319 lines
10 KiB
Plaintext
319 lines
10 KiB
Plaintext
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Mexico: A Political Prognosis and
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Analysis
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Or The Once and Future EZLN
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By Matt Miscreant and Todd Prane
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The "armed" part of the rebellion in
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southern Mexico lasted just 10 days, but
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the stand off may last much longer. The
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Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
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needs a legitimate victory in the August
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21st elections if they are to continue
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on their neo-liberal path; the Zapatista
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National Liberation Army (EZLN) could
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exploit the political turmoil around the
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elections, if they are still a political
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force in Mexico at that time. Against
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this backdrop, and with the August
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elections still wide-open (creating the
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possibility of the first new ruling
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party in six decades), it seems like a
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good time to take a quick look around.
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The Negotiations
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The EZLN and representatives of the PRI
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finally sat down at the Cathedral in San
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Crist=F3bal de las Casas on Feb. 21. The
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talks were mediated by Archbishop Samuel
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Ruiz Garc=EDa, and the chief negotiators
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were Manuel Camacho Sol=EDs for the PRI
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and members of the Clandestine
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Indigenous Revolutionary Committee--
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General Command for the EZLN. The
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Zapatistas' demands were a mixture of
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revolution and reform, with some of the
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apparently reformist demands actually
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requiring revolutionary change. The
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government declared that it will meet
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parts of the demands, mostly in ways
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that only look like change This is
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consistent with the PRI's history of
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seeming to accept radical demands (thus
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the Institutional Revolutionary Party)
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though in reality co-opting them. The
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government has gone so far as to
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characterize the negotiations as
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agreements needing only a signature.
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The EZLN responded: "If the supreme
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government wants to present the
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documents of San Crist=F3bal as
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'agreements,' then let's consider the
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EZLN's list of demands the 'agreement'
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and guarantee democracy in the next
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elections with the resignation of the
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federal president." The government's
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mis-characterization of the dialogue has
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threatened the talks and the chance for
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a peaceful solution with the Zapatistas.
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Indeed, it is doubtful that a peaceful
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solution is possible; the Zapatistas
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probably will not agree to any
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settlement that does not incorporate
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their more revolutionary demands, such
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as the resignation of President Carlos
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Salinas de Gortari, which would likely
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spell the end of the PRI's hegemony and
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radically open up political space in
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Mexico. It is likely that the EZLN
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realizes that the PRI will not meet
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their more radical demands and is only
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buying time to increase their strength.
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Time is on the side of the Zapatistas,
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who have been quietly organizing for ten
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years, and not to fight for only ten
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days. As Sub-Commander Marcos said in a
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letter to the editor of Tiempo: "Taking
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power? No, something far more
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difficult. A new world."
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Time is not on the side of the PRI,
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whose power will be at stake in the
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August elections. Should the PRI win
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again they will likely be accused of
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election fraud yet again, which in the
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current political climate could lead to
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radical consequences; it is important to
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remember the uprisings that happened
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after the last elections were stolen
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from center-left candidate Cuahut=E9moc
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C=E1rdenas. Also, it is rumored that
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other radical-left armed groups will
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begin a war on the federal government in
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August, possibly providing the
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Zapatistas with armed allies in other
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parts of the country [see L&R vol. 5.
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no. 1].
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The Assassination and the August
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Elections
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The entire negotiation process had the
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undesireable effect of increasing
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President Salinas' popularity (due to
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the perception that he "handled the
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situation" well.) The negotiations also
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increased the popularity of Manuel
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Camacho Sol=EDs. Camacho Sol=EDs, once a
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PRI presidential hopeful, was passed
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over in favor of Luis Donaldo Colosio
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Murrieta, but after the negotiations
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seemed likely for an independent
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candidacy. Such a candidacy would have
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floored the PRI by drawing away large
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amounts of their most solid support.
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Camacho, however coincidentally,
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announced that he would not seek
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national office the day before Colosio
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was shot.
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Colosio was assassinated on March 23,
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1994, in Tijuana by Mario Aburto
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Mart=EDnez, a 23-year old Tijuana
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resident. This was big news, even in the
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US, for two reasons: the first is that
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no prominent Mexican politician had been
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assassinated since 1928 when President-
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elect General Alvaro Obreg=F3n was killed;
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the second is that Colosio's death
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throws an already uncertain election
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into complete disarray and raises all
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kinds of questions about the killer and
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his motivations. Both of those factors,
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in the context of the ongoing situation
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in Chiapas, add up to a fear on the part
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of American investors that Mexico is
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unable to maintain a capitalist
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democracy and will fall prey to the same
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difficulties as Guatemala, El Salvador,
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Per=FA, and so many other Latin American
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countries. The assassination gives more
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substance to a joke that was already
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circulating in Mexico: President Carlos
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Salinas went to sleep on New Year's Eve
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thinking that he would wake up in the
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First World and woke up on New Year's
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Day in the Third.
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However, with the assassination of
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Colosio, the PRI had an opportunity to
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change the political climate and
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nominate a new, more popular candidate.
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Instead, they have shown their
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commitment to business as usual, which
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means neo-liberal economics/class war on
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Mexico's poor, by selecting another
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faceless technocrat, Ernesto Zedillo
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Ponce de Le=F3n, to run in Colosio's
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place. The line of faceless bureaucrats
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is long and the assassination of Colosio
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has not resulted in a real change in the
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PRI. What it has done, however, is two
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things: 1) At the same time reaffirm
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the PRI's committment to avoiding
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internal democracy (within the party)
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and further destabilize the PRI's
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position, increasing the chance for the
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need to steal the elections; 2) Raise
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all sorts of questions about who would
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have motives to shoot Colosio with
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speculations about everyone from the PRI
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to the Pope.
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All of this gets back to the question of
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the negotiations and how, exactly they
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shifted the political balance in Mexico.
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The EZLN quickly denied any involvement
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in the assassination, though it appeared
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they might be subject to an assault by
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the Federal Army in the wake of the
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killing. Immediately following the act,
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Federal Army troops appeared to be
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massing to attack, and government planes
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made aerial attacks near the highway
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between Comit=E1n and Altamirano.
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Although this signaled that the PRI
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might try to blame the assassination on
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the EZLN, the PRI has changed tactics.
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Now the PRI is not blaming the EZLN at
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all, but is using the assassination to
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build support for themselves in the
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elections, using rhetoric which
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identifies the PRI with Mexico, claiming
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that the assassin killed Mexico itself
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when he shot Colosio. Reports published
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in the capitalist press services just
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prior to L&R going to press indicate
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that a right-wing faction within the PRI
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may have been responsible for the
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assassination. This does not come as
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much of a surprise, but it does threaten
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the PRI's strategy of turning the
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assassination into an assault on all of
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Mexico into little more than the usual
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internal PRI maneuvering, stepped up a
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level. All of this raises questions
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about the viability of the PRI in the
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next elections.
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Solidarity with the EZLN
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Even as the EZLN faces questions of its
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long-term survival, North American
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solidarity groups face the difficult
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transition from the excitement- and
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communique-filled days of January to
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protracted, dependable activity. Most of
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the small groupings and even some of the
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larger coalitions will quickly fade as
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the communiques come more slowly and the
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standoff continues. Of central
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importance, though, is whether these
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groupings will be around in August for
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the elections.
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Solidarity work in Mexico has been
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frenetic. Demonstrations have been
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large and frequent, with activities
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building to a huge day of protest to be
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held April 10, the 75th anniversary of
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the assassination of Emiliano Zapata.
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Marchers from most states of the
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Republic, notably from Guerrero, have
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travelled by foot to the Capitol,
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shouting their support for the EZLN (and
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fetishizing Subcomandante Marcos) the
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whole way. The last leg of the march--
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from the state of Mexico into the
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Federal District (from the outskirts
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into the city)--and the demonstration
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will be a good way to gauge ongoing
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Mexican public interest in and support
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for the EZLN.
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At the moment, North American solidarity
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work is concentrated around information-
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sharing, although material aid caravans
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are already being launched, notably by
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the Pomo Indians in Northern California,
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with the assistance of a broad-based
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coalition in the San Francisco Bay Area.
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If activists in North America are to be
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of more substantial aid to the Zapatista
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revolutionary movement, we need to
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expand our activities. We need to
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resist North American intervention--the
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US has already sent troops to Guatemala,
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just across the border from Chiapas, in
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a covert military operation--while
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protesting the already-enormous Mexican
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Army presence in the state. Our ability
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to stop the capitalist war machine from
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crushing the Mexican insurgency may be
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crucial to whether the movement brings
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about revolutionary change or is
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smashed. Resistance must be coordinated
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and groups working in solidarity with
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the Zapatistas must be in contact with
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each other and work together in a
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principled manner--across the border.
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We must be in contact with those we are
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in solidarity with and help them in
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achieving their liberation, including
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giving material aid. Their liberation
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and ours are inextricably linked.
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Freedom cannot exist within the confines
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of one country; we cannot separate the
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liberation of the Chiapanecos from our
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own.
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______________________________________
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Matt Miscreant is a member of Santa
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Cruz-based Zapatista Action Project.
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Todd Prane is a member of New York City-
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based Zapatista Solidarity Committee.
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Both are members of Love and Rage
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Revolutionary Anarchist Federation.
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sources include: Nicanet Weekly News
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Update/339Lafayette St./NY, NY 10012;
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New York Transfer News
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Service/nyt@blythe.org/(212)675-9690;
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Equipo Pueblo/pueblo@laneta.apc.org [add
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phone]
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Communique Packet #1 of the ZSC: Dec
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31, 1993 through Feb 2, 1994
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Info-Bulletin #2 of the ZSC: late Jan,
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1993 - March 17, 1994
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$1 and three stamps each to Love and
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Rage/NYC.
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_______________________________________
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Fromthe Love and Rage New York News
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Bureau Love and Rage is a Revolutionary
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Anarchist Federation in Canada, the US
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and Mexico. For more information
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please write to lnr@blythe.org
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For an email subscription to our
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bimonthly publication
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please send $10 to POB 853 Stuyvesant
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Sta/ NY, NY 10009
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_______________________________________
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