354 lines
21 KiB
Plaintext
354 lines
21 KiB
Plaintext
From: pmsc13sg@smucs1.umassd.edu (Stephen Grossman)
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Subject: ZIG-ZAG 1.3
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Message-ID: <C6z60n.ECD@umassd.edu>
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Organization: UMASS DARTMOUTH, NO. DARTMOUTH, MA.
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Date: Thu, 13 May 1993 17:02:46 GMT
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Lines: 346
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================================================================================
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ZIG-ZAG 1.3 May 13, 1993
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TRACKING THE MARXIST DIALECTICAL STRATEGY OF ADVANCE-RETREAT-ADVANCE OR
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UNITY-SPLIT-UNITY IN INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTION
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STEPHEN GROSSMAN WEEKLY? INTERNET
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talk.politics.soviet, talk.politics.theory, talk.politics.misc,
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alt.individualism, talk.politics.misc, alt.politics.usa.misc,
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alt.politics.media, soc.culture.soviet, soc.history, alt.conspiracy,
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alt.politics.radical-left, alt.activism, alt.activism.d, alt.censorship,
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alt.politics.usa.republican, alt.news-media, news.future,
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misc.headlines, alt.society.revolution, alt.society.anarchy,
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alt.revolution.counter, alt.politics.correct
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================================================================================
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A leading American news organization praised Johnnetta Cole,
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anthropologist, president of Spelman College, and Marxist. "...her contacts
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with...pro-Cuban organizations...member of the national committee of the
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Venceremos Brigade, a group that sponsored sugar-cane cutting expeditions to
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Cuba but one the [FBI] maintains is connected to Cuban Intelligence
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forces....member of the executive board of the U.S. Peace Council [in
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1983]....the F.B.I considers its parent organization, the World Peace Council,
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a Soviet front. Dr Cole said she was never a member of the council, but wrote
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for the group. ["A Scholar's Convictions...," Week in Review, _NYT_, Jan.10,
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1993]
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________________________________________________________________________________
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The following are examples of dialectics:
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"...a struggle between a "reformist " President and a "reactionary"
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Congress...in which the [U.S.] or the West can swing the outcome through a
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quick infusion of aid or support. however vicious and real it may[!] be, the
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current congress is likely to be only one of many convulsions of a system in
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the process of profound and bewildering transformation....a mind-set alien to
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...a free market." ["Aid to Russia," _NYT_, Mar.11, 1993, p.1]
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"...The possibility that Comunists will again dominate Russia and make
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[dialectical] alliances with nationalists in other [dialectically] former
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Soviet states, also nuclear, does that make no difference at all in American
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strategic thinking? And what is American strategic thinking?" [A.M. Rosenthal,
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"Facing the Risks," Op-Ed, _NYT, Mar.16, 1993]
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"Georgian [leader Shevardnadze] Asks for Weapons; Warns of War With
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Russia" [_NYT_, Mar.18, 1993]
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"Yeltsin, Asking Aid, Talks of Communist Revival" [_NYT_, Mar.17, 1993,
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p.6]
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Marxist dialectics guides these revolutionaries to temporarily split
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their forces and to tell class enemies that aid will help the "good" side
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against the "bad" side. This theory-driven strategy is not secret but widely
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publicized in books. Of course, if class enemies are Pragmatists or
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traditionalists who don't use theory then Marxists are not going to tell them
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to use a library. "We wanted to deceive you. But you wanted to be deceived."
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[Chinese Marxist to Western intellectual; quoted by Paul Hollander, _Political
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Pilgrims_, 1979]
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"Russian conservatives can't pay for an arms race any more than Russian
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liberals can. In the past few months, there has been a clear convergence in
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their positions on defense and foreign policy. Liberals now favor increased
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sales of sophisticated military equipment to the third world to keep Russian
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arms manufacturers in business [or to aid other Marxist revolutionaries]. And
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conservatives say they recognize that the military-industrial complex has to be
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sharply cut back. A change of government could push this convergence[!] further
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still." [Stephen Sestanovich, Op-Ed, _NYT, Mar.23, 1993
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"[In Russia] power is not something to be shared; a white flag is a
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sign to attack; compromise is only a lull in the fight[!!!!!]." [Steven
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Erlanger, "It's a Tradition: Russia's Politics of Fear and Favor," Week in
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Review, _NYT_, Mar.28, 1993, p.1]
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"YELTSIN, SURVIVING CLOSE VOTE, CLAIMS DEFEAT OF A...'Communist
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coup d'etat.'" [_NYT_, Mar.29, 1993, p.1]
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The _NYT_, with quotes, recognizes the "coup" as a fraud. But they
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don't identify the standard of evidence by which the earlier "coup" was real,
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unless, of course, it "ended" communism" and thus permitted Pragmatists to feel
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comfortable in compromising with mass murderers.
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"He also shows how Marxism-Leninism had tried to use ethnicity and the
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principle of national self-determination as tools..." [Stanley Hoffmann, "An
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Idea...," _NYT Book Rev._, April 4, 1993, p.10]
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"The Bolsheviks introduced all the forms[!] of democratic rule-a
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Constitution, the "soviets" or councils, courts of law. But real power remained
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concentrated in a secretive, arbitrary, and rigidly hierarchical bureaucracy,
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the Communist Party, which based its claim to rule on the vague [to
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Pragmatists] premise of historical inevitability." ["No Self-Evident Truths,"
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_NYT_, Mar.13, 1993, p.1]
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It is recognized that Marxists defrauded class enemies in the past but,
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Pragmatically, that past is disconnected from the present, where, we are
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assured, Pragmatists are no longer defrauded by Marxist revolutionary
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strategists.
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'...leaders often appear to change everything while making sure that
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nothing important is changed." [Leslie Gelb, Op-Ed, _NYT_, Apr.22, 1993]
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"...after months of on-again, of-again talks in which [head Bosnian
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Serb leader, Karadzic] seemed intent primarily on buying time so his forces
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could seize more territory." ["Head Bosnia Serb...," _NYT_, May 5, 1993, p. 1]
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"...it may be that this latest show of sweet reason is a subterfuge.
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[Serbian leader] Milosevic in Serbia and Karadzic in occupied Bosnia may be
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playing nice-war-criminal, tough-war-criminal with Lord Vance-Owen, pretending
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to make peace until the world relaxes." [ William Safire, Op-Ed, _NYT_, May 3,
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1993]
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"There is an old and wise rule of thumb about Arab-Israeli
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negotiations. If they seem to be getting better, just wait a while and they'll
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almost always get worse." [Leslies Gelb, Op-Ed, _NYT_, May 6, 1993]
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"How gullible can we be? Serbia's purpose [in announcing its embargo of
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war supplies to its ethnic cleansers] is to enable its militia within Bosnia to
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drive out or kill the Muslim population. To accomplish this without inviting
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air attacks on Belgrade power plants, Mr. Milosevic must PRETEND TO DISSOCIATE
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HIS NATION FROM ITS FRONT-LINE FIGHTERS [editor's emphasis]....ELABORATE
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CHARADE OF A RIFT. [Milosevic] directed his chief Bosnian Serb stooge to buy
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two weeks of warmaking by signing a meaningless peace agreement; he made a
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great show of lecturing the Bosnian Serb leadership to ratify it; he posed as
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being being furious when they stalled some more with a phony
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referendum....Naturally, the U.N.'s David Owen...buys this NOTION OF A RIFT and
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all but embraces this war criminal as a new hero....SERBIAN RIFT
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TRICK...is...aimed at not only delaying the air strikes, but at extending
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another embargo. [on Serbian Rift, Op-Ed, William Safire, _NYT_, May 10, 1993]
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After the alleged end of Marxism as a serious threat the Pragmatists of
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the _NYT_ and elsewhere recognize that dialectics (advance-retreat-advance or
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unity-split-unity) is a powerful method of war. Why does this new recognition
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of the zig-zags of war not extend to Marxist revolution?
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________________________________________________________________________________
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Marxists on their policy and its lack in the U.S.:
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"There are no liberals, moderates or conservatives in the Soviet
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leadership; there are only communists whose actions are determined by the
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requirements of the long range policy. They may take on a public guise of
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liberals or Stalinists, but only if required to do so by the Presidium
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[Politburo?] of the party in the interests of that policy." [Anatoliy Golitsyn,
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Stalin's KGB archive researcher, _New Lies For Old_, Dodd, NYV, 1984]
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"I could find no unity, no consistent objective or strategy among
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Western countries. it is not possible to fight the soviet system and strategy
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with small steps." [Jan Sejna, former Assistant Secretary of the Czech Defense
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Council, a very high level Communist Party group with very high level
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coordination with Communists from other nations, _We Will Bury You_, Sidgewick,
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London, 1982]
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The Soviet [Intelligence and Marxist] organs have had an ally in
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the short attention spans of their adversaries. Thus they have come to rely on
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the probability that earlier, similar events are either not known or have been
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forgotten." [Corson & Crowley, _New KGB_]
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"It is true that the top leadership contains elements which are more
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prone to advocate the use of direct force (some of the orthodox in the Central
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Committee of the Party and in the military) while others favor the use of
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political measures (some in the Foreign Ministry and in the economic sector).
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but these are meerely differences with respect to means. Soviet leaders are
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all _aggressive_, all hawks with respect to the final goals of their
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policy....Men do not reach the pinnacle of Communist power without a strong
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grasp of political reality....The fable of hawks and doves contesting in the
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Kremlin has been encouraged for Western consumption by Soviet propaganda and
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disinformation outlets....[Of the greatest U.S. foreign policy weakness toward
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the S.U., Foreign Minister Gromyko said,] 'They don't comprehend our final
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goals....and they mistake tactics for strategy. Besides they have too many
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doctrines and concepts prpclaimed at different times, but the absence of a
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solid, coherent, and consistent policy is their biggest flaw'....Gromyko's
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opinion was generally shared by other Soviet leaders who generally see American
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foreign policy as likely to zig-zag [chaotically] even during the term of a
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single administration....Brezhnev [advised] us to pretend in our talks with
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americans that we ourselves did not take some Marxist dogmas seriously."
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[Arkady Shevchenko, former Soviet Ambassador to the UN, _Breaking With Moscow_,
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Knopf, NYC, 1985]
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"The development of splits in the communist world appeals to Western
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consciousness in many ways. It feeds the craving for sensationalism
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[Pragmatism?]; it raises hope of commercial profit; it stirs memories of past
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heresies and splits in the communist movement; it shows that factionalism is an
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element in communist as in Western politics; iot supports the comforting
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illusion that, left to itself, the communist world world will disintegrate and
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that the communist threat to the rest of the worlds will vanish; and it
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confirms the opinions of those who, on intellectual grounds, reject the
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pretensions of communistdogma to provide a unique, universal, and infallible
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guide to the undestanding of history and the conduct of policy." [Golitsyn,
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p.82]
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"Clinton and Foreign Issues: Spasms of Attention" [_NYT_, Mar.22,
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1993].
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"Clinton targets 'Evil Empire' laws....President Clinton is pledging to
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work quickly with Congress to repeal "Evil Empire" trade laws and other Cold
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War restrictions on Russia that no longer serve a purpose. 'There are a lot of
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statutes that are just antiquated, they're old-fashioned," Secretary of State
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Warren Christopher said today. 'They've got nothing to do with Russia in the
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modern world, they've got nothing to do with the new Russia." [(New Bedford,
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MA) Standard-Times, Apr.15, 1993]
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This is the sleazy voice of Pragmatism; the denial of relations among
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things; this is how WW2 started, with the enemies of Nazism exposing their lack
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of dignity and rationality in public by evading the theory and practice of Nazi
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politics for a few pleasant lies from Hitler just before the Munich
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appeasement that cost 50 million lives.
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"When Hitler made his appeal for peace after proclaiming the
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restoration of military conscription in Germany, the London _Times_ commented
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editorially: 'It is to be hoped that the speech will be taken everywhere as a
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sincere and well-considered utterance[!] meaning precisely what it says."
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["Hitler and Khrushchev," G.F. Hudson, _New Leader_, Oct.2, 1961]
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Of course, Pragmatists will deny any similarity because of (trivial)
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differences. So Rolls-Royces and Volkwagens are not both cars. The problem is
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not essentially bad foreign policy but the philosophy which produced the
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politics which produced the foreign policy.
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________________________________________________________________________________
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"Marxism-Leninism serves as an unshakable scientific and theoretical
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foundation. Loyalty to the ideas of scientific communism is the source of the
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purposeful, principled, and consistent foreign policy of the foreign countries,
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as well as of its creative activity. Marxism-Leninism is a sound methodological
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basis, resting on which the socialist countries determine their principled
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stand and elaborate a long-term[!] foreign policy line....in the
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'Inaugural Address of the Working Men's International Association'....Marx
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pointed out that it was necessary for the working people 'to, master
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themselves the mysteries of international politics; to watch the diplomatic
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acts of their respective governments; to counteract them, if necessary, by
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all[!] means in their power....It is only natural that the foreign policy of
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each country belonging to the socialist community possesses its own[!] specific
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features conditioned by historical, geographical, and other circumstances. It
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is not these circumstances, however, which determine the essence of
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politics....proletarian internationalism demands, first, that the interests of
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the proletarian struggle in any one country should be subordinated to the
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interests of that struggle on a worldwide scale....The ways for the
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implementation of the policy of peaceful coexistence are not determined by the
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subjective wishes of statesmen or parties. More than half a century of the
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Soviet Union's foreign policy shows that at every given period of time these
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ways depend, above all, on the objective factors, the most important being the
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balance of forces between the two systems....In the capitalist countries, much
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money is spent on furnishing information to foreign policy agencies on the
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present-day international situation. This work, however being empirical and
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enttirely pragmatic is thereby[!] devoid of true scientific validlity. The very
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methodological basis is wrong....It is not by chance that in the foreign policy
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of the USA we witness a permanent renewal of foreign policy doctrines. Each new
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US President deems it necessary to formulate a foreign policy doctrine of his
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own....Bourgeois political theory also asserts that in the modern world the
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role of ideology is diminishing, whereas in actual fact it is growing. This
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also applies to the sphere of international relations....the so-called
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de-ideologisation of international relations is pure invention[!]....The
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assertions by US Professor A. Rapaport that...Soviet foreign policy is
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allegedly becoming 'less ideologically oriented' are obviously[!] nothing but
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fabrications....[V. Asparturian, a US sovietologist] asserts that the USSR has
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allegedly turned into a state interested in preserving and stabilizing the
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status quo. Such reasoning obviously stems from the urge to compromise[!] the
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consistent revolutionary course as Soviet foreign policy and present it as a
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coservative force seeking to perpetuate the existing social relations. [N.
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Kapchenko, "Marxism-Leninism: The Scientific Basis of Socialist Foreign
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Policy," _International Affairs_(Moscow), Oct. 1972, p.73; this is the
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_theoretical_ foreign policy journal of the Central Committee of the CPSU]
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________________________________________________________________________________
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In "Hard Line, Hard Luck for Cuba," a _NYT_ Op-Ed essay [May 10, 1993],
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Rolando Prats Paez, a leader of the Social Democracy Movement _in_ Cuba,
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democracy and helps Castro."
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This is a classic example of Marxist disinformation. First, Marxist
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dictatorships, like Cuba, have such an extraordinarily systematic control over
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their slaves that public dissidence is either impossible, immediately
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sucicidal, or active measures (political influence operations) by the
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International Dept. of the national Communist Party. Cuba has representatives
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of the Party in each residential block(!) surveilling the actions of everybody.
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The withdrawal of ration cards and employment privileges(!) is a potential
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threat which makes force mostly unnecessary. The very term, social democracy,
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is an indication of Marxist influence, especially as socialists have long been
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massively infiltrated and manipulated (with exceptions) by Marxists. But, the
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name helps Marxist sympathizers and Pragmatists evade the brutality of Marxism.
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This is not Marxist propaganda, but disinformation in which the source is
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concealed (to useful idiots and deaf-mutes). This is how Marxists conduct their
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revolution, through witting and unwitting (and even half-witting)
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agents-of-influence among the bourgeoisie. It is an act of war and the
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Constitution's prohibition of treason covers it, regardless of the "clear and
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present danger" Pragmatists on the Supreme Court.
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_______________________________________________________________________________
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The following list of Soviet active measures (political influence
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operations) is only the beginning of research. Some items were taken from
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"Soviet Active Measures" (John Dziak, _Problems of Communism_, Nov. 1984) and
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from _New Lies For Old_ (Anatoliy Golitsyn, Dodd, NYC, 1984).
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Ambassador's (Lockhart) Plot, 1918
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Brest-Litovsk Treaty, 1918
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Far Eastern Republic, 1920-22
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The Trust, 1921-27
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New Economic Policy, 1921-1929
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Smena Vekh and Eurasian movements, 1920s and 1930s
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Tanaka Memorial/Institute for Pacific Relations, 1927-late 1930s
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United Fronts/Willi Muenzenberg(?), 1930s
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Using America to Provoke Japan, Germany(?) Into War, 1930s
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Stalin's Religion/Nationalism/Constitution, 1930s-1945
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Uncle Joe Against Fascism, 1930s-1945
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Tukhachevskiy Affair, 1937
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WW2's Spurious "Max" Messages, 1939-1945
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WIN in Poland and Elsewhere in East Europe, mid-late 1940s.
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War Conferences from the Atlantic Charter to Yalta, early-late 1940s
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U.S Support of Mao, mid-late 1940s
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Peace Campaign Charging U.S. With Biowar in Korea, 1950(?)
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Campaign Against Germany and NATO, 1950s and 1960s
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Numerous Forgeries Against U.S., 1950s-1990s+(?)
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Phony splits and phony liberalization of Marxist Empire, 1950s-1990(?)
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Khrushchev's Destalinization/Dissident Activity, 1956
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Evolution of the Soviet Regime/Dissidence, 1958+
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Second Soviet-Yugoslav Split, 1958-60
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Soviet-Albanian Dispute and Split, 1958-62
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Sino-Soviet Split, late 1950s-1969(?)
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Eurocommunism, 1960-mid1970s
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Brezhnev's Detente, 1960s-1970s
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Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
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Romanian Independence, 1962-1970s
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Recurrence of Power Struggles in the Soviet, Chinese, and Other
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Parties, 1962-?
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Democratization in Czechoslovakia, 1968
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Campaign Against the "neutron" wahead and NATO theatre nuclear force
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modernization, 1970s-1980s.
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Attempts to Exploit the Peace Movement, 1970s-1980s
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Gorbachev's Glasnost, 1985-1991
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Withdrawal from Eastern Europe, 1991
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Soviet Coup/End of Communist Threat, 1991
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Soviet Break-Up, 1991-2
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Soviet Search for Foreign Aid, 1992-?
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The "Cold War" is partly a _continuous_ series of Marxist active
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measures from 1918 to the present because political war is war just as much as
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military war. The class enemies of Marxist revolution must officially recognize
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this.
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================================================================================
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ZIG-ZAG is archived at (ftp) uglymouse.css.itd.umich.edu:
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/pub/Politics/ZigZag.
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Unless personal discussion is important, comments from NEWS should be posted
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to the group and then the group's name as well as the date and directory
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number of the post e-mailed to _ZIG-ZAG_ at <pmsc13sg@umassd.edu>.
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Seeking library or other English language edition of _The Problem of
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Compromise in Politics as Seen by Lenin_ by Alexander Lebedev [Novosti, Moscow,
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1989]. Contact _ZIG-ZAG_.
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Selling hangmen's rope. Good for capitalists. Long-term payments. See V. Lenin,
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Red Square, Kremlin.
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================================================================================
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********************************************************************************
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Beyond and back of the wind, | Stephen Grossman
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Little birds fly into the sea, | pmsc13sg@umassd.edu
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Morning light shine on me. |
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[Marianne Faithfull & Wally Baderou] |
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********************************************************************************
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