122 lines
5.4 KiB
Plaintext
122 lines
5.4 KiB
Plaintext
14 Digit Hacking
|
||
|
||
|
||
Well boys and girls, it would seem my predictions of increased
|
||
telco security has come true. In 1986 I predicted that within 2
|
||
years all of the telcos would move to the 14 digit format. This
|
||
because of their inability to protect their systems from us -
|
||
phreaks. Take Heart!! We're not dead yet.
|
||
|
||
Those of you who have read my book, The Phreaker's Handbook or
|
||
Phreak's Long Distance Phone Thieves have a handle on what's
|
||
up. This is the news on increased telcom security as of Oct 1987.
|
||
|
||
Allnet
|
||
|
||
Allnet is going hog wild with their new software analysis
|
||
package. They've cut the maximum amount of time you can stay on a
|
||
code down to three days. It depends on when you whack it. They do
|
||
not run the software on Fri, Sat, or Sun. So if you whack the
|
||
code on Friday, it will stay good until Monday around 1 P.M.
|
||
Pacific Standard Time. If you bang them during the week, you'll
|
||
lose the code in less than 24 hours.
|
||
|
||
Mci
|
||
|
||
If your first love was the 5 digit Mci Node, say bye bye. They
|
||
are slowly dismantling the local dialup network and keeping the
|
||
950-0222 nodes which incidentally are 14 digit At&t 0+ format.
|
||
In the last year my return rates have dropped from 5 per hundred
|
||
to 1 per 300. Rather pathetic. And that was multinode, multi
|
||
destination hacking. Incidentally, another one of my innovations
|
||
that came about in May of 1986 when they installed the first
|
||
version of the monitoring software.
|
||
|
||
Sprint
|
||
|
||
You can start kissing off those 9 digit codes. Sprint's new FON
|
||
system is totally 14 digits and can only be accessed thru an 800
|
||
number. For which there is a 55 cent surcharge most of which goes
|
||
to At&t. Sprint is going to let Ma Bell provide their security
|
||
for them. They say they aren't going to issue the 9 digit codes
|
||
anymore. They aren't killing all the codes at once though. We
|
||
still have time to play with Sprint. I think they're going to
|
||
kick back and see what they results of the FON project. If for no
|
||
reason other than the expense of 55cents just for the privilege
|
||
of placing a call, I recommend everyone discontinue their Sprint
|
||
accounts and go to another company. Incidentally, the "increased
|
||
quality" of the new fiber optic network can't be that great when
|
||
you consider that you have to connect and downconnect to your
|
||
destination on the hold copper wire networks owned by your local
|
||
telco. Hardly worth 55 cents.
|
||
|
||
Metrophone
|
||
|
||
I know of no one who's gotten a code off of Metro in over a year.
|
||
This used to be the whore of the networks. She never said no. Now
|
||
she never says yes.
|
||
|
||
Skyline (mci)
|
||
|
||
950-1088 I've seen codes posted in remote areas for this service.
|
||
Have not heard of, or been able to bag one code in the large
|
||
metro areas. Mci appears to be killing this node and routing to
|
||
the 1022 node again 14 digits.
|
||
|
||
|
||
The problem of whacking 14 digit codes is that of possibilities.
|
||
There are 14x14 possible combinations of numbers. This makes it
|
||
practically, which any predictable regularity to hack out the
|
||
code. We can resort to that old standard (created by me) of
|
||
prefix hacking. The attached file is for the entire Southern
|
||
California Area. It includes the area code and prefixes used
|
||
here. They are all valid and courtesy of Pacific and General
|
||
Telephone companies. These 6 digits will reduce the possibilities
|
||
down to 8x8. This is a pain in the ass, but it is possible.
|
||
This scenario will work with any telco that uses valid phone
|
||
numbers as part of the code. DO NOT HACK YOUR LOCAL TELCO OR AT&T
|
||
unless you're equipped to do it from a fortress phone (pay
|
||
phone). Ess will pick up your actions at you'll have a phone
|
||
truck in front of your house within 30 minutes. Trust me, I did
|
||
it, and a knew better too. Nothing came of it other than I went
|
||
in the bathroom and kicked myself in the ass for being so dumb!
|
||
|
||
I want you to think of the prefix file as a chain file. Add all
|
||
the prefixes in your local area to it, area codes too please.
|
||
In a couple of months I want to see this thing back in the
|
||
Southern California Area busting at the seams.
|
||
|
||
Ok, what do we do with those companies that use bastardized
|
||
routines for their codes. The Ustel format uses 527 for the 818
|
||
area. The new FON card uses 524 for 818. Both companies are now
|
||
owned by Sprint so we can see a similarity in the thought
|
||
processes here can't we? I'm starting a separate file with the
|
||
first six digits of the Fon Card and Another one for the Ustel.
|
||
US/Sprint is on the 9501033 node and uses the 0+ At&t format
|
||
I've your partial to 800's go for the Fon's. I personally leave
|
||
800's alone.
|
||
|
||
If you're inclined to cancel your Ustel or Sprint accounts, add
|
||
your first six digits to the list and put it back in the archive
|
||
file. This is the only way we're going to crack the bastards,
|
||
group effort at data collection.
|
||
|
||
There is one other possibility. The 14 digit code is the product
|
||
of a formula called a "hashing formula" By entering the first
|
||
10 digits of the card it will generate a 4 digit security code.
|
||
It also relates to the logical record location within the telco's
|
||
computer system. If anyone has this formula, and has no love for
|
||
the phone companies....get this sucker into circulation.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Good luck guys...more updates available as the news developes.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
Bobo T. Hacker
|
||
aka Robert Morgan.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|