169 lines
9.3 KiB
Plaintext
169 lines
9.3 KiB
Plaintext
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CPID/ANI Developments
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The introduction of calling number identification and delivery
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services over the past two years, first by the interexchange carriers
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and now the LECs, have not been the only developments to provoke
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concern over telecommunications-related privacy issues. Growth in the
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use of analog wireless services and, of course, the burst in "junk
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calling" made economical by recent long distance rate reductions are
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certainly also factors. But the new Caller*ID and ANI delivery
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services share primary responsibility for the unprecedented level of
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state and federal legislative and regulatory activity seeking to
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strengthen all forms of privacy protection. Because of the ease of
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public access to state regulatory forums and the high profile
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currently enjoyed by telecommunications generally, the telephone
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industry -- much more so than, for example, the direct mailers, the
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credit/collection industries, or other personal data manupulators --
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has become the focal point of public criticism concerning issues
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affecting perceived personal privacy. This is, without question, a
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good and healthy development, perhaps even long overdue.
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The telcos' recent cavalier attempts to introduce new caller
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identification services as though "nothing has changed" now face
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hostile challenges, even adverse backlash, with potential technical
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and disappointing economic consequences. For example, network
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technology and new revenue generating applications are being
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threatened by popular but naive state and federal proposals which
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would mandate calling number blocking at the caller's option while
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refusing to recognize that this solution is not technically feasible
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with most forms of CPID delivery -- not even with the most
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sophisticated ISDN-based delivery methods. (ISDN protocol allows for
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the insertion of a "privacy code" in the data stream, but nevertheless
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delivers the private data across the network on the presumption that
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the receipient will honor the "code".)
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Although Caller*ID and other similar Calling Party Identification
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(CPID) services so far have been approved in more jurisdictions than
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have turned them down, it is apparent that momentum is building
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against their deployment, at least in their intended mode -- that is,
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on a universal, nonoptional basis without number blocking. The
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proponents of ubiquitous CPID delivery appear to be at a loss to come
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up with a publicly acceptable yet cost effective technical or
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alternative service solution to the publics' privacy concerns which
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would not also substantially undermine CPID functionality and its
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commercial and private utility.
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Specifically, the public's privacy concerns seem to have settled on
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the three obviious: (1) protection of the caller's need or desire
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under particular calling circumstances not to disclose the number from
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which his/her call is originating; (2) a perceived telephone company
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duty to avoid all forms of unwarranted number disclosure on behalf of
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those who have subscribed to and rely on nonpublished and unlisted
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telephone number service; and (3) control over the use and
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dissemination of CPID information delivered over the network.
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But despite its best intentions, to date CPID proponents have been
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able to agree only on the following meager suggestions: (1) promotion
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of the use of telephones, calling card and local operator services as
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means by which callers can avoid disclosing their telephone number;
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and (2) help agencies and institutions requiring protection against
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number disclosure or unwanted "call backs" should order service from a
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designated local exchange set aside by the LEC to guarantee number
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anonymity, or subscribe to so-called outward-only exchange services.
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(While the US West operating companies have acquiesed to requiring
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nondisclosure agreements from noncarrier recipients of CPID
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information as a method of containing abuse, this practice is far from
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considered acceptable by the carrier industry generally.)
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The first set of alternatives leaves an impression of arrogance and
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insensitivity to the practical needs and circumstances of callers
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desiring number anonymity. The second alternatives are not
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universally available and will involve added line costs to the help
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agencies. As for controls limiting re-use and resale of network
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generated information, the CPID providers fear that these would
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undermine the usefulness of CPID information to a large segment of the
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potential commercial market.
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Calling number blocking is surfacing as everyone's suggested answer to
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the number anonymity problem. While both selective call-by-call or
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calling line number blocking on all calls are technically feasible,
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they tend to deminish the utility of CPID services for present and
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planned applications. However, CPID proponents appear willing to
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accept very limited blocking provided it is extended only to certain
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categories of customers and call-based help services, such as hot
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lines. But this solution could prove impossible to administer and
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might even be unlawfully discriminatory under existing regulatory
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statutes.
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The lack of significant progress after nearly two years of wrestling
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with the CPID privacy issues suggests the need to exhaust and possibly
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mandate nontechnical approaches. These might include the following:
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First, there should be strict institutional controls limiting the use
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of CPID and other telephone generated data and information, and
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restricting telemarketing call practices. Such controls could be
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industry self-administered or, if this proves to be ineffective, they
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could be prescribed by regulators and set forth in the telcos'
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exchange tariffs. In either case, consensus on specific conduct
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guidelines will not be reached among industry participants alone
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without the intervention of either legislators or regulators. Thus,
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it behooves the CPID advocates -- both providers and potential users --
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to move in this direction and embrace outside intervention in
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developing a code of conduct quickly, before short-sighted technical
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restraints or other absolute prohibitions are immposed and become
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irreversible.
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Second, there should be a widespread CPID public awareness campaign
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sponsored by CPID providers and supported by all commercial users of
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such services and those who manufacture or sell products capable of
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receiving or capturing CPID data.
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Third, the industry should adopt a simple, universally recognisible
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symbol (such as the asterick) which can be printed in association with
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the publication or other promotion of any telephone number which is
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equipped to capture CPID information. The purpose of this symbol
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would be to alert callers that their number or other network
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identifiable information might be captured or recognized by the called
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party. It would appear in directories and in all ads or other
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promotions involving display of numbers equipped to receive CPID
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information.
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Finally, if and where CPID blocking is prescribed, it should be
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offered only to existing subscribers and only for a reasonable
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transitional period. Blocking should not be offered to new or changed
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subscribers, and should be phasessd out for grandfathered subscribers
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after a reasonable period has been allowed for all customers to become
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familiar with the fact that new and evolving telecommunications
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capabilities and services can no longer assure number anonymity. (New
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and relocating subscribers would be informed that there can no longer
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be an automatic expectation of caller anonymity with normal uses of
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the telephone network.)
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Meanwhile, the publicity evoked by Caller*ID has had a multiplier
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effect. It has stimulated public policy debate, first at the state
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and now the federal level, on telecommuications privacy issues
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extending beyond just the original question of caller anonymity.
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This, in turn, has resulted in an unprecedented number of legislative
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and regulatory proposals and even judicial proceedings which , if not
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effectively addressed by knowledgeable and interested parties, could
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lead to a patch quilt of unworkable or ineffective new laws and
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regulations which fall short of satisfying either sides' best
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interests and which could have unintended and disappointing results.
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The most recent step targeted at curbing the spread of CPID/ANI
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deployment without controls was the introduction of Senate Bill S.
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2030 by Senator Kohl (D.WI) referred to as the "Telephone Privacy Act
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of 1990". This bill would amend The Electronic Privacy Act of l986 to
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require that any provider of telephone services which include a caller
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identification delivery capability must also furnish, at no additional
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charge, the capability for the caller to prevent the "dissemination of
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their telephone numbers to persons of their choosing." Civil remedies
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would be made available to persons aggrieved by violations of the new
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law. According to Senator Kohl, the purpose of the bill is not to
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curb technology, but to open debate on telecommunications-related
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privacy issues generally.
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Moving in this same direction, Dr. Bonnie Guiton, Special Advisor to
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the President on Consumer Affairs, has convened a task force of
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industry representatives, known as the Privacy in Telecommunications
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Working Group, to make recommendations to how to proceed in this
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emerging privacy area. (I have been invited as a member of the task
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group). While the Kohl Bill and CPID/ANI issues generally fall within
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the scope of the task force assignment, it will address all areas of
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telecommunications privacy-related matters.
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