6789 lines
243 KiB
Plaintext
6789 lines
243 KiB
Plaintext
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SILENT SERVICE II
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DOCUMENTATION
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BY "THE JET"
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INTRODUCTION
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WORLD WAR II WAS THE LARGEST AND MOST DESTRUCTIVE WAR IN HISTORY.
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MOST AMERICANS REMEMBER IT AS THE LAST "GOOD" WAR, FOUGHT FOR
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FREEDOM AND JUSTICE AGAINST EVIL TYRANNIES SEEKING TO CONQUER THE
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WORLD. THERE IS SOME TRUTH IN THIS: FEW DEFEND ADOLF HITLER'S NAZI
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FASCISM, THE WAY VIOLENT MILITARY MEN LITERALLY ASSASSINATED THEIR
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WAY TO POWER IN JAPAN, OR THE INSENSITIVE, REPRESSIVE AND OFTEN
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BLOODY GOVERNMENTS THAT CRASSLY EXPLOITED WHOMEVER THEY
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"LIBERATED" IN EUROPE, AFRICA, CHINA OR SOUTHEAST ASIA.
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JAPAN WAS AMERICA'S MORTAL ENEMY FROM THE PEARL HARBOR RAID IN 1
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94-1 TO THE ATOMIC BOMBINGS OF 1945. THE STRUGGLE WITH JAPAN WAS A
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VAST AND BLOODY WAR THAT SPRAWLED ACROSS THE WESTERN HALF OF THE
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PACIFIC. AMERICA FOUND NUMEROUS HEROES IN THAT WAR: SAILORS,
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SOLDIERS AND AVIATORS. AMONG THEM WERE SUBMARINERS FROM THE
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"SILENT SERVICE", MEN LIKE "MUSH" MORTON, DICK O'KANE, SAM DEALEY,
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AND RED RAMAGE.
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AMERICAN SUBMARINES PURSUED A DANGEROUS CALLING. THEY SAILED ALONE
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FAR INTO ENEMY TERRITORY, SOMETIMES RIGHT TO THE JAPANESE COAST-
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LINE, THOUSANDS OF MILES FROM A FRIENDLY BASE. THEY CHALLENGED THE
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WORLD'S MOST SUCCESSFUL NAVY, THE POWER THAT HAD CAPTURED ALL OF
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SOUTHEAST ASIA IN FOUR MONTHS. A SUBMARINE CAPTAIN WAS IN A LONELY
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AND EXPOSED POSITION.
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YET BY WAR'S END THESE SAME LONELY SUBMARINERS VIRTUALLY WIPED OUT
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THE JAPANESE MERCHANT MARINE SINGLE-HANDEDLY. THEY ACCOMPLISHED
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WHAT THE GERMAN U-BOATS ATTEMPTED AND FAILED: TOTAL STRANGULATION
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OF A MARITIME ECONOMY.
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THE EXPLOITS OF AMERICAN SUBMARINERS ARE STILL LEGENDARY. HOW SAM
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DEALEY LOOKED "DOWN THE THROAT" AT DESTROYERS CHARGING TO RAM AND
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EXPERTLY 'TORPEDOED THEM. HOW RED RAMAGE STORMED THROUGH ENEMY
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CONVOYS AT NIGHT, ON THE SURFACE, GUNS AND TORPEDOES BLAZING,
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LEAVING BURNING AND SINKING SHIPS IN HIS WAKE. HOW MUCH MORTON
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BRAVELY CREPT INTO UNCHARTED, SHALLOW HARBORS, FOUGHT HIS WAY OUT
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AGAIN, AND THEN CHASED DOWN AND SANK EVERY SHIP HE ENCOUNTERED.
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HOW DICK O'KANE, IN PATROL AFTER PATROL SHOWED UNBELIEVABLE SKILL
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IN STALKING AND ATTACKING WELL-GUARDED CONVOYS, AND THEN IN ESCAP-
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ING THE INEVITABLE COUNTERATTACKS.
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SUBMARINING WAS A DANGEROUS PROFESSION. CASUALTIES WERE HIGH: SIX
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TIMES GREATER THAN THE WWII NAVY AS A WHOLE. BOATS WERE CRACKED
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AND CRUSHED BY DEPTH CHARGING, TAKING DYING MEN TO A WATERY GRAVE.
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OF THE FAMOUS SKIPPERS MENTIONED, SAM DEALEY AND "MUSH" MORTON
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WERE KILLED IN ACTION,
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3
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4
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WHILE DICK O'KANE WAS TAKEN PRISONER. ONLY RED RAMAGE AND HIS BOAT
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SURVIVED THE WAR INTACT.
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ALL THIS ACTION, HEROISM AND GLORY MAKES FOR A GREAT SIMULATION.
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MANY PEOPLE OVER THE YEARS HAVE ATTEMPTED SUCH PRODUCTS, AND MOST
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FEEL THE FINEST WAS MICROPROSE'S 1985 SILENT SERVICE.
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TODAY COMPUTER POWER AND GRAPHICS ARE FAR BETTER THAN 1985. THE 1
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NEW SILENT SERVICE II TAKES FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE BEST IN MICRO-
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COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY TO GIVE YOU GREATER REALISM AND A BETTER
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SIMULATION EXPERIENCE. EVERY ASPECT OF THE ORIGINAL BEST-SELLER
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HAS BEEN ENHANCED AND REDESIGNED. YOU HAVE OPTIONS AND SITUATIONS
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NEVER BEFORE AVAILABLE, INCLUDING A "WAR CAREER" THAT COVERS THE
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ENTIRE PACIFIC WAR. BEST OF ALL, LIKE ALL MICROPROSE PRODUCTS,
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GAME IS INFINITELY PLAYABLE AND REPLAYABLE, GIVING YOU FRESH
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CHALLENGES AND NEW SITUATIONS TO MASTER.
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DO YOU HAVE THE STUFF TO BE A SUBMARINE HERO? WE LET YOU TAKE COMM
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IN AMERICA'S WARTIME "SILENT SERVICE" AND FIND OUT!
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4
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5
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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INTRODUCTION.....................3
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 5
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QUICK START 6
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TUTORIAL 8
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COMBAT TUTORIAL 9
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PATROL TUTORIAL 15
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COMMANDING A SUBMARINE 18
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INITIAL OPTIONS 19
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TOURING THE BOAT 25
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THE INFO PANEL 25
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THE CHART 26
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PERISCOPE 28
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BRIDGE OUTLOOK 29
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GAUGES 31
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DAMAGE REPORT 33
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CAPTAIN'S LOG 37
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STATUS ICONS 37
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WAR PATROLS 39
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VIEWS 39
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NAVIGATION CONTROLS 40
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BATTLE CONTROLS 42
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VIEW CONTROLS 42
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CHART CONTROLS 44
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CON & ENGINE CONTROLS 44
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FIRING TORPEDOES 47
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DECK GUN CONTROLS 50
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LAUNCHING DEBRIS 53
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END THIS BATTLE 53
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COMPUTER CONTROLS 54
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AFTERMATH OF BATTLE 56
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SUBMARINE TACTICS & STRATEGY 60
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BATTLE TACTICS 61
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PATROL STRATEGY 77
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AMERICAN COMMANDS 79
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PATROL AREAS 81
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STRATEGIES ON PATROL 85
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THE PACIFIC WAR 87
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HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENTS 98
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TECHNICAL DATA 106
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US SUBMARINES OF WWI 107
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US TORPEDOES 114
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JAPANESE SHIPS IN WWI 116
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APPENDIX 122
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DESIGN NOTES 122
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FURTHER READING 124
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CREDITS 127
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5
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6
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QUICK START
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THE MATERIALS
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THIS MANUAL PROVIDES A TUTORIAL, DETAILED OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS,
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TECHNICAL DATA AND TACTICAL TIPS. IT APPLIES TO ALL COMPUTER
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SYSTEMS.
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THE TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT GIVES SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR YOUR
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COMPUTER SYSTEM.
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THE KEYBOARD OVERLAY(S) PRESENT ALL THE MAIN CONTROLS
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AND ORDERS FOR YOUR SUB IN BATTLE. FOR STRATEGIC "WAR PATROL"
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MOVEMENTS, REFER TO THE TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT AND THIS MANUAL, NOT
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THE KEYBOARD OVERLAY.
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THE MAP OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC EXACTLY MATCHES THE INTERNAL "COM-
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PUTER DATA" USED IN THIS SIMULATION (HENCE THE "JAGGED" COAST-
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LINES, ETC.)
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THE TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT HAS COMPLETE INFORMATION ABOUT INSTALL-
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ING SILENT SERVICE II ON EITHER FLOPPY OR HARD DISKS.
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LEARNING SILENT SERVICE II
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THERE ARE THREE BASIC APPROACHES TO LEARNING THIS SIMULATION.
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PICK THE METHOD THAT SUITS YOU BEST:
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(1) PLAY & SKIM: YOU CAN DIVE IN AND TRY THE GAME, SKIMMING WHAT
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YOU
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NEED FROM THIS MANUAL. BE SURE TO LOOK AT THE DESCRIPTIONS OF THE
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VIEWS (P 25-38) AND THE CONTROLS (PAGES 42-53). FOR YOUR FIRST
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GAMES, PICK TRAINING THEN THE FIRST TWO HISTORICAL BATTLES
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("WHALES & DUDS" AND "MUSH OR LOOSE"). WHEN YOU'RE READY FOR MORE,
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TRY THE THIRD AND FOURTH HISTORICAL BATTLES ("FLASHER'S TANKERS").
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(2) TUTORIAL:HERE YOU FOLLOW THE TUTORIAL (PAGES 9-17) STEP BY
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STEP. AS YOU FOLLOW ALONG , YOU'LL WANT TO SKIM "COMMANDING A
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SUBMARINE" (PAGE 59) FOR MORE EXPLANATION.
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(3) STUDY: IN REAL LIFE MOST NAVAL OFFICERS FIRST LEARN "FROM THE
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BOOK", TRY TO SURVIVE IN REAL LIFE. TO DUPLICATE THIS, FIRST READ
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"COMMANDING SUBMARINE" (PAGES 18-59). SKIM THROUGH "BATTLE TAC-
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TICS" AND "PATROL STRATEGY" (PAGES 61-86) AS WELL. IF YOU STILL
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WANT TO BE "IN CHARACTER", START ; CAREER. HOWEVER, FOR EASIER
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LEARNING WE RECOMMEND A FEW HISTORICAL BATTLES OR A SINGLE WAR
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PATROL FIRST.
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6
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"
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9
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COMBAT TUTORIAL
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START BY FOLLOWING THE INSTALLATION INSTRUCTIONS IN THE TECHNICAL
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SUPPLEMENT. YOU SHOULD "INSTALL" (COPY) THE GAME ONTO FLOPPY
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DISKS OR A HARD DISK,-" AND PLAY FROM THOSE. ALSO PUNCH OUT THE
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APPROPRIATE KEYBOARD OVERLAY AND PLACE IT ON YOUR KEYBOARD. ALL
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CONTROLS ARE REFERRED TO BY THE NAME ON THE OVERLAY, WHICH APPEARS
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HERE IN ITALICS.
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THIS TUTORIAL ACQUAINTS YOU WITH THE CONTROLS AND COMMANDS NEEDED
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TO OPERATE YOUR SUBMARINE. THIS FIRST TUTORIAL OCCURS ON A PRAC-
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TICE "RANGE" NEAR PEARL HARBOR. YOUR TARGETS ARE OLD HULKS UNABLE
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TO MOVE OR SHOOT. THERE ARE NO "ENEMIES" TO DISTRACT YOU AND NO
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TIME LIMIT.
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INITIAL OPTIONS
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AFTER THE TITLE SCREENS, YOU'RE SHOWN A JAPANESE SHIP. TO CORRECT-
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LY INITIAL OPTIONS IDENTIFY IT, COMPARE THE PICTURE WITH THOSE IN
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THIS MANUAL (PAGES 116-121), THEN SELECT THE NAME USING THE CURSOR
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KEYS.
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NEXT A SERIES OF OPTIONS APPEARS. PLEASE MAKE THESE CHOICES:
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" "TRAINING" IS THE APPROPRIATE TYPE OF GAME.
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" "INTRODUCTORY" IS THE APPROPRIATE DIFFICULTY LEVEL.
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" TYPE YOUR NAME WHERE REQUESTED.
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" "JANUARY 1,1944" IS A GOOD DATE, ALTHOUGH ANY DATE WILL DO.
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" "GATO" IS THE RECOMMENDED SUBMARINE CLASS.
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YOU'LL BE ASSIGNED A SUBMARINE FROM THE GATO CLASS. PRESS ANY KEY
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TO CONTINUE AND SEE YOUR FIRST LOGBOOK ENTRY, WHICH NOTES THE
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UPCOMING TRAINING EXERCISE.
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FINALLY, CHECK THE KEYBOARD OVERLAY OR TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT TO
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FIND THE KEYBOARD CONTROLS THAT PAUSE THE GAME. THIS ALLOWS YOU TO
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READ A FEW PARAGRAPHS OF THIS TUTORIAL, DO IT, THEN PAUSE SO YOU
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CAN READ THE NEXT FEW PARAGRAPHS, ETC.
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9
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10
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AT THE START
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AT THE START OF THE EXERCISE, YOU'RE VIEWING A CHART OF THE GENER-
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AL AREA. TAKE A MOMENT AND EXAMINE YOUR KEYBOARD OVERLAY. DURING
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BATTLE YOU FIND EVERY CONTROL HERE. ON SOME MACHINES A JOYSTICK
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AND/OR MOUSE DUPLICATE SOME OF THESE CONTROLS (SEE THE TECHNICAL
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SUPPLEMENT FOR DETAILS)
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ON THE CHART YOU'RE A DOT IN THE MIDDLE OF A BOX. THERE ARE FOUR
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SMALL DOTS NORTH OF YOU. THESE ARE FOUR TARGET HULKS, ANCHORED
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HERE FOR TARGET PRACTICE. YOU CAN USE THE ZOOM AND UNZOOM KEYS TO
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ENLARGE OR REDUCE THE SCALE. FOR MORE INFORMATION ABOUT CHARTS AND
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SCALES, SEE PAGES 26-28;
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BELOW THIS CHART IS THE "INFO PANEL" THAT SHOWS THE STATUS OF YOUR
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1 THE START YOUR SPEED IS 0, YOUR DEPTH IS 000 (I.E., YOU'RE ON
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THE SURFACE YOUR HEADING (HDG) IS 000 (DUE NORTH). YOUR VIEW
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BEARING (BEARING) 000 (NORTH), YOU HAVE 6 TORPEDOES LOADED IN THE
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BOW TUBES AND 4 TORPEDOES LOADED IN THE STERN TUBES. THE TARGET
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INFORMATION TO THE RIGHT IS BLANK BECAUSE YOU'VE NOT "MARKED" A
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TARGET.
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TO THE RIGHT OF THE CHART IS A PANEL OF TEN TORPEDO TIMERS. THESE
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SH LONG BEFORE A TORPEDO REACHES ITS TARGET (IF THE TDC LIGHT
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BESIDE THE ' ON) , OR HOW LONG BEFORE THE TORPEDO RUNS OUT OF GAS
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(IF THE TDC LIGHT IS OF NOW ALL THE TIMERS READ 0:00 BECAUSE NO
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TORPEDOES ARE RUNNING.
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FOR A LARGER CHART SCREEN, TAP THE INFO PANEL ON/OFF KEY. THIS
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GIVES YOU A FULL-SCREEN CHART. TAP THE KEY AGAIN TO RESTORE THE
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INFO PANEL.
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HEADING VS. BEARING: TAP THE BRIDGE LOOK OUT KEY. YOU'RE NO LOOK-
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OUT POSITION ON TOP OF THE SUB'S CONNING TOWER. YOU SEE THE OCEAN
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AHEAD. THERE ARE SHIPS (THE TARGET HULKS) ON THE HORIZON. DO NOT
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STALL SUB'S ENGINES. INSTEAD, TRY OUT VIEW LEFT AND VIEW RIGHT.
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NOTICE HOW YOUR FIELD OF VISION MOVES LEFT AND RIGHT. WHEN YOUR
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VIEW MOVES, YOUR VIEW (BEARING ON THE INFO PANEL) MOVES WITH IT.
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HOWEVER, HEADING (HDI INFO PANEL) HAS NOT MOVED BECAUSE THE SUB'S
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HULL HASN'T TURNED.
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YOU MUST UNDERSTAND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HEADING AND BEARING IN
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ORDER TO COMMAND EFFECTIVELY. HEADING IS THE DIRECTION YOUR BOAT
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POSITION IN WHICH IT TRAVELS. BEARING IS THE DIRECTION OF YOUR
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VIEW. THE LOOK( PERISCOPE, TBT (TARGET BEARING TRANSMITTER)
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BINOCULARS, TORPEDOES ; GUN ARE ALL POINTED AND FIRED ALONG THE
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BEARING, NOT THE BOAT'S HEADING.
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THIS CAN BE CONFUSING. THERE ARE TWO KEYS TO ASSIST YOU. TAP SET
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VIEW TO COURSE TO SWING YOUR BEARING AROUND SO IT POINTS "STRAIGHT
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AHEAD( DIRECTION THE SUB POINTS). TAP SET COURSE TP VIEW TO TURN
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THE SUB SO IT' HEADED IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS YOUR VIEW BEARING.
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10
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11
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FIND YOUR TARGETS: SELECT BRIDGE TBT. THIS IS A PAIR OF BINOCULARS
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IN A SPECIAL MOUNTING. THEY HAVE A DARK SCALE ACROSS THE LOWER
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CENTER. TURN YOUR VIEW LEFT AND RIGHT OVER THE TARGET HULKS. THE
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SCALE BRIGHTENS WHEN IT IS OVER A SHIP. THIS MEANS THAT SHIP IS
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"MARKED". THE TARGET INFORMATION ON THE INFO PANEL COMES TO LIFE,
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SHOWING THE ENEMY'S RANGE (IN YARDS), SPEED (IN KNOTS), AND COURSE
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(HEADING).
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FOR A BETTER VIEW OF A TARGET, TAP ZOOM ONE OR MORE TIMES. TO
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RETURN TO A NORMAL VIEW, TAP UNZOOM.
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MOVE THE CENTER OF THE SCALE TO THE CENTER OF THE LEFTMOST ENEMY
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SHIP AND TAP TDC ON/OFF. THE TDC LIGHT (ON THE INFO PANEL) TURNS
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ON AND A SMALL BLACK POINTER APPEARS ON THE SCALE. THIS MEANS YOUR
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TORPEDO DATA COMPUTER (TDC) IS "LOCKED" ON THE TARGET. WHILE THE
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TDC IS RUNNING, YOUR VIEW AUTOMATICALLY ROTATES TO KEEP THE CUR-
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RENT TARGET POINT CENTERED IN YOUR VIEW. YOU CAN TURN THE TDC OFF
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BY TAPPING TDC ON/OFF AGAIN. YOU CAN ONLY TURN ON THE TDC WHEN A
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TARGET IS "MARKED", BUT YOU CAN TURN IT OFF ANYTIME.
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MAKE SURE YOUR HEADING (HDG) IS 000 AND THE TDC IS ON. TAP AHEAD
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FULL (3). THIS STARTS YOUR SUB MOVING NORTH. YOUR SPEED WILL
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INCREASE TO 1 5 KNOTS BUT THE HEADING WON'T CHANGE (BECAUSE YOU'RE
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NOT TURNING). HOWEVER, AS THE TDC TRACKS THE TARGET, YOU'LL SEE
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THE VIEW BEARING ROTATE AND THE TARGET RANGE GET SMALLER.
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NOTE THAT WHEN THE TDC IS "OFF" (NOT RUNNING) THE VIEW LEFT AND
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VIEW RIGHT KEYS SWING YOUR VIEW LEFT AND RIGHT. WHEN THE TDC IS
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"ON" (RUNNING), YOUR VIEW IS LOCKED ON TARGET. THE KEYS NOW ADJUST
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THE TORPEDO AIM LEFT OR RIGHT. YOU'LL SEE THE TORPEDO AIMING
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POINTER MOVE ON THE SCALE AS YOU TAP VIEW LEFT AND VIEW RIGHT.
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THE ATTACK
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SINKING THE ENEMY: TAP SET COURSE TO VIEW. THIS SWINGS YOUR SUB
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AROUND AND HEADS IT TOWARD THE TARGET SHIP. WHEN THE RANGE TO
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TARGET DECREASES TO 1,000 YARDS, TAP ALL STOP (0). IT'S TIME TO
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GIVE YOUR DECK GUN CREW A LITTLE PRACTICE.
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TAP FIRE DECK GUN ONCE. YOU'LL HEAR THE GUN FIRE AND SEE EITHER AN
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EXPLOSION OR SHELL SPLASH NEAR THE TARGET. THIS IS BECAUSE THE GUN
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CREW DOES THEIR BEST TO AIM THE GUN AT THE "MARKED" TARGET THAT
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YOU'RE TRACKING WITH THE TDC. IF THE TARGET WASN'T "MARKED", THE
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CREW REFUSES TO SHOOT (THEY DON'T HAVE A TARGET!).
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11
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11
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12
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IF THE SPLASH IS IN FRONT OF THE TARGET, YOU'RE FIRING TOO
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"SHORT". YOU N TO ELEVATE THE GUN SLIGHTLY TO LENGTHEN THE FIRING
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RANGE. TAP GUN UP (+) 1 DEGREE ONCE. YOU'LL SEE THE ELEVATION
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INDICATOR AT THE TOP OF THE TBT CHANGE.
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IF THE SPLASH IS BEHIND THE TARGET, YOU'RE FIRING TOO "LONG". YOU
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NEED TO DEPRESS THE GUN SLIGHTLY. TAP GUN DOWN (-) 1 DEGREE ONCE.
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ADJUST YOUR GUN ELEVATION UP OR DOWN UNTIL YOU'RE SCORING HITS.
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SOME MAY SET THE HULK AFIRE, OR CAUSE SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS.
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EVENTUALLY THE TARGET WILL SINK. YOU'VE SCORED YOUR FIRST KILL!
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TORPEDOES AWAY: OBVIOUSLY, THE DECK GUN IS RARELY THE BEST WAY TO
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A SHIP - IT TAKES MANY SHELLS AND A LONG TIME, AND ALL THE WHILE
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YOU'RE ON SURFACE, VULNERABLE TO RETURN FIRE. IT'S TIME TO TRY THE
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TRADITIONAL SUB; WEAPON: THE TORPEDO. TORPEDOES CAN BE FIRED
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SURFACED OR SUBMERGED. HERE WE'LL MAKE A SUBMERGED ATTACK.
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TAP THE DIVE KEY ONCE. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY YOU'LL BE REMOVED FROM
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THE BRIDGE TBT AND GO TO THE CHARTS. AFTER ALL, WHEN A SUB DIVES,
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ALL THE PERSONNEL MUST GO BELOW. ON THE CHART, WATCH THE DEPTH
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CAREFULLY. WHEN YOU REACH 050 FEET, TAP RISE ONCE. THIS LEVELS
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OUT THE SUBMARINE. IF YOU TAP AGAIN, YOUR SUB STARTS BACK UP. TO
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LEVEL OUT AT A DEPTH, YOU CAN ALSO TAP STRAIGHT & LEVEL. HOWEVER,
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THIS WOULD ALSO STRAIGHTEN OUT ANY TURNS.
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YOU CAN ALSO DIVE OR RISE YOUR SUB TO PERISCOPE DEPTH (50 TO 55
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FEET) TAPPING THE PERISCOPE DEPTH KEY. YOUR CREW WILL AUTOMATI-
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CALLY TAKE YOU TO THE PROPER DEPTH, DIVING AS NECESSARY.
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WHEN YOU'RE STEADY AT 055 FEET, TRY TAPPING PERISCOPE TO LOOK
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THROUGH IT.
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YOU CAN MOVE THE PERISCOPE VIEW LEFT OR RIGHT JUST LIKE THE BRIDGE
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TBE. SINCE THE LAST SHIP IS SUNK, YOUR TDC IS OFF AND NO TARGET
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IS MARKED. SWING THE SCOPE AROUND TO MARK A NEW TARGET, THEN TURN
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ON THE TDC TO TRACK IT.
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IN REAL BATTLE, THE TDC IS EXTREMELY USEFUL BECAUSE IT COMPUTES
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THE ENEMY'S COURSE AND SPEED. IT THEN AUTOMATICALLY SETS THE
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TORPEDO'S COURSE SO IT WILL INTERSECT WITH THE ENEMY. THE TDC
|
|
CONTINUALLY UPDATES THIS SETTING SO YOU CAN FIRE THE TORPEDO AT
|
|
ANY TIME. WITH THE TDC RUNNING, TORPEDOES ! ALWAYS HIT UNLESS
|
|
EITHER (A) THE ENEMY CHANGES SPEED OR COURSE (OR BOTH) YOU FIRE,
|
|
OR (B) THE TORPEDO MALFUNCTIONS. HERE THE ENEMY IS ANCHORED A
|
|
HAVE FLAWLESS TORPEDOES, SO EVERY "FISH" FIRED IS A HIT.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
12
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
13
|
|
|
|
TAP FIRE TORPEDO ONCE AND YOU'LL SEE WHAT HAPPENS. A "TIN FISH" IS
|
|
LAUNCHED, YOU SEE THE WAKE RUNNING TOWARD THE TARGET, AND BLAMMO!
|
|
A HIT. THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE IS SOMEWHAT RANDOM, SO ONE HIT MAY OR
|
|
MAY NOT SINK THE TARGET. IF IT DOESN'T, KEEP FIRING UNTIL YOU SINK
|
|
THE HULK.
|
|
|
|
NOTE THAT WHEN THE TDC IS RUNNING YOUR VIEW IS "LOCKED" ONTO THE
|
|
MARKED TARGET. THE VIEW LEFT AND VIEW RIGHT KEYS ADJUST TORPEDO
|
|
AIM, NOT THE VIEW. YOU MUST TURN OFF THE TDC TO CHANGE YOUR VIEW.
|
|
|
|
FIRING STERN TUBES: SWING YOUR PERISCOPE ONTO THE THIRD TARGET
|
|
HULK TO "MARK" IT, THEN TURN ON YOUR TDC ONCE MORE.
|
|
|
|
NOW TAP AHEAD FULL (3). NOTICE THAT YOUR SUB IS MOVING AT A MUCH
|
|
SLOWER SPEED THAN ON THE SURFACE. IN REAL BATTLES, YOUR SLOWER
|
|
SUBMERGED SPEED CAN BE IMPORTANT. NOW PRESS TURN STARBD (RIGHT) OR
|
|
TURN PORT (LEFT). YOU'LL NOTICE YOUR SUB'S HEADING SWINGS AWAY
|
|
FROM YOUR BEARING. SHIFT TO THE CHARTS (TAP CHARTS) AND WATCH YOUR
|
|
SUB MOVING THERE. WHEN YOUR SUB IS TRAVELLING ALMOST EXACTLY AWAY
|
|
FROM THE ENEMY, TAP STRAIGHT & LEVEL AND THEN ALL STOP (0).
|
|
DURING ALL THIS, BECAUSE YOU LEFT YOUR PERISCOPE UP, THE CREW AND
|
|
TDC CONTINUED WATCHING THE TARGET. THE CURRENT TARGET RANGE,
|
|
SPEED AND COURSE SHOULD STILL BE VISIBLE ON THE INFO PANEL.
|
|
|
|
NOW TAP FIRE TORPEDO ONCE. YOU'LL SEE A TORPEDO LEAVE YOUR BOAT
|
|
AND HEAD TO THE TARGET. NOTICE THAT ON THE INFO PANEL YOU ONLY
|
|
HAVE THREE STERN TUBES LOADED NOW, INSTEAD OF THE ORIGINAL FOUR.
|
|
MEANWHILE THE "S1 " TIMER IS COUNTING DOWN THE SECONDS BEFORE THE
|
|
TORPEDO HITS.
|
|
|
|
YOUR CREW AUTOMATICALLY SELECTS EITHER BOW OR STERN TUBES TO FIRE,
|
|
WHICHEVER IS CLOSER TO THE TARGET. SINCE YOUR STERN WAS FACING
|
|
TOWARD THE TARGET, THEY FIRED A STERN TUBE.
|
|
|
|
IF YOU'RE QUICK YOU CAN GET BACK TO THE PERISCOPE AND WATCH THE
|
|
TORPEDO EXPLODE.
|
|
|
|
AT SOME POINT IN ALL THIS, YOU PROBABLY RECEIVED A MESSAGE THAT
|
|
ONE OF YOUR BOW TUBES HAS BEEN RELOADED. AS YOU FIRE YOUR TORPE-
|
|
DOES, YOUR CREW RELOADS THEM AS FAST AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER,
|
|
YOUR TORPEDO SUPPLY IS LIMITED. TAP GAUGES AND LOOK IN THE UPPER
|
|
RIGHT CORNER. THE LIGHTED TORPEDO GRAPHICS SHOW :THE NUMBER OF
|
|
TUBES CURRENTLY LOADED. THE NUMBERS BELOW SHOW THE NUMBER OF
|
|
ADDITIONAL TORPEDOES AVAILABLE, BUT NOT YET LOADED INTO A TUBE.
|
|
|
|
|
|
13
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
14
|
|
|
|
|
|
ENDING THE TRAINING CRUISE
|
|
|
|
YOU CAN END TRAINING BY SINKING THE LAST HULK WITH GUN FIRE AND/OR
|
|
TORPEDOES. WHEN THE LAST ENEMY SHIP IS SUNK, THE BATTLE ENDS
|
|
SHORTLY THEREAFTER, BATTLES ALSO END IF ALL SURVIVING ENEMY SHIPS
|
|
HAVE ESCAPED BEYOND 30,000 YARDS).
|
|
|
|
IN ADDITION, YOU CAN TAP END THIS BATTLE. YOU AREN'T ALLOWED TO
|
|
QUIT IF YOU'RE TOO CLOSE TO THE ENEMY, OR THEY DETECTED YOU
|
|
(IMPOSSIBLE IN THIS CASE!).
|
|
|
|
FURTHER BATTLE TRAINING
|
|
|
|
TO GET MORE EXPERIENCE IN BATTLE, PLAY SOME OF THE HISTORICAL
|
|
BATTLE SCENARIOS. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON VIEWS REFER TO
|
|
PAGES 25-38, FOR CONTROLS REFER TO PAGES 42-55.
|
|
|
|
THE FIRST TWO SCENARIOS, "WHALES & DUDS" AND "MUSH ON THE LOOSE"
|
|
ONLY HAVE MERCHANT SHIPS. THREE OTHER SCENARIOS FEATURE BATTLES
|
|
AGAINST CONVOYS "FLASHER'S TANKERS (I)", "FLASHER'S TANKERS (II)",
|
|
AND "KILLER O'KANE".
|
|
|
|
THE MOST DIFFICULT SCENARIOS ARE THOSE AGAINST WARSHIPS, SINCE
|
|
THEY MOVE SO QUICKLY. THESE INCLUDE "SINK THE YAMATO!", "DEATH OF
|
|
THE SHINANO" AND "AN EMBARRASSMENT OF RICHES".
|
|
|
|
A GOOD FINAL PRACTICE - AND A FINE, QUICK GAME IN ITS OWN RIGHT IS
|
|
THE "RANDOM ENCOUNTER". THIS SCENARIO GENERATES AN INFINITE
|
|
VARIETY OF ALTERNATIVES APPROPRIATE FOR THE TIME PERIOD YOU SE-
|
|
LECT, INCLUDING SINGLE MERCHANT CONVOYS AND WARSHIP GROUPS,
|
|
14
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
15
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PATROL TUTORIAL
|
|
|
|
|
|
NOW IT'S TIME TO TRY OUT A WAR PATROL. IN A WAR PATROL YOU LEAVE
|
|
PORT, CRUISE TO TO YOUR PATROL ZONE, SEARCH OUT ENEMIES, AND SINK
|
|
THEM. WHEN YOU'RE OUT OF - TORPEDOES OR LOW ON FUEL, YOU RETURN TO
|
|
PORT.
|
|
|
|
AFTER THE TITLE SCREENS, YOU'RE SHOWN A JAPANESE SHIP. TO CORRECT-
|
|
LY IDENTIFY IT, COMPARE THE PICTURE WITH THOSE IN THIS MANUAL
|
|
(PAGES 116-121), THEN SELECT THE NAME USING THE CURSOR KEYS.
|
|
|
|
NEXT A SERIES OF OPTIONS APPEARS. PLEASE MAKE THESE CHOICES:
|
|
|
|
" "A SINGLE WAR PATROL" IS THE APPROPRIATE TYPE OF GAME.
|
|
|
|
" "INTRODUCTORY" IS THE APPROPRIATE DIFFICULTY LEVEL.
|
|
|
|
" TYPE YOUR NAME WHERE REQUESTED.
|
|
|
|
" "JANUARY 1 , 1 94-4" IS A GOOD DATE, ALTHOUGH ANY DATE WILL DO.
|
|
|
|
" "IMP. GATO" IS THE APPROPRIATE SUBMARINE CLASS.
|
|
|
|
NOW YOU'LL SEE A MAP OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC. USE THE CURSOR TO
|
|
SELECT AN APPROPRIATE STARTING BASE. KEEP TAPPING THE CURSOR UNTIL
|
|
"MIDWAY - SUBPAC" APPEARS. THIS WILL BE YOUR STARTING BASE.
|
|
PRESS THE RETURN KEY TO FINISH YOUR SELECTION.
|
|
|
|
NOW A BLACK BOX APPEARS. THIS IS A POSSIBLE PATROL ZONE. AGAIN,
|
|
USE THE CURSOR TO MOVE THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE SELECTIONS. STOP
|
|
WHEN YOU REACH THE "EAST CHINA SEA". THIS WILL BE YOUR PATROL
|
|
AREA. AGAIN, PRESS THE RETURN KEY TO FINISH YOUR SELECTION.
|
|
|
|
YOU'LL BE ASSIGNED A SUBMARINE FROM THE IMPROVED GATO CLASS, PRESS
|
|
ANY KEY TO CONTINUE AND SEE YOUR FIRST LOGBOOK ENTRY, WHICH SHOWS
|
|
YOUR OFFICIAL SAILING ORDERS. PRESS ANY KEY TO BEGIN YOUR WAR
|
|
PATROL.
|
|
|
|
|
|
PATROLLING
|
|
|
|
|
|
THE WAR PATROL BEGINS WITH A MAP VIEW OF THE ENTIRE WESTERN PACIF-
|
|
IC OCEAN. YOUR BOAT IS A BRIGHT DOT SURROUNDED BY A BRIGHT BOX.
|
|
YOUR WAR PATROL ZONE IS A DARK BOX OFF THE COAST OF CHINA, SOUTH-
|
|
ERN KOREA AND SOUTHERN JAPAN.
|
|
|
|
CONTROLS: THE KEYBOARD OVERLAY IS NOT USED DURING A WAR PATROL.
|
|
ONLY A VERY LIMITED NUMBER OF CONTROLS ARE USED WHILE PATROLLING.
|
|
|
|
THE CURSOR KEYS OR NUMERIC KEYPAD MOVE YOUR BOAT ACROSS THE PACIF-
|
|
IC TOWARD THE PATROL AREA (FOR JOYSTICK OR MOUSE CONTROLS, SEE
|
|
YOUR TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT) LAND AND REEF AREAS ARE IMPASSABLE;
|
|
YOU'LL HAVE TO MOVE AROUND THOSE. A LARGER SCALE NAVIGATION MAP IS
|
|
INCLUDED TO HELP YOU NAVIGATE
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
15
|
|
|
|
|
|
16
|
|
|
|
|
|
TRY EACH OF THE FOLLOWING KEYS, WHICH ARE AVAILABLE DURING A WAR
|
|
PATROL (AS WELL AS IN BATTLE):
|
|
|
|
CAPTAINS LOG PROVIDES SAILING ORDERS, INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR
|
|
BOAT'S PAST HISTORY.
|
|
|
|
DAMAGE REPORT ALLOWS YOU TO MONITOR DAMAGE REPAIRS.
|
|
|
|
GAUGES ALLOWS YOU TO MONITOR THE BOAT'S CURRENT STATUS IN C
|
|
ESPECIALLY THE NUMBER OF TORPEDO TUBES AND TORPEDOES AVAILABLE.
|
|
|
|
PORTS IS A SPECIAL KEY ONLY AVAILABLE DURING THE PATROL. IT
|
|
TOGGLES ON AND OFF FOR ALL FRIENDLY AND ENEMY PORTS/BASES. NOTE
|
|
THAT THESE VARY WITH TIME.
|
|
|
|
THE COMPUTER CONTROLS (PAUSE,BOSS, SAVE GAME, EXIT TO DOS,
|
|
JOYSTICK ADJUST, VOLUME ADJUST, RESTART GAME. ETC/) ARE ALL AVAIL-
|
|
ABLE WHILE PATROLLING.
|
|
|
|
TIME & FUEL: AS YOU MOVE, YOU'LL SEE THE INFO PANEL IN THE UPPER
|
|
LEFT CHANGE. THE PANEL SHOWS THE CURRENT DATE AND TIME. TIME IS
|
|
KEPT USING A MILITARY CLOCK. THIS MEANS 01 00 IS 1 AM, 1 200 IS
|
|
NOON, I 300 IS 1 PM IS 9 PM, AND 24-00 IS MIDNIGHT. BELOW THE
|
|
TIME IS THE NUMBER OF DAYS CRUISING YOU HAVE LEFT. MOST SUB TYPES
|
|
(INCLUDING THE GATO CLASS) HAVE 60 DAYS (
|
|
|
|
MOVE YOUR SUB ACROSS THE PACIFIC AND INTO THE PATROL ZONE. AS S(
|
|
YOU ENTER THE ZONE, NOTE HOW MANY DAYS OF FUEL REMAIN. THE DIF-
|
|
FERENCE AMOUNT OF FUEL IT TOOK YOU TO REACH YOUR ZONE. A WISE
|
|
CAPTAIN ENDS HIS PATROL WHEN HIS FUEL IS DOWN TO ABOUT 1 1/2 TIMES
|
|
(150%) OF THIS AMOUNT.
|
|
|
|
FOR EXAMPLE, YOUR PATROL FROM MIDWAY STARTS WITH 60 DAYS AVAIL-
|
|
ABLE. WHEN YOU REACH THE EAST CHINA SEA, YOU'RE DOWN TO 45 DAYS
|
|
THEREFORE, IT TOOK YOU 1 5 DAYS TO REACH YOUR PATROL AREA. TO BE
|
|
SAFE, YOU END YOUR PATROL WHEN YOU HAVE ABOUT 22-23 DAYS OF FUEL
|
|
REMAINING (15 * 1.5 = 22.5). IF YOU REMAIN ON PATROL SO LONG THAT
|
|
YOU HAVE LESS THAN 15 DAYS OF FUEL LEFT, YOU WON'T HAVE ENOUGH TO
|
|
GET BACK TO MIDWAY. HOWEVER, YOU CAN LOOK FOR NEARER PORTS BY
|
|
TAPPING THE PORTS KEY.
|
|
|
|
TIME: CONTINUE CRUISING AND YOU'LL NOTICE THAT EVERY MOVES, TIME
|
|
FLIPS PAST. ALSO NOTICE THAT EVEN IF YOU DON'T MOVE, TIME CONTIN-
|
|
UES TO PASS. YOU BOAT CRUISES AROUND AT ITS CURRENT LOCATION IF
|
|
YOU DON'T MOVE IT. TO FREEZE THE PATROL, YOU MUST PRESS THE PAUSE
|
|
KEY.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
16
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
17
|
|
|
|
|
|
CONTACTS: EVENTUALLY YOUR BOAT ENCOUNTERS THE ENEMY. MOST CON-
|
|
TACTS OCCUR IN YOUR PATROL ZONE, BUT AN ENCOUNTER IS POSSIBLE
|
|
ALMOST ANYWHERE. SOME CONTACTS OCCUR WHEN THE ENEMY SPOTS YOU.
|
|
OTHER TIMES YOU SPOT THEM WITH RADAR OR VISUALLY.
|
|
|
|
BE SURE TO NOTE THE TIME OF THE CONTACT. A NIGHT CONTACT MEANS A
|
|
NIGHT BATTLE, WHERE YOU'LL PROBABLY WANT TO FIGHT ON THE SURFACE.
|
|
A DAY CONTACT MEANS YOU'LL PROBABLY WANT TO FIGHT SUBMERGED. A
|
|
RADAR CONTACT MEANS YOU WILL START FURTHER AWAY FROM THE ENEMY
|
|
WITH MORE TIME TO MANEUVER. A VISUAL CONTACT GIVES YOU LESS TIME.
|
|
A VISUAL CONTACT AT NIGHT RESULTS IN A BATTLE THAT STARTS AT
|
|
POINT-BLANK RANGE, PERHAPS WITH YOUR BOAT INSIDE THE CONVOY'S
|
|
FORMATION!
|
|
|
|
|
|
BATTLE TACTICS
|
|
|
|
IF YOU ENCOUNTER SPEEDY WARSHIPS, JUST GETTING INTO FIRING POSI-
|
|
TION IS HARD ENOUGH. WITH SLOWER MERCHANT SHIPS OR CONVOYS YOU CAN
|
|
CIRCLE AROUND AND ATTACK THEM FROM WHATEVER DIRECTION SEEMS MOST
|
|
FAVORABLE.
|
|
|
|
AS SOON AS YOU HAVE TIME, IT'S WISE TO CHECK THE GAUGES FOR THE
|
|
CURRENT WATER TEMPERATURE AND DEPTH UNDER KEEL. THERE'S NOTHING
|
|
MORE EMBARRASSING THAN MAKING A CRASH DIVE STRAIGHT INTO THE OCEAN
|
|
BOTTOM!
|
|
|
|
IN DAYLIGHT YOU NORMALLY ATTACK SUBMERGED. AT NIGHT YOUR SUB IS SO
|
|
HARD TO SEE THAT YOU CAN MAKE SURFACE ATTACKS. HOWEVER, AT NIGHT
|
|
DECK GUN FLASHES GIVE AWAY YOUR POSITION. AVOID USING THE DECK GUN
|
|
AT NIGHT IF RETURN GUNFIRE IS A THREAT.
|
|
|
|
IF ENEMY DESTROYERS PURSUE YOU, DON'T RELY ON WEAPONS TO SAVE
|
|
YOURSELF. DESTROYERS ARE HARD TO HIT WITH TORPEDOES. THEIR GUNS
|
|
ARE MORE POWERFUL THAN YOURS. YOUR BEST BET IS TO CRASH DIVE, IF
|
|
POSSIBLE BELOW THE TEMPERATURE LAYER (TO COLDER WATER) , THEN MOVE
|
|
AWAY. THE FASTER YOU MOVE , THE BETTER THE ENEMY CAN HEAR YOU.
|
|
WHEN EVADING ATTACK, IT'S BEST TO SNEAK AWAY AT SLOW SPEED.
|
|
|
|
MORE INFORMATION
|
|
|
|
|
|
FOR DETAILED INFORMATION ABOUT CONTROLS AVAILABLE DURING A PATROL,
|
|
SEE PAGES 39-41. FOR MORE INFORMATION ABOUT STRATEGY AND TACTICS,
|
|
SEE PAGES 77-86.
|
|
|
|
|
|
17
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
19
|
|
|
|
COMMANDING A SUBMARINE
|
|
|
|
|
|
INITIAL OPTIONS
|
|
|
|
|
|
AT THE START SILENT SERVICE II PRESENTS YOU WITH VARIOUS OPTIONS.
|
|
USING THESE YOU CAN SELECT ANYTHING FROM AN INDIVIDU-
|
|
AL BATTLE TO REFIGHTING ALL OF WORLD WAR II. YOU ALSO SELECT THE
|
|
TYPE OF SUBMARINE YOU WISH TO COMMAND AND AN
|
|
APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF REALISM AND DIFFICULTY.
|
|
|
|
SHIP IDENTIFICATION
|
|
|
|
HERE YOU SEE A PAGE FROM YOUR BOAT'S SHIP ID BOOK. COMPARE THE
|
|
PICTURE SHOWN WITH THE VARIOUS SHIP PICTURES IN THIS MANUAL (PAGES
|
|
116-121 ). THEN USE THE CURSOR KEYS SELECT THE CORRECT NAME. IF
|
|
YOU FAIL TO MAKE A CORRECT IDENTIFICATION, YOU'RE LIMITED TO THE
|
|
TRAINING SCENARIO.
|
|
|
|
GAME TYPE
|
|
|
|
TRAINING: THIS IS A SINGLE LEARNING "BATTLE" AGAINST FOUR MOTION-
|
|
LESS, UNARMED FREIGHTER HULKS. YOU'RE FREE TO CRUISE AROUND AND
|
|
ATTACK THEM WITH TORPEDOES AND/OR GUNS. TRAINING TAKES AN HOUR OR
|
|
TWO, MAINLY BECAUSE YOU'LL CONSTANTLY REFER TO THIS MANUAL AND THE
|
|
TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT.
|
|
|
|
A SINGLE BATTLE: HERE YOU TO SELECT ONE OF EIGHT ACTUAL SUBMARINE
|
|
ENGAGEMENTS, OR A NINTH RANDOM ENGAGEMENT AGAINST AN UNPREDICTABLE
|
|
FORCE OF JAPANESE SHIPS. INDIVIDUAL BATTLES TAKE A HALF HOUR TO
|
|
TWO HOURS, DEPENDING ON THE NUMBER OF SHIPS INVOLVED AND YOUR
|
|
COMMAND STYLE. FOR A SUMMARY OF EACH HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENT, SEE
|
|
PAGES 98-1 05.
|
|
|
|
* SINGLE WAR PATROL: HERE YOU TAKE A SUBMARINE ON A COMPLETE WAR
|
|
PATROL INTO THE WESTERN PACIFIC, SEARCHING FOR ENEMIES, ENGAGING
|
|
THEM, AND (HOPEFULLY) RETURNING BACK TO A FRIENDLY BASE ALIVE. A
|
|
WAR PATROL CAN TAKE A FEW HOURS TO AN EVENING OR TWO , DEPENDING
|
|
ON HOW MANY CONTACTS YOU MAKE, AND THE SIZE OF THE RESULTING
|
|
BATTLES.
|
|
|
|
A WAR CAREER: HERE YOU JOIN THE US NAVY AS A SUBMARINE SKIPPER
|
|
ANY TIME DURING WORLD WAR II. YOU SAIL ON A SERIES OF WAR PATROLS
|
|
IN ONE OR MORE
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
19
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
20
|
|
|
|
TYPES OF SUBS UNTIL EITHER YOU'RE KILLED OR THE WAR ENDS. THIS IS
|
|
THE LONGEST MOST ELABORATE VERSION OF SILENT SERVICE II. IT MAY
|
|
TAKE HUNDREDS OF HOURS IF YOU START AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR
|
|
(DECEMBER 7, 1941).
|
|
|
|
RESUME A SAVED GAME: THIS ALLOWS YOU TO CONTINUE A GAME PREVI-
|
|
OUSLY SAVED TO DISK.
|
|
|
|
SEE THE HALL OF FAME: THIS SHOWS THE SUBMARINER'S "HALL OF FAME".
|
|
|
|
QUIT GAME: THIS EXITS THE GAME, RETURNING YOU TO THE COMPUTERS
|
|
OPERATING SYSTEM.
|
|
|
|
RECOMMENDED CHOICES: TRY "TRAIN ADVANCE TO ONE OF THE FIRST TWO
|
|
SINGLE BATTLES ("WHALES & DUDS" OR "MUSH THE LOOSE"). AFTER THAT
|
|
TRY MORE SINGLE BATTLES OR A SINGLE WAR PATROL. SELECT DATES IN
|
|
1943 OR 1944 FOR GOOD GAMING VARIETY. FINALLY YOU'LL BE READY FOR
|
|
THE ULTIMATE TEST: A WAR CAREER STARTING DECEMBER 7TH, 1941!
|
|
|
|
|
|
DIFFICULTY LEVEL
|
|
|
|
INTRODUCTION: THIS DIFFICULTY LEVEL IS DESIGNED PURELY FOR BEGIN-
|
|
NERS. JAPANESE CONVOYS DO NOT ZIP-ZAG, YOUR DECK GUN AND TORPE-
|
|
DOES DO LARGE AMOUNTS OF DAMAGE AND YOUR SUBMARINE ALWAYS HAS
|
|
RADAR (EVEN BEFORE IT WAS REALLY INTRODUCED!). JAPANESE WARSHIP
|
|
COMMANDERS ARE SLOW TO REACT, AND IF THEY DO YOUR SUBMARINE CAN
|
|
WITHSTAND A REMARKABLE AMOUNT OF PUNISHMENT. FINALLY, WHENEVER
|
|
YOU USE THE SHIP ID BOOK, YOUR CREW WILL AUTOMATICALLY SHOW
|
|
YOU THE CORRECT PAGE.
|
|
|
|
THIS VERSION IS CONSIDERED "EASY" BY EXPERIENCE PLAYERS. CONSE-
|
|
QUENTLY, POINT SCORING IS GREATLY REDUCED.
|
|
|
|
NORMAL: THIS LEVEL INTRODUCES YOU TO THE DANGERS OF REAL COMBAT.
|
|
JAPANESE WARSHIPS ARE A BIT MORE ALERT AND ALL JAPANESE SHIPS MAY
|
|
ZIGZAG. YOU ONLY HAVE RADAR IF IT'S HISTORICALLY APPROPRIATE.
|
|
YOUR SUBMARINE MORE VULNERABLE TO DAMAGE. YOU HAVE A CHOICE BE-
|
|
TWEEN "FLAWLESS AND "HISTORICAL" TORPEDOES.
|
|
|
|
THIS VERSION IS SUGGESTED FOR "NORMAL" PLAYERS FAMILIAR WITH THE
|
|
GAME. IT'S A BIT EASIER THAN THE REALITY FACED BY SKIPPERS DURING
|
|
THE WAR (A LOT EASIER IF YOU SELECT FLAWLESS TORPEDOES)
|
|
|
|
ADVANCED: THIS LEVEL IS SIMILAR TO "NORMAL", BUT THE JAPANESE ARE
|
|
YET MORE SKILLFUL AND FREQUENTLY ZIG-ZAG, WHILE YOUR SUBMARINE'S
|
|
ABILITY STAND DAMAGE IS FAIRLY REALISTIC. YOU CAN STILL PICK
|
|
BETWEEN "FLAWLESS "HISTORICAL" TORPEDOES.
|
|
|
|
20
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
21
|
|
|
|
THIS VERSION IS SUGGESTED FOR "EXPERIENCED" PLAYERS WHO ROUTINELY
|
|
DO VERY WELL IN THE "NORMAL" VERSION. WITH HISTORICAL TORPEDOES,
|
|
THIS VERSION IS A CLOSE APPROXIMATION OF WWII REALITY.
|
|
|
|
ULTIMATE: THIS IS THE MOST DIFFICULT SETTING FOR THE GAME. THE
|
|
JAPANESE ARE SHARP-EYED SCOUNDRELS WHO CAN SMELL YOU COMING AT
|
|
LONG RANGES. YOUR SUBMARINE WAS BUILT SLAP-DASH, SO IT'S A BIT
|
|
WEAKER THAN NORMAL, YOU'RE FORCED TO USE HISTORICAL TORPEDOES,
|
|
|
|
THIS VERSION IS DESIGNED FOR PLAYERS WHO HAVE EXHAUSTED THE CHAL-
|
|
LENGE OF "ADVANCED" PLAY. IT'S PROBABLY A BIT HARDER THAN REAL
|
|
LIFE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE POINT SCORING AWARDS ARE THE HIGH-
|
|
EST.
|
|
|
|
|
|
ENTER YOUR NAME
|
|
|
|
TYPING YOUR NAME HERE MEANS THAT ALL ORDERS AND RECORDS REFLECT
|
|
YOUR NAME. TYPICAL MILITARY FORM IS A FIRST INITIAL AND A FULL
|
|
LAST NAME, BUT MANY SUBMARINER SKIPPERS WERE KNOWN BY A NICKNAME
|
|
AND A LAST NAME (SUCH AS "MUSH" MORTON OR "DICK" O'KANE).
|
|
|
|
SELECT STARTING DATE
|
|
|
|
|
|
THIS OPTION DOES NOT APPEAR IN SINGLE HISTORICAL BATTLES, SINCE
|
|
THE DATE FIXED HISTORICALLY.
|
|
|
|
OTHERWISE, THIS DETERMINES THE DATE YOU TAKE COMMAND OF YOUR NEW
|
|
BOAT. USE THE CURSOR KEYS TO SELECT THE MONTH, DAY AND YEAR. THE
|
|
DATE AFFECTS SUBMARINES AVAILABLE, WHETHER YOU HAVE RADAR (AT
|
|
"NORMAL" DIFFICULTY AND HIGHER), AND WHAT'S HAPPENING IN THE WAR.
|
|
IN A WAR PATROL OR WAR CAREER, IT DETERMINES YOUR CHOICE OF START-
|
|
ING BASE. FINALLY, IN A WAR CAREER IT DETERMINES HOW LONG THE WAR
|
|
WILL LAST - THE LATER THE DATE, THE SOONER THE WAR WILL END.
|
|
|
|
|
|
RECOMMENDED CHOICE: ALL AMERICAN SUBMARINES HAD RADAR BY THE
|
|
START OF 1943, AND HAD FIXED ALL TORPEDO DEFECTS BY THE START OF
|
|
1944. NEW PLAYERS ARE ADVISED TO SELECT A DATE IN EARLY 1944 - THE
|
|
"HAPPY HUNTING TIME" FOR AMERICAN SUBMARINES. WAR PATROLS FROM
|
|
NOVEMBER 1944 ONWARD CAN BE FRUSTRATING BECAUSE MOST JAPANESE
|
|
SHIPPING WAS ALREADY SUNK!
|
|
|
|
SELECT SUBMARINE CLASS
|
|
|
|
SUBMARINES ARE LISTED IN ASCENDING ORDER. THAT IS, THE FURTHER
|
|
DOWN THE LIST, THE BETTER THE BOAT. NATURALLY, POINT SCORING IS
|
|
IMPROVED IF YOU HAVE A POORER BOAT. SEE PAGES 107-113 FOR COMPLETE
|
|
DATA ON ALL CLASSES. A COPY OF THESE "TECHNICAL SPECS" ALSO AP-
|
|
PEARS IN YOUR LOGBOOK FOR EASY REFERENCE.
|
|
|
|
OLD `S' CLASS: THIS IS THE WORST POSSIBLE BOAT, WITH A VERY SLOW
|
|
SURFACED SPEED, FEW TORPEDO TUBES, AND VERY FEW TORPEDOES. IT ALSO
|
|
HAS EXCEPTIONALLY SHORT RANGE (35 DAYS). ONLY EXPERIENCED PLAYER
|
|
SHOULD CHOOSE THIS CLASS, AND
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
21
|
|
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|
|
|
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|
|
|
|
|
22
|
|
|
|
THEN BE CAREFUL TO STAY WITHIN THE OPERATIONAL LIMITS OF THIS
|
|
TYPE.
|
|
|
|
BARRACUDA CLASS: THIS IS A MODEST IMPROVEMENT OVER THE "S" CLASS.
|
|
THE BIGGEST GAIN IS A LONGER RANGE (50 DAYS), MAKING WAR PATROLS
|
|
EASIER. IT'S ALSO A LARGE, STRONG SUBMARINE. ASIDE FROM THE NAR-
|
|
WHALS, NOT UNTIL THE GATO CLASS DID THE US NAVY PRODUCE A SUBMA-
|
|
RINE OF EQUIVALENT STRENGTH.
|
|
|
|
NARWHAL CLASS: THIS CLASS IS VERY SLOW SUBMERGED, AND NOT VERY
|
|
MANEUVERABLE. ITS ONLY REDEEMING FEATURES ARE EXTREMELY POWERFUL
|
|
DECKGUNS AND A LARGE CAPACITY TO WITHSTAND DAMAGE (BECAUSE OF ITS
|
|
GREAT SIZE). IT IS THE FIRST OF THE FULL-RANGED (60-DAY) SUBMARINE
|
|
CLASSES.
|
|
|
|
'P' CLASS: THIS CLASS IS THE FIRST OF THE "FLEET BOATS". IT HAS
|
|
GOOD SPEED, FULL-RANGED ENDURANCE, BUT FEWER TORPEDOES AND TORPEDO
|
|
TUBES THAN YOU MIGHT DESIRE. ASIDE FROM THE OLD `S', THIS CLASS IS
|
|
THE SMALLEST AND MOST VULNERABLE TO
|
|
DAMAGE.
|
|
|
|
NEW `S' CLASS: THIS CLASS IS FASTER THAN THE P'S AND HAS BETTER
|
|
STERN TORPEDO ARMAMENT. IT IS ALSO SLIGHTLY STRONGER.
|
|
|
|
'T' CLASS: THIS CLASS IS VERY SIMILAR TO THE "GATO". THE MAIN
|
|
DIFFERENCE IS A SLIGHTLY SLOWER SPEED SUBMERGED, AND SOMEWHAT LESS
|
|
STRENGTH (THE `T'S WERE NO STRONGER THAN THE`S'S).
|
|
|
|
GATO CLASS: THIS IS THE "STANDARD" CLASS OF US SUBMARINES. IT WAS
|
|
USED THROUGHOUT THE WAR IN GREAT NUMBERS. DURING 1942 AND EARLY 4-
|
|
3 MANY OLDER TYPES WERE RETIRED, WITH THEIR CAPTAINS AND CREWS
|
|
GOING TO THE NEWER GATOS.
|
|
|
|
IMPROVED GATO CLASS: THE MAIN IMPROVEMENTS ARE A SLIGHTLY DEEPER
|
|
DIVING DEPTH AND A MORE POWERFUL DECK GUN. THESE BEGAN IN 1943.
|
|
|
|
TENCH CLASS: THIS CLASS IS VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL TO THE IMPROVED
|
|
GATO IN OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS. IT IS SLIGHTLY HARDER TO SINK.
|
|
|
|
RECOMMENDED CHOICE: NEW PLAYERS ARE STRONGLY URGED TO SELECT THE
|
|
GATO CLASS OR IMPROVED GATO CLASS. ONE OR THE OTHER IS AVAILABLE
|
|
THROUGHOUT THE WAR, AND GIVES YOU A STRONG, WELL-ARMED SUBMARINE
|
|
|
|
|
|
SELECT TORPEDO TYPE
|
|
|
|
|
|
THE SPECIFIC TYPE OF TORPEDO CARRIED (MARK 10, 14, 18-1 OR 18-2)
|
|
DEPENDS ON YOUR BOAT AND THE TIME PERIOD. OLD `S' BOATS
|
|
AUTOMATICALLY GET MARK 10S. LATER SUBS AUTOMATICALLY GET MARK 14S
|
|
UNTIL THE MARK 18S ARRIVE. THEN YOU HAVE YOUR CHOICE OF 14S OR
|
|
18S. SEE PAGES 114--115 FOR DETAILED TORPEDO SPECIFICATIONS.
|
|
|
|
FLAWLESS TORPEDOES: THESE TORPEDOES HAVE NO FAULTS. THEY ALWAYS
|
|
EXPLODE WHEN THEY HIT A TARGET. HOWEVER, THEY ARE STILL GOVERNED
|
|
BY REALISTIC
|
|
|
|
|
|
22
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
23
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
VALUES FOR MAXIMUM RANGE AND SPEED. THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE CAUSED IS
|
|
REALISTICALLY VARIABLE AS WELL.
|
|
|
|
IN ADDITION, AT THE "INTRODUCTORY" DIFFICULTY LEVEL THE TORPEDO
|
|
HAS A MORE POWERFUL WARHEAD WHICH DOES EXTRA DAMAGE.
|
|
|
|
HISTORICAL TORPEDOES: THESE TORPEDOES HAVE REALISTIC FAULTS. ALL
|
|
TORPEDOES MAY BE DUDS OCCASIONALLY, EVEN THE LATE-WAR MODEL 18S.
|
|
THIS IS REALISTIC, BUT SOMETIMES FRUSTRATING TO GAME PLAYERS.
|
|
|
|
IN ADDITION THE MARK 14S HAVE ALL THEIR HISTORICAL FAULTS IN
|
|
APPROPRIATE HISTORICAL PERIODS. THIS MEANS AN INCREASED CHANCE OF
|
|
PREMATURE EXPLOSIONS UNTIL THE MAGNETIC EXPLODER IS DISCARDED
|
|
OR DISABLED, AND AN INCREASED CHANCE OF DUDS (DEPENDING ON CONTACT
|
|
ANGLE) UNTIL THE CONTACT EXPLODER IS FIXED.
|
|
|
|
WARNING: THE MARK 14-TORPEDO FAULTS ARE VERY REALISTIC, AND ARE
|
|
CORRECTED PIECEMEAL (AS THEY WERE IN REAL LIFE). HISTORICAL GAMERS
|
|
WILL UNDOUBTEDLY ENJOY THIS CHALLENGE. HOWEVER, REMEMBER THAT
|
|
THESE FAULTS CAN BE FRUSTRATING. NOBODY LIKES TO SEE A BIG TARGET
|
|
ESCAPE JUST BECAUSE THE SILLY TORPEDOES MALFUNCTIONED. IF THE
|
|
PROSPECT OF THIS BOTHERS YOU, CHOOSE FLAWLESS TORPEDOES.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SELECT YOUR STARTING BASE
|
|
|
|
THIS OPTION IS AVAILABLE IF YOU'RE STARTING A WAR PATROL OR A WAR
|
|
CAREER. YOUR STARTING BASE AFFECTS WHICH SUBMARINE COMMAND DI-
|
|
RECTS YOUR OPERATIONS (SUBPAC OR SUBSOWESPAC), WHICH IN TURN
|
|
AFFECTS THE WAR PATROL ZONES AVAILABLE TO YOU. EQUIPMENT UPGRADES
|
|
AND SOLUTIONS TO MARK 14 TORPEDO PROBLEMS ARE ALSO AFFECTED.
|
|
|
|
ON MOST COMPUTERS YOU USE THE CURSOR KEYS TO TOGGLE THROUGH THE
|
|
BASE POSSIBILITIES. PRESS THE "ENTER" KEY TO SELECT THE BASE OF
|
|
YOUR CHOICE.
|
|
|
|
SELECT WAR PATROL ZONE
|
|
|
|
|
|
THIS OPTION APPEARS WHENEVER YOU START A WAR PATROL (INCLUDING
|
|
EACH PATROL IN A WAR CAREER). YOUR STARTING PORT AND HIGH COMMAND
|
|
(SUBPAC OR SUBSOWESPAC) AFFECT THE WAR PATROL ZONES AVAILABLE. IF
|
|
YOU'RE USING AN OLD'S' BOAT, BE SURE TO SELECT A ZONE CLOSE TO
|
|
YOUR BASE - OTHERWISE YOUR LIMITED FUEL MAY MAKE A SUCCESSFUL
|
|
PATROL IMPOSSIBLE.
|
|
|
|
ON MOST COMPUTERS YOU USE THE CURSOR KEYS TO TOGGLE THROUGH THE
|
|
ZONE
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
11
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
24
|
|
|
|
|
|
YOUR COMMAND ASSIGNMENT
|
|
|
|
THIS IS THE NAME OF A REAL US NAVY SUBMARINE OF THE APPROPRIATE
|
|
CLASS. AFTER THE OLD `S' CLASS (WHICH USED NUMBERS), AMERICAN
|
|
SUBMARINE NAMED AFTER FISH.
|
|
|
|
SAILING ORDERS
|
|
|
|
THIS IS A SUMMARY OF YOUR ORDERS FOR THE UPCOMING WAR PATROL. IT
|
|
THE PATROL ZONE YOU SELECTED, SAILING DATE, AND OTHER PERTINENT
|
|
DATA. IT'S PLACED IN YOUR LOGBOOK FOR EASY REFERENCE.
|
|
|
|
24
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
TOURING THE BOAT
|
|
|
|
|
|
THE FOLLOWING SECTION IS A GUIDED TOUR TO ALL THE STATIONS ON
|
|
YOUR BOAT. LIKE A REAL SUBMARINE SKIPPER, YOU SHOULD BE FAMILIAR
|
|
WITH ALL THE DETAILS OF YOUR COMMAND!
|
|
|
|
THE INFO PANEL
|
|
|
|
THIS READOUT PANEL APPEARS OVER THE BOTTOM OF YOUR CHARTS, BRIDGE,
|
|
AND PERISCOPE VIEWS. ON THE CHARTS IT CAN BE SWITCHED ON AND OFF
|
|
BY PRESSING THE INFO PANEL ON/OFF KEY.
|
|
|
|
DEPTH: YOUR CURRENT DEPTH, IN FEET. A DEPTH OF "000" MEANS YOU'RE
|
|
ON THE SURFACE. "RADAR DEPTH" IS 025 OR LESS - AT THESE DEPTHS
|
|
YOUR RADAR IS ABOVE WATER AND FUNCTIONAL. "PERISCOPE DEPTH" IS 055
|
|
OR LESS - AT THESE DEPTHS YOUR PERISCOPE CAN BE RAISED ABOVE
|
|
WATER.
|
|
|
|
SPEED: YOUR CURRENT SPEED, IN KNOTS. ONE KNOT IS 2002 YARDS PER
|
|
HOUR, OR 33.3 YARDS PER MINUTE. THEREFORE, A BOAT AT 10 KNOTS
|
|
TRAVELS 333 YARDS PER MINUTE, AT 20 KNOTS 666 YARDS PER INCH.
|
|
|
|
HDG (HEADING): YOUR CURRENT COURSE AS A COMPASS DIRECTION. ON A
|
|
COMPASS, NORTH IS 000, EAST 090, SOUTH 180, AND WEST 270.
|
|
|
|
BEARING: THE CURRENT BEARING TO THE ENEMY. EFFECTIVELY, IT IS THE
|
|
DIRECTION YOU'RE LOOKING (AS A LOOKOUT, WITH TBT, OR WITH THE
|
|
PERISCOPE). NOTE THAT YOUR BEARING AND HEADING CAN BE QUITE
|
|
DIFFERENT, LEADING TO PECULIAR OPTICAL ILLUSIONS.
|
|
|
|
LOADED BOW: THE NUMBER OF BOW TORPEDO TUBES LOADED AND READING
|
|
FOR ACTION. THE MAXIMUM VARIES WITH THE TYPE OF SUB YOU COMMAND.
|
|
|
|
LOADED STERN: THE NUMBER OF STERN TORPEDO TUBES LOADED AND READY
|
|
FOR ACTION. THE MAXIMUM VARIES WITH THE TYPE OF SUB YOU COMMAND.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
25
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
26
|
|
|
|
|
|
TARGET COURSE: THE COURSE, IN COMPASS DEGREES, OF THE TARGET LAST
|
|
"MARKED" BY A LOOKOUT, IN YOUR PERISCOPE, OR IN YOUR TBT.
|
|
|
|
TDC LIGHT: THIS LIGHT IS "ON" WHEN THE TDC (TORPEDO DATA COMPUTER)
|
|
IS RUNNING. IT IS "OFF" WHEN THE COMPUTER IS TURNED OFF. THE TDC
|
|
COMPUTES TORPEDO COURSES AND AUTOMATICALLY "PROGRAMS" YOUR TORPE-
|
|
DOES.
|
|
|
|
TORPEDOES RUNNING: THIS SECONDARY PANEL ONLY APPEARS ON YOUR
|
|
CHARTS (SEE BELOW). IT SHOWS WHICH TORPEDOES (IF ANY) ARE RUNNING,
|
|
PREDICTED "HIT" OR "OUT OF FUEL" TIME.
|
|
|
|
TORPEDO ID: TORPEDOES FIRED FROM THE BOW TUBES ARE LABELED B1
|
|
THROUGH B6. THOSE FIRED FROM THE STERN TUBES ARE LABELLED S1
|
|
THROUGH S4.
|
|
|
|
TORPEDO TDC LIGHT: THIS LIGHT IS ON IF THE TORPEDO WAS FIRED TDC.
|
|
IT IS OFF IF THE TORPEDO WAS FIRED MANUALLY.
|
|
|
|
TORPEDO TIMER: WHEN THIS READS 0:00, NO TORPEDO IS RUNNING.
|
|
OTHERWISE, IT SHOWS THE MINUTES OF THE TORPEDO RUN.
|
|
|
|
IF THE TDC LIGHT IS ON FOR THAT TORPEDO, THE TIMER IS COUNTING
|
|
TOWARD THE PREDICTED INTERCEPTION POINT.
|
|
|
|
IF THE TDC LIGHT IS OFF FOR THAT TORPEDO, THE TIMER COUNTS DOWN
|
|
THE TORPEDO'S FUEL (I.E., WHEN IT REACHES ZERO, THE TORPEDO RUNS
|
|
OUT OF FUEL).
|
|
|
|
THE CHART
|
|
|
|
YOUR SUBMARINE HAS A COMPLETE SET OF CHARTS FOR THE ENTIRE WESTERN
|
|
PACIFIC OCEAN AT FOUR DIFFERENT SCALES. THE LARGEST SCALE SHOWS
|
|
THE ENTIRE OCEAN ON ONE CHART. SMALLER SCALES SHOW A LARGE,
|
|
MEDIUM OR SMALL AMOUNT OF ARE . YOU CHANGE CHART SCALE BY TAPPING
|
|
THE ZOOM KEYS.
|
|
|
|
ALL CHARTS SHOW AREAS OF LAND AND SEA. LIGHTER-COLORED SEA AREAS
|
|
|
|
|
|
26
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
27
|
|
|
|
|
|
ARE SHALLOW WATER. THE DEPTH VARIES
|
|
FROM 50 TO 200 FEET EXCEPT CLOSE TO
|
|
LAND OR REEFS, WHERE IT MAY BE EVEN
|
|
SHALLOWER.
|
|
|
|
YOUR POSITION ON THE PACIFIC OCEAN (LARGEST SCALE) CHART IS A
|
|
SINGLE DOT. ON ALL SMALLER SCALE CHARTS YOUR POSITION IS REPRE-
|
|
SENTED BY A SMALL LINE AND A WAKE SHOWING YOUR SPEED AND DIRECTION
|
|
OF TRAVEL.
|
|
THE ZOOM BOX APPEARS AROUND YOUR POSITION ON ALL CHARTS EXCEPT THE
|
|
SMALLEST. IT REPRESENTS THE AREA IN THE NEXT SMALLER CHART. HOWEV-
|
|
ER, THE BOX ON THE PACIFIC OCEAN CHART IS OVERSIZED, SINCE AN
|
|
ACCURATELY SIZED BOX WOULD BE A SINGLE DOT!
|
|
|
|
CHART PLOTS
|
|
|
|
CHART SCALES: THE AMOUNT OF AREA COVERED BY EACH CHART VARIES,
|
|
DEPENDING ON WHETHER THE INFORMATION PANEL IS PRESENT ACROSS THE
|
|
BOTTOM.
|
|
|
|
YOUR CREW AUTOMATICALLY UPDATES ("PLOTS") EACH CHART WITH THE
|
|
POSITION OF YOUR BOAT, ALL ENEMY SHIPS, AND ALL TORPEDOES. EACH
|
|
OF THESE APPEARS AS A SHORT COLORED LINE. THE COLOR VARIES WITH
|
|
THE TYPE OF CONTACT (RADAR, SONAR OR VISUAL, IN ASCENDING PRIORI-
|
|
TY). EACH HAS A "TAIL", OR WAKE. THE SIZE OF THE WAKE
|
|
ROUGHLY REPRESENTS THE SPEED OF THE SHIP OR TORPEDO. THE DIRECTION
|
|
OF THE SHIP AND WAKE TOGETHER APPROXIMATE THE DIRECTION OF TRAVEL.
|
|
SEE THE TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT FOR SYMBOLS AND COLORS.
|
|
|
|
NORMALLY THE CHART BEGINS CENTERED ON YOUR SUBMARINE. HOWEVER, IF
|
|
THE TDC (TORPEDO DATA COMPUTER, SEE PAGES 47-50) IS RUNNING, THE
|
|
CHART IS CENTERED HALFWAY BETWEEN YOUR SUB AND THE "MARKED" TARGET
|
|
(BUT ONLY IF BOTH CAN FIT ON THE CHART AT THAT SCALE).
|
|
|
|
YOUR CREW CONSTANTLY UPDATES THE POSITION OF YOUR BOAT AND ALL
|
|
YOUR TORPEDOES. THEY ALSO UPDATE ALL ENEMY SHIPS WITH THE BEST
|
|
AVAILABLE INFORMATION. IF YOUR BOAT CAN SEE THE ENEMY, OR IS USING
|
|
RADAR, ENEMY POSITIONS ARE VERY ACCURATE. IF YOUR BOAT IS USING
|
|
SONAR ONLY, ENEMY POSITIONS ARE FAIRLY GOOD,BUT NOT PERFECT.
|
|
|
|
IF THE CREW HAS NO NEW INFORMATION AN A SHIP, THEY REMOVE IT FROM
|
|
THE PLOT. OF COURSE, THE ENEMY IS PROBABLY STILL BE THERE, JUST
|
|
OUTSIDE OF DETECTION RANGE!
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
27
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
28
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
THIS IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT IF YOU'RE SURFACING AFTER RUNNING
|
|
DEEP. IT PAYS TO RAISE THE PERISCOPE AND LOOK AROUND FIRST!
|
|
|
|
THE CREW ALSO PLOTS SINKING SHIPS FOR A WHILE AFTER THEY DISAPPEAR
|
|
BENEATH THE SURFACE. THIS HELPS REMIND YOU THAT A SLOWLY SINKING
|
|
HULK CAN BE A NAVIGATION HAZARD.
|
|
|
|
|
|
PERISCOPE
|
|
|
|
THE PERISCOPE MUST BE RAISED ("UP") BEFORE YOU CAN USE THIS VIEW.
|
|
YOUR DEPTH MUST BE 55' OR LESS TO USE THE PERISCOPE. YOU CANNOT
|
|
USE THE PERISCOPE IF IT'S LOWERED. IF YOU PRESS PERISCOPE AND
|
|
NOTHING HAPPENS THE PERISCOPE IS PROBABLY DOWN. TRY TAPPING PERI-
|
|
SCOPE UP/DOWN ONCE TO RAISE THE SCOPE.
|
|
|
|
THE DIRECTION YOUR VIEW FACES APPEARS IN BEARING ON THE INFO
|
|
PANEL. THE PERISCOPE CAN BE ROTATED TO LOOK IN ANY DIRECTION.
|
|
THE VIEW LEFT, VIEW LEFT FAST, VIEW RIGHT AND VIEW RIGHT FAST KEYS
|
|
CONTROL ROTATION.
|
|
|
|
VIEW AREA: THIS IS THE SEASCAPE VISIBLE THROUGH THE PERISCOPE
|
|
LENS. THE VIEW CAN BE ROTATED LEFT OR RIGHT. THE VIEW LEFT, VIEW
|
|
LEFT FAST, VIEW RIGHT AND VIEW RIGHT FAST KEYS CONTROL ROTATION.
|
|
HOWEVER, THESE ONLY WORK IF THE TDC IS OFF. IF THE TDC IS RUNNING
|
|
THESE KEYS CONTROL THE TORPEDO AIMING POINTER.
|
|
|
|
AIMING SCALE: THIS SCALE IN THE BOTTOM OF THE VIEW AREA IS USED TO
|
|
"MARK" TARGETS AND AIM TORPEDOES. WHENEVER THE SCALE BRIGHTENS
|
|
YOU HAVE "MARKED" A TARGET. YOUR CREW AUTOMATICALLY UPDATES ALL
|
|
TORPEDO FIRING DATA TO THE LAST "MARK" GIVEN. THIS DATA ALSO
|
|
APPEARS ON THE INFO PANEL.
|
|
|
|
YOUR CREW CAN ONLY TRACK ON TARGET A A TIME. WHEN EVER YOU GIVE A
|
|
NEW "MARK" (BY MOVING THE SCALE ONTO A TARGET UNTIL IT BRIGHTENS)
|
|
YOU ERASE ALL EARLIER INFORMATION.
|
|
|
|
|
|
28
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
29
|
|
|
|
|
|
TORPEDO AIMING POINTER: THIS APPEARS ON THE BRIGHTENED SCALE ONLY
|
|
WHEN THE TDC IS ON (RUNNING). IT AIMS TORPEDOES LEFT, RIGHT OR
|
|
DIRECTLY AT THE TARGET. THE VIEW LEFT AND VIEW RIGHT KEYS
|
|
ADJUST THE AIMING POINTER, NOT YOUR VIEW AREA.
|
|
|
|
MAGNIFICATION: YOUR PERISCOPE HAS FOUR MAGNIFICATION LEVELS: "1 "
|
|
(NORMAL VISION) TO "4" (MAXIMUM MAGNIFICATION). THESE ARE CON-
|
|
TROLLED BY THE ZOOM AND UNZOOM KEYS.
|
|
|
|
INFO PANEL: SEE ABOVE.
|
|
|
|
BRIDGE LOOKOUT
|
|
|
|
THE BRIDGE LOOKOUT IS AVAILABLE ONLY IF YOU'RE ON THE SURFACE (AT
|
|
DEPTH 000). IT SHOWS THE VIEW FROM THE TOP OF THE CONNING TOWER
|
|
("BRIDGE"), AS SEEN BY A LOOKOUT. IT SHOWS ONE QUARTER (ABOUT 90")
|
|
OF THE HORIZON AROUND YOUR BOAT. THE DIRECTION YOU'RE FACING
|
|
APPEARS IN BEARING ON THE INFO PANEL.
|
|
THE VIEW CAN BE ROTATED LEFT OR RIGHT.
|
|
THE VIEW LEFT, VIEW LEFT FAST, VIEW RIGHT AND VIEW RIGHT FAST KEYS
|
|
CONTROL ROTATION.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
29
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
30
|
|
|
|
|
|
THIS IS AVAILABLE ONLY IF YOU'RE ON THE SURFACE (AT DEPTH 000).
|
|
IT SHOWS THE THE VIEW FROM THE TOP OF THE CONNING TOWER (BRIDGE)
|
|
AS YOU LOOK THROUGH BINOCULARS MOUNTED IN THE TBT (TARGET BEARING
|
|
TRANSMITTER).
|
|
|
|
THE TBT (TARGET BEARING TRANSMITTER) IS USED TO AIM YOUR TORPEDOES
|
|
AND DECK GUN WHILE YOU'RE ON THE SURFACE. THE DIRECTION YOU'VE
|
|
LOOKING APPEARS IN BEARING ON THE INFO PANEL.
|
|
|
|
VIEW AREA: THIS IS THE SEASCAPE VISIBLE THROUGH THE BINOCULAR
|
|
LENSES. THE VIEW CAN BE ROTATED LEFT OR RIGHT. THE VIEW LEFT,
|
|
VIEW LEFT FAST, VIEW RIGHT, AND VIEW RIGHT FAST KEYS CONTROL
|
|
ROTATION. THESE KEYS WORK WHILE THE TDC IS OFF. IF THE TDC IS
|
|
RUNNING, THESE KEYS CONTROL THE TORPEDO AIMING POINTER INSTEAD.
|
|
|
|
DECK GUN ELEVATION ADJUSTMENT: THIS INDICATES HOW MUCH EXTRA
|
|
ELEVATION OR DEPRESSION YOU'RE ORDERING TO THE DECK GUN CREW. A
|
|
"0" MEANS THE GUN IS ELEVATED CORRECTLY FOR THE TARGET'S CURRENT
|
|
RANGE. A "+1" OR MORE MEANS THE GUN IS ELEVATED ESPECIALLY HIGH
|
|
(USEFUL IF THE TARGET IS OPENING THE RANGE TO YOU), WHILE "-1" OR
|
|
LESS MEANS THE GUN IS DEPRESSED MORE THAN NORMAL (USEFUL IF THE
|
|
TARGET IS CLOSING THE RANGE). NOTE: "0" DOES NOT MEAN THE DECK
|
|
GUN IS SHOOTING AT "0" RANGE.
|
|
|
|
DECK GUN ELEVATION IS CONTROLLED BY ADDING OR SUBTRACTING DEGREES
|
|
USING THE GUN DOWN (-) 1 DEGREE AND THE GUN UP (+) 1 DEGREE KEYS.
|
|
|
|
IMPORTANT NOTE: YOU CANNOT USE THE DECK GUN UNLESS YOUR TDC IS
|
|
ALREADY TRACKING A TARGET. SEE TDC ON/OFF (PAGE 51) FOR DETAILS.
|
|
|
|
AIMING SCALE: THIS SCALE IN THE BOTTOM OF THE VIEW AREA "MARKS"
|
|
TARGETS AND AIMS THE DECK GUN AND TORPEDOES. WHENEVER THE SCALE
|
|
BRIGHTENS YOU HAVE "MARKED" A TARGET.
|
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30
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31
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|
|
|
YOUR CREW AUTOMATICALLY UPDATES ALL FIRING DATA TO THE LAST "MARK"
|
|
GIVEN. THIS DATA ALSO APPEARS ON THE INFO PANEL.
|
|
|
|
YOUR CREW TRACKS ONLY ONE TARGET AT A TIME. WHENEVER YOU GIVE A
|
|
NEW "MARK" (BY MOVING THE SCALE ONTO A TARGET UNTIL IT BRIGHTENS)
|
|
YOU DROP THE PREVIOUS TARGET.
|
|
|
|
TORPEDO AIMING POINTER: THIS APPEARS ON THE BRIGHTENED SCALE WHEN
|
|
THE TDC IS ON (RUNNING). IT AIMS TORPEDOES LEFT, RIGHT OR DIRECTLY
|
|
AT THE TARGET. VIEW LEFT AND VIEW RIGHT KEYS ADJUST THE AIMING
|
|
POINTER, NOT YOUR VIEW AREA.
|
|
|
|
MAGNIFICATION: THE TBT BINOCULARS HAVE FOUR MAGNIFICATION LEVELS:
|
|
"1" (NORMAL VISION) TO "4" (MAXIMUM MAGNIFICATION). THESE ARE
|
|
CONTROLLED BY THE ZOOM AND UNZOOM KEYS.
|
|
|
|
INFO PANEL: SEE ABOVE.
|
|
|
|
GAUGES
|
|
|
|
BY TAPPING THE GAUGES KEY, YOU
|
|
CAN SEE ALL THE IMPORTANT GAUGES THAT
|
|
REPORT ON THE CONDITIONS OF YOUR BOAT
|
|
AND THE SURROUNDING ENVIRONMENT.\
|
|
|
|
CRITICAL GAUGES
|
|
|
|
THESE GAUGES PROVIDE INFORMATION USEFUL IN BATTLE AND UNAVAILABLE
|
|
ELSEWHERE. YOU SHOULD CONSULT THE GAUGES PERIODICALLY.
|
|
|
|
DEPT UNDER KEEL (DUK): THIS INDICATES THE DEPTH OF THE WATER (IN
|
|
FEET) BETWEEN THE KEEL (BOTTOM) OF YOUR SUB AND SEA BOTTOM. KEEP
|
|
A CLOSE EYE ON THE DUK IF YOU'RE IN SHALLOW WATER OR UNDERTAKING
|
|
A DEEP DIVE. HITTING THE BOTTOM CAN SERIOUSLY DAMAGE YOUR SUB.
|
|
|
|
WATER TEMPERATURE (TEMP): THIS INDICATES THE TEMPERATURE OF THE
|
|
WATER OUTSIDE THE HULL. THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT IF YOU'RE TRYING
|
|
TO EVADE
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
31
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|
32
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|
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|
|
|
DETECTION BY ENEMY SONAR. AT A MIDDLE DEPTH (USUALLY BETWEEN 100'
|
|
AND 200') THE WATER TEMPERATURE SUDDENLY DROPS, THE BOUNDARY
|
|
BETWEEN THE WARM SURFACE WATER AND THE COLD DEEPER WATER IS "THE
|
|
LAYER". THIS BOUNDARY LINE DEFLECTS SONAR, WHICH HELPS HIDE YOU
|
|
FROM SURFACE SHIPS.
|
|
|
|
BATTERY LEVEL: WHEN SUBMERGED YOUR SUB IS POWERED BY BATTERIES,
|
|
WHICH DISCHARGE SLOWLY. MOVING SUBMERGED INCREASES THE AMOUNT OF
|
|
DISCHARGE. THE FASTER YOU GO, THE FASTER YOUR BATTERIES DISCHARGE.
|
|
WHILE SITTING STATIONARY, YOUR BATTERY CAN LAST ABOUT 24 HOURS, AT
|
|
QUARTER SPEED ABOUT 12 HOURS, HALF SPEED ABOUT 5 HOURS, AT FULL
|
|
SPEED ABOUT 2 1/4 HOURS, AND AT FLANK SPEED ABOUT 1 1/4-HOURS.
|
|
|
|
YOUR BATTERIES CAN ONLY BE RECHARGED WHILE ON THE SURFACE.
|
|
WHENEVER YOU'RE SURFACED, ANY DIESEL ENGINES NOT USED FOR MOVEMENT
|
|
ARE USED INSTEAD TO RECHARGE THE BATTERIES. IT TAKES ALL FOUR
|
|
DIESEL ENGINES A COUPLE OF HOURS TO COMPLETELY RECHARGE THE BAT-
|
|
TERIES. HOWEVER, YOU MUST BE AT "ALL STOP" TO USE FOUR DIESELS
|
|
FOR RECHARGING. IF YOU HAVE SOME ENGINES MOVING THE BOAT, IT TAKES
|
|
PROPORTIONATELY LONGER TO RECHARGE THE BATTERIES (WITH TWO ENGINES
|
|
MOVING THE BOAT AND TWO RECHARGING, IT TAKES TWICE AS LONG, WITH
|
|
THREE MOVING THE BOAT AND ONE RECHARGING, FOUR TIMES AS LONG). NO
|
|
RECHARGING OCCURS IF YOU'RE MOVING AT FLANK (MAXIMUM) SPEED.
|
|
|
|
CLOCK: THIS IS A 24-HOUR MILITARY CLOCK. AS ON ALL CLOCKS, THE
|
|
SMALL HAND SHOWS THE HOURS, THE LARGE HAND THE MINUTES. ON A
|
|
MILITARY CLOCK TIME RUNS FROM 0000 TO 2400. FOR EXAMPLE 8 AM IS
|
|
0800; NOON IS 1200, 3 PM IS 1500, 10 PM IS 2200 AND MIDNIGHT IS
|
|
2400.
|
|
|
|
USEFUL GAUGES
|
|
|
|
THESE GAUGES EITHER REPEAT INFORMATION ON THE INFO PANEL OR ARE
|
|
LESS CRITICAL IN BATTLE.
|
|
|
|
SPEED: THIS SHOWS YOUR CURRENT SPEED IN KNOTS (NAUTICAL MILES PER
|
|
HOUR).
|
|
|
|
ENGINE ROOM TELEGRAPH: THIS SHOWS WHICH OF THE FOUR ENGINES ARE
|
|
MOVING THE SUB. IF "4" IS LIT, ALL ENGINES ARE RUNNING FOR MAXI-
|
|
MUM SPEED. WHEN "2" IS LIT, TWO ARE RUNNING FOR HALF SPEED, ETC.
|
|
"STOP" MEANS NONE ARE RUNNING. "BACK" MEANS ALL ENGINES ARE
|
|
MOVING THE BOAT SLOWLY IN REVERSE.
|
|
|
|
IF YOU'RE ON THE SURFACE, ANY ENGINE NOT CURRENTLY DRIVING THE SUB
|
|
IS RECHARGING THE BATTERIES - IF THEY NEED RECHARGING.
|
|
|
|
32
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
33
|
|
|
|
|
|
DEPTH: THIS INDICATES THE CURRENT DEPTH (IN FEET) OF YOUR SUBMA-
|
|
RINE. ONCE YOU BEGIN TO SUBMERGE (GO TO A DEPTH OF 1' OR MORE) ALL
|
|
HATCHES ARE CLOSED AND LOCKED. THIS PREVENTS YOU FROM GETTING TO
|
|
THE BRIDGE LOOKOUT AND BRIDGE TBT. HOWEVER, AT DEPTHS UP TO 25'
|
|
YOUR RADAR CAN STILL OPERATE. AT DEPTHS UP TO 55' YOUR PERISCOPE
|
|
CAN STILL REACH THE SURFACE.
|
|
|
|
LEVELING BUBBLE: THIS IS MUCH LIKE A CARPENTER'S LEVEL. IT INDI-
|
|
CATES WHETHER THE SUB IS DIVING, RISING, OR RUNNING STEADY. WHEN
|
|
THE BUBBLE FLOATS TO THE RIGHT, YOU'RE DIVING; WHEN TO THE LEFT,
|
|
YOU'RE CLIMBING. WHEN THE BUBBLE IS IN THE MIDDLE, YOUR SUB IS
|
|
LEVEL.
|
|
|
|
COMPASS: THIS INDICATING THE DIRECTION YOU'RE TRAVELING. NORTH IS
|
|
000, EAST IS 090, SOUTH IS 180, AND WEST IS 270.
|
|
|
|
FORWARD TORPEDO TUBE INDICATORS SHOW THE NUMBER OF FORWARD TORPEDO
|
|
TUBES CURRENTLY LOADED. A TUBE THAT'S LOADED AND READY IS ILLUMI-
|
|
NATED, A TUBE THAT'S EMPTY OR RELOADING IS DARK.
|
|
|
|
AFT TORPEDO TUBE INDICATORS SHOW THE NUMBER OF AFT TORPEDO TUBES
|
|
CURRENTLY LOADED. A TUBE THAT'S LOADED AND READY IS ILLUMINATED, A
|
|
TUBE THAT'S EMPTY OR RELOADING IS DARK.
|
|
|
|
FORWARD TORPEDO RELOADS INDICATES THE NUMBER OF TORPEDOS AVAILABLE
|
|
FOR RELOADING IN FORWARD TUBES. THEREFORE, THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
|
|
FORWARD-FIRING TORPEDOS ON YOUR BOAT IS THE NUMBER OF LOADED TUBES
|
|
PLUS THESE RELOADS.
|
|
|
|
AFT TORPEDO RELOADS INDICATES THE NUMBER OF TORPEDOS AVAILABLE FOR
|
|
RELOADING IN AFT TUBES. THEREFORE, THE TOTAL NUMBER OF AFT-FIRING
|
|
TORPEDOS ON YOUR BOAT IS THE NUMBER OF LOADED TUBES PLUS THESE
|
|
RELOADS.
|
|
|
|
FUEL GAUGE: THIS "COLUMN" GAUGE SHOWS YOUR REMAINING FUEL OIL. IT
|
|
HAS THREE COLUMNS, WITH EACH DIVIDED INTO A NUMBER OF SECTIONS.
|
|
SINCE OIL IS BLACK, THE DARK AREAS SHOW FUEL REMAINING, WHILE
|
|
LIGHTER SECTIONS SHOW WATER. NOTE -THAT OIL FLOATS ON WATER, AND
|
|
IS THEREFORE ALWAYS AT THE TOP PART OF THE GAUGE.
|
|
|
|
CHRISTMAS TREE: THIS AREA SHOWS WHICH HATCHES AND OTHER OPENINGS
|
|
ARE OPEN (RED) OR CLOSED (GREEN). THE "TREE" IS GREEN WHEN YOU
|
|
DIVE.
|
|
|
|
|
|
DAMAGE REPORT
|
|
|
|
THIS DISPLAY SHOWS THE MAJOR SYSTEMS ON YOUR SUBMARINE, AND THEIR
|
|
DAMAGE STATUS. WHENEVER A SYSTEM IS DAMAGED, ITS CURRENT CONDI-
|
|
TION IS LIGHTED. IF A SYSTEM IS UNDAMAGED OR COMPLETELY RE-
|
|
PAIRED, IT'S DARK.
|
|
|
|
SOME DAMAGE IS TEMPORARY. IF SO, "REPAIRING" MAY BE LIGHTED ALSO.
|
|
REPAIRS CAN TAKE A FEW MINUTES TO A FEW DAYS, DEPENDING ON THE
|
|
SYSTEM.
|
|
|
|
SOME DAMAGE IS PERMANENT. IT CANNOT BE REPAIRED UNTIL YOU RETURN
|
|
TO BASE. ONCE AT A FRIENDLY BASE, ALL DAMAGE IS AUTOMATICALLY
|
|
REPAIRED.
|
|
|
|
|
|
33
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
34
|
|
|
|
|
|
DAMAGE PERCENTAGE: YOUR SUB CANNOT TAKE DAMAGE FOREVER. EVENTU-
|
|
ALLY THE ACCUMULATED DAMAGE WILL WEAKEN YOUR HULL SO MUCH THAT THE
|
|
SUBMARINE SINKS IN FACT, A QUICK SERIES OF VERY BAD HITS COULD DO
|
|
THIS ALMOST INSTANTLY. THE DAMAGE PERCENTAGE IS AN ESTIMATE FROM
|
|
YOUR CREW OF HOW CLOSE YOU'VE COME TO A CATASTROPHIC COLLAPSE AND
|
|
SINKING. SOMETIMES YOU MAY FINS THE PERCENTAGE BECOMES LESS.
|
|
THIS OCCURS AS THE CREW REPAIRS DAMAGE. IF DAMAGE DOES NOT
|
|
THREATEN THE WATERTIGHT INTEGRITY OF THE BOAST THE CREW MAY IGNORE
|
|
IT FOR PERCENTAGE PURPOSES. AS A RESULT YOU MAY HAVE A PIECE OF
|
|
EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTIONING WHILE THE DAMAGE READS 00%.
|
|
|
|
SOME DAMAGE IS UNREPAIRABLE EXCEPT AT A BASE. AS CAPTAIN YOU MUST
|
|
JUDGE WHEN YOU SHOULD BREAK OFF THE BATTLE OR THE PATROL AND
|
|
RETURN FOR REPAIRS.
|
|
|
|
PERISCOPE
|
|
|
|
YOU CANNOT LOOK THROUGH A DAMAGED PERISCOPE--USUALLY BECAUSE THE
|
|
TUBE IS BENT AND/OR JAMMED. THIS MAKES UNDERWATER ATTACKS SO
|
|
DIFFICULT AND INACCURATE THAT YOU'RE ADVISED TO ATTACK ONLY FROM
|
|
THE SURFACE.
|
|
|
|
PERISCOPE DAMAGE CAN BE REPAIRED ONLY AT A BASE.
|
|
|
|
RADAR
|
|
|
|
WRECKED RADAR DOES NOT FUNCTION AT ALL. AS A RESULT, YOUR CON-
|
|
TACTS ARE AT CLOSER RANGES. YOU'LL HAVE TO RELY ON EYESIGHT,
|
|
PERISCOPE OBSERVATIONS AND SONAR, WHICH ARE USUALLY SHORTER RANGED
|
|
THAN RADAR.
|
|
|
|
IN 1944 AND 1945 WRECKED RADAR IS ESPECIALLY DISADVANTAGEOUS AT
|
|
NIGHT SINCE THE JAPANESE MAY HAVE THEIR OWN RADARS, AND THEREFORE
|
|
COULD (ON THEIR RADAR) BEFORE YOU SPOT THEM (WITH YOUR LOOKOUTS).
|
|
|
|
WRECKED RADAR CAN BE REPAIRED ONLY AT A BASE.
|
|
|
|
DECK GUN
|
|
|
|
A WRECKED DECK GUN CANNOT FIRE. NOW YOUR ONLY WEAPON IS TORPE-
|
|
DOES. ONCE WRECKED, A DECK GUN CAN BE REPAIRED ONLY AT A BASE.
|
|
|
|
TORPEDO ROOMS
|
|
|
|
THESE ARE THE CREW AREAS THAT RELOAD AND CONTROL THE TORPEDO
|
|
TUBES. MOST SPARE TORPEDOES ARE ALSO STORED HERE.
|
|
|
|
34
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
35
|
|
|
|
|
|
FLOODING/REPAIRING: WHEN A TORPEDO ROOM IS DAMAGED IT BEGINS TO
|
|
FLOOD. THE CREW IMMEDIATELY BEGINS REPAIRS. WHILE REPAIRS ARE IN
|
|
PROGRESS THE TUBES CANNOT BE FIRED. ONCE THE CREW HAS COMPLETED
|
|
REPAIRS, THE EFFICIENCY OF THE TORPEDO ROOM RETURNS TO NORMAL.
|
|
|
|
HALF OUT: IF A FLOODING TORPEDO ROOM SUFFERS FURTHER DAMAGE, HALF
|
|
OR ALL OF THE TUBES MAY BE PERMANENTLY OUT OF ACTION.
|
|
|
|
ENGINES
|
|
|
|
YOUR SUB HAS FOUR DIESEL ENGINES. THESE PROVIDE POWER FOR MOVING
|
|
ON THE SURFACE AND FOR RECHARGING BATTERIES. WHENEVER AN ENGINE IS
|
|
WRECKED YOUR MAXIMUM SPEED IS REDUCED (AND BATTERY RECHARGING IS
|
|
MADE MORE DIFFICULT).
|
|
|
|
DAMAGED/REPAIRING: A DAMAGED ENGINE IS OUT OF ACTION UNTIL THE
|
|
CREW REPAIRS IT. ONCE REPAIRED, IT FUNCTIONS NORMALLY AGAIN.
|
|
ENGINE REPAIRS ARE OFTEN LENGTHY - DON'T EXPECT RESULTS IN JUST A
|
|
FEW MINUTES.
|
|
|
|
WRECKED: A WRECKED ENGINE IS BEYOND REPAIR BY YOUR CREW. IT
|
|
CANNOT BE USED FOR THE REST OF THE VOYAGE. IT CAN BE REPAIRED
|
|
ONLY AT A BASE.
|
|
|
|
FUEL TANKS
|
|
|
|
THE FUEL TANKS CARRY OIL FOR YOUR DIESEL ENGINES. IF A FUEL TANK
|
|
IS DAMAGED, YOU IMMEDIATELY LOSE A LARGE AMOUNT OF OIL. THIS LOSS
|
|
CAN SERIOUSLY AFFECT YOUR CRUISING RANGE.
|
|
|
|
THE CREW AUTOMATICALLY SHUTS OFF VALVES TO ISOLATE THE DAMAGE.
|
|
HOWEVER, SMALL LEAKS CONTINUE. THE LEAKAGE MAY REVEAL YOUR POSI-
|
|
TION TO A NEARBY ENEMY, BUT ISN'T LARGE ENOUGH TO CAUSE ANY FUR-
|
|
THER REDUCTIONS IN YOUR CRUISING RANGE.
|
|
|
|
YOU CAN SUFFER MULTIPLE HIS IN YOUR FUEL TANKS, WITH A ONE-TIME
|
|
LOSS IN CRUISING RANGE WITH EACH HIT. LEAKING FUEL TANKS CAN BE
|
|
REPAIRED ONLY AT A BASE.
|
|
|
|
BATTERIES
|
|
|
|
YOUR SUB USES TWO LARGE BANKS OF BATTERIES, ON FORWARD, ONE AFT,
|
|
TO POWER ITS ELECTRIC ENGINES FOR UNDERWATER TRAVEL. IF ONE
|
|
BATTER IS DAMAGED YOU'RE REDUCED TO HALF SPEED SUBMERGED. IF BOTH
|
|
ARE DAMAGED YOU'RE IMMOBILIZED UNTIL AT LEAST ONE IS REPAIRED, OR
|
|
UNTIL YOU SURFACE. YOU CAN STILL SURFACE AND DIVE, REGARDLESS OF
|
|
BATTERY DAMAGE.
|
|
|
|
DAMAGED/REPAIRING: THE BATTER IS OUT OF ACTION UNTIL THE CREW
|
|
REPAIRS IT. ONCE REPAIRED, IT FUNCTIONS NORMALLY AGAIN.
|
|
|
|
FLOODED, SURFACE: IF A DAMAGED BATTERY SUFFERS FURTHER DAMAGE,
|
|
FLOODING REACHES LEAKING BATTERY ACIDS, GENERATING DEADLY CHLORINE
|
|
GAS. YOU MUST SURFACE IMMEDIATELY, BEFORE THE GAS KILLS YOU AND
|
|
YOUR CREW. IN THIS SITUATION YOU SHOULD HIT THE BLOW ALL TANKS
|
|
KEY AND SURFACE AS FAST AS POSSIBLE.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
35
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
36
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ONCE SURFACED YOUR CREW IMMEDIATELY VENTS THE GAS FUMES. YOU CAN
|
|
DIVE AGAIN IF YOU WISH. MEANWHILE, REPAIRS CONTINUE ON THE DAMAGED
|
|
BATTERY.
|
|
|
|
DIVE PLANES
|
|
|
|
|
|
THE DIVE PLANES ALLOW YOUR BOAT TO DIVE AND SURFACE QUICKLY: THEY
|
|
ACT AS "WINGS," GUIDING THE SHIP SMOOTHLY UP OR DOWN. IF THE DIVE
|
|
PLANES ARE DAMAGED YOUR ABILITY TO CONTROL THE SHIP WHEN DIVING OR
|
|
CLIMBING IS REDUCED. @ IT TAKES LONGER TO DIVE AND LONGER TO
|
|
SURFACE.
|
|
|
|
ADDITIONAL DAMAGE TO THE DIVE PLANES CAN WRECK THEM. IF THE PLANES
|
|
ARE WRECKED YOU CANNOT DIVE AT ALL, AND CAN RISE ONLY BY "BLOWING
|
|
ALL TANK THE SURFACE. REPAIRING WRECKED PLANES IS VIRTUALLY IMPOS-
|
|
SIBLE AT SEA TO BE STUCK ON THE SURFACE UNTIL YOU REACH A BASE FOR
|
|
REPAIRS.
|
|
|
|
FIRE MIDSHIPS
|
|
|
|
|
|
SOMETIMES DAMAGE CAUSES FIRES. THE MOST LIKELY AREA IS THE WHERE
|
|
MANY ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS MEET IN THE CONTROL PANELS. WHEN A
|
|
OCCURS THE CREW WORKS QUICKLY TO EXTINGUISH IT. HOWEVER, UNTIL
|
|
IT'S OUT OF THE CREW REACTS SLOWLY TO ALL YOUR COMMANDS. IN FACT,
|
|
DON'T BE SURPRISED IF SEEMS TO IGNORE YOUR COMMANDS (YOU MAY NEED
|
|
TO PRESS A KEY MULTIPLE TIMES TO "GET THROUGH" TO YOUR DISTRACTED
|
|
CREW).
|
|
|
|
A CONTINUING FIRE CAUSES DAMAGE TO YOUR STRUCTURAL STRENGTH AND
|
|
THE SUBMARINE'S OVERALL SURVIVABILITY.
|
|
|
|
BULKHEADS
|
|
|
|
YOUR SUBMARINE'S STRUCTURAL STRENGTH LARGELY DEPENDS ON ITS BULK-
|
|
HEADS. THESE ARE THE BASIC SKELETAL STRUCTURE OF THE VESSEL. IF
|
|
A BULKHEAD BUCKLES OR CRACKS, THE ENTIRE HULL IS WEAKENED. THIS
|
|
PRODUCES PERMANENT DAMAGE.
|
|
|
|
WEAKENED/REPAIRING: WHEN A BULKHEAD IS DAMAGED, THE CREW IMMEDI-
|
|
ATELY STARTS REPAIRS. THESE REPAIRS ARE MAINLY "SHORING UP" THE
|
|
WEAKENED MEMBER WITH BEAMS CARRIED ESPECIALLY FOR THIS PURPOSE.
|
|
|
|
ONCE A BULKHEAD IS WEAKENED AND UNDER REPAIR, YOUR MAXIMUM SAFE
|
|
DIVING DEPTH IS REDUCED TO HALF(50%) OF THE NORMAL VALUE. FUR-
|
|
THERMORE YOUR BOAT CANNOT TURN AS FAST.
|
|
|
|
SHORED UP: IF REPAIRS ARE SUCCESSFUL, THE BULKHEAD IS "SHORED UP"
|
|
TURNING ABILITY BECOMES SOMEWHAT BETTER, BUT THE SAFE DIVING DEPTH
|
|
IS STILL (50%) OF THE NORMAL VALUE . FURTHERMORE, THE OVERALL
|
|
STRENGTH OF THE SUBMARINE REMAINS LESS THAN BEFORE.
|
|
|
|
MULTIPLE BULKHEAD HITS GREATLY WEAKEN THE HULL OF YOUR SUBMARINE,
|
|
UNTIL EVENTUALLY IT CRUMPLES. THIS IS TRUE EVEN IF THE BULKHEADS
|
|
ARE SHORE( OR MORE BULKHEADS HAVE BEEN WEAKENED, HEAD FOR BASE
|
|
IMMEDIATE--EVEN
|
|
|
|
36
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
37
|
|
|
|
|
|
IF THEY'RE SHORED UP YOU'RE STILL IN GREAT" DANGER.
|
|
|
|
SINKING: MULTIPLE BULKHEAD
|
|
DAMAGE CAN CRACK YOUR HULL. THE SUB
|
|
BEGINS TO BREAK UP AND SINK. IF YOU'RE
|
|
VERY QUICK AND VERY LUCKY, SOMETIMES
|
|
BLOWING ALL TANKS WILL RELIEVE THE PRESSURE
|
|
ON THE HULL AND STOP THIS. BUT THIS
|
|
IS A LAST AND OFTEN FORLORN HOPE. USUALLY
|
|
YOUR DOOMED.
|
|
|
|
CAPTAIN'S LOG
|
|
|
|
TAP THE CAPTAINS LOG KEY. AT ANY TIME DURING PLAY, YOU CAN CON-
|
|
SULT THE CAPTAIN'S LOG BOOK. IT CONTAINS CURRENT DATA ABOUT YOUR
|
|
BOAT, YOUR SAILING ORDERS AND OTHER RECORDS. USE THE CURSOR KEYS
|
|
TO PAGE BACK AND FORTH IN THE LOG BOOK.
|
|
|
|
STATUS ICONS
|
|
|
|
THE ICONS APPEAR AT THE BOTTOM RIGHT CORNER OF MOST VIEWS. THEY
|
|
REMIND YOU OF VARIOUS OPTIONS CURRENTLY SELECTED.
|
|
|
|
TIME RATE: DEFAULT SETTING IS "1" WHICH MEANS TIME PASSES AT
|
|
"READ LIFE" SPEEDS. HOWEVER, TIME CAN BE SET AS HIGH AS "8" WHERE
|
|
TIME PASSES MUCH FASTER.
|
|
|
|
SOUND VOLUME: THIS INDICATES WETHER ALL, SOME OR NONE OF THE
|
|
SOUNDS ARE HEARD. SEE THE TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT FOR THE DIFFERENT
|
|
SETTINGS AVAILABLE.
|
|
|
|
|
|
37
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
38
|
|
|
|
ANIMATIONS ON/OFF: THIS INDICATES WHETHER THE GAME SHOW ANIMATIONS
|
|
OR NOT.
|
|
|
|
TORPEDO SPEED: THIS INDICATES WHETHER YOUR TORPEDOES ARE SET TO
|
|
RUN AT HIGH SPEED (SHORT RANGE) OR LOW SPEED (LONGER RANGE). THIS
|
|
ONLY APPLIES TO MARK 14 TORPEDOES. IF YOU HAVE MARK 10 OR MARK 18
|
|
THE SPEED IS ALWAYS HIGH.
|
|
|
|
RADAR RUNNING: THIS INDICATES THAT YOUR RADAR SET IS ABOVE WATER
|
|
AND FUNCTIONING
|
|
|
|
PERISCOPE: THIS INDICATES WHETHER THE PERISCOPE US UP OR DOWN.
|
|
YOU CANNOT LOOK THROUGH THE "SCOPE" UNLESS IT'S UP.
|
|
|
|
38
|
|
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|
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|
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39
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
WAR PATROL CONTROLS
|
|
|
|
|
|
WAR PATROLS ALLOW YOU TO SAIL YOUR SUBMARINE AROUND THE PACIFIC
|
|
OCEAN. THE BATTLE CONTROLS (SEE PAGES 42-53) ARE INACTIVE UNTIL
|
|
YOU MAKE CONTACT WITH ENEMY SHIPS.
|
|
|
|
|
|
WAR PATROL CONTROLS APPLY ONLY IF YOU SELECT A "WAR PATROL" OR
|
|
"WAR CAREER" OPTION, AND ONLY DURING NAVIGATION BETWEEN BATTLES.
|
|
WAR PATROL CONTROLS DO NOT APPLY IN "TRAINING" OR "SINGLE BAT-
|
|
TLES". (SEE INITIAL OPTIONS, PAGES 19-24, FOR MORE INFORMATION).
|
|
|
|
|
|
VIEWS
|
|
|
|
ONLY A LIMITED NUMBER OF VIEWS, OFTEN WITH SPECIAL CONTROLS ARE
|
|
AVAILABLE DURING WAR PATROL OPERATIONS. (FORE A MORE COMPLETE
|
|
DESCRIPTION OF EACH VIEW, SEE TOURING THE BOAT PAGES 23-28)
|
|
|
|
VIEWS AVAILABLE
|
|
|
|
CHARTS: ONLY THE TARGETS SCALE CHART IS AVAILABLE, SHOWING THE
|
|
ENTIRE INFO PANEL, A SPECIAL PANEL APPEARS IN THE UPPER LEFT
|
|
SHOWING CRUCIAL PATROL INFORMATION.
|
|
|
|
DAMAGE REPORT: THIS IS AVAILABLE SO YOU CAN VIEW THE STATUS OF
|
|
YOUR BOAT.
|
|
|
|
|
|
39
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
40
|
|
|
|
|
|
CAPTAIN'S LOG: THIS IS AVAILABLE, WITH YOUR SAILING ORDERS,
|
|
RECENTLY RECEIVED RADIO MESSAGES, AND RECORDS OF YOUR ACCOMPLISH-
|
|
MENTS.
|
|
|
|
UNAVAILABLE VIEWS: BRIDGE LOOKOUT, PERISCOPE, AND BRIDGE TBT.
|
|
|
|
VIEW CONTROLS-CHART
|
|
|
|
IN WAR PATROLS, THE NORMAL ZOOM AND UNZOOM FUNCTIONS ARE UNAVAIL-
|
|
ABLE. INSTEAD YOU HAVE ONE SPECIAL OPTION.
|
|
|
|
PORTS: TOP THE PORTS KEY TO SEE ALL JAPANESE AND AMERICAN
|
|
PORTS/BASES ON THE MAP. JAPANESE BASES ARE AREAS OF LARGE NAVAL
|
|
ACTIVITY, AND ARE PROTECTED BY WIDE-RANGING ENEMY PATROLS. THE
|
|
BASE SYMBOLS AUTOMATICALLY DISAPPEAR WHENEVER YOU RESUME NAVIGA-
|
|
TION.
|
|
|
|
ENTER AN AMERICAN BASE ENDS A WAR PATROL IN A SINGLE WAR PATROL
|
|
THIS ALSO ENDS THE GAME. IN A WAR CAREER THE GAME CONTINUES WITH
|
|
VARIOUS OPTIONS FOR REFUELING, REPAIR OR EVEN GETTING A NEW SUB
|
|
FRESH FROM THE CONSTRUCTION YARDS.
|
|
|
|
VIEW CONTROLS-DAMAGE REPORT
|
|
|
|
AS IN BATTLES, THERE ARE NO SPECIAL CONTROLS ON THE DAMAGE REPORT
|
|
SCREEN. SELECT ANOTHER VIEW TO EXIT.
|
|
|
|
VIEW CONTROLS-CAPTAIN'S LOG
|
|
|
|
THE CONTROLS IN THE CAPTAIN'S LOG ARE THE SAME AS IN BATTLE. USE
|
|
THE CURSOR KEYS TO PAGE THROUGH THE LOGBOOK, EXAMINING YOUR SAIL-
|
|
ING ORDERS, CURRENT DATA, RECENT RADIO MESSAGES AND RECORDS.
|
|
|
|
NAVIGATION CONTROLS
|
|
|
|
DURING A WAR PATROL, SIMPLIFIED CONTROLS ARE USED TO "CON"
|
|
(MANEUVER) YOUR SUBMARINE ACROSS THE PACIFIC OCEAN. YOU MUST USE
|
|
THE CHART VIEW FOR NAVIGATION.
|
|
|
|
KEYBOARD: USE THE CURSOR KEYS TO MOVE YOUR SUB NORTH (UP), SOUTH
|
|
(DOWN), EAST (RIGHT), OR WEST (LEFT) ON THE MAP.
|
|
|
|
EACH TAP OF THE KEY MOVES YOUR SUB MANY MILES AND CAUSES THE CLOCK
|
|
TO ADVANCE A NUMBER OF HOURS.
|
|
|
|
ON MANY MACHINES WITH A NUMERIC KEYPAD, ALL THE KEYS ARE THE CON.
|
|
THIS ALLOWS DIAGONAL MOVEMENT (USING 1, 3, 7, AND 9 KEYS) AS WELL
|
|
AS LEFT-RIGHT AND UP-DOWN MOVEMENT.
|
|
|
|
JOYSTICK OR MOUSE: IF YOUR MACHINE HAS A JOYSTICK OR MOUSE AT-
|
|
TACHED IN SOME VERSIONS THIS CAN MOVE YOUR SUB. SEE THE TECHNICAL
|
|
SUPPLEMENT FOR DETAILS.
|
|
|
|
|
|
40
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
41
|
|
|
|
TIME: DURING A WAR PATROL, A FEW HOURS ADVANCE EVERY FEW SECONDS.
|
|
IF YOU SIT IN PLACE AND WATCH THE CLOCK, YOU'LL SEE THE HOURS
|
|
ADVANCE. THEREFORE TO PAUSE THE GAME YOU MUST TAP THE PAUSE
|
|
(KEYS).
|
|
|
|
ENEMY ATTACK: WHEN YOU SUB ENCOUNTERS AN ENEMY FORCE, THE WAR
|
|
PATROL TEMPORARILY HALTS. IF THE ENEMY SIGHTED YOU FIRST, YOU'RE
|
|
FORCED INTO BATTLE. IF YOU SIGHT THE ENEMY FIRST, YOU'RE GIVEN
|
|
THE CHANCE TO ENGAGE OR AVOID THE ENEMY.
|
|
|
|
|
|
NOTE THAT IF YOU SUB HAS SJ RADAR (NORMAL AFTER THE MIDDLE OF
|
|
1942), MANY CONTACTS (ESPECIALLY AT NIGHT) ARE RADAR CONTACTS.
|
|
WHEN YOU GO TO BATTLE THESE ENEMIES ARE VISIBLE ON YOUR CHARTS,
|
|
BUT NOWHERE ELSE. THIS IS BECAUSE RADAR "SEES" FURTHER THAN
|
|
EYESIGHT, ALLOWING YOU TO DETECT THE ENEMY BEFORE YOU CAN SEE HIM
|
|
VISUALLY FROM THE BRIDGE LOOKOUT, PERISCOPE OR BRIDGE TBT.
|
|
|
|
BEFORE RADAR WAS INSTALLED (AND SOMETIMES AFTERWARD), SUBMARINES
|
|
COULD BLUNDER INTO THE ENEMY. DON'T BE SHOCKED IF SOMETIMES YOU
|
|
FIND ENEMY SHIPS ALL AROUND YOU.
|
|
|
|
|
|
41
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
42
|
|
|
|
BATTLE CONTROLS/VIEW CONTROLS
|
|
|
|
EACH KEY OR CONTROL HAS A NAME IN ITALICS. THIS NAME IS USED ON
|
|
THE KEYBOARD OVERLAY. THE MASTER LIST OF ALL NAME AND KEYS AP-
|
|
PEARS IN THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT SUPPLEMENT (IN CASE YOUR OVERLAY IS
|
|
DAMAGED OR LOST)
|
|
|
|
VIEW CONTROLS
|
|
|
|
THESE CONTROLS DETERMINE WHICH VIEW IS ON YOUR SCREEN.
|
|
|
|
CHARTS: TAP THIS KEY TO VIEW YOUR BATTLE CHARTS. THIS VIEW IS
|
|
EXPLAINED ON PAGES 26-28.
|
|
|
|
BRIDGE LOOKOUT: TAP THIS KEY TO GO TO THE BRIDGE LOOKOUT POSITION.
|
|
THIS IS POSSIBLE ONLY IF YOU'RE ON THE SURFACE (AT 000' DEPTH).
|
|
THIS VIEW IS EXPLAINED ON PAGE 29.
|
|
|
|
BRIDGE TBT: TAP THIS KEY TO GO TO THE BRIDGE AND LOOK OUT THROUGH
|
|
BINOCULARS MOUNTED ON THE TBT (TARGET BEARING TRANSMITTER). AS IN
|
|
THE BRIDGE LOOKOUT, THIS IS POSSIBLE ONLY IF YOUR ON THE SURFACE
|
|
(AT 000' DEPTH). THIS VIEW IS EXPLAINED ON PAGE 30.
|
|
|
|
PERISCOPE: TAP THIS KEY TO LOOK THROUGH THE PERISCOPE. THIS IS
|
|
POSSIBLE ONLY IF YOUR AT PERISCOPE DEPTH (55' OR LESS) AND THE
|
|
PERISCOPE IS UP. THIS VIEW IS EXPLAINED ON PAGE 28.
|
|
|
|
SOMETIMES THIS VIEW SUDDENLY DISAPPEARS AND YOU'LL FIND YOURSELF
|
|
LOOKING AT YOUR CHARTS. THIS OCCURS IF YOUR PERISCOPE DROPS
|
|
BENEATH THE WATER--BECAUSE YOUR DEPTH DROPS BELOW 55', OR BECAUSE
|
|
YOU'VE LOWERED THE SCOPE.
|
|
|
|
GAUGES: TAP THIS KEY VIEW THE VARIOUS DIALS AND GAUGES IN THE
|
|
SUB. THIS VIEW IS EXPLAINED ON PAGES 31-33.
|
|
|
|
DAMAGE REPORT: TAP THIS KEY TO SEE A GRAPHIC DAMAGE REPORT ABOUT
|
|
YOUR SUB. THIS VIEW IS ON PAGES 33-36.
|
|
|
|
CAPTAIN'S LOG: TAP THIS KEY TO SEE YOUR LOGBOOK.
|
|
|
|
VIEW SCANNING CONTROLS
|
|
|
|
THESE CONTROLS ADJUST THE DIRECTION IN WHICH YOU ARE LOOKING. THEY
|
|
ONLY APPLY TO THE BRIDGE LOOKOUT, PERISCOPE AND BRIDGE TBT VIEWS.
|
|
|
|
VIEW RIGHT: THIS MOVES YOUR VIEWPOINT TO THE RIGHT ON THE BRIDGE
|
|
LOOKOUT, BRIDGE TBT OR PERISCOPE VIEW.
|
|
|
|
IF THE TDC IS ON (RUNNING), THIS KEY ADJUSTS YOUR TORPEDO AIM TO
|
|
THE RIGHT INSTEAD OF SHIFTING YOUR VIEW. TO CHANGE YOUR VIEW, YOU
|
|
MUST TURN OFF THE TDC.
|
|
|
|
VIEW LEFT: THIS MOVES YOUR VIEWPOINT TO THE LEFT ON THE BRIDGE
|
|
LOOKOUT, BRIDGE TBT AND PERISCOPE VIEW
|
|
|
|
|
|
42
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
43
|
|
|
|
IF THE TDC IS ON (RUNNING), THIS KEY AIMS THE TORPEDO TO THE LEFT
|
|
INSTEAD OF SHIFTING YOUR VIEW. TO CHANGE YOUR VIEW, YOU MUST TURN
|
|
OFF THE TDC.
|
|
|
|
VIEW RIGHT FAST: THIS QUICKLY MOVES YOUR VIEWPOINT TO THE RIGHT
|
|
ON THE BRIDGE LOOKOUT, BRIDGE TBT OR PERISCOPE VIEW. YOUR VIEW-
|
|
POINT SKIPS IN LARGE 10 DEGREE JUMPS, SO JUST A FEW TAPS ARE
|
|
NEEDED TO SCAN THE ENTIRE HORIZON.
|
|
|
|
VIEW LEFT FAST: THIS QUICKLY MOVES YOUR VIEWPOINT TO THE LEFT ON
|
|
THE BRIDGE LOOKOUT, BRIDGE TBT OR PERISCOPE VIEW. YOUR VIEWPOINT
|
|
SKIPS IN LARGE 10 DEGREE JUMPS, SO JUST A FEW TAPS ARE NEEDED TO
|
|
SCAN THE ENTIRE HORIZON.
|
|
|
|
SET VIEW TO COURSE: THIS IMMEDIATELY MOVES YOUR VIEWPOINT TO
|
|
STRAIGHT AHEAD:THE BEARING CHANGES TO MATCH YOUR HEADING. YOUR
|
|
VIEW IS NOW OVER THE BOW OF YOUR BOAT, LOOKING WHATEVER DIRECTION
|
|
YOUR TRAVELLING.
|
|
|
|
TDC ON/OFF: THIS CAUSE YOUR PERISCOPE OR BRIDGE TBT TO "TRACK" A
|
|
TARGET. IT ALSO COMMUNICATES CORRECT FIRING INFO TO YOUR TORPE-
|
|
DOES. FOR A DETAILED EXPLANATION OF HOW TO USE THIS FEATURE, SEE
|
|
TORPEDO FIRING CONTROLS, PAGE 49 BELOW.
|
|
|
|
OTHER VIEWING CONTROLS
|
|
|
|
THESE CONTROLS ARE AVAILABLE ON A VARIETY OF SCREENS, AS APPROPRI-
|
|
ATE.
|
|
|
|
PERISCOPE UP/DOWN: THIS KEY RAISES AND LOWERS YOUR PERISCOPE.
|
|
YOU CAN TOGGLE YOUR PERISCOPE UP AND DOWN BY TAPPING THE PERISCOPE
|
|
UP/DOWN KEY. THE PERISCOPE IS ONLY FUNCTIONAL WHEN "UP" AND YOUR
|
|
DEPTH OF 55 FEET OR LESS. YOU CAN EVEN USE THE PERISCOPE ON THE
|
|
SURFACE.
|
|
|
|
ZOOM VIEW: THIS MAGNIFIES (ENLARGES) YOUR VIEW. AT THE BRIDGE
|
|
TBT OR PERISCOPE, IT SHOWS LESS AREA BUT WITH GREATER DETAIL. THE
|
|
TBT OR PERISCOPE MAGNIFICATION RANGES FROM "1" (NORMAL EYESIGHT)
|
|
TO "4" (MAXIMUM ZOOM). ON THE CHARTS, IT SENDS YOU TO A SMALLER
|
|
SCALE (MORE DETAIL BUT LESS AREA).
|
|
|
|
UNZOOM VIEW: THIS REDUCES YOUR VIEW. AT THE BRIDGE TBT OR PERI-
|
|
SCOPE IT SHOWS MORE BUT WITH LESS DETAIL. THE TBT OR PERISCOPE
|
|
MAGNIFICATION RANGES FROM "1" (NORMAL EYESIGHT) TO "4" (MAXIMUM
|
|
ZOOM). ON THE CHARTS, IT SENDS YOU TO A LARGER SCALE (LESS
|
|
DETAIL BUT MORE AREA).
|
|
|
|
SHIP ID BOOK
|
|
|
|
THE SHIP ID BOOK IS AVAILABLE WHILE YOU'RE EXAMINING CHARTS, ON
|
|
THE BRIDGE (EITHER AT THE LOOKOUT OR THE TBT), OR AT THE PERI-
|
|
SCOPE. THE BOOK SHOWS PICTURES OF ENEMY NAVAL VESSELS, WHICH
|
|
HELPS TO IDENTIFY TARGETS.
|
|
|
|
IF YOU SELECT "INTRODUCTORY" DIFFICULTY, YOUR CREW WILL POINT OUT
|
|
WHICH PAGE OF THE BOOK IS CORRECT. THIS IS, THEY IDENTIFY THE
|
|
TARGET FOR YOU!
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
43
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
44
|
|
|
|
SHIP ID BOOK ON/OFF: THIS KEY TOGGLES THE BOOK ON AND OFF. WHEN
|
|
PRESENT, THE BOOK OVERLAYS THE INFO PANEL ON THE LOWER PART OF
|
|
YOUR VIEW.
|
|
|
|
CURSOR KEYS: THE UP/DOWN CURSOR KEYS PAGE THROUGH THE BOOK. THE
|
|
LEFT/RIGHT KEYS PAGE THROUGH DIFFERENT VIEWS OF A SHIP.
|
|
|
|
IMPORTANT: WHEN YOU HAVE THE BOOK OPEN THE CON (MOVEMENT) CON-
|
|
TROLS MAY BE INACTIVE. THIS IS BECAUSE IN SOME VERSIONS
|
|
(DEPENDING ON YOUR HARDWARE) THE CURSOR KEYS ARE ALSO THE CON
|
|
KEYS. SEE THE TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT FOR DETAILS.
|
|
|
|
CHART CONTROLS
|
|
|
|
THE FOLLOWING VIEWING KEYS ARE AVAILABLE WHILE EXAMINING THE
|
|
CHARTS. SEE PAGES 26-48 FOR A COMPLETE DESCRIPTION OF THE
|
|
CHARTS.
|
|
|
|
INITIALLY THE CHART VIEW IS CENTERED ON YOUR BOAT. HOWEVER, IF
|
|
THE TDC (TORPEDO DATA COMPUTER) IS "ON", INSTEAD THE VIEW IS
|
|
CENTERED HALFWAY BETWEEN YOUR BOAT AND THE TDC TARGET IF BOTH FIT
|
|
ON THE CHART.
|
|
|
|
RE-CENTER CHART: TAP THIS KEY TO RE-CENTER YOUR BOAT IN THE
|
|
MIDDLE OF THE CHART. HOWEVER, IF THE TDC IS RUNNING THE VIEW IS
|
|
CENTERED HALFWAY BETWEEN YOUR BOAT AND THE TDC TARGET IF BOTH
|
|
FIT.
|
|
|
|
ZOOM: EACH TAP ENLARGES THE CHART, SHOWING A SMALLER AREA, BUT IN
|
|
MORE DETAIL. THE CHART ALSO RE-CENTERS AUTOMATICALLY.
|
|
|
|
UNZOOM: EACH TAP REDUCES THE CHART, SHOWING A LARGER AREA, BUT IN
|
|
LESS DETAIL. THE CHART ALSO RE-CENTERS AUTOMATICALLY.
|
|
|
|
INFO PANEL ON/OFF: THIS KEY SHOWS OR REMOVES THE INFO PANEL FORM
|
|
THE CHART.
|
|
|
|
SHIP ID BOOK ON/OFF: THIS KEY SHOWS OR REMOVES THE SHIP ID BOOK
|
|
FROM THE CHART
|
|
|
|
CON AND ENGINE CONTROLS
|
|
|
|
YOUR SUBMARINE AUTOMATICALLY USES DIESEL ENGINES WHEN SURFACED AND
|
|
SLOWER ELECTRIC ENGINES WHEN SUBMERGED. MANEUVERING AND SPEED
|
|
(ENGINES) CONTROLS ARE THE SAME IN BOTH SITUATIONS.
|
|
|
|
|
|
44
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
45
|
|
|
|
|
|
THE CON - DEPTH CONTROLS
|
|
|
|
THE "CON" ARE THOSE CONTROLS USED TO STEER YOUR SUBMARINE. THE
|
|
DEPTH CONTROLS REGULATE YOUR OPERATING DEPTH--FROM SURFACED (0"
|
|
DEPTH) ON DOWN TO MAXIMUM DEPTH.
|
|
|
|
DIVE: TAP THIS KEY TO SEND YOUR SUB DOWNWARD. THIS WILL SUBMERGE
|
|
A SURFACED SUB, OR CAUSE A SUBMERGED SUB TO GO DEEPER. THE LEVEL
|
|
OFF, TAP EITHER THE STRAIGHT & LEVEL KEY, OR THE RISE KEY.
|
|
|
|
WARNING: IF YOU DON'T LEVEL OFF THE SUB EVENTUALLY EITHER HITS
|
|
THE BOTTOM OR IS CRUSHED BY THE OCEAN.
|
|
|
|
CRASH DIVE: TAP THIS KEY TO SEND YOUR SUB DOWNWARD QUICKLY. TO
|
|
LEVEL OFF TAP EITHER STRAIGHT & LEVEL OR RISE.
|
|
|
|
RISE: TAP THIS KEY TO SEND YOUR SUB UPWARD. THIS CAUSES A SUB-
|
|
MERGED SUBMARINE TO MOVE UPWARD. TO LEVEL OFF, TAP EITHER THE
|
|
STRAIGHT & LEVEL KEY OR THE DIVE KEY.
|
|
|
|
WARNING: IF YOU DON'T LEVEL OFF THE SUB EVENTUALLY SURFACES.
|
|
|
|
BLOW ALL TANKS: TAP THIS KEY TO SURFACE AT MAXIMUM SPEED. HOWEV-
|
|
ER, YOU CAN ONLY DO THIS ONCE IN A BATTLE. THAT'S BECAUSE THIS
|
|
COMMAND PUMPS ALL YOUR PRESSURIZED AIR INTO THE BALLAST TANKS
|
|
(PUSHING OUT THE WATER THAT KEEPS YOU SUBMERGED). AFTER GIVING
|
|
THIS COMMAND YOU CANNOT STOP YOUR RISE. YOU WILL SURFACE, REGARD-
|
|
LESS OF SUBSEQUENT COMMANDS.
|
|
|
|
USEFUL NOTE: THIS IS THE ONLY WAY TO SURFACE IF YOUR DIVING
|
|
PLANES ARE COMPLETELY WRECKED.
|
|
|
|
STRAIGHT & LEVEL: TAP THIS KEY TO "LEVEL OFF" YOUR SUB AT ITS
|
|
CURRENT DEPTH. IT ALSO STOPS ANY STARBOARD OR PORT TURNS AT THE
|
|
SAME TIME.
|
|
|
|
PERISCOPE DEPTH: TAP THIS KEY TO SENT YOUR BOAT TO PERISCOPE
|
|
DEPTH. IF YOU'VE SURFACED, THE BOAT WILL DIVE TO 55', THEN LEVEL
|
|
OUT. IF YOU'VE UNDERWATER, THE BOAT WILL RISE OR DIVE UNTIL IT
|
|
REACHES PERISCOPE DEPTH OF 55', THE LEVEL OUT.
|
|
|
|
NOTE THAT UNLIKE ALL OTHER DEPTH CONTROLS, THIS ONE AUTOMATICALLY
|
|
LEVELS YOU ONCE YOU REACH THE DESIRED DEPTH.
|
|
|
|
MAXIMUM DEPTH: THE "TEST DEPTH" OF YOUR SUB IS THE MAXIMUM SAFE
|
|
OPERATING DEPTH. THIS IS THE DEPTH TO WHICH YOUR SUB IS TESTED.
|
|
|
|
IN REALITY, MAY SUBS WENT DEEPER THAN THEIR TEST DEPTH--SOMETIMES
|
|
AS MUCH AS 50% DEEPER. HOWEVER, THE DEEPER YOU GO BELOW TEST
|
|
DEPTH, THE GREATER THE CHANCE OF DAMAGE. IF YOU'RE GOING BELOW
|
|
TEST, WATCH YOUR DAMAGE CONTROL CAREFULLY. YOU CAN SUFFER BULK-
|
|
HEAD DAMAGE IF YOU GO TOO DEEP, OR EVEN DISCOVER THE ENTIRE BOAT
|
|
COLLAPSING INWARD, KILLING BOTH YOU AND YOU CREW.
|
|
|
|
|
|
45
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
46
|
|
|
|
|
|
ONCE YOUR BULKHEADS ARE DAMAGED (BY GOING TOO DEEP, OR BY ENEMY
|
|
DEPTH CHARGES) YOUR TEST DEPTH IS CUT IN HALF. IF YOUR TEST DEPTH
|
|
WAS NORMALLY 300', WITH DAMAGED BULKHEADS YOUR NEW TEST DEPTH IS
|
|
150'. IF YOU GOT BELOW THAT, YOU MAY SUFFER FURTHER DAMAGE OR BE
|
|
SUNK.
|
|
|
|
THE CON - HEADING (COURSE) CONTROLS
|
|
|
|
THE "CON" ALSO ALLOWS YOU TO CONTROL THE HEADING (COURSE) OF YOUR
|
|
SUB.
|
|
|
|
TURN PORT (LEFT): TAP THIS KEY TO START YOUR SUB TURNING LEFT.
|
|
THE BOAT CONTINUES TURNING UNTIL YOU ISSUE THE ORDER TO STOP . TO
|
|
STOP TURNING TAP EITHER TURN STARBOARD (RIGHT), TURN HARD STAR-
|
|
BOARD, OR STRAIGHT & LEVEL.
|
|
|
|
TURN HARD PORT (LEFT FAST): TAP THIS KEY TO TURN YOUR SUB HARD
|
|
LEFT. THIS PUTS THE SUB INTO THE TIGHTEST POSSIBLE TURN. TO STOP
|
|
TURNING YOU CAN TAP EITHER TURN STARBOARD(RIGHT), TURN HARD STAR-
|
|
BOARD OR STRAIGHT & LEVEL.
|
|
|
|
TURN STARBOARD (RIGHT): TAP THIS KEY TO START YOU SUB TURNING
|
|
RIGHT. THE BOAT CONTINUES TURNING UNTIL YOU ISSUE THE ORDER TO
|
|
STOP. TO STOP TURNING TAP EITHER TURN PORT (LEFT), TURN HARD PORT
|
|
OR STRAIGHT & LEVEL.
|
|
|
|
TURN HARD STARBOARD (RIGHT FAST): TAP THIS KEY TURN YOUR SUB HARD
|
|
RIGHT. THIS PUTS THE SUB INTO THE TIGHTEST POSSIBLE TURN. TO
|
|
STOP TURNING YOU CAN TAP EITHER TURN PORT (LEFT), TURN HARD PORT,
|
|
OR STRAIGHT & LEVEL.
|
|
|
|
SET COURSE TO VIEW: THIS KEY TURNS YOUR BOAT UNTIL ITS COURSE
|
|
MATCHES YOUR CURRENT VIEW (BEARING). IT'S A FAST AND CONVENIENT
|
|
WAY TO ORDER THE BOAT TO TURN ONTO A HEADING.
|
|
|
|
STRAIGHT AND LEVEL: THIS KEY STOPS ALL TURNS AND "STRAIGHTENS
|
|
OUT" YOUR COURSE. IT ALSO STOPS ANY DIVING OR RISING, SO YOUR SUB
|
|
WILL CRUISE AT THE CURRENT DEPTH.
|
|
|
|
THE ENGINES - SPEED CONTROL
|
|
|
|
THESE CONTROL THE SPEED OF YOUR SUB. YOU HAVE FOUR ENGINES. THE
|
|
NUMBER OF ENGINES "ON LINE" DETERMINES YOUR CURRENT SPEED. YOU
|
|
SELECT THIS WITH THE ENGINE KEYS. THE EXACT SPEED, IN KNOTS,
|
|
DEPENDS ON THE TYPE (CLASS) OF SUB.
|
|
|
|
DIESEL & ELECTRIC POWER: ON THE SURFACE YOUR SUBMARINE USES
|
|
DIESEL ENGINES, POWERED BY OIL FROM THE OIL TANKS. YOUR SUB HAS
|
|
ENOUGH OIL FOR 35, 50 OR 60 DAYS OF CRUISING, DEPENDING ON CLASS.
|
|
YOU CONSUME OIL ABOUT FOUR TIMES FASTER IN BATTLE, SINCE THE
|
|
ENGINES ARE NOT RUN AS ECONOMICALLY.
|
|
|
|
IN WAR PATROLS YOU SHOULD KEEP A CAREFUL EYE ON YOUR OIL CONSUMP-
|
|
TION AND REMAINING FUEL (SEE PAGES 39 AND 86).
|
|
|
|
|
|
46
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|
|
|
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|
47
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SUBMERGED, YOUR SUB USES BATTERIES TO POWER ELECTRIC ENGINES.
|
|
THIS IS BECAUSE DIESELS RUNNING IN A SUBMERGED SUB EXHAUST ALL THE
|
|
AIR WITHIN A FEW MINUTES, WHICH KILLS THE CREW BY ASPHYXIATION.
|
|
|
|
THE ELECTRIC ENGINES USE BATTLES THAT GRADUALLY RUN DOWN. THE
|
|
BATTERIES ARE RECHARGED BY RUNNING THE DIESEL ENGINES WHEN YOU'RE
|
|
BACK ON THE SURFACE. DIESELS NOT USED TO MOVE THE SUB ARE USED
|
|
INSTEAD TO RECHARGE THE BATTERIES.
|
|
|
|
AHEAD FLANK (4 ENGINES): THIS IS YOUR MAXIMUM FORWARD SPEED.
|
|
SUBMERGED IT USES UP YOUR BATTER POWER VERY QUICKLY. ON THE
|
|
SURFACE, ALL ENGINES ARE USED TO DRIVE THE SUB, SO THE BATTERIES
|
|
CANNOT BE RECHARGED.
|
|
|
|
AHEAD FULL (3 ENGINES): THIS IS A FAST FORWARD SPEED. SUBMERGED,
|
|
IT USED UP BATTERIES RATHER QUICKLY. ON THE SURFACE, THREE EN-
|
|
GINES DRIVE THE SUB, WHILE ONLY ONE RECHARGES THE BATTERIES.
|
|
|
|
AHEAD HALF (2 ENGINES) THIS IS A MODERATE FORWARD SPEED. SUB-
|
|
MERGED IT USES UP BATTERIES AT A MODERATE RATE. ON THE SURFACE,
|
|
TWO ENGINES DRIVE THE SUB AND TWO RECHARGE THE BATTERIES.
|
|
|
|
AHEAD SLOW (1 ENGINE): THIS IS YOUR SLOWEST FORWARD SPEED.
|
|
SUBMERGED, IT USED UP BATTERIES VERY SLOWLY. ON THE SURFACE, ONE
|
|
ENGINE DRIVES THE BOAT WHILE THREE RECHARGE BATTERIES.
|
|
|
|
ALL STOP (0 ENGINES): YOU SUBMARINE STOPS IN PLACE. SUBMERGED
|
|
YOUR BATTERIES ARE HARDLY REDUCED AT ALL (ONLY MINOR ELECTRICAL
|
|
SYSTEMS DRAW CURRENT). ON THE SURFACE, ALL DIESEL ENGINES ARE
|
|
USED TO RECHARGE THE BATTERIES.
|
|
|
|
REVERS (-4 ENGINES) YOUR SUB MOVES BACKWARDS AT A SLOW SPEED.
|
|
UNFORTUNATELY, DUE TO GEARING IMITATIONS ALL ENGINES MUST BE USED.
|
|
THEREFORE YOUR BATTERIES ARE REDUCED QUICKLY, AND ON THE SURFACE
|
|
ALL DIESEL ENGINES ARE USED FOR REVERSE MOVEMENT. HOWEVER, SUBS
|
|
RARELY MOVE IN REVERSE EXCEPT IN SHORT PERIODS.
|
|
|
|
FIRING TORPEDOES
|
|
|
|
|
|
TORPEDOES ARE YOUR MAIN WEAPON. THEY CAN BE FIRED EITHER AT A
|
|
"MARKED" TARGET OR USING A "MANUAL PLOT". MOST CAPTAINS PREFER TO
|
|
USE THE EASIER "MARKED" TECHNIQUE.
|
|
|
|
TORPEDO FIRING TECHNIQUES
|
|
|
|
"MARK" TARGET FIRING PROCEDURE: THIS TECHNIQUE IS THE EASIEST AND
|
|
MOST STRAIGHTFORWARD METHOD OF FIRING. IT USES YOUR BOAT'S TDC
|
|
(TORPEDO DATA COMPUTER) TO CORRECTLY SET YOUR TORPEDOES. YOU JUST
|
|
LINE UP A TARGET IN YOUR
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
47
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
48
|
|
|
|
PERISCOPE OR TBE, TURN ON THE TDC, AND FIRE.
|
|
|
|
FIRST YOU GO TO THE PERISCOPE OR BRIDGE TBT VIEW AND ROTATE (USING
|
|
VIEW LEFT AND VIEW RIGHT) UNTIL YOU FIND A TARGET. WHEN THE
|
|
VESSEL IS CENTERED IN YOUR VIEW, THE AIMING SCALE BRIGHTENS AND
|
|
THE INFO PANEL DISPLAYS TARGET INFORMATION (RANGE, COURSE AND
|
|
SPEED). THIS MEANS THE TARGET IS "MARKED".
|
|
|
|
QUICKLY, WHILE THE TARGET IS STILL MARKED, TAP THE TDC ON/OFF KEY
|
|
TO TURN YOUR TDC. THIS CAUSES THE PERISCOPE OR TBT TO FOLLOW THE
|
|
TARGET AUTOMATICALLY WHILE THE INFO PANEL UPDATES THE TARGET DATA
|
|
AND TORPEDO FIRING SOLUTION CONTINUALLY. THE INFO PANEL TDC LIGHT
|
|
SHOWS THAT THE TDC IS RUNNING IN ADDITION, THE TORPEDO AIMING
|
|
POINTER APPEARS ON THE PERISCOPE OR TBT CROSSHAIRS.
|
|
|
|
WHEN THE RANGE AND FIRING POSITION SEEM GOOD TO YOU (AS CAPTAIN),
|
|
TAP FIRE TORPEDO.
|
|
|
|
TO FIRE A "SPREAD" OF TORPEDOES, USE THE VIEW LEFT AND VIEW RIGHT
|
|
KEYS TO MOVE THE TORPEDO AIMING POINTER LEFT AND RIGHT OF CENTER.
|
|
THIS SETS THE TORPEDO PATH SLIGHTLY LEFT OR RIGHT OF CENTER,
|
|
CREATING A "SPREAD". YOU MUST DO THIS WHILE THE TDC IS ON. THIS
|
|
TECHNIQUE DOESN'T WORK IF THE TDC IS OFF.
|
|
|
|
TO SWITCH TARGETS, TURN OFF THE TDC BY PRESSING TDC ON/OFF AGAIN.
|
|
ROTATE YOUR VIEW, "MARK" ANOTHER TARGET AND TURN ON THE TDC ONCE
|
|
MORE.
|
|
|
|
AFTER FIRING, YOU'LL SEE ON THE CHARTS VIEW THE TORPEDO TIMER
|
|
COUNTING DOWN. THE TDC LIGHT BESIDE THE TIMER WILL BE ON IF THE
|
|
TORPEDO WAS FIRED UNDER TDC CONTROL. THE TIMER IS COUNTING DOWN
|
|
TO THE ANTICIPATED CONTACT WITH THE TARGET.
|
|
|
|
"MANUAL PLOT" FIRING PROCEDURE: IN THIS TECHNIQUE YOU COMPUTER
|
|
FIRING ANGLES YOURSELF. THIS TECHNIQUES DOES NOT USE THE TDC.
|
|
MAKE SURE THE TDC IS NOT RUNNING (THE TDC LIGHT IS OFF ON THE INFO
|
|
PANEL) BEFORE USING MANUAL FIRING.
|
|
|
|
THIS METHOD IS EASIEST TO PLAN FORM THE CHARTS. YOU DECIDE WHAT
|
|
ANGLE TO FIRE A TORPEDO SO IT INTERCEPTS THE ENEMY SHIP'S COURSE.
|
|
TO DO THIS, YOU'LL NEED TO ESTIMATE HOW QUICKLY THE TORPEDO TRAV-
|
|
ELS IN RELATION TO HOW FAST THE TARGET IS MOVING, AND THEN FIRE AT
|
|
THE APPROPRIATE INSTANT. FOR A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF HOW TO
|
|
PLAN A MANUAL SHOT, SEE PAGES 69-72.
|
|
|
|
IN MANUAL PLOTTING, THE TORPEDO FIRES IN YOUR VIEW DIRECTION
|
|
(BEARING). THE CREW SELECTS BOW OR STERN TUBERS, WHICHEVER
|
|
IS CLOSER TO YOUR VIEW BEARING. IF THE TUBES ARE EMPTY, THE CREW
|
|
REPORTS THIS FACT AND DOESN'T SHOOT. YOU MUST EITHER CHANGE YOUR
|
|
HEADING OR BEARING TO USE THE OTHER TUBES.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
48
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
49
|
|
|
|
|
|
FIRING RANGES: MINIMUM TORPEDO RANGE IS 300 YARDS. A GOOD FIRING
|
|
RANGE IS 600 TO 1200 YARDS, DEPENDING ON TORPEDO MODEL AND SITUA-
|
|
TION. AT RANGES OVER 2000 YARDS TORPEDOES ARE UNLIKELY TO HIT A
|
|
MOVING TARGET. MAXIMUM RANGE IS 3500 TO 9000 YARDS, DEPENDING ON
|
|
THE TORPEDO MODEL. SEE PAGES 114-115 FOR DETAILED INFO ON ALL
|
|
TORPEDOES.
|
|
|
|
FIRING POSITION: NORMALLY THE IDEAL FIRING POSITION IS STRAIGHT
|
|
INTO THE SIDE OF A SHIP. FIRING AT AN ANGLE TOWARD THE BROADSIDE
|
|
IS THE NEXT BEST (AND GIVES EARLY MARK 14S A BETTER CHANCE OF
|
|
EXPLODING). SHOOTING AT THE BOW OF AN ONCOMING SHIP IS TRICKY
|
|
BECAUSE THE TARGET AREA IS QUITE NARROW. SHOOTING AT THE STERN OF
|
|
A SHIP IS THE WORST POSSIBLE SHOT, SINCE THE TORPEDO MUST OVERTAKE
|
|
ITS TARGET.
|
|
|
|
EARLY VERSIONS OF THE MARK 14 SOMETIMES EXPLODED PREMATURELY.
|
|
THIS WAS GENERALLY CAUSED BY THE DEFECTIVE MAGNETIC EXPLODER.
|
|
DEPENDING ON THE SUBMARINE COMMAND, THIS DEFECT IS IDENTIFIED AND
|
|
FIXED SOMETIME IN 1943.
|
|
|
|
TORPEDO FIRING COMMANDS
|
|
|
|
MARKING A TARGET: YOU DO THIS BY CENTERING THE TARGET IN YOUR
|
|
PERISCOPE OR TBT. THE TARGET IS "MARKED" WHEN THE AIMING SCALE IS
|
|
LIGHTED AND TARGET DATA APPEARS IN THE INFO PANEL.
|
|
|
|
TDC ON/OFF: THIS TOGGLES THE TDC (TORPEDO DATA COMPUTER) ON AND
|
|
OFF. THE TDC CAN BE "TURNED ON" ONLY FROM THE PERISCOPE OR BRIDGE
|
|
TBT VIEW. FURTHERMORE, YOU MUST HAVE A TARGET "MARKED" OR ELSE
|
|
THE TDC WON'T START. A TARGET IS "MARKED" WHEN THE AIMING SCALE
|
|
BRIGHTENS AND THE INFO PANEL BEGINS DISPLAYING TARGET DATA.
|
|
|
|
YOU CAN ADJUST YOUR VIEW WHILE THE TDC IS RUNNING. THIS MOVES
|
|
THE TORPEDO AIMING PINT LEFT OR RIGHT, CAUSING THE TDC TO AIM THE
|
|
TORPEDO LEFT OR RIGHT OF THE TARGET. IF YOU MOVE THE VIEW SO FAR
|
|
THAT THE TARGET IS NO LONGER VISIBLE THE TDC AUTOMATICALLY TURNS
|
|
OFF.
|
|
|
|
YOU CAN MANUALLY TURN OFF THE TDC BY TAPPING TDC ON/OFF AGAIN.
|
|
|
|
TO SWITCH A NEW TARGET, TURN OFF THE TDC, "MARK" A NEW TARGET,
|
|
THEN TURN ON THE TDC ONCE MORE.
|
|
|
|
CHANGE TORPEDO SPEED: NORMALLY YOUR TORPEDOES ARE SET FOR THE
|
|
FASTEST POSSIBLE SPEED. IN ALL NORMAL FIRING CIRCUMSTANCES THIS
|
|
IS THE CORRECT.
|
|
|
|
CHANGE TORPEDO SPEED: NORMALLY YOUR TORPEDOES ARE SET FOR THE
|
|
FASTEST POSSIBLE SPEED. IN ALL NORMAL FIRING CIRCUMSTANCES THIS
|
|
IS THE CORRECT CHOICE. HOWEVER, THE MARK 14 TORPEDO HAS SLOWER
|
|
SPEED THAT GIVES IT MUCH MORE RANGE THAN THE 4500 AT HIGH SPEED.
|
|
IF YOU THINK THE TORPEDO NEEDS TO TRAVEL FURTHER, TAP THIS KEY TO
|
|
SET THE TORPEDOES TO LOW SPEED (31.5 KTS) AND 9000 YARDS RANGE.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
49
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
50
|
|
|
|
THIS KEY HAS NOT EFFECT ON MARK 10 AND MARK 18 TORPEDOES, WHICH
|
|
ONLY HAVE ONE SPEED.
|
|
|
|
AIM TORPEDOES: YOU MUST HAVE THE TDC ON (SEE ABOVE) TO AIM TORPE-
|
|
DOES. USE THE VIEW LEFT AND VIEW RIGHT TO MOVE TORPEDO AIMING
|
|
POINTER LEFT OR RIGHT OF THE TARGET.
|
|
|
|
FIRE TORPEDO: THIS FIRES A LOADED TORPEDO TUBE. BOW TUBES ARE USED
|
|
FOR FIRING AT TARGETS IN THE 180 DEGREE ARC AHEAD OF THE BOAT,
|
|
STERN TUBES FOR TARGETS IN THE 180 DEGREE ARC BEHIND THE BOAT. IF
|
|
ALL TUBES IN THE APPROPRIATE DIRECTION ARE EMPTY AND/OR RELOADING,
|
|
YOU CANNOT FIRE IN THAT DIRECTION.
|
|
|
|
IF YOU FIRE WHILE THE TDC IS RUNNING (INFO PANEL TDC LIGHT IS
|
|
"ON") THE TDC (TORPEDO DATA COMPUTER) AUTOMATICALLY COMPUTES THE
|
|
CORRECT COURSE FOR THE TORPEDO. AFTER THE TORPEDO LEAVES THE TUBE
|
|
IF TURNS ONTO COURSE AND HEADS FOR A PRE-CALCULATED INTERCEPTION
|
|
POINT WITH THE TARGET.
|
|
|
|
ON THE CHARTS VIEW YOU'LL SEE A TIMER FOR THAT TORPEDO COUNTING
|
|
DOWN TO THE PREDICTED INTERCEPTION TIME. THE TDC LIGHT BESIDE THE
|
|
TIMER WILL BE ON INDICATING THE TORPEDO FIRED UNDER TDC CONTROL.
|
|
|
|
IF YOU FIRE WHEN THE TDC IS OFF (INFO PANEL TDC LIGHT IS "OFF"),
|
|
THE TORPEDO FIRES STRAIGHT OUT OF THE BOW OR STERN. IT CONTINUES
|
|
STRAIGHT AHEAD UNTIL IT RUNS OUT OF FUEL OR HITS A TARGET. THE BOW
|
|
TUBES FIRE IF YOUR CURRENT VIEW BEARING IS CLOSER TO THE BOW THAN
|
|
THE STERN. THE STERN TUBES TIRE IF YOUR CURRENT VIEW BEARING IS
|
|
CLOSER TO THE STERN THAN THE BOW.
|
|
|
|
ON THE CHARTS VIEW YOU'LL SEE A TIMER FOR THE TORPEDO COUNTING
|
|
DOWN THE PREDICTED TIME WHEN THE TORPEDO'S FUEL IS EXHAUSTED. THE
|
|
TDC LIGHT BESIDE THE TIMER WILL BE OFF, INDICATING THE TORPEDO WAS
|
|
FIRED UNDER MANUAL CONTROL.
|
|
|
|
DECK GUN CONTROLS
|
|
|
|
YOUR DECK GUN IS SECONDARY ARMAMENT. ITS SHELLS ARE NOWHERE NEAR
|
|
AS POWERFUL AS YOUR TORPEDOES. MORE IMPORTANTLY, YOU MUST SURFACE
|
|
TO USE THE DECK GUN, WHICH EXPOSES YOUR SUB TO HOSTILE GUNFIRE.
|
|
ANY WARSHIP LARGER THAN A PATROL BOAT (PC) HAS BETTER GUN ARMA-
|
|
MENT. THEREFORE, MOST SUBMARINES ONLY USE THEIR DECK GUN TO
|
|
"POLISH OFF" DAMAGED MERCHANTMEN, OR IF THEY'RE EXTREMELY DESPER-
|
|
ATE.
|
|
|
|
DECK GUN FIRING TECHNIQUES
|
|
|
|
|
|
YOU CAN FIRE YOUR DECK GUN WHENEVER THE SUBMARINE IS ON THE SUR-
|
|
FACE. YOU SHOULD USE THE TBT VIEW WHEN FIRING, SINCE THE GUN
|
|
CONTROLS ARE VISIBLE THERE. TO FIRE THE DECK GUN, AIM AT THE
|
|
TARGET UNTIL IT IS "MARKED", TURN ON THE
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
50
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
51
|
|
|
|
TDC, ADJUST THE GUN ELEVATION, THEN FIRE. ON SUBSEQUENT SHOTS YOU
|
|
SIMPLY ADJUST THE ELEVATION IF NECESSARY AND FIRE AGAIN.
|
|
|
|
MAXIMUM RANGE OF YOU DECK GUN IS 4000 YARDS. THIS LIMIT IS DUE TO
|
|
THE SUBMARINE'S GUN-MOUNTING AND SIGHTS; THE SIZE OF THE GUN HAS
|
|
NO EFFECT ON MAXIMUM RANGE.
|
|
|
|
UNMARKED TARGETS CANNOT BE HIT BY YOUR DECK GUN. THE TARGET MUST
|
|
BE MARKED AND TRACKED BY THE TDC BEFORE YOUR CAN FIRE. THIS
|
|
REPRESENTS THE GUN CREW RANGING AND FOLLOWING THE TARGET.
|
|
|
|
MARKED TARGETS: A TARGET IS "MARKED" WHEN THE AIMING SCALE IS
|
|
HIGHLIGHTED AND TARGET DATA APPEARS IN THE INFO PANEL.
|
|
|
|
TDC AND GUNFIRE: YOU MUST USE YOUR TDC TO CONTINUALLY TRACK A
|
|
"MARKED" TARGET. WHEN THE TARGETS IS "MARKED", TAP TDC ON/OFF.
|
|
THIS AUTOMATICALLY KEEPS YOU AIMED AT THE TARGET. YOUR GUN CREW
|
|
ELEVATES THE GUN TO THE CURRENT RANGE OF THE TARGET (AS SHOWN IN
|
|
"TARGET RANGE" ON THE INFO PANEL). TO STOP TRACKING JUST TURN OFF
|
|
THE TDC BY TAPPING TDC ON/OFF AGAIN
|
|
|
|
ADJUSTING FIRE: YOUR GUN CREW AIMS AT THE TARGET'S LOCATION,
|
|
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT WHETHER IT'S MOVING LEFT OR RIGHT ACROSS YOUR
|
|
VIEW. HOWEVER, THE CREW DOES NOT ADJUST FOR THE TARGET'S MOTION
|
|
TOWARD OR AWAY FROM YOU.
|
|
|
|
IF YOU FEEL THE ENEMY IS MOVING TOWARD YOU, DEPRESS THE GUN ONE OR
|
|
MORE DEGREES (-1 OR MORE). IF THE ENEMY IS MOVING AWAY, ELEVATE
|
|
THE GUN ONE OR MORE DEGREES MORE (+1 OR MORE). THE FASTER ENEMY
|
|
IS CLOSING OR OPENING THE RANGE, THE MORE DEPRESSION OR ELEVATION
|
|
YOU NEED.
|
|
|
|
NOTE THAT IF A TARGET IS CLOSING FAST, EVEN THOUGH YOU DEPRESS THE
|
|
GUN A LARGE AMOUNT, YOU MAY FIND SHOTS STILL LANDING BEHIND THE
|
|
TARGET (BECAUSE OF HIS HIGH SPEED). CONVERSELY, IF A TARGET IS
|
|
FLEEING FAST, YOUR SHOTS FREQUENTLY LAND BEHIND HIM UNTIL YOU
|
|
APPLY SUFFICIENT ELEVATION.
|
|
|
|
DECK GUN FIRING CONTROLS
|
|
|
|
MARKING A TARGET: CENTER THE TARGET IN YOU TBT. THE TARGET IS
|
|
"MARKED" WHEN THE CROSSHAIRS ARE LIGHTED AND TARGET DATA APPEARS
|
|
IN THE INFO PANEL.
|
|
|
|
TDC ON/OFF: THIS TOGGLES THE TDC ON AND OFF. YOU MUST HAVE A
|
|
TARGET "MARKED" IN THE TBT VIEW TO TURN ON THE TDC.
|
|
|
|
WHILE THE TDC IS RUNNING YOUR VIEW AND THE DECK GUN CREW'S AIM
|
|
ROTATES TO FOLLOW THE TARGET. FURTHERMORE, THE GUN CREW AUTOMATI-
|
|
CALLY ELEVATES THE GUN TO HIT AT THE CURRENT RANGE (SHOWN ON THE
|
|
INFO PANEL). THE CREW DOES NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT RANGE CHANGES.
|
|
YOU MUST ESTIMATE HOW FAST THE RANGE IS
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
51
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
52
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CHANGING, AND MAKE THE APPROPRIATE ADJUSTMENT TO ELEVA-
|
|
TION/DEPRESSION. ALTHOUGH THE TORPEDO AIMING POINTER IS PRESENT
|
|
TO ADJUST I DON'T NEED IT WITH THE DECK GUN (THE GUN CREW AUTOMAT-
|
|
ICALLY ROTATES TO TRACK THE TARGET).
|
|
|
|
YOU CAN MANUALLY TURN OFF THE TDC BY TAPPING TDC ON/OFF A SECOND
|
|
TIME.
|
|
|
|
TO SWITCH TO A NEW TARGET, TURN OFF THE TDC, "MARK" A NEW TARGET,
|
|
THEN TURN ON THE TDC ONCE MORE.
|
|
|
|
GUN DOWN (-) 1 DEGREE: EACH TAP OF THIS KEY DEPRESSES (LOWERS) THE
|
|
GUN BARREL BY ONE DEGREE. THIS DECREASES THE DISTANT TRAVELLED BY
|
|
THE SHELL.
|
|
|
|
WHEN FIRING AT A MARKED TARGET, THE BARREL IS LOWERED IN RELATION
|
|
TO THE CREW'S NORMAL FIRING ANGLE. YOU LOWER THE GUN ONLY IF
|
|
YOU'RE FIRING AT A "MARKED" TARGET THAT'S MOVING TOWARD YOU.
|
|
|
|
GUN UP (+) 1 DEGREE:EACH TAP OF THIS KEY ELEVATES (RAISES) THE GUN
|
|
BARREL BY ONE DEGREE. THIS INCREASES THE DISTANCE TRAVELLED BY THE
|
|
SHELL.
|
|
|
|
|
|
WHEN FIRING AT A MARKED TARGET, THE BARREL IS RAISED IN RELATION
|
|
TO THE CREW'S NORMAL FIRING ANGLE. YOU RAISE THE GUN ONLY IF
|
|
YOU'RE FIRING AT A "MARKED" TARGET THAT'S MOVING AWAY FROM YOU.
|
|
|
|
FIRE DECK GUN : THIS FIRES ONE SHELL AT THE ENEMY (ON NARWHAL
|
|
CLASS SUBS IT FIRES A BROADSIDE OF BOTH GUNS IN CLOSE SUCCESSION).
|
|
THE GUN ONLY FIRES IT A TARGET IS "MARKED" AND/OR THE TDC IS ON
|
|
AND FOLLOWING A TARGET.
|
|
|
|
THE SHELL FIRES AT THE MARKED TARGET'S CURRENT POSITION PLUS OR
|
|
MINUS A CERTAIN DISTANCE DEPENDING ON THE AMOUNT OF ELEVATION OR
|
|
DEPRESSION CURRENTLY SET.
|
|
|
|
IF THE SHELL HITS, YOU'LL SEE AN EXPLOSION ON THE TARGET SHIP. IF
|
|
IT MISSES YOU'LL SEE A WATER-SPOUT.
|
|
|
|
ENEMY GUNFIRE
|
|
|
|
WHILE YOU'RE ON THE SURFACE, ENEMY WARSHIPS OR ARMED MERCHANTMEN
|
|
MAY FIRE BACK AT YOUR SUB. IF WATER-SPOUTS APPEAR, ENEMY SHELLS
|
|
ARE LANDING NEAR YOUR BOAT. EVENTUALLY HE'LL FIND THE RANGE AND
|
|
BEGIN SCORING HITS, CAUSING DAMAGE AND EVENTUALLY SINKING YOU. THE
|
|
ONLY DEFENSES ARE TO (A) DAMAGE THE ENEMY SO BADLY HIS AIM OR GUNS
|
|
ARE DESTROYED, OR (B) SUBMERGE. ONCE YOU REACH PERISCOPE DEPTH
|
|
(50-55') YOU'RE INVULNERABLE TO ENEMY GUNFIRE.
|
|
|
|
BEWARE OF ENEMY CRUISERS AND BATTLESHIPS. THEIR GUNS ARE SO POWER-
|
|
FUL THAT ONE HIT COULD BLOW YOUR BOAT RIGHT OUT OF THE WATER!
|
|
|
|
52
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
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|
53
|
|
|
|
LAUNCHING DEBRIS
|
|
|
|
WHEN YOU'RE SUBMERGED AND UNDER DEPTH CHARGE ATTACK, YOU MAY WANT
|
|
TO DECEIVE THE ENEMY INTO THINKING YOU'RE DEAD. ONE TRICK IS
|
|
TO LOAD YOUR TORPEDO TUBES WITH VARIOUS EXTRA ITEMS (DEBRIS), AND
|
|
LAUNCH IT. WHEN THIS FLOATS TO THE SURFACE, THE ENEMY MAY THINK
|
|
YOU'RE SUNK.
|
|
|
|
TO ATTEMPT THIS DECEPTION, TAP THE LAUNCH DEBRIS KEY.
|
|
|
|
YOU CAN DO THIS ONLY ONCE PER BATTLE, AND IT MAY NOT WORK.
|
|
|
|
END THIS BATTLE
|
|
|
|
TAP THIS KEY TO END A BATTLE. YOU CANNOT USE THIS TO ESCAPE
|
|
POSSIBLE ATTACKS -- IF ENEMIES ARE STILL IN REASONABLE PROXIMITY,
|
|
YOU CANNOT END THE BATTLE. IN THIS CASE, SAIL AWAY FROM THE
|
|
ENEMY AS QUICKLY AS YOU FELL PRUDENT, THEN TRY AGAIN
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
53
|
|
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|
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|
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|
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|
|
|
54
|
|
|
|
COMPUTER CONTROLS
|
|
|
|
THIS SPECIAL SET OF CONTROLS ADJUST THE OPERATION OF YOUR COMPUT-
|
|
ER. THESE CONTROLS MAY VARY WITH SPECIFIC SYSTEMS; SEE YOUR
|
|
TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT FOR DETAILS.
|
|
|
|
PAUSE
|
|
|
|
THIS PAUSES (FREEZES) THE ACTION. PRESS ANY KEY AGAIN TO RESUME
|
|
THE GAME ACTION.
|
|
|
|
ANIMATION ON/OFF
|
|
|
|
|
|
THIS TOGGLES ON AND OFF THE GRAPHIC ANIMATIONS OF TORPEDO FIRING
|
|
AND DEPTH CHARGE ATTACKS. TURNING OFF THE ANIMATION HELPS SPEED
|
|
UP THE GAME ON SMALLER OR SLOWER COMPUTERS. IT ALSO REDUCES THE
|
|
AMOUNT OF RAM TO RUN THE GAME.
|
|
|
|
"BOSS" HIDE GAME
|
|
|
|
THIS TEMPORARILY HIDES THE GAME BEHIND THE BLANK SCREEN. THE
|
|
COMPUTER IS INOPERATIVE UNTIL YOU HIT THE "BOSS" HIDE GAME KEY
|
|
AGAIN. USE THIS FEATURE WHEN YOUR WORK OR HOME BOSS APPROACHES,
|
|
THEN COMPLAIN THAT YOU'RE TRYING TO FIGURE OUT WHY THE COMPUTER
|
|
ISN'T WORKING!
|
|
|
|
SAVE GAME
|
|
|
|
THIS SAVES THE CURRENT GAME TO DISK, INCLUDING BOTH THE CURRENT
|
|
SITUATION AND ANY WAR CAREER OR WAR PATROL INFORMATION. YOU CAN
|
|
SELECT WHICH "SAVE GAME" FILE TO USE. IF YOU REUSE A FILE, YOU'LL
|
|
OVERWRITE THE GAME PREVIOUSLY SAVED THERE. ON FLOPPY DISK SYSTEMS
|
|
YOU MAY NEED A FORMATTED DISK FOR THE SAVE GAME FILES.
|
|
|
|
RESTART GAME
|
|
|
|
THIS ENDS THE CURRENT GAME AND SENDS YOU BACK TO THE VERY START
|
|
BUT WITHOUT RELOADING LOTS OF FILES FROM DISK.
|
|
|
|
WARNING: THE GAME IS NOT SAVED WHEN YOU DO THIS. IF YOU WANT TO
|
|
SAVE THE GAME, MAKE SURE YOU DO THAT BEFORE HITTING RESTART GAME.
|
|
|
|
JOYSTICK ADJUST
|
|
|
|
THIS READJUSTS YOUR JOYSTICK. USE IT IF THE BOAT OR VIEW SEEMS TO
|
|
"WANDER" LEFT OR RIGHT, AS IF THE JOYSTICK WAS IN USE (EVEN THOUGH
|
|
IT ISN'T).
|
|
|
|
VOLUME ADJUST
|
|
THIS ADJUSTS THE SOUND EFFECTS IN YOUR GAME. IT'S A MULTI-POSITION
|
|
SWITCH. EACH TAP OF THE KEY CHANGES YOU TO THE NEXT LOWER LEVEL.
|
|
AFTER THE LOWEST YOU CYCLE TO THE HIGHEST AGAIN.
|
|
|
|
MOST SYSTEMS HAVE FOUR POSITIONS: ALL SOUNDS, ALL SOUNDS EXCEPT A
|
|
FEW VERY COMMON ONES, CRITICAL (ONLY) SOUNDS, AND NO SOUND. HOWEV-
|
|
ER, THE EXACT NUMBER CAN VARY. SEE THE TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT FOR
|
|
DETAILS.
|
|
|
|
54
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
55
|
|
|
|
|
|
QUIT GAME (TO DOS)
|
|
|
|
THIS IMMEDIATELY QUITS THE GAME AND RETURNS YOU TO THE OPERATING
|
|
SYSTEM (DOS ON IBM-COMPATIBLE SYSTEMS).
|
|
|
|
WARNING: THE GAME IS NOTE SAVED WHEN YOU DO THIS. IF YOU WANT TO
|
|
SAVE THE GAME, MAKE SURE YOU DO THAT BEFORE HITTING QUIT GAME
|
|
|
|
|
|
55
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
56
|
|
|
|
AFTERMATH OF BATTLE
|
|
|
|
REPLAY
|
|
|
|
AT THE END OF EACH BATTLE, YOU HAVE THE OPTION TO VIEW A "REPLAY".
|
|
THIS IS AN EXACT REPRODUCTION OF WHAT HAPPENED, INSTANT BY IN-
|
|
STANT, VIEW BY VIEW.
|
|
|
|
THE EXACT FEATURES AND CAPABILITIES OF THE REPLAY VARY FROM ONE
|
|
COMPUTER SYSTEM TO ANOTHER, AND MAY VARY DEPENDING ON HOW YOU HAVE
|
|
(OR HAVE NOT) INSTALLED THE GAME. SEE THE TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT
|
|
FOR DETAILS.
|
|
|
|
AFTER A SINGLE BATTLE
|
|
|
|
AFTER THE BATTLE YOU SEE A LOGBOOK ENTRY LISTING THE SHIPS YOU
|
|
ENGAGED AND THE RESULTS. AN ENEMY SHIP MAY HAVE ESCAPED YOUR
|
|
ATTACK, BEEN DAMAGED (AND ESCAPED), OR BEEN SUNK. YOU RECEIVE A
|
|
POINT SCORE FOR DAMAGED AS WELL AS SUNKEN SHIPS. YOU RECEIVE
|
|
TONNAGE CREDIT ONLY FOR SHIPS SUNK.
|
|
|
|
PRESS ANY KEY TO EXIT THIS AND SEE WHAT AWARDS OR COMMENDATIONS
|
|
YOU RECEIVED (IF ANY). PRESS ANY KEY AGAIN TO SEE THE SUBMARINER'S
|
|
HALL OF FAME.
|
|
|
|
AFTER A WAR PATROL
|
|
|
|
A WAR PATROL ENDS WHENEVER YOU SAIL INTO A FRIENDLY BASE YOUR
|
|
PERFORMANCE DURING THE PATROL DETERMINES YOUR RECEPTION AT THE
|
|
PIER. THEN PRESS ANY KEY TO SEE WHAT PRAISE (OR COMPLAINTS) YOU
|
|
EARNED ON THE PATROL. PRESS AGAIN TO SEE THE SUBMARINER'S HALL OF
|
|
FAME.
|
|
|
|
AFTER A WAR CAREER
|
|
|
|
A WAR CAREER ENDS ONLY WHEN JAPAN SURRENDERS (ENDING THE PACIFIC
|
|
WAR) OR IF YOU'RE KILLED IN ACTION. JAPAN ALWAYS SURRENDERS ON
|
|
THE HISTORICAL DATE IN AUGUST, 1945. YOUR CAREER THEN ENDS WITH A
|
|
FINAL RETURN TO PORT. AS IN A NORMAL WAR PATROL, PRESS ANY KEY TO
|
|
SEE WHAT YOU EARNED FOR THE PATROL. PRESS AGAIN TO SEE THE SUBMA-
|
|
RINER'S HALL OF FAME.
|
|
|
|
SCORING
|
|
|
|
TONNAGE: DURING WWII THE US NAVY USED TONNAGE SUNK AS A METHOD
|
|
OF MEASURING SUCCESS IN THE SUBMARINE FORCE. THE MOST SUCCESSFUL
|
|
CAPTAIN WAS THE ONE WHO SANK THE MOST TONNAGE. MERCHANT AND
|
|
MILITARY TONNAGE ARE RATED EQUALLY. NOTE THAT THIS RATING DOES
|
|
NO@ TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ENEMIES DAMAGED BUT NOT SUNK, OR THE DIFFI-
|
|
CULTY OF ACHIEVING THOSE SINKINGS.
|
|
|
|
POINT SCORE: AS IN MOST MICROPROSE SIMULATIONS, SILENT SERVICE II
|
|
HAS A COMPLEX FORMULA FOR SCORING YOUR PERFORMANCE. YOU RECEIVE A
|
|
"POINT VALUE" FOR EACH ENEMY SHIP DAMAGED OR SUNK.
|
|
|
|
THE VALUE OF ASW(ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE) VESSELS IS BASED ON THEIR
|
|
CAPABILITIES. THE MORE POWERFUL THE SHIP, THE MORE IT IS WORTH.
|
|
THEREFORE DDS AND DDAAS ARE WORTH MORE THAN DES, WHO IN TURN ARE
|
|
WORTH MORE THAN PCS.
|
|
|
|
56
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
57
|
|
|
|
THE VALUE OF DAMAGING OTHER SHIPS DEPENDS ON THEIR INTRINSIC
|
|
STRENGTH (A STRONG BATTLESHIP IS WORTH MORE THAN A SMALL CARGO
|
|
SHIP). IF YOU SINK THE SHIP, YOU GET A BONUS BASED ON THE THE
|
|
TARGET'S VALUE. TARGET VALUE IS DETERMINED BY THE STRENGTH OF THE
|
|
SHIPS GUARDING IT. A WELL-GUARDED TARGET IS OBVIOUSLY IMPORTANT,
|
|
AND THEREFORE IS QUITE VALUABLE IF SUNK. A POORLY GUARDED TARGET
|
|
IS LESS IMPORTANT AND THEREFORE EARNS A SMALLER BONUS IF SUNK. A
|
|
LARGE WELL-PROTECTED TROOP TRANSPORT COULD BE WORTH AS MUCH AS A
|
|
CRUISER, OR EVEN AN OLD, UNGUARDED BATTLESHIP!
|
|
|
|
YOUR POINT SCORE IS ADJUSTED BASED ON THE DIFFICULTY LEVEL SE-
|
|
LECTED, THE CLASS OF BOAT YOU COMMAND AND IF YOU HAVE HISTORICAL
|
|
OR FLAWLESS TORPEDOES.
|
|
|
|
POINT SCORES ARE MOST USEFUL FOR EVALUATING WAR PATROLS OR A WAR
|
|
CAREER. A HIGHER TOTAL SCORE FOR EITHER INDICATES BETTER ABILI-
|
|
TIES AS A SUBMARINE CAPTAIN. SCORES ARE ALSO GIVEN FOR INDIVIDUAL
|
|
BATTLES, BUT THESE ARE SMALL COMPARED TO WHAT'S POSSIBLE IN A WAR
|
|
PATROL OR WAR CAREER.
|
|
|
|
THE SUBMARINER'S HALL OF FAME
|
|
|
|
THE HALL OF FAME LISTS YOUR TOP SCORES. THE HALL OF FAME ALSO
|
|
LISTS VARIOUS REAL CAPTAINS AND THEIR TONNAGE SCORE FOR HISTORICAL
|
|
INTEREST. SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE SCREEN FOR HOW TO CLEAR THE
|
|
HALL OF FAME.
|
|
|
|
PROMOTIONS, MEDALS AND CITATIONS
|
|
|
|
PROMOTION: IT WAS US NAVY POLICY TO ASSIGN COMMAND OF A SUBMARINE
|
|
TO EITHER A LIEUTENANT COMMANDER (LT. CMDR) OR A COMMANDER (CMDR).
|
|
OFFICERS OF A LOWER RANK SERVED IN JUNIOR (NON-SKIPPER) POSITION
|
|
ON A SUBMARINE. OFFICERS OF A HIGHER RANK (CAPTAIN OR ABOVE) NO
|
|
LONGER COMMANDED A BOAT IN COMBAT; INSTEAD THEY RECEIVED A STAFF,
|
|
COMMAND OR SIMILAR JOB ASHORE.
|
|
|
|
YOU BEGIN THE GAME AS A LIEUTENANT COMMANDER. IF YOUR RECORD
|
|
AFTER A SERIES OF PATROLS IS GOOD, WHENEVER YOU FINISH AN ESPE-
|
|
CIALLY SUCCESSFUL PATROL YOU MAY BE PROMOTED TO COMMANDER. THIS
|
|
IS THE ONLY PROMOTION YOU CAN EARN DURING THE WAR. HOWEVER, IF
|
|
YOU SELECTED A HIGH DIFFICULTY LEVEL AND SURVIVE AN ENTIRE WAR
|
|
CAREER (STARTING DECEMBER 7, 1941), YOU ARE PROMOTED TO CAPTAIN
|
|
(AT ADVANCED DIFFICULTY) REAR ADMIRAL (AT ULTIMATE DIFFICULTY) AT
|
|
THE WAR'S END.
|
|
|
|
MEDALS FOR VALOR: YOU RECEIVE THESE BASED ON YOUR SCORE FOR A
|
|
SINGLE WAR PATROL. EACH WAR PATROL IS A NEW OPPORTUNITY TO GAIN
|
|
MEDALS, REGARDLESS OF YOUR PAST RECORD (JUST AS IT WAS IN THE REAL
|
|
WAR). THE MOST DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE IS THE MEDAL OF HONOR, THE
|
|
LEAST DIFFICULT IS THE BRONZE STAR FOR VALOR.
|
|
|
|
IN REALITY, MANY OF THESE MEDALS (ESPECIALLY THE NAVY CROSS AND
|
|
SILVER STAR) WERE AWARDED FOR TONNAGE SUNK IN A SINGLE PATROL.
|
|
HOWEVER, THE NAVY
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
57
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
58
|
|
|
|
|
|
MADE EXCEPTIONS, BASED ON VARIOUS EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
|
|
THEREFORE, THE FAIREST METHOD IS TO USE SCORES RATHER THAN TON-
|
|
NAGE.
|
|
|
|
UNIT CITATIONS: THESE ARE AWARDED TO ESPECIALLY DESERVING VES-
|
|
SELS. TO ACHIEVE A UNIT CITATION, YOUR SUB MUST HAVE AN OUTSTAND-
|
|
ING OVERALL RECORD, AND IN ADDITION MUST HAVE JUST FINISHED AN
|
|
OUTSTANDING WAR PATROL. AS A RESULT, UNIT CITATIONS ARE MORE
|
|
DIFFICULT TO GET THAN ANY MEDAL (EXCEPT PERHAPS THE MEDAL OF
|
|
HONOR).
|
|
|
|
THE PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION (PUC) IS THE MOST DIFFICULT TO
|
|
ACHIEVE. IT MEANS THE PRESIDENT OF THE US IS PERSONALLY AWARE OF
|
|
YOUR ACCOMPLISHMENTS.
|
|
|
|
THE NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION (NUC) IS SLIGHTLY LESS DIFFICULT TO
|
|
ACHIEVE. IT MEANS THAT EVEN IF THE PRESIDENT DIDN'T NOTICE YOUR
|
|
EFFORTS, THE NAVY CERTAINLY DID!
|
|
|
|
ASIATIC-PACIFIC CAMPAIGN MEDAL (AP): THIS IS AWARDED TO THE
|
|
SKIPPERS WHO SURVIVE A WAR CAREER THAT BEGAN ON DECEMBER 7TH,
|
|
1941--IN OTHER WORDS, SURVIVE THE ENTIRE WAR.
|
|
|
|
IF REALITY THIS MEDAL WAS AWARDED TO THOSE WHO SURVIVED THE WAR,
|
|
REGARDLESS OF STARTING DATE. THE 12-7-41 START REQUIREMENT LENDS
|
|
SPECIAL VALUE TO THIS MEDAL IN SILENT SERVICE II.
|
|
|
|
ALSO NOTE THAT HOSE SKIPPERS WHO SELECTED "ADVANCED' OR "ULTIMATE"
|
|
DIFFICULTY WILL RECEIVE A FINAL PROMOTION TO CAPTAIN OR REAR
|
|
ADMIRAL AFTER RECEIVING THIS MEDAL.
|
|
|
|
|
|
58
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
61
|
|
|
|
3 TACTICS AND STRATEGY
|
|
|
|
BATTLE TACTICS
|
|
|
|
BASIC CONCEPTS
|
|
|
|
A SUBMARINE'S MAIN WEAPON IS THE TORPEDO. TORPEDOES DELIVER
|
|
POWERFUL EXPLOSIVES INTO THE ENEMY'S HULL BELOW THE WATERLINE.
|
|
THE EXPLOSION OCCURS BENEATH THE ARMOR, OFTEN IN THE VITALS OF THE
|
|
SHIP, AND IS FOLLOWED BY MASSIVE FLOODING. TORPEDOES CAN SINK THE
|
|
LARGEST WARSHIPS, INCLUDING BATTLESHIPS AND AIRCRAFT CARRIERS.
|
|
IT'S THE GREAT EQUALIZER THAT MAKES SUBMARINES SO EFFECTIVE.
|
|
|
|
THE OTHER STRENGTH OF WWII SUBMARINE IS STEALTH. IT CAN SNEAK
|
|
INTO ENEMY WATERS AND STRIKE FROM HIDING. SUBMARINES CAN TRAVEL
|
|
INTO AREAS TOO DANGEROUS FOR ANY SURFACE WARSHIP. UNLIKE SURFACE
|
|
SHIPS, SUBMERGED SUBMARINES CAN ESCAPE AIR AND SURFACE ATTACK.
|
|
EVEN ENEMY SONAR CANNOT DETECT THEM EXCEPT AT CLOSE RANGE. ALMOST
|
|
ALWAYS, THE FIRST WARNING OF A SUBMARINE'S PRESENCE IS A TORPEDO
|
|
WAKE OR TORPEDO EXPLOSION.
|
|
|
|
A SUBMARINE'S INVISIBILITY ISN'T RESTRICTED TO SUBMERGED OPERA-
|
|
TIONS. EVEN ON THE SURFACE A SUBMARINE IS HARD TO SEE. THE
|
|
NEARLY-AWASH HULL IS NOTHING MORE THAN A SHADOW TO DISTANT SHIPS.
|
|
THE CONNING TOWER IS SMALL; WHEN SEEN BOW- OR STERN-ON, IT LOOKS
|
|
LIKE A DARK LINE. SUBMARINES INVARIABLY SEE THEIR TARGETS BEFORE
|
|
THEY'RE SPOTTED. THIS ALLOWS THE SUB TO "STALK" THE TARGETS,
|
|
ESPECIALLY IF THEY ARE SLOWER MERCHANTMEN.
|
|
|
|
A SUBMARINE'S INVISIBILITY IS ESPECIALLY POWERFUL AT NIGHT. OFTEN
|
|
MERCHANT SHIPS CAN'T SPOT SURFACED SUBS UNTIL THEY'RE INSIDE
|
|
TORPEDO RANGE. THIS ALLOWS SUBS TO CRUISE IN, ATTACK, AND ESCAPE
|
|
ON THE SURFACE, ALL WITHOUT BEING SPOTTED.
|
|
|
|
THE CONTACT
|
|
|
|
EVALUATING CONTACT: MOST CONTACTS ARE AT LONG RANGE, WITH EITHER
|
|
RADAR (IF AVAILABLE) OR EYESIGHT. AS SKIPPER YOUR FIRST TASK IS
|
|
TO "DEVELOP" THE SITUATION. FIRST. DETERMINE THE ENEMY'S COURSE
|
|
AND RANGE. IF YOUR WITHIN VISUAL RANGE, USE THE TBT OR PERISCOPE
|
|
TO "MARK" TARGETS AND NOTE THEIR COURSE SPEED AND RANGE. IF YOU
|
|
HAVE RADAR AND THE ENEMY IS DISTANT, MAKE
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
61
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
62
|
|
|
|
|
|
SURE YOUR AT RADAR DEPTH(25') OR LESS, SINCE RADAR "SEES" FURTHER
|
|
THAN HUMAN EYESIGHT.
|
|
|
|
DON'T BE SURPRISED IF YOUR CONTACTS SEEM TO APPEAR AND DISAPPEAR.
|
|
IF THE ENEMY TURNS HOW BOW OR STERN TOWARD YOUR BOAT, HE'S MUCH
|
|
HARDER TO SEE BOTH ON RADAR AND WITH EYESIGHT. BY KNOWING THIS
|
|
YOU CAN GUESS WHAT DIRECTION HE'S TURNED TOWARD.
|
|
|
|
SOMETIMES YOU'LL BE SURPRISED BY EVERY CLOSE ENCOUNTER. THIS
|
|
ESPECIALLY COMMON AT NIGHT IF YOU'VE WITHOUT RADAR. AS IN REAL
|
|
LIFE, YOU COULD FIND YOURSELF INSIDE AN ENEMY CONVOY OR TASK
|
|
FORCE!
|
|
|
|
SITUATIONS: THE BEST POSSIBLE SITUATION IS WHEN YOU'RE ALREADY
|
|
WITHIN THE ENEMY'S FORMATION, OR DIRECTLY IN THEIR PATH. IN
|
|
EITHER CASE, YOU NEED ONLY POSITION YOURSELF FOR GOOD TORPEDO
|
|
SHOTS AND OPEN FIRE.
|
|
|
|
UNFORTUNATELY, OFTEN YOU'RE THOUSANDS OF YARDS AWAY FROM THE
|
|
ENEMY'S COURSE! HERE YOU MUST PLAN AN INTERCEPT THAT PLACES YOU
|
|
AHEAD OF THEM.
|
|
|
|
SOMETIMES ALL YOU SEE IS ENEMY ANTI-SUBMARINE SHIPS (DESTROYERS
|
|
AND PATROL BOATS). THEY COULD BE GUARDIANS OF A LARGER, MORE
|
|
DISTANT TARGET. ALTERNATIVELY, THEY COULD BE JUST AN ASW PATROL.
|
|
ONLY A VERY BRAVE (OR VERY FOOLHARDY CAPTAIN TANGLES WITH ASW
|
|
PATROLS. UNLESS YOU SPOT A GOOD TARGET SOON, YOUR ADVISED TO
|
|
AVOID THEM.
|
|
|
|
INTERCEPTIONS AND CHASES: WHEN PURSUING AN ENEMY,REMEMBER THAT
|
|
HE'S MOVING TOO. HEADING TOWARD HIS CURRENT POSITION ONLY RESULTS
|
|
IN YOUR SUB ARRIVING AT WHERE HE WAS, NOT WHERE HE'S GOING.
|
|
UNLESS HE'S ALREADY HEADED AWAY FROM YOU AT HIGH SPEED, AVOID A
|
|
"STERN CHASE". YOU'RE MORE LIKELY TO BE SPOTTED AND NEED TO GET
|
|
MUCH CLOSER FOR A GOOD TORPEDO SHOT.
|
|
|
|
THE STANDARD MANEUVER TO ACHIEVE A GOOD FIRING POSITION IS THE
|
|
"END AROUND" (SEE BOX). THE SUB SWINGS AROUND THE CONVOY ON THE
|
|
SURFACE AT MAXIMUM SPEED, POSITIONS ITSELF AHEAD OF THE TARGET,
|
|
SUBMERGES, AND LIES IN WAIT. THIS ALLOWS THE SUB TO MANEUVER INTO
|
|
A PERFECT FIRING POSITION AS THE ENEMY SHIPS SAIL PAST IT. IF THE
|
|
SUB DOESN'T SINK EVERYONE, IT CAN SNEAK AWAY, DO ANOTHER END
|
|
AROUND AND ATTACKS AGAIN.
|
|
|
|
INTERCEPTING ENEMY WARSHIPS IS A GREATER CHALLENGE. TASK FORCES
|
|
WITH CRUISERS, BATTLESHIPS, AND/OR AIRCRAFT CARRIERS TRAVEL FASTER
|
|
(21-27 KNOTS) THAN A SUB. THE SUB HAS ONE CHANCE TO INTERCEPT
|
|
THESE TARGETS, AND ONE CHANCE TO FIRE. AFTERWARD ESCORTING DE-
|
|
STROYERS "WORK OVER" THE SUB, ALLOWING THE WARSHIPS TO ESCAPE
|
|
(ASSUMING THEY'RE NOT TOO HEAVILY DAMAGED.)
|
|
|
|
(BOX)
|
|
INITIALLY THE SUBMARINE SPOTS A NORTHBOUND CONVOY. TO MAKE AN
|
|
"END AROUND", THE SUB TURNS PARALLEL TO THE CONVOY AND MOVES
|
|
NORTHWARD ON THE SURFACE. AS THE SUB PULLS AHEAD OF THE CONVOY,
|
|
IT BEGINS TO CURVE INWARD, KEEPING THE ENEMY IN SIGHT. EVENTUALLY
|
|
THE SUB MOVE FAR ENOUGH AHEAD THAT IT TURNS EAST AND MOVES TO A
|
|
POSITION IN FRONT OF THE ONCOMING CONVOY. AS THE ENEMY AP-
|
|
PROACHES, THE SUB SUBMERGES AND PREPARES A TORPEDO ATTACK.
|
|
THROUGHOUT THE SUB KEEPS THE CONVOY AT THE EDGE OF VISIBILITY,
|
|
AND/OR MAKES PERIODIC RADAR SWEEPS. SINCE SUBS ARE HARDER TO SEE,
|
|
THIS POSSIBLE WITHOUT DETECTION.
|
|
|
|
62
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
63
|
|
|
|
|
|
COPING WITH ZIG-ZAGS: THE JAPANESE OFTEN USE ZIG-ZAG TACTICS. THE
|
|
PROBABILITY OF ZIG-ZAGS INCREASES WITH DIFFICULTY LEVEL.
|
|
|
|
A SHIP OR GROUP THAT ZIG-ZAGS ALMOST NEVER SAILS ALONG ITS "REAL"
|
|
COURSE (THE "BASE COURSE"). INSTEAD IT SAILS SOMEWHAT TO THE
|
|
RIGHT, THEN SOMEWHAT TO THE LEFT. THE RIGHT AND LEFT TURNS ARE AT
|
|
IRREGULAR TIMES TO FURTHER CONFUSE THE ENEMY.
|
|
|
|
THE BEST WAY TO GUESS WHETHER THE ENEMY IS ZIG-ZAGGING IS TO
|
|
CONSIDER WHERE HE MIGHT BE GOING. IF HIS CURRENT COURSE ISN'T
|
|
AIMED AT ANY PORT, BASE, OR COMMON SHIPPING LANE, THEN HE MAY BE
|
|
ON A "ZIG" OR A "ZAG". IF HE MAKES A SUDDEN, LARGE TURN THEN HE'S
|
|
ALMOST CERTAINLY ZIG-ZAGGING.
|
|
|
|
IF YOU SUSPECT ZIG-ZAG TACTICS, TRY TO DETERMINE THE ENEMY'S BASE
|
|
COURSE. A ZIG-ZAGGING ENEMY MUST CROSS AND RECROSS THE BASE
|
|
COURSE. YOU CAN BE SURE OF INTERCEPTING THEM AT THOSE POINTS.
|
|
|
|
SURVIVING AN AMBUSH: SOMETIME A CONTACT BEGINS AS AN AMBUSH. THE
|
|
ENEMY HAS ALREADY SPOTTED YOUR SUB:DESTROYERS, DESTROYER ESCORTS,
|
|
AND/OR PATROL CRAFT ARE HEADED STRAIGHT AT YOU! THE STANDARD
|
|
TACTIC IS TO EVADE AND ESCAPE, NORMALLY BY GOING DEEP AND MOVING
|
|
AWAY SLOWLY. A FEW BRAVE SKIPPERS FIRED TORPEDOES "DOWN THE
|
|
THROAT" AT THE APPROACHING ENEMY. HOWEVER, THESE SHOTS ARE DIFFI-
|
|
CULT. FURTHERMORE, FAILURE MEANS THE ENEMY IS QUITE LIKELY TO
|
|
SCORE A DAMAGING RAM OR DEPTH CHARGE ATTACK
|
|
|
|
VISIBILITY AND TACTICS
|
|
|
|
CONCEALMENT IS A SUBMARINE'S BEST TACTICAL TOOL. IT'S IMPORTANT
|
|
TO KNOW WHAT TENDS TO HIDE YOUR BOAT AND WHAT TENDS TO REVEAL IT.
|
|
|
|
SPEED:ON THE SURFACE, THE FASTER YOU TRAVEL, THE BIGGER YOUR
|
|
FOAMING WAKE. THE WAKE OFTEN GIVES AWAY YOUR POSITION FIRST.
|
|
WHEN MANEUVERING TO ATTACK THE ENEMY, TRAVEL AT THE MINIMUM POSSI-
|
|
BLE SPEED TO ACCOMPLISH YOUR PURPOSE. IF YOU MUST MAKE A DASH, DO
|
|
IT AT THE LAST MOMENT, TO AVOID GIVING YOURSELF AWAY EARLY.
|
|
|
|
SUBMERGED, THE FASTER YOU TRAVEL, THE MORE NOISE YOU MAKE AND THE
|
|
CORRECT THE EFFECTIVE RANGE OF ENEMY LISTENING EQUIPMENT. WHEN
|
|
LYING IN AMBUSH YOU MAY FIND IT EFFECTIVE TO STOP ALL ENGINES.
|
|
WHEN TRYING TO ESCAPE DEPTH CHARGE ATTACKS, SNEAKING AWAY AT LOW
|
|
SPEED IS OFTEN MORE EFFECTIVE THAN TRYING TO DASH AWAY.
|
|
|
|
SILHOUETTE: A SUB IS EASIER TO SPOT IF YOU PRESENT YOUR BROADSIDE
|
|
TO ENEMY. IF JUST THE BOW AND STERN IS FACING THE ENEMY (END-ON),
|
|
THE SUB MUCH HARDER TO SEE: THE HULL AND CONNING TOWER ARE LONG,
|
|
BUT NOT WIDE. THIS
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
63
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
64
|
|
|
|
IS TRUE OF RADAR AND SONAR AS WELL AS EYESIGHT. A GOOD SKIPPER
|
|
TRIES TO FACE TOWARD OR AWAY FROM THE ENEMY AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.
|
|
|
|
DEPTH & VISIBILITY: A SUBMARINE IS MOST VISIBLE WHEN SURFACED
|
|
|
|
A SUBMARINE AT "RADAR DEPTH" (25') HAS THE HULL AND CONNING TOWER
|
|
SUBMERGED BUT THE MASS OF MASTS (INCLUDING THE RADAR SET) ARE
|
|
ABOVE WATER. THE SUB IS HARDER TO SPOT THAN A SURFACED BOAT, AND
|
|
YET HAS BOTH RADAR AND PERISCOPE AVAILABLE FOR USE. THE MAIN
|
|
DRAWBACK IS THAT THE BOAT MUST USE ITS SLOWER ELECTRIC ENGINES.
|
|
|
|
A SUBMARINE AT PERISCOPE DEPTH (50-55') IS EVEN LESS VISIBLE. WITH
|
|
THE PERISCOPE DOWN IT'S INVISIBLE TO ALL DETECTION EXCEPT SONAR.
|
|
IF THE SCOPE IS UP, THE SEA STATE AND SUB SPEED DETERMINE VISIBIL-
|
|
ITY. THE CALMER THE SEA AND THE FASTER THE SUB, THE MORE VISIBLE
|
|
THE PERISCOPE.
|
|
|
|
AS A SUBMARINE DIVES DEEPER, IT EVENTUALLY DROPS BELOW A TEMPERA-
|
|
TURE "LAYER" INTO COLDER WATER. SONAR WAVES DON'T PENETRATE THE
|
|
"LAYER" VERY WELL, REDUCING DETECTION RANGE EVEN MORE.
|
|
|
|
RADAR: IF YOUR SUB HAS RADAR, YOUR HAVE A SIGNIFICANT TACTICAL
|
|
ADVANTAGE. A SUBMARINE USING RADAR CAN TRACK THE ENEMY BEYOND THE
|
|
NORMAL EYESIGHT. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE IN 1942 AND 1943, BEFORE
|
|
THE JAPANESE DEVELOPED RADAR RECEIVERS AND THEIR OWN RADAR SETS.
|
|
RADAR IS MOST USEFUL AT NIGHT OR IN BAD WEATHER. WHILE THESE
|
|
CONDITIONS GREATLY REDUCE HUMAN EYESIGHT, THEY DON'T AFFECT RADAR.
|
|
AS A RESULT, THE SUB CAN SEE MUCH FURTHER.
|
|
|
|
THE RADAR SPOTS DIFFERENT SHIPS AT DIFFERENT RANGES. THE LARGER
|
|
THE SHIP THE FURTHER AWAY RADAR "SEES" IT. SUBMARINES ARE VERY
|
|
SMALL. THEY DON'T REGISTER ON RADAR UNTIL FAIRLY SHORT RANGES
|
|
(4,000 TO 5,000 YARDS).
|
|
|
|
EYESIGHT: IF YOUR SUB LACKS RADAR, TACTICS ARE MORE COMPLEX. SINCE
|
|
YOUR SUB IS LESS VISIBLE THAN A SHIP, YOU'LL PROBABLY SEE THE
|
|
ENEMY BEFORE HE SEES YOU. HOWEVER, YOU MUST REMAIN AT THE "EDGE"
|
|
OF VISIBILITY. IF YOU VENTURE TOO CLOSE, HE'LL SPOT YOU.
|
|
|
|
THE USUAL TECHNIQUE IS AN "END AROUND" WHILE REMAINING AT THE
|
|
VISIBILITY LIMIT, THEN SUBMERGE AND ATTACK.
|
|
|
|
NIGHT VISIBILITY RANGE IS USUALLY QUITE SHORT. A SUBMARINE CAN
|
|
"STALK" A CONVOY ON THE SURFACE, LOOKING FOR GAPS IN THE ESCORT
|
|
SCREEN WHERE IT CAN STREAK IN UNOBSERVED, FIRE TORPEDOES INTO THE
|
|
MERCHANTMEN, AND STREAK OUT. AGAIN, UNLESS YOU HAVE RADAR, IT'S
|
|
BEST TO STAY AT THE EDGE OF VISIBILITY TO MINIMIZE THE CHANCE OF
|
|
THE ENEMY SPOTTING YOUR SUB.
|
|
|
|
64
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
65
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
IN BOTH CASES ROVING ENEMY ESCORTS CAUSE PROBLEMS. THEY OFTEN MAKE
|
|
SWEEPS AROUND THEIR CHARGES, FORCING YOU TO SUBMERGE BRIEFLY, THEN
|
|
SURFACE WHEN THEY MOVE AWAY.
|
|
|
|
ANOTHER PROBLEM IS FACING. REMEMBER THAT IF THE ENEMY TURNS THEIR
|
|
BOW OR STERN TOWARD YOUR BOAT, YOUR ABILITY TO SEE THEM IS RE-
|
|
DUCED, BOTH WITH EYESIGHT AND RADAR. IF YOU KEEP YOUR BROADSIDE
|
|
TOWARD THEM, THEY MAY JUST SEE YOU BEFORE YOU SEE THEM! THIS IS
|
|
MOSTLY A PROBLEM IN AMBUSH SITUATIONS. IN AN "END AROUND" YOU ARE
|
|
USUALLY EITHER RUNNING PARALLEL TO THEIR COURSE, OR SHOWING THE
|
|
ENEMY YOUR BOW OR STERN.
|
|
|
|
SONAR: IF YOUR SUB IS SUBMERGED, UNLESS YOU'VE AT RADAR DEPTH OR
|
|
USING A PERISCOPE, YOU MUST USE LISTENING HYDROPHONES AND SONAR TO
|
|
DETECT ENEMY SHIPS. MAXIMUM RANGE IS A FEW THOUSAND YARDS.
|
|
THEREFORE, DON'T BE SURPRISED WHEN ALL BUT THE CLOSEST TARGETS ARE
|
|
LIKELY TO DISAPPEAR. HOWEVER, YOUR SONAR DETECTION RANGE IS
|
|
BETTER THAN THE ENEMY'S IN MOST ALL SITUATIONS. THE SOLE EXCEP-
|
|
TION AGAIN IS WHEN YOUR BROADSIDE FACES THE ENEMY BOW OR STERN.
|
|
|
|
ONE SPECIAL LIMITATION OF SONAR IS "THE BAFFLES". IF YOUR SUB IS
|
|
MOVING QUICKLY, THE DISTURBED WATER ASTERN BLINDS YOUR SONAR.
|
|
ENEMIES DIRECTLY BEHIND YOUR SUB MAY DISAPPEAR FROM YOUR CHARTS.
|
|
|
|
JAPANESE CAPABILITIES: JAPANESE WARSHIPS ARE INVARIABLY BETTER AT
|
|
SPOTTING SUBMARINES THAN MERCHANT SHIPS. WARSHIPS HAVE A LARGER
|
|
AND BETTER DISCIPLINED CREW, INCLUDING LOOKOUTS IN ALL DIRECTIONS.
|
|
MERCHANT SHIPS HAVE FEWER LOOKOUTS, AND OFTEN FORGET TO LOOK
|
|
ASTERN.
|
|
|
|
IN 1943 THE JAPANESE BEGAN USING RADAR AND BY 1944 IT WAS FAIRLY
|
|
COMMON. HOWEVER, THEIR RADAR SETS WERE MUCH INFERIOR TO THE US
|
|
MODEL, WITH A MUCH SHORTER RANGE.
|
|
|
|
THE JAPANESE ALSO HAD RADAR RECEIVERS, WHICH DETECTED AMERICAN
|
|
RADAR EMISSIONS. HOWEVER, THEY WERE EXTREMELY UNRELIABLE. AFTER
|
|
CHASING INNUMERABLE "BAD CONTACTS" THE JAPANESE LOST FAITH IN THIS
|
|
DEVICE, ESPECIALLY SINCE AMERICAN SUBS TENDED TO SWITCH THEIR
|
|
RADAR ON AND OFF. THE MOST SUCCESSFUL SUB SKIPPERS USED THEIR
|
|
RADAR FULLY DESPITE RADAR RECEIVERS. THEREFORE, IT IS ALWAYS
|
|
AVAILABLE IN SILENCE SERVICE II.
|
|
|
|
SEE EVADING ASW ATTACKS (BELOW, PAGE 75) FOR INFORMATION ABOUT
|
|
JAPANESE SONAR.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
65
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
66
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
THE SETUP
|
|
|
|
THE BIGGEST PROBLEM FOR A SUBMARINE SKIPPER IS ACHIEVING A GOOD
|
|
FIRING POSITION OR "SETUP".
|
|
|
|
IDEAL TORPEDO FIRING RANGE IS 800 TO 1200 YARDS FOR MARK 14 AND
|
|
18-2 TORPEDOES, ABOUT 600 TO 1000 FOR MARK 10 OR 18-1 (BECAUSE
|
|
THEY'RE SLOWER).
|
|
|
|
MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE TORPEDO RANGE IS ABOUT 2000 YARDS AGAINST A SHIP
|
|
MOVING 10 KNOTS OR FASTER. IF THE TARGET IS STATIONARY, YOU CAN
|
|
FIRE UP TO THE MAXIMUM RANGE OF THE TORPEDO (3500 TO 9000 YARDS,
|
|
DEPENDING ON THE TORPEDO MODEL).
|
|
|
|
THE MARK 14 HAS TWO RANGE SETTINGS. HOWEVER, THE SHORTER RANGE IS
|
|
4500 YARDS - MORE THAN ENOUGH FOR ANY DECENT SHOT. THE LONG RANGE
|
|
GIVES YOU 9,000 YARDS RANGE, BUT THE TORPEDO TRAVELS MUCH TOO
|
|
SLOWLY (31.5 KNOTS). THE LONG RANGE SETTING IS USED PRIMARILY FOR
|
|
DESPERATE SHOTS.
|
|
|
|
THE MARK 10S AND 14S ARE STEAM TORPEDOES. THEIR BUBBLING WAKE IS
|
|
EASY TO SPOT. THIS GIVES THE TARGET TIME TO MANEUVER BEFORE THE
|
|
TORPEDO HITS. MOST SHIPS CAN OUTMANEUVER A SINGLE TORPEDO. HOWEV-
|
|
ER, A "SPREAD" OF TORPEDOES RUNNING SIDE BY SIDE IS MUCH HARDER TO
|
|
AVOID.
|
|
|
|
MARK 18 TORPEDOES ARE ELECTRIC. THEIR WAKE ISN'T AS OBVIOUS,
|
|
GIVING THE TARGET MUCH LESS TIME TO MANEUVER. UNFORTUNATELY, THE
|
|
MARK 18-1 IS SO SLOW (27 KNOTS) THAT THE ADVANTAGE IS MOOT. THE
|
|
MARK 18-2 IS FAST ENOUGH (4-0 KNOTS) TO BE A POTENT WEAPON.
|
|
|
|
ARMING DISTANCE: TORPEDOES ARE SET TO "ARM" THEIR WARHEADS AFTER
|
|
300 YARDS. UNARMED TORPEDOES ARE HARMLESS. SOME DENT A HULL AND
|
|
BOUNCE OFF, OTHERS PENETRATE THE HULL AND JAM THEMSELVES INTO
|
|
THEIR OWN HOLE, CAUSING TRIVIAL LEAKS.
|
|
|
|
IN ADDITION, THE TORPEDO ARMING DEVICE IS ONLY GENERALLY RELI-
|
|
ABLE. THE SAFE DISTANCE COULD BE A OF DISTANCE COULD BE A LITTLE
|
|
MORE OR A LITTLE LESS. WISE SKIPPERS ADDED A BIT OF "KENTUCKY
|
|
WINDAGE" AND DIDN'T FIRE UNLESS THE TORPEDO WOULD TRAVEL AT LEAST
|
|
400 YARDS TO TARGET.
|
|
|
|
BROADSIDE SHOTS: THE IDEAL TORPEDO IS INTO THE SIDE OF A SHIP
|
|
MOVING PERPENDICULAR TO THE TORPEDO'S PATH (SEE ILLUSTRATION).
|
|
NOTE THAT THE SUB MUST FIRE A BIT BEFORE THE SHIP IS RIGHT IN
|
|
FRONT OF HIM. ALSO NOTE THAT THE SUB IS BETTER OFF FACING IN THE
|
|
DIRECTION OF FIRE. OTHERWISE THE TORPEDOES MUST CURVE AROUND
|
|
BEFORE RUNNING TOWARD THE TARGET. THIS MAKES THE TORPEDO RUN
|
|
LONGER, INCREASING THE CHANCE THEY'LL BE SEEN, AS WELL AS MAKING
|
|
IT EASIER FOR THE TARGET SHIP TO EVADE.
|
|
|
|
66
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
67
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
UNTIL LATE IN 1943 MARK 14S HAD CONTACT EXPLODER FAULTS THAT
|
|
CAUSED MANY BROADSIDE HITS TO "DUD" (NOT EXPLODE). THE EARLY MARK
|
|
14-S WERE MORE LIKELY TO EXPLODE ON A GLANCING HIT. IN SILENT
|
|
SERVICE II THIS PROBLEM OCCURS ONLY IF YOU SELECT "HISTORICAL
|
|
TORPEDOES".
|
|
|
|
BOW SHOTS: SHOOTING AT A SHIP'S BOW ("DOWN THE THROAT") IS MORE
|
|
DIFFICULT. SHIPS ARE NARROW, SO THE CHANCE OF A MISS IS MUCH
|
|
GREATER. FURTHERMORE, THE FIRER MUST SHOOT FASTER. REMEMBER THAT
|
|
THE TORPEDO AND TARGET WILL MOVE TOWARD EACH OTHER, SO THE TORPEDO
|
|
MIGHT NOT ARM ITSELF BEFORE IT HITS THE TARGET.
|
|
|
|
THE "DOWN THE THROAT" SHOT COMMONLY OCCURS WHEN AN ESCORTING
|
|
WARSHIP SPOTS THE SUBMARINE AND HEADS STRAIGHT FOR IT. THE SUBMA-
|
|
RINE IS NOW LOOKING AT THE WARSHIP'S ONCOMING BOW. DO YOU DIVE
|
|
AND TRY TO HIDE, OR WAIT AND SHOOT TORPEDOES? THE PROBLEM IS THAT
|
|
AFTER SHOOTING A SUB IS STILL AT A FAIRLY SHALLOW DEPTH, WHICH
|
|
INCREASES YOUR CHANCE OF SUFFERING DAMAGE.
|
|
|
|
STERN SHOTS: SHOOTING AT A SHIP'S STERN IS THE WORST POSSIBLE
|
|
SETUP. THE TARGET IS JUST AS NARROW AS IN A BOW SHOT. WORSE, THE
|
|
TARGET IS MOVING AWAY, SO THE TORPEDO MUST CATCH UP. AS A RESULT
|
|
THE TORPEDO "CLOSES" ON THE TARGET MORE SLOWLY. THIS GIVES THE
|
|
TARGET MORE TIME TO SEE AND REACT TO THE TORPEDO.
|
|
|
|
ONE SMALL, MITIGATING FACTOR IS THAT MERCHANT SHIPS USUALLY KEEP
|
|
VERY POOR LOOKOUT ASTERN. A TORPEDO ATTACK FROM THE REAR IS LESS
|
|
LIKELY TO BE NOTICED. FURTHERMORE, IT THE MERCHANTMAN IS MOVING
|
|
SLOWLY (10 KNOTS OR LESS), A FAST TORPEDO (A MARK 14 OR 18-2)
|
|
APPROACHES FAIRLY QUICKLY.
|
|
|
|
PREMATURES AND DUDS: NO MUNITION IS PERFECT. ALL TORPEDOES SOME-
|
|
TIMES BLEW UP PREMATURELY OR WERE DUDS (FAILED TO GO OFF). THIS
|
|
OCCURS IN SILENT SERVICE II FOR ALL "HISTORICAL" TORPEDOES.
|
|
|
|
MARK 14 TORPEDOES HAD A NUMBER OF SPECIAL FLAWS THAT MADE THEM
|
|
MUCH LESS RELIABLE THAN MOST. THEIR CONTACT EXPLODER WAS FAULTY.
|
|
STRAIGHT-ON BROADSIDE HITS TENDED TO DUD, WHILE TORPEDOES THAT HIT
|
|
AT GLANCING ANGLES WERE MORE LIKELY TO EXPLODE CORRECTLY. IN THE
|
|
LATE 1943 THE EXPLODER WAS REDESIGNED, MAKING IT MUCH MORE RELI-
|
|
ABLE.
|
|
|
|
THE MARK 14 TORPEDOES ALSO HAD A MAGNETIC EXPLODER. WHEN ARMED,
|
|
THIS DEVICE TENDED TO CAUSE TORPEDOES TO EXPLODE PREMATURELY, OR
|
|
TO IGNORE THE COMMANDS FINALLY REALIZED THIS PROBLEM AND ORDERED
|
|
THE MAGNETIC EXPLODERS DEACTIVATED (WHICH MEANT THE TORPEDO RELIED
|
|
EXCLUSIVELY ON THE CONTACT EXPLODER).
|
|
|
|
|
|
67
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
68
|
|
|
|
|
|
TDC TORPEDO FIRING
|
|
|
|
THE TDC: AMERICAN SUBMARINES HAD A ANALOG "TORPEDO DATA COMPUTER"
|
|
(TDC) THAT CALCULATED A TORPEDO'S CORRECT COURSE. THE CREW HAD TO
|
|
INPUT THE TARGET'S COURSE, SPEED AND RANGE.
|
|
|
|
WHEN YOU "TURN ON" THE TDC THE CREW CONSTANTLY UPDATES THE FIRING
|
|
SOLUTIONS TO THE COMPUTER, SO YOUR TORPEDO IS ALWAYS READY TO
|
|
FIRE.
|
|
|
|
THE TDC FIRING SOLUTION ASSUMES THE TARGET WILL NEITHER TURN NOR
|
|
CHANGE SPEED. UNFORTUNATELY, ONCE THE ENEMY SPOTS THE TORPEDO, HE
|
|
USUALLY TURNS AND FREQUENTLY INCREASES SPEED AS WELL.
|
|
|
|
SPREADS: GOOD CAPTAINS COMPENSATED FOR TARGET MANEUVERS BY FIRING
|
|
A "SPREAD" OF THREE OR FOUR TORPEDOES. WHEN FIRING AT A SHIP'S
|
|
BROADSIDE, THE RULE OF THUMB WAS TO SPACE OUT THE "SPREAD" ALONG
|
|
THE LENGTH OF THE SHIP, WITH THE FIRST TORPEDO "MARKED" AT THE BOW
|
|
AND THE LAST TORPEDO "MARKED" AT THE STERN. MORE ENTERPRISING
|
|
COMMANDERS VISUALIZED IN THEIR MIND THE PATH OF A PERFECT TORPEDO,
|
|
IMAGINED POSSIBLE ENEMY MANEUVERS, THE IMAGINED AIMING ADJUSTMENTS
|
|
THAT WOULD HIT THOSE MANEUVERS.
|
|
|
|
AIMING TDC SPREADS: TO AIM A TDC SPREAD YOU FIRST "MARK" A TAR-
|
|
GET. WHILE STILL TRACKING (I.E. THE TDC LIGHT IS STILL ON) USE
|
|
THE VIEW LEFT AND VIEW RIGHT KEYS TO MOVE THE TORPEDO AIMING
|
|
POINTER LEFT OR RIGHT. THE TDC USES THE CURRENT COURSE, SPEED AND
|
|
RANGE DATA TO SET THE TORPEDO, BUT IT FIRES TOWARD A SPOT SLIGHTLY
|
|
TO THE RIGHT OR LEFT OF THE REAL TARGET POSITION, DEPENDING ON THE
|
|
POSITION OF THE AIMING POINTER WHEN THE TORPEDO IS FIRED.
|
|
|
|
AIMING AT THE BOW OF A SHIP HELPS IF THE ENEMY INCREASES SPEED
|
|
AND/OR TURNS TOWARD YOU. THE TIGHTER THE TURN AND/OR HIGHER THE
|
|
SPEED, THE MORE YOU MUST LEAD THE TARGET.
|
|
|
|
AIMING AT THE STERN OF A SHIP HELPS IF THE ENEMY DECREASES SPEED
|
|
AND/OR TURNS AWAY FROM YOU. AGAIN, THE SLOWER THE SPEED AND/OR
|
|
THE TIGHTER THE TURN, THE MORE YOU MUST AIM BEHIND THE TARGET.
|
|
|
|
WHEN AIMING AT THE BOW OR STERN OF A SHIP, YOU MUST FIRE THE
|
|
SPREAD TO EITHER SIDE. THE HARDER THE ENEMY COULD TURN, THE WIDER
|
|
YOU SHOULD "OPEN OUT" THE SPREAD. ENEMY DESTROYERS AND PATROL
|
|
BOATS ARE THE MOST MANEUVERABLE, WHILE LARGE TRANSPORTS AND BAT-
|
|
TLESHIPS ARE THE LEAST MANEUVERABLE.
|
|
|
|
REMEMBER THAT WHEN THE TDC IS ON, THE VIEW LEFT AND VIEW RIGHT
|
|
KEYS CONTROL THE AIMING POINTER ONLY, NOT THE VIEW. YOU MUST TURN
|
|
OFF THE TDC TO MOVE YOUR VIEW.
|
|
|
|
|
|
68
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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69
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|
MANUAL TORPEDO FIRE
|
|
|
|
IN REAL LIFE SOME CAPTAINS FIRED TORPEDOES WITHOUT USING THE TDC.
|
|
INSTEAD THEY USED THE CHARTS, PLOTTED THE PROSPECTIVE COURSE OF
|
|
THE ENEMY SHIP, AND SET UP THE APPROPRIATE TORPEDO INTERCEPT
|
|
COURSE. YOU CAN DO THIS TOO. A RULER, PROTRACTOR (TO MEASURE
|
|
ANGLES), AND SCRATCH PAPER WERE THE TRADITIONAL TOOLS USED BY THE
|
|
"PLOT CREW" IN REAL SUBMARINES. WITH A RULER YOU'LL FIND THAT 1"
|
|
EQUALS = 1000 YDS IS A USEFUL SCALE (THAT IS, 1/2" EQUALS 500
|
|
YARDS, 1/4 EQUALS 250 YDS, 1/8" EQUALS 125 YDS AND 1/16" EQUALS
|
|
67.5 YDS).
|
|
|
|
AS YOU'LL SEE, MANUAL COMPUTATION TAKES TIME AND WORK, AND IS
|
|
SOMEWHAT INACCURATE. THE TDC SOLVES MOST OF THESE PROBLEMS FOR
|
|
YOU. FURTHERMORE, THE METHOD BELOW IS DESIGNED FOR GOOD SETUPS--
|
|
FIRING STRAIGHT INTO THE BROADSIDE OF A SHIP. HOWEVER, YOU CAN
|
|
USE VARIANTS OF THIS METHOD TO CALCULATE SHOTS AT ANY ANGLE.
|
|
|
|
PLOT: YOU START BY MARKING YOUR POSITION, A BEARING LINE TO THE
|
|
ENEMY'S INITIAL POSITION, AND BY MEASURING THE RANGE. THIS GIVES
|
|
YOU THE ENEMY'S STARTING LOCATION. NOW DRAW A LINE FROM THERE
|
|
ALONG THE ENEMY'S COURSE.
|
|
|
|
FIRING RANGE: NEXT PLOT A LINE FROM YOUR SUB TO THE ENEMY'S
|
|
COURSE. IF YOU HAVE A TRIANGLE, SLIDE IT ALONG THE ENEMY'S COURSE
|
|
UNTIL THE RIGHT-ANGLE SIDE INTERSECTS WITH YOUR SUB. THE LINE
|
|
ALONG THAT SIDE IS THE TORPEDO'S PATH FROM YOUR SHIP TO THE TAR-
|
|
GET. MEASURE THIS LINE TO DETERMINE THE FIRING RANGE.
|
|
|
|
ALSO MEASURE WITH A PROTRACTOR THE DIRECTION OF FIRE. TURN YOUR
|
|
SUB UNTIL IT'S HEADING IN THIS DIRECTION. THIS MEANS THE TORPE-
|
|
DOES DON'T HAVE TO TURN LEFT OR RIGHT AFTER THEY LEAVE YOUR BOAT.
|
|
|
|
IF THE FIRING RANGE SEEMS TOO LONG, MOVE YOUR SUB ALONG THE LINE
|
|
OF FIRE, CLOSING THE RANGE.
|
|
|
|
FIRING BEARING: ONCE YOU HAVE YOUR FIRING RANGE AND HEADING, YOU
|
|
NEED TO CALCULATE WHEN TO FIRE. YOU START BY COMPUTING HOW LONG
|
|
THE TORPEDO TAKES TO RUN FROM YOUR SUB TO THE INTERCEPTION POINT.
|
|
ONE KNOT OF SPEED MEANS MOVEMENT OF 0.555 YARDS PER SECOND. (SEE
|
|
THE BOX TO THE BELOW FOR SPEEDS OF ALL TORPEDOES.)
|
|
|
|
U.S. TORPEDO SPEEDS
|
|
|
|
MARK 10 20 YDS/SEC @ 36 KTS
|
|
|
|
MARK 14 25.5 YDS/SEC @ 46 KTS; OR
|
|
17.5 YDS/SEC @ 31.5 KTS
|
|
|
|
MARK 18-1 15 YDS/SEC @ 27 KTS
|
|
|
|
MARK 18-2 22.2 YDS/SEC @ 40 KTS
|
|
|
|
HOW CALCULATE HOW LONG (IN SECONDS) THE TORPEDO TAKES TO ARRIVE AT
|
|
THE INTERCEPTION POINT. (DIVIDE THE TOTAL DISTANCE BY THE YDS/SEC
|
|
VALUE BELOW).
|
|
|
|
NEXT CALCULATE HOW FAR THE ENEMY SHIP WILL TRAVEL DURING THAT SAME
|
|
PERIOD IN TIME. DO THIS BY MULTIPLYING TOGETHER THE ENEMY'S SPEED
|
|
IN KNOTS TIMES THE TORPEDO TIME IN SECONDS TIMES 0.555.
|
|
|
|
FINALLY, MEASURE FROM THE INTERCEPTION POINT BACK ALONG THE ENE-
|
|
MY'S COURSE THE APPROPRIATE DISTANCE. WHEN THE ENEMY SHIP REACHES
|
|
THIS POINT, YOU
|
|
|
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|
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|
|
69
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|
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|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
70
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SHOULD FIRE YOUR TORPEDO--SO THAT THE ENEMY SHIP AND THE TORPEDO
|
|
ARRIVE AT THE SAME POINT AT THE SAME TIME.
|
|
|
|
DRAW A LINE TO THIS POINT AND USE THE PROTRACTOR TO DETERMINE ITS
|
|
BEARING. THIS IS THE "FIRING BEARING". ROTATE YOUR TBT PERISCOPE
|
|
TO THIS BEARING. WHEN THE ENEMY MOVES CLOSE TO THE CENTER OF THE
|
|
VIEW, SPIN YOUR SCOPE OR TBT TO THE COURSE YOU PRE-CALCULATED FOR
|
|
THE TORPEDO AND SHOOT (THE TORPEDO FIRES ALONG YOUR VIEW BEARING).
|
|
|
|
MATHEMATICAL SOLUTIONS: IF YOU'RE FAMILIAR WITH TRIGONOMETRY,
|
|
YOU'LL REALIZE THAT FIRING RANGE AND BEARING CAN BE CALCULATED
|
|
MATHEMATICALLY.
|
|
|
|
SOLVING THE PROBLEM WITH MATH YIELDS MORE ACCURATE FIRING HEADINGS
|
|
AND BEARING, BUT UNLESS YOU'RE THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH THE MATHE-
|
|
MATICAL PRINCIPLES, YOU'LL PROBABLY MAKE A FATAL ERROR THAT INVAL-
|
|
IDATES THE WHOLE EFFORT. ERRORS WITH A RULER AND A PROTRACTOR ARE
|
|
USUALLY CAUSED BY IMPRECISE MEASUREMENTS, AND ARE FAIRLY SMALL.
|
|
|
|
DURING WWII THE FIRE CONTROL CREW ON A SUB ALWAYS CALCULATED
|
|
MANUAL SOLUTIONS AS A "BACK UP" IN CASE OF PROBLEMS WITH THE TDC.
|
|
THEY USED THE RULER AND PROTRACTOR METHOD, RATHER THAN PURE MATHE-
|
|
MATICS.
|
|
|
|
EXAMPLE: (SEE PAGES 71-72 FOR ILLUSTRATIONS) YOUR SUBMARINE SPOTS
|
|
AN ENEMY MERCHANTMAN AT BEARING 243, 5,000 YARDS AWAY MOVING
|
|
NORTHEAST COURSE 050 AT 9 KNOTS. YOUR SUBMARINE HAS MADE AN END-
|
|
AROUND AND GOTTEN CLOSE TO HIS PROJECTED COURSE.
|
|
|
|
YOU PLOT HIS COURSE AND AN APPROPRIATE TORPEDO INTERCEPT FOR A
|
|
BROADSIDE HIT (SEE ILLUSTRATION). YOU DISCOVER THE TORPEDO NEEDS
|
|
TO TRAVEL ABOUT 1125 YARDS, WHICH YOUR 46-KNOT MARK 14 WILL COVER
|
|
AT 25.5 YARDS PER SECOND. THEREFORE, THE TORPEDO NEEDS 44 SECONDS
|
|
TO REACH THE INTERCEPTION POINT (1125 / 25.5 = 44.1 , ROUNDED OFF
|
|
TO 44 SECONDS).
|
|
|
|
MEANWHILE, THE 9 KNOT FREIGHTER WILL COVER ABOUT 200 YDS (9 X 44 X
|
|
0.555 = 220). THEREFORE, YOU BACK UP 220 YARDS ALONG THE FREIGHT-
|
|
ER'S COURSE FROM THE INTERCEPTION POINT. WHEN HE REACHES THIS
|
|
POSITION, YOU MUST SHOOT.
|
|
|
|
USING YOUR PROTRACTOR, YOU'LL FIND THAT THE FIRING BEARING IS 309
|
|
DEGREES AND THE ACTUAL TORPEDO PATH IS 320 DEGREES.
|
|
|
|
YOU ROTATE THE TBT OR SCOPE TO 309 DEGREES AND WAIT FOR THE
|
|
FREIGHTER TO APPEAR. A SECOND OR TWO BEFORE HIS MIDSHIPS CROSS
|
|
THE MIDDLE OF THE SCOPE YOU SWING YOUR VIEW TO 320 DEGREES AND
|
|
FIRE.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
70
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
71
|
|
|
|
|
|
TO FIRE A SPREAD, YOU MIGHT SHOOT AT 319 DEGREES, 320 DEGREES AND
|
|
321 DEGREES. A ONE-OR TWO DEGREE SPREAD BETWEEN TORPEDOES IS FINE
|
|
FOR A SLOW SHIP LIKE THIS. A FASTER SHIP, LIKE A DESTROYER, MIGHT
|
|
REQUIRE A WIDER SPREAD WITH MORE TORPEDOES.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
71
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
73
|
|
|
|
SURFACE ENGAGEMENTS
|
|
|
|
WHOM TO ENGAGE: THE ORIGINAL PURPOSE OF DECK GUNS WAS TO THREATEN
|
|
PEACEFUL MERCHANTMEN, FORCING THEM TO SURRENDER. HOWEVER, AMERI-
|
|
CA'S "UNRESTRICTED" SUBMARINE WAR AGAINST JAPAN DISPENSED WITH
|
|
SUCH NICETIES. DECK GUNS ARE USED TO FINISH OFF TARGETS UNWORTHY
|
|
OF ANOTHER TORPEDO. THEY ARE ALSO USED ON TARGETS TOO SMALL FOR A
|
|
TORPEDO, AND AS A WEAPON OF LAST RESORT BY A SUBMARINE FORCED TO
|
|
SURFACE OR WITHOUT TORPEDOES.
|
|
|
|
MOST JAPANESE MERCHANTMEN STARTED THE WAR UNARMED. DECK GUNS WERE
|
|
ADDED GRADUALLY. BY 1944 THE MAJORITY OF SHIPS CARRIED THEM.
|
|
THOSE WHICH DIDN'T OFTEN BUILT "DUMMY" GUNS TO DISCOURAGE SURFACE
|
|
ATTACKS BY SUBMARINES AND OTHER SMALL CRAFT.
|
|
|
|
MERCHANT SIPS TYPICALLY HAVE TWO TO FOUR 3" TO 5" GUNS, WHILE MOST
|
|
SUBMARINES HAVE JUST ONE. HOWEVER, MERCHANT GUNS ARE MANNED BY
|
|
LESS SKILLFUL CREWS, WHICH MEANS SLOWER AND LESS ACCURATE SHOOT-
|
|
ING. IF THE SUB TORPEDOES THE MERCHANT FIRST, THE CREW IS FURTHER
|
|
DISTRACTED. HOWEVER, SOME MERCHANTMEN HAVE EXCEPTIONAL CAPTAINS
|
|
AND CREWS. ON THE SURFACE THESE SHIPS CAN FIGHT A SUBMARINE TO A
|
|
DRAW, OR POSSIBLY WIN.
|
|
|
|
PATROL BOATS NORMALLY HAVE ONE OR TWO 3" TO 5" GUNS. THEY ARE
|
|
VERY SMALL AND LIGHTLY BUILT, AND THUS EASILY PUT OUT OF ACTION.
|
|
THEIR CREWS ARE BETTER THAN MERCHANTMEN, BUT INFERIOR TO MAJOR
|
|
WARSHIPS. OVERALL, A PATROL BOAT IS AT BEST A MATCH FOR A SUBMA-
|
|
RINE, BUT AGAIN, EVEN WINNING A GUN DUEL CAN CAUSE SERIOUS DAMAGE
|
|
TO THE SUB.
|
|
|
|
JAPANESE WARSHIPS (DESTROYERS AND LARGER) ARE MORE POWERFUL THAN A
|
|
SUBMARINE. NOT ONLY IS THE SHIP LARGER, STRONGER AND FASTER, BUT
|
|
THE GUN TURRETS ARE FAR MORE STABLE, WITH HIGH QUALITY FIRE CON-
|
|
TROL EQUIPMENT. DESTROYER GUNS HAVE A MAXIMUM RANGE OF 14,000 TO
|
|
20,000 YARDS, ALTHOUGH EFFECTIVE RANGE IS UNDER 10,000.
|
|
|
|
CRUISERS AND BATTLESHIPS GROSSLY OUTGUN A SUBMARINE. ONE SHELL
|
|
FROM THEIR PRIMARY BATTERIES CAN CRIPPLE OR SINK A SUB. THE
|
|
SECONDARY OR TERTIARY BATTERIES ARE AS POWERFUL AS AN ENTIRE
|
|
DESTROYER'S BROADSIDE! HEAVY CRUISERS AND BATTLESHIPS CAN FIRE TO
|
|
THE VISUAL HORIZON.
|
|
|
|
HOW TO SCORE HITS: THE ONLY SENSIBLE WAY TO USE A DECK GUN IS
|
|
FROM THE BRIDGE TBT, WITH TDC TRACKING YOUR TARGET. IN THIS
|
|
SITUATION THE GUN CREW AUTOMATICALLY ROTATES AND ELEVATES THE GUN
|
|
FOR THE TARGET'S CURRENT POSITION. YOU NEED ONLY ADJUST THE
|
|
ELEVATION FOR THE TARGET'S MOTION. SINCE SHELLS TRAVEL QUICKLY,
|
|
THE ADJUSTMENTS ARE FAIRLY SMALL.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
73
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
74
|
|
|
|
|
|
IF THE TARGET IS STATIONARY, SCORING HITS IS EASY. NO ADJUSTMENTS
|
|
ARE NEEDED AND MOST SHELLS HIT. MINUSCULE IMPERFECTIONS IN YOUR
|
|
GUN, AMMUNITION, OR CREW CAN CAUSE A FEW DUDS OR MISSES.
|
|
|
|
IF THE ENEMY IS MOVING, COMPARE THE ENEMY'S COURSE TO YOUR VIEW
|
|
BEARING. IF HE'S MOVING TOWARD OR AWAY FROM YOU, DEPRESS OR
|
|
ELEVATE THE GUN SLIGHTLY.
|
|
|
|
THE EXACT AMOUNT OF DEPRESSION/ELEVATION DEPENDS ON THE ENEMY'S
|
|
SPEED. EXPECT YOUR FIRST FEW SHOTS TO MISS. OBSERVE WHETHER THE
|
|
SHELLS FALL SHORT OR LONG AND CORRECT ACCORDINGLY. REMEMBER, IT A
|
|
FAST ENEMY (SUCK AS A DESTROYER) IS CHARGING TOWARD YOU, YOUR
|
|
SHELLS WILL PROBABLY FALL BEHIND HIM. CONVERSELY, IF HE'S FLEEING
|
|
RAPIDLY, YOUR SHOTS FREQUENTLY LAND SHORT.
|
|
|
|
EVADING ASW DETECTION & SEARCH
|
|
|
|
JAPANESE SHIPS CAN SPOT A SUBMARINE VARIOUS WAYS: VISUALLY, WITH
|
|
RADAR OR WITH SONAR. A TORPEDO WAKE OR TORPEDO EXPLOSION CAN ALSO
|
|
ALERT THEM. ONCE ONE SHOPS SPOTS A SUB, HE RADIOS ALL SHIPS IN
|
|
THE FORCE, CALLING IN AVAILABLE HELP AND WARNING AWAY POTENTIAL
|
|
TARGETS.
|
|
|
|
WHEN JAPANESE SHIPS PURSUE A CONTACT, THEY EXPECT THE SUBMARINE TO
|
|
SUBMERGE (WHICH IT USUALLY DOES). THE SITUATION IS NOW A DUEL
|
|
BETWEEN THE ASW (ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE) SHIP'S ABILITY TO FIND
|
|
AND TRACK A TARGET WITH SONAR VERSUS THE SUBMARINE'S ABILITY TO
|
|
ESCAPE.
|
|
|
|
JAPANESE SONAR HAS SHORT RANGE. THE BEST DEFENSE IS AVOIDING ASW
|
|
SHIPS: LIGHT CRUISERS, DESTROYERS, DESTROYER-ESCORTS AND PATROL
|
|
BOATS.
|
|
|
|
THE SINGLE MOST USEFUL TACTIC IS DIVING BELOW THE THERMAL LAYER.
|
|
AT A CERTAIN DEPTH (USUALLY 150' AND 250') OCEAN WATER GETS MUCH
|
|
COLDER. THE AREA WHERE THE CHANGE OCCURS IS THE "THERMAL LAYER".
|
|
SONAR SIGNALS "BEND" OR "BOUNCE" ON THIS LAYER. THEREFORE, IF
|
|
YOU'RE BENEATH THE LAYER, IN COLD WATER, ENEMY SONAR IS LESS
|
|
LIKELY TO DETECT YOU. OF COURSE, IN SHALLOW WATER THERE IS RARELY
|
|
ENOUGH DEPTH TO CREATE A THERMAL LAYER.
|
|
|
|
THE OTHER STANDARD TACTIC IS TO MOVE QUIETLY. THE SLOWER YOUR SUB
|
|
MOVES THE QUIETER IT IS. OF COURSE, NO MOVEMENT AT ALL IS QUIET-
|
|
IST, BUT HIS GETS YOU LITERALLY NOWHERE. THE STANDARD TECHNIQUE
|
|
IS TO CREEP AWAY AT YOUR SLOWEST.
|
|
|
|
A SMALL FACTOR IN SONAR DETECTION IS THE FACING OF YOUR SUB.
|
|
ENEMY SONAR IS MORE EFFECTIVE WHEN IT BOUNCES OFF YOUR BROADSIDE,
|
|
LESS EFFECTIVE IF IT BOUNCES OFF YOUR BOW OR STERN (I.E. WHEN YOUR
|
|
SUB FACES TOWARD OR AWAY FROM THAT ENEMY).
|
|
|
|
ONE FACTOR UNKNOWN TO YOU IS THE QUALITY OF THE SONAR OPERATOR ON
|
|
THE JAPANESE SHIP. INTERPRETING SONAR SIGNALS IS A FINE TARGET.
|
|
A SKILLFUL, EXPERIENCED
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
74
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
75
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
OPERATOR CAN FIND AND TRACK TARGETS AT MUCH GREATER RANGES THAN
|
|
GREENHORNS. ALL SONAR OPERATORS STARTED THE WAR WITH LITTLE EXPE-
|
|
RIENCE. WARSHIP CREWS DEVELOPED GOOD SKILLS OVER THE YEARS.
|
|
PATROL BOATS WERE LESS WELL TRAINED, AND MANY NEW ONES WERE ADDED
|
|
IN 1943, 1944 AND 1945. THEREFORE SOME PCS ARE VERY GOOD, WHILE
|
|
OTHERS ARE VERY POOR.
|
|
|
|
BAFFLES: AS A SHIP MOVES IT CREATES A WAKE OF DISTURBED WATER.
|
|
SONAR SIGNALS CANNOT TRAVEL CLEARLY THROUGH THIS WAKE. AS A RE-
|
|
SULT, THE SHIP IS "BLIND" IN AN ARC ACROSS ITS STERN. THIS BLIND
|
|
SPOT IS CALLED "THE BAFFLES". A SUBMARINE IN THE "BAFFLES" OF A
|
|
SHIP IS COMPLETELY INVISIBLE TO THE SONAR OF THAT SHIP.
|
|
|
|
ASW SHIPS MINIMIZE BAFFLES PROBLEMS BY CONSTANTLY TURNING. THIS
|
|
ROTATES THE BAFFLES ARC, MAKING IT DIFFICULT FOR A SUBMARINE TO
|
|
REMAIN HIDDEN.
|
|
|
|
ASW SHIPS ALSO OPERATE IN PAIRS: EACH CAN WATCH THE OTHER'S BAT-
|
|
TLES.
|
|
|
|
EVADING ASW ATTACKS
|
|
|
|
ONCE A JAPANESE ASW SHIP HAS SONAR CONTACT, IT BEGINS MAKING DEPTH
|
|
CHARGE ATTACKS. THE ASW SHIPS DRIVES DIRECTLY OVER THE SUBMA-
|
|
RINE'S LAST POSITION (OR CLOSE TO IT) AND DROPS A "PATTERN" OF
|
|
DEPTH CHARGES TO EITHER SIDE AND BEHIND IT. THE DEPTH CHARGES ARE
|
|
FUSED TO EXPLODE AT A CERTAIN DEPTH.
|
|
|
|
HOWEVER, THE ASW SHIP LOSES SONAR CONTACT JUST BEFORE IT DROPS THE
|
|
DEPTH CHARGES (SONAR HAS A MINIMUM RANGE). THE SHIP DOESN'T
|
|
REGAIN CONTACT UNTIL SOME SECONDS AFTER THE CHARGES EXPLODE.
|
|
FURTHERMORE, JAPANESE SONAR PROVIDES INACCURATE DEPTH DATA. THE
|
|
SHIP'S CAPTAIN USUALLY GUESSES WHAT DEPTH TO SET THE CHARGES,
|
|
WHILE THE SUB SKIPPER TRIES TO OUTGUESS HIM.
|
|
|
|
EVADING DEPTH CHARGES: A GOOD SUBMARINES CAPTAIN EXPLOITS THESE
|
|
WEAKNESSES TO EVADE ATTACK. JUST BEFORE THE ASW SHIP PASSES
|
|
OVERHEAD A SUBMARINE SHOULD QUICKLY TURN ONTO A NEW COURSE. BOLD
|
|
CAPTAINS MAY EVEN RING UP HIGHER SPEEDS FOR A SHORT TIME, KNOWING
|
|
THE ENEMY WON'T HEAR THEIR ENGINES. IN ANY CASE, UNLESS THE ENEMY
|
|
MAKES THE RIGHT GUESS, THE DEPTH CHARGE ATTACK WILL BE OFF TARGET.
|
|
IF YOUR BOAT IS TAKING DAMAGE FROM A DEPTH CHARGE ATTACK, MAKE A
|
|
RADICAL CHANGE IN DEPTH. THIS TOO MAY THROW OFF THE ENEMY'S AIM.
|
|
|
|
ULTIMATELY THE SUB SEEKS TO ESCAPE ATTACKS ENTIRELY. THE BEST WAY
|
|
IS TO DIVE BELOW THE LAYER AND SNEAK AWAY AT 3-5 KNOTS. WITH A
|
|
FEW GOOD GUESSES YOU CAN SLIP OUTSIDE THE ENEMY'S SONAR RANGE.
|
|
|
|
TORPEDO COUNTERATTACKS: ATTEMPTING TO TORPEDO AN ASW WARSHIP IS
|
|
RARELY WORTHWHILE. COMING TO PERISCOPE DEPTH TO AIM IS A VERY BAD
|
|
IDEA. THE PERISCOPE NOT ONLY GIVES AWAY YOUR POSITION, IT ALSO
|
|
MEANS THE ENEMY HAS
|
|
|
|
|
|
75
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
76
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BETTER INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR DEPTH. FIRING FROM A DEEPER DEPTH,
|
|
USING JUST YOUR CHARTS, IS MUCH SAFER.
|
|
|
|
DETERMINING A GOOD FIRING SOLUTION IS DIFFICULT BECAUSE THE ENEMY
|
|
IS CONSTANTLY TURNING AT HIGH SPEED. EVEN IF YOU LINE UP A SHOT,
|
|
YOU MUST INSURE THAT THE TORPEDO WILL RUN OVER 300 YARDS. OTHER-
|
|
WISE ITS UNARMED WARHEAD WILL "DUD" INTO THE ENEMY'S SIDE. NEED-
|
|
LESS TO SAY, ACHIEVING ALL THIS IN A FEW SECONDS IS VERY DIFFI-
|
|
CULT.
|
|
|
|
BEING RAMMED: ENEMY WARSHIPS AND EVEN BRAVE MERCHANTMEN ARE PER-
|
|
FECTLY WILLING TO RAM YOUR SUB. THE THING MOST CAPTAINS FORGET IS
|
|
THAT SUBMERGING DOES NOT ELIMINATE THIS DANGER. AT PERISCOPE DEPTH
|
|
(55' OR LESS), THE CONNING TOWER AND PERISCOPE SHEERS ARE TALL
|
|
ENOUGH THAT RAM CONTACT IS STILL POSSIBLE. TO MAKE SURE YOU'RE
|
|
SAFE FROM RAMMING, DIVE TO 60' OR MORE AND LOWER YOUR PERISCOPE.
|
|
|
|
BEWARE THAT EVEN IF THE ENEMY MISSES RAMMING YOUR BOAT, IF THEY
|
|
HAVE DEPTH CHARGES THEY'LL TOSS A FEW ONTO YOU WITH A VERY GOOD
|
|
CHANCE OF CAUSING SERIOUS DAMAGE.
|
|
|
|
RAMMING ATTACKS OFTEN CAUSE MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF DAMAGE--MORE THAN A
|
|
DEPTH CHARGE HIT. THEREFORE IT'S WORTHWHILE TO AVOID GETTING
|
|
RAMMED EVEN THAT MEANS YOU'LL SUFFER DEPTH CHARGE DAMAGE.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
76
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
77
|
|
|
|
PATROL STRATEGY
|
|
|
|
THE FIRST STEP TO GOOD STRATEGY IS KNOWING THE ENEMY. THEN EVALU-
|
|
ATE YOUR OWN CAPABILITIES, EXAMINE THE COMBINATIONS, AND CREATE A
|
|
PLAN FOR SINKING THE MOST ENEMY SHIPS AT THE LEAST RISK. MANY
|
|
WERE SUCCESSFUL, BUT FEW SURVIVED THE WAR.
|
|
|
|
JAPANESE NAVAL TRAFFIC
|
|
|
|
JAPANESE WARSHIP ANCHORED IN PROTECTED HARBORS UNTIL A MAJOR
|
|
MILITARY OPERATION BEGAN. EVERY FEW YEARS, OR AFTER MAJOR BATTLE
|
|
DAMAGE A SHIP WOULD RETURN TO THE NAVAL YARDS IN JAPAN FOR OVER-
|
|
HAUL. IN JAPAN THE LARGE FLEET ANCHORAGES WERE TOKYO BAY AND THE
|
|
KURE NAVY YARD. DURING 1942 AND EARLY 1943 TRUK AND RABAUL WERE
|
|
THE FRONT-LINE BASES. LATER IN 1943 THROUGH MIDDLE 1944 THE FLEET
|
|
FELL BACK TO YAP AND PALAU. LATER IN 1944 IT FELL BACK AGAIN TO
|
|
BRUNEI AND BALIKPAPAN. AFTER LEYTE GULF THE FLEET WAS LARGELY
|
|
DESTROYED, WITH THE REMNANTS FLEEING EITHER TO JAPAN, OR SOUTH TO
|
|
SINGAPORE AND CAM RANH BAY ON THE INDOCHINA COAST.
|
|
|
|
AT VARIOUS TIMES IN THE WAR THE JAPANESE FLEET LEFT PORT TO GIVE
|
|
BATTLE. IT WAS ESPECIALLY ACTIVE IN EARLY 1942, SECURING THE
|
|
CONQUEST OF THE SOUTHWESTERN PACIFIC FROM BURMA TO NEW GUINEA,
|
|
THEN IN LATER 1942 SUPPORTING THE FIGHTING IN THE SOLOMONS. THERE
|
|
WERE NO MAJOR NAVAL BATTLES IN 1943. IN 1944 BOTH THE FLEET AND
|
|
NAVAL AIR FORCES WERE WIPED OUT IN TWO MAJOR BATTLES (THE FILIPI-
|
|
NO SEA AND LEYTE GULF).
|
|
|
|
THE SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN FROM AUGUST TO NOVEMBER 1942 WAS AN ADDI-
|
|
TIONAL EXCEPTION TO THE NORMAL PATTERN OF JAPANESE MOVEMENTS.
|
|
HERE THE "TOKYO EXPRESS", COMPOSED OF DESTROYERS AND SOMETIMES A
|
|
LIGHT CRUISER, RACED AT HIGH SPEED FROM RABAUL OR THE SHORTLANDS
|
|
TO GUADALCANAL, THEN BACK AGAIN. AT ITS PEAK THE TOKYO EXPRESS
|
|
RAN TWO OR THREE TIMES A WEEK.
|
|
|
|
JAPANESE MERCHANT SHIPPING AND ASW FORCES
|
|
|
|
THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY APPROACHED THE PROBLEM OF SUBMARINE
|
|
QUITE DIFFERENTLY FROM THE ALLIES.
|
|
IN THE FIRST YEAR OR TWO OF WAR, AMERICAN SUBMARINE PERFORMANCE
|
|
WAS POOR. THIS WAR PARTLY DUE TO FEW FLEET BOATS ON PATROL AND
|
|
PARTLY BECAUSE OF POOR MARK 14 TORPEDO PERFORMANCE. AS A RESULT,
|
|
THE JAPANESE LOST FEW SHIPS, WHICH INSPIRED NO MORE THAN MODEST
|
|
ASW (ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE) EFFORTS. AS AMERICAN SUBS BECAME
|
|
MORE EFFECTIVE THE JAPANESE TRIED TO INCREASE THEIR ANTI-SUBMARINE
|
|
MEASURES.
|
|
|
|
PORT PATROLS: JAPAN'S FIRST ASW POLICY WAS REGULAR ANTI-SUBMARINE
|
|
PATROLS AROUND MAJOR PORTS. PORTS ARE NATURAL "CONGREGATION
|
|
POINTS" FOR SHIPS.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
77
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
78
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
OBVIOUSLY IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DISCOURAGE AMERICAN SUBMARINES FROM
|
|
HANGING AROUND PORTS, TORPEDOING SHIPS THAT ENTERED AND LEFT!
|
|
|
|
ESCORT GROUPS: DURING 1942 THE JAPANESE NAVY CREATED THE "FIRST
|
|
CONVOY ESCORT FLEET" OF COASTAL ESCORTS. THE FLEET WAS DIVIDED
|
|
INTO MANY SMALL UNITS SCATTERED AMONG THE COASTAL PORTS OF
|
|
INDOCHINA, SOUTHERN CHINA AND THE HOME ISLANDS OF JAPAN. AS ONE OR
|
|
MORE MERCHANTMEN ARRIVED IN OR NEAR AN ESCORT UNIT'S PORT, THE
|
|
ESCORTS JOINED THE MERCHANTS AND TRAVELLED WITH THEM UP THE COAST
|
|
FOR A DAY OR TWO, UNTIL THEY REACHED ANOTHER PORT OR TURN-OVER
|
|
POINT. THE ESCORTS THEN RELEASED THE MERCHANTS AND TRAVELED BACK
|
|
AGAIN, HOPEFULLY ESCORTING MERCHANTS GOING THE OTHER DIRECTION.
|
|
IN OTHER WORDS, MERCHANTSHIPS WERE "HANDED ALONG" FROM ONE ESCORT
|
|
GROUP TO ANOTHER AS THEY MOVED.
|
|
|
|
UNFORTUNATELY FOR JAPAN, THESE COASTAL ESCORT GROUPS RECEIVED LOW
|
|
PRIORITY IN SHIP ALLOCATIONS. A FEW ANCIENT DESTROYERS, OLD MINE-
|
|
SWEEPERS, AND VARIOUS SMALL CRAFT WERE USED, CAPTAINED BY OVERAGE
|
|
OFFICERS WITH LITTLE OR NO EXPERIENCE IN ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE.
|
|
SOME BECAME QUITE GOOD, BUT OTHERS -WERE
|
|
ALMOST USELESS.
|
|
|
|
CONVOYS: UNTIL LATE 1943 THE JAPANESE NAVY DID NOT FORCE MERCHANT
|
|
SHIPS INTO CONVOYS. MERCHANTMEN WERE FREE TO SAIL ALONE OR IN
|
|
GROUPS, AS THEY DESIRED. MERCHANT SKIPPERS PREFERRED TO SAIL
|
|
ALONE. THEY COULD TRAVEL FASTER AND RETAIN MORE CONTROL OVER
|
|
THEIR FATE. THIS RESULTED IN MERCHANTMEN SCATTERING ACROSS THE
|
|
SEAS, INCREASING THE PROBABILITY OF A SUB FINDING A TARGET.
|
|
|
|
IN AREAS OF KNOWN DANGER NEAR "FRONT LINE" WAR ZONES MERCHANTMEN
|
|
WERE GROUPED TOGETHER AND PLACED UNDER THE COMMAND OF A JAPANESE
|
|
NAVAL OFFICER. THIS "CONVOY LEADER" HAD DECK GUNS AND FREQUENTLY
|
|
SOME DEPTH CHARGES (BUT NO SONAR) ON HIS SHIP, WHICH HELPED PRO-
|
|
TECT THE GROUP FROM SURFACE ATTACK. DEFENSES INCREASED AS MORE
|
|
MERCHANTMEN RECEIVED DECK GUNS, EVEN IF THEIR GUN CREWS WERE NOT
|
|
ESPECIALLY SKILLFUL.!
|
|
|
|
IN LATE 1943 THE JAPANESE NAVY BECAME ALARMED AT RISING MERCHANT
|
|
LOSSES AND ORGANIZED A NEW "GRAND ESCORT COMMAND" THAT INCLUDED
|
|
AIRCRAFT AND HUNTER-KILLER DESTROYER GROUPS. ALTHOUGH THE COAST
|
|
ESCORTS CONTINUED, MOST OF THEIR BETTER SHIPS WERE TRANSFERRED TO
|
|
THE NEW COMMAND.
|
|
|
|
MORE IMPORTANTLY, MOST MERCHANT SHIPS WERE REQUIRED TO SAIL IN
|
|
CONVOYS. THESE CONVOYS WERE ESCORTED BY WARSHIPS, INCLUDING AT
|
|
LEAST ONE DESTROYER OR DESTROYER ESCORT WHEREVER POSSIBLE. THE
|
|
RATIO OF ESCORTS TO MERCHANTS VARIED WIDELY, DEPENDING ON THE
|
|
SHIPS AVAILABLE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CARGO. BY MID 1944
|
|
VIRTUALLY ALL SURVIVING JAPANESE SHIPS SAILED IN CONVOYS.
|
|
|
|
78
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
79
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
THROUGHOUT WWII, AMERICAN SUBMARINES IN THE PACIFIC WERE DIVIDED
|
|
BETWEEN TWO COMMANDS: SUBPAC AT PEARL HARBOR, AND A SECOND COMMAND
|
|
THAT STARTED IN MANILA, MOVED TO AUSTRALIA FOR MOST OF THE WAR,
|
|
THEN RETURNED TO MANILA JUST BEFORE THE WAR ENDED. THE SECOND
|
|
COMMAND WAS ORIGINALLY KNOWN AS SUBSASIATIC, BUT IN EARLY 1 942
|
|
WAS REORGANIZED AS SUBSOWESPAC.
|
|
|
|
THIS DIVISION EXISTED BECAUSE THE US PACIFIC FLEET AFTER PEARL
|
|
HARBOR WAS CONTROLLED BY ADMIRAL NIMITZ. GENERAL MACARTHUR,
|
|
ORIGINALLY COMMANDING THE US ARMY IN THE PHILIPPINES, RETREATED TO
|
|
AUSTRALIA AND LOBBIED HARD TO BE THE OVERALL COMMANDER IN THE
|
|
PACIFIC. HE AND NIMITZ DISAGREED COMPLETELY ON PLANS AND STRATEGY.
|
|
IN WASHINGTON THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WERE ALSO DIVIDED, MOSTLY
|
|
ALONG "ARMY VS. NAVY" LINES. PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT RESOLVED THE
|
|
CONFLICT WITH A COMPROMISE. THE ARMY (MACARTHUR) WOULD CONTROL AN
|
|
OFFENSIVE FROM AUSTRALIA INTO THE SOUTH PACIFIC AND THE PHILIP-
|
|
PINES. THIS WOULD BE THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC COMMAND. THE NAVY
|
|
(NIMITZ) WOULD CONTROL AN OFFENSIVE ACROSS THE CENTRAL PACIFIC.
|
|
THIS WOULD BE THE PACIFIC COMMAND. THEY WOULD RACE EACH OTHER TO
|
|
THE JAPANESE HOME ISLANDS!
|
|
|
|
EACH COMMAND DIRECTED A MAJOR OFFENSIVE, AND THEREFORE COMMANDED
|
|
AIR FORCES, NAVAL SURFACE FORCES AND GROUND TROOPS, AS WELL AS
|
|
SUBMARINES.
|
|
|
|
|
|
THEATERS AND TRANSFERS
|
|
|
|
AS A SUBMARINE COMMANDER, YOU CAN CHOOSE BETWEEN OPERATIONAL
|
|
COMMANDS, AS WELL AS SWITCHING BETWEEN THEM. IN A WAR CAREER, THE
|
|
BASE TO WHICH YOU RETURN DETERMINES WHICH THEATER COMMANDS CON-
|
|
TROLS YOUR BOAT IN THE NEXT PATROL: SUBPAC OR SUBSASIATIC-
|
|
SUBSOWESTPAC. THIS IN TURN AFFECTS WHICH PATROL ZONES ARE AVAIL-
|
|
ABLE.
|
|
|
|
SUBPAC IS LIMITED TO WAR PATROLS IN THE NORTHERN AREAS. IN THE
|
|
EARLY WAR THIS INCLUDES AREAS NEAR MIDWAY AND PEARL HARBOR WHERE
|
|
YOU GUARD AGAINST PATROLS AROUND THE JAPANESE HOME ISLANDS AND IN
|
|
THE RICHEST CONVOY AREAS: THE FORMOSA & LUZON STRAITS AND THE
|
|
EAST CHINA SEA.
|
|
|
|
SUBPAC IS BASED AT PEARL HARBOR, WHICH ALWAYS GETS THE LATEST
|
|
EQUIPMENT FIRST. DURING LATE 1942 THIS MEANS YOU'LL PROBABLY GET
|
|
THE NEW SJ RADAR FASTER. SUBPAC USES MIDWAY ISLAND AS A FORWARD
|
|
BASE STARTING IN JULY 1942. FINALLY, ALL "NEW CONSTRUCTION" BOATS
|
|
ARRIVE FIRST AT PEARL HARBOR (IN SUBPAC).
|
|
|
|
FROM JANUARY 1943 ONWARD ADMIRAL LOCKWOOD COMMANDS SUBPAC. HE
|
|
SOLVES PROBLEMS WITH THE MARK 14 TORPEDO FASTER THAN HIS COUNTER-
|
|
PART IN SUBSOWESPAC.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
79
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
80
|
|
|
|
|
|
DURING 1944 SUBPAC SETS UP ADVANCE BASES AT MANJURO IN THE MAR-
|
|
SHALLS (IN MAY), THEN AT SAIPAN (IN AUGUST). THE LATTER IS VERY
|
|
USEFUL.
|
|
|
|
SUBSASIATIC AND SUBSOWESPAC ARE LIMITED TO WAR PATROLS IN SOUTHERN
|
|
AREAS. INITIALLY THE COMMAND IS "SUBSASIATIC" AND BASED AT MANILA
|
|
IN THE PHILIPPINES. HOWEVER, BY CHRISTMAS 1 941 THIS IS ABANDONED
|
|
IN FAVOR OF TJILATJAP ON THE SOUTH COAST OF JAVA. HOWEVER, THE
|
|
RAPID JAPANESE CONQUESTS FORCE THE ALLIES TO ABANDON THAT IN EARLY
|
|
MARCH, 1942. THE SUBS RETREAT TO FREMANTLE, AND SHORTLY AFTER
|
|
SUBSOWESPAC TAKES OVER FROM SUBSASIATIC.
|
|
|
|
BRISBANE ON AUSTRALIA'S OTHER COAST OPENS FOR BUSINESS IN APRIL
|
|
1942. IT INITIALLY OPERATES TASK FORCE 42 (TF 42), DEDICATED TO
|
|
SUBMARINES OPERATING IN THE SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA. MANY OF THE
|
|
OLD "S" BOATS FROM THE PHILIPPINES END UP IN TF42, WHILE THE NEWER
|
|
FLEET BOATS OPERATE FROM FREMANTLE.
|
|
|
|
DURING 1943 DARWIN (ON AUSTRALIA'S NORTH COAST) OPENS AS A TEMPO-
|
|
RARY PORT IN SEPTEMBER. IN LATE OCTOBER A TENDER MOVES TO MILNE
|
|
BAY AT THE SOUTH EAST TIP OF NEW GUINEA, ALL DOING TF42 A BASE IN
|
|
THE NEW GUINEA AREA. BRISBANE AND MILNE BAY CLOSE IN EARLY 1944
|
|
BECAUSE THE FRONT IS MOVING WESTWARD. SHORTLY THEREAFTER TF42 IS
|
|
DISBANDED AND ITS BOATS REINTEGRATED INTO SUBSOWESPAC. MEANWHILE,
|
|
MANUS HARBOR IN THE ADMIRALTIES BECOMES OPERATIONAL IN APRIL, THEN
|
|
MIOS WOENDI IN NORTHWEST NEW GUINEA IN SEPTEMBER, FINALLY, AFTER
|
|
MACARTHUR RECONQUERS LUZON AND MANILA, A SUBMARINE BASE IS ESTAB-
|
|
LISHED THERE IN MARCH 1945.
|
|
|
|
BASES & OPERATIONAL AREAS
|
|
|
|
SUBPAC
|
|
BASES WAR PATROL AREAS
|
|
PEARL HARBOR 12/41-8/45 CENTRAL PACIFIC 12/41-6/42
|
|
MIDWAY 7/42-8/45 WESTERN PACIFIC 12/41-2/45
|
|
MANJURO 5/44-8/45 MARIANA ISLAND 12/41-6/44
|
|
SAIPAN 8/44-8/45 TRUK & MARSHALLS 12/41-3/44
|
|
PALAU ISLANDS 12/41-9/44
|
|
NORTHERN JAPAN 12/41-8/45
|
|
SOUTHERN JAPAN 12/41-8/45
|
|
SEA OF JAPAN 6/43-10/43
|
|
SEA OF JAPAN 1/45-8/45
|
|
YELLOW SEA 12/41-8/45
|
|
EAST CHINA SEA 12/41-8/45
|
|
FORMOSA/LUZON STR 12/41-8/45
|
|
|
|
SUBSASIATIC & SUBSOWESPAC
|
|
BASES WAR PATROL AREAS
|
|
MANILA 12/41 PHILIPPINES 12/41-10/44
|
|
TIJILATJAP 12/41-3/42 SOUTH CHINA SEA 12/41-8/45
|
|
FREMANTLE 4/42-8/45 MALAYA 12/41-8/45
|
|
DARWIN 9/43-8/45 CELEBES 1/42-8/45
|
|
MANUS HARBOR 4/44-8/45 JAVA SEA 1/42-8/45
|
|
MIOS WOENDI 9/44-8/45
|
|
MANILA 3/45-8/45
|
|
|
|
TASK FORCE 42
|
|
BASES WAR PATROL AREAS
|
|
BRISBANE 4/42-5/44 SOLOMON ISLANDS 4/42-11/43
|
|
MILNE BAY 10/43-3/44 NEW GUINEA 4/42-4/44
|
|
|
|
|
|
80
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
81
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DURING 1941 AND 1942 THIS COMMAND GIVES YOU EXCELLENT HUNTING
|
|
AGAINST THE ADVANCING JAPANESE FORCES. DURING 1943 THE LEADERSHIP
|
|
OF SUBSOWESPAC CONTINUED TO IGNORE THE COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE MARK
|
|
14 TORPEDO'S DEFECTIVE WARHEAD. IF YOU PICK HISTORICAL TORPEDOES,
|
|
YOU'LL BE STUCK WITH INFERIOR WEAPONS SLIGHTLY LONGER. IN 1944 AND
|
|
45 MERCHANTSHIPPING IS LESS PREVALENT HERE THAN IN SUBPAC, BUT
|
|
MORE JAPANESE WARSHIPS OPERATE IN THE SUBSOWESPAC ZONE.
|
|
|
|
PATROL AREAS SUBPAC PATROL AREAS
|
|
|
|
PATROL AREAS ARE DIVIDED INTO TWO GENERAL GROUPS: THOSE PATROLLED
|
|
SUBPAC BOATS, AND THOSE BY SUBSASIATIC/SUBSOWESPAC BOATS.
|
|
|
|
THE RICHEST SUBPAC PATROL AREAS ARE, IN ORDER OF PRIORITY, FORMOSA
|
|
& LUZON STRAITS, SOUTHERN JAPAN, SEA OF JAPAN, AND THE EAST CHINA
|
|
SEA. OTHER AREAS CAN BE TEMPORARILY RICH IN TARGETS IN CERTAIN
|
|
SPOTS, NOTABLY TRUK IN 1942 AND EARLY IN 1943.
|
|
|
|
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC: THIS AREA INCLUDES MIDWAY ISLAND AND THE
|
|
APPROACHES TO PEARL HARBOR. IN THE FIRST MONTHS OF THE WAR THERE
|
|
IS A SERIOUS THREAT OF JAPANESE WARSHIP RAIDS OR AMPHIBIOUS INVA-
|
|
SIONS, ESPECIALLY AGAINST WAKE AND MIDWAY ISLAND. AFTER THE MIDDLE
|
|
OF 1942 THIS THREAT DISAPPEARS AND SUBS ARE NO LONGER ASSIGNED TO
|
|
THIS AREA.
|
|
|
|
THE WESTERN PACIFIC: THIS AREA INCLUDES IWO JIMA AND THE SOUTHERN
|
|
APPROACHES TO THE JAPANESE HOME ISLANDS. DURING THE EARLY MONTHS
|
|
OF THE WAR MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE JAPANESE FLEET TRAVEL THROUGH THE
|
|
AREA ON THEIR WAY TO AND FROM THE CENTRAL PACIFIC. THEREAFTER THE
|
|
AREA IS VERY QUIET, ALTHOUGH SOME CONVOY ROUTES EXIST ALONG THE
|
|
SOUTHWESTERN BORDER.
|
|
|
|
NORTHERN JAPAN: THIS AREA COVERS THE EAST COAST OF NORTHERN JAPAN.
|
|
A VARIETY OF GENERAL CARGO TRAFFIC CAN BE FOUND ALONG THE JAPANESE
|
|
COAST. THE OPEN SEA FURTHER EAST IS VERY QUIET, WITH ALMOST NO
|
|
NAVAL TRAFFIC. A WISE CAPTAIN WILL HUNT CLOSE TO THE COAST,
|
|
ESPECIALLY THE SOUTHEASTERN AREAS.
|
|
SEA OF JAPAN: DUE TO NARROW ENTRANCES AND EXITS, SUBPAC NORMALLY
|
|
PROHIBITS OPERATIONS IN THIS AREA. HOWEVER, BETWEEN JUNE AND
|
|
OCTOBER 1943, AND THROUGHOUT MOST OF 1945, ADMIRAL LOCKWOOD DE-
|
|
CIDES THE POTENTIAL GAINS OUTWEIGH THE RISKS. IN THESE SHORT
|
|
PERIODS SUBMARINE PATROLS ARE ALLOWED.
|
|
DURING 1945 THIS IS ABOUT THE ONLY ZONE WITH SIGNIFICANT JAPANESE
|
|
NAVAL TRAFFIC.
|
|
|
|
THIS AREA HAS A LARGE AMOUNT OF TRAFFIC ALONG THE JAPANESE COAST-
|
|
LINE AND BETWEEN SHIMMINATO AND MAINLAND ASIA. UNFORTUNATELY, THE
|
|
ENTRANCES ARE HEAVILY GUARDED. THE KOREA (TSUSHIMA) STRAITS IN THE
|
|
SOUTH ARE HEAVILY
|
|
|
|
81
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
82
|
|
|
|
MINED AND PATROLLED AS IS THE TSUGARU STRAIT BETWEEN JAPANESE
|
|
ISLANDS OF HOKKAIDO AND HONSHU. THE NORTHERMOST ENTRANCE, THE LA
|
|
PEROUSE STRAIT BETWEEN HOKKAIDO AND SAKHALIN ISLAND, IS THE EASI-
|
|
EST TO PASS. DURING 1943 ADMIRAL LOCKWOOD ORDERED ALL RAIDS TO
|
|
USE THIS STRAIT.
|
|
|
|
SOUTHERN JAPAN: THIS AREA INCLUDES THE HEAVILY TRAFFICKED SOUTHERN
|
|
COAST OF JAPAN. PASSAGE INTO THE SHALLOW AND HEAVILY DEFENDED
|
|
INLAND SEA IS NOT RECOMMENDED, BUT PATROLLING CLOSE INTO THE
|
|
ENTRANCES (THE KII SUIDO TO THE NORTH, THE BUNGO SUIDO TO THE
|
|
SOUTH) CAN BE VERY PROFITABLE. IN ADDITION, OPEN SEA TO THE SOUTH
|
|
HAS MILITARY CONVOYS TO AND FROM IWO JIMA, THE MARIANAS, AND
|
|
POINTS BEYOND.
|
|
|
|
MARIANA ISLANDS: THIS AREA THE PACIFIC ISLAND CAROLINES TO THE
|
|
SOUTH. MOST SUPPLY AND TROOP CONVOYS TO THE PACIFIC ISLAND BASES
|
|
OF THE EMPIRE PASS ALONG THE WESTERN EDGE OF THE MARIANAS. FLEET
|
|
WARSHIPS FOLLOW A SIMILAR PATH FROM TOKYO OR KURE TO SAIPAN AND
|
|
GUAM, THEN TO YAP OR TRUK. AFTER THE FIRST FEW MONTHS OF 1944-
|
|
TRUK AND RABAUL CEASE TO BE USEFUL BASES. WARSHIPS ARE BASED
|
|
FURTHER WEST, BUT TROOP AND SUPPLY REINFORCEMENTS CONTINUE INTO
|
|
THE MARIANAS UNTIL THE AMERICAN SUMMER INVASIONS.
|
|
|
|
YELLOW SEA: THIS AREA IS EXTREMELY SHALLOW AND DANGEROUS. THE
|
|
LARGEST CONCENTRATION OF JAPANESE SHIPPING IS ALONG THE SOUTHWEST
|
|
COAST OF KOREA, TRAVELLING BETWEEN SEOUL AND THE JAPANESE HOME
|
|
ISLANDS. THEY CARRY TROOPS AND SUPPLIES TO AND FROM THE JAPANESE
|
|
ARMY IN MANCHURIA (MANCHUKUO).
|
|
|
|
EAST CHINA SEA: THIS AREA STRADDLES THE MAIN SHIPPING ROUTE BE-
|
|
TWEEN THE JAPANESE HOME ISLANDS AND THE EMPIRE'S POSSESSIONS TO
|
|
THE SOUTH. VIRTUALLY ALL RAW MATERIAL SHIPMENTS TO JAPAN TRAVEL
|
|
FROM THE FORMOSA AND LUZON STRAITS TO THE HOME ISLANDS. DURING THE
|
|
FIRST MONTHS OF THE WAR, WARSHIPS AND TROOP TRANSPORTS MOVE SOUTH
|
|
TO CONQUER THESE AREAS. THEREAFTER, LARGE AMOUNTS OF RAW MATERI-
|
|
ALS COMING TO JAPAN PASS THROUGH. MILITARY SUPPLIES AND SOME
|
|
TROOPS WENT THE OTHER DIRECTION, SUPPORTING THE GARRISONS TO THE
|
|
SOUTH, AS WELL AS THE CAMPAIGNS IN BURMA AND SOUTHERN CHINA. FROM
|
|
LATE 1943 TO LATE 1944 MILITARY TRAFFIC GROWS AS THE JAPANESE MOVE
|
|
REINFORCEMENTS INTO THE PHILIPPINES AND CHINA.
|
|
|
|
FORMOSA & LUZON STRAITS: VIRTUALLY ALL JAPANESE SHIPPING TRAFFIC
|
|
FROM ITS SOUTHERN POSSESSIONS TO THE HOME ISLANDS TRAVELLED
|
|
THROUGH THESE TWO STRAITS. THE SAME "GOOD HUNTING" POSSIBLE IN
|
|
THE EAST CHINA SEA IS FOUND HERE, BUT THERE'S MUCH LESS AREA TO
|
|
SEARCH. OF COURSE, THESE STRAITS ARE ALSO
|
|
|
|
82
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
83
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PATROLLED BY JAPANESE ANTI-SUBMARINE FORCES. AMERICAN FLEET VICTO-
|
|
RIES IN THE PHILIPPINES IN LATE 1944 CLOSE THE LUZON STRAIT. THE
|
|
FORMOSA STRAIT REMAINS IN USE, BUT BY 1945 NUMBERS ARE MUCH FEW-
|
|
ER.
|
|
|
|
PALAU ISLANDS: THESE ISLANDS ARE THE MAIN FLEET BASES OF THE
|
|
IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY IN THE WESTERN CAROLINES. NAVAL TRAFFIC IN
|
|
AND OUT OF YAP AND ULITHI IS ESPECIALLY HEAVY. MERCHANT CONVOYS
|
|
ALSO RUN TO THESE BASES. DURING 1942 AND EARLY '43 CONVOYS USE
|
|
THEM AS STOPOVER POINTS ON THEIR WAY TO NEW GUINEA, RABAUL AND THE
|
|
SOLOMONS.
|
|
|
|
TRUK & MARSHALL ISLANDS: TRUK IS THE GREAT ISLAND FORTRESS GUARD-
|
|
ING THE EASTERN BORDER OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE. TRUK IS THE ORIGIN
|
|
AND DESTINATION OF NUMEROUS MILITARY TROOP AND SUPPLY CONVOYS,
|
|
UNTIL AIR RAIDS IN EARLY 1944 DESTROY ITS NAVAL CAPACITY.
|
|
THROUGHOUT 1942 AND 1943 WARSHIPS FIGHTING IN THE SOLOMONS ARE
|
|
BASED AT TRUK. HOWEVER, IT LACKS MAJOR SHIPYARD FACILITIES. SHIPS
|
|
IN NEED OF MAJOR REPAIR OR OVERHAUL MOVE FROM TRUK TO JAPAN
|
|
(USUALLY VIA SAIPAN), AND WHEN REPAIRED RETURN TO TRUK AGAIN.
|
|
|
|
THE MARSHALLS ARE JAPANESE TERRITORY, BUT HAVE VERY LITTLE SHIP-
|
|
PING OR MILITARY ACTIVITY UNTIL THE AMERICAN INVASIONS IN LATE
|
|
1943. THEY ARE ALWAYS A SIDESHOW: MORE IMPORTANT TARGETS ARE
|
|
AVAILABLE AT TRUK.
|
|
|
|
SUBSASUATIC AND SUBSOWESPAC PATROLS AREAS
|
|
|
|
NO AREAS HERE ARE AS CONSISTENTLY RICH IN TARGETS AS THE BEST
|
|
SUBPAC AREAS. HOWEVER, AT SPECIFIC TIMES INDIVIDUAL AREASCAN
|
|
PROVIDE BETTER HUNTING, SUCH AS THE SOUTHWESTERN SEAS IN LATE '41
|
|
AND EARLY '42, OR THE SOLOMONS IN LATE '42. THE PHILIPPINES,
|
|
ESPECIALLY AROUND MANILA AND THE NORTHWEST COAST OF LUZON, ARE
|
|
QUITE ATTRACTIVE IN `43 AND '44.
|
|
|
|
SOLOMON ISLANDS: THROUGHOUT THE LAST HALF OF 1942 THIS AREA IS
|
|
THE SCENE OF INTENSE NAVAL COMBAT, AS THE JAPANESE ATTEMPT TO
|
|
DESTROY THE AMERICAN MARINES ON GUADALCANAL. JAPANESE MAJOR FLEET
|
|
UNITS STATIONED IN TRUK SWING DOWN PERIODICALLY IN MAJOR OFFEN-
|
|
SIVES, WHILE CRUISERS AT RABAUL AND DESTROYERS IN THE SHORTLANDS
|
|
MAKE RUNS DOWN "THE SLOT" BETWEEN THE ISLANDS TO "LRONBOTTOM
|
|
SOUND" ON THE NORTHEAST SIDE OF GUADALCANAL.
|
|
|
|
AFTER THE JAPANESE EVACUATION OF GUADALCANAL IN FEBRUARY 1943 THE
|
|
TEMPO OF COMBAT DECLINES. STILL, THROUGHOUT 1943 JAPANESE CRUIS-
|
|
ERS, DESTROYERS, AND SMALL TRANSPORTS CONTINUE OPERATING IN THE
|
|
UPPER SOLOMONS.
|
|
|
|
NEW GUINEA: IN THE SUMMER OF 1942 A SMALL JAPANESE ARMY MARCHES
|
|
OVERLAND FROM BUNA TO ATTACK PORT MORESBY. THE FAIL, BUT THE
|
|
AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE TAKES UNTIL EARLY 1944 TO
|
|
RECAPTURE NEW GUINEA.
|
|
|
|
83
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
84
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
UNTIL THE END JAPANESE TRANSPORTS AND SUPPLY SHIPS SAIL FROM THE
|
|
CELEBES, THE PALAUS, THE MARIANAS AND RABAUL TO VARIOUS PORTS
|
|
ALONG THE NORTH COAST.
|
|
|
|
VIRTUALLY NO JAPANESE SHIPS OPERATE ALONG THE SOUTH COAST. TRAFFIC
|
|
IN THE SHALLOW ARAFURA AND VERY DEEP BANDAN SEAS IS ALSO LIGHT.
|
|
|
|
CELEBES: THROUGHOUT THE WAR THIS AREA WAS A SECONDARY SOURCE OF
|
|
RAW MATERIALS FOR THE JAPANESE EMPIRE. THE GREAT PORTS ARE
|
|
MAKASSAR AND BALIKPAPAN ON THE MAKASSAR STRAIT. DURING THE EARLY
|
|
MONTHS OF 1942, CRUISERS, BATTLESHIPS AND CARRIERS INHABIT THIS
|
|
AREA, SUPPORTING INVASIONS INTO THE DUTCH EAST INDIES. THEN IN
|
|
LATE 1944 LARGE WARSHIP GROUPS MUSTER AT BALIKPAPAN, A MAJOR
|
|
SOURCE OF FUEL OIL, IN PREPARATION FOR THE GREAT NAVAL BATTLES IN
|
|
THE FILIPINO SEA AND LEYTE GULF.
|
|
|
|
JAVA SEA: THIS AREA IS ONE OF THE MAJOR RAW MATERIAL SOURCES FOR
|
|
THE JAPANESE EMPIRE. INDIVIDUAL SHIPS AND SMALL CONVOYS SAIL
|
|
CONSTANTLY FROM SURABAYA ON JAVA, AND FROM SINGAPORE TO WORK THEIR
|
|
WAY ALONG THE SOUTHERN COAST OF BORNEO. ALL HEAD FOR ROUTES
|
|
THROUGH THE SOUTH CHINA SEA TOWARD THE FORMOSA AND LUZON STRAITS.
|
|
|
|
THIS AREA ONLY SEES LARGE WARSHIPS DURING THE FIRST MONTHS OF 1942
|
|
(DURING THE JAPANESE CONQUEST), AND THEN AGAIN IN 1945, AS REM-
|
|
NANTS OF THE JAPANESE FLEET FLEE TO SINGAPORE.
|
|
|
|
PHILIPPINES: INVADED BY JAPAN IN DECEMBER OF 1941 , THE PHILIP-
|
|
PINES ARE NOT COMPLETELY RECAPTURED UNTIL THE BEGINNING OF 1945.
|
|
MANILA, ON THE LARGE NORTHERN ISLAND OF LUZON, IS A MAJOR PORT. IN
|
|
ADDITION TO FILIPINO EXPORTS LEAVING HERE FOR JAPAN, MANILA IS THE
|
|
KEY ARRIVAL POINT FOR REINFORCING TROOPS AND SUPPLIES. HOWEVER IT
|
|
IS NEVER A MAJOR NAVAL BASE WHILE IN JAPANESE HANDS.
|
|
|
|
THE MORE SOUTHERN AREAS OF THE PHILIPPINES LIE ALONG IMPORTANT
|
|
SHIPPING ROUTES, WITH BRUNEI TANKERS SKIRTING THE PALAWANS IN THE
|
|
SOUTHWEST, WHILE VARIOUS SUPPLY CONVOYS TO THE PALAUS PASS AROUND
|
|
MINDANO.
|
|
|
|
DURING THE 1944 NAVAL BATTLES FOR THE MARIANAS AND THE PHILIP-
|
|
PINES, TAWITAWI, JUST OFF THE NORTHEAST COAST OF BORNEO, SERVES
|
|
BRIEFLY AS A MAJOR FLEET ANCHORAGE. FROM HERE WARSHIPS SALLY
|
|
EASTWARD ACROSS THE CELEBES SEA, OR NORTHEAST TOWARD LEYTE.
|
|
SOUTH CHINA SEA: THIS AREA BRIEFLY SEES WARFLEETS STEAMING SOUTH-
|
|
WARD TO INDONESIA AND MALAYA IN EARLY 1942. THEREAFTER IT IS
|
|
ALMOST ENTIRELY OCCUPIED BY MERCHANT SHIPPING MOVING ALONG THE
|
|
COAST OF INDOCHINA AND SOUTHERN CHINA. A SIMILAR AMOUNT OF MER-
|
|
CHANT SHIPPING PASSES THROUGH THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF THIS AREA,
|
|
TRAVELING BETWEEN THE FORMOSA AND LUZON
|
|
|
|
84
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
85
|
|
|
|
|
|
STRAITS AND THE INDONESIAN SOURCES OF RAW MATERIAL. AFTER THE
|
|
AMERICAN CONQUEST OF THE PHILIPPINES IN LATE 1944 MOST OF THE
|
|
OPEN-OCEAN ROUTES ARE ELIMINATED BY CARRIER STRIKES, BUT THE
|
|
INDOCHINESE AND CHINESE COASTAL TRAFFIC CONTINUES.
|
|
|
|
MALAYA: THIS AREA, JUST SOUTH OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, HAS TWO
|
|
MAJOR SHIPPING ROUTES. ONE CROSSES THE GULF OF SIAM FROM SINGAPORE
|
|
TO CAM RANH BAY, THE OTHER RUNS ALONG THE NORTHWEST COAST OF
|
|
BORNEO AND UP ALONG THE PALAWANS. ALONG THIS LATTER ROUTE IS THE
|
|
OIL PORT OF BRUNEI, THE SINGLE BEST SOURCE OF FUEL OIL TO JAPAN.
|
|
|
|
JAPANESE WARSHIPS FREQUENT THIS AREA ONLY TWICE. THE FIRST IS
|
|
EARLY IN 1942, AS THE INVASION FORCES PASS SOUTHWARD TO MALAYA,
|
|
SINGAPORE AND THE DUTCH EAST LNDIES. THE SECOND IS IN LATE 1944-
|
|
AND EARLY 1945, WHEN BRUNEI BECOMES A MAJOR FLEET ANCHORAGE FOR
|
|
WARSHIPS UNABLE TO FIND FUEL ELSEWHERE.
|
|
|
|
STRATEGIES ON PATROL
|
|
|
|
YOUR GOAL WHEN PATROLLING AN AREA IS TO GENERATE THE MAXIMUM
|
|
NUMBER OF ENEMY CONTACTS. MORE CONTACTS MEANS MORE CHANCES TO
|
|
REACH A GOOD FIRING POSITION. SINCE YOUR JOB IS TO SINK SHIPS, YOU
|
|
SHOULD INVESTIGATE ALL CONTACTS. DECIDING WHICH CONTACTS TO
|
|
PURSUE AND ATTACK, AND WHICH TO AVOID, DEPENDS ON WHETHER YOU'RE
|
|
IN A "RICH" AREA WITH PLENTY OF "GOOD FISHING", OR A RELATIVELY
|
|
POOR AREA WHERE TARGETS ARE RARE.
|
|
|
|
THE PATROL ZONE: YOUR BEST CHANCE OF MAKING CONTACTS IS WITHIN
|
|
THE PATROL ZONE. SEARCHING FOR ENEMIES OUTSIDE YOUR ZONE YIELDS A
|
|
LOWER PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS. HOWEVER, YOU MAY STILL RUN INTO GOOD
|
|
TARGETS IF YOU STUMBLE ONTO A SHIPPING LANE, A MILITARY OPERATION,
|
|
OR A PORT AREA.
|
|
|
|
SHIPPING LANES: JAPANESE SUPPLY LINES AND MERCHANT TRAFFIC RUN
|
|
ALONG COMMON ROUTES. IF YOUR SUB IS ON ONE OF THESE LANES, THE
|
|
CHANCES OF MAKING CONTACT WITH A "JUICY" TARGET ARE MUCH IN-
|
|
CREASED.
|
|
|
|
JAPANESE SHIPPING, BY AND LARGE, PREFERRED TO MOVE ALONG COASTAL
|
|
WATERS AND THROUGH NARROW PASSAGES, RATHER THAN MAKE BIG OPEN-
|
|
OCEAN VOYAGES.
|
|
|
|
MILITARY OPERATIONS: JAPANESE WARSHIPS OPERATED IN VARIOUS AREAS
|
|
AT VARIOUS TIMES DURING THE WAR. LIKE SHIPPING, MILITARY OPERA-
|
|
TIONS USUALLY DICTATED TRAVEL ALONG CERTAIN PATHS. UNLIKE SHIP-
|
|
PING, WARSHIPS USUALLY PREFERRED "SEA ROOM" AND OFTEN SAILED
|
|
FURTHER OUT TO SEA WHERE POSSIBLE.
|
|
|
|
85
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
86
|
|
|
|
|
|
PORT AREAS: THE WATERS AROUND MAJOR PORTS AND BASES ARE OBVIOUS
|
|
SPOTS TO LOOK FOR ALL TYPES OF SHIPS, CIVILIAN AND MILITARY, AS
|
|
THEY ENTER AND LEAVE. UNFORTUNATELY, PORT AREAS ARE ALSO PRO-
|
|
TECTED BY LOTS OF ANTI-SUBMARINE PATROLS.
|
|
|
|
YOUR CHANCE OF FINDING TARGETS IS SOMEWHAT INCREASED NEAR PORTS,
|
|
BUT YOUR CHANCE OF BEING SURPRISED BY ENEMY ASW SHIPS IS MUCH
|
|
GREATER. OVERALL, HANGING AROUND PORTS MODERATELY INCREASES CON-
|
|
TACTS AND GREATLY INCREASES YOUR RISKS.
|
|
|
|
OVERSTAYING YOUR WELCOME: WHEREVER YOU CONTACT JAPANESE SHIPS IN
|
|
AN AREA, THE JAPANESE ALERT SHIPPING ABOUT YOUR SUBMARINE. FOR A
|
|
SHORT PERIOD MERCHANT AND MILITARY TRAFFIC AVOIDS THE AREA, WHILE
|
|
LOCAL ASW SHIPS SEEK YOU OUT. THEREFORE, IT'S VERY DANGEROUS TO
|
|
KEEP PATROLLING THE SPOT WHERE YOU RECENTLY MADE AN ATTACK.
|
|
|
|
FUEL SUPPLY: WHEN YOU SAIL FROM YOUR HOME BASE TO THE PATROL AREA,
|
|
NOTE HOW MANY DAYS OF FUEL YOU USED. TO BE SAFE, WHEN YOUR SUPPLY
|
|
REACHES 150 DEGREES (3/2 YDS) OF THAT VALUE, HEAD FOR HOME. THIS
|
|
GIVES YOU A "SAFETY CUSHION". EVEN IF YOU SUFFER BATTLE DAMAGE IN
|
|
YOUR FUEL TANKS ON THE WAY HOME (WHICH EMPTIES 1/5TH OF YOUR
|
|
TANKS), YOU'LL STILL HAVE FUEL TO SPARE.
|
|
|
|
BE ESPECIALLY CAREFUL AT THE START OF THE WAR WHEN SAILING FROM
|
|
MANILA OR JAVA. THESE BASES WILL SOON FALL TO THE ENEMY, WHICH
|
|
FORCES YOU TO SAIL FURTHER TO REACH HOME. KEEP AN EXTRA 7 TO 10
|
|
DAY FUEL RESERVE FOR SUCH EMERGENCIES.
|
|
|
|
IGNORING YOUR FUEL STATUS IS A GOOD WAY TO EARN THE WRATH OF YOUR
|
|
COMMANDER. NOTHING IS MORE EMBARRASSING THAN BEING TOWED INTO
|
|
PORT. IF YOU DO IT TOO OFTEN, AND DON'T HAVE A GOOD EXCUSE (LIKE A
|
|
VERY SUCCESSFUL WAR PATROL OTHERWISE), YOU COULD BE KICKED OUT OF
|
|
ACTIVE COMMAND PERMANENTLY!
|
|
|
|
86
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
87
|
|
|
|
THE PACIFIC WAR A BRIEF CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF THE PACIFIC WAR
|
|
|
|
|
|
PEARL HARBOR-DECEMBER 7, 1941: THE JAPANESE SURPRISE CARRIER
|
|
STRIKE ON PEARL HARBOR DESTROYED OR DAMAGED SEVEN BATTLESHIPS AND
|
|
OVER HALF THE PLANES ON THEIR AIRFIELDS. EIGHT HOURS LATER THE US
|
|
NAVY DEPARTMENT ORDERED "EXECUTE UNRESTRICTED AIR AND SUBMARINE
|
|
WARFARE AGAINST JAPAN".
|
|
|
|
FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES & INDONESIA - DECEMBER '41 TO APRIL '42:
|
|
IN THE PHILIPPINES, MACARTHUR'S FORCES WERE OUTMANEUVERED BY
|
|
JAPANESE INVASIONS IN DECEMBER. MANILA WAS ABANDONED BY CHRISTMAS.
|
|
MAINLAND FORCES IN THE MOUNTAINS OF BATAAN SURRENDERED APRIL 8,
|
|
'42. CORREGIDOR (THE ISLAND FORTRESS IN MANILA BAY) SURRENDERED
|
|
MAY 6, '42.
|
|
|
|
DURING DECEMBER AND JANUARY ALL REMAINING AMERICAN ISLANDS IN THE
|
|
WESTERN PACIFIC FELL, INCLUDING GUAM AND WAKE ISLAND.
|
|
|
|
THE JAPANESE QUICKLY CAPTURED HONG KONG IN DECEMBER 1941, SIN-
|
|
GAPORE AND SUMATRA IN FEBRUARY 1942. AFTER A NAVAL BATTLE IN THE
|
|
JAVA SEA (2/27/4-2) THE VICTORIOUS JAPANESE CONQUERED JAVA AND
|
|
BORNEO IN MARCH. THE REMAINING SMALL ISLANDS OF THE DUTCH EAST
|
|
LNDIES FELL SOON AFTERWARD.
|
|
|
|
BATTLE OF CORAL SEA - MAY 3-8, 1942: THE JAPANESE ATTEMPT TO
|
|
INVADE PORT MORESBY ON NEW GUINEA, INCLUDING A THREE-CARRIER
|
|
COVERING FORCE, WAS INTERCEPTED BY TWO AMERICAN CARRIERS. THE
|
|
AMERICANS LOST ONE FLEET CARRIER, THE JAPANESE ONE LIGHT CARRIER.
|
|
ALL SURVIVING CARRIERS SUFFERED BATTLE DAMAGE, PREVENTING THE
|
|
INVASION. AMERICA SUFFERED A TACTICAL DEFEAT BUT WON A STRATEGIC
|
|
VICTORY BY SAVING PORT MORESBY.
|
|
|
|
BATTLE OF MIDWAY--JUNE 4-6, 1942: THE JAPANESE ATTEMPT TO INVADE
|
|
MIDWAY AND DRAW THE US FLEET INTO A DECISIVE ENGAGEMENT BACKFIRED
|
|
WHEN THREE US CARRIERS AMBUSHED THE FOUR JAPANESE CARRIERS, SINK-
|
|
ING ALL FOUR. JAPANESE COUNTERSTRIKES SANK JUST ONE US CARRIER.
|
|
THIS DECISIVE ENGAGEMENT TURNED THE TIDE OF THE PACIFIC WAR.
|
|
|
|
GUADALCANAL CAMPAIGN - AUGUST '42 TO FEBRUARY '43: THE JAPANESE,
|
|
OPERATING FROM RABAUL AND TRUK, STARTED AN AIRBASE ON GUADALCANAL.
|
|
THE AMERICANS COUNTER-INVADED WITH A FULL DIVISION OF MARINES
|
|
(16,000 MEN) AND FINISHED THE AIRFIELD FOR THEMSELVES. BOTH SIDES
|
|
REINFORCED ON LAND WHILE SURFACE AND CARRIER GROUPS DUELED FOR
|
|
NAVAL SUPREMACY. THIS INCLUDED TWO CARRIER BATTLES (THE EASTERN
|
|
SOLOMONS: 8/24/42, AND THE SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS:10/26-27/42) AND
|
|
FIVE NIGHT SURFACE BATTLES (SAVO ISLAND: 8/9/42; CAPE ESPERANCE:
|
|
10/11-12/42; FIRST BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL: 11/12-13/42; SECOND
|
|
BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL: 11/14-15/42; TASSAFARONGA: 11/30/42).
|
|
THESE BATTLES
|
|
|
|
87
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
88
|
|
|
|
|
|
HINDERED REINFORCEMENT BY BOTH SIDES, AND WERE EFFECTIVELY A DRAW.
|
|
ON LAND THE JAPANESE ARMY GROSSLY UNDERESTIMATED THE AMERICAN
|
|
MARINES AND WERE DECISIVELY DEFEATED. IN FEBRUARY THE JAPANESE
|
|
EVACUATED THE FEW SURVIVORS.
|
|
|
|
LATER SOLOMON CAMPAIGNS - JUNE TO NOVEMBER '43 : THE AMERICAN
|
|
FORCES INVADED THEIR WAY UP THE SOLOMONS ISLANDS, GAINING GROUND
|
|
SLOWLY AND AT HIGH COST. THE JAPANESE RESISTED WITH LAND TROOPS,
|
|
LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT, AND LOCAL LIGHT NAVAL FORCES, CAUSING A
|
|
SERIES OF CRUISER/DESTROYER NIGHT SURFACE BATTLES (KOLOMBANGARA:
|
|
7/12-13/43, VELLA GULF: 8/6-7/43, AND EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY:
|
|
(11/2/43). NO LARGE JAPANESE FLEET UNITS WERE COMMITTED.
|
|
|
|
DURING EARLY 1944 THE ADMIRALTY ISLANDS WERE OCCUPIED. AMERICAN
|
|
BASES THERE, ON NEW GUINEA, AND IN THE SOLOMONS HAD SURROUNDED
|
|
THE JAPANESE AT RABAUL AND KAVIENG. CONSTANT AIR STRIKES REDUCED
|
|
BOTH TO WRECKAGE, BUT THE LAND FORTIFICATIONS WERE TOO STRONG TO
|
|
ASSAULT. THEY REMAINED SURROUNDED AND POWERLESS FOR THE REST OF
|
|
THE WAR.
|
|
|
|
NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGN - JUNE '42 TO MAY '44: IN JULY '42 THE
|
|
JAPANESE MARCHED FROM THE NORTH COAST PORT OF BUNA OVER THE RUG-
|
|
GED, JUNGLE OWEN-STANLEY MOUNTAINS TO PORT MORESBY ON THE SOUTH
|
|
COAST. THERE THEY WERE FINALLY HALTED BY THE AUSTRALIANS. WITH US
|
|
REINFORCEMENTS THE ALLIES COUNTER-ATTACKED BACK OVER THE MOUNTAINS
|
|
AND CAPTURED BUNA IN JANUARY 1943. THROUGHOUT 1943 ALLIED FORCES
|
|
SLOWLY MARCHED UP THE NORTH COAST, CAPTURING LAE IN SEPTEMBER '43.
|
|
MACARTHUR LEAPFROGGED AROUND THE POWERFUL GARRISON AT WEWAK TO
|
|
AITAPE (APRIL 1944) AND ULTIMATELY BIAK ISLAND (MAY
|
|
1944).
|
|
|
|
THE GILBERTS--TARAWA--NOVEMBER '43: THE GILBERT ISLANDS WERE
|
|
JAPAN'S FURTHEST CENTRAL PACIFIC OUTPOST, AND THEREFORE THE FIRST
|
|
BY SEA (ON NOVEMBER 19, 1943). ON TARAWA THE VICTORIOUS AMERICAN
|
|
MARINES SUFFERED ENORMOUS CASUALTIES FROM THE VASTLY OUTNUMBERED
|
|
JAPANESE DEFENDERS (WHO WERE ELIMINATED BY NOVEMBER 23RD). THE
|
|
LOSSES WERE CAUSED BY OPERATIONAL ERRORS, POOR EQUIPMENT AND
|
|
IGNORANT COMMANDERS. THE REMAINING GILBERT ISLANDS WERE VIRTUALLY
|
|
UNGARRISONED AND EASILY OCCUPIED. THE "VICTORY" AT TARAWA WAS SO
|
|
COSTLY THAT AMERICA OVERHAULED AND REORGANIZED ITS AMPHIBIOUS
|
|
WARFARE DOCTRINE.
|
|
|
|
THE MARSHALLS - KWAJALEIN & ENIWETOK - JANUARY & FEBRUARY '44
|
|
THE AMERICAN MARINES ELECTED TO BYPASS THE STRONGLY HELD EASTERN
|
|
ISLANDS OF MALOELAP, WOTJE AND MILI, AND INVADE THE CENTRAL IS-
|
|
LANDS, NOTABLY KWAJALEIN, THE WORLD'S LARGEST CORAL ATOLL, WHILE
|
|
CARRIER RAIDS DESTROYED THE AIRBASES ON THE
|
|
|
|
88
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
89
|
|
|
|
EASTERN ISLANDS. INVADED JANUARY 31, 1944, KWAJALEIN WAS SECURED
|
|
BY FEBRUARY 7. ENIWETOK WAS INVADED ON FEBRUARY 17TH AND SECURED
|
|
BY THE 21ST.
|
|
|
|
MEANWHILE, THE COVERING CARRIER FORCE MADE MASSIVE STRIKES AGAINST
|
|
THE ENORMOUSLY STRONG JAPANESE BASE AT TRUK. THE MAIN JAPANESE
|
|
FLEET ESCAPED JUST WEEKS BEFORE THE ATTACK (AFTER OPERATING FROM
|
|
TRUK THROUGHOUT '42 AND '43), BUT MANY LIGHT UNITS AND MERCHANT
|
|
SHIPS WERE SUNK IN THE HARBOR-LAGOON. HOWEVER, TRUK'S DEFENSES
|
|
WERE SO STRONG THAT NO INVASION WAS CONSIDERED. SINKING ALL ITS
|
|
SHIPS AND WRECKING ITS AIR FORCE WAS CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT. LIKE
|
|
RABAUL, IT WAS BYPASSED FOR THE REST OF THE WAR.
|
|
|
|
THE MARIANAS - SAIPAN & THE BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA - JUNE TO
|
|
AUGUST '44: ONLY THE SOUTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS HAD MILITARY VALUE.
|
|
THE JAPANESE REGARDED THE MARIANAS AS THEIR MAIN LINE OF DEFENSE.
|
|
WHEN SAIPAN WAS INVADED JUNE 15, 1944, THE JAPANESE MAIN FLEET
|
|
SORTIED TO COUNTERATTACK. AMERICAN CARRIER/BATTLESHIP TASK FORCES
|
|
SAILED WESTWARD INTO THE PHILIPPINE SEA TO SCREEN THE INVASION.
|
|
|
|
THE BATTLE WAS JOINED JUNE 19, 1944 WHEN JAPANESE CARRIER RAIDS
|
|
ARRIVED OVER THE AMERICAN FLEET. AMERICAN VETERANS FLYING THE NEW
|
|
F6F HELLCAT FIGHTER MASSACRED THE RAW, INEXPERIENCED JAPANESE
|
|
PILOTS. THE BATTLE WAS UNOFFICIALLY KNOWN AS "THE GREAT MARIANAS
|
|
TURKEY SHOOT". UNFORTUNATELY, THE AMERICAN CARRIER COMMANDER
|
|
(ADMIRAL SPRUANCE) FAILED TO PURSUE QUICKLY ENOUGH THE NEXT DAY.
|
|
THIS ALLOWED THE VIRTUALLY PLANELESS JAPANESE CARRIERS TO ESCAPE
|
|
(EXCEPT FOR THOSE SUNK BY SUBMARINES).
|
|
|
|
MEANWHILE, SAIPAN WAS NOT CONQUERED FOR TWO WEEKS THE ENTIRE
|
|
GARRISON OF OVER 24,000 FOUGHT FROM MOUNTAIN CAVES WITH A SAMURAI
|
|
MENTALITY THAT PREFERRED DEATH TO "DISHONORABLE" SURRENDER. AS
|
|
THE AMERICANS MOVED FORWARD, JAPANESE WOMEN AND CHILDREN JUMPED
|
|
FROM THE CLIFFS RATHER THAN BE CAPTURED. AMERICAN CASUALTIES WERE
|
|
HUGE: ABOUT ONE-THIRD OF THE INITIAL INVASION FORCE WAS WOUNDED
|
|
OR KILLED.
|
|
|
|
TINIAN AND GUAM, WITH WEAKER DEFENSES, WERE OVERRUN IN JULY AND
|
|
AUGUST AFTER LOR@G NAVAL BOMBARDMENTS. THE JAPANESE CORRECTLY
|
|
UNDERSTOOD THAT THE LOSS OF THESE ISLANDS MEANT DEFEAT. HOWEVER,
|
|
IN THE MILITARY DOMINATED JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, NO GENERAL WAS
|
|
WILLING TO RISK THE PERSONAL DISHONOR OF URGING A NEGOTIATED
|
|
SURRENDER.
|
|
|
|
SOON AMERICAN AIRBASES ON SAIPAN AND NEIGHBORING GUAM HOSTED B-
|
|
29 BOMBERS, WHO BEGAN RAINING DEATH AND DESTRUCTION ON THE JAPA-
|
|
NESE HOME ISLANDS.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
89
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
90
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
THE PALAUS - SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER '44: THESE ISLANDS WERE MAJOR
|
|
JAPANESE FLEET BASES, WITH EXCELLENT ANCHORAGES BUT WEAKER DE-
|
|
FENSES THAN THE MARIANAS. NOW ISOLATED, THEY WERE INVADED ON
|
|
SEPTEMBER 15. THE AMERICANS PROCEEDED SLOWLY AND CAREFULLY, ELIMI-
|
|
NATING OPPOSITION ON PELELIU (THE MAIN JAPANESE GARRISON) BY
|
|
NOVEMBER 25. NEARBY ANGAUR FELL MORE EASILY, WHILE ULITHI ATOLL
|
|
WAS VIRTUALLY UNGARRISONED.
|
|
|
|
MEANWHILE, DURING THE WEEK OF OCTOBER 10-17, 1944, THE AMERICAN
|
|
CARRIER FLEET (TF38 UNDER ADMIRAL "BULL" HALSEY) SAILED PAST THE
|
|
PHILIPPINES TO FORMOSA AND BACK, LAUNCHING MASSIVE AIR RAIDS
|
|
DAILY. THE REMAINING JAPANESE AIR POWER IN THE PACIFIC WAS MUS-
|
|
TERED AGAINST THIS RAID AND VIRTUALLY DESTROYED. FROM THAT POINT
|
|
ONWARD THE JAPANESE GAVE UP FIGHTING CONVENTIONAL AIR BATTLES AND
|
|
CONCENTRATED ON DEVELOPING KAMIKAZE SUICIDE-TACTICS
|
|
(WHERE THE ATTACKING PLANE FLEW STRAIGHT INTO THE SHIP). THE
|
|
ENTIRE AIRFORCE WAS GRADUALLY TURNED INTO MISSILES GUIDED BY
|
|
ONBOARD HUMANS.
|
|
|
|
LEYTE GULF & THE PHILIPPINES - OCTOBER 1944: DESPITE A DARING
|
|
PLAN TO BYPASS THE PHILIPPINES AND INVADE FORMOSA, POLITICAL
|
|
CONSIDERATIONS DICTATED RECAPTURE OF THIS GIGANTIC ISLAND CHAIN.
|
|
THE FIRST LANDINGS WERE IN THE PROTECTED WATERS OF LEYTE GULF ON
|
|
OCTOBER 20, 1944. MEANWHILE, THE JAPANESE MUSTERED THEIR REMAIN-
|
|
ING NAVAL STRENGTH TO STOP THE INVASION. A PLANELESS CARRIER FLEET
|
|
SORTIED FROM JAPAN AND SUCCESSFULLY DREW OFF THE AMERICAN CARRI-
|
|
ERS, WHO SANK THESE "DECOYS" OFF CAPE ENGANO ON OCTOBER 25, 1944.
|
|
MEANWHILE THE FULL BATTLESHIP POWER OF JAPAN SORTIED FROM SINGA-
|
|
PORE AND INDONESIA, STRIKING FROM THE SOUTH. ONE GROUP WAS
|
|
INTERCEPTED BY AMERICAN SHORE-BOMBARDMENT BATTLESHIPS (INCLUDING
|
|
SHIPS RAISED AND REBUILT AFTER PEARL HARBOR) IN THE SURIGAO
|
|
STRAIT. THEIR RADAR-CONTROLLED GUNS DESTROYED THE RADARLESS
|
|
JAPANESE IN LESS THAN ONE HOUR OF NIGHT BATTLE.
|
|
|
|
THE SECOND AND STRONGER GROUP SUFFERED AIR RAIDS ON THE 24TH THAT
|
|
SANK THE SUPER-BATTLESHIP MUSASHI (WITH 18 TORPEDO HITS!). AFTER A
|
|
FAKE RETREAT JUST BEFORE NIGHTFALL THE GROUP RUSHED FORWARD,
|
|
SURPRISING THE AMERICAN SHIPS COVERING THE INVASION THE NEXT
|
|
MORNING. IN THE FAMOUS BATTLE OFF SAMAR ON OCTOBER 25TH, A GROUP
|
|
OF SLOW AMERICAN ESCORT CARRIERS WAS OVERTAKEN BY THE JAPANESE
|
|
FORCE OF 4 BATTLESHIPS, 6 CRUISERS AND 11 DESTROYERS. THEY VIRTU-
|
|
ALLY WIPED OUT "TAFFY 3'S" ESCORT CARRIERS, DESTROYERS AND DE-
|
|
STROYER ESCORTS. BUT THE TINY AMERICAN SHIPS, SUPPORTED BY ANY
|
|
PLANE THAT COULD FLY, SANK A FEW CRUISERS
|
|
|
|
90
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
91
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
AND SO DEMORALIZED THE JAPANESE THAT THEY RETIRED INSTEAD OF
|
|
PRESSING AHEAD. THIS HEROIC FIGHT SAVED THE AMERICAN INVASION
|
|
FORCE.
|
|
|
|
OVERALL THE BATTLE OF LEYTE GULF, OCTOBER 24-25, 1944, WAS THE
|
|
GREATEST NAVAL BATTLE IN WORLD HISTORY. IT WAS A DECISIVE JAPANESE
|
|
DEFEAT. THE REMNANTS OF THE IMPERIAL NAVY SCATTERED TO PROTECTED
|
|
ANCHORAGES. THEY NEVER REFORMED AS A BATTLE FLEET. MACARTHUR'S
|
|
TROOPS SECURED LEYTE ISLAND IN DECEMBER 1944, THEN INVADED LUZON
|
|
ON JANUARY 9, 1945, CAPTURING MANILA BY MARCH. HOWEVER, MOPPING UP
|
|
OPERATIONS ON VARIOUS ISLANDS LASTED ALMOST TO THE END OF THE
|
|
WAR.
|
|
|
|
IWO JIMA & OKINAWA - SPRING 1945: AMERICAN PLANNERS, IMPRESSED BY
|
|
THE FANATICAL AND UNYIELDING RESISTANCE OF JAPANESE SOLDIERS AND
|
|
CIVILIANS, DID NOT BELIEVE THE JAPANESE WOULD SURRENDER UNTIL
|
|
THEIR HOMELAND WAS INVADED AND CONQUERED (LIKE GERMANY). TO PRE-
|
|
PARE OUTLYING ASSAULT BASES, IWO JIMA WAS INVADED ON FEBRUARY 19,
|
|
1945. THIS RESULTED IN A MONTH OF UNBELIEVABLY BLOODY FIGHTING.
|
|
IWO WAS SECURED ON MARCH 16TH, 1945.
|
|
|
|
OKINAWA WAS INVADED ON APRIL 1ST, 1945. THE JAPANESE CONSIDERED
|
|
THIS ISLAND PART OF THEIR HOMELAND. THE FIGHTING HERE FULLY
|
|
EQUALED THAT JUST FINISHED IN IWO JIMA, WHILE CONTINUAL KAMIKAZE
|
|
ATTACKS CAUSED HEAVY LOSSES TO THE AMERICAN FLEET. THE REMAINING
|
|
JAPANESE SUPER-BATTLESHIP YAMATO MADE A HOPELESS SORTIE (THE LAST
|
|
JAPANESE WARSHIP SORTIE OF THE WAR) BUT WAS SUNK BY MASSIVE CARRI-
|
|
ER STRIKES ON APRIL 7TH, 1945. AFTER APRIL THE JAPANESE AIR
|
|
COUNTERATTACKS FADED AWAY, BUT THE CONQUEST OF OKINAWA WAS NOT
|
|
FINISHED UNTIL JULY 3RD, 1945.
|
|
|
|
ATOMIC BOMBS & SURRENDER - AUGUST, 1945: AFTER IWO JIMA AND
|
|
OKINAWA, AMERICAN PLANNERS BEGAN ORGANIZING THE INVASION OF THE
|
|
JAPANESE HOME ISLANDS. A REPEAT OF THE FANATICAL RESISTANCE ON IWO
|
|
JIMA AND OKINAWA, COUPLED WITH THE DAMAGING KAMIKAZE ATTACKS,
|
|
WOULD MAKE AN INVASION EXTREMELY COSTLY TO BOTH SIDES. THE CASUAL-
|
|
TIES FROM THE INVASION CAMPAIGN COULD EXCEED ALL AMERICAN LOSSES
|
|
SUFFERED IN EUROPE FOR THE WHOLE WAR.
|
|
|
|
THROUGHOUT 1945 AMERICAN CARRIERS RANGED ALONG THE JAPANESE AND
|
|
CHINESE COASTS, WRECKING EVERYTHING OF MILITARY VALUE THEY COULD
|
|
FIND. BY JULY AMERICAN BATTLESHIPS WERE CRUISING OFF COASTAL
|
|
CITIES, BOMBARDING ANYTHING IN RANGE. MEANWHILE B-29S MOUNTED
|
|
FIRESTORM RAIDS THAT DESTROYED TOKYO AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES,
|
|
BURNING TO DEATH TENS OF THOUSANDS OF JAPANESE CIVILIANS.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
91
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
92
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ON AUGUST 6TH, 1945, A LONE B-29 DROPPED AN ATOMIC BOMB OVER THE
|
|
CITY OF HIROSHIMA. THE 2000' AIRBURST DESTROYED THE ENTIRE CITY,
|
|
KILLING OVER 72,000 OUTRIGHT AND WOUNDING ANOTHER 68,000, MANY
|
|
FATALLY WITH RADIATION. ON AUGUST 9TH A SECOND BOMB LANDED ON
|
|
NAGASAKI WITH ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT RESULTS. STUPIFIED BY DESTRUC-
|
|
TION OF SO MUCH WITH JUST TWO BOMBS, THE JAPANESE FINALLY
|
|
ABANDONED THE SAMURAI CODE AND SURRENDERED ON AUGUST 15TH, 1945.
|
|
|
|
A BRIEF HISTORY OF SUBMARINE OPERATIONS
|
|
|
|
1941-1942: SUBSASIATIC LOST ONLY ONE BOAT AND ONE SUBTENDER TO
|
|
JAPANESE AIR RAIDS ON MANILA HARBOR. THE REST ESCAPED AND AT-
|
|
TEMPTED TO ATTACK JAPANESE WARSHIPS AND TRANSPORTS CONVERGING ON
|
|
THE PHILIPPINES. HOWEVER, COMMANDERS WERE CAUTIOUS (CONDITIONED
|
|
BY PEACETIME EXERCISES THAT PENALIZED RISK-TAKING OR INDIVIDUAL
|
|
INITIATIVE). VERY FEW BOATS ACHIEVED GOOD SET-UP POSITIONS. WHEN
|
|
MANILA FELL THE COMMAND RETREATED TO JAVA, THEN AGAIN TO AUSTRA-
|
|
LIA.
|
|
|
|
SUBSASIATIC WAS REORGANIZED INTO SUBSOWESPAC IN SPRING 1942, WITH
|
|
MAJOR BASES AT FREMANTLE (NEAR PERTH IN SOUTHWESTERN AUSTRALIA)
|
|
AND BRISBANE (IN EASTERN AUSTRALIA). THE FREMANTLE SUBS OPERATED
|
|
AGAINST JAPANESE SHIPPING IN THE RAW-MATERIALS HEADLAND OF THE NEW
|
|
EMPIRE. THEY ALSO RESCUED SURVIVORS AND SUPPORTED GUERILLAS IN THE
|
|
PHILIPPINES. THE BRISBANE SUBS OPERATED IN THE SOLOMONS AND ALONG
|
|
THE NEW GUINEA COAST, FREQUENTLY COMMITTED TO SPECIAL MISSIONS AND
|
|
WARSHIP INTERCEPTION, WITH MERCHANT SHIPPING ATTACKS A LOW PRIORI-
|
|
TY. SUBMARINE COMMANDERS DEEMED INSUFFICIENTLY AGGRESSIVE WERE
|
|
REMOVED AND REPLACED BY OTHER OFFICERS, USUALLY
|
|
SLIGHTLY YOUNGER ONES. IF THEY WEREN'T SUCCESSFUL AFTER TWO OR
|
|
THREE PATROLS, THEY TOO WERE REPLACED.
|
|
|
|
SUBPAC OPERATING OUT OF PEARL HARBOR AND LATER MIDWAY USED MUCH
|
|
OF ITS STRENGTH IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS, INCLUDING ISLAND RAIDS,
|
|
SCOUTING DURING THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY (JUNE, 1942), OR ATTEMPTING
|
|
TO INTERCEPT JAPANESE WARSHIPS. THE REMAINDER PATROLLED ALONG THE
|
|
JAPANESE, KOREA, AND NORTHERN CHINESE COASTS. AS IN
|
|
SUBSASIATIC!SUBSOWESPAC, UNAGGRESSIVE SKIPPERS WERE REPLACED BY
|
|
NEW MEN.
|
|
1943: SUBSOWESPAC, FRUSTRATED WITH MEAGER RESULTS IN 1942, GAVE
|
|
ITS BOATS MORE FREEDOM BY ENCOURAGING CAPTAINS TO SEEK MERCHANT
|
|
SHIPPING LANES, RATHER THAN WAITING NEAR PORTS. GENERAL MACARTHUR
|
|
STILL DEMANDED A LARGE NUMBER OF SPECIAL MISSIONS, SO THE OVERALL
|
|
NUMBER OF SUBMARINES AVAILABLE FOR USE AGAINST SHIPPING REMAINED
|
|
SMALL. FURTHERMORE, THROUGHOUT THE YEAR SUBSOWESPAC CONTINUED TO
|
|
IGNORE COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE MARK 14,
|
|
|
|
92
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
93
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SO MUCH SO THAT CAPTAINS WERE SPECIFICALLY ORDERED TO CONTINUE
|
|
USING THEIR MAGNETIC EXPLODERS. THIS IS PROBABLY BECAUSE KEY
|
|
SUBSOWESPAC COMMANDERS WERE INVOLVED IN THE ORIGINAL DEVELOPMENT
|
|
OF THE MARK 14 TORPEDO, AND REFUSED TO ADMIT THAT THEIR EARLIER
|
|
WORK WAS IN ANY WAY FLAWED.
|
|
|
|
MEANWHILE, SUBPAC UNDER THE NEW LOCKWOOD ADMINISTRATION WAS FREE
|
|
TO SEND HEAVY CONCENTRATIONS OF SUBMARINES INTO JAPANESE HOME
|
|
WATERS. USING RADAR, SUBPAC BOATS SANK LARGE AMOUNTS OF RAW MATE-
|
|
RIAL EN ROUTE TO JAPAN. ADMIRAL LOCKWOOD WAS ALSO IN THE FOREFRONT
|
|
OF SOLVING TORPEDO PROBLEMS. FIRST HE INVESTIGATED THE MAGNETIC
|
|
EXPLODERS AND DEEMED THEM UNRELIABLE.
|
|
|
|
AFTER THE TINOSA'S EXPERIENCE (SEE "WHALES & DUDS", PAGE 98) HE
|
|
DISCOVERED AND FIXED THE FLAWS IN THE CONTACT EXPLODER. SUBPAC WAS
|
|
ALSO THE FIRST TO GET THE IMPROVED GATO CLASS BOATS, AND THESE NEW
|
|
BOATS WERE FREQUENTLY SKIPPERED BY NEWLY PROMOTED MEN WHO HAD MADE
|
|
WAR PATROLS IN '41 AND '42. THEIR WAR EXPERIENCE BEFORE CAPTAIN-
|
|
SHIP GAVE THEM KNOWLEDGE AND INSIGHTS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE
|
|
CONDITIONED BY PEACETIME.
|
|
|
|
SUBPAC ATTEMPTED RAIDS INTO THE SEA OF JAPAN DURING THIS YEAR.
|
|
AFTER THE LOSS OF THE FAMOUS "MUSH" MORTON AND HIS BOAT, THE
|
|
WAHOO, LOCKWOOD GAVE UP THESE MISSIONS AS TOO DANGEROUS.
|
|
|
|
1944: SUBSOWESPAC OPERATIONS CONTINUED MUCH AS THEY HAD IN 1943,
|
|
WITH NO APPRECIABLE INCREASE IN RESULTS (ALTHOUGH THE MARK 14
|
|
TORPEDO PROBLEMS WERE NOW FIXED). PART OF THE REASON WAS THE
|
|
CONTINUING HIGH DEMAND FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF
|
|
THE GROUND FIGHTING. THE REMAINDER WAS THAT THE SUBS WERE AT-
|
|
TEMPTING TO INTERCEPT SCATTERED FREIGHTERS IN THE VAST SOUTHERN
|
|
AREAS, RATHER THAN THE TRAFFIC CHOKE-POINTS FURTHER NORTH.
|
|
|
|
MEANWHILE, SUBPAC HAD FINALLY FIGURED OUT THAT THE LUZON AND
|
|
FORMOSA STRAITS WERE JAPAN'S SHIPPING BOTTLENECK. VIRTUALLY ALL
|
|
MERCHANT TRAFFIC BETWEEN THE HOME ISLANDS AND THE SOUTHERN SOURCES
|
|
OF MATERIAL PASSED THROUGH BASE AT SAIPAN GREATLY REDUCED CRUISING
|
|
TIME TO THE PATROL ZONE, WHICH MEANT MORE SUBMARINES WERE ON
|
|
PATROL LONGER. JAPANESE MERCHANT SHIPPING SUFFERED CRIPPLING
|
|
LOSSES, DESPITE A CRASH BUILDING PROGRAM OF NEW MERCHANTMEN AND
|
|
ASW SHIPS.
|
|
|
|
|
|
93
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
94
|
|
|
|
|
|
BOTH COMMANDS USED INFORMAL WOLFPACKS, COMMANDED BY SUBMARINERS ON
|
|
THE SPOT. THESE PATROLS HELPED "SWEEP" THE SEAS AND FIND CONVOYS
|
|
OR MERCHANTMEN. ATTACKS WERE NOT COORDINATED, SINCE THIS REQUIRED
|
|
FREQUENT RADIO MESSAGES THAT GAVE AWAY A SUB'S POSITION. SIMULTA-
|
|
NEOUS ATTACKS ON CONVOYS WERE USUALLY ACCIDENTAL, RATHER THAN
|
|
DELIBERATE. MANY SUBS WERE STILL SENT ON INDEPENDENT CRUISES.
|
|
|
|
1945: IN THE FINAL HALF-YEAR OF THE WAR SUBMARINES HAD FEW TAR-
|
|
GETS. THE JAPANESE FLEET WAS VIRTUALLY ELIMINATED. SHIPPING WAS
|
|
ALL BUT GONE AS WELL. BY THE SUMMER SUBMARINE SKIPPERS WERE RE-
|
|
DUCED TO SINKING SAMPANS, JUNKS AND FISHING BOATS FOR LACK OF
|
|
ANYTHING LARGER. BY THE END OF THE WAR THE JAPANESE MERCHANT
|
|
MARINE HAD BEEN VIRTUALLY DESTROYED.
|
|
|
|
|
|
RESULTS OF THE SUBMARINE WAR
|
|
|
|
THE SCORE: AMERICAN SUBMARINES HAD A DEVASTATING EFFECT ON THE
|
|
JAPANESE MERCHANT MARINE DURING WORLD WAR II IN THE PACIFIC. AT
|
|
THE START OF WWII SUBSASIATIC HAD 29 BOATS, SUBPAC HAD 22. IN
|
|
DECEMBER 1941 THESE BOATS MANAGED ONLY 281 DAYS OF WAR PATROLS IN
|
|
THEIR ASSIGNED AREAS. DURING LATE 1944, WHEN THE AMERICAN SUBMA-
|
|
RINE WAR REACHED ITS PEAK, THERE WERE AN AVERAGE OF 43 BOATS IN
|
|
WAR PATROL ZONES PRODUCING OVER 1,300 DAYS OF WAR PATROLLING PER
|
|
MONTH.
|
|
|
|
MEANWHILE, THE JAPANESE MERCHANT MARINE STARTED THE WAR WITH ABOUT
|
|
6.0 MILLION TONS OF CAPACITY. DURING THE WAR ANOTHER 3.2 MILLION
|
|
TONS WERE BUILT. YET AT WAR'S END JAPAN HAD JUST 1.8 MILLION TONS
|
|
AFLOAT. JAPANESE PLANTS WERE QUIET FOR LACK OF RAW MATERIAL,
|
|
JAPANESE CIVILIANS RECEIVED STARVATION RATIONS. OF THE 8.1 MIL-
|
|
LION TONS OF JAPANESE MERCHANTMEN LOST, AMERICAN SUBMARINES SANK
|
|
ABOUT 60%. MOST OF THE REMAINDER WERE DESTROYED BY AIR RAIDS ON
|
|
JAPANESE BASES AND HARBORS IN LATE 1944 AND 1945. AMERICAN SUBMA-
|
|
RINES ALSO SANK 201 WARSHIPS, BUT 127 OF THESE WERE SMALL PATROL
|
|
BOATS AND OTHER AUXILIARIES OF MODEST MILITARY VALUE.
|
|
|
|
|
|
US SUBMARINES VS JAPANESE WARSHIPS
|
|
JAPANESE FLEET SUNK BY PERCENTAGE
|
|
TYPE OF SHIP STRENGTH SUBMARINES SUNK
|
|
|
|
CV FLEET CARRIER 13 4 31%
|
|
CVL LIGHT CARRIER 8 0 -
|
|
CVE ESCORT CARRIER 6 5 83%
|
|
BBH SPR BATTLESHIP 2 0 -
|
|
BB BATTLESHIP 6 0 -
|
|
BC BATTLE CRUISER 4 1 25%
|
|
CA HEAVY CRUISER 18 3 17%
|
|
CL LIGHT CRUISER 27 7 26%
|
|
DD DESTROYER 173 37 21%
|
|
SS SUBMARINE 247 22 9%
|
|
|
|
JAPANESE FLEET STRENGTH INCLUDES ALL SHIPS AT THE START OF THE
|
|
WAR, PLUS SHIPS COMPLETED BEFORE THE END OF THE WAR. THE
|
|
"DESTROYER" CATEGORY INCLUDES DDAA'S AND LARGE DES, AS WELL AS ALL
|
|
DESTROYERS USED AS SUCH DURING THE WAR.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
94
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
95
|
|
|
|
|
|
JAPANESE MERCHANT SEAMEN SUFFERED GREATLY IN THE CAMPAIGN. CON-
|
|
SERVATIVE AMERICAN ESTIMATES PUT THEIR LOSSES AT 69,600 (16,200
|
|
KILLED, 53,400 WOUNDED). MANY WERE BADLY BURNED WHEN THEY ABAN-
|
|
DONED SHIP INTO SEAS COATED WITH BURNING OIL. OTHERS WERE EATEN
|
|
BY SHARKS. CREWS ON SMALL COASTAL STEAMERS (UNDER 500 TONS) AND
|
|
FISHERMEN ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THESE FIGURES. THEIR LOSSES ARE
|
|
CERTAINLY THOUSANDS MORE.
|
|
|
|
THE US NAVY LOST ONLY 41 SUBMARINES TO ENEMY ACTION. A TOTAL OF
|
|
374 OFFICERS AND 3,131 MEN WERE KILLED IN SUBMARINES.
|
|
|
|
CONCLUSIONS: THE AMERICAN SUBMARINE WAR AGAINST JAPAN WAS THE
|
|
MOST RAPACIOUS AND DEADLY ASSAULT ON MERCHANT SHIPPING IN THE
|
|
HISTORY OF MANKIND. BY THE END OF 1944 SUBMARINES WERE DOING SO
|
|
MUCH DAMAGE THAT THEY WOULD HAVE PROBABLY DESTROYED THE ENTIRE
|
|
MERCHANT MARINE SINGLE-HANDED, GIVEN ANOTHER ENTIRE YEAR. WHAT
|
|
THE U-BOATS ATTEMPTED AND FAILED IN THE ATLANTIC, THE AMERICANS
|
|
ACHIEVED IN THE PACIFIC.
|
|
|
|
AT THE SAME TIME THE AMERICAN SUBMARINE SERVICE HAD TRIED ITS
|
|
HARDEST TO INTERCEPT AND SINK JAPANESE WARSHIPS. ARMED WITH
|
|
DECODED COPIES OF ALL JAPANESE SHIP MOVEMENTS, SUBMARINES WERE
|
|
VECTORED TO INTERCEPT POSITIONS WITH UNBELIEVABLE ACCURACY.
|
|
HOWEVER, THE RESULTS WERE
|
|
|
|
US SUBMARINES VS JAPANESE MERCHANT SHIPS
|
|
|
|
TONNAGE* PERCENT
|
|
INITIAL MERCHANT TONNAGE 5,996,607 65%
|
|
TONNAGE BUILT DURING WAR 3,231,509 35%
|
|
|
|
TOTAL WARTIME MERCHANT MARINE 9,228,116 100%
|
|
|
|
SUNK BY SUBMARINES 4,859,634 60%
|
|
SUNK BY AIRCRAFT** 2,467,382 30%
|
|
SUNK BY MINES 397,412 5%
|
|
SUNK BY SURFACE GUNFIRE 77,145 1%
|
|
OTHER LOSSES 340.018 4%
|
|
|
|
TOTAL LOST 8,141,591 100%
|
|
|
|
*LIMITED TO SHIPS OF 500 TONS OR MORE
|
|
**INCLUDES US ARMY AIR FORCE (SUBSEQUENTLY RENAMED US AIR FORCE)
|
|
AND US NAVY AIRCRAFT BASED ON AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND AT LAND BASES
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
US SUBMARINES VS JAPANESE ECONOMY
|
|
|
|
DATE BULK COMMODITIES* ARRIVING IN JAPAN
|
|
1940 24.2 MILLION TONS
|
|
1941 22.0 MILLION TONS
|
|
1942 21.3 MILLION TONS
|
|
1943 18.0 MILLION TONS
|
|
1944 11.1 MILLION TONS
|
|
1945 5.5 MILLION TONS**
|
|
|
|
*INCLUDES COAL, IRON ORE, IRON, SCRAP IRON, STEEL, BAUXITE, LEAD,
|
|
TIN, ZINC, PHOSPHORITE, DOLOMITE, MAGNESITE, RUBBER, SALT, SOYBEAN
|
|
CAKE, SOYBEANS, RICE, OTHER GRAINS AND FLOURS
|
|
**ANNUALIZED FIGURE BASED ON 3.0 MILLION TONS RECEIVED BY 8/15/45
|
|
|
|
95
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
96
|
|
|
|
|
|
NOT ESPECIALLY IMPRESSIVE. SUBMARINES DID NOT "TURN THE TIDE" IN
|
|
ANY MAJOR NAVAL BATTLE OR CAMPAIGN. THEIR ACHIEVEMENTS WERE VERY
|
|
MUCH "HIT AND MISS", WITH MOST ATTACKS RESULTING IN MINOR DAMAGE,
|
|
RATHER THAN A SINKING. TRADITIONAL SURFACE BATTLES AND THE NEW
|
|
CARRIER AIR BATTLES PROVED MUCH MORE DECISIVE IN WINNING (OR
|
|
LOSING) MILITARY CAMPAIGNS.
|
|
|
|
MORALITY AND SUBMARINE WARFARE
|
|
|
|
IN 1922 THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN AND JAPAN SIGNED THE LONDON
|
|
NAVAL TREATY AMONG OTHER PROVISIONS, THE TREATY OUTLAWED UNRE-
|
|
STRICTED SUBMARINE WARFARE AGAINST CIVILIAN VESSELS. SUBMARINES
|
|
WERE SUPPOSED TO ACT LIKE SURFACE SHIPS. THEY WERE OBLIGED TO
|
|
REMOVE THE CREW TO A SAFE PLACE BEFORE CAPTURING OR SINKING A
|
|
SHIP.
|
|
|
|
HOWEVER, FROM THE START OF WORLD WAR II AMERICAN SUBMARINE COM-
|
|
MANDERS, INCLUDING THE COMMANDERS OF BOTH SUBSASIATIC AND SUBPAC,
|
|
ORDERED THEIR BOATS TO WAGE UNRESTRICTED WARFARE ON ALL JAPANESE
|
|
SHIPS, INCLUDING MERCHANT SHIPS. SOME COMMANDERS
|
|
(SUCH AS "MUSH" MORTON) EVEN WENT SO FAR AS TO SURFACE AND MA-
|
|
CHINE-GUN BOATS AND SURVIVORS AFTER SINKING THEIR SHIP! BY 1945
|
|
AMERICAN SUBS HAD SO MUCH TROUBLE FINDING MERCHANT SHIPS TO SINK
|
|
THAT THEY TOOK TO SINKING FISHING BOATS WITH DECK GUNS, MACHINE
|
|
GUNS, EVEN RIFLES AND HAND GRENADES! THIS INCLUDED ANY VESSEL
|
|
CREWED BY PEOPLE WITH ORIENTAL FEATURES OPERATING OF JAPANESE-
|
|
CONTROLLED COASTS, EVEN THOUGH THE CREW MIGHT BE CHINESE, VIETNAM-
|
|
ESE, CAMBODIAN OR MALAYSIAN.
|
|
|
|
BY COMPARISON, JAPANESE SUBS MOUNTED NO CAMPAIGN AGAINST CIVILIAN
|
|
VESSELS. THEIR SUBMARINES WERE USED AGAINST SURFACE WARSHIPS, AS
|
|
SCOUTS, AND ON OCCASIONAL POLITICAL MISSIONS (SUCH AS A TOKEN
|
|
BOMBARDMENT OF THE US WEST COAST, OR A PLAN TO TRANSPORT SEA-
|
|
|
|
THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1922
|
|
|
|
THE DOCUMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW GUIDING WWII PACIFIC SUBMARINE
|
|
OPERATIONS, SIGNED BY THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN AND JAPAN READS
|
|
AS FOLLOWS:
|
|
|
|
(1) IN THEIR ACTIONS WITH REGARD TO MERCHANT SHIPS, SUBMARINES
|
|
MUST INFORM TO THE RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO WHICH SURFACE
|
|
VESSELS ARE SUBJECT.
|
|
|
|
(2) IN PARTICULAR, EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF PERSISTENT REFUSAL TO
|
|
STOP ON BEING DULY SUMMONED, OR OF ACTIVE RESISTANCE TO VISIT OR
|
|
SEARCH, A WARSHIP, WHETHER SURFACE VESSEL OR SUBMARINE, MAY NOT
|
|
SINK OR RENDER INCAPABLE OF NAVIGATION A MERCHANT VESSEL WITHOUT
|
|
HAVING FIRST PLACED PASSENGERS, CREW AND SHIP'S PAPERS IN A PLACE
|
|
OF SAFETY. FOR THIS PURPOSE THE SHIP'S BOATS ARE NOT REGARDED AS A
|
|
PLACE OF SAFETY UNLESS THE SAFETY OF THE PASSENGERS AND CREW IS
|
|
ASSURED, IN THE EXISTING SEA AND WEATHER CONDITIONS, BY PROXIMITY
|
|
OF LAND, OR THE PRESENCE OF ANOTHER VESSEL WHICH IS IN A POSITION
|
|
TO TAKE THEM ON BOARD.
|
|
|
|
THE UNITED STATES DID NOT FORMALLY ABROGATE THIS TREATY AT THE
|
|
START OF THE WAR. INSTEAD, WITHIN EIGHT HOURS OF THE PEARL HARBOR
|
|
ATTACK, THE US NAVY DEPARTMENT ORDERED ALL PACIFIC SUBMARINE
|
|
COMMANDS TO "EXECUTE UNRESTRICTED AIR AND SUBMARINE WARFARE
|
|
AGAINST JAPAN." IN GENERAL AMERICAN SUBMARINERS AGREED WITH THIS
|
|
ORDER, MANY OF THEM WITH GUSTO AND ENTHUSIASM.
|
|
|
|
|
|
96
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
97
|
|
PLANES FOR A RAID ON THE PANAMA CANAL). THIS POLICY CAN BE VIEWED
|
|
EITHER AS DELIBERATELY LAW-ABIDING OR AS COINCIDENTAL WITH JAPAN'S
|
|
MILITARY THEORIES AND PLANS, DEPENDING ON YOUR VIEWPOINT.
|
|
|
|
GERMANY WAS THE ONLY OTHER NATION IN WWII TO WAGE LARGE-SCALE
|
|
UNRESTRICTED SUBMARINE WARFARE. ALTHOUGH ALLIED PROPAGANDISTS
|
|
PORTRAYED U-BOAT SKIPPERS AS CRAZED MANIACS WHO GLEEFULLY MACHINE-
|
|
GUNNED SURVIVORS IN THE WATER, THERE ARE NUMEROUS CASES OF U-BOATS
|
|
BEFORE SINKING THE VESSEL. IN SOME CASES COURTEOUS U-BOAT CAP-
|
|
TAINS EVEN GAVE THE CREW FOOD, A MAP, AND A COMPASS TO HELP THEM
|
|
REACH LAND. IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO FIND SIMILAR EXAMPLES
|
|
OF AMERICAN COURTESY TOWARD JAPANESE MERCHANT SEAMEN.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
97
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
98
|
|
|
|
HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENTS WHALES AND DUDS
|
|
|
|
THE SITUATION: YOU RANDALL "DAN" DASPIT, COMMANDING THE TINOSA, A
|
|
GATO-CLASS SUBMARINE. IT'S 0930 (MORNING), JULY 24TH, 1943, WEST
|
|
OF TURK. YOU INVESTIGATE A RADAR CONTACT AND DISCOVER A SINGLE,
|
|
UNESCORTED TARGET--A HUGE WHALING FACTORY SHIP, NOW SERVING AS AN
|
|
OIL TANKER. YOU HAVE MARK 14 TORPEDOES WITH THEIR WORTHLESS
|
|
MAGNETIC EXPLODERS DEACTIVATED.
|
|
|
|
TACTICAL ADVICE: YOU'RE IN A FAIRLY GOOD POSITION, BUT BEYOND
|
|
GOOD SHOOTING RANGE. THE ENEMY IS MAKING 13 KNOTS ON THE SURFACE.
|
|
YOU HAVE THREE TACTICAL OPTIONS.
|
|
|
|
FIRST YOU CAN TAKE A QUICK SHOT IMMEDIATELY. THIS MIGHT SLOW DOWN
|
|
THE TARGET, ALLOWING YOU TO APPROACH SUBMERGED AND FINISH HIM
|
|
OFF.
|
|
|
|
SECOND, YOU CAN PULL BACK TO RADAR CONTACT RANGE (OVER 10,000
|
|
YARDS), SURFACE AND "END AROUND" AHEAD OF HIM USING YOUR SUPERIOR
|
|
20-KNOT SPEED, THEN SUBMERGE AND ATTACK.
|
|
|
|
THIRD, YOU CAN SURFACE RIGHT NOW AND SHOOT IT OUT. YOU'LL PROBA-
|
|
BLY TAKE DAMAGE, BUT A FEW HITS MIGHT SLOW HIM DOWN SO YOU CAN
|
|
SUBMERGE AND APPROACH FOR A GOOD TORPEDO SHOT.
|
|
|
|
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED: DAN DASPIT FIRED A SINGLE TORPEDO IMMEDI-
|
|
ATELY. IT HIT THE TARGET (TONAN MARU #3) IN THE STERN AND DIS-
|
|
ABLED HER PROPELLERS. THE SHIP QUICKLY COASTED TO A STOP AND
|
|
DASPIT SAILED UP, SUBMERGED, TO 800 YARDS. HE THEN PROCEEDED TO
|
|
FIRE, ONE AT A TIME, ELEVEN TORPEDOES INTO THE BROADSIDE OF THE
|
|
TONAN MARU #3. THE FIRST WAS A DUD, SO BEFORE EACH SUBSEQUENT
|
|
SHOT THE TORPEDO ROOM CREW COMPLETELY "MAINTENANCED" THE TORPEDO
|
|
TO MAKE SURE IT WAS IN PERFECT OPERATING ORDER.
|
|
|
|
ALL ELEVEN SHOTS WERE DUDS OR FAILURES. NOT ONE EXPLODED AGAINST
|
|
THE SIP. EVENTUALLY A DESTROYER ARRIVED AND TOWED THE TONAN MARU
|
|
#3 INTO TRUK. THE OUTRAGED DASPIT SAVED HIS LAST TORPEDO AND
|
|
RETURNED TO PEARL HARBOR. ADMIRAL LOCKWOOD WAS SIMILARLY OUT-
|
|
RAGED. HE ORDERED TESTS THAT FINALLY IDENTIFIED THE DESIGN FLAWS
|
|
IN THE MARK 14'S CONTACT EXPLODER.
|
|
|
|
MUSH ON THE LOOSE
|
|
|
|
THE SITUATION: YOU'RE DUDLY "MUSH" MORTON, COMMANDING THE WAHOO,
|
|
A GATO-CLASS SUBMARINE. IT'S 0845 (MORNING), JANUARY 26, 1943,
|
|
NORTHWEST OF WEWAK, NEW GUINEA. YOU INVESTIGATE SMOKE ON THE
|
|
HORIZON AND FIND THREE JAPANESE MERCHANT SHIPS, WITH AN ESCORT.
|
|
YOU APPROACH AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE ON THE SURFACE.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
98
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
99
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
TACTICAL ADVICE: YOU'LL BE SEEN IF YOU MOVE MUCH CLOSER ON THE
|
|
SURFACE. YOU CAN SUBMERGE AND MOVE INTO A GOOD ATTACK POSITION
|
|
SLIGHTLY AHEAD OF THE ENEMY, OR YOU CAN TURN DUE EAST AND RUN
|
|
AHEAD OF THEM A BIT ON THE SURFACE BEFORE TURNING NORTH, SUBMERG-
|
|
ING, AND MOVING TO AN ATTACK POSITION. THE LATTER METHOD GENERALLY
|
|
YIELDS A BETTER TORPEDO-FIRING SOLUTION.
|
|
|
|
IF YOU'RE USING HISTORICAL TORPEDOES, BEAR IN MIND THAT YOUR MARK
|
|
14S USE THE UNRELIABLE MAGNETIC EXPLODER AS WELL AS THE TERRIBLE
|
|
CONTACT EXPLODER.
|
|
|
|
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED: MORTON DIVED AND CHARGED STRAIGHT IN, GIVING
|
|
HIM REAR QUARTER SHOTS ON THE ENEMY. HE HIT ALL THREE TARGETS,
|
|
SINKING ONE, IMMOBILIZING A SECOND, AND SLOWING A THIRD. THE
|
|
IMMOBILIZED SHIP WAS A TRANSPORT, WHICH HE POLISHED OFF WITH
|
|
ANOTHER TORPEDO, THEN SURFACED AND GUNNED DOWN THE SOLDIERS IN THE
|
|
WATER WITH HIS LIGHT AA GUNS. IT TOOK HIM ABOUT A HOUR TO DESTROY
|
|
ALL THE BOATS AND LIFE RAFTS, AS WELL AS KILLING MANY OF THE
|
|
SOLDIERS.
|
|
|
|
MORTON THEN SAILED IN PURSUIT OF THE ESCAPING FREIGHTER, WHICH HAD
|
|
SINCE JOINED UP WITH A TANKER. AFTER A LONG, TEN-HOUR CHASE HE
|
|
TORPEDOED THE TANKER AT DUSK, SURFACED AND CLOSED. THE SURVIVING
|
|
FREIGHTER HAD MANNED ITS GUNS, CAUSED A HEATED GUN DUEL THAT
|
|
MORTON RESOLVED BY FIRING HIS LAST TORPEDOES TO SINK THE ENEMY.
|
|
|
|
THIS ALONG WITH EARLIER EXPLOITS IN THE PATROL, MADE MORTON A "WAR
|
|
HERO". HE RECEIVED THE NAVY CROSS WHILE THE PRESS CALLED THE
|
|
WAHOO "THE ONE-BOAST WOLF PACK". GIVEN THE GROSS UNRELIABILITY OF
|
|
HIS TORPEDOES. MUSH WAS AN EXTREMELY LUCKY GUY.
|
|
|
|
FLASHER'S TANKERS (I)
|
|
|
|
THE SITUATION: YOU'RE GEORGE GRIDER COMMANDING THE FLASTHER, AN
|
|
IMPROVED GATO-CLASS SUBMARINE. IT'S 0900 (MORNING), DECEMBER 4TH,
|
|
1944. YOUR SWEEPING THROUGH THE PHILIPPINES WITH A WOLFPACK. YOU
|
|
MAKE RADAR CONTACT WITH A THREE-SHIP CONVOY THAT'S HEADED STRAIGHT
|
|
TOWARD YOUR CURRENT POSITION. IT'S STARTING TO RAIN, WHICH LOWERS
|
|
VISIBILITY SIGNIFICANTLY.
|
|
|
|
TACTICAL ADVICE: SUBMERGE AND LET THEM APPROACH. YOU MAY NOT SEE
|
|
ANYTHING UNTIL THEY GET WITHIN 4,000 TO 5,000 YARDS, DUE TO POOR
|
|
VISIBILITY. YOU CHOOSE WHETHER TO ATTACK THE ESCORT FIRST AND THEN
|
|
THE TANKER, OR VICE VERSA.
|
|
|
|
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED: GRIDER DISCOVERED THAT HE WAS FACING A
|
|
SINGLE TANKER ESCORTED BY TWO DESTROYERS. HE TOOK THE BOLD AP-
|
|
PROACH AND DECIDED TO ATTACK A DESTROYER FIRST, THEN THE TANKER.
|
|
HIS FIRST SLAVO OF FOUR TORPEDOES HIT ONE OF THE DESTROYERS,
|
|
WRECKING IT. HOWEVER, HE'D LINED UP HIS SHOTS SO THE
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
99
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
100
|
|
|
|
TANKER WAS BEHIND THE DESTROYER. LO AND BEHOLD, THE OTHER TWO
|
|
TORPEDOES HIT THE TANKER, SETTING IT AFIRE.
|
|
|
|
GRIDER EVADED A DEPTH CHARGE COUNTERATTACK FROM THE UNDAMAGED
|
|
DESTROYER, RETURNED TO PERISCOPE DEPTH, AND SAW IT STOPPED TO
|
|
RESCUE SURVIVORS FROM THE BURNING TANKER AND NOW SUNKEN DESTROYER.
|
|
GRIDER LAUNCHED ANOTHER SALVO OF FOUR TORPEDOES, THREE OF WHICH
|
|
HIT THE DESTROYER, SINKING IT ALMOST INSTANTLY. THEN HE POLISHED
|
|
OFF THE STILL-BURNING TANKER
|
|
|
|
FLASHER'S TANKERS (II)
|
|
|
|
THE SITUATION: YOU'RE GEORGE GRIDER, COMMANDING THE FLASHER, AN
|
|
IMPROVED GATO-CLASS SUBMARINE. IT;S 0100 ( AN HOUR AFTER MID-
|
|
NIGHT), DECEMBER 22ND, 1944, OFF THE INDOCHINA COAST -- 18 DAYS
|
|
AFTER THE ENCOUNTER ABOVE. YOU'VE BEEN CHASING ONE TANKER CONVOY
|
|
OR ANOTHER UP AND DOWN THIS COAST FOR DAYS, FRUSTRATED BY SEAS SO
|
|
HEAVY YOU COULDN'T FIRE TORPEDOES. JUST AS YOU'RE ABOUT TO GIVE
|
|
UP, IN WEATHER LULL YOUR RADAR OPERATOR FINDS THE ENEMY. HE'S
|
|
TRYING TO "HUG THE COAST" AND DISCOURAGE SUB ATTACKS BY SAILING IN
|
|
SHALLOW WATER. YOU DECIDE TO OUTWIT THEM BY MOVING EVEN CLOSER TO
|
|
THE COAST FOR A NIGHT SURFACE ATTACK. THE WATER IS SO SHALLOW
|
|
THAT YOU COULD HIT BOTTOM BEFORE REACHING PERISCOPE DEPTH!
|
|
|
|
TACTICAL ADVICE: YOU'RE IN AN EXCELLENT ATTACK POSITION. LET THE
|
|
CONVOY COME UP, KEEPING YOUR BOW TOWARD THEM (TO MINIMIZE YOUR
|
|
VISIBILITY TO THEM) AND SLOWLY APPROACH. THE LEADING SHIPS ARE
|
|
PROBABLY ESCORTS, FURTHERMORE BEWARE OF SMALL PCS HOVERING ABOUT.
|
|
THE CENTRAL COLUMN IS THE TANKERS. IF YOU SET WITHIN 800 TO 1000
|
|
YARDS OF ONE, TORPEDO SALVOS IN ALL DIRECTIONS COULD CLEANUP
|
|
PLENTY. ONCE THEY SPOT YOU, CRANK UP TO MAXIMUM SPEED AND RUN
|
|
AWAY FROM THE NEAREST ESCORT. IF THEY'RE TOO CLOSE, YOU MAY HAVE
|
|
TO SUBMERGE. BEWARE OF BEING RAMMED EVEN WHEN SUBMERGED BECAUSE
|
|
OF THE SHALLOW WATER.
|
|
|
|
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED: GRIDER LET THE LEADING ESCORTS GO PAST AS HE
|
|
CLOSED ON THE TANKERS. THEN HE FIRED ALL HIS BOW TUBES, SPUN
|
|
AROUND, AND FIRED ALL THE STERN TUBES INTO THE TANKER COLUMN. THE
|
|
THREE SHIPS EXPLODED IN VAST FLAMES. GRIDER THEN EASED THE @/AS@E@
|
|
AWAY, BUT THERE WAS NO PURSUIT. APPARENTLY THE ESCORTS THOUGHT THE
|
|
CONVOY HAD BLUNDERED INTO A MINEFIELD.
|
|
|
|
SINK THE YAMATOGATO
|
|
|
|
THE SITUATION: YOU'RE EUGENE MCKINNEY, COMMANDING THE SKATE, A
|
|
GATO-CLASS SUBMARINE. IT'S 0430 (JUST BEFORE DAWN), CHRISTMAS
|
|
DAY, 1943, OUTSIDE TRUK HARBOR. THANKS TO AN ULTRA MESSAGE,
|
|
YOU'RE IN THE RIGHT POSITION TO FIND A HUGE BLIP TO THE NORTHWEST
|
|
ON THE SJ RADAR, MOVING TOWARD YOU AT 23 KNOTS.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
100
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
101
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
TACTICAL ADVICE: AS YOU CAN GUESS FROM THE TITLE, THE BIG BABY
|
|
HEADED YOUR WAY IS THE YAMATO, LARGEST BATTLESHIP IN THE WORLD AND
|
|
FLAGSHIP OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY. DON'T BE SURPRISED IF
|
|
ADDITIONAL SHIPS APPEAR - THE YAMATO IS PROBABLY ESCORTED BY
|
|
SMALLER SHIPS NOT VISIBLE AT THIS RANGE.
|
|
|
|
GET RIGHT IN FRONT OF THE YAMATO AND SUBMERGE. AT JUST UNDER 1000
|
|
YARDS FIRE EVERYTHING YOU'VE GOT FROM THE BOW, SPIN AROUND, AND
|
|
EMPTY THE STERN TUBES INTO HIM AS WELL. YOUR ONLY HOPE IS TO SCORE
|
|
ENOUGH HITS TO SLOW OR TEMPORARILY STOP THE YAMATO. AFTER YOU
|
|
ACHIEVE THAT YOU MUST THEN ESCAPE THE ESCORTING DESTROYERS'
|
|
COUNTERATTACK. THEN YOU CAN RETURN AND HOPEFULLY POLISH OFF A
|
|
CRIPPLED MONSTER.
|
|
|
|
THIS IS HARDER THAN IT SOUNDS BECAUSE THE YAMATO IS COMING ON LIKE
|
|
A FREIGHT TRAIN. SHE'S BIG ENOUGH TO SHRUG OFF A COUPLE HITS AND
|
|
KEEP ON GOING. ABOVE ALL, DON'T TRY A SURFACE BATTLE. SUBMARINES
|
|
AREN'T BUILT TO "SLUG IT OUT" WITH SUPER-BATTLESHIPS !
|
|
|
|
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED: MCKINNEY HAD DIFFICULTY WITH THE
|
|
YAMATO'S ZIGZAGS UNTIL SHE SUDDENLY MADE A TURN STRAIGHT AT HIM.
|
|
HE MISSED SETTING UP A GOOD SHOT FROM HIS BOW, BUT DID FIRE ALL
|
|
FOUR STERN TUBES. TWO HIT THE BATTLESHIP IN THE BOW, CAUSING
|
|
TRIVIAL DAMAGE. THE YAMATO STEAMED ONWARD AT FULL SPEED INTO TRUK,
|
|
WHERE THE DAMAGE WAS PATCHED.
|
|
|
|
|
|
DEATH OF THE SHINANO
|
|
|
|
THE SITUATION: YOU'RE JOSEPH ENRIGHT, COMMANDING THE ARCHERFISH,
|
|
AN IMPROVED GATO-CLASS SUBMARINE. IT'S 1715 (EARLY EVENING),
|
|
NOVEMBER 28TH, 1944, OFF TOKYO BAY. AFTER A BORING DAY WAITING TO
|
|
PICK UP ANY DOWNED B-29 CREWS FALLING OUT OF THE SKY (NONE DID)
|
|
YOU'RE RELEASED FOR HUNTING. ABOUT DINNERTIME YOUR RADAR PICKS UP
|
|
A HUGE BLIP LEAVING TOKYO BAY.
|
|
|
|
TACTICAL ADVICE: THIS CONTACT MUST BE A SUPER-SHIP (LIKE THE
|
|
YAMATO). ALSO LIKE THE YAMATO, EXPECT ESCORTS. GET AHEAD OF THE
|
|
GROUP AND MAKE A NIGHT ATTACK. IT'S USEFUL TO REMAIN ON THE SUR-
|
|
FACE AND USE YOUR TOP SPEED UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE. AS WITH THE
|
|
YAMATO, THE KEY TO VICTORY IS SCORING ENOUGH HITS IN THE FIRST
|
|
ATTACK TO SLOW OR STOP THE TARGET. THEN YOU CAN RETURN TO SINK IT
|
|
LATER.
|
|
|
|
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED: ENRIGHT SPENT A FRUSTRATING EVENING DEALING
|
|
WITH ENEMY ZIG-ZAGS. HE'D RACE TOWARD TO A GOOD INTERCEPT, ONLY TO
|
|
SEE THE ENEMY ZIG AWAY. THIS WAS COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT THE
|
|
ENEMY DIDN'T KEEP ON THE SAME BASE COURSE, BUT WAS INSTEAD SWING-
|
|
ING WESTWARD TOWARD THE INLAND SEA.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
101
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
102
|
|
|
|
|
|
FINALLY, ABOUT 0300 ENRIGHT WAS AHEAD OF THE ONCOMING TARGET AND
|
|
INSIDE ITS PROTECTING DESTROYERS. HE SUBMERGED AND FIRED FOUR BOW
|
|
TUBES AT 1500 YARDS RANGE, THEN SWUNG AROUND AND FIRED TWO STERN
|
|
TUBES. FOUR OF THE TORPEDOES HIT. NORMALLY THE SHINANO WOULD HAVE
|
|
SURVIVED, BUT IT WASN'T FINISHED FITTING OUT. THE WATERTIGHT DOORS
|
|
LEAKED AND THE CREW WAS TOTALLY UNTRAINED. AS A RESULT, FLOODING
|
|
GOT WORSE AND WORSE UNTIL SEVEN HOURS LATER THE JAPANESE WERE
|
|
FORCED TO ABANDON SHIP.
|
|
|
|
|
|
THE SHINANO WAS THE LARGEST AIRCRAFT CARRIER BUILT DURING WWII. IT
|
|
WAS ORIGINALLY INTENDED TO BE A YAMATO-CLASS SUPER-BATTLESHIP.
|
|
DURING THE WAR IT WAS REDESIGNED AS AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER AND COM-
|
|
PLETED AS SUCH.
|
|
|
|
KILLER O'KANE
|
|
|
|
THE SITUATION: YOU'RE RICHARD "DICK" O'KANE COMMANDING THE
|
|
TANG, AN IMPROVED GATO-CLASS SUBMARINE. IT'S 30 MINUTES PAST
|
|
MIDNIGHT IN THE SHALLOW FORMOSA STRAIT, OCTOBER 23RD, 1944. YOUR
|
|
RADAR PICKS UP TEN BLIPS OF VARYING SIZE. IT LOOKS LIKE A CONVOY
|
|
OF FIVE MERCHANTMEN WITH FIVE ESCORTS.
|
|
|
|
IF YOU'RE PLAYING WITH HISTORICAL TORPEDOES, THE TANG HAS SHIPPED
|
|
THE VERY SLOW MARK 18-1S (O'KANE REQUESTED MARK 14S, BUT NONE WERE
|
|
AVAILABLE). YOU'LL NEED TO GET WITHIN 1000 YARDS FOR ACCURATE
|
|
SHOOTING.
|
|
|
|
TACTICAL ADVICE: THE CONVOY IS HEADED AWAY FROM YOU. YOU CAN
|
|
EITHER TRY TO OVERHAUL THEM FROM ASTERN, OR RUN AROUND
|
|
THEIR FLANK AND LIE INWAIT AHEAD. THE LATTER IS BETTER, SINCE YOUR
|
|
SLOW MARK 18-1S ARE WORTHLESS IN STERN ATTACKS.
|
|
|
|
AS IN MOST NIGHT BATTLES, DON'T OPEN FIRE WITH YOUR DECK GUN
|
|
UNLESS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. FIRING THE GUN GIVES AWAY YOUR POSI-
|
|
TION TO EVERY SHIP WITHIN DOZENS OF MILES.
|
|
|
|
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED: O'KANE MADE AN "END AROUND" AND POSITIONED
|
|
HIMSELF IN FRONT OF THE ONCOMING CONVOY. HE THROTTLED DOWN TO LOW
|
|
SPEED AND LET THE MERCHANTMEN COME UP PAST HIM, ALL ON THE SAME
|
|
COURSE. NOW IN THE MIDDLE OF THE CONVOY, HE OPENED FIRE WITH BOW
|
|
AND STERN TUBES, FIRING NINE TORPEDOES. THE JAPANESE SCATTERED IN
|
|
CONFUSION, WITH THE CONVOY COMMANDER (ON BOARD ONE OF THE MER-
|
|
CHANTMEN) ACCIDENTALLY RAMMING ANOTHER SHIP DURING A RAMMING RUN
|
|
ON THE TANG. THREE JAPANESE SHIPS WENT DOWN AND THE TANG ESCAPED
|
|
UNTOUCHED.
|
|
|
|
THE NEXT NIGHT THE TANG FOUND ANOTHER CONVOY, SINKING TWO SHIPS
|
|
AND DAMAGING A THIRD. O'KANE CLOSED ON THE CRIPPLE AND FIRED, ONLY
|
|
TO WATCH THE TORPEDO MALFUNCTION AND CIRCLE AROUND. DESPITE EMER-
|
|
GENCY MANEUVERS, THE TORPEDO HIT THE TANG IN THE STERN AND SANK
|
|
HER. O'KANE AND SOME OF THE BRIDGE
|
|
|
|
102
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
103
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
OFFICERS WERE BLOWN OVERBOARD AND SURVIVED. A FEW CREWMEN FORWARD
|
|
ALSO ESCAPED BECAUSE THE SUB SANK IN SHALLOW WATER. O'KANE SUR-
|
|
VIVED JAPANESE POW CAMPS AND EVENTUALLY RECEIVED THE MEDAL OF
|
|
HONOR FOR HIS EXPLOITS.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
AN EMBARRASSMENT OF RICHES
|
|
|
|
THE SITUATION: YOU'RE HERMAN KOSSLER, COMMANDING THE CAVALLA, AN
|
|
IMPROVED GATO-CLASS SUBMARINE. AFTER DAYS OF REPORTING AND CHAS-
|
|
ING VARIOUS OF JAPANESE WARSHIP AND OIL TANKER GROUPS IN THE
|
|
SOUTHERN PHILIPPINE SEA, YOU'VE BEEN VECTORED TO AN INTERCEPT
|
|
POSITION. ON JUNE 19TH, 1944, YOU "UP-SCOPE" AT 1048 FOR A ROU-
|
|
TINE CHECK AND WOW! -JAPANESE CARRIERS! IN FACT, YOU CAN SEE IT'S
|
|
THE SHOKAKU FLYING OFF AND LANDING AIRCRAFT. THAT REQUIRES THE
|
|
CARRIER TO STEAM STEADILY INTO THE WIND - RIGHT PAST YOUR SUB!
|
|
|
|
TACTICAL ADVICE: POSITION YOUR BOAT SO THE SHOKAKU WILL PASS
|
|
CLOSELY. WHEN SHE DOES, LET HER HAVE IT WITH ALL YOU'VE GOT. AS
|
|
THE SITUATION DEVELOPS, YOU'LL DISCOVER THAT THE SHOKAKU IS ACCOM-
|
|
PANIED BY OTHER ATTRACTIVE TARGETS. HOW MANY TORPEDOES DO YOU
|
|
ASSIGN TO EACH? WHATEVER YOU DO, MAKE YOUR FIRST SALVO COUNT.
|
|
ALL THESE TARGETS ARE WARSHIPS WITH A MAXIMUM SPEED OVER 30 KNOTS.
|
|
IF YOU DON'T SLOW THEM DOWN WITH THE FIRST SALVO, THEY'LL CER-
|
|
TAINLY RUN.
|
|
|
|
ONE THING KOSSLER FORGOT WAS TO MAKE A RADAR CHECK. IF YOU COME UP
|
|
TO RADAR DEPTH AND DO THIS, YOU'LL FIND THAT THE SHOKAKU ISN'T THE
|
|
ONLY JUICY TARGET AROUND. NOW YOU'VE GOT REAL PROBLEMS - IS IT
|
|
POSSIBLE TO GET THEM ALL?
|
|
|
|
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED: KOSSLER GOT INTO PERFECT POSITION ON THE
|
|
SHOKAKU AND FIRED ALL HIS BOW TUBES (SIX FISH) AT 1200 YARDS, THE
|
|
ESCORTING DESTROYERS IMMEDIATELY POUNCED ON HIM, KEEPING HIM DEEP
|
|
AND EVADING FOR HOURS. MEANWHILE, THE SHOKAKU TOOK FOUR HITS,
|
|
SETTING HER AFIRE, WITH PLANES, FUEL AND BOMBS EXPLODING EVERY-
|
|
WHERE. BY THE MIDAFTERNOON THE BURNING WRECKAGE TURNED OVER AND
|
|
SANK.
|
|
|
|
MEANWHILE, THREE HOURS EARLIER, JIM BLANCHARD COMMANDING THE
|
|
ALBACORE HIT ANOTHER JAPANESE CARRIER, THE FLEET FLAGSHIP TAIHO,
|
|
WITH ONE TORPEDO. IT JAMMED THE FORWARD ELEVATOR, BUT THERE WAS NO
|
|
OTHER SERIOUS DAMAGE. HOWEVER, THE DAMAGE CONTROL OFFICER MADE A
|
|
SERIOUS ERROR THAT SPREAD GASOLINE FUMES THROUGHOUT THE SHIP.
|
|
JUST AFTER THE SHOKAKU SANK, THE GASOLINE-ADEN AIR WAS FINALLY
|
|
IGNITED AND TAIHO BLEW UP.
|
|
|
|
THE PLANES FROM THESE CARRIERS, AS WELL AS OTHERS, WERE DESTROYED
|
|
BY FIGHTERS FROM SEVEN US CARRIERS (ALL THIS OCCURRED DURING THE
|
|
BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA). HOWEVER, THE ONLY JAPANESE CARRIERS
|
|
SUNK IN THE BATTLE WERE THE TAIHO AND SHOKAKU.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
103
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
104
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
RANDOM ENGAGEMENT
|
|
|
|
THE SITUATION: HERE YOU CAN SELECT THE DATE AND TYPE OF SUBMARINE
|
|
YOU WISH TO COMMAND. THIS SITUATION GENERATES A RANDOM ENGAGEMENT
|
|
BASED ON THE TYPES OF JAPANESE SHIPS OPERATING IN THAT TIME PERI-
|
|
OD AND FOLLOWING THEIR HISTORICAL TACTICS AND SAILING PATTERNS.
|
|
YOU COULD ENCOUNTER WARSHIPS OR MERCHANTMEN. THESE ENGAGEMENTS ARE
|
|
SIMILAR TO THOSE YOU'LL EXPERIENCE DURING A WAR PATROL OR A WAR
|
|
CAREER
|
|
|
|
|
|
104
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
4 TECHNICAL DATA
|
|
|
|
US SUBMARINES OF WORLD WAR II
|
|
|
|
DESIGN THEORIES
|
|
|
|
AFTER WORLD WAR I (1914-18) THE US NAVY BEGAN EXPERIMENTING WITH
|
|
NEW SUBMARINE DESIGNS. BEFORE THE SUCCESS OF GERMAN U-BOATS IN
|
|
WWI, NAVAL STRATEGISTS REGARDED SUBMARINES AS COASTAL DEFENSE
|
|
VESSELS THAT COULD AMBUSH ENEMY WARSHIPS THAT VENTURED TOO NEAR A
|
|
COASTLINE, PORT, OR BAY. GRADUALLY THIS CONCEPT WAS EXTENDED TO
|
|
WARSHIP AMBUSHES IN ANY WATERS, INCLUDING ENEMY WATERS.
|
|
|
|
ALTHOUGH SUBMARINES WERE USED AGAINST MERCHANTMEN IN WWI, MANY
|
|
POWERS FELT ITS MORALITY WAS EQUIVALENT TO USING POISON GAS. THERE
|
|
WAS CONSIDERABLE POPULAR SENTIMENT FOR EITHER BANNING SUBMARINES
|
|
ENTIRELY, OR THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1922, AGREEING NOT TO
|
|
PERFORM UNRESTRICTED OF HEARTS THAT UNRESTRICTED SUBMARINE WARFARE
|
|
WAS LIKELY, FOR POLITICAL REASONS THEY FELT OBLIGED TO DESIGN
|
|
SUBMARINES FOR USE AGAINST SURFACE WARSHIPS.
|
|
|
|
THIS CAUSED THE US NAVY TO EVOLVE THE "FLEET BOAT" CONCEPT. THIS
|
|
SUBMARINE WOULD CRUISE WITH THE SURFACE BATTLE FLEET. FOR EXAMPLE,
|
|
THE AMERICAN CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR WAR AGAINST JAPAN ASSUMED THE
|
|
MAIN BATTLE FLEET AT PEARL HARBOR WOULD SAIL WEST TO RESCUE THE
|
|
PHILIPPINES FROM JAPANESE INVASION. THE BATTLE FLEET WAS COMPOSED
|
|
MAINLY OF LATE WWI-VINTAGE BATTLESHIPS WITH A CRUISING SPEED OF
|
|
17 KNOTS AND A MAXIMUM SPEED OF 20-21 KNOTS.
|
|
|
|
A "FLEET BOAT" WITH A TOP SPEED OF 20-21 KNOTS COULD TRAVEL WITH
|
|
THE BATTLESHIPS AND BE USED IN REGULAR BATTLES, AS WELL AS IN
|
|
AMBUSHES.
|
|
|
|
THE "P" CLASS WAS THE FIRST OF THESE DESIGNS. EXPERIMENTATION
|
|
CONTINUED UNTIL THE MIDDLE OF 1941 , WHEN THE NAVY FINALLY PUT THE
|
|
GATO CLASS INTO MASS PRODUCTION.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
107
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
108
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
RATING SUBMARINES
|
|
|
|
BY TRADITION ALL SUBMARINES ARE REFERRED TO AS "BOATS". A SUBMA-
|
|
RINE NEVER A "SHIP" IN US NAVY TERMINOLOGY.
|
|
|
|
LAUNCHED: THE DATE OF LAUNCH GIVES AN APPROXIMATE MEASURE OF A
|
|
SUBMARINE'S AGE. IT NORMALLY TOOK TWO TO SIX MONTHS TO "FIT OUT" A
|
|
SUBMARINE EVERY AFTER LAUNCHING. IN PEACETIME SUBMARINES RECEIVED
|
|
AN OVERHAUL EVERY SEVEN TO FIFTEEN YEARS. IN WARTIME IT WAS EVERY
|
|
TWO TO THREE YEARS.
|
|
|
|
TONNAGE & LENGTH: THE TONNAGE AND LENGTH OF A BOAT GIVE AN APPROX-
|
|
IMATE IDEA OF ITS SIZE. ALL THINGS BEING EQUAL (WHICH THEY RARELY
|
|
ARE), TONNAGE ALSO MEASURES THE DAMAGE A BOAT CAN ABSORB BEFORE
|
|
SINKING.
|
|
|
|
SPEED: THE REPORTED MAXIMUM SPEED OF THE SUBMARINE ON THE SURFACE
|
|
(USING DIESEL POWER) AND SUBMERGED (USING ELECTRIC POWER). THE
|
|
1920S AND '30S CLASSES USUALLY HAD A "DESIGNED" SPEED 1-2 KNOTS
|
|
HIGHER THAN THE FIGURES HERE (WHICH ARE SPEEDS ACTUALLY ACHIEVED).
|
|
AMERICAN PROPULSION TECHNOLOGY OF THIS ERA ALMOST NEVER ACHIEVED
|
|
DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS.
|
|
|
|
TEST DEPTH: THE MAXIMUM "SAFE" DIVING DEPTH OF THE SUBMARINE,
|
|
BASED ON THE DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS. AMERICAN STRUCTURAL TECHNOLOGY
|
|
WAS ALMOST ALWAYS SUPERIOR TO SPECIFICATION, ALLOWING A BOAT TO
|
|
DIVE BELOW THE TEST DEPTH. TRUE MAXIMUM DEPTH WAS 10% TO 50%
|
|
GREATER THAN THE TEST DEPTH, DEPENDING ON THE SPECIFIC BOAT.
|
|
|
|
TORPEDOES: THESE ARE PRIMARY WEAPON OF A SUBMARINE. THEREFORE,
|
|
THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF LAUNCHING TUBES AND THE OVERALL MAXIMUM
|
|
NUMBER OF TORPEDOES ARE IMPORTANT STATISTICS. DUE TO THEIR BULK,
|
|
TORPEDOES CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED BETWEEN BOW AND STERN AREAS WHILE
|
|
A SUBMARINE IS AT SEA.
|
|
|
|
DECK GUN: DUE TO MUZZLE VELOCITY, AMERICAN 3" AND 4" SUBMARINE
|
|
DECK GUNS WERE ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT IN POWER (THE 3" GUN HAD A
|
|
SMALLER SHELL, BUT WAS MORE ACCURATE). THE 5" DECK GUN, @SUCH
|
|
DESIRED BUT ALMOST UNIVERSALLY DENIED UNTIL LATE IN THE WAR, HAD
|
|
GREATER POWER AND ACCURACY. THE 6" GUNS ON THE NARWHAL CLASS WERE
|
|
AS LARGE AS THOSE ON A LIGHT CRUISER, BUT HAD LESS RANGE.
|
|
|
|
ENDURANCE: THIS REPRESENTS THE NUMBER OF DAYS THE SUBMARINE CAN
|
|
RUN AT ECONOMICAL SPEED (10-15 KNOTS) USING ITS DIESELS. IN SHORT,
|
|
ENDURANCE REPRESENTS THE AMOUNT OF FUEL OIL ON BOARD.
|
|
|
|
|
|
CREW: A SUBMARINE'S CREW IS BASED ON ITS SIZE. DESIGNERS PROVIDED
|
|
SPACE FOR THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE CREW WITHIN THE HULL. AS IN SOME
|
|
MODERN SUBS (INCLUDING CURRENT ARNERICAN ATTACK SUBS), THE CREW-
|
|
MEN WERE "HOT BUNKED", TWO MEN SHARED THE SAME BUNK BED, ONE
|
|
SLEEPING WHILE THE OTHER WAS "ON WATCH" (WORKING AT HIS DUTIES).
|
|
|
|
108
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
110
|
|
|
|
|
|
OLD "S" CLASS'
|
|
|
|
LAUNCHED:OCTOBER 1918 THROUGH NOVEMBER 1922
|
|
TONNAGE:840-870 TONS SURFACED, 1090-1135 TONS SUBMERGED
|
|
LENGTH:219-231'
|
|
SPEED:15 KTS SURFACED, 11 KTS SUBMERGED
|
|
TEST DEPTH:200
|
|
TORPEDOES:4 BOW TUBES AND 10 TORPEDOES, 1 STERN TUBE AND 2 TORPE-
|
|
DOES
|
|
DECK GUN:ONE 4" (OR ONE 3" ON SOME)
|
|
ENDURANCE:35 DAYS
|
|
CREW:4-2 OFFICERS AND MEN
|
|
|
|
THE "S-BOATS" WERE THE FIRST LARGE CLASS OF SUBMARINES BUILT FOR
|
|
THE US NAVY. THEY WERE SIMILAR TO OR SLIGHTLY BETTER THAN SUBMA-
|
|
RINES BUILT BY THE EUROPEAN COMBATANTS DURING WWI. THEY WERE
|
|
NUMBERED ("S-1" THROUGH "S-48") RATHER THAN NAMED. BY 1941 THESE
|
|
BOATS WERE RIDICULOUSLY OUTDATED. MUCH OF THEIR EQUIPMENT WAS SO
|
|
OLD IT BROKE DOWN CONTINUALLY. THEIR LOW SURFACE SPEED AND SMALL
|
|
ENDURANCE MADE THEM USELESS LOR LONG-DISTANCE OPERATIONS. BY THE
|
|
END OF 1942 ALL "S" BOATS HAD BEEN RETIRED FROM ACTIVE OPERATIONS
|
|
IN FRONTLINE AREAS. A FEW CONTINUED PATROLLING THE ALEUTIANS AND
|
|
OTHER "MINOR" AREAS DURING 1943 BEFORE FINAL RETIREMENT.
|
|
|
|
BARRACUDA CLASS
|
|
|
|
LAUNCHED: AUGUST 1924 THROUGH JUNE 1924
|
|
TONNAGE:2000 TONS SURFACED, 2620 TONS SUBMERGED
|
|
LENGTH:341.5'
|
|
SPEED :16 KTS SURFACED, 8 KTS SUBMERGED
|
|
TEST DEPTH:225'
|
|
TORPEDOES:4 BOW TUBES AND 12 TORPEDOES, 2 STERN TUBES AND 4 TORPE-
|
|
DOES
|
|
DECK GUN:ONE 5"
|
|
ENDURANCE:50 DAYS
|
|
CREW:80 OFFICERS AND MEN
|
|
|
|
ORIGINALLY THE "V" CLASS, THESE BOATS WERE THE FIRST EXPERIMENT
|
|
WITH LARGE CRUISING SUBMARINES WITH SUFFICIENT SPEED TO KEEP UP
|
|
WITH WWI-STYLE BATTLESHIPS AND BATTLE FLEETS. COMPLETION WAS
|
|
DELAYED FROM 1921 TO 1924- BY POSTWAR CONGRESSIONAL CUTS IN MILI-
|
|
TARY BUDGETS. THE DESIGN WAS OVER-AMBITIOUS: THE DIESEL ENGINES
|
|
WERE UNABLE TO DEVELOP THE EXPECTED POWER, THE HULL LEAKED FUEL
|
|
OIL, DIVING SPEEDS WERE SLOW, AND UNDERWATER MANEUVERABILITY WAS
|
|
POOR. BY 1941 THESE BOATS WERE A MECHANICAL NIGHTMARE TO OPERATE.
|
|
ALL WERE WITHDRAWN BY THE END OF 1942
|
|
|
|
NARWHAL CLASS
|
|
LAUNCHED: DECEMBER 1929 THROUGH MARCH 1930
|
|
TONNAGE:2710 TONS SURFACED, 4080 TONS SUBMERGED
|
|
LENGTH:381'
|
|
SPEED:16 KTS SURFACED, 6 KTS SUBMERGED
|
|
TEST DEPTH:250'
|
|
TORPEDOES:4 BOW TUBES AND 12 TORPEDOES, 2 STERN AND 4 TORPEDOES
|
|
DECK GUN:TWO 6"
|
|
|
|
110
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
111
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ENDURANCE:60 DAYS
|
|
CREW:90 OFFICERS AND MEN
|
|
|
|
THESE BOATS WERE THE LARGEST CLASS OF SUBMARINES BUILT FOR THE US
|
|
NAVY BEFORE OR DURING WWII. THE GREAT SIZE WAS NEEDED FOR A NEW
|
|
AND MORE POWERFUL TYPE OF GERMAN DIESEL ENGINE. UNFORTUNATELY, THE
|
|
ENGINES WERE A FAILURE AND THE BOATS NEVER ACHIEVED THE DESIGN
|
|
SPEED OF 17 KTS SURFACED AND 8 KTS SUBMERGED. THEIR HUGE SIZE
|
|
MADE THEM SLOW TO DIVE AND SLUGGISH TO MANEUVER. HOWEVER, THE
|
|
BOATS WERE SPACIOUS AND HAD POWERFUL DECK GUN ARMAMENT. DURING THE
|
|
1930S ONE OF THE CLASS (THE ARGONAUT) HAD THE REAR TORPEDO TUBES
|
|
REPLACED BY MINE-LAYING GEAR. AFTER THE FIRST FEW MONTHS OF WWII
|
|
THE BOATS WERE USED PRIMARILY FOR COMMANDO RAIDS AND SIMILAR
|
|
CLANDESTINE MISSIONS BEHIND ENEMY LINES.
|
|
|
|
"P" CLASS
|
|
|
|
LAUNCHED:MAY 1935 THROUGH MARCH 1937
|
|
TONNAGE:1310-1330 TONS SURFACED. 1960-2210 TONS SUBMERGED
|
|
LENGTH:298-301'
|
|
SPEED :19 KTS SURFACED, 8 KTS SUBMERGED
|
|
TEST DEPTH:250'
|
|
TORPEDOES:4 BOW TUBES AND 12 TORPEDOES, 2 STERN TUBES AND 4 TORPE-
|
|
DOES
|
|
DECK GUN:ONE 3" OR 4"
|
|
ENDURANCE:60 DAYS
|
|
CREW:55 OFFICERS AND MEN
|
|
|
|
AFTER THREE UNSUCCESSFUL EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS IN THE EARLY 1930S
|
|
(THE DOLPHIN, CACHALOT AND CUTTLEFISH), THE NAVY FINALLY SETTLED
|
|
ON THE NEW "FLEET BOAT" CONCEPT WITH NEW, LIGHTWEIGHT DIESEL
|
|
ENGINES ALONG WITH A BETTER ELECTRIC BATTERY. THE RESULTING "P"
|
|
CLASS, THE FIRST "FLEET BOATS", WERE LASTER, MORE MANEUVERABLE AND
|
|
QUICKER DIVING. THEY ALSO HAD THE FIRST ANALOG TORPEDO DATA
|
|
COMPUTERS (TDCS) AND THE FIRST AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS. THE
|
|
LATTER NOT ONLY IMPROVED CREW PERFORMANCE IN HOT WEATHER, BUT ALSO
|
|
GREATLY REDUCED ELECTRICAL FAULTS CAUSED BY CONDENSATION WITHIN
|
|
THE HULL.
|
|
|
|
NEW `"S" CLASS
|
|
|
|
LAUNCHED:JUNE 1937 THROUGH AUGUST 1939
|
|
TONNAGE:1435-1475 TONS SURFACED, 2210-2350 TONS SUBMERGED
|
|
LENGTH:308-310.5'
|
|
SPEED:20 KTS SURFACED, 9 KTS SUBMERGED
|
|
TEST DEPTH :300'
|
|
TORPEDOES:4 BOW TUBES AND 12 TORPEDOES, 4 STERN TUBES AND 8 TORPE-
|
|
DOES
|
|
DECK GUN:ONE 4" (OR ONE 3" ON SOME)
|
|
ENDURANCE:60 DAYS
|
|
CREW:70 OFFICERS AND MEN
|
|
|
|
THE NEW "S" (OR SALMON) CLASS WAS ACTUALLY A CONTINUATION OF THE
|
|
"P" CLASS, WITH A DIFFERENT AND SOMEWHAT SUPERIOR TYPE OF DIESEL
|
|
ENGINE. ALTHOUGH THE HOPED-FOR DESIGN SPEED WAS 21 KTS, IN REALI-
|
|
TY THE BOATS NEVER MADE MORE THAN 20. THE CLASS DID HAVE A PROBLEM
|
|
WITH THE DIESEL
|
|
|
|
111
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
112
|
|
|
|
ENGINE AIR INTAKES. THESE WERE SUPPOSED TO SHUT AUTOMATICALLY
|
|
DURING A DIVE, BUT IN A TEST DIVE OF THE SQUALUS THE LIDS STAYED
|
|
OPEN, CAUSING THE BOAT TO FLOOD AND SINK. OVER ONE THIRD OF HER
|
|
CREW WERE DROWNED, BUT THE BOAT WAS RAISED, REFURBISHED AND RE-
|
|
NAMED THE SAILFISH (INFORMALLY KNOWN AS THE "SQUALFISH".)
|
|
|
|
"T" CLASS
|
|
|
|
LAUNCHED:DECEMBER 1939 THROUGH JANUARY 1941
|
|
TONNAGE:1475 TONS SURFACED 2370 TONS SUBMERGED
|
|
LENGTH: 307'
|
|
SPEED:20 KTS SURFACED 9 KTS SUBMERGED
|
|
TEST DEPTH:325'
|
|
TORPEDOES:6 BLOW TUBES AND 16 TORPEDOES, 4 STERN TUBES AND 8
|
|
TORPEDOES
|
|
DECK GUN: ONE 5"
|
|
ENDURANCE: 60 DAYS
|
|
CREW:85 OFFICERS AND MEN
|
|
|
|
ALS KNOWN AS THE TAMBOR CLASS, THESE WERE THE FIRST FLEET BOATS TO
|
|
CARRY THE ENLARGED ARMAMENT OF 6 BOW TUBES AND 4 SERTN TUBES.
|
|
OTHER INTERNAL EQUIPMENT WAS UPGRADED AND IMPROVED OVER THE "P"
|
|
AND "S" CLASSES. THE TEETHING PROBLEMS OF VARIOUS DIESEL ENGINE
|
|
DESIGNS HAD FINALLY BEEN RESOLVED. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OVER 15
|
|
YEARS AN ENTIRE CLASS OF US SUBMARINES HAD A GOOD, RELIABLE POWER
|
|
PLANT.
|
|
|
|
GATO CLASS
|
|
|
|
LAUNCHED:MARCH 1941 THROUGH MAY 1943
|
|
TONNAGE: 1525 TONS SURFACED, 2415 TONS SUBMERGED
|
|
LENGTH:312'
|
|
SPEED:20 KTS SURFACED, 10 KTS SUBMERGED
|
|
TEST DEPTH: 350'
|
|
TORPEDOES:6 BOW TUBES AND 16 TORPEDOES, 4 STERN TUBES AND 8 TORPE-
|
|
DOES
|
|
DECK GUN: ONE 4" (ON SOME ONE 3" OR ONE 5")
|
|
ENDURANCE 60 DAYS
|
|
CREW: 80 OFFICERS AND MEN
|
|
|
|
THIS CLASS WAS THE FINAL REFINEMENT OF THE FLEET BOAT CONCEPT. IT
|
|
INCORPORATED ALL THE DESIGN PRODUCED, WITH OVER 200 BUILT DURING
|
|
THE WAR (INCLUDING THE IMPROVED GATOS, BELOW). THE CLASS WAS
|
|
PROBABLY THE MOST FORMIDABLE SUBMARINE BUILT BY ANY NATION IN THE
|
|
WAR, AND SUPERIOR IN MOST RESPECTS TO GERMAN U-BOAT DESIGNS.
|
|
|
|
IMPROVED GATO CLASS
|
|
|
|
LAUNCHED:MAY 1943 THROUGH JULY 1945
|
|
TONNAGE: 1525 TONS SURFACED, 2415 TONS SUBMERGED
|
|
LENGTH:312'
|
|
SPEED:20 KTS SURFACED, 10 KTS SUBMERGED
|
|
TEST DEPTH:400'
|
|
TORPEDOES:6 BOW TUBES AND 16 TORPEDOES, 4 STERN TUBES AND 8 TORPE-
|
|
DOES
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
112
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
113
|
|
|
|
|
|
DECK GUN:ONE 5"
|
|
ENDURANCE:60 DAYS
|
|
CREW: 80 OFFICERS AND MEN
|
|
|
|
IT WAS VERY HARD TO IMPROVE SIGNIFICANTLY ON THE MAGNIFICENT GATO
|
|
DESIGN. HOWEVER, A NEW METHOD OF STRENGTHENING THE HULL PERMITTED
|
|
DEEPER DIVING, AND 5" DECK GUNS (LONG DESIRED BY SUBMARINERS) WERE
|
|
FINALLY FITTED AS STANDARD WEAPONS. MANY OTHER PIECES OF EQUIPMENT
|
|
RECEIVED SLIGHT IMPROVEMENT. THERE WAS NO OFFICIAL CHANGE FROM
|
|
"GATO" TO "IMPROVED GATO" CLASS. INSTEAD THE IMPROVEMENTS WERE
|
|
ADDED AS SOON AS THEY WERE AVAILABLE AT EACH SHIPYARD.
|
|
|
|
TENCH CLASS
|
|
|
|
LAUNCHED:JULY 1944 THROUGH JANUARY 1946
|
|
TONNAGE:1570 TONS SURFACED, 2415 SUBMERGED
|
|
LENGTH:312'
|
|
SPEED:20 KTS SURFACED, 10 KTS SUBMERGED
|
|
TEST DEPTH:400'
|
|
TORPEDOES :6 BOW TUBES AND 16 TORPEDOES, 4 STERN TUBES AND 8
|
|
TORPEDOES
|
|
DECK GUN:ONE 5"
|
|
ENDURANCE:60 DAYS
|
|
CREW:80 OFFICERS AND MEN
|
|
|
|
THIS WAS THE FINAL CLASS OF "FLEET SUBMARINES" BUILT DURING WWII.
|
|
A NUMBER WERE CANCELLED OR SCRAPPED UNFINISHED AT THE END OF THE
|
|
WAR. THE CLASS WAS SIMILAR TO THE IMPROVED GATOS, BUT WITH ENOUGH
|
|
REFINEMENTS AND ADJUSTMENTS TO MERIT A NEW CLASS NAME.
|
|
|
|
TYPE VII GERMAN U-BOAT
|
|
|
|
LAUNCHED:1937 THROUGH 1945
|
|
TONNAGE:626-769 TONS SURFACED, 745-871 TONS SUBMERGED
|
|
LENGTH:211-220'
|
|
SPEED:16-17 KTS SURFACED, 7,5 8 KTS SUBMERGED
|
|
TEST DEPTH:650'
|
|
TORPEDOES:4 BOW TUBES AND 12 TORPEDOES, 1 STERN TUBE AND 2 TORPE-
|
|
DOES
|
|
DECK GUN:ONE 3.5"
|
|
ENDURANCE:2ODAYS(AT 12KTS)
|
|
CREW:44 OFFICERS AND MEN
|
|
|
|
THIS DATA IS PROVIDED FOR COMPARATIVE INTEREST. THIS TYPE (VIIA, B
|
|
AND C) WAS THE STANDARD GERMAN U-BOAT USED IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC
|
|
THROUGHOUT THE WAR. IT HAD ONLY TWO DIESEL ENGINES, BUT WAS LESS
|
|
VISIBLE ON THE SURFACE (SMALLER CONNING TOWER) AND COULD "CRASH
|
|
DIVE" IN 30 SECONDS (FLEET BOATS TOOK 60 SECONDS). THE LARGER TYPE
|
|
IX WERE CONSIDERED TOO LARGE AND UNMANEUVERABLE FOR COMBAT OPERA-
|
|
TIONS, WHILE THE FIRST TYPE XXI (A HIGHLY ADVANCED SUCCESSOR TO
|
|
THE TYPE VII) MADE ITS `SHAKE DOWN' CRUISE IN THE LAST MONTH OF
|
|
THE WAR.
|
|
|
|
113
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
114
|
|
|
|
US TORPEDOES
|
|
|
|
RATING TORPEDOES
|
|
|
|
PROPULSION: STEAM PROPULSION LEAVES A HIGHLY VISIBLE TRAIL OF
|
|
BUBBLES WHILE ELECTRIC PROPULSION LEAVES ONLY A WAKE OF DISTURBED
|
|
WATER, WHICH IS LESS VISIBLE.
|
|
|
|
SPEED/RANGE: AT A GIVEN SPEED, A TORPEDO CAN TRAVEL A GIVEN
|
|
DISTANCE. THE MARK 14 HAD TWO SPEED SETTINGS. AMERICAN TORPEDOES
|
|
WERE ABOUT AVERAGE IN THEIR SPEED AND RANGE CAPABILITIES.
|
|
|
|
WARHEAD: THE AMOUNT OF HIGH EXPLOSIVE IN THE WARHEAD. AMERICAN
|
|
TORPEDOES HAD SMALL WARHEADS. SOME TORPEDOES OF SIMILAR SIZE OF
|
|
OTHER NATIONS HAD 600 TO 900 LB. WARHEADS.
|
|
|
|
AVAILABLE: THE "IN SERVICE" TIME PERIOD FOR THE WEAPON.
|
|
|
|
MARK 10 TORPEDO
|
|
|
|
PROPULSION:STEAM
|
|
SPEED/RANGE:3500 YARDS AT 36 KTS
|
|
WARHEAD:500 LBS
|
|
AVAILABLE: UNTIL THE END OF 1943
|
|
|
|
DESIGNED DURING WWI AND CLOSELY BASED ON THE ORIGINAL WHITEHEAD
|
|
TORPEDO, THIS WEAPON WAS STANDARD ARMAMENT FOR ALL AMERICAN SUBMA-
|
|
RINES UNTIL THE LATE 1930S. ALL THE OLD "S" BOAT CLASS SUBMARINES
|
|
USED THIS MODEL BECAUSE THEIR TUBES AND FIRING CONTROLS COULDN'T
|
|
BE ADAPTED TO THE MARK 14. HOWEVER, LATER BOATS COULD STILL USE
|
|
THE MARK 10S.
|
|
|
|
MARK 14 TORPEDO
|
|
|
|
PROPULSION: STEAM
|
|
SPEED/RANGE:4500 YARDS AT 46 KNOTS
|
|
SPEED/RANGE:9000 YARDS AT 31.5 KNOTS
|
|
WARHEAD:500 LBS
|
|
AVAILABLE: THROUGHOUT THE WAR
|
|
|
|
DESIGNED IN THE 1930S, THIS TORPEDO WAS TO BE THE "WONDER WEAPON"
|
|
OF THE US NAVY. IT HAD A MAGNETIC PROXIMITY EXPLODER DESIGNED TO
|
|
EXPLODE BENEATH A SHIP AND BREAK ITS KEEL, AS WELL AS A "BACK-UP"
|
|
CONTACT EXPLODER. UNFORTUNATELY, THE NAVY DEPARTMENT PROHIBITED
|
|
ANY LIVE-FIRE TESTS OF THE TORPEDO. AS A RESULT, IT RAN 10-15'
|
|
TOO DEEP, AND ITS MAGNETIC
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
114
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
115
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPLODER RARELY WORKED (IT EITHER CAUSED PREMATURE EXPLOSIONS, OR
|
|
FAILED TO EXPLODE AT ALL). ITS CONTACT EXPLODER FREQUENTLY FAILED
|
|
WHEN THE TORPEDO HIT "STRAIGHT ON," BUT FUNCTIONED SOMEWHAT BETTER
|
|
AT GLANCING ANGLES.
|
|
|
|
THE DEPTH PROBLEM WAS DISCOVERED IN EARLY 1942 BY ADMIRAL LOCKWOOD
|
|
(THEN COMMANDING IN FREMANTLE) AND MOST SKIPPERS CORRECTED FOR IT.
|
|
OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT DIDN'T OCCUR UNTIL JUNE 2OTH, 1942. NOT
|
|
UNTIL JUNE 1943 DID ADMIRAL LOCKWOOD (NOW AT SUBPAC) DISCOVER THAT
|
|
THE MAGNETIC EXPLODER WAS FAULTY, HOWEVER, THE SUBSOWESPAC HQ
|
|
STAFF INSISTED UNTIL THE END OF '43 THAT THE MAGNETIC EXPLODER WAS
|
|
FINE. THE CONTACT EXPLODER FAULT WAS NOT DISCOVERED UNTIL JULY-
|
|
AUGUST 1943, AND NEW EXPLODERS WEREN'T READY UNTIL SEPTEMBER.
|
|
AGAIN, ADMIRAL LOCKWOOD AT SUBPAC DISCOVERED THE PROBLEMS AND
|
|
SUBSOWESPAC AFTER CONSIDERABLE BUREAUCRATIC SKIRMISHING, GRUDGING-
|
|
LY AGREED THAT PROBLEMS MIGHT EXIST.
|
|
|
|
|
|
MARK 18 MOD 1 TORPEDO
|
|
|
|
PROPULSION: ELECTRIC
|
|
SPEED/RANGE 4000 YARDS AT 27 KNOTS
|
|
WARHEAD: 500 LBS
|
|
AVAILABLE: 1944 AND 1945 ONLY
|
|
|
|
POPULARLY KNOWN AS THE "18-1", THIS TORPEDO WAS ORIGINALLY DE-
|
|
SIGNED BY PRIVATE CONTRACTORS (NOT THE US NAVY). HOWEVER, LATER
|
|
DEVELOPMENT OF THIS WEAPON WAS GREATLY SLOWED BY THE INEPTITUDE OF
|
|
THE US NAVY BUREAU OF ORDNANCE, THE FIRST TORPEDOES DELIVERED RAN
|
|
POORLY, BUT AFTER EXTENSIVE TESTING THE FAULTS WERE FOUND AND
|
|
CORRECTED. THE WEAPON WAS EFFICIENT BUT NOT ESPECIALLY EFFECTIVE
|
|
DUE TO ITS VERY LOW SPEED, FOR EXAMPLE, A SUBMARINE ASTERN OF A
|
|
WARSHIP WAS HELPLESS, SINCE THIS TORPEDO COULD NOT OVERTAKE A
|
|
MAJOR WARSHIP MOVING AT HIGH SPEED.
|
|
|
|
MARK 18 MOD 2 TORPEDO
|
|
|
|
PROPULSION:ELECTRIC
|
|
SPEED/RANGE:4000 YARDS AT 40 KNOTS
|
|
WARHEAD:500 LBS
|
|
AVAILABLE:LATER 1944 AND 1945 ONLY
|
|
|
|
UPGRADES IN THE MARK 18 ENGINE DESIGN, COMBINED WITH NEW AND
|
|
IMPROVED MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES, INCREASED ITS SPEED CONSIDERABLY.
|
|
THE RESULT WAS POPULARLY KNOWN AS THE "18-2". THIS TORPEDO WAS
|
|
MORE EFFECTIVE THAN THE OLD MARK 14. HOWEVER HQ STAFFS, STILL
|
|
EMBARRASSED BY THIS TORPEDO FORCING SUB CAPTAINS TO USE THE FAULTY
|
|
FEATURES OF THE MARK 14, LET EACH SKIPPER SELECT HIS OWN TORPEDO
|
|
TYPES. MANY DISTRUSTED NEW WEAPONS FROM THE NAVY BUREAU OF ORD-
|
|
NANCE AND SELECTED MARK 14S INSTEAD.
|
|
|
|
115
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
116
|
|
|
|
|
|
JAPANESE SHIPS IN WORLD WAR II
|
|
|
|
RATING SHIPS
|
|
|
|
TONNAGE: WARSHIP TONNAGE IS MEASURED IN MAY WAYS, INCLUDING
|
|
STANDARD LIGHT DISPLACEMENT (ONLY APPROPRIATE TO INTERNATIONAL
|
|
LAW, SUCH AS THE NAVAL LIMITATION TREATY OF 1922), NORMAL DIS-
|
|
PLACEMENT, AND FULL-LOAD DISPLACEMENT. NORMAL DISPLACEMENT IS
|
|
USED HERE, AND IS GENERALLY REPRESENTATIVE OF A SHIP'S SIZE.
|
|
|
|
MAX SPEED : THIS IS THE MAXIMUM SPEED THE SHIP'S ENGINES CAN
|
|
PRODUCE IN CALM WATERS. MOST WARSHIPS CRUISE AT A LOWER SPEED (17
|
|
TO 24 KNOTS) TO CONSERVE FUEL. MERCHANT SHIP ENGINES ARE DESIGNED
|
|
FOR A DIFFERENT RANGE OF SPEED OUTPUT AND CAPABILITY, AND THERE
|
|
FORE THEY CRUISE ECONOMICALLY AT SPEEDS VERY CLOSE TO THEIR MAXI-
|
|
MUM SPEED.
|
|
|
|
MAIN GUNS: THE NUMBER AND SIZE OF THE SHIP'S MAIN BATTER. MAJOR
|
|
WARSHIPS INVARIABLY HAVE SECONDARY OR EVEN TERTIARY BATTERIES, AS
|
|
WELL AS LIGHT AA GUNS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE YAMATO CLASS SUPER-BAT-
|
|
TLESHIP HAD 6.1" SECONDARY AND 5" TERTIARY TURRETS, AS WELL AS
|
|
NUMEROUS 25MM AA GUN MOUNTINGS.
|
|
|
|
ARMOR: THE MAXIMUM THICKNESS OF A WARSHIP STEEL ARMOR. BELT
|
|
ARMOR IS ALONG THE SIDE OF THE SIP, USUALLY JUST ABOVE THE WATER-
|
|
LINE. DECK ARMOR IS THE ALL OF VARIOUS ARMORED DECKS, THE THICK-
|
|
EST OF WHICH IS USUALLY WELL DOWN INSIDE THE SHIP, AT THE TOP OF
|
|
THE BELT, FORMING AN ARMORED BOX OVER THE SHIP'S VITALS.
|
|
|
|
ASW WEAPONS: THE ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE ARMAMENT OF THE SHIP.
|
|
MOST LARGER WARSHIPS DID NOT CARRY SONAR OR DEPTH CHARGES. A
|
|
FULLY SUBMERGED SUBMARINE CAN ONLY BE FOUND AND ATTACKED WITH ASW
|
|
WEAPONRY.
|
|
|
|
|
|
TORPS TO SINK: THIS IS A ROUGH, STATISTICAL ESTIMATE OF HOW MANY
|
|
TORPEDO EXPLOSIONS ARE NEEDED TO SINK THE SHIP. IT IS BASED ON THE
|
|
WEAK 500 LB. WARHEADS IN US TORPEDOES (TORPEDOES USED BY OTHER
|
|
WWII NAVIES WERE MORE POWERFUL). IT DOES NOT INCLUDE SECONDARY
|
|
DAMAGE SUCH AS FIRES, EXPLODING AMMUNITION OR FUEL, ETC. IT DOES
|
|
CONSIDER A NORMAL, EXPECTED FREQUENCY OF DUDS AND MALFUNCTIONS.
|
|
HOWEVER, THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE THE EXTRAORDINARY DEFECTS IN THE
|
|
MARK 14 (WHICH WERE GRADUALLY CORRECTED DURING 1943).
|
|
|
|
RADAR RANGE: THE MAXIMUM RANGE AT WHICH SUBMARINE-MOUNTED SJ
|
|
RADAR COULD DETECT THE SHIP, ASSUMING IDEAL OPERATING CONDITIONS.
|
|
THE RANGE VARIES DEPENDING ON WHETHER THE SHIP IS END- ON OR
|
|
BROADSIDE TO THE RADAR SET (THE BROADSIDE CAN BE SEEN FURTHER
|
|
AWAY).
|
|
|
|
116
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
117
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BBH SUPER BATTLESHIPS
|
|
|
|
TONNAGE:67,123 TONS
|
|
MAX SPEED:27 KNOTS
|
|
MAIN GUNS NINE 18.1
|
|
ARMOR:16.1 BELT, 9' DECK
|
|
ASW WEAPONS: NONE
|
|
TORPS TO SINK:ABOUT 12
|
|
RADAR RANGE:25000 TO 40000 YARDS
|
|
|
|
THE YAMATO CLASS OF SUPER-BATTLESHIPS WAS BEGUN IN 1937. THEY WERE
|
|
THE LARGEST, MOST HEAVILY ARMED AND ARMORED BATTLESHIPS EVER BUILT
|
|
IN HUMAN HISTORY (LARGER EVEN THAN THE AMERICAN /OWVACLASS, AL-
|
|
THOUGH THE IOWAS WERE FASTER). THEY WERE AMBUSHED MORE THAN ONCE
|
|
BY AMERICAN SUBMARINES, BUT SHRUGGED OFF THE ONE OR TWO TORPEDO
|
|
HITS AND SPED AWAY. ALL WERE EVENTUALLY SUNK BY AMERICAN AIR
|
|
ATTACKS IN LATE 1944 AND SUMMER OF 1945.
|
|
|
|
|
|
BB BATTLESHIPS
|
|
|
|
TONNAGE:30-35,000 TONS
|
|
MAX SPEED:25 KNOTS
|
|
MAIN GUNS:TWELVE 14" OR EIGHT 16"
|
|
ARMOR:12" BELT, 2' TO 7' DECK
|
|
ASW WEAPONS: NONE
|
|
TORPS TO SINK: ABOUT 9
|
|
RADAR RANGE: 20000 TO 32000 YARDS
|
|
|
|
THE FUSO CLASS OF BATTLESHIPS IS TYPICAL OF MANY JAPANESE BATTLE-
|
|
SHIP CLASSES. BUILT DURING OR IMMEDIATELY AFTER WWI, THEY WERE
|
|
EXTENSIVELY REBUILT AND MODIFIED DURING THE 1930S. THE ADDED
|
|
"PAGODA" SUPERSTRUCTURES WERE U5PQUELY JAPANESE. ALTHOUGH THESE
|
|
BATTLESHIPS NEVER ENGAGED IN A SURFACE BATTLE, SLIGHTLY SMALLER
|
|
BATTLECRUISERS ( KONGO CLASS) WITH EIGHT 14" GUNS SAW EXTENSIVE
|
|
ACTION IN THE SOLOMONS DURING 1942. THE ONLY JAPANESE
|
|
"BATTLESHIP" SUNK BY A SUBMARINE WAS ACTUALLY A KONGO CLASS SHIP.
|
|
|
|
|
|
CV AIRCRAFT CARRIER
|
|
|
|
TONNAGE:30-34000 TONS
|
|
MAX SPEED 28 TO 34 KNOTS
|
|
MAIN GUNS:SIXTEEN 5" GUNS (SOME HAD A FEW 8" GUNS ALSO)
|
|
ARMOR:VARIED 8.5" BELT, 6.7 DECK TYPICAL
|
|
ASW WEAPONS: NONE
|
|
TORPS TO SINK:ABOUT 6 (LESS IF VULNERABLE)
|
|
RADAR RANGE:20000 TO 31000 YARDS
|
|
|
|
IN 1941 THE JAPANESE NAVY HAD SIX POWERFUL "FLEET" CARRIERS, OF
|
|
WHICH THE KAGA WAS ONE. SOME WERE BUILT ON THE UNCOMPLETED HULLS
|
|
OF BATTLESHIPS OR BATTLECRUISERS, THE OTHERS WERE BUILT AS CARRI-
|
|
ERS FROM THE "KEEL UP". IF CAUGHT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS, ESPE-
|
|
CIALLY WITH MANY FUELED AND ARMED AIRCRAFT, THE CARRIERS WERE VERY
|
|
VULNERABLE. OTHERWISE THEY PROVED DIFFICULT TO SINK. THE SHOKAKU,
|
|
FOR EXAMPLE, WAS DAMAGED IN NUMEROUS BATTLES BEFORE BEING SUNK
|
|
LATE IN THE WAR.
|
|
|
|
117
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
118
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
JAPAN ALSO HAD A VARIETY OF MEDIUM AND LIGHT CARRIERS OF SMALLER
|
|
DISPLACEMENT AND LOWER SPEED. DURING THE WAR A NUMBER OF ADDI-
|
|
TIONAL FLEET CARRIERS WERE COMPLETED. THE LARGEST WAS THE SHINANO.
|
|
BUILT ON A YAMATO CLASS BATTLESHIP HULL, IT WAS HUGE (68,059
|
|
TONS). UNFORTUNATELY, THE ARCHERFISH FOUND AND SANK HER WITH JUST
|
|
FOUR LUCKY TORPEDO HITS BEFORE THE SHIP WAS FITTED OUT OR ITS CREW
|
|
TRAINED.
|
|
|
|
THESE FAMOUS SHIPS SAW HEAVY SERVICE THROUGHOUT THE WAR, INCLUDING
|
|
NUMEROUS SURFACE BATTLES FROM THE JAVA SEA TO THE ALEUTIAN IS-
|
|
LANDS. THEY WERE ALSO USED EXTENSIVELY AS ESCORTS FOR FLEET CARRI-
|
|
ERS IN NAVAL AIR ACTIONS. LARGE AND POWERFUL, JAPANESE HEAVY
|
|
CRUISERS WERE SOMETIMES MISTAKEN FOR BATTLESHIPS BECAUSE OF THEIR
|
|
BIG SUPERSTRUCTURES.
|
|
|
|
BUILT BETWEEN 1918 AND 1925, THESE SHIPS WERE NEVER MODERNIZED OR
|
|
UPGRADED, PROBABLY BECAUSE THEIR SMALL SIZE MADE THEM UNSUITABLE
|
|
FOR WORK IN A BATTLE LINE. DURING WWII THEY WERE PRIMARILY USED AS
|
|
DESTROYER SQUADRON LEADERS. IN THE LATER PART OF THE WAR JAPAN
|
|
COMPLETED A FEW LARGER LIGHT CRUISERS WITH 6.1" GUNS, BUT MOST
|
|
WERE FINISHED TOO LATE TO SEE MAJOR ACTION.
|
|
|
|
|
|
DDAA DESTROYER
|
|
|
|
TONNAGE: 3500 TONS
|
|
MAX SPEED: 33 KNOTS
|
|
MAIN GUNS: EIGHT 3.9"
|
|
ARMOR: NONE
|
|
ASW WEAPONS: SONAR, DEPTH CHARGE RACKS AND THROWERS
|
|
TORPS TO SINK: ABOUT 2
|
|
RADAR RANGE: 10000 TO 15000 YARDS
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
118
|
|
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119
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STARTED IN 1940, THESE SHIPS WERE ORIGINALLY INTENDED TO BE NATO-
|
|
AIRCRAFT CRUISERS. WHEN COMPLETED THEY WERE RE-RATED AS DESTROY-
|
|
ERS DUE TO THEIR SMALL DISPLACEMENT. THE 3.9" GUNS WERE FORMIDA-
|
|
BLE RAPID-FIRING WEAPONS WHOSE VOLUME OF FIRE WAS SUPERIOR TO THE
|
|
NORMAL 5" ARMAMENT OF A DESTROYER (ALTHOUGH MAXIMUM RANGE WAS
|
|
SOMEWHAT LESS). THE SHIPS WERE PRIMARILY USED AS DESTROYERS,
|
|
RATHER THAN IN THEIR INTENDED ROLE AS ANTI-AIRCRAFT SHIPS GUARDING
|
|
HEAVIER SURFACE WARSHIPS (SUCH AS CARRIERS).
|
|
|
|
DD DESTROYER
|
|
|
|
TONNAGE: 2000-2500 TONS
|
|
MAX SPEED: 24-38 KNOTS
|
|
MAIN GUNS: FOUR TO SIX 5"
|
|
ARMOR: NONE
|
|
ASW WEAPONS: SONAR, DEPTH CHARGE RACKS AND THROWERS
|
|
TORPS TO SINK: ABOUT 2
|
|
RADAR RANGE: 9000 TO 14000 YARDS
|
|
|
|
JAPAN HAD NUMEROUS CLASSES OF FLEET DESTROYERS, ALL BUILT ON
|
|
SIMILAR LINES. THEY PERFORMED A VARIETY OF FUNCTIONS. ALL MAJOR
|
|
FLEET TAK FORCES INCLUDED A SCREEN OF DESTROYERS. THEY ALSO
|
|
OPERATED ALONE IN SMALL SQUADRONS OF 4 TO 8 SHIPS, SOMETIMES WITH
|
|
A LIGHT CRUISER LEADING THEM. THE "TOKYO EXPRESS" THAT RAN ALMOST
|
|
NIGHTLY DOWN "THE SLOT" DURING THE SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN WAS A DE-
|
|
STROYER SQUADRON CARRYING TROOPS AND SUPPLIES. FINALLY, THESE
|
|
DESTROYERS WERE ASSIGNED TO MERCHANT ESCORT AND PROTECTION DUTIES,
|
|
ESPECIALLY FROM 1943 ONWARD WHEN JAPAN BEGAN USING CONVOYS.
|
|
|
|
DE DESTROYER ESCORT
|
|
|
|
TONNAGE: 1500 TONS
|
|
MAX SPEED: 28 KNOTS
|
|
MAIN GUNS: THREE 5"
|
|
ARMOR: NONE
|
|
ASW WEAPONS: SONAR, DEPTH CHARGE RACKS AND THROWERS
|
|
TORPS TO SINK: ABOUT 1
|
|
RADAR RANGE: 8000 TO 13000 YARDS
|
|
|
|
BEGUN IN 1943, THESE SHIPS WERE BUILT VERY QUICKLY (5 TO 9 MONTHS
|
|
EACH), AND USED TO REPLACE FLEET DESTROYERS IN A CONVOY ESCORT
|
|
ROLE. DUE TO AMERICAN BOMBING AND LACK OF RAW MATERIALS, MANY
|
|
WERE INCOMPLETE AT THE END OF WAR. TO A SUBMARINE THESE SHIPS
|
|
WERE ALMOST AS DANGEROUS AS A FULL FLEET DESTROYER, THE ONLY
|
|
DIFFERENCE BEING A SLIGHTLY SLOWER TOP SPEED.
|
|
|
|
PC PATROL CRAFT
|
|
|
|
TONNAGE: ABOUT 800 TONS
|
|
MAX SPEED: 16 TO 19 KNOTS
|
|
MAIN GUNS: TWO OR THREE 3" TO 4.7"
|
|
ARMOR: NONE
|
|
ASW WEAPONS: SONAR, DEPTH CHARGE RACKS AND THROWERS
|
|
TORPS TO SINK: USUALLY 1
|
|
RADAR RANGEL 7000 TO 11000 YARDS
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
119
|
|
|
|
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|
|
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|
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|
|
120
|
|
|
|
|
|
A VARIETY OF STEEL- AND WOOD-HULLED SMALL CRAFT WERE BUILT BY
|
|
JAPAN AS MERCHANT ESCORT BETWEEN 1943 AND 1945. THESE SUPPLE-
|
|
MENTED NUMEROUS MINESWEEPERS AND PATROL BOAT ALREADY FUNCTIONING
|
|
AS ESCORTS. MOST WERE USED TO ESCORT COASTAL CONVOYS, BUT THE
|
|
LARGER ONES (SUCH AS THE UKURU CLASS, TYPE CS AND TYPE DS) COULD
|
|
HANDLE THE OPEN SEA FOR SHORT OR MODERATE VOYAGES. THESE SHIPS
|
|
WERE NOWHERE NEAR AS FORMIDABLE AS DESTROYERS OR DESTROYER ES-
|
|
CORTS. IN FACT, IN ONE FAMOUS ACTION THE SUBMARINE SALMON, DAMAGED
|
|
BY DEPTH CHARGES, SURFACED AND DEFEATED TWO SUCH PATROL CRAFT IN A
|
|
GUN DUEL.
|
|
|
|
TROOP TRANSPORT
|
|
|
|
TONNAGE: 4000 TO 17000 TONS
|
|
MAX SPEED: 8 TO 17 KNOTS
|
|
MAIN GUNS: NONE TO FOUR 3" TO 5" GUNS
|
|
ARMOR: NONE
|
|
ASW WEAPONS: NONE
|
|
TORPS TO SINK: 1 TO 3 VARIES WITH SIZE
|
|
RADAR RANGE: 6000 TO 11000 YDS IF SMALL, 10000 TO 19000 YARDS IF
|
|
LARGE
|
|
|
|
|
|
JAPANESE TROOP TRANSPORTS CAME IN ALL TYPES AND SIZES. SOME WERE
|
|
CONVERTED PASSENGER BUT MANY WERE FREIGHTERS WITH CARGO SPACE
|
|
CONVERTED INTO BUNK AREAS. MOST CARRIED AMMUNITION AND STORES FOR
|
|
THE TROOPS ON BOARD, MAKING THEM QUITE VULNERABLE WHEN LOADED.
|
|
|
|
OIL TANKER
|
|
|
|
TONNAGE: 2000 TO 16000 TONS
|
|
MAX SPEED 6 TO 14 KNOTS
|
|
MAIN GUNS: NONE TO TWO 3" TO 5" GUNS
|
|
ARMOR: NONE
|
|
ASW WEAPONS: NONE
|
|
TORPS TO SINK: 1 TO 3 VARIES WITH SIZE, MORE IF EMPTY
|
|
RADAR RANGE: 5000 TO 10000 YDS IF SMALL, 10000 TO 19000 YARDS IF
|
|
LARGE
|
|
|
|
|
|
JAPANESE OIL TANKERS CAME IN ALL SIZES. ALTHOUGH SMALLER ONES
|
|
PREDOMINATED DURING WWII. TANKERS WERE VERY VULNERABLE WHEN
|
|
LOADED, ESPECIALLY SINCE MANY JAPANESE-CONTROLL OIL AREAS (SUCH AS
|
|
BRUNEI) PRODUCED HIGH-GRADE CRUDE THAT COULD BE TRANSPORTED AND
|
|
USED WITHOUT REFINING. UNFORTUNATELY, THIS OIL CONTAINED AN
|
|
UNUSUALLY HIGH CONCENTRATION OF VOLATILE GASES, RESULTING IN
|
|
SPECTACULAR EXPLOSIONS WITH A TORPEDO HIT IGNITED THEM. HOWEVER,
|
|
AN EMPTY OIL TANKER WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO SINK, SINCE A PUNCTURED
|
|
TANK COULD BE SEALED OFF AND TREATED LIKE A FULL ONE (A TANK
|
|
FILLED WITH WATER IS NOT UNLIKE A TANK FILLED WITH OIL!).
|
|
|
|
CONVERTED FACTORY SHIP
|
|
|
|
TONNAGE: 15000 TO 20000 TONS
|
|
MAX SPEED: 8 TO 16 KNOTS
|
|
MAIN GUNS: USUALLY TWO TO SIX 4.7" OR 5" GUNS
|
|
ARMOR: NONE
|
|
ASW WEAPONS: NONE
|
|
TORPS TO SINK: 2 TO 4, MORE IF EMPTY
|
|
RADAR RANGE: 10000 TO 20000 YDS
|
|
|
|
|
|
120
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
121
|
|
|
|
|
|
GIANT JAPANESE WHALING FACTORY SHIPS AND SIMILAR VESSELS WERE
|
|
CONVERTED DURING WWII TO A VARIETY OF DUTIES, BUT OIL TRANSPORT
|
|
WAS THE MOST COMMON. THE ABOVE DATA IS BASED ON AN OIL TANKER
|
|
CONVERSION. BECAUSE OF THEIR LARGE SIZE, THE SHIPS WERE USUALLY
|
|
WELL ARMED.
|
|
|
|
LARGE FREIGHTERS
|
|
|
|
TONNAGE: 7000 TO 18000 TONS
|
|
MAX SPEED: 6 TO 15 KNOTS
|
|
MAIN GUNS: NONE TO FOUR 3" TO 5" GUNS
|
|
ARMOR: NONE
|
|
ASW WEAPONS: NONE
|
|
TORPS TO SINK: 2 OR 3, MORE IF LOADED BULK CARRIER
|
|
RADAR RANGE: 7000 TO 20000 YARDS
|
|
|
|
JAPANESE FREIGHTERS CARRIED RAW MATERIAL IN BULK, FOOD AND MILI-
|
|
TARY STORES OF ALL TYPES, INCLUDING HIGHLY VOLATILE AMMUNITION OR
|
|
GASOLINE (FOR GROUND VEHICLES AND AIRCRAFT). BULK AND STORES
|
|
CARRIERS ARE NOT ESPECIALLY VULNERABLE WHEN LOADED. IN FACT, BULK
|
|
CARRIERS ARE SOMEWHAT LESS VULNERABLE WHEN LOADED. HOWEVER, AMMO
|
|
AND GASOLINE SHIPS ALMOST ALWAYS SINK AFTER THE FIRST HIT IF
|
|
LOADED.
|
|
|
|
SMALL FREIGHTERS
|
|
|
|
TONNAGE: 1000 TO 8000 TONS
|
|
MAX SPEED: 6 TO 14 KNOTS
|
|
MAIN GUNS: NONE TO FOUR 3" TO 5" GUNS
|
|
ARMOR: NONE
|
|
ASW WEAPONS: NONE
|
|
TORPS TO SINK: 1 OR 2, MORE IF LOADED BULK CARRIER
|
|
RADAR RANGE: 4000 TO 15000 YARDS
|
|
|
|
MANY JAPANESE FREIGHTERS WERE SMALLER SIZED. LIKE THE LARGER ONES,
|
|
THEY CARRIED BULK RAW MATERIALS, STORES AND EQUIPMENT OF ALL
|
|
TYPES, AND SOMETIMES AMMO AND GASOLINE. IT WAS NOT EASY TO ESTI-
|
|
MATE DISPLACEMENT BASED ON SIZE, SINCE MANY DID NOT APPEAR SIGNIF-
|
|
ICANTLY SMALLER THAN THE LARGER ONES.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
121
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
122
|
|
|
|
|
|
5 APPENDIX
|
|
|
|
DESIGN NOTES
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SILENT SERVICE II WAS THE BRAINCHILD OF BILL STEALEY, MICROPROSE'S
|
|
PRESIDENT. BACK IN 1985 SID MEIER'S ORIGINAL SILENT SERVICE WAS A
|
|
SMASH BESTSELLER FOR VARIOUS 8-BIT COMPUTERS, SUCH AS THE ATARI
|
|
800, COMMODORE C-64 AND APPLE II. IN 1990 THE COMMON MICROCOMPUT-
|
|
ER IS A 16 BIT MACHINE WITH MORE MEMORY, COMPUTING HORSEPOWER, AND
|
|
DISK SPACE. WE WANTED TO EXPLOIT THIS GREATER POWER TO MAKE
|
|
SILENT SERVICE INTO SOMETHING BIGGER AND BETTER THAN ITS ILLUSTRI-
|
|
OUS ANCESTOR.
|
|
|
|
IN LATE SUMMER 1989 THE CREATIVE TEAM ASSEMBLED IN MPS LABS.
|
|
LEAD PROGRAMMER ROY GIBSON AND ARTIST KIM BISCOE WERE BOTH BRIT-
|
|
ISH, WHICH LEFT AN AIR OF INTERNATIONALISM IN A GAME ABOUT AMERI-
|
|
CAN SUBMARINES FIGHTING THE JAPANESE ALONG THE PACIFIC RIM!
|
|
ORIGINALLY THE GAME DESIGNER/PROJECT MANAGER WAS BRUCE SHELLEY,
|
|
WHO DID MUCH OF THE ORIGINAL BRAINSTORMING AND RESEARCH WITH ROY.
|
|
HOWEVER, THE RAILROAD TYCOON PROJECT DERAILED HIS TIME AND ARNOLD
|
|
HENDRICK TOOK OVER IN MIDSTREAM. ARNOLD FINISHED UP THE HISTORICAL
|
|
KNIT-PICKING, WROTE THE MANUAL, AND GENTLY ENCOURAGED ROY AND KIM
|
|
TO FINISH THE PROJECT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. RUMORS THAT HE
|
|
CARRIED A BASEBALL BAT TO TIMETABLE MEETINGS ARE COMPLETELY UN-
|
|
FOUNDED, AS ARE THE RUMORS THAT MICROPROSE'S HIGHER MANAGEMENT
|
|
WISHED HE DID!
|
|
|
|
THE GREATEST TECHNOLOGICAL FEAT IN SILENT SERVICE II IS THE HIGHLY
|
|
REALISTIC PRESENTATION OF ENEMY SHIPS. WE ORIGINALLY WANTED
|
|
DIFFERENT PICTURES FOR EVERY TYPE OF WARSHIP IN THE IMPERIAL
|
|
JAPANESE NAVY (IJN). BRUCE AND ROY COMBED :THE US NAVAL ARCHIVES
|
|
SEARCHING FOR DETAILED VIEWS. WITH THE KIND HELP OF LIBRARIAN
|
|
KATHY LLOYD WE TRIED ACTUAL WWII SHIP RECOGNITION BOOKS, BUT FOUND
|
|
THEM INFERIOR TO A MAGNIFICENT RESOURCE ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF WASH-
|
|
INGTON D.C. THIS WAS DON MONTGOMERY, WHO SPENT YEARS MODELLING
|
|
EVERY WARSHIP OF THE
|
|
|
|
122
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
123
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
IJN IN 1/700 SCALE. WHEN PHOTOGRAPHED FROM PERISCOPE PERSPECTIVE,
|
|
THESE :MODELS MADE SUPERLATIVE "RAW MATERIAL" FOR ARTIST KIM
|
|
BISCOE. AFTER EXTENSIVE ARTWORK TIED TO COMPLEX SCALING ALGORITHMS
|
|
BUILT BY ACE "TOOL-MAKER" DAVE MCKIBBIN, WE ACHIEVED SCREEN IMAGES
|
|
THAT CLOSELY MATCH WHAT REAL SUBMARINERS SAW THROUGH BINOCULARS OR
|
|
PERISCOPES.
|
|
|
|
OF COURSE, THE GAME DEVELOPMENT HAD MANY OTHER TRIUMPHS. WE EX-
|
|
PLOITED THE ADDITIONAL POWER OF 16-BIT MICROCOMPUTERS TO COMPLETE-
|
|
LY REWORK ALL THE BATTLE LOGIC, ADDING MORE DETAIL AND REALISM. WE
|
|
EXPECTED THE PLAY TEST DEPARTMENT TO COMPLAIN ABOUT THE NEW FEA-
|
|
TURES. INSTEAD, THEY URGED ON US EVEN MORE! THE ORIGINAL SILENT
|
|
SERVICE WAS AN OLD FAVORITE: EVERYBODY HAD IDEAS ON HOW TO IMPROVE
|
|
IT. SOON OUR PROBLEM WAS NOT WHAT TO INCLUDE, BUT WHAT WE WERE
|
|
OBLIGED TO LEAVE OUT!
|
|
|
|
SILENT SERVICE II IS A FINE GAME IN ANY 16-BIT COMPUTER ENVIRON-
|
|
MENT, HOWEVER, WE'D LIKE TO ESPECIALLY RECOMMEND IT FOR IBM MCGA
|
|
AND VGA 256- COLOR GRAPHICS (ALL PS/2S OR ANY MACHINE WITH A VGA
|
|
BOARD AND MONITOR). IT IS ONE OF THE FIRST SIMULATIONS DESIGNED TO
|
|
TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF 256-COLOR GRAPHICS. THE RESULTS ARE ABSO-
|
|
LUTELY AMAZING. ENHANCING AN IBM'S SOUND SYSTEM WITH ONE OF THE
|
|
ADD-ON BOARDS WE SUPPORT IS ALSO A GOOD IDEA.
|
|
|
|
IN THE FINAL STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT, WHILE PLAYING SILENT SERVICE
|
|
II, WE FOUND OURSELVES TRANSPORTED MENTALLY TO A TIME 50 YEARS
|
|
AGO, WHEN SMALL BANDS OF BRAVE MEN SET SAIL OVER THOUSANDS OF
|
|
MILES TO CHALLENGE THE MIGHT OF A SEEMINGLY INVINCIBLE EMPIRE.
|
|
TODAY AMERICA'S VICTORY IS TAKEN FOR GRANTED. BUT IT TOOK BRAVE
|
|
MEN TO STRUGGLE PAST THE FIRST DISASTERS AND DEFEATS, THEN EVENTU-
|
|
ALLY EMERGE VICTORIOUS. IN SILENT SERVICE II YOU'RE ONE OF THAT
|
|
BAND OF HEROES, SETTING SAIL TO VICTORY AND ETERNAL GLORY.
|
|
|
|
A NOTE ABOUT WAR
|
|
|
|
WAR IS PERHAPS THE MOST UNPLEASANT ATTRIBUTE OF THE HUMAN RACE.
|
|
HISTORIANS CAN LIST LITERALLY THOUSANDS OF WARS. CAUSES AND
|
|
RESULTS ARE LEGION, THE AMOUNT OF DEATH AND SUFFERING UNIMAGIN-
|
|
ABLE. WE AMERICANS SOMETIMES FORGET THIS BECAUSE IT'S BEEN 125
|
|
YEARS SINCE WAR HAS DEVASTATED OUR OWN LAND. SINCE THEN WE'VE
|
|
ALWAYS FOUGHT OVERSEAS. ON THE OTHER HAND, MEN (AND A FEW WOMEN)
|
|
ARE FASCINATED BY WARFARE, BY THE EXTREME RISKS AND SOMETIMES
|
|
WORLD-SHAKING RESULTS. YOUNG MEN ARE ESPECIALLY ENTRANCED BY TALES
|
|
OF ADVENTURE AND BRAVERY.
|
|
|
|
MANY MICROPROSE SIMULATIONS DEAL WITH WARFARE. IN A SIMULATION
|
|
YOU CAN VICARIOUSLY EXPERIENCE THE THRILLS OF WARFARE AND THE
|
|
RESPONSIBILITIES OF BATTLE-
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
123
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
124
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
FIELD COMMAND WITHOUT ANYONE GETTING HURT, MUCH LESS KILLED. BUT
|
|
ALWAYS REMEMBER THAT THE REAL THING IS UNIMAGINABLY HORRIBLE, FULL
|
|
OF PAIN AND DEATH. SIMULATIONS ARE DECEIVING BECAUSE WE "EDIT OUT"
|
|
THE UNPLEASANT PARTS!
|
|
|
|
IT IS ALSO WORTH MENTIONING THAT JAPAN LEARNED A GREAT DEAL FROM
|
|
WWII. JAPAN HAS RENOUNCED THE USE OF MILITARY POWER AS AN INSTRU-
|
|
MENT OF FOREIGN POLICY. ITS ARMED FORCES ARE PURELY TO GUARD ITS
|
|
OWN BORDERS, AND ARE DELIBERATELY KEPT SMALL. THE OFFICER CORPS
|
|
ITSELF HAS A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT ATTITUDE FROM THE OVERCONFIDENT
|
|
RADICAL-RIGHTISTS WHO TOOK OVER THE GOVERNMENT IN THE 1920S AND
|
|
'30S. EVEN WHEN PROVOKED BY JAPAN'S MOST FAMOUS AND
|
|
POPULAR AUTHOR (MISHIMA), THEY REFUSED TO INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN
|
|
POLITICS. THE JAPAN OF TODAY IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM THE JAPAN OF
|
|
1941.
|
|
|
|
FURTHER READING
|
|
GENERAL HISTORIES
|
|
|
|
THE ARE MAY EXCELLENT SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT AMERICAN SUBMA-
|
|
RINES IN THE PACIFIC DURING WWII. AS WITH ALL HISTORY, REMEMBER
|
|
THAT EACH WRITER HAS OPINIONS AND A VIEW POINT WHICH COLORS WHAT
|
|
HE PRESENTS.
|
|
|
|
THE PACIFIC WAR 1941-1945 BY JOHN COSTELLO. THIS IS AN EXCELLENT
|
|
ONE-VOLUME ACCOUNT THAT GIVES EQUAL WEIGHT AND CONSIDERABLE DETAIL
|
|
TO ALL NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, INCLUDING JAPANESE, CHINESE AND
|
|
BRITISH, RATHER THAN THE RAHRAH-AMERICA STUFF USUALLY FOUND IN THE
|
|
USA. WHILE EXCELLENT FOR THE ENTIRE WAR, THE BOOK DOESN'T INCLUDE
|
|
MUCH ABOUT SUBMARINES PER SE.
|
|
|
|
THE SILENT VICTORY BY CLAY BLAIR, JR,, IS THE SINGLE BEST HISTORY
|
|
OF AMERICAN WWII SUBMARINES. IT COVERS ALL THE EVENTS, PERSONALI-
|
|
TIES, AND INDIVIDUAL PATROLS IN EXHAUSTIVE DETAIL. ALTHOUGH A
|
|
SUBMARINER HIMSELF, BLAIR IS REMARKABLY IMPARTIAL AND QUITE ENJOY-
|
|
ABLE TO READ. UNFORTUNATELY, AS WITH MANY SUPERLATIVE HISTORY
|
|
BOOKS, THE HARDCOVER VERSION IS NOW OUT OF PRINT.
|
|
|
|
US SUBMARINE OPERATIONS IN WWII BY THEODORE ROSCOE IS A DETAILED
|
|
OPERATIONAL HISTORY WITH SOME VERY USEFUL APPENDICES. WRITTEN
|
|
SHORTLY AFTER THE WAR, IT IS AN OFFICIAL HISTORY IN ALL BUT NAME,
|
|
AND EXTREMELY LAUDATORY TO THE US NAVY IN GENERAL, ITS OFFICERS,
|
|
AND ESPECIALLY THE MEN OF ITS SUBMARINE SERVICE. ALTHOUGH IT'S
|
|
GREAT READING, DON'T EXPECT A BALANCED VIEWPOINT.
|
|
|
|
HISTORY OF US NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WWII BY S.E. MORISON IS THE
|
|
CLASSIC 15-VOLUME HISTORY OF THE US NAVY. MORISON WAS ONE OF
|
|
AMERICA'S FINEST HISTORIANS AND AN EXCELLENT WRITER. IF YOU DON'T
|
|
WANT TO TACKLE ALL 15 VOLUMES, HE HAS A SUPERBLY READABLE ONE-
|
|
VOLUME SUMMARY TITLED THE TWO-OCEAN WAR.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
124
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
125
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
TECHNICAL SOURCES
|
|
|
|
FINDING DATA AND STATISTICS BOOKS TAKES TIME. MANY ARE OUT OF
|
|
PRINT, AND MOST LIBRARIES DON'T CARRY THEM. FORTUNATELY WE HAD
|
|
ACCESS TO VARIOUS LARGE PRIVATE COLLECTIONS. AMONG THE BEST BOOKS
|
|
WE ENCOUNTERED WERE THESE:
|
|
|
|
WARSHIPS OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY, 1869-1945 BY JETSCHURA,
|
|
JUNG AND MICKEL. TRANSLATED FROM GERMAN AND PUBLISHED BY THE US
|
|
NAVAL INSTITUTE, THIS IS THE SINGLE BEST VOLUME FOR DATA ON EVERY
|
|
JAPANESE WARSHIP, GIVEN IN EXHAUSTIVE DETAIL.
|
|
|
|
US WARSHIPS OF WORLD WAR II BY PAUL SILVERSTONE. ORIGINALLY PUB-
|
|
LISHED IN BRITAIN, THIS HANDY VOLUME PROVIDES BASIC DATA ON THE
|
|
HUGE US WWII FLEET, INCLUDING ITS SUBMARINES. SIMILAR VOLUMES BY
|
|
VARIOUS AUTHORS COVER OTHER WWII FLEETS. UNFORTUNATELY, ALL ARE
|
|
NOW OUT OF PRINT.
|
|
|
|
US SUBS IN ACTION BY ROBERT C. STERN. THIS SQUADRON/SIGNAL BOOK
|
|
WAS INTENDED FOR MODELERS, BUT INCLUDES A WEALTH OF ILLUSTRATIONS
|
|
AND VISUAL DETAIL THAT AIDED US IN DUPLICATION THE "LOOK" OF US
|
|
SUBMARINES.
|
|
|
|
USS TORSK. WE REPEATEDLY VISITED THIS TENCH-CLASS SUBMARINE (A
|
|
REAL BOAT!) AND USED ITS EQUIPMENT AS A MODEL FOR THAT SHOWN IN
|
|
THE GAME. WE TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THAT THE TENCH CLASS HAS REFINE-
|
|
MENTS NOT AVAILABLE ON EARLIER CLASSES.
|
|
|
|
OTHER BOOKS
|
|
|
|
CLEAR THE BRIDGE BY RICHARD H. O'KANE. THIS IS A VERY INTERESTING
|
|
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL ACCOUNT OF O'KANE'S COMMAND OF THE USS TANG
|
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DURING HER FIVE WAR PATROLS, IN WHICH THE BOAT EARNED TWO PRESI-
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DENTIAL UNIT CITATIONS AND HER SKIPPER THE MEDAL OF HONOR.
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WAHOO BY RICHARD O'KANE. THIS IS A HISTORY OF THE USS WAHOO'S WAR
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PATROLS UNDER THE COMMAND OF "MUSH" MORTON. O'KANE WAS EXECUTIVE
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OFFICER (SECOND IN COMMAND) FOR MANY OF THESE, AND THEREFORE
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WRITES FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE.
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TAKE HER DEEP BY L.J.GALANTIN RECOUNTS THE WAR PATROLS OF THE USS
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HALIBUT UNDER HIS COMMAND. IT PROVIDES AN EXCELLENT INSIGHT INTO
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"AVERAGE" WAR PATROLS UNDER A "MERELY" COMPETENT SKIPPER.
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COMPARING GALANTIN TO O'KANE PROVIDES INTERESTING INSIGHTS INTO
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WHAT MAKES A REALLY GREAT SUB SKIPPER: PERSONALITY, SKILL OR
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LUCK?
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SHINANO! BY JOSEPH F. ENRIGHT RECOUNTS THE FIRST AND FINAL VOYAGE
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OF THAT AIRCRAFT CARRIER, AND HOW THE ARCHERFISH SANK HER. WHAT
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THE BOOK DOESN'T REVEAL IS THAT THIS WAS ENRIGHT'S ONLY BIG SCORE
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FOR THE ENTIRE WAR, DESPITE NUMEROUS WAR PATROLS.
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125
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126
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BOWFIN BY E.P.HOYT DETAILS THE WAR PATROLS OF THAT BOAT. HOYT HAS
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WRITTEN TONS OF WWII BOOKS, INCLUDING LOTS ABOUT SUBMARINES.
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HOWEVER, MUCH OF HIS WORK IS DERIVATIVE.
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RUN SILENT, RUN DEEP BY EDWARD BEACH, A WWII SUB SKIPPER, IS
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FICTION. THE BOOK IS WELL WRITTEN, EXCITING AND TECHNICALLY
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ACCURATE. THE NOVEL COMBINES IN ONE CHARACTER ALL THE GREAT US
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SUB SKIPPERS OF THE WAR. IT'S VERY HIGHLY RECOMMENDED.
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WAR UNDER THE PACIFIC BY KEITH WHEELER IS A TIME-LIFE "PICTURE
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BOOK", ONE OF A SUBSCRIPTION SERIES. ITS MANY PHOTOGRAPHS HELPED
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INSPIRE US ALL, ESPECIALLY ARTIST KIM BISCOE. WE RECOMMEND IT FOR
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A "VISUAL FEEL" OF THE PERIOD, INCLUDING THE ERA, MEN, THE BOATS,
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AND THE BATTLES.
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ARNOLD HENDRICK, MAY 1990
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126
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127
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CREDITS
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GAME DESIGN
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ARNOLD HENDRICK AND ROY GIBSON
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BASED ON THE ORIGINAL SILENT SERVICE BY
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SID MEIER
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PROGRAMMING
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ROY GIBSON
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GRAPHICS
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KIM BISCOE
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MUSIC & SOUND EFFECTS
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KEN LAGACE AND JIM MCCONKEY
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WITH THEME MUSIC COMPOSED BY
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DR. JEFFERY L. BRIGGS
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QUALITY ASSURANCE 'CHRIS TAORMINO, ELAN ROIREAU AND RUSSELL
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COONEY
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MANUAL
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WRITTEN BY ARNOLD HENDRICK
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DIRECTION & DESIGN BY LRIS IDOKOGI
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GRAPHICS BY BARBARA BENTS, MICHAEL REIS, LRIS IDOKOGI AND
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CHERI GLOVER
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LAYOUT BY MICHAEL REIS AND IRIS IDOKOGI
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CHAPTER ILLUSTRATIONS BY KEN ZARUBA
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PROJECT MANAGEMENT
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ARNOLD HENDRICK AND BRUCE SHELLEY
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PACKAGE DESIGN
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CREATIVE DIRECTION BY MARK CIOLA
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WITH JOHN EMORY, JUANITA BUSSARD AND JACK KAMMER
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PHOTOGRAPHY BY FREDERICK SUTTER PHOTOGRAPHY
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BASED ON COMPUTER ART BY KIM BISCOE
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SPECIAL THANKS TO...
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USS TORSK, BALTIMORE MARITIME MUSEUM.
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KATHY LLOYD, LIBRARIAN OF THE OPERATIONAL ARCHIVES AT THE
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WASHINGTON NAVY YARD.
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DON MONTGOMERY, MASTER MODELER.
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OPTIONS BACKDROP COURTESY OF THE ESTATE OF FRED FREEMAN,
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CMDR, USN (RET).
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THE JET OF INC FOR PUTTING THESE DOX IN COMPUTER FORMAT
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127
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=
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X-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-X
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Another file downloaded from: The NIRVANAnet(tm) Seven
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& the Temple of the Screaming Electron Taipan Enigma 510/935-5845
|
|
Burn This Flag Zardoz 408/363-9766
|
|
realitycheck Poindexter Fortran 510/527-1662
|
|
Lies Unlimited Mick Freen 801/278-2699
|
|
The New Dork Sublime Biffnix 415/864-DORK
|
|
The Shrine Rif Raf 206/794-6674
|
|
Planet Mirth Simon Jester 510/786-6560
|
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|
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"Raw Data for Raw Nerves"
|
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X-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-X
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