199 lines
12 KiB
Plaintext
199 lines
12 KiB
Plaintext
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In >Dayton Daily News< May 29, 1992
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COMMUNITY POLICING IN DAYTON:
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MORE FLASH THAN SUBSTANCE?
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Dean Lovelace and Gordon Welty
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A community gathering was held on May 3 at College Hill
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Community Church to discuss the acquittal of Rodney King's
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assailants and its aftermath in Los Angeles. On that occa-
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sion, Mayor Clay Dixon acknowledged that Dayton has in the past
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had problems with police brutality. But he was reassured be-
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cause, as he indicated, "Dayton now has in place community polic-
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ing." Is community policing a promising development in the
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history of Dayton's troubled police department? Or is this just
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another weak reed -- like the earlier Civilian Review Board, with
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no real community-based component -- which will easily bend in
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the face of the next onslaught of official violence?
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It is worth recalling that the January 11, 1992 >Los Angeles
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Times< reported that Police Chief Daryl Gates had taken personal
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control of the Community Policing Project in Los Angeles. This
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project was one outcome of the Christopher Commission's inquiry
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into the Rodney King beating. It proved a weak reed, indeed.
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Rodney King was not the first victim of police brutality and
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blind justice, nor will he be the last. African-American commu-
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nities are always at the brink of rebellion, and a spark of
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injustice can easily ignite an explosion of rage. The African-
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American community has been plagued with "Black on Black" crime
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that receives little attention until it spreads beyond African-
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American neighborhoods. Community policing has been offered as a
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remedy to this problem also.
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Many cities have experimented with various forms of "commu-
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nity policing" -- by the end of 1990 it was estimated that there
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were more than 300 such programs across the nation. Dayton is
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one such city. Police Chief James Newby proposed a community
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policing project for Dayton as early as November 9, 1990. This
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followed the infamous "Iron-Gate Case" where David Greer was
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burned by several Dayton police officers on January 12, 1990.
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However, these Community Policing programs have yet to prove
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their effectiveness. As Hubert Williams of the Police Foundation
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put it on BET's "Lead Story" on February 2, 1992, "there is no
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documentation that community policing reduces crime." What
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evidence is there about the effectiveness of Dayton's project?
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After all, the test of effectiveness is to increase the sense of
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security of the citizens, the community.
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Let us first consider community need, and then the official
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response. We have just completed analysis of data from a tele-
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phone survey of Dayton residents which relates to both these
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issues. This survey was completed in early March 1992, randomly
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sampling more than 210 households -- some located inside and some
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outside the target neighborhoods of Dayton's Community Policing
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program as identified in the >Dayton Daily News< (January 29,
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1992). Of the respondents, all were over 18 years of age, and
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57% were female. 37 % were African American, 60 % White, and 3 %
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other. 58 % were married, of which 60 % had been married for
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more than a decade. 53 % had children in the home. 76 %
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had lived at this address for five or more years.
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Let us consider the community's need. It is axiomatic in
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police-community relations that citizens are less likely to
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resort to their own security measures, if the police are able to
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solve the citizens' problems. In Dayton, as in many cities
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around the nation, citizens perceive their own community's secu-
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rity problems as fairly serious. In our study, for example, the
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majority of the respondents (62.5 %) said they considered the
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crime problem in their own Dayton neighborhood to be "somewhat
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serious." By contrast, 10 % responded "very serious," and 25 %
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responded "not very serious."
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Furthermore, 48 % of the sample indicated their own Dayton
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household had been criminally victimized during the past three
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years -- the most prevalent crime reported was theft (37.8 %),
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followed by vandalism (20.9 %). Moreover, the citizens feared
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drug-related crime even more than vandalism, and assault even
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more than theft, even though their actual reportage of these
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crimes in Dayton was not as prevalent.
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The citizens' behavior corresponds to their perceptions. In
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light of these experiences as victims, and these fears about
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crime, Dayton residents would be expected to resort to their own
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security measures. And indeed, a majority of our respondents
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indicated they had extra locks on doors (69 %), locks on windows
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(61 %), and had a gun (51 %). A minority of the respondents
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indicated they had an electronic home security system (35 %),
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door sensors (21 %), or a guard dog (17 %). These latter securi-
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ty measures are, of course, more expensive than locks or guns.
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Finally, two-thirds of the respondents stated that their neigh-
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bors also had some of these security measures. Thus a substan-
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tial portion of Dayton residents are incurring an additional
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expense on top of paying their local tax dollars, in an effort to
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ensure the security of their own homes.
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Most disturbing, perhaps, is the finding that more than half
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of our respondents said they had a gun or guns in their home for
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protection. This availability of weapons is directly related to
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the incidence of violence involving weapons. And adults' sanc-
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tioning of weapons for protection is directly related to the
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prevalence of youth bearing weapons in school, etc. As we re-
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flect back on the evidence we have presented here, we see that
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Dayton citizens' resorting to their own security measures can be
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traced back to the inability of the police to provide that secu-
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rity, to solve the citizens' problems.
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Let us turn now to the issue of the offical response to
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those needs. Clearly the traditional modes of policing have not
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proved effective in Dayton. What about Community Policing? The
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majority of our respondents (57 %) indicate they have not heard
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of the Community Policing program at all, regardless of where
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they live. This finding is in itself an important reflection of
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the ineffectiveness of the program's implementation.
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Even if the Community Policing program is poorly implement-
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ed, it may be differentially implemented, with greater impact in
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target areas than in other areas.
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We compare the responses of two groups: those who reside
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inside the four target neighborhoods, and those who reside just
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outside the neighborhoods. A significantly larger portion
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of those who reside inside the target neighborhoods indicated
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that they had heard about the Community Policing program (48 %)
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than did those outside (33 %). There are three ways in which
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they could have heard about it.
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We analyse the responses of those 89 Dayton residents who
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indicated that they had heard of the program, in terms of those
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who had read about the program in the newspaper (38 %), those who
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had seen it on TV (32 %), and those who had heard about it from a
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police officer (31 %). We find no statistically significant
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relationship between the three sets of responses. Since the
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three sets are independent, we see that those respondents who
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indicated that they had heard of the Community Policing program
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tended to have received that information from the mass media --
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the newspaper and TV -- rather than from personal interaction.
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This is suggestive that the public relations effort (or marketing
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effort) associated with the Community Policing program is more
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effective than the actual programmatic outreach.
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But any community policing program must amount to more than
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publicity in the newspaper. It must actually enhance the inter-
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action of citizens and police. What is the effectiveness of the
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Community Policing program's outreach effort? Of those 89
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Dayton respondents who have heard about the Community Policing
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program, the majority (53 %) indicate that they have never seen a
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Community Policing officer. This finding is in itself an impor-
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tant reflection of the failure of the program's outreach effort.
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Even if the Community Policing programmatic outreach is
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largely ineffective, it may still be differentially effective,
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with lesser impact outside the target neighborhoods than within
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them. As we shall see, however, the data suggests otherwise.
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As a final step, then, we compare the responses of the 89
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Daytonians who had heard about the Community Policing program,
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broken down into the groups inside and outside the target neigh-
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borhoods. Our findings here are the most striking of the entire
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study. There is no statistically significant difference in the
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portions of those residing inside (45 %) and those residing
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outside the target neighborhoods (50 %) who indicate they have
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ever seen a Community Policing officer.
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As we turn to the analysis of the data, it will be useful to
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distinguish between city-initiated and neighborhood-initiatedpo-
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licing programs. To date, virtually all policing programs in
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Dayton, including the Civilian Review Board (headed by the Police
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Chief) and the Community Policing program, have been city-initi-
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ated, that is reflecting agendas and priorities which are set
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down town, rather than those of the community.
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In the case of the Community Policing program in Dayton, the
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means of undercutting neighborhood initiatives seem quite simple.
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There is a peculiar bureaucratic structure whereby the Community
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Policing officer is subject to a "dual reporting" relationship,
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responsible to one lieutenant in the program structure and at the
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same time to another lieutenant in the district chain of com-
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mand. These officers have not yet discovered "how to serve both
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God and Mammon," hence end up serving only one superior. And
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that tends to be the lieutenant in the traditional line of com-
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mand. In effect, this permits the subversion of any initiative,
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the overturning of any priority, which does not come from
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down town. Little wonder Community Policing programmatic
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outreach is ineffective.
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But it is the citizens' tax dollars which are funding this
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"dual structure," subsidizing this duplication of bureaucratic
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effort, this exercise in ineffectiveness. To what end? All this
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makes sense only if we understand that the Community Policing
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program was initiated as a community relations response to the
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n"Iron-Gate Case." Our data suggest that this program may enhance
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the public relations of the police in Dayton. Improved policing,
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on the other hand? No!
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There are many interpretations and models of community-based
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policing. One feature of any effective program, in our opinion,
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is the primacy of neighborhood initiatives. This would insure
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that neighborhood residents set the agenda, the priorities, and
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the terms of recruitment and deployment of police personnel into
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the target neighborhoods. The primacy of neighborhood initia-
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tives will go a long way toward ensuring that residents feel
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safe and secure in their own community.
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In any case, our study findings reflect upon a comment Mayor
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Dixon made at College Hill: the Rodney King verdict amounts to a
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"wake up call." Dayton must wake up in time for a deep and
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allround policy discussion about policing in general, and commu-
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nity policing in particular.
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----------------------------------------
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DEAN LOVELACE is Past President of the Edgemont Neighborhood
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Coalition, Co-Chair of the Montgomery Co. Rainbow Coalition, and
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Director of Neighborhood Development in the Office of SRD at the
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University of Dayton. GORDON WELTY is Professor of Sociology at
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Wright State University, and a Charter Member of the Rainbow
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Coalition.
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