343 lines
20 KiB
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343 lines
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Plaintext
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OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO oOOOO OOOO. OOOO OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO
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OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO" .OOOOOO OOOOOo OOOO OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO
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OOOO oOOOOOOO OOOOOOO. OOOO oOOOO
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OOOO .OOOO OOOO OOOOOOOOo OOOO OOOO"
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OOOO oOOOO OOOO OOOO "OOOO. OOOO OOOOo .OOOO'
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OOOO .OOOO" OOOO OOOO OOOOoOOOO "OOOO. oOOOO
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OOOO oOOOOOOO..OOOO OOOO "OOOOOOO OOOOoOOOO"
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OOOO .OOOO"""OOOOOOOO OOOO OOOOOO "OOOOOOO'
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OOOO oOOOO ""OOOO OOOO "OOOO OOOOOO
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|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
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| There Ain't No Justice |
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| #87 |
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|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
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- How to Destroy a Network -
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by Joeseph Elkhorne
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Given: one Middle Eastern country with more sudden wealth than is good for
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it, for finance; an American quasi-governmental Group with insufficient
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expertise in the field of television, for planning; a firm from Great Britain
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with their own standards and poor logistics, for construction; an American
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field service company with American standards -- and no prior television
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experience -- for maintenance; and local people with no technological
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background, for operations.
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Specify that each group will be autonomous; add them together. Do not stir --
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they will mix themselves. The result after half a decade will make one of
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early communist Russia's five-year plans look like grand achievement.
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The newcomer asks in dismay, "Where did it all go wrong?"
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There is no simple answer. Like Topsy, the thing "jest growed." Perhaps one
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can say that this particular television network is a tribute to the committee
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mind -- or its damnation.
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The country concerned had more than enough capital to do things right. Its
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ruler is progressive, wise, and a good administrator; his Minister of
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Information is knowledgeable, concerned about the high illiteracy rate of the
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people, and believes that television ought to aid them. So, good intentions
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inspired the authorization of a nationwide system, but did not pave a road to
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excellence.
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Undoubtedly, the first mistake was to place the responsibility for planning
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in the hands of men who knew nothing about television. Without valid criteria
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for evaluation, they could not judge good from bad. Without the grace to
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disqualify themselves, they created a Frankenstein monster. The system they
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conceived does a disservice not only to the people for whom it was intended
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but heaps guilt by association on American ability.
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This group has gained notoriety in American recently through errors in its
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prime field of endeavor; needless to say, television engineer is not it.
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Engineering is a word as broad as theology -- each specialist should stick to
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his own field until he has the additional knowledge to branch out. Few
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television engineers could built a road -- nor would they try to.
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An analysis of the flagship station of this Middle Eastern network indicts
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the Group for creative stupidity. The plan of the building shows no logic
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whatsoever. For instance, engineers' stores cannot be reached except by going
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through the studio -- frequently inadvisable or impossible because of
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production or on-the-air operations. What few supplies are delivered to the
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station are invariably placed in the engineering office at a third corner of
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the building, making an inefficient triangle for parts handling.
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The workshop itself almost seems to be an afterthought. Few pieces of test
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equipment were on hand, mainly because Group's representative at the station
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always had people "putting things out of the way" in the stores area, so that
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everything would be suitable for the numerous inspections. The maintenance
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area is small and cramped, nestled behind equipment racks -- if an
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oscilloscope cart is pulled alongside the workbench, one has to walk around
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the racks to get to the other end of the bench.
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Studio Control required just enough thought to get equipment placed
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initially, with absoutely no consideration for maintenance thereafter. The
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19-inch monitors on suspended shelves were potential hernia producers, and
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always failed at busy times. A hapless engineer then had to climb over the
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director, stand on the video console, disconnect cables, and lift the monster
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down -- without interfering with operations, mind. Two console-mounted audio
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tape recorders and a transcription turntable clustered around the audio
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console, which itself sat on a "temporary" table, all adjacent to the video
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switcher. Mothing in studio control could be checked without moving at least
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two other pieces of gear.
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The videotape room, designed for two machines, pointed up the fact that no
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concept of growth entered the minds of the designers. Three large, quadrature
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machines graced that tiny floor, side by side. Neither of the two electric
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outlets in the room were convenient to the machines. If one ran an extension
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cord, someone who shouldn't have been in there in the first place was certain
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to fall over the cord while squeezing past the test cart, while the engineer
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tried to do emergency maintenance (is there any other kind?) with half a
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dozen ME's (middle easterners) offering advice and asking when they could use
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the machine for "a very important program". In addition, several hundred
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one-hour tapes were stored in this cozy room.
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Master Control contained the camera control units, an auxiliary but unuseable
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audio console, a transmitter control console and master monitor, two
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transmitters, and the equipment racks, all in the space of a large living
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room.
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The telecine area contained two film islands, one with a 35 mm. projector.
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This unit was used once in 16 months. Since the entire building was on a
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concrete slab and cable trenches had not been thought of, buss ducts ran
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along the walls, across the floors and some cable disappeared into the
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overhead lofts. Cable had been tied onto horizontal runs there initially, in
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piles ten inches high, making it totally impossible to remove a bad one.
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All the bad features of this station certainly stretch the long arm of
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coincidence. It is as though the designers lay awake at night trying to
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achieve perfection in ineptness. Every facet of the station showed such
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forethought.
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For instance, the city was on 60-cycle power, but the television system was
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625-line, 25-frame standard. This necessitated a 60-to-50 rotary convertor in
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a utility building. That particular monument to malfeasance contained two
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stand-by generators also. One was 60-cycle, the other 50. The latter unit
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usually wouldn't run in an emergency -- but if the situation had gotten bad,
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the control circuitry for the rotary convertor was probably out of action
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too, rendering the 60-cycle stand-by unit superfluous.
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Lighting in the studio building was supposed to be 60-cycle and all the
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television equipment tied to the 50-cycle mains. However, the audio console
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and some ancillary gear was on 60. One transmitter had the wonderful
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provision of emergency operation on the 60-cycle mains, but that did little
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good if the sync generators, cameras, vtr's and film islands were out of
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service.
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The power system was loaded so close to its limitations that line surges
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frequently destroyed equipment. City power varied anywhere from 80 to 145
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volts, with some surges peaking 170. This is great for broadcast gear. Those
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two transmitters were to insure no lost air-time -- but if both were
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energized, the surge when the second transmitter's cooling blower came on
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could conceivably take out half the station.
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Signal distribution was singular. The video patch panels appeared in two
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different bays, scattered amongst four racks. Sometimes one "couldn't get
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there from here". There was one rack-mounted oscilloscope, but most of the
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signals that needed to be checked were in the other bay. Clearing a fault
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while on the air was a major miracle.
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In addition to poor distribution, the station records were abyssmal: one
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tattered, looseleaf notebook, adhering to no known engineering standard, gave
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partial block diagrams of the _original_ wiring. Few changes had been entered
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therein for five years. At least, the perpetrators of such a poor job weren't
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ashamed to put their sins to paper -- as in the case of the TR-22 which had
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one output used, wired to the studio control monitor, looped through the
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patch panel and terminated back in studio control at the TS-11 (vintage 1946)
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switcher. When the monitor caught fire one night and was removed, naturally
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the VTR signal path was broken and no video came through on the next take,
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upsetting the director. The engineer who pulled the monitor made a natural
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mistake -- he never expected such idiotic distribution. The oher outputs of
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the machine? Unused and unterminated.
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The original cabling itself could only be described as horrible -- the system
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must have been laid out by a drunken plumber and finished by a spastic
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blacksmith. Some cables had tags or numbers, different at each end, and
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written on surgical tape. Others had labels affixed with fossilized Scotch
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tape, and evidently written with a 6H pencil. Five years of heat and dust
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made everything "temporary" of this nature completely worthless.
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The first subcontractor was ousted for "racial" misdemeanors: it did business
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with Israel. Before their men left, as their final contribution to chaos,
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they burned many volumes of records and drawings.
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That the second subcontractor had never been involved in an international
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television operation before didn't disqualify them -- they were in good
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company. As a matter of record, this firm had never been involved in _any_
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sort of television before. Nor had they done business in the Middle East
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before. And from their curious personnel treatment, they evidently had never
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employed human beings before. When anyone had a complaint, major or minor,
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legitimate or spurious -- instead of discussing it, the management said, "If
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you don't like it here, you can go back to the States."
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In less than a year, the project resembled a turnstile. The project manager
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was replaced. Two engineering adviers and three production advisers strutted
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their brief hour on the stage. Three staff accountants graced the scene.
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Eleven different company men served as chief engineer or acting chief
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engineer in the flagship station in a 16-month period. The man who lasted the
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longest had been requested to come down from the second station in the
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network -- it didn't take long under the close scrutiny of the project office
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and daily contact for him to be dismissed for incompetency. He had been with
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the company in the Middle East for 15 months. The man appealed to the prime
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contractor, who suggested tha tthe letter of dismissal be rescinded.
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The engineering staff in the flagship station should have been six warm
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bodies, bu the average for over a year was four. Of these, only two were
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permnanetly assigned there during that year. Some 25 other engineers passed
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through the station in 15 months, some for as little as two days, some for a
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couple of weeks. Needless to say, with a station in such poor condition, a
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man had to be there quite a while before he knew what was going on.
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Temporary jobs and repairs left by the first company became a permanent
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legacy, since "temporary" work has a notorious habit of entrenching itself.
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No reliable inventory was provided. The stores area resembled a pack-rat's
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nest and hadn't seen janitorial skills in five years.
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Most of the equipment was deteriorating, for several reasons. First of all,
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the station was obsolescent when it was built. The bulk of the gear came out
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of a warehouse where it had been for years -- since most was circa-1946
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tube-type equipment. The extreme desert heat and insidious dust hastened the
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process of decline. Granted, the building had air-conditioning -- when it
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worked -- but all power was shut down at sign-off and it didn't take long for
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the interior to reach ambient outdoor level.
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Another topper -- Group had planned for 15 years' use from each and every
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item -- "just as it done in the United States" -- a curious and untrue
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assertion.
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Outside broadcasts were always fun. Imagine TK-60's on a parade ground or
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playing field when the temperature in the shade might be 121 degrees, not
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uncommon at ten on a May morning. At the studio, the received microwave
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signal did not appear on the TS-11 siwtcher but had to be patched at the
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penultimate moment into a normal VTR position. The engineer there never had
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any assurance that anything would work until he saw it OK on the air. If he
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had audio and video, he was never congratulated. If there was some problem,
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he alone would carry the can. The situation felt like snatching defeat out of
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the jaws of victory, every day of the week.
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Syndicated videotapes arrived from Lebanon, multiple generation dubs. It was
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not uncommon to find something like 240 units of recorded geometric error --
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and the ME's would criticize the Americans for "not cooperating to make the
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picture nice". The ME's also had a habit of shooting sound-on-film at the
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wrong speed and a gross inability to understand that if you jury-rigged an
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on-air projector to partially correct the frame rate on this "very important
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film", the audio would also change. Directors would block four hours of
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production time, show up three hours late, demand special engineering effects
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that required half a day to rig, then wonder why their time was cut off so
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that the station could go on the air. As usual, the consensus was that the
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Americans were not cooperating again ...
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Many such problems were pointed out to the project office. Hundreds of
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suggestions originated with the staff engineers. They had to originate there,
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since the project manager arrived in the Middle East bragging that he didn't
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know a thing about television. Unfortunately for everyone, his ignorance,
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coupled with a psychological inability to accept meaningful advice from his
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"inferiors" meant that no improvement would be forthcoming.
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But if the Americans had personnel problems with their own people, the locals
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were an unique case. The American subcontractor had no authority over the
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Middle Easterners -- and they in turn had no sense of responsibility.
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The ME's wrecked equipment with impunity, and frequently. Their attitude
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toward work was the same as in their private life: "When something is broke
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we can get another one."
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The Americans were told by their employer (before they left the states) that
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they had to work six days a week because the ME's did -- and found out when
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they arrived overseas that the ME's only worked six hours a day, when they
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showed up at all! The ME's had frequent religious holidays, forty-eight
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authorized vacation days, unlimited sick leave -- and many of them seemed
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poorly most of the year. One ME had not been seen at the television station
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in eight months but once -- when he came in to have his vacation permission
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signed by the ME station manager.
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When these excesses were pointed out of the Group, nothing was done. When
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criticisms were delivered to the project manager, he ignored them. When ME
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operators failed to show up to do their jobs, American maintenance engineers
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were expected to fill in. The project manager, in his ivory tower miles away,
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not having to face the multitude of daily problems, only said, "We got to
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help them fellers out."
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The ME's had a strange attitude toward the staton. Some of them had spent two
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or more years in the United States, receiving specialized training. But, as
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the expression goes, you can lead a camel to water ... One bright young man
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came back talking about how great he was at solid-state circuit design --
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when asked to perform maintenance work on his maintenance shift, he stated
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without apparent shame: "I am not qualifed to do such work. I am not able to
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fix a picture monitor."
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They hold an attitude similar to the ancient Greek scientists. Those worthies
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were glad to observe but didn't want to get their hands dirty, for that was
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beneath them. The ME's either took the approach that physical work was good
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enough for the Americans, or that their advanced training qualified them for
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a much more responsbile job like, say, Minister of Information.
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Since the various factions were autonomous, this made for strained relations
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and nil achievement. The engineer in 'the firing line' was certain of only
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one thing: he had authority for nothing and responsibility for everything. If
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he told the ME's the proper approach to a job, he received a rude suggestion
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and the statement: "We have always done it this way." That is why video
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operators often adjusted the cameras with the Beam pot. In addition to direct
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insults, several days later, a query would be received from the project
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office asking the engineer why he was no 'cooperating'.
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The chief engineer, if there was one, would lay down regulations for station
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personnel -- and have them underbut by the project manager, conferring in
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secret with the ME station manager and his henchmen. The other ME's would
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then strut and brag that they could do as they pleased.
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The Group representative would tell the ME's something would be done which
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they wanted -- when such things conld only be done by the subcontractor, but
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were out of the scope of the contract, anyway. "Our Man from Group" had only
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one qualification to oversee and critique a television operation --
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twenty-two years in the regular army.
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Just one additional example of working conditions at this station describes
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the quality: a weekly, full optical and mechanical alignment of both film
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islands was mandatory.
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The proof of the pudding is in the eating -- and the proof of television is
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in the seeing. The amount of air time lost is rising by an exponential rate.
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There is no hope in sight with the present hierarchy, both American and
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Middle Easterner.
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If the situation weren't grim enough, some of the ME's are muttering darkly,
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"We can run it all by ourselves" while others are saying, "It's time to go
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color."
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Meanwhile, Our Man from Group has come up with a neat scheme to keep invaders
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from using the transmitters: booby trap them with grenades.
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Move over, House of Usher!
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<20> <20><> <20>
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|