banner of 'anti-elitism' and 'structure-
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lessness'. To counter effectively the competition from another informal
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structure, they would have to become 'public' and this possibility is fraught
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with many dangerous implications. Thus, to maintain its own power, it is
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easier to rationalize the exclusion of the members of the other informal
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structure by such means as 'red-baiting', 'lesbian-baiting' or 'straight-
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baiting'. The only other alternative is formally to structure the group in
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such a way that the original power is institutionalized. This is not always
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possible. If the informal elites have been well structured and have exercised
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a fair amount of power in the past, such a task is feasible. These groups
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have a history of being somewhat politically effective in the past, as the
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tightness of the informal structure has proven an adequate substitute for
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a formal structure. Becoming structured does not alter their operation much,
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though the institutionalization of the power structure does not open it to
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formal challenge. It is those groups which are in greatest need of structure
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that are often least capable of creating it. Their informal structures have
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not been too well formed and adherence to the ideology of 'structureless-
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ness' makes them reluctant to change tactics. The more unstructured a
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group it is, the more lacking it is in informal structures; the more it
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adheres to an ideology of 'structurelessness', the more vulnerable it is
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to being taken over by a group of political comrades.
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Since the movement at large is just as unstructured as most of its
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constituent groups, it is similarly susceptible to indirect influence. But
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the phenomenon manifests itself differently. On a local level most groups
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can operate autonomously, but only the groups that can organize a national
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activity are nationally organized groups. Thus, it is often the structured
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feminist organizations that provide national directions for feminist
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activities, and this direction is determined by the priorities of these
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organizations. Such groups as National Organization of Women and
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Women's Equality Action League and some Left women's caucuses are
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simply the only organizations capable of mounting a national campaign.
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The multitude of unstructured women's liberation groups can choose to
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support or not support the national campaigns, but are incapable of
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mounting their own. Thus their members become the troops under the
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leadership of the structured organizations. They don't even have a
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way of deciding what the priorities are.
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The more unstructured a movement is, the less control it has over the
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directions in which it develops and the political actions in which it
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engages. This does not mean that its ideas do not spread. Given a certain
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amount of interest by the media and the appropriateness of social conditions,
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the ideas will still be diffused widely. But diffusion of ideas does not mean
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they are implemented; it only means they are talked about. Insofar as they
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can be applied individually they may be acted upon; insofar as they require
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co-ordinated political power to be implemented, they will not be.
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As long as the women's liberation movement stays dedicated to a form
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of organization which stresses small, inactive discussion groups among
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friends, the worst problems of unstructuredness will not be felt. But this
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style of organization has its limits; it is politically inefficacious,
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exclusive and discriminatory against those women who are not or cannot be
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tied into the friendship networks. Those who do not fit into what already
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exists because of class, race, occupation, parental or marital status, or
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personality will inevitably be discouraged from trying to participate.
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Those who do not fit in will develop vested interests in maintaining
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things as they are.
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The informal groups' vested interests will be sustained by the informal
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structures that exist, and the movement will have no way of determining
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who shall exercise power within it. If the movement continues deliberately
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not to select who shall exercise power, it does not thereby abolish power.
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All it does is abdicate the right to demand that those who do exercise
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power and influence be responsible for it. If the movement continues to
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keep power as diffuse as possible because it knows it cannot demand
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responsibility from those who have it, it does prevent any group or person
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from totally dominating. But it simultaneously ensures that the movement
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is as ineffective as possible. Some middle ground between domination and
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ineffectiveness can and must be found.
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These problems are coming to a head at this time because the nature of
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the movement is necessarily changing. Consciousness-raising, as the main
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function of the women's liberation movement, is becoming obsolete. Due
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to the intense press publicity of the last two years and the numerous
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overground books and articles now being circulated, women's liberation
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has become a household word. Its issues are discussed and informal rap
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groups are formed by people who have no explicit connection with any
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movement group. Purely educational work is no longer such an overwhelm-
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ing need. The movement must go on to other tasks. It now needs to
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establish its priorities, articulate its goals and pursue its objectives
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in a co-ordinated way. To do this it must be organized locally,
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regionally and nationally.
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Principles of Democratic Structuring
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Once the movement no longer clings tenaciously to the ideology of
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'structurelessness', it will be free to develop those forms of organisation
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best suited to its healthy functioning. This does not mean that we should
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go to the other extreme and blindly imitate the traditional forms of
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organisation. But neither should we blindly reject them all . Some traditional
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techniques will prove useful, albeit not perfect; some will give us insights
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into what we should not do to obtain certain ends with minimal costs to
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the individuals in the movement. Mostly, we will have to experiment with
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different kinds of structuring and develop a variety of techniques to use
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for different situations. The 'lot system' is one such idea which has emerged
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from the movement. It is not applicable to all situations, but it is usefull,
|
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in some. Other ideas for structuring are needed. But before we can proceed
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to experiment intelligently, we must accept the idea that there is nothing
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inherently bad about structure itself - only its excessive use.
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While engaging in this trial-and-error process, there are some principles
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we can keep in mind that are essential to democratic structuring and are
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politically effective also:
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1 _Delegation_ of specific authority to specific individuals for specific
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tasks by democratic procedures. Letting people assume jobs or tasks by
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default only means they are not dependably done. If people are selected to
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do a task, preferably after expressing an interest or willingness to do it,
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they have made a commitment which cannot easily be ignored.
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2 Requiring all those to whom authority has been delegated to be
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_responsible_ to all those who selected them. This is how the group has
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control over people in positions of authority. Individuals may exercise
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power, but it is the group that has the ultimate say over how the power
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is exercised.
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3 _Distribution_ of authority among as many people as is reasonably
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possible. This prevents monopoly of power and requires those in positions
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of authority to consult with many others in the process of exercising it.
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It also gives many people an opportunity to have responsibility for specific
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tasks and thereby to learn specific skills.
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4 _Rotation_ of tasks among individuals. Responsibilities which are held
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too long by one person, formally or informally, come to be seen as that
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person's 'property' and are not easily relinquished or controlled by the
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group. Conversely, if tasks are rotated too frequently the individual does
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not have time to learn her job well and acquire a sense of satisfaction of
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doing a good job.
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5 _Allocation_ of tasks along rational criteria. Selecting someone for a
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position because they are liked by the group, or giving them hard work
|
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because they are disliked, serves neither the group nor the person in the
|
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long run. Ability, interest and responsibility have got to be the major
|
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concerns in such selection. People should be given an opportunity to learn
|
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skills they do not have, but this is best done through some sort of
|
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'apprenticeship' programme rather than the 'sink or swim' method. Having
|
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a responsibility one can't handle well is demoralising. Conversely, being
|
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blackballed from what one can do well does not encourage one to develop
|
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one's skills. Women have been punished for being competent throughout most
|
|
of human history Qthe movement does not need to repeat this process.
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6 _Diffusion of information_ to everyone as frequently as possible.
|
|
Information is power. Access to information enhances one's power. When
|
|
an informal network spreads new ideas and information among themselves
|
|
outside the group, they are already engaged in the process of forming
|
|
an opinion Qwithout the group participating. The more one knows about
|
|
how things work, the more politically effective one can be.
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7 _Equal access to resources_ needed by the group. This is not always
|
|
perfectly possible, but should be striven for. A member who maintains
|
|
a monopoly over a needed resource (like a printing press or a darkroom
|
|
owned by a husband) can unduly influence the use of that resource.
|
|
Skills and information are also resources. Members' skills and information
|
|
can be equally available only when members are willing to teach what they
|
|
know to others.
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When these principles are applied, they ensure that whatever structures
|
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are developed by different movement groups will be controlled by and be
|
|
responsible to the group. The group of people in positions of authority
|
|
will be diffuse, flexible, open and temporary. They will not be in such an
|
|
easy position to institutionalize their power because ultimate decisions
|
|
will be made by the group at large. The group will have the power to
|
|
determine who shall exercise authority within it.
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Jo Freeman
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