588 lines
26 KiB
Plaintext
588 lines
26 KiB
Plaintext
....T.........T.........T.........T.........T.........T.........R...............
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THE CASE AGAINST WAITING PERIODS. . . .
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HINCKLEY PLOY EXPOSED
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in much of the propaganda in support of a national waiting
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period, it is alleged that, if such a waiting
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period/background check system had been in place, "John
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Hinckley would have been caught" because "he lied on a federal
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form" when he purchased the revolver used in his attack on
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President Reagan.
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It is further claimed that Hinckley "would have been in
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jail, instead of on his way to Washington, DC " had such a
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background check been conducted.
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These allegations are irrefutably false.
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John Hinckley purchased a total of eight firearms--two.
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38cal. And four. 22cal. Revolvers, as well as two
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rifles--from Aug. 1979 to Jan. 1981. The 22.cal. revolver used
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in his assault on President Reagan was one of the two he
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purchased in October 1980, more than six months before he left
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for Washington, DC. Federal law was Diligently complied with by
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the firearms dealer who filed multiple purchase forms with the
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regional office of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
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after the purchase.
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That purchase, and all previous purchases, were legal. And
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they would have been legal under any "waiting period" scheme
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ever devised.
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At the time of purchase, and up until his attack on the
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President, John Hinckley had no felony record, he had no record
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of mental illness or commitment (no check involves police
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inspection of private conversations with a psychiatrist,) and he
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was using a valid Texas drivers license issued May 23,1979, to
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make his firearms purchases.
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The contention that a background check would have
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"uncovered" the fact that he did not physically reside at the at
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the address listed on his license is a willful distortion of the
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criminal record check made by local police. To the contrary,
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had a check been run and all criminal records been thorough and
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completely available, they would have confirmed that Hinckley
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was not a prohibited person and that his last known address was
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in Lubbock, Texas.
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Simply put, no detection system ever proposed or ever
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devised has mindreading capability. Advocates of the background
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check do a gross dis-service to the nation by distorting the
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truth. No regulatory "gun control" scheme would have prevented
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Hinkley in his determination to carry out the tragic
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assassination attempt on President Reagan.
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PROMISES DOOMED TO FAIL
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Waiting period s fail to reduce crime; yet that failure is
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used as an excuse to impose more restrictive laws. For example,
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beginning with 2-days in 1940, moving to 3-days in 1958, and to
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5-days in 1965, Californias waiting period was raised to 15-days
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in 1976, a longer minimum time than any other state. But this
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gradual increase in the waiting period has not reduced violent
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crime. Between 1965 and 1985, the rate of violent crime per
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100,000 people rose over 170%.
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Yet, the failure of current law was used in 1982 as an
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argument for the passage of the ill-concieved and ill-fated
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Proposition-15, the handgun freeze and registration initiative.
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California voters saw through this deception and soundly
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defeated Proposition 15 by a nearly 2-1 margin.
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While insulting good and honest citizens, the waiting period
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scheme will not keep guns out of the hands of criminals, nor
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will it prevent "crimes of passion. " Indeed, according to
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prominent antigun scholars, Phillip J. Cook and James Blose of
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Duke University, "Ineligible people are less likely to submit to
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the screening process than are eligible people. . . Because
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these people find ways of circumventing the screening system
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entirely. . . " (The Annals, May 1981)
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The criminals do not obtain their firearms through retail
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channels. This was also confirmed by a survey of felons
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conducted by Profs. James Wright and Peter Rossi of the
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University of Massachusetts, who concluded that retail sales
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play a minor and unimportant role as direct sources of criminal
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handguns.
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Inaccurate and out of date records make citizens more apt
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than criminals to be denied permits. A recent study by the
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Office of Technology Assessment, an arm of Congress, Found that
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almost half of a sample of criminal history records that the FBI
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sent to police, state agencies, banks and other such
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institutions throughout the United States, were incomplete or
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inaccurate. Such inaccuracies could well lead to the denial of
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licences to thousands of reputable citizens under a federal
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registration and licensing system.
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Ironically, a Chicago newspaper in 1983 submitted six
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Illinois licensing application forms to the state in the names
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of such characters as bank robber John Dillinger and Cuban
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revolutionary Che Guevara. Although Illinois has computerized
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registers which are checked in the course of handgun license
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investigations, all the applications were approved except for
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Vito "the Godfather" Corleone whose bogus form included a
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photograph of actor Marlon Brando in his film role.
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A waiting period scheme redirects police from fighting crime
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to the unrewarding task of snooping into the private lives of
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law-abiding citizens buying guns through licensed firearms
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dealers. Such "crime control" schemes merely make our streets
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and homes safer for criminals plying their nafarious trades. A
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November, 1982 U.S. News and World Report cover story on crime
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included an article on the police, subheadlined: It's no wonder
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the forces in blue don't catch more crooks. Their budgets
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continue to get tighter and society keeps giving them extra
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chores." The article went on to note that only 45 officers are
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actually on patrol in the streets of every 100 on duty at a
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given time. And the article pointed out that other studies have
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shown that police now spent only about 15% of their time dealing
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with violent crime. A waiting period/Background check is a
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perfect example of such diversion of police activity.
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Yet, waiting periods have been soft-peddled as fair and
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reasonable, preventive, moderate and acceptable to sportsmen.
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Nothing could be further from the truth. This is a proposal to
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be taken seriously. What do these words really mean?
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FAIR AND REASONABLE?
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Purely and simply, waiting periods begin the step-by-step
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process where the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms
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becomes a privilege.
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Under the waiting period licensing procedures, prospective
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gun owners are presumed to be guilty of crime until a police
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check into their background proves their innocence. Such a
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presumption is repellent to Anglo-American jurisprudence.
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Background checks invite serious violations of the right to
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privacy. Indeed, since most persons who seek psychiatric
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assistance are not legally institutionalized, a thorough
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background check would require the; opening of hitherto private
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medical records to police. And the leading proponents would
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even extend curbs to those with records of arrest followed by
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acquittal, for minor traffic violations, or even for using a gun
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in self-defense.
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Ironically, at the time when there is already uncertainty
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about the propriety of the FBI keeping computerized records in
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the National Crime Information Center on anyone who might
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possibly be a criminal, the waiting period would set into motion
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a system of records on law-abiding citizens who comply with the
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waiting period law. Such recordkeeping amounts to "de facto"
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registration, awaiting only a central computer processing
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capability for complete gun registration, awaiting only a
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central computer processing capability for complete gun
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registration. In Virginia cities, California, Illinois, and
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Pennsylvania, authorities are using waiting periods to establish
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such a system.
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Waiting period schemes impose additional undue burdens on
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law-abiding citizens: they force the applicant to take time off
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from his job, make repeated trips to a licensed firearms dealer
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to legally purchase a firearm, and to pay for the inconvenience
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since the additional paperwork costs to dealers are passed along
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to the consumer.
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And a waiting period/background check costs the citizens of
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the state a tremendous amounts of money for useless bureaucratic
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paperwork and investigation. A study by Cook and Blose (The
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Annuls, May, 1981) found that the FBI's regulations require any
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background investigation request be accompanied by a set of
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fingerprints and that the state criminal records bureau conduct
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a check prior to the ID Divisions search. And the current
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turnaround time for FBI searches is 22 working days. Based on
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these features, they determined that a FBI check is too costly
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and time consuming.
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In addition, waiting periods encourage obstruction by the
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issuing authority. In jurisdictions with waiting periods on the
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books, there are countless cases of "lost" applications, petty
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harassments requiring repeated trips to different offices for
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completion of paperwork, fingerprinting and bureaucratic red
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tape designed to discourage gun ownership.
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In New Jersey, a frequently cited state by anti-gunners, for
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one year the police refused to issue any permits because the FBI
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was refusing to do fingerprint checks on civil matters.
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Authorities there regularly take 90 days-and occasionally much
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longer-to process the application, even though the statue
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requires it be done within 30 days. Moreover, thousands of
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applications have been rejected simply because the police didn't
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want a citizen to have a handgun, even though there was no
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criminal or mental record to justify rejection under the law.
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This is similar to Broward County, Florida, where a large
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percentage of rejected applications were based on traffic
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violations rather than valid bases for denials.
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Such discretionary power by police is opposed by the
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American people because it is abhorrent in a society built on
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freedom. In a nationwide survey by Decision Making Information,
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Inc. , in 1978, the question was asked, "Would you favor or
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oppose a law giving the police the power to decide who may own a
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firearm? " By a margin of more than 2-1 the public was found to
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be against the power police inevitably acquire through waiting
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period/licensing legislation. The U.S. Senare reflected the
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will of the people in 1985, rejecting a waiting period by a 3-1
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margin.
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_________________________________________________________________
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A CRIME PREVENTION TOOL?
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_________________________________________________________________
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Almost half the states-including 64% of the
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population-require background checks/waiting periods on all
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handgun transfers. But, according to Cook and Blose, "there has
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been no convincing empirical demonstration that a police check
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on handgun buyers reduces violent crime rates" (The Annuls, May,
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1981) Indeed, a comparison of states with added or extended
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waiting periods from 1965 to 1985 reveals the ineffectiveness of
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such "crime control" experiments. (see table B)
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_________________________________________________________________
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TABLE B
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1965 1985 %CHANGE
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UNITED STATES 5.1 7.9 +54.9
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New Jersey * 3.2 5.4 +68.8
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increased time
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California (from 2 to 15 days) 4.7 10.5 +123.4
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Connecticut(from 1 to 14 days) 1.6 3.8 +137.5
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Indiana (from 2 to 7 days) 3.5 5.8 +65.7
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Washington (from 2 to 3 days) 2.2 5.2 +136.4
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Wisconsin (from 0 to 2 days) 1.5 2.8 +86.7
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Illinios (from 0 to 1 for long
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guns, 3 for handguns) 5.2 8.0 +53.8
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*New Jersey, a favorite state for waiting period proponents,
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recorded a 69% rise in homicide during those 20 years.
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Homicide rate comparison for the United States as a whole per
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100,000 persons and states with waiting periods for the years
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1965 and 1985 are revealing. (source: FBI Uniform Crime
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Reports, 1965 and 1985)
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_________________________________________________________________
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Based on the 1985 FBI Uniform Crime Reports, there would
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appear to be an inverse relationship between gun availability
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and violent crime. Data from the two states with the greatest
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number of local jurisdictions with waiting periods and/or
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licensing requirement-Virginia and Florida -make clear waiting
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periods and/or licensing have no impact, even allowing for the
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urban nature of most regulatory jurisdictions. (table C and D)
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Willis Booth, a former chief with 40 years of law
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enforcement experience and a lobbyist for the Florida Police
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Chiefs Association succinctly expressed Floridas law
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enforcement's assessment of waiting periods and background
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checks: "I think any working policeman will tell you that the
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crooks already have guns. If a criminal fills out an
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application and sends his application. . . He's the biggest,
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dumbest crook I've ever seen." In 1987, the Florida State
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Legislature subsequently repealed all waiting period ordinances
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in the state.
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_________________________________________________________________
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TABLE C
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violent homicide robbery aggravated
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crime assault
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Virginia as a whole 294.7 7.1 100.2 160.1
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MSA (metropolitan
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statistical areas) 347.6 7.5 133.1 175.8
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MSA Cities/Counties
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with waiting periods
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and/or police permits424.3 9.0 184.5 194.8
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MSA Cities/Counties
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without waiting
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periods and/or
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police permitts 244.9 5.6 64.2 150.2
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The 1985 violent crime rate per 100,000 persons for Virginia,
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the state's Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs), and
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Virginia cities and countries with local waiting periods and/or
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police permits illustrates the higher rates in the later.
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(Sources: FBI Uniform Crime Reports 1985; BATF State Laws and
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Published Ordinances, 1985)
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_________________________________________________________________
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_________________________________________________________________
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TABLE D
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violent homicide robbery aggravated
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crime assault
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Florida as a whole 941.1 11.4 312.4 564.5
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MSAs as a whole 989.8 12.0 336.9 586.6
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MSAs with waiting
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periods and/or
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police permits 1167.5 14.1 460.6 639.8
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MSAs without
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waiting period and/
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or police permits 838.5 10.1 231.7 541.3
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1985 crime data for Florida, which has no statewide "waiting
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period" compares the rate per 100,000 persons for the entire
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state with Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) with
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and without such regulations. Crime rates are consistently
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higher in restrictive cities located in otherwise
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non-restrictive areas.
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In 1987, Virginia and Florida adopted preemption laws
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effectively repealing all the Florida city and county ordinances
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and most of the Virginia ordinances. These data tables are
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valid as of 1985 only.
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_________________________________________________________________
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Indeed, a study of waiting periods by Professors Joseph P.
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Magaddino and Marshall H. Medoff of California State University
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at Long Beach found them to be totally useless in curbing crime.
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Their findings reconfirmed the results of multiple
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regression analyses by Matthew DeZee of Florida State
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University, who favors restrictive gun laws, and by Douglas
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Murray of the University of Wisconsin. They found that waiting
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periods, either alone or in combination with other gun laws,
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were not effective in reducing violent crimes or gun-related
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criminal violence.
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_________________________________________________________________
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PREVENTS CRIMES OF PASSION?
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_________________________________________________________________
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Proponents content "waiting periods" will sharply reduce the
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number of handgun murders committed annually. This information
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is based on misconstrued and outdated FBI data showing 70% of
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all murders involve people who know each other - relatives,
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friends, acquaintances, or neighbors.
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These FBI categories are misleading: Acquaintances can be,
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as Harvard Professor Mark Moore has said, "old but familiar
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enemies, " "neighbors" is defined on the basis of where people
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live, not whether they are friends, enemies or strangers; and
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predatory felonies are often committed in criminals'
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neighborhoods. The area if familiar; escape is easy; the
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criminal doesn't stand out as he might in a socially or racially
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different environment; and he can count on fear of retaliation
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to limit cooperation of victims or witnesses with the police.
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It must be emphasized that murder, including "domestic" and
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"acquaintance" murder, is for the most part not committed by
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decent, law-abiding citizens catalyzed into "murderers" by the
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presence of firearms.
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Indeed, FBI Uniform Crime Reports detailing the
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characteristics of murders (until 1975), studies by the Chicago
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police, the Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency, and the
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annual Homicide Analysis by the New York City Police, show that
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70-80 percent of suspected murderers have criminal careers of
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longstanding. There have been an average of six arrests per
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suspect, half of them for violent crimes. Victims have similar
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records about 50 percent of the time.
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Waiting periods are further based on the false assumption
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that newly purchased firearms are used in murder and other
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violent crimes. Yet, the Police Foundation's FIREARM ABUSE
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(1977) found that only 2.1 percent of handguns traced to all
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crime were less than a month old. And a month is twice as long
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as any state's waiting period.
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In fact, an analysis by James D. Wright of the University of
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Massachusetts suggests that 75-80 percent of gun purchasers
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already own firearms. In the unlikely event that these
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individuals would chose to commit a violent crime, a "waiting
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period" would be irrelevent.
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In addition, the most frequent time for argument-precipitated
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murders is during the 10pm to 3am time frame, when gun shops
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are closed. And studies by the FBI and New York City Police
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Department (NYPD) indicates that about 50 percent of murderers
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are under the influence of Alcohol or drugs at the time of the
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murder- conditions under which the sale of firearms is already
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prohibited by law.
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Waiting periods assume that violent people, deprived of
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ready access to a handgun will not kill. Yet Dr. Marvin
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Wolfgang, the noted criminologist who studied homicide in
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Philadelphia and published PATTERNS IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, found
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that the nature of homicide had little to do with the absence or
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presence of firearms. He noted: "it is the contention of this
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observer that few homicides due to shootings could be avoided
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merely if a firearm were not immediately present, and that the
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offender would select some other weapon to achieve the same
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destructive goal. Probably only in those cases where a felon
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kills a police officer, or vice versa, would homicide be avoided
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in the absence of a firearm. "
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Crimes of "passion" bring into play the plethora of curious
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objects used to commit murder, from brooms to ceramic lamps, and
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especially knives, according to a list of murder weapons used in
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San Francisco and New York between 1973 and 1983.
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The waiting period supposes that the crime of passion is
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some sudden impulse that will pass. But a National Institute of
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Justice (NIJ) study reveals the victim of family violence often
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suffered repeated problems from the same person for months or
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even years, and if not successfully resolved, such incidents
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can eventually result in serious injury or death. Indeed, a
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study conducted in Kansas City indicated that in 90 percent of
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spouse-slayings, there has been at least one prior police call
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regarding wife-beating and in 50 percent of such murders police
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had been called at least five times. Of course, part of the
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problem is that arrests are rarely made on such calls, although
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recent research shows that arrests, coupled with support for the
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victim, may reduce repeated beatings.
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The tragic murder of John Lennon, and the assassination
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attempt on President Reagan renewed the cry for stricter
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"waiting periods." Ironically, Lennon's murderer purchased his
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gun in Hawaii, a state requiring permits to purchase,
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registration and banning the so-called "Saturday Night
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Specials," almost six weeks before committing the crime. And
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President Regan's assailant John Hinckley could have legally
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purchased firearms under a waiting period scheme.
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_________________________________________________________________
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ACCEPTABLE TO SPORTSMEN?
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_________________________________________________________________
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Already, strict gun laws are placed on the nation's 60
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million law-obedient firearms owners under the Gun Control Act
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of 1968 (GCA'68), which requires licensing of manufacturers,
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importers, and dealers; prohibit almost all interstate transfers
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of handguns and requires interstate transfers of rifles and
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shotguns to be through licensed dealers and in compliance with
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the laws of the states where the dealer operates and the buyer
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resides, and even prohibit relatives from giving firearms to
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family members living in different states; prohibit the sale of
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arms or ammunition by a dealer or anyone else to, or the
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acquisition or transportation by, felons, persons under felony
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indictment, fugitives, drug addicts, mental incompetents,
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illegal aliens, dishonorably discharged veterans, those who have
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renounced their U.S. citizenship, and employees of all such
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persons; require licensees to keep records available for BATF
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inspection; prohibits receipt or possession of guns by convicts,
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dishonorably discharged veterans, illegal aliens, the insane,
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persons who have renounced their citizenship; and prohibits the
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importation of many firearms and parts from abroad.
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Yet, these laws have failed to reduce crime, which is much
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higher than when GCA'68 took effect. The solution, according to
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gun control fanatics, is to impose even more restrictive laws on
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the law-abiding.
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A current proposal would have the federal government ask
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local authorities to run background checks in seven days with
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all of the costs to be borne by local departments with the added
|
||
risk of federal prosecution if the local police retained the
|
||
application in their files, and with no standards for approval
|
||
or denial, and no provision for appeal.
|
||
Clearly, restrictive gun laws only penalize the nation's
|
||
law-abiding firearms owners for the violent acts committed by a
|
||
small number of criminals who commit a disproportionately large
|
||
number of crimes. And, regrettably, "gun control" in any form
|
||
diverts and wastes scarce resources which could instead be used
|
||
to support genuine crime control measures.
|
||
The only effect of a waiting period is to deny someone the
|
||
ability to defend him or herself. In San Leandro, California, a
|
||
female single parent was forced to endure 15 days of terror at
|
||
the hands of a maniacal neighbor while she awaited the
|
||
completion of the background check. The day after she was
|
||
allowed to pick up her handgun, she killed her attacker with it.
|
||
Statistically, a waiting period would seem more likely to
|
||
interfere with the estimated 600,000 citizens who use handguns
|
||
for protection each year than with the roughly 100,000 criminals
|
||
who repeatedly misuse handguns - generally acquired by theft or
|
||
from fences, drug dealers, and the black market.
|
||
Yet the Wright-Rossi study found that three-quarters of the
|
||
convicted felons were able to get their most recent handguns
|
||
within a day - despite long criminal records.
|
||
As the WALL STREET JOURNAL noted shortly after the Lennon
|
||
murder: "...the sudden hue and cry for more gun control at such
|
||
times is a kind of cop-out, the sort of cop-out that is part of
|
||
the problem in America."
|
||
"The country knows that something is wrong. Too many are
|
||
turning to crimes of violence. The notion that this can be
|
||
changed by controlling guns, we worry, may be an excuse for
|
||
avoidind the hard work of making our decrepit criminal justice
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
system start to function, and the even harder work of
|
||
buttressing what used to be called the nation's moral fiber. "
|
||
|
||
_________________________________________________________________
|
||
|
||
SENTENCE THE CRIMINAL?
|
||
_________________________________________________________________
|
||
|
||
It is clear that the way to curb violent crime is to punish
|
||
the criminal. Studies suggest that 75-85 percent of urban
|
||
violence is perpetrated by career criminals, and 30-35 percent
|
||
of robbery and murder is committed by persons on some form of
|
||
conditional release - bail, parole, probation, suspended
|
||
sentence. To combat crime, America must address this problem of
|
||
recidivism and the "revolving door" system of justice.
|
||
Over a ten year period after the 1975 adoption of a
|
||
mandatory penalty for using a firearm to commit a violent crime,
|
||
Virginia's homicide rate fell 38 percent and robbery declined 28
|
||
percent. A 1974 Arizona law saw homicide fall 17 percent and
|
||
robbery 28 percent. While the West South Central region of the
|
||
United States saw robbery rise 21 percent, respectively, a 1975
|
||
Arkansas mandatory penalty statue viewed a 30 percent decrease
|
||
in homicide and a 15 percent decrease in robbery. South
|
||
Carolina recorded an astounding 38 percent decrease in homicide
|
||
and 15 percent decrease in robbery after adopting a mandatory
|
||
penalty.
|
||
Clearly, instead of imposing further penalties - in the form
|
||
of "waiting periods" and additional assaults on the civil rights
|
||
of law-abiding gun owners and gun-purchasers, the proper
|
||
approach is to implement mandatory punishment for the criminal
|
||
abuser of firearms.
|
||
The violent crime rate has decreased in part since 1980,
|
||
because the number of persons in American prisons has increased
|
||
from 315,000 in 1980 to 503,600 in 1985.
|
||
The remedy, or any appropriate penalty, must be after the
|
||
commission of an offense if the presumption of innocence is to
|
||
be preserved, indeed, if democracy itself is to survive.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
This information and additional information is available by
|
||
writing the;
|
||
|
||
NRA INSTITUTE FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
|
||
1600 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
|
||
Washington, DC 20036
|
||
|