textfiles/politics/SPUNK/sp000272.txt

OBVIOUSLY A PROVOCATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
by Mikhail Tsovma

Two days after the succesful storm of the parliament in Moscow
gunshots are still to be heard around Moscow and this "obvious fact"
of the existence of Communist fighters and "snipers" pushes people to
embrace the martial law, the curfew and police and military troops
loyal to president Yeltsin as the saviors of peace and calmness of
Muscovites. This situation, of course, is exactly what Yeltsin was
looking for when he started his coup d'etat on September 21st and
there are clear signs that he or at least somebody from his team were
the people who worked hard to reach this result.
Communist fighters and "snipers" somehow leaked through the lines of
police and troops surrounding the White House on the day that the
troops started the storm of the parliament and caused many deaths
among the government troops and civilians, the media reports. Gunfire
is heard in various districts of Moscow, but it is quite likely that,
like in Moscow's northern suburb of Otradnoye (in the evening of
October 5), policemen are just firing machine guns into the air. What
is it if not an outright provocation designed to make people believe
they need more law and order.
Even the Moscow-based English-language periodical Moscow Tribune
which seems to undoubtedly believe in the stories about Communist
snipers published several materials revealing how the forces of law
and order were too reluctant when dealing with the rioters on Sunday,
October 3 during the clashes on Oktyabrskaya and Smolenskaya Square.
"we've got other goals. We have other orders", - a police officer is
reported to say when asked why the police, at least 120 strong, had
acted slowly and done so little to stop 40 rioters, when the clashes
were just beginning. (John Helmer, Moscow Crisis: The First Spark,
Moscow Tribune, Oct.5.)
Sometime after when the riot was gathering its strength Muscovites
witnessed demonstrators forcing police to retreat, attacking them
with their own equipment and fighting their way over the Moscow river
and across the Ring Road to parliament. (Reuters, Oct.3, 14:54.) The
police troops that were blocking the bridge across the Moscow River
were rather poorly equiped (helmets, shields and rubber batons only)
and stood in the line one-man thick only. It's worth mentioning that
during less dramatic oppositional demonstrations in Moscow police
forces were much broader represented and were acting much more
fearlessly, managing to stop the demonstrators where and when needed.
An hour and a half after the beginning of the demonstration (time
that is usually more than enough for the police to predict the
movement of the demonstrators and block the streets where needed)
police troops once again were defeated on Smolenskaya Square not far
from the White House.
These victories inspired the opposition to storm the TV centre later
in the evening, which somehow appeared to be unprotected. Soon after
the beginning of the storm Yeltsin declared a state of emergency in
Moscow, the government declared that it has been forced to use force
"to end the actions of political adventurists an IS DOING EVERYTHING
POSSIBLE TO AVERT MASS BLOODSHED". (Reuters, Oct.3, 17:51 and 19:04).
At 19:56 Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov blamed "bandits" for the deaths of
two policemen and two interior ministry soldiers and the media
reported that troops loyal to president were brought to Moscow.

WHO WERE THE SNIPERS?

One of  the keystones  of the media campaign on October 4 were "the
snipers", that  is armed  putchists who spread all over  the city and
whose numbers it was impossible to guess. One  of the doctors who was
evacuating the injured from the  parliament was  interviewed by
Russian TV  and said that  there was a considerable number of people
shot near the  White House  in the  morning and during the day right
in   their  hearts,  necks  and  heads.  This  was presented by  the
media  as the evidence of the crimes of the putschists.  In fact  it
is,  but  it  appears  more grounded to  say that these were the
people killed by the KGB and  special police  troops loyal  to the
government. Though there  were quite a lot of arms in the White House
there were hardly any "snipers", that is people specially trained in
shooting, among  its defenders.  It  is  more probable that  those
who  were  shot  were  shot  by  the snipers of  KGB. (During  the
August  1991 coup there were much worries  about whether these
special KGB troops will take the  side of  Yeltsin or  not.) Since
none of these special troops  declared their loyalty to the
parliament, it's hardly so that the Communist "snipers" killed people
in dozens around the parliament.
Witnesses that were among the spectators of the storm of the White
House on Oct.4 report that there were government snipers who were
shooting "in all directions" (Moscow Tribune, Oct.5) and particularly
civilians. October 6 issue of Izvestiya, Russia's biggest newspaper,
features a story "Troops Near The White House Shot Everything That
Moves" describing how the soldiers started shooting at the windows
and roofs of buildings around the parliament if they saw anybody
moving there. This went on for about two days and none of the
specially trained anti-terrorist detachments of KGB were involved in
the fight against the mythical snipers.
During the "sniper incident" on Novy Arbat (the only one described in
the media as far as I know) soldiers from APCs shot in various
directions, including the house on the embankment of the Moscow River
near the parliament where dozens of people and TV crews gathered to
see the fight. After the people on Novy Arbat tried to escape into
one of the courtyards they were met by gunshots from the neighboring
streets and the windows of the houses that composed the courtyard -
the area was totally in control of the police troops and there were
no "Communist fighters" there.

It is  also interesting  to learn  how it  happened  that
considerable numbers  of armed  people  leaked  from  the White House
and spread  around the  city. The parliament was blocked from all
sides and since its defenders didn't have tanks  it was  almost
impossible  for  them  to  get out... until  they were  let out  by
the  government. The story about "unprofessional actions of the
police and the military" is  an old  one and  it is  usually used by
the authorities to  justify more  repression and  the use  of more
troops.  This is  what  happened  during  the  clash between
communists  and the police on the 1st of May this year. This  is
what  happened  on  October  3  when  the authorities let the
opposition  "defeat" special police troops on  the streets  of
Moscow.  This is  probably how they provoked more violence during the
storm of the White House.
Currently the media reports dozens of cases when journalists were
arrested by the forces of law and order, severely beaten up, held in
Lefortovo KGB prison (together with the leaders of parliament and
dozens of civilians, including children), their films exposed.
(Izvestiya, October 6.) I doubt that any of the policemen or military
will be punished for these actions - they feel that this is their
time and that they can do whatever they want without being punished
or anything like that. This is what they were doing for years, but
what's going on now is just outrageous.
And it's not just the police and the military since every other high-
rank "democrat" is trying to make revenge on his opponents. Yeltsin
had his fun destroying the paliament, Moscow's mayor Luzhkov gladly
witnessed (and sanctioned, I'm sure) arrests and beatings of Moscow
City Soviet deputees that bothered him a lot about the legal grounds
of his multiple political and business activities. Heads of local
administrations are disbanding troublesome Soviets in their regions.
In the situation where there are virtually no political organizations
that really represent the interests of different social groups,
Soviets were almost the only opposition to the governmental course
(though the one that can be called the real opposition), but with
them being disbanded, oppositional organizations and papers closed,
and martial law and censorship introduced, the road for Yeltsin's
triumphant elections is clean. Long live the real freedom of choice,
the choice between the Big Brother and yourself!

POSTSCRIPT

Vecherniya Moskva, Moscow evening paper on October 6, reported that
none of president's decrees implemented censorship and that the
censorship that existed was dictated by the needs of the moment and
that they won't work anymore. Nezavisimaya gazeta, one of the pro-
democratic, pro-Yeltsin papers appeared on that day with about half a
page of blank space plus some published informations lacking the
starting sentences. The editor-in-chief of histerically pro-
governmental Moskovsky Komsomolets said on TV that blank spaces in
some of the papers is he fault of the editors. He also went as far as
to declare that there will be no blank spaces in his paper because
they publish the truth and nothing else but the truth and the rtuth
can't be censored. Do you love me, Moskovsky Komsomolets? Yes, I love
you, Big Brother!

------- End of Forwarded Message




Russian Labor Review Has A New Address

November 16, 1993

Dear Friends,

Russian Labor Review has experienced some problems in distribution
of its first two issues, but has reorganized its distribution
system to overcome these. For any of you who may have experienced
delays in delivery or non-delivery, we apologize. If you have
experienced any difficulty in your subscription, or have any other
questions, please write or email to the new U.S. address below.

PLEASE USE THIS NEW ADDRESS, and change your address books
accordingly. The new address for international subscriptions is:

Russian Labor Review, P.O. Box 8461, Berkeley, CA 94707; Tel:
510-489-8554; Fax:  510-471-4454; Email:rlrsf@igc.apc.org.

This address should be used for all international correspondence
and subscriptions.

For those of you unfamiliar with Russian Labor Review (RLR), it is
an attractive new quarterly English language magazine, published
in Moscow by the KAS-KOR Labor Information Center, covering the
events and debates in the workers' movement throughout the ex-USSR
in a comprehensive way. RLR is thoroughly non-sectarian, with
articles from a wide variety of viewpoints. For any one at all
interested in the ex-USSR or the international labor movement,
it's a must.  I reproduce a subscription blurb below.

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Subscribe to Russian Labor Review!

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RLR is also looking for library subscriptions, as well as
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International Coordinator

Russian Labor Review

Addendum:

The Russian address is still current:  Russian Labor Review, P.O.
Box 16, 129642 Moscow, Russia/CIS; Tel:(095) 921-0655;
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The French address printed in previous issues of the magazine
should be used for France only and the old U.S. address should NOT
be used.




/* Written  6:39 pm  Feb  3, 1994 by glas:kaskor in web:glasnost.news */
/* ---------- "Unemploument in Russia" ---------- */
From: kaskor (Cyrill A. Buketov)
Subject: Unemploument in Russia

/* Written  6:38 pm  Feb  3, 1994 by kaskor@glas.apc.org in glas:labr.cis */
/* ---------- "Unemploument in Russia" ---------- */
#UNEMPLOYMENT IN RUSSIA: OFFICIALS HIDE THE REALITY 
#By Jane Dillendorf
#MOSCOW -- "The problem of unemployment in Russia is no big deal!"
This is the conclusion you might draw if you were to look no
further than the official figures. According to statistics issued by 
the Russian Federal Employment Service at the end of January, there 
are now only 835,000 jobless people in the country -- barely 1 per 
cent of the workforce. 
#However, statistics can be made to hide reality as well as to reveal 
it. In this case, the official statisticians have performed a 
masterwork, reducing the country's unemployment rate to around a tenth 
of its probable level. 
#Russia today is one of the world's centres of concealed unemployment. 
The mechanisms involved in this phenomenon are simple. Enterprises 
which cannot maintain production at previous levels pay their 
employees a fraction of their usual wages and send them on forced 
vacations. The length of the stand-down and the payment made are 
totally up to the enterprise management. 
#There are other types of concealed unemployment as well: shortened
workweeks or workdays, or keeping employees at their workplaces but
giving them almost nothing to do.
#For the workers involved, this ``pseudo-employment'' is obviously 
better than outright joblessness. But the situation has a disturbing 
side, since it mystifies the reality and allows workers to avoid 
taking action to force changes.  
#Providing a firm estimate of the extent of concealed unemployment is 
difficult. The Russian State Committee on Statistics, however, cites a 
figure of "up to 12 million", which together with the officially 
registered unemployed suggests a total of about 13 million workers who 
do not have real full-time jobs.
#This is about 18 per cent of the Russian workforce -- closer to what 
you would expect in a country gripped by catastrophic depression. The 
only reason the figure is not far higher is the continuing support of 
state and many privatised enterprises by the government. Cheap state
credits are the only thing saving many firms from bankruptcy.
#Of the people who lose their jobs, large numbers never register with
an employment bureau. Part of the reason is suspiciousness of the new
structures. In the ``good old days'' the system of labour bureaus
provided something closer to compulsion than help. In the city of
Saratov on the Volga, for example, two-thirds of unemployed women
refused the help of the service's psychologists.
#Many Russians simply do not know what employment services do, or
where to find them. People are ignorant of their rights, set out in
the Law on Employment of 1991, and often have no idea that this law
exists.
#The employment bureaus very often lack the money to pay all the
registered jobless the tiny benefits that are available. For people
who cannot survive without these sums, the situation means hours of
standing in line, frequently in snow or rain. In these circumstances,
it is difficult for people to have faith in the system.
#Of the registered unemployed, no fewer than 75 per cent are women, 
more than half of them with higher education. People aged from 16 to 
29 make up 30 per cent of the total jobless. Among unemployed youth, 
almost every third person has just graduated from an institution of 
higher or special education. Despite alarming forecasts, former 
military personnel and immigrants -- often refugees from other 
countries of the former Soviet Union -- have not made a major impact 
on the jobless figures.
#The economic reasons underlying job cuts vary from region to region.
The conversion of military to civilian production has been a major 
factor in the north-west of Russia and in the Urals. The severance of 
ties between former Soviet republics has had a drastic effect in 
central European Russia and in the North Caucasus.
#The future prospects for employment depend heavily on the economic
policies followed by the new government. Today as in the past the
authorities have two choices. Should they keep aiding unprofitable
enterprises, artificially increasing the amount of pseudo-employment?
Or should they proceed to a new stage of reforms even if this
creates a whole constellation of problems?
#If the second option is chosen, the Federal Employment Service
predicts that open unemployment will reach at least five million by
the end of 1994. Until now only a handful of enterprises have been
declared bankrupt, but economists are predicting that use of the
bankruptcy legislation will become commonplace in the next six
months.
#If, as now seems likely, the new Russian government continues 
providing cheap credits to cash-strapped industries, the rise in the 
number of jobless will not be so rapid. But the increase is unlikely 
to be halted; the steady worsening of the employment situation seen 
during 1993 can be expected to continue.
#Another feature of the Russian labour market in future years will be
large numbers of chronically unemployed people. This reflects the
striking discrepancy between the skills of job seekers and the type
of jobs on offer. Ninety per cent of vacancies today are for
unskilled manual labour, while around half the unemployed have
higher or specialised secondary education.
#The peculiarities of the Russian ``propiska'' (residence permit)
system make it difficult for people who are looking for
jobs to move to other cities. Also, Russia suffers from an acute
housing shortage, meaning that migrant job seekers often have no
chance of finding accommodation.
#Until now, many newly jobless people have been able to find
employment -- often highly unstable -- in the new sector of private 
trade. But new taxes introduced in 1994 are expected to make a great 
deal of this activity unprofitable.
#It is hard even to imagine what the employment services could do if
they were faced with a 13-million-strong army of jobless. In 1993
they managed to help only 840,000 Russians.
#Meanwhile, the official figure of ``one per cent unemployed'' stands
as a symbol of the way the Russian authorities prefer to deny the
problem rather than to seek ways of counteracting it.
=====================================================
Spread by KAS-KOR Labour Information, Education & Research Centre
Moscow, 01/01/1994. Ph: 7-095-9210655 E-mail: kaskor@glas.apc.org