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THE CASE AGAINST WAITING PERIODS. . . .
HINCKLEY PLOY EXPOSED
in much of the propaganda in support of a national waiting
period, it is alleged that, if such a waiting
period/background check system had been in place, "John
Hinckley would have been caught" because "he lied on a federal
form" when he purchased the revolver used in his attack on
President Reagan.
It is further claimed that Hinckley "would have been in
jail, instead of on his way to Washington, DC " had such a
background check been conducted.
These allegations are irrefutably false.
John Hinckley purchased a total of eight firearms--two.
38cal. And four. 22cal. Revolvers, as well as two
rifles--from Aug. 1979 to Jan. 1981. The 22.cal. revolver used
in his assault on President Reagan was one of the two he
purchased in October 1980, more than six months before he left
for Washington, DC. Federal law was Diligently complied with by
the firearms dealer who filed multiple purchase forms with the
regional office of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
after the purchase.
That purchase, and all previous purchases, were legal. And
they would have been legal under any "waiting period" scheme
ever devised.
At the time of purchase, and up until his attack on the
President, John Hinckley had no felony record, he had no record
of mental illness or commitment (no check involves police
inspection of private conversations with a psychiatrist,) and he
was using a valid Texas drivers license issued May 23,1979, to
make his firearms purchases.
The contention that a background check would have
"uncovered" the fact that he did not physically reside at the at
the address listed on his license is a willful distortion of the
criminal record check made by local police. To the contrary,
had a check been run and all criminal records been thorough and
completely available, they would have confirmed that Hinckley
was not a prohibited person and that his last known address was
in Lubbock, Texas.
Simply put, no detection system ever proposed or ever
devised has mindreading capability. Advocates of the background
check do a gross dis-service to the nation by distorting the
truth. No regulatory "gun control" scheme would have prevented
Hinkley in his determination to carry out the tragic
assassination attempt on President Reagan.
PROMISES DOOMED TO FAIL
Waiting period s fail to reduce crime; yet that failure is
used as an excuse to impose more restrictive laws. For example,
beginning with 2-days in 1940, moving to 3-days in 1958, and to
5-days in 1965, Californias waiting period was raised to 15-days
in 1976, a longer minimum time than any other state. But this
gradual increase in the waiting period has not reduced violent
crime. Between 1965 and 1985, the rate of violent crime per
100,000 people rose over 170%.
Yet, the failure of current law was used in 1982 as an
argument for the passage of the ill-concieved and ill-fated
Proposition-15, the handgun freeze and registration initiative.
California voters saw through this deception and soundly
defeated Proposition 15 by a nearly 2-1 margin.
While insulting good and honest citizens, the waiting period
scheme will not keep guns out of the hands of criminals, nor
will it prevent "crimes of passion. " Indeed, according to
prominent antigun scholars, Phillip J. Cook and James Blose of
Duke University, "Ineligible people are less likely to submit to
the screening process than are eligible people. . . Because
these people find ways of circumventing the screening system
entirely. . . " (The Annals, May 1981)
The criminals do not obtain their firearms through retail
channels. This was also confirmed by a survey of felons
conducted by Profs. James Wright and Peter Rossi of the
University of Massachusetts, who concluded that retail sales
play a minor and unimportant role as direct sources of criminal
handguns.
Inaccurate and out of date records make citizens more apt
than criminals to be denied permits. A recent study by the
Office of Technology Assessment, an arm of Congress, Found that
almost half of a sample of criminal history records that the FBI
sent to police, state agencies, banks and other such
institutions throughout the United States, were incomplete or
inaccurate. Such inaccuracies could well lead to the denial of
licences to thousands of reputable citizens under a federal
registration and licensing system.
Ironically, a Chicago newspaper in 1983 submitted six
Illinois licensing application forms to the state in the names
of such characters as bank robber John Dillinger and Cuban
revolutionary Che Guevara. Although Illinois has computerized
registers which are checked in the course of handgun license
investigations, all the applications were approved except for
Vito "the Godfather" Corleone whose bogus form included a
photograph of actor Marlon Brando in his film role.
A waiting period scheme redirects police from fighting crime
to the unrewarding task of snooping into the private lives of
law-abiding citizens buying guns through licensed firearms
dealers. Such "crime control" schemes merely make our streets
and homes safer for criminals plying their nafarious trades. A
November, 1982 U.S. News and World Report cover story on crime
included an article on the police, subheadlined: It's no wonder
the forces in blue don't catch more crooks. Their budgets
continue to get tighter and society keeps giving them extra
chores." The article went on to note that only 45 officers are
actually on patrol in the streets of every 100 on duty at a
given time. And the article pointed out that other studies have
shown that police now spent only about 15% of their time dealing
with violent crime. A waiting period/Background check is a
perfect example of such diversion of police activity.
Yet, waiting periods have been soft-peddled as fair and
reasonable, preventive, moderate and acceptable to sportsmen.
Nothing could be further from the truth. This is a proposal to
be taken seriously. What do these words really mean?
FAIR AND REASONABLE?
Purely and simply, waiting periods begin the step-by-step
process where the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms
becomes a privilege.
Under the waiting period licensing procedures, prospective
gun owners are presumed to be guilty of crime until a police
check into their background proves their innocence. Such a
presumption is repellent to Anglo-American jurisprudence.
Background checks invite serious violations of the right to
privacy. Indeed, since most persons who seek psychiatric
assistance are not legally institutionalized, a thorough
background check would require the; opening of hitherto private
medical records to police. And the leading proponents would
even extend curbs to those with records of arrest followed by
acquittal, for minor traffic violations, or even for using a gun
in self-defense.
Ironically, at the time when there is already uncertainty
about the propriety of the FBI keeping computerized records in
the National Crime Information Center on anyone who might
possibly be a criminal, the waiting period would set into motion
a system of records on law-abiding citizens who comply with the
waiting period law. Such recordkeeping amounts to "de facto"
registration, awaiting only a central computer processing
capability for complete gun registration, awaiting only a
central computer processing capability for complete gun
registration. In Virginia cities, California, Illinois, and
Pennsylvania, authorities are using waiting periods to establish
such a system.
Waiting period schemes impose additional undue burdens on
law-abiding citizens: they force the applicant to take time off
from his job, make repeated trips to a licensed firearms dealer
to legally purchase a firearm, and to pay for the inconvenience
since the additional paperwork costs to dealers are passed along
to the consumer.
And a waiting period/background check costs the citizens of
the state a tremendous amounts of money for useless bureaucratic
paperwork and investigation. A study by Cook and Blose (The
Annuls, May, 1981) found that the FBI's regulations require any
background investigation request be accompanied by a set of
fingerprints and that the state criminal records bureau conduct
a check prior to the ID Divisions search. And the current
turnaround time for FBI searches is 22 working days. Based on
these features, they determined that a FBI check is too costly
and time consuming.
In addition, waiting periods encourage obstruction by the
issuing authority. In jurisdictions with waiting periods on the
books, there are countless cases of "lost" applications, petty
harassments requiring repeated trips to different offices for
completion of paperwork, fingerprinting and bureaucratic red
tape designed to discourage gun ownership.
In New Jersey, a frequently cited state by anti-gunners, for
one year the police refused to issue any permits because the FBI
was refusing to do fingerprint checks on civil matters.
Authorities there regularly take 90 days-and occasionally much
longer-to process the application, even though the statue
requires it be done within 30 days. Moreover, thousands of
applications have been rejected simply because the police didn't
want a citizen to have a handgun, even though there was no
criminal or mental record to justify rejection under the law.
This is similar to Broward County, Florida, where a large
percentage of rejected applications were based on traffic
violations rather than valid bases for denials.
Such discretionary power by police is opposed by the
American people because it is abhorrent in a society built on
freedom. In a nationwide survey by Decision Making Information,
Inc. , in 1978, the question was asked, "Would you favor or
oppose a law giving the police the power to decide who may own a
firearm? " By a margin of more than 2-1 the public was found to
be against the power police inevitably acquire through waiting
period/licensing legislation. The U.S. Senare reflected the
will of the people in 1985, rejecting a waiting period by a 3-1
margin.
_________________________________________________________________
A CRIME PREVENTION TOOL?
_________________________________________________________________
Almost half the states-including 64% of the
population-require background checks/waiting periods on all
handgun transfers. But, according to Cook and Blose, "there has
been no convincing empirical demonstration that a police check
on handgun buyers reduces violent crime rates" (The Annuls, May,
1981) Indeed, a comparison of states with added or extended
waiting periods from 1965 to 1985 reveals the ineffectiveness of
such "crime control" experiments. (see table B)
_________________________________________________________________
TABLE B
1965 1985 %CHANGE
UNITED STATES 5.1 7.9 +54.9
New Jersey * 3.2 5.4 +68.8
increased time
California (from 2 to 15 days) 4.7 10.5 +123.4
Connecticut(from 1 to 14 days) 1.6 3.8 +137.5
Indiana (from 2 to 7 days) 3.5 5.8 +65.7
Washington (from 2 to 3 days) 2.2 5.2 +136.4
Wisconsin (from 0 to 2 days) 1.5 2.8 +86.7
Illinios (from 0 to 1 for long
guns, 3 for handguns) 5.2 8.0 +53.8
*New Jersey, a favorite state for waiting period proponents,
recorded a 69% rise in homicide during those 20 years.
Homicide rate comparison for the United States as a whole per
100,000 persons and states with waiting periods for the years
1965 and 1985 are revealing. (source: FBI Uniform Crime
Reports, 1965 and 1985)
_________________________________________________________________
Based on the 1985 FBI Uniform Crime Reports, there would
appear to be an inverse relationship between gun availability
and violent crime. Data from the two states with the greatest
number of local jurisdictions with waiting periods and/or
licensing requirement-Virginia and Florida -make clear waiting
periods and/or licensing have no impact, even allowing for the
urban nature of most regulatory jurisdictions. (table C and D)
Willis Booth, a former chief with 40 years of law
enforcement experience and a lobbyist for the Florida Police
Chiefs Association succinctly expressed Floridas law
enforcement's assessment of waiting periods and background
checks: "I think any working policeman will tell you that the
crooks already have guns. If a criminal fills out an
application and sends his application. . . He's the biggest,
dumbest crook I've ever seen." In 1987, the Florida State
Legislature subsequently repealed all waiting period ordinances
in the state.
_________________________________________________________________
TABLE C
violent homicide robbery aggravated
crime assault
Virginia as a whole 294.7 7.1 100.2 160.1
MSA (metropolitan
statistical areas) 347.6 7.5 133.1 175.8
MSA Cities/Counties
with waiting periods
and/or police permits424.3 9.0 184.5 194.8
MSA Cities/Counties
without waiting
periods and/or
police permitts 244.9 5.6 64.2 150.2
The 1985 violent crime rate per 100,000 persons for Virginia,
the state's Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs), and
Virginia cities and countries with local waiting periods and/or
police permits illustrates the higher rates in the later.
(Sources: FBI Uniform Crime Reports 1985; BATF State Laws and
Published Ordinances, 1985)
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
TABLE D
violent homicide robbery aggravated
crime assault
Florida as a whole 941.1 11.4 312.4 564.5
MSAs as a whole 989.8 12.0 336.9 586.6
MSAs with waiting
periods and/or
police permits 1167.5 14.1 460.6 639.8
MSAs without
waiting period and/
or police permits 838.5 10.1 231.7 541.3
1985 crime data for Florida, which has no statewide "waiting
period" compares the rate per 100,000 persons for the entire
state with Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) with
and without such regulations. Crime rates are consistently
higher in restrictive cities located in otherwise
non-restrictive areas.
In 1987, Virginia and Florida adopted preemption laws
effectively repealing all the Florida city and county ordinances
and most of the Virginia ordinances. These data tables are
valid as of 1985 only.
_________________________________________________________________
Indeed, a study of waiting periods by Professors Joseph P.
Magaddino and Marshall H. Medoff of California State University
at Long Beach found them to be totally useless in curbing crime.
Their findings reconfirmed the results of multiple
regression analyses by Matthew DeZee of Florida State
University, who favors restrictive gun laws, and by Douglas
Murray of the University of Wisconsin. They found that waiting
periods, either alone or in combination with other gun laws,
were not effective in reducing violent crimes or gun-related
criminal violence.
_________________________________________________________________
PREVENTS CRIMES OF PASSION?
_________________________________________________________________
Proponents content "waiting periods" will sharply reduce the
number of handgun murders committed annually. This information
is based on misconstrued and outdated FBI data showing 70% of
all murders involve people who know each other - relatives,
friends, acquaintances, or neighbors.
These FBI categories are misleading: Acquaintances can be,
as Harvard Professor Mark Moore has said, "old but familiar
enemies, " "neighbors" is defined on the basis of where people
live, not whether they are friends, enemies or strangers; and
predatory felonies are often committed in criminals'
neighborhoods. The area if familiar; escape is easy; the
criminal doesn't stand out as he might in a socially or racially
different environment; and he can count on fear of retaliation
to limit cooperation of victims or witnesses with the police.
It must be emphasized that murder, including "domestic" and
"acquaintance" murder, is for the most part not committed by
decent, law-abiding citizens catalyzed into "murderers" by the
presence of firearms.
Indeed, FBI Uniform Crime Reports detailing the
characteristics of murders (until 1975), studies by the Chicago
police, the Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency, and the
annual Homicide Analysis by the New York City Police, show that
70-80 percent of suspected murderers have criminal careers of
longstanding. There have been an average of six arrests per
suspect, half of them for violent crimes. Victims have similar
records about 50 percent of the time.
Waiting periods are further based on the false assumption
that newly purchased firearms are used in murder and other
violent crimes. Yet, the Police Foundation's FIREARM ABUSE
(1977) found that only 2.1 percent of handguns traced to all
crime were less than a month old. And a month is twice as long
as any state's waiting period.
In fact, an analysis by James D. Wright of the University of
Massachusetts suggests that 75-80 percent of gun purchasers
already own firearms. In the unlikely event that these
individuals would chose to commit a violent crime, a "waiting
period" would be irrelevent.
In addition, the most frequent time for argument-precipitated
murders is during the 10pm to 3am time frame, when gun shops
are closed. And studies by the FBI and New York City Police
Department (NYPD) indicates that about 50 percent of murderers
are under the influence of Alcohol or drugs at the time of the
murder- conditions under which the sale of firearms is already
prohibited by law.
Waiting periods assume that violent people, deprived of
ready access to a handgun will not kill. Yet Dr. Marvin
Wolfgang, the noted criminologist who studied homicide in
Philadelphia and published PATTERNS IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, found
that the nature of homicide had little to do with the absence or
presence of firearms. He noted: "it is the contention of this
observer that few homicides due to shootings could be avoided
merely if a firearm were not immediately present, and that the
offender would select some other weapon to achieve the same
destructive goal. Probably only in those cases where a felon
kills a police officer, or vice versa, would homicide be avoided
in the absence of a firearm. "
Crimes of "passion" bring into play the plethora of curious
objects used to commit murder, from brooms to ceramic lamps, and
especially knives, according to a list of murder weapons used in
San Francisco and New York between 1973 and 1983.
The waiting period supposes that the crime of passion is
some sudden impulse that will pass. But a National Institute of
Justice (NIJ) study reveals the victim of family violence often
suffered repeated problems from the same person for months or
even years, and if not successfully resolved, such incidents
can eventually result in serious injury or death. Indeed, a
study conducted in Kansas City indicated that in 90 percent of
spouse-slayings, there has been at least one prior police call
regarding wife-beating and in 50 percent of such murders police
had been called at least five times. Of course, part of the
problem is that arrests are rarely made on such calls, although
recent research shows that arrests, coupled with support for the
victim, may reduce repeated beatings.
The tragic murder of John Lennon, and the assassination
attempt on President Reagan renewed the cry for stricter
"waiting periods." Ironically, Lennon's murderer purchased his
gun in Hawaii, a state requiring permits to purchase,
registration and banning the so-called "Saturday Night
Specials," almost six weeks before committing the crime. And
President Regan's assailant John Hinckley could have legally
purchased firearms under a waiting period scheme.
_________________________________________________________________
ACCEPTABLE TO SPORTSMEN?
_________________________________________________________________
Already, strict gun laws are placed on the nation's 60
million law-obedient firearms owners under the Gun Control Act
of 1968 (GCA'68), which requires licensing of manufacturers,
importers, and dealers; prohibit almost all interstate transfers
of handguns and requires interstate transfers of rifles and
shotguns to be through licensed dealers and in compliance with
the laws of the states where the dealer operates and the buyer
resides, and even prohibit relatives from giving firearms to
family members living in different states; prohibit the sale of
arms or ammunition by a dealer or anyone else to, or the
acquisition or transportation by, felons, persons under felony
indictment, fugitives, drug addicts, mental incompetents,
illegal aliens, dishonorably discharged veterans, those who have
renounced their U.S. citizenship, and employees of all such
persons; require licensees to keep records available for BATF
inspection; prohibits receipt or possession of guns by convicts,
dishonorably discharged veterans, illegal aliens, the insane,
persons who have renounced their citizenship; and prohibits the
importation of many firearms and parts from abroad.
Yet, these laws have failed to reduce crime, which is much
higher than when GCA'68 took effect. The solution, according to
gun control fanatics, is to impose even more restrictive laws on
the law-abiding.
A current proposal would have the federal government ask
local authorities to run background checks in seven days with
all of the costs to be borne by local departments with the added
risk of federal prosecution if the local police retained the
application in their files, and with no standards for approval
or denial, and no provision for appeal.
Clearly, restrictive gun laws only penalize the nation's
law-abiding firearms owners for the violent acts committed by a
small number of criminals who commit a disproportionately large
number of crimes. And, regrettably, "gun control" in any form
diverts and wastes scarce resources which could instead be used
to support genuine crime control measures.
The only effect of a waiting period is to deny someone the
ability to defend him or herself. In San Leandro, California, a
female single parent was forced to endure 15 days of terror at
the hands of a maniacal neighbor while she awaited the
completion of the background check. The day after she was
allowed to pick up her handgun, she killed her attacker with it.
Statistically, a waiting period would seem more likely to
interfere with the estimated 600,000 citizens who use handguns
for protection each year than with the roughly 100,000 criminals
who repeatedly misuse handguns - generally acquired by theft or
from fences, drug dealers, and the black market.
Yet the Wright-Rossi study found that three-quarters of the
convicted felons were able to get their most recent handguns
within a day - despite long criminal records.
As the WALL STREET JOURNAL noted shortly after the Lennon
murder: "...the sudden hue and cry for more gun control at such
times is a kind of cop-out, the sort of cop-out that is part of
the problem in America."
"The country knows that something is wrong. Too many are
turning to crimes of violence. The notion that this can be
changed by controlling guns, we worry, may be an excuse for
avoidind the hard work of making our decrepit criminal justice
system start to function, and the even harder work of
buttressing what used to be called the nation's moral fiber. "
_________________________________________________________________
SENTENCE THE CRIMINAL?
_________________________________________________________________
It is clear that the way to curb violent crime is to punish
the criminal. Studies suggest that 75-85 percent of urban
violence is perpetrated by career criminals, and 30-35 percent
of robbery and murder is committed by persons on some form of
conditional release - bail, parole, probation, suspended
sentence. To combat crime, America must address this problem of
recidivism and the "revolving door" system of justice.
Over a ten year period after the 1975 adoption of a
mandatory penalty for using a firearm to commit a violent crime,
Virginia's homicide rate fell 38 percent and robbery declined 28
percent. A 1974 Arizona law saw homicide fall 17 percent and
robbery 28 percent. While the West South Central region of the
United States saw robbery rise 21 percent, respectively, a 1975
Arkansas mandatory penalty statue viewed a 30 percent decrease
in homicide and a 15 percent decrease in robbery. South
Carolina recorded an astounding 38 percent decrease in homicide
and 15 percent decrease in robbery after adopting a mandatory
penalty.
Clearly, instead of imposing further penalties - in the form
of "waiting periods" and additional assaults on the civil rights
of law-abiding gun owners and gun-purchasers, the proper
approach is to implement mandatory punishment for the criminal
abuser of firearms.
The violent crime rate has decreased in part since 1980,
because the number of persons in American prisons has increased
from 315,000 in 1980 to 503,600 in 1985.
The remedy, or any appropriate penalty, must be after the
commission of an offense if the presumption of innocence is to
be preserved, indeed, if democracy itself is to survive.
This information and additional information is available by
writing the;
NRA INSTITUTE FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
1600 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036