89 lines
3.5 KiB
Plaintext
89 lines
3.5 KiB
Plaintext
Brief explanation of anarcho capitalism:
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Under Anarcho Capitalism judgment is separate from
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enforcement, and enforcement is based on fealty and
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association, not on place. Therefore the enforcement
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areas of enforcement organizations overlap vastly.
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If someone suffers an adverse judgment from a well
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respected court, and refuses to abide by that judgment,
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then the judgment will not automatically be enforced, but
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his reputation is damaged in a fashion that makes it
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comparatively safe to use violence against him.
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Courts are kept honest because they fear loss of respect.
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Enforcement organizations generally, but not always,
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adhere to what the courts commend because they fear loss
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of respect, leading to violence from other enforcement
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organizations and loss of customers and clients.
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Enforcement is largely based on fealty, rather than place.
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For reasons of convenience it is likely that most people
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in one neighborhood would give fealty to the same militia,
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or subscribe to the same renta-cop agency, but sometimes
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there would be conflicts. Perhaps there would be two
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competing militias. Militia A might claim that Militia B
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was soft on crime. Militia B might claim that Militia A
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was lawless and violent, as occurred in the famous dispute
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between the "Regulators" and the "Moderators".
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If Militia A (the "Regulators") was lawless and violent,
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this would probably eventually bring it into conflict with
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other enforcement organizations, a conflict that would
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normally be resolved by the courts.
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Militia A might reject the verdict of the courts, though
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this is unlikely. If it did it is likely that most of its
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clients would repudiate fealty, and the leadership of
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Militia A might very likely die.
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The "Regulators" quietly faded away when their excesses
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were publicly exposed in trials arranged by the
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"Moderators".
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The free rider problem:
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Because enforcement under anarcho capitalism is non
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territorial, defense and law enforcement are
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indistinguishable except for the size of the criminal
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gangs.
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Since one is defending people, not places, there is no free
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rider problem. An individual free rider runs a risk that
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he may have difficulty enforcing law and custom when a
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crime is committed against him. He is relying on kindness
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of strangers for the safety of his property, his liberty,
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and his life.
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Similarly for a group, for example a militia, which
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attempts to free ride. It is in danger from small scale
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threats.
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An association of such groups that attempts to free ride
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is in danger from large scale threats.
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Anarcho Capitalism can be criticized that its solution to
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the free rider problem (death) is excessively drastic, but
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you cannot criticize anarcho capitalism that it will be
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overrun by free riders. Anarcho Syndicalism will be
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overrun by free riders, forcing the syndicalists to use
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statist and eventually totalitarian measures, as happened
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in the end in Catalonia, but not anarcho capitalism.
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It is likely that an Anarcho Capitalist defense against a
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large scale threat would be inefficient, costly,
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destructive, and bloody, compared to the defense mounted by
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a more centrally organized form of social order. This is
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however a different issue to the free rider problem,
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though closely related.
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An anarcho capitalist defense against a large scale threat
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would very likely resemble the defense of America against
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the British during the revolutionary war. The British
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could go where they pleased and destroy whatever they
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wished, but were unable to obtain political control by so
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doing.
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