1859 lines
100 KiB
Plaintext
1859 lines
100 KiB
Plaintext
[pp 38-40: Article from DIE ZEIT, 30 November 1984, by Thomas von Randow]
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Bildschirmtext: A Blow Against the System
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A Computer Club Discovers Breaches of Security in the Bundespost's BTX Program
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"Whoever hooks up to the BTX system in the next two to three years should be
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punished for stupidity." This withering assessment of the Bundespost's new
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service, Bildschirmtext, could be heard last week at the eighth conference of
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data protection specialists in Cologne--from an authoritative source. It was
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spoken by the chairman of the Association for Data Protection (GDD), the
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conference host, after he heard the comments of a computer entthusiast. With
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wit and a relaxed patter, Herwart ("Wau") Holland of Hamburg's "Chaos Computer
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Club" (CCC) explained how he and his 23-year-old fellow club member, Steffen
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Wern‚ry, had managed to take the Bildschirmtext service for a ride.
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It is easier to get a winning six-digit combination in the lottery than to
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illegally acquire the password of a BTX subscriber, Bildschirmtext experts at
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the Bundespost had boasted. But that is exactly what the computer chaotics did
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straight away. An error, in professional circles called a bug, in the system's
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computer program made it as simple as child's play for the hackers. Many
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Bildschirmtext users had already noticed that there was something wrong with
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the program.
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Suppliers compose full-screen images with information about what they have to
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offer--merchandise from the mail-order catalogue, vacations, account statements
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for bank customers, or simply letters to friends. These "pages" can then be
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called in by (authorized) BTX subscribers, and responses to the relevant
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questions--concerning a flight booking or a money transfer, for example--can be
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input at home on the keyboard of the BTX auxiliary unit.
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However, space on a television screen is limited, and the BTX page can hold
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only 1,626 characters. So that the designer knows during editing how many
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characters he has left on the page, this number is indicated at the bottom edge
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of the screen. Until recently, however, this number was wrong--programmers are
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notoriously poor at mental arithmetic. The page was full before the number of
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available characters reached zero. For this reason, many suppliers experienced
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a chaotic overflow of characters, something that should not happen.
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Suddenly, all sorts of words, numbers or incomprehensible letter sequences flit
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by on the screen. The reason for this character salad: The creators of the
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BTX program apparently forgot to take care of "trash disposal," i.e., to see to
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it that excess text be ignored by the program or somehow set aside. For that
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reason, the excess characters force parts of the program writer onto the
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screen, and they are, as the Hamburg hackers discovered, sometimes telling.
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Specifically, they sometimes reveal the very secret that a BTX subscriber must
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guard most closely, his identification code. This password is the key to
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access to the system. Although it cannot be used to plunder someone else's
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bank account, it is possible to cause a great deal of mischief. Merchandise
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can be ordered, vacations can be booked, magazine subscriptions can be entered.
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By agreement, the legal holder of the security code is liable for all damage
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thus incurred.
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Steffen Wern‚ry and his colleagues--the club is a registered subscriber--caused
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masses of BTX pages to overflow and then studied the ghostly characters on the
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screen. In so doing, they discovered "usd 70000," the password for Hamburger
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Sparkasse (Haspa). Now they were able to carry out what they had been planning
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for some time: an impressive demonstration of the inadequacies of
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Bildschirmtext. They set up a "contribution page." Suppliers may charge a
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type of protection fee or contribution for each call-in of their pages,
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although this fee cannot exceed DM 9.99. The account of the subscriber who
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calls in the page is automatically charged with the fee. With the Sparkasse
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password, the hackers now called in their own page--to the tune of DM 9.97.
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The idea was for this to occur repeatedly, which is why a home computer was
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programmed to automatically call in the page over and over again. It did its
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job well, and while the club members worked on other activities, the cash
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register rang every three seconds. From Saturday at 6:00 p.m. until Sunday at
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1:00 p.m., a total of DM 135,000 was credited to the club's account, money
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which they gladly returned to Haspa.
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Long before computers were popular, American students dubbed a type of trick
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using technology a "hack." Legendary is the hack of Captain Crunch, a student
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who took his name from a brand of breakfast cereal. Inside the box of this
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type of cereal was a small plastic whistle, that was coincidentally tuned to
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exactly 2,600 hertz. In the American telephone system, as Captain Crunch
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discovered, this frequency, when whistled into the microphone of the telephone
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receiver, caused a breakdown in the fee meter.
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Word of the trick with free long-distance calls soon spread; it made the cereal
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company rich and the telephone company poor. Or at any rate, it was in a
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difficult bind. A decision had to be made between accepting the loss, the
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amount of which was difficult to determine, and undertaking expensive technical
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changes in the continental network. Bell decided in favor of the second
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option.
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This type of blow against a computer system represents a wonderful triumph that
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goes far beyond the financial advantage associated with it; it is a liberating
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blow, which frees us for a few moments from the dominance of technology. In
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the 1930s, small-plot gardeners in Hamburg illuminated their houses free of
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charge. The supplier of electricity was the nearby antenna of a strong radio
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broadcaster, from which energy was diverted using a simple trap circuit to the
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lamps. For years, this hack went undetected--and once it was finally blown
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open, it elicited a fundamental legal debate: Are radio waves movable property
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under the meaning of the law?
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The trickster who thought up the hack with the first push-button pay phone by
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SEL just 10 years ago remained anonymous. For this, he used a piezoelectric
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lighter. Whoever wanted to make a free phone call simply went to a telephone
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booth with the SEL phone, inserted a five-mark piece and called his party. But
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before all the money was used up, the lighter had to be struck near the key
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pad. The spark from the lighter significantly disturbed the electronics and
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the phone was then forced to assume that the connection had not been made, and
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thus--in dubio pro comparticipte--the five-mark piece was returned. In all pay
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phones of that type, the logic boards had to be replaced.
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For the victim, the hack is not only annoying, it is generally an educational
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experience as well, revealing technical design flaws. Naturally, as the degree
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of complexity of the system increases, so does the potential for damage that
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can be inflicted even with the first hack. Thus, it is a wonder that the games
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played by BTX hackers have thus far been harmless. After all, they revealed
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the wretchedness of the Bildschirmtext design with a degree of clarity that
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leaves nothing to be desired.
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In BTX's country of origin, Great Britain, hackers made a game out of cracking
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Prince Philip's electronic mailbox. The BTX mailboxes are definitely oddly
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constructed. Bildschirmtext letters that have already been mailed can be
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rewritten later by the sender. Any mailbox can even be rendered fully
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inoperative. In order to do so, all that is required--as the Hamburg Chaos
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hackers also discovered--is that the command to repeat the entire call-in be
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placed at the end of a page edit. The page drawn up in this way then appears
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repeatedly. It also does so in the mailbox to which it is sent, the result
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being that nothing else can be retrieved from it. Only the Bundespost knows
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how to break up this vicious cycle.
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A microcomputer can also be connected to the Bildschirmtext system. But pity
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the poor soul who uses it to call in a crash program specialized for his type
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of machine. That will cause the computer to crash, destroying the programs
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loaded in its memory. The only thing that can be done then is to reboot. The
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destructive program is offered as a harmless Bildschirmtext page. Advanced
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hackers have even set them up as time bombs. It is only later, once the page--
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generally headed with silly sayings--is long forgotten that the machine breaks
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down, so that generally the cause can no longer be determined.
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The Bundespost should have learned its lesson long ago, before its pride and
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joy, Bildschirmtext, was dealt a resounding blow last week by the Sparkasse
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trick. The piecemeal adjustments that they undertook in the past after every
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announced BTX hack were apparently inadequate. A program that needs so much
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clearing up is hopelessly contaminated.
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Naturally, the Bundespost knows this, and it grieves them in particular because
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BTX had just overcome the last political hurdle on the path to being
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universally introduced. It also hurts since there is already a dearth of
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interest in the new medium of communication. According to predictions by the
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Ministry, BTX should have around 150,000 subscribers by now. In reality, that
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figure is only a scant 19,000, of which 3,000 are suppliers.
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It is questionable whether the Bundespost will be able to compensate for its
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losses from IBM, who set up the system. "Big Blue" will scarcely be able to
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get out of supplying a new computer program. And that could take two to three
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years, which is the time that Reinhard Vossbein meant when he declared anyone
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who subscribes to Bildschirmtext during that period guilty of stupidity.
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[p 40: Unattributed text]
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MSG by GAST
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20 November 1984, 5:10 a.m.
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MICKI is thinking about the CCC's BTX gag (bravo, by the way...), and reaches
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the following conclusion:
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The more securely a system is protected against unauthorized access, the more
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unauthorized the people who can uncover weaknesses must be.
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Ultimately, you have a system to which only the unauthorized have access...
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In this regard: Keep on doing it!
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[p 40: Unattributed text of computer program]
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10 REM bankrob.ba
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20 REM Version 1.00
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30 REM (c) 1984 by Wau
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40 MOTOR OFF: 'Relay for money key
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100 CLS:PRINT"Bankrob.ba -Restart procedure"
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110 INPUT "Prior money received: ";MONEY
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120 IN=52:'Time value key on
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130 OUT=169:'Time value key off
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150 CLS:PRINT0,"DM ";MONEY,"in: ";IN;" out: ";OUT;
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160 PRINT90,"o<<<< out >>>> O"
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170 PRINT130,"i<<<< in >>>> I"
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180 PRINT170,"Stop with x "
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190 PRINT210,TIME$;:GOTO 1100
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200 REM Rhomboid loop
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210 MOTOR ON:PRINT40,"IN":PRINT40,TIME$:FOR I=1 TO IN:GOSUB 1000:NEXT I
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220 MOTOR OFF:PRINT40,"OUT":FOR I=1 TO IN:GOSUB 1000:NEXT I
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230 MOTOR ON:PRINT40,"IN":FOR I=1 TO IN:GOSUB 1000:NEXT I
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240 MOTOR OFF:PRINT40,"OUT":FOR I=1 TO OUT:GOSUB 1000:NEXT I
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250 MONEY=MONEY+9.97:PRINT0,"DM ";MONEY,"In: ";IN;" Out: ";OUT;
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260 GOTO200
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1000 REM Speed
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1010 X$=INKEY$:IF X$="" THEN RETURN
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1020 IF X$="o"THEN OUT=OUT-1:RETURN
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1030 IF X$="O"THEN OUT=OUT+1:RETURN
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1040 IF X$="i"THEN IN=IN-1:RETURN
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1050 IF X$="I"THEN IN=IN+1:RETURN
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1060 IF X$<>"x" THEN RETURN
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1100 PRINT170,"Continue with x "
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1110 MOTOR OFF:PRINT40,"OUT"
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1120 X$=INKEY$:IF X$="x" THEN 1150 ELSE 1120
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1150 PRINT170,"Stop with x ";GOTO 200
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[pp 41-42: Article by "Wau," from TAZ, 22 November 1984]
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How the Hamburger Sparkasse BTX Code Was Cracked
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Bildschirmtext Tested for Weaknesses
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Ever since the coup by the Chaos Computer Club in Hamburg, who used a bug in
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the Bildschirmtext system to charge fees of DM 135,000 to Hamburger Sparkasse,
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Bildschirmtext, or BTX, has been a topic of discussion, and the chaotics from
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the Chaos Club have made headlines.
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Bildschirmtext is a big joke being played on consumers. For more than seven
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years, "field tests" were run in Berlin and D<>sseldorf. From the very
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beginning, it was obvious that the system would be introduced following the
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field tests, regardless of the results of the "tests." The political objective
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made immense investments possible, thus making it simply impossible to abandon
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the system. After the "test," the test subscribers could throw away their
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equipment, since in the meantime it had become technically obsolete. The
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Bundespost paid for the technical conversion, giving all the subscribers a
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1,000-mark credit, financed by the coins spent on pay telephone calls.
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Nevertheless, around one in six refused this attractive offer and terminated
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BTX service. The Bundespost predicted 150,000 subscribers by the end of 1984.
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It was actually a scant 20,000, which includes many who are not active
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subscribers. In the meantime, the Bundespost has stopped making its own
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predictions, instead spending a couple of million on programs that are supposed
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to provide better prognoses.
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The Bundespost has invested more than DM 700 million in BTX. If you compare
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this to subsidies for opera houses, then the Bundespost has built a 35,000-mark
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box for each subscriber. The only problem is that the opera program is still
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rather monotonous.
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IBM is the supplier of the computer and of the programs for the current system.
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They had high hopes about their deal, and wanted to sell their system to a
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number of countries. After all, approximately 100 people worked on programming
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for around two years. If you spend DM 20,000 a month for one of these
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specialists, that makes DM 50 million. A succession of several executives was
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in charge of the project. There were only a few "minor details" to be improved
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in the program, and with programs the smaller the correction, the more time
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they take.
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Chaos Team Becomes BTX Supplier
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In the fall of 1984, after long debate, the Chaos Computer Club decided to
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subscribe to BTX. Naturally as a "supplier," since being a subscriber is not
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interesting. They started with the least expensive equipment, which was
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technically refurbished. Still, the first months were torturous. The
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prevailing mood with home computers is well-known: "Turn it on--it doesn't
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work." But with the Bundespost, everyone expects that everything will work
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fine. It is only rarely that you get mail from the Bundespost saying, "Because
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of work on the system, few telephone calls will be possible on the weekend."
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With Bildschirmtext, hardly anything worked. Even an accent on a letter in a
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person's name caused unexpected developments (and this in a "European" system).
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In terms of computerization, changing names with accepts is offered up as a
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subversive strategy. Moreover, the blocking and unblocking of pages did not
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work. Blocked pages were legible, unblocked ones were not. The Bundespost
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told people who complained that they were doing something wrong. Blocked pages
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are something like the closed doors in an Advent calendar. On the first of
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December, the first door is opened (in BTX: unblocked), on the second the
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second door, and so on. The Bundespost has a Christmas calendar game of chance
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in Bildschirmtext. Every day, new letters behind a door can be seen, and on 24
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December, there is a complete sentence (Season's Greetings from the
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Bundespost). But without any coercion, all the doors flew open on the first of
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the month. Either someone at the Bundespost typed something wrong, or the
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system has yet another small bug. The Chaos Computer Club (CCC) first got wind
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of this on 12 December, and sent in the complete solution, the prize being
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telephone credits. It is interesting how many subscribers sent in the solution
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before the CCC. Does the Bundespost perhaps believe here as well that some
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chaotics sneaked into the Bundespost to find the solution?
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However, a major problem with BTX is composing pages. The CCC does a type of
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electronic newspaper, which is published irregularly. Once a new article has
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been written and is supposed to be loaded into the system, all eyes focus on
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the lowest line, waiting for the message "ED007 EXECUTION NOT POSSIBLE AT
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PRESENT" or otherwise "Won't work right now."
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In order to penetrate the BTX system, all you need is the connection code.
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Every subscriber has a different 12-digit number. This access authorization is
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generally sent by pressing one key. This is practical and reasonably safe.
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You can imagine it as a nine-digit padlock (the first three numbers are
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generally zero) on your bicycle shed. Secondly, there is a personal code word.
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This is comparable to a padlock on the bicycle itself. And you can also put
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your bicycle in a communal shed. In BTX, this is called a "free-access
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connection." In that case, anyone can go into the communal shed and, if he
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knows the number of a particular bicycle lock, he can move about in BTX and
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take a look at things. A lot of it is free of charge, but some information or
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offerings cost money. Springer-Verlag reports cost 1 pfennig, FRANKFURTER
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ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG reports cost 2 pfennigs, and the owner of the bicycle pays
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for this, not the cyclist.
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Test of BTX Weaknesses
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At some point, discussion at CCC came back to BTX and the policy of the
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Bundespost to simply ignore or deny the risks of BTX. The question arose of
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whether this was intentional or just stupid. A test was decided on. Who would
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be the guinea pig? The Bundespost Ministry in Bonn? A single quote suffices
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here: BTX is allegedly secure because it is difficult to tap into the
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telephone lines in this country, since they are all underground.
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The BTX control facility in Ulm is not that interesting as a test object. It
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tries to keep the system running. And the Berlin office of BTX is responsible
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for calming down postal customers when something goes wrong. The Central
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Telecommunications Office (FTZ) in Darmstadt is the site where technical plans
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and standards are drawn up. There one might expect to find the practical
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technicians who worked out the security system. Those are the right people for
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a test of BTX weaknesses. Without giving it much more thought, the BTX
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connection of the FTZ was tested one day by the CCC: Do they or do they not
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have free access? In order to find out, their subscriber number had to first
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be entered: 06151 83. That is the telephone number for the FTZ. Then there
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is the prompt for the code word. At this point, you can type in anything and
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tell from the subsequent error message whether the FTZ has a free-access
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connection or not. The CCC typed something in, the same telephone number
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again. The FTZ was careless: There was free access. But even worse, the FTZ
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had chosen its own telephone number as its secret code word. That is clearly
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more careless than one would have expected, certainly from Bundespost
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specialists.
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A record is kept by the Hamburg data protection commissioner of who worked on
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Bildschirmtext when. Since the BTX reports when someone was last "on," an
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"outside use" can often be detected in this way. But scarcely anyone keeps a
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record of it; it is too tedious. At any rate, the FTZ did not notice the
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"outside use" by the CCC. This cleared up the question: The Bundespost was
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not withholding and/or providing false information about BTX out of stupidity.
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The CCC considered what it should do now. The most obvious thing was of course
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to get money from the Bundespost. In order to do so, a page for which a fee is
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charged must be called in by another BTX subscriber. And that can be repeated
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any number of times. The highest price per page is currently DM 9.99. With 1-
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pfennig pages from Axel Springer, the CCC tested, at its own expense, how fast
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money can be collected using that method. In non-automatic operation, it
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worked out to around DM 10 an hour. For the CCC page, at DM 9.97, this would
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be DM 10,000 an hour. So you could really get something over night. These
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fees are charged on the telephone bill--in this case, the FTZ's telephone bill
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--and transferred to the suppliers a couple of weeks later. Right now, it is
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not working again, the Bundespost has another bug in the program, and it hopes
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to be able to pay the fees in February. In principle, however, the money is
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being recorded.
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Getting the money would be phase one. What then? Should we sell this breach
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of security to the Bundespost? We could, as is normal in industry, "hack" DM
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100,000 or more and then sell the Bundespost consultation on this problem for a
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certain percentage of the money. Or get free, lifetime telephone service for
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the CCC or something like that. The Bundespost had to pay for its gross
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negligence.
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In both cases, however, the price would have been silence. Otherwise, the
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concentrated rage of the postal authorities would have been forthcoming.
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Consequently, perhaps half a dozen officials would have tried to do something
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to the CCC.
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But the CCC wanted enlightenment about the risks of this new system. To this
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end, the finance transaction had to be made public. Fine, but who should push
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the starting button for the money transfer? After all, it is an infringement
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like a parking ticket, although more expensive: a DM 50,000 fine. Will the
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data protection commissioner do it? He probably would have taken advantage of
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the opportunity and attempted to achieve an improvement by official means.
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A politician? Perhaps. But what if he leaks the story? There remained only
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one option: Do it ourselves, and abrogate our criminal liability by going
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public with it. A week later, the attempt failed, since the FTZ had in the
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meantime closed off free access to its connection.
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Hackers as Data Protection Specialists
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Several weeks later, Wau gave a presentation at a conference of data protection
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specialists in Cologne: BTX--El Dorado for Hackers. Cologne was a sea of pin-
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stripes, and Wau looked like a parrot in the midst of it all. Despite their
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initial distance, the audience was impressed by his presentation. Only the
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representative of the Bundespost felt that he was hitting below the belt, and
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that he did not intend to address those issues. That was dismissed with
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laughter, since the presentation depicted a series of program bugs drastically
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and in three dimensions. There is a bug in the sending of electronic mail.
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The sender can still change the contents after the letter has arrived. You can
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send a business partner a bid for, say, DM 2,300 and then later change the
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price, either raising it or lowering it. Another bug means that under certain
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circumstances the BTX system spits out internal system information. With a
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little luck, connection code words and secret passwords can be detected in this
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way. "Nonsense," said the Bundespost representative. And to the offer of
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cooperation came only the response, "First you have to get serious." It is
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unclear whether the CCC succeeded in doing so. At the very least, the BTX
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system finally spit out the connection code word and secret password of the
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Hamburger Sparkasse after a number of tries with the well-known system bug.
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Thus, it became possible to carry out the presentation planned for the FTZ with
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the Sparkasse instead.
|
||
|
||
Almost everything went as planned. Over night, in 12 hours and 59 minutes, a
|
||
good DM 134,000 was raised. With a portabfŸ œÒÆ@%ÁÕÑ•È<E280A2>Ñ¡”<C2A1>Á…<C381>”ƒen run in a
|
||
daily newspaper, and a meeting of two dozen people from all over West Germany
|
||
then took place in Berlin. We then decided to keep in touch and exchange
|
||
experiences. The idea was simply to put together a magazine, but at that point
|
||
it was all too vague, and it didn't come off. Next, contacts with the United
|
||
States were established, with Cheshire Catalyst (the "king" of U.S. hackers,
|
||
Ed.) and with his magazine TAP, which a bunch of people here in West Germany
|
||
already knew about and subscribed to. At the Telecom in the fall of 1983, I
|
||
met him personally and wrote a two-page article about him in a daily newspaper.
|
||
And this two-page article elicited a great deal of response. By the end of the
|
||
year, things had progressed far enough to set up a magazine. Previously, the
|
||
idea was to exchange all information by floppy disk, but everything was
|
||
incompatible, and it had no purpose. The magazine was announced around the
|
||
beginning of the year, and we received 100 replies within one week. And so to
|
||
us in Hamburg, it was obvious: If 100 people want it, then it has to be done.
|
||
In March, the first issue was finally finished. Once the first and second
|
||
issues were out, there was a veritable flood of letters. The amount of mail
|
||
was equivalent to placing both my hands on end.
|
||
|
||
[Question] How many subscriptions does the magazine have?
|
||
|
||
[Answer] We took the course that whoever writes should get information,
|
||
regardless of whether they send money in. The number of subscriptions
|
||
fluctuates somewhere over 200.
|
||
|
||
[Question] How do your finances look right now?
|
||
|
||
[Answer] Terrible! The production costs are around 10 pfennigs per copy, for
|
||
both sides of a DIN A3 page. On the other hand, the most expensive thing is
|
||
postage, 50 pfennigs a piece. For each copy there are three copies that are
|
||
not paid for, that we simply send out, as a sample or in response to a request
|
||
with no money enclosed. It is in fact financed by the skin of our teeth, but
|
||
we do hope that a number of people are willing to pay for it. If money comes
|
||
in, then we can continue.
|
||
|
||
[Question] And of the 200 subscriptions has each one paid around DM 30?
|
||
|
||
[Answer] More or less. They came in with the full amount, a couple sent more
|
||
than that, but unfortunately it was fewer than we had hoped. It costs about DM
|
||
1000 to produce one issue of DATENSCHLEUDER.
|
||
|
||
[Question] How long will people receive DATENSCHLEUDER for their DM 30?
|
||
|
||
[Answer] One Chaos year. That is effectively around one year, with around 10
|
||
issues. You definitely have to give our address, or they'll come beating your
|
||
door down for that.
|
||
|
||
[Question] How many regular members do you have now?
|
||
|
||
[Answer] About the membership structure--it's rather open and free. Everyone
|
||
who has information for us simply contributes it, whether he has a subscription
|
||
or simply receives DATENSCHLEUDER, or even if he knows nothing about
|
||
DATENSCHLEUDER. There are people who are working on the modem layout, and we
|
||
are producing and marketing motherboards, for example. And then we do
|
||
DATENSCHLEUDER, and also do communication via computer. It is simply an open
|
||
structure, where anyone who feels like it can join in and leave at any time.
|
||
But we are thinking about whether we should impose organizational structures on
|
||
the whole thing. There are a couple of external areas where we are simply
|
||
encountering problems. But on the other hand, we basically like this open
|
||
structure. It's a dilemma.
|
||
|
||
[Question] But surely you can provide an approximate number?
|
||
|
||
[Answer] If we approach it in terms of subscriptions, we come up with more
|
||
than 200, of which around 30 are in Hamburg. But that's very fluid. Should I
|
||
count a graphic artist who does a couple of pictures for DATENSCHLEUDER as a
|
||
member? We don't look at it that narrowly. Somebody comes along, finds it
|
||
interesting, and joins in. That's also how it is at our meetings, which we
|
||
hold once a week at a bar here in Hamburg. We always get different people
|
||
there, it's just a regular meeting base. On the other hand, we generally meet
|
||
once a month to exchange information.
|
||
|
||
[Question] What kind of people are involved?
|
||
|
||
[Answer] It ranges from pilots to a metalworker, people who run their own
|
||
shops to unemployed people and students. They are between 16 and 35. No one
|
||
is older than that.
|
||
|
||
[Question] What is your assessment of the legal status of your activities?
|
||
|
||
[Answer] We just don't like being forced into any corner. Now people are
|
||
saying that it's all criminal, breaking into data bases and getting into
|
||
0ä=
|
||
|