1023 lines
49 KiB
Plaintext
1023 lines
49 KiB
Plaintext
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 20:15:55 PDT
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Reply-To: <surfpunk@osc.versant.com>
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Return-Path: <cocot@osc.versant.com>
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Message-ID: <surfpunk-0082@SURFPUNK.Technical.Journal>
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Mime-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain
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From: surfpunk@osc.versant.com (n dhvfyvat, be rira n fgreayvtug!)
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To: surfpunk@osc.versant.com (SURFPUNK Technical Journal)
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Subject: [surfpunk-0082] CRYPT: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
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! ! I recently heard an even better hypothetical that
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! illustrates the issues raised by encryption:
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!
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! Suppose the only two navajo speakers left in the
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! world were talking on the phone to plot the
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! overthrow of the United States. If the FBI could
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! not obtain a translator, would that mean the
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! plotters could be compelled to hold their phone
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! conversations in English?
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!
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! Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
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Tim May is one the leftmost figure on the cover of WIRED #2.
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Several of these are by him. Most material found on cypherpunks.
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Mail a polite note to Cypherpunks-request@toad.com to join that list,
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but be prepared for 20 to 50 messages a day ... strick
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________________________________________________________________________
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________________________________________________________________________
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Date: Thu, 29 Apr 93 01:36:34 -0700
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To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
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From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
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Subject: Tough Choices: PGP vs. RSA Data Security
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Cypherpatriots,
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This is a tough posting to write. I may even be called a quisling, or even
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a sternlight!
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This may be the most important posting I make during this current
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Clipper-Big Brother Chip controversy.
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I suggest that we as a community seriously reconsider our basic support for
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PGP. Not because of any flaws in the program, but because of issues related
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to Clipper and the potential limits on crypto.
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Continuing use of PGP causes several problems:
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1. If RSA fails to take actions against sites and users, it weakens their
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legal position with respect to their patents. The government does not need
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licenses in any case, but users of Clipperphones *do* (not the final
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end-users, but the suppliers of Clipperphones to non-government customers).
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(A case can be made that repudiation of the patents might be a good thing.
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I know I have argued this at times. It's hard to know.)
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2. The "guerrilla crypto" aspect of the PGP community (and our group) is
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charming, but may be counterproductive. If we are viewed as outlaws, the
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target even of RSA, then we have almost no influence, save for underground
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subversion.
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(To put this another way, if we are seen as RSA Data's enemy, we lose a
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potential ally. I am suggesting that a coming war between strong crypto on
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one side and government snooping on the other will force all participants
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to choose up sides.)
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3. Supporting a legal version of strong crypto, which RSA Data-approved
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programs are and PGP is *not*, is a much more solid foundation from which
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to fight possible restrictions on strong crypto.
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4. Our time could better be spent by solidifying existing RSA programs,
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including RIPEM, RSAREF-derived programs, MailSafe, and so forth. This is
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the approach several major companies have taken (Apple, Lotus, Sun, etc.).
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I've urged Jim Bidzos to work toward some compromise with the PGP community
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(and I think everyone recognizes the positive aspects of this growing
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community). This might include creating translation programs so MailSafe or
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RIPEM can read PGP files, a reworking of PGP to conform to licensing
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requirements, etc.
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I'm hoping that Phil Zimmermann can see what the real battle is. The PGP
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community is not likely to win their battle in court, and the effect of
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such a court battle will be divisive and ultimately may help the government
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in its plans. Phil Z. is most unlikely to ever see any real revenues from
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PGP.
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I think the benefits of a strong, legal, supported crypto product are
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greater than the dubious benefits of having a "free" piece of software. At
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any reasonable hourly wage, the cost of MailSafe ($125, last time I
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checked) is dwarfed by the amount of time crypto activists like ourselves
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spend debating it, downloading it, awaiting patched versions, etc.
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(All is not rosy on the RSA Data side, either. RSA Data chose to
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concentrate on getting RSA built in to e-mail products from the major
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companies and chose not to devote much effort to PGP-like personal
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encryption products (such as MailSafe, which runs on DOS and UNIX only and
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which hasn't changed much since 1988). Support for RSA Data should mean
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more support for these kinds of products. We could essentially ask RSA for
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a commitment in this area.)
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I'm arguing that we should look carefully and see what the real issues are,
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who the real enemy is, and then make plans accordingly.
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Awaiting your feedback,
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-Tim May
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--
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Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
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tcmay@netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
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408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
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W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, smashing of governments.
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Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.
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Waco Massacre + Big Brother Wiretap Chip = A Nazi Regime
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________________________________________________________________________
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From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic@eff.org>
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Subject: Some thoughts on Clipper and the Constitution
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To: e*c
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Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 11:15:17 EDT
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Note: These notes were a response to a question during Saturday's
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Cypherpunks meeting about the possible implications of the Clipper
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Chip initiative on Fourth Amendment rights. Forward to anyone else who
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might think these interesting.
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--Mike
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Notes on Cryptography, Digital Telephony, and the Bill of Rights
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By Mike Godwin
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I. Introduction
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A. The recent announcement of the federal government's "Clipper
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Chip" has started me thinking again about what the principled "pure
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Constitutional" arguments a) opposed to Digital Telephony and b) in favor
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of the continuing legality of widespread powerful public-key encryption.
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B. These notes do *not* include many of the complaints that have
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already been raised about the Clipper Chip initiative, such as:
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1. Failure of the Administration to conduct an inquiry before
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embracing a standard,
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2. Refusal to allow public scrutiny of the chosen encryption
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algorithm(s), which is the normal procedure for testing a cryptographic
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scheme, and
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3. Failure of the administration to address the policy questions
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raised by the Clipper Chip, such as whether the right balance between
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privacy and law-enforcement needs has been struck.
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C. In other words, they do not address complaints about the federal
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government's *process* in embracing the Clipper Chip system. They do,
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however, attempt to address some of the substantive legal and
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Constitutional questions raised by the Clipper Chip and Digital Telephony
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initiatives.
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II. Hard Questions from Law Enforcement
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A. In trying to clarify my own thinking about the possible
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Constitutional issues raised by the government's efforts to guarantee
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access to public communications between individuals, I have spoken and
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argued with a number of individuals who are on the other side of the
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issues from me, including Dorothy Denning and various respresentatives of
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the FBI, including Alan McDonald.
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B. McDonald, like Denning and other proponents both of Digital
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Telephony and of a standard key-escrow system for cryptography, is fond of
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asking hard questions: What if FBI had a wiretap authorization order and
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couldn't implement it, either because it was impossible to extract the
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right bits from a digital-telephony data stream, or because the
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communication was encrypted? Doesn't it make sense to have a law that
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requires the phone companies to be able to comply with a wiretap order?
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C. Rather than respond to these questions, for now at least let's
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ask a different question. Suppose the FBI had an authorization order for a
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secret microphone at a public restaurant. Now suppose it planted the bug,
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but couldn't make out the conversation it was authorized to "seize"
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because of background noise at the restaurant. Wouldn't it make sense to
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have a law requiring everyone to speak more softly in restaurants and not
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to clatter the dishes so much?
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D. This response is not entirely facetious. The Department of
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Justice and the FBI have consistently insisted that they are not seeking
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new authority under the federal wiretap statutes ("Title III"). The same
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statute that was drafted to outline the authority for law enforcement to
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tap telephonic conversations was also drafted to outline law enforcement's
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authority to capture normal spoken conversations with secret or remote
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microphones. (The statute was amended in the middle '80s by the Electronic
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Communications Privacy Act to protect "electronic communications," which
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includes e-mail, and a new chapter protecting _stored_ electronic
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communications was also added.)
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E. Should we understand the law the way Digital Telephony
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proponents insist we do--as a law designed to mandate that the FBI (for
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example) be guaranteed access to telephonic communications? Digital
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Telephony supporters insist that it merely "clarifies" phone company
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obligations and governmental rights under Title III. If they're right,
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then I think we have to understand the provisions regarding "oral
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communications" the same way. Which is to say, it would make perfect sense
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to have a law requiring that people speak quietly in public places, so as
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to guarantee that the government can bug an oral conversation if it needs
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to.
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F. But of course I don't really take Digital Telephony as an
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initiative to "clarify" governmental prerogatives. It seems clear to me
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that Digital Telephony, together with the "Clipper" initiative, prefigure
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a government strategy to set up an information regime that precludes truly
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private communications between individuals who are speaking in any way
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other than face-to-face. This I think is an expansion of government
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authority by almost any analysis.
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III. Digital Telephony, Cryptography, and the Fourth Amendment
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A. In talking with law enforcement representatives such as Gail
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Thackeray, one occasionally encounters the view that the Fourth Amendment
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is actually a _grant_ of a Constitutional entitlement to searches and
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seizures. This interpretation is jolting to those who have studied the
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history of the Fourth Amendment and who recognize that it was drafted as a
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limitation on government power, not as a grant of government power. But
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even if one doesn't know the history of this amendment, one can look at
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its language and draw certain conclusions.
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B. The Fourth Amendment reads: "The right of the people to be
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secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
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searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
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but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
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particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
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things to be seized."
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C. Conspicuously missing from the language of this amendment is any
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guarantee that the government, with properly obtained warrant in hand,
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will be _successful_ in finding the right place to be searched or persons
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or things to be seized. What the Fourth Amendment is about is _obtaining
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warrants_--similarly, what the wiretap statutes are about is _obtaining
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authorization_ for wiretaps and other interceptions. Neither the Fourth
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Amendment nor Title III nor the other protections of the ECPA constitute
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an law-enforcement _entitlement_ for law enforcement.
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D. It follows, then, that if digital telephony or widespread
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encryption were to create new burdens for law enforcement, this would not,
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as some law-enforcement representatives have argued, constitute an
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"effective repeal" of Title III. What it would constitute is a change in
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the environment in which law enforcement, along with the rest of us, has
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to work. Technology often creates changes in our social environment--some,
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such as the original innovation of the wiretap, may aid law enforcement,
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while others, such as powerful public-key cryptography, pose the risk of
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inhibiting law enforcement. Historically, law enforcement has responded to
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technological change by adapting. (Indeed, the original wiretaps were an
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adaptation to the widespread use of the telephone.) Does it make sense for
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law enforcement suddenly to be able to require that the rest of society
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adapt to its perceived needs?
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IV. Cryptography and the First Amendment
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A. Increasingly, I have come to see two strong links between the
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the use of cryptography and the First Amendment. The two links are freedom
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of expression and freedom of association.
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B. By "freedom of expression" I mean the traditionally understood
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freedoms of speech and the press, as well as freedom of inquiry, which has
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also long been understood to be protected by the First Amendment. It is
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hard to see how saying or publishing something that happens to be
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encrypted could not be protected under the First Amendment. It would be a
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very poor freedom of speech indeed that dictated that we could *never*
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choose the form in which we speak. Even the traditional limitations on
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freedom of speech have never reached so far. My decision to encrypt a
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communication should be no more illegal than my decision to speak in code.
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To take one example, suppose my mother and I agree that the code "777",
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when sent to me through my pager, means "I want you to call me and tell me
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how my grandchild is doing." Does the FBI have a right to complain because
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they don't know what "777" means? Should the FBI require pager services
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never to allow such codes to be used? The First Amendment, it seems to me,
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requires that both questions be answered "No."
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C. "Freedom of association" is a First Amendment right that was
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first clearly articulated in a Supreme Court case in 1958: NAACP v.
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Alabama ex rel. Patterson. In that case, the Court held that Alabama could
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not require the NAACP to disclose a list of its members residing in
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Alabama. The Court accepted the NAACP's argument that disclosure of its
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list would lead to reprisals on its members; it held such forced
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disclosures, by placing an undue burden on NAACP members' exercise of
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their freedoms of association and expression, effectively negate those
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freedoms. (It is also important to note here that the Supreme Court in
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effect recognized that anonymity might be closely associated with First
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Amendment rights.)
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D. If a law guaranteeing disclosure of one's name is sufficiently
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"chilling" of First Amendment rights to be unconstitutional, surely a law
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requiring that the government be able to read any communications is also
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"chilling," not only of my right to speak, but also of my decisions on
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whom to speak to. Knowing that I cannot guarantee the privacy of my
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communications may mean that I don't conspire to arrange any drug deals or
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kidnapping-murders (or that I'll be detected if do), but it also may mean
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that I choose not to use this medium to speak to a loved one, or my
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lawyer, or to my psychiatrist, or to an outspoken political activist.
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Given that computer-based communications are likely to become the dominant
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communications medium in the next century, isn't this chilling effect an
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awfully high price to pay in order to keep law enforcement from having to
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devise new solutions to new problems?
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V. Rereading the Clipper Chip announcements
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A. It is important to recognize that the Clipper Chip represents,
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among other things, an effort by the government to pre-empt certain
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criticisms. The language of announcements makes clear that the government
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wants us to believe it has recognized all needs and come up with a
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credible solution to the dilemma many believe is posed by the ubiquity of
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powerful cryptography.
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B. Because the government is attempting to appear to take a
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"moderate" or "balanced" position to the issue, its initiative will tend
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to pre-empt criticisms of the government's proposal on the grounds of
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*process* alone.
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C. But there is more to complain about here than bad process. My
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rereading of the Clipper Chip announcements will reveal that the
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government hopes to develop a national policy that includes limitations on
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some kinds of cryptography. Take the following two statements, for
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example:
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D. 'We need the "Clipper Chip" and other approaches that can both
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provide law-abiding citizens with access to the encryption they need and
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prevent criminals from using it to hide their illegal activities.'
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E. 'The Administration is not saying, "since encryption threatens
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the public safety and effective law enforcement, we will prohibit it
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outright" (as some countries have effectively done); nor is the U.S.
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saying that "every American, as a matter of right, is entitled to an
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unbreakable commercial encryption product." '
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F. It is clear that neither Digital Telephony nor the Clipper Chip
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make any sense without restrictions on other kinds of encryption.
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Widespread powerful public-key encryption, for example, would render
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useless any improved wiretappability in the communications
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infrastructure, and would render superfluous any key-escrow scheme.
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G. It follows, then, that we should anticipate, consistent with
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these two initiatives, an eventual effort to prevent or inhibit the use of
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powerful private encryption schemes in private hands.
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H. Together with the Digital Telephony and Clipper Chip
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initiatives, this effort would, in my opinion, constitute an attempt to
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shift the Constitutional balance of rights and responsibilities against
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private entities and individuals and in favor of law enforcement. They
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would, in effect, create _entitlements_ for law enforcement where none
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existed before.
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I. As my notes here suggest, these initiatives may be, in their
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essence, inconsistent with Constitutional guarantees of expression,
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association, and privacy.
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________________________________________________________________________
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Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 12:09:01 -0700
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To: Cypherpunks@toad.com
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From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
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Subject: MEETING SUMMARY: 4-24-93 Cypherpunks Meeting
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Cc: tcmay@netcom.com, jim@rsa.com, tenney@netcom.com
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Several people have asked for summaries (or minutes) for our physical
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Cypherpunks meetings, especially for our "Emergency Ad Hoc Meeting" a few
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days ago.
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Some Reasons NOT to do Minutes:
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* it formalizes a fundamentally informal meeting (recall that Cypherpunks
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have no legal status, no structure, no voting procedures, no officers,
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etc.).
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* some folks may be leery of having their names appear.
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* the credit assignment problem: as soon as summaries are written, people
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begin to complain that someone else got the credit for their idea, that
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their views weren't mentioned in the summary, and so forth.
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* somebody has to take the notes needed to generate the summary.
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Some Reasons IN FAVOR of Minutes:
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* with 40 people at our last meeting (counting the audio conference call,
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via Internet, to Boston and Washington, D.C.), with more than 400 on our
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mailing list, and with the Wiretap Chip events, these are historic times.
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(Fortunately, the list itself is a valuable archive of our history. Let's
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hope good archives are being kept by someone!)
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* folks who cannot attend physical meetings may still want to know what's
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basically going on. (And perhaps other groups will nucleate and grow.)
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* even folks who were at the meeting may want a summary, to keep their
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memories refreshed.
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So, some pros and cons to writing up a summary. What I plan to do here is
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to just write up a very brief snapshot summary, oriented more toward
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informing the non-attendees than to reminding the attendees of action items
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or things they agreed to do.
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Anyone with additions to make is of course encouraged to do so. Using the
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"MEETING SUMMARY:" prefix might be useful.
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1. The Meeting Itself.
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Saturday, 24 April 1993, 12 noon to past 6 p.m. (when I had to leave).
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Offices of Cygnus Support, in Mountain View. Approximately 25-30 in
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attendance, including several new faces.
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John Gilmore was selling issues of "Wired" at cost.
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An amazing conference call was made to sites in Northern Virginia (Bob
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Stafford, Paul Ferguson, others) and to Boston (Marc Horowitz, Derek
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Atkins, others). What was amazing was that the audio went through the
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Internet and was DES-encrypted (for a while at least, until complaints by
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one of the sites about the audio quality caused us to turn off the
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encryption). Still, seeing an encrypted Internet conference call was
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something...a small step toward the world of Vinge's "True Names."
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Jim Bidzos, President of RSA Data Security, intended to just speak briefly
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about the Clipper Chip, Capstone, and the view of RSA, but ended up staying
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and participating for several hours. Mike Godwin, of EFF, was present at
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the Boston (I think) site. Glenn Tenney, organizers of the Hackers
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Conference and general activist, was also present for the first time. The
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other usual folks were there, including many active in cryptography and
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data security. (My apologies for not mentioning any other luminaries here.)
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All in all, a stimulating meeting.
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2. The Theme: The Clipper Chip.
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This of course dominated the discussion all day, and was the explicit
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reason for the emergency meeting. There's too much to cover here in detail.
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Jim Bidzos and Arthur Abraham both presented information on the Clipper
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Chip, including a long data sheet from Mykrotronx (sent to Arthur) on their
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Myk-78 chip. (Copies distributed, and also faxed to the remote sites.)
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There was some debate about who Mykotronx was and whether it was really
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independent from the NSA.
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Capstone, the follow-on program, is a superset of Clipper and contains the
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DSS signature standard (which RSA Data led the fight against...and most of
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thought it was a dead issue--then it appeared here!). No public key methods
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are known to be incorporated, thought they may be. (Lots of analysis and
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question-asking still to be done.)
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Reverse-engineering was also discussed. VLSI Technology, the chip company,
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is a partner with Mykrotronx and apparently has a tamper-resistant chip
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technology.
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3. What Motivated the Clipper Chip?
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It appears the Clipper/Capstone program is initially intended to "buy
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market share" as quickly as possible, with government offices requiring
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|
Clipperphones (and probably for those they do business with). Perhaps the
|
|
intent is undercut competing models and make Clipper the de facto standard,
|
|
which can then be made the de jure standard.
|
|
|
|
Some think the key escrow features were added _late_ in the proposal and
|
|
may even be _expected_ to fail (fail in the sense of key escrow agencies
|
|
never getting rolling, issues never getting resolved, etc.). This fits with
|
|
the idea of built-in backdoor to the enciphered traffic. The Agency may be
|
|
more interested in quickly proliferating a breakable "standard" for voice
|
|
encryption than in implementing the key escrow idea. (Left unanswered in
|
|
this speculation is how court-ordered wiretaps would then be
|
|
executed...would the FBI and NSA simply acknowledge the weakness? I don't
|
|
think so.)
|
|
|
|
The secrecy of the Clipper/Capstone project was quite impressive. Bidzos
|
|
confirmed again, and convincingly, that he knew *nothing* of this whole
|
|
effort until the announcement (or possibly the night before, when a
|
|
reporter called him?). Apparently John Markoff, who sometimes reads this
|
|
list and can comment if he wishes, had figured out some aspects or had been
|
|
told them by a source, and was preparing an article for the "NY Times."
|
|
This may've prompted the announcement timing.
|
|
|
|
Several people commented that several previously-puzzling events become
|
|
clearer in retrospect, such as the then-unknown Mykrotronx sniffing around
|
|
to get an RSA license (which they don't yet have).
|
|
|
|
I can't recap all the discussion, much of which was similar to what's been
|
|
going on in sci.crypt and elsewhere. Everyone agreed that this was a
|
|
seminal event, that the Clipper/Capstone announcement is a crucial event.
|
|
|
|
|
|
3. Lobbying Against the Clipper Chip
|
|
|
|
The profound consequences call for major efforts.
|
|
|
|
We discussed boycotting products, spreading negative reports, and reverse
|
|
engineering the algorithm and publishing it so software solutions can
|
|
spoof/imitate _part_ of the system (i.e., so someone with a SoundBlaster
|
|
board or other system can talk to someone with one of these Clipperphones
|
|
without escrowing keys or being wiretappable)
|
|
|
|
John Gilmore has already posted to the list the results of our
|
|
brainstorming session to come up with questions to ask the FBI, NIST, NSA,
|
|
Congress, and the Administration. Mike Godwin argued that a lot of
|
|
embarrassing questions could quickly derail the plan. Others confirmed that
|
|
the NSA mathematicians seemed to be put on the spot by the many questions.
|
|
That is, it's conceivable this plan could begin to unravel fairly soon.
|
|
|
|
|
|
4. Educating the Public.
|
|
|
|
The Boston group took this as their focus of the rest of the meeting (we
|
|
went offline after about an hour or so on the conference call). I haven't
|
|
heard the results.
|
|
|
|
|
|
5. Lobbying the Legislature and Officials.
|
|
|
|
Similarly, the D.C. group took this as their area of involvement. No
|
|
feedback yet.
|
|
|
|
|
|
6. What Happens if Clipper Flops?
|
|
|
|
An interesting discussion out in the lobby (and I probably missed many such
|
|
interesting discussions!) had to do with scenarios for how Clipper may
|
|
fail. Whit Diffie described how the failure could either so greatly
|
|
embarrass the Administration that they'd be loathe to try it again (the
|
|
Viet Nam Syndrome, applied to crypto) or that it could provoke them to
|
|
tighten restrictions even further, perhaps even to the point of an outright
|
|
ban on the use of unapproved encryption at *any* level. (Issues of
|
|
enforceability, detectability, Constitutional issues, etc., of course exist
|
|
and will be points of attack on any such comprehensive ban.)
|
|
|
|
(The question of whether Clipper and Capstone applies, either now or later,
|
|
to *data* came up several times. The Capstone chip is rated at "10-16
|
|
Mbps," which implies it is targeted for Ethernet-type speeds, and hence
|
|
data. There was general agreement by all I heard that the Clipper/Capstone
|
|
program is indeed intended to target more than just voice encryption and
|
|
that our fears about restrictions on strong crypto are justified.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
7. Other Miscellaneous Topics
|
|
|
|
* Since Jim Bidzos was there, the topic of PGP naturally came up several
|
|
times. Eric Hughes let this run for a while, then moved the discussion back
|
|
to Clipper. Jim Bidzos clearly had some strong opinions, but also did not
|
|
want this to be the forum for debating patents and the legality and ethics
|
|
of PGP. He did acknowledge, in my opinion, the point that RSA Data Security
|
|
had somewhat neglected the individual end-user (in products such as
|
|
MailSafe, which hasn't changed since 1988), in favor of the many large
|
|
deals with Lotus, Microsoft, Apple, etc., to get RSA installed in their
|
|
e-mail software. He acknowledged that in some sense this left an ecological
|
|
niche for a product like PGP to fill, though he insisted that such a
|
|
product could be legally developed and distributed if it used the "RSAREF"
|
|
package and wasn't sold commercially. (There are lots of threads and
|
|
keywords here: RSAREF, RIPEM, TIPEM, B-SAFE, Apple's OCE, etc.)
|
|
|
|
(Some of us continue to hope some accommodation can be reached between RSA
|
|
Data and the PGP community. The upcoming battle over strong crypto is a
|
|
bigger issue than this squabble. I remain convinced that RSA Data Security
|
|
is "on our side" in this fight for continued access to strong crypto. In
|
|
fact, in my opinion, the Clipper/Capstone program looks to be a complete
|
|
end-run around RSA and public key techniques, a thinly disguised attempt to
|
|
seize control of the crypto market from RSA. In this battle, RSA may be
|
|
fighting for their economic survival!)
|
|
|
|
* The issue of the name of our group, the Cypherpunks name, was not
|
|
discussed. The U.K. group has apparently picked "U.K. Cryptoprivacy Group"
|
|
as their name.
|
|
|
|
* The normal schedule for meetings will continue, with the next regular
|
|
Cypherpunks (Bay Area) meeting on Saturday, 8 May.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Well, this is my summary. Feedback is welcome. While I don't want to take
|
|
meticulous notes the way a "Recording Secretary" is supposed to, I don't
|
|
mind writing up these kinds of snapshot summaries.
|
|
|
|
May you live in interesting times, indeed!
|
|
|
|
-Tim May
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
|
|
tcmay@netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
|
|
408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
|
|
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, smashing of governments.
|
|
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.
|
|
Waco Massacre + Big Brother Wiretap Chip = A Nazi Regime
|
|
|
|
________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 1993 12:17:26 -0500
|
|
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
|
|
From: matt@oc.com (Matthew Lyle)
|
|
Subject: MacWeek article on Clipper/Capstone
|
|
|
|
MacWEEK 04.26.93
|
|
|
|
Page 1
|
|
|
|
SECURITY CHIPS TRIGGER ALARM
|
|
|
|
Clipper and Capstone open digital back door.
|
|
|
|
By Mitch Ratcliffe
|
|
|
|
Washington -- The White House and National Security Agency, as part of
|
|
a wide-ranging retooling of U.S. privacy policies, are preparing two
|
|
encryption chips for use in the computer and telecommunications
|
|
industries. Privacy advocates cried foul last week because the chips
|
|
include a back door that allows police to monitor communications.
|
|
|
|
The Clipper chip announced this month can encrypt voice and data
|
|
communications at up to 16Mbps. Clipper is due to debut in secure
|
|
telephones from AT&T Co. this summer. The second chip, called Capstone
|
|
and currently under development at the NSA, is a superset of Clipper that
|
|
will implement the much-criticized Digital Signature Standard to add
|
|
authentication capabilities. Its existence was revealed during a briefing
|
|
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge last week.
|
|
|
|
President Clinton ordered the National Institute of Standards and
|
|
Technology to establish Clipper as a federal standard. Since the
|
|
government is the largest computer customer in the world, its Federal
|
|
Information Processing Standards (FIPS) often are imposed on the industry
|
|
as de facto standards.
|
|
|
|
If Capstone follows Clipper into the FIPS requirements, DSS could usurp RSA
|
|
Data Security Inc.'s public-key encryption scheme, which Apple licensed
|
|
for AOCE (Apple Open Collaboration Environment).
|
|
|
|
But Apple's representative at the NSA briefing, Gursharan Sidhu, technical
|
|
director of collaborative computer and leader of the AOCE project, said
|
|
he is not worried that the government will force an encryption scheme
|
|
on the industry.
|
|
|
|
"We were given the impression that they are very open to suggestions,"
|
|
Sidhu said, adding that the government is faced with a growing conundrum as
|
|
it tries to simultaneously protect privacy and maintain its ability
|
|
to tap lawbreakers' communications.
|
|
|
|
"People have the idea that in cellular the security of communications
|
|
had gone away, so there is pressure to encrypt. [Without a back door], even
|
|
the casual criminal would be able to communicate with invincible
|
|
security," Sidhu said. "Law-enforcement agencies wouldn't be able to
|
|
collect intelligence."
|
|
|
|
A spokesman for NIST said Capstone will not be introduced unless the
|
|
president's review of national encryption policy conclueds it is needed.
|
|
But he also said the Department of Defense and NSA are already working
|
|
to develope a PCMCIA card-based implementation of Capstone for a
|
|
classified defense messaging system.
|
|
|
|
The NSA confirmed it is working on Capstone but could not confirm
|
|
the Capstone PCMCIA card project.
|
|
|
|
Clipper and Capstone use a "key escrow" technology that lets
|
|
law-enforcement agencies with a court order unscramble conversations
|
|
and documents. To reduce the potential for wiretap abuse, two agencies
|
|
to be named by Attorney General Janet Reno will hold half of each key. The
|
|
NSA said the key escrow agents will not be law-enforcement agencies.
|
|
|
|
Privacy advocates complained that the algorithms that perform Clipper
|
|
scrambling functions will remain classified. Encryptin technologies
|
|
typically gain acceptance only after cryptographers pore over the
|
|
component algorithms and key management systems.
|
|
|
|
"We can't protect the key escrow features if we reveal the algorithm
|
|
to the public ... that's caused some heartburn," said John Podesta, staff
|
|
secretary to President Clinton. "I'm not suggesting that the public
|
|
should trust us any more than any other government agency, but we are
|
|
doing a more comprehensive review [than any previous administration]."
|
|
|
|
Podesta said the Clinton team is taking a free-market approach to
|
|
encryption, in contrast to the previous administrations, which tried to
|
|
legislate simplified approaches.
|
|
|
|
"In the wireless communications environment, we have to more the ball
|
|
forward on security and privacy," Podesta said. "The jury's still out on
|
|
whether [Clipper] is the answer."
|
|
|
|
Jim Bidzos, president of RSA Data Security of Redwood City, Calif.,
|
|
said the NSA is using Clipper and Capstone in an attempt to confuse the
|
|
market for privacy-enhancing technologies. "It takes three or four
|
|
years fo rthis kind of proposal to die." Bidzos said. Computer and
|
|
communications companies might withhold support for any standard,
|
|
giving the NSA more time to prepare for the encrypted world, he said.
|
|
|
|
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, a Washington, D.C.
|
|
based public-interest group, has filed 11 Freedom of Information Act
|
|
requests for access to Clipper development records. The group suspects
|
|
the NSA and NIST violated the Computer Security Act of 1987, whic limits
|
|
the NSA's role in development of public encryption technologies to
|
|
providing advice and assistance. NSA said it developed both chips.
|
|
|
|
|
|
________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 1993 22:36:01 -0700
|
|
From: Arthur Abraham <a2@well.sf.ca.us>
|
|
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
|
|
Subject: MYK-78
|
|
|
|
|
|
I've been stalking Mykotronx with phone and smail since right
|
|
after the announcement, and finally got through the guy who
|
|
kept telling me that I'd undertand if I just knew a little
|
|
more crypto, to the guy who really know what was going on and
|
|
wanted to tell me. This is what I found out:
|
|
|
|
Mykotronx MYK-78 has been identified as the Privacy "Clipper"
|
|
chip. The "Clipper" name comes from Washington, and the guys
|
|
at Mykotronx know about the Intergraph chip.
|
|
|
|
The data sheets, as those of you who have read them know, are
|
|
confusing, incomplete and internally inconsistent. This is
|
|
evident even if you do not consider that they are to implement
|
|
the social protocol described by Dorothy Denning (her
|
|
19-Apr-93 paper, as published in Cypherpunks).
|
|
|
|
After some discussions with Mykotronx, I was able to convince
|
|
them of the truth of the last paragraph and to have them
|
|
explain just what the chip was designed to do. I would also
|
|
like to emphasize that these discussions revealed that the
|
|
poor quality of the documentation does not result from any
|
|
attempt to obscure the operation of the chip, they were very
|
|
forth coming and eager to discuss its operation. The
|
|
deficiencies result more from the nature of a military
|
|
contractor's relationship to its one customer: the customer
|
|
understands how to use the chip so there's no pressure to get
|
|
it described carefully. Going public was a bit of a surprise
|
|
to them, in fact the announcement was made during their
|
|
application engineer's vacation. I am sure there is an
|
|
interesting story in this timing, but the people I was talking
|
|
to didn't seem to know it.
|
|
|
|
On to the chip:
|
|
|
|
You don't just hook up a clear-text bit stream to one end and
|
|
get a Denning-stream out the other. It needs a bit of care
|
|
and feeding.
|
|
|
|
At startup it requires a Random Seed (8 bytes/64-bits) and a
|
|
crypto-variable CV (10 bytes/80-bits) for its DES-type
|
|
algorithm. This is Denning's "skipjack" algorithm and, like
|
|
DES, is a symmetric key block cypher, which performs in all
|
|
the DES modes:
|
|
|
|
64-Bit Electronic Code Book (ECB)
|
|
64-Bit Cypher Block Chaining (CBC)
|
|
8/16/32/64 Bit Cypher Feedback
|
|
64-Bit Output Feedback (OFB)
|
|
|
|
In the last three modes the encryption of each block is
|
|
dependent on the previous blocks. (If you care to know more
|
|
about DES modes, see FIPS-PUB 81 which is cited in the data
|
|
sheets.)
|
|
|
|
One other thing about Skipjack: Denning describes it as having
|
|
"32 rounds of scrambling" and this is supported by the data
|
|
sheet's timing charts, which note 64 clocks cycles to complete
|
|
an encryption. Since this would operate on an 8-byte/64-bit
|
|
block, with the 15MHz internal clock we appear to have roughly
|
|
a 10M-bit/1.3MB transfer rate in encryption/decryption. This
|
|
is fast enough for the average telephone, or several
|
|
telephones, or maybe a stereo CD. It's probably just average
|
|
performance for 1 micron technology and some units clock up to
|
|
30MHz (they expect 0.8 micron eventually, with improved
|
|
performance).
|
|
|
|
Back to the Crypto-Variable, CV. The CV is the session key,
|
|
is selected off-chip, and must always be accompanied by a 3
|
|
byte/24-bit checkword. Where do you get the check word?...
|
|
you ask the chip! If you load a CV with a bad checkword, the
|
|
chip sets its ERROR line -- oh, sadness. But then you can
|
|
read out a good checkword, and subsiquently reload the same CV
|
|
with the good checkword (happy now?). The checkword is
|
|
actually just the first three bytes from an application of
|
|
Skipjack to the CV.
|
|
|
|
Do all this and the chip is loaded and ready for plaintext.
|
|
You could just give it an Encryption command, and start
|
|
pulling cyphertext out the other side, but who would
|
|
understand it? First you have to get the key information out
|
|
of the chip and send it to the chip on the other side of the
|
|
link.
|
|
|
|
Skipjack is DES-like so to run a decryption mode on the other
|
|
chip we're going to have to send it the session key, CV, and
|
|
the Initial Vector, IV, which is the starting state of the
|
|
stream for the non-ECB modes of operation. We selected CV
|
|
ourselves, and learned its checkword during the startup
|
|
experience, but where's IV?
|
|
|
|
Well, we generate it using "a feature not found in current DES
|
|
chips" (data sheet, 1-3). And quite a feature it is, too. We
|
|
use this command, Generate IV, and it makes all 8
|
|
bytes/64-bits of the IV, based on the Random Seed... But
|
|
That's Not ALL!
|
|
|
|
You issue the Generate IV command three (3) times to get the
|
|
full 24 byte/192-bit LEEF block. LEEF = Law Enforcement
|
|
Exploitation Field. (I wrote this down very carefully to be
|
|
sure I had it right.)
|
|
|
|
...Actually, you issue a Read Data command after each Generate
|
|
IV command, but I won't bore you with details. The first 8
|
|
bytes/64-bits are called L1 or LEEF-1, the second 8
|
|
bytes/64-bits are L2 or LEEF-2, and then here is the IV we've
|
|
all been waiting for, in its full 8 byte/64-bit glory. You
|
|
probably noticed that LEEF is 24 bytes/192-bits long, and has
|
|
the structure [L1,L2,IV]. Mykotronx is not supposed to tell
|
|
us the structure of L1,L2.
|
|
|
|
The interesting thing is that [CV,checkword,L1,L2,IV] is a
|
|
self-checking unit. The receiving chip checks it as it is
|
|
loaded. If something is wrong, the chip sets its ERROR line.
|
|
If CV is fermished, you have to get all the way to IV before
|
|
you're rasberried. In transmitting this we are advised to
|
|
encrypt CV because it is, after all, the session key.
|
|
|
|
OK, so we are encrypting and the other chip is decrypting.
|
|
Suppose something happens and the other chip wants to talk to
|
|
us, so that it encrypts and we decrypt. It has all it needs
|
|
to encrypt and we have all we need to decrypt, but one more
|
|
thing has to be done. We need to save the state of the
|
|
chaining cypher so we can resume it at the same place in the
|
|
chain when we return to encrypting. Use the Save State
|
|
command, which pops out 8 bytes/64-bits of Saved State, SS, or
|
|
the current contents of the Skipjack encryption register. To
|
|
make this a bit clearer, if we pulled the Saved State right
|
|
after Generate IV, we'd find SS = IV.
|
|
|
|
The chip's serial number is 4-bytes/32-bits long, not the 3.75
|
|
bytes/30-bits Denning reported, but don't worry, _you'll_
|
|
never see it. It and the family key are written in over pins
|
|
Vpp1 and Vpp2, which are then burned out. All chips are
|
|
currently planned to have the same family key, but if you
|
|
happen to meet a chip with a different family key and it sends
|
|
you [CV,checkword,L1,L2,IV], you could understand it.
|
|
|
|
That's the main part of what's missing from the data sheets.
|
|
The rest works pretty much as described, and is at a level of
|
|
detail too fine to interest anyone except a compulsive
|
|
hardware wonk. Oh, one more thing, on page 1-4 where the
|
|
Configuration Register is shown with two "Arm CV" bits, the
|
|
one at position D5 should be "Arm IV".
|
|
|
|
-a2.
|
|
|
|
ps: I will be at a meeting the rest of the week, so please
|
|
don't expect me to respond to requests for clarification until
|
|
I return. Sorry.
|
|
|
|
-a2.
|
|
|
|
________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
From: szabo@techbook.com (Nick Szabo)
|
|
Subject: How to protect your electronic privacy -- consumer pamphlet
|
|
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
|
|
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 1993 03:20:30 -0700 (PDT)
|
|
|
|
Here is a handout I've written for our next Portland-area libertarian
|
|
meeting. Comments welcome. Feel free to distribute freely (you
|
|
can edit out Portland-specific stuff) with attributions.
|
|
|
|
----------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
How to Protect Your Electronic Privacy
|
|
Nick Szabo, April 30 1993
|
|
Distribute Freely
|
|
|
|
We conduct more and more of our legal, political, and private business
|
|
over the wires. Every decade, the number of phone calls that the
|
|
government can record for later playback increases by a factor of ten.
|
|
Commercial organizations gather and sell our transactions; marketers
|
|
and governments cross-reference them, forming our vast electronic
|
|
reputation. The number of e-mail messages doubles every year, and many
|
|
political organizations are coming to rely on networks like Internet and
|
|
LiberNet. Most e-mail users are unaware that it is the most public
|
|
medium ever invented, and use it to write love letters, letters to their
|
|
lawyer, discussion of illegal activities, etc. Vast volumes of e-mail
|
|
can be stored on small magnetic tapes and searched in bulk for keywords,
|
|
eg "mari[jh]uana". The good news is, the computer brings an even greater
|
|
weapon to fight these threats to our privacy and political freedoms: widely
|
|
available, automatic cryptography.
|
|
|
|
Instead of developing phones allowing truly private conversations, which
|
|
are now feasible, AT&T recently put a phone on the market that contains
|
|
the NSA-designed "Clipper" wiretap chip. All users' encryption keys are
|
|
registered with the U.S. government, giving it exclusive access to
|
|
wiretapping this system's phones. The use of an unpublished algorithm
|
|
and other features also make the system insecure. "Clipper" would also
|
|
make traffic analysis (finding out who is calling whom, when, etc.)
|
|
much easier. The goal of this government/Ma Bell collusion is to
|
|
subsidize the creation of a standard that forces truly private phone
|
|
systems off the market.
|
|
|
|
By purposefully allowing a government backdoor in its "secure" phones,
|
|
AT&T has demonstrated its contempt for its customers' privacy. Here are
|
|
some other long-distance providers that may have more respect. All U.S.
|
|
line providers are required to surrender to telephone taps under
|
|
government "authorization", but some require more "authorization" than
|
|
others, or otherwise make a greater fuss about it. Local wiretaps are
|
|
beyond the control of long-distance companies, but long-distance
|
|
eavesdropping is much more difficult if the company uses fiber optic
|
|
instead of microwave links. Ask company representatives for details.
|
|
|
|
Allnet Long Distance Services 1-800-783-2020
|
|
MCI, commercial 1-800-888-0800
|
|
MCI, residential 1-800-950-5555
|
|
Metromedia Communications Corp. 1-800-275-2273
|
|
One-2-One Communications 1-800-293-4121
|
|
Sprint, residential 1-800-877-7746
|
|
Sprint, business 1-800-733-5566
|
|
|
|
Real phone privacy can be obtained with a veil of encryption, by using
|
|
pairs of phones containing privacy chips, which scramble the
|
|
signals *and* keep the keys private. Contact your local business
|
|
telephone dealers for privacy phones from Ericson, Cylink and other
|
|
companies. Keep your eye out for portable-computer-based
|
|
software with voice input that can be used to encrypt voice mail
|
|
and send it over the networks like e-mail; these may be appearing
|
|
on the market or as freeware within six months.
|
|
|
|
Data privacy can be obtained with public-key encryption
|
|
features which have been added to some of the newer e-mail packages
|
|
from Microsoft, Apple, Novell, etc. Beware: most software encryption
|
|
has been restricted by the U.S. government to very weak algorithms.
|
|
"Cypherpunks" enjoy writing programs to crack the weakened file
|
|
encryption in Word Perfect, Lotus, etc. Be sure the software contains
|
|
the new "RSA" public-key algorithm, which probably cannot be cracked
|
|
by anybody, even the NSA with their buildings full of supercomputers.
|
|
A strong freeware RSA package is also available called Pretty Good
|
|
Privacy (PGP); this is the international standard on the Internet.
|
|
PGP can also be used for protecting the files on your PC. On an Internet
|
|
machine type "archie pgp" to find out where PGP is available for
|
|
download. Several BBS systems also have PGP available.
|
|
|
|
In public key encryption, there are two keys, one used to lock
|
|
(really scramble) the data, the other to unlock (unscramble) the data.
|
|
To join the fun, publish or send your freinds your public key, and
|
|
they can then send you messages only you can unlock with your private
|
|
key. You collect other's public keys and do the same. PGP key
|
|
distribution is based on an informal, voluntary web of trust instead
|
|
of the government's rigid heirarchy which is vulnerable to failure
|
|
at the top. Just as today's businessmen trade business cards,
|
|
tommorrow's businessmen will trade public keys -- if the government
|
|
doesn't ban them first.
|
|
|
|
For more detailed information on electronic privacy, see:
|
|
|
|
* Your local phone dealer. If he does not know about privacy
|
|
issues and phone privacy products, ask him to find out!
|
|
* The May/June issue of "Wired" magazine featuring "crypto-rebels"
|
|
on the cover. A history computer cryptography and the "cypherpunk"
|
|
movement, whose goal is to break the government monopoly on cryptography
|
|
and to restore our right to privacy in the electronic age.
|
|
* "Mondo 2000" #9 (most recent) features two good articles on PGP, and
|
|
a third article on protecting our financial privacy from governments.
|
|
* The Winter/Spring issue of "Extropy" features and article on digital
|
|
cash. Unlike current electronic funds transfer, digital cash increases
|
|
financial privacy.
|
|
* On the Internet, the cypherpunks mailing list
|
|
(cypherpunks-request@toad.com) and the newsgroups sci.crypt. In the
|
|
Portland area two Internet providers are agora (293-1772 data) and
|
|
techbook (220-0636 data).
|
|
* Organizations helping lobby for electronic privacy: Electronic Frontier
|
|
Foundation (eff.org), Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
|
|
(cpsr.org), Privacy International. These are not entirely libertarian
|
|
(eg EFF tends to support Gore's socialist "Data Highway".)
|
|
* James Bamford, _The Puzzle Palace_, 1983: A classic expose of the
|
|
National Security Agency.
|
|
|
|
Nick Szabo szabo@techbook.com
|
|
|
|
________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May)
|
|
Subject: COMP.RISKS is where the action seems to be
|
|
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
|
|
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 22:25:14 PDT
|
|
|
|
Comp.risks is carrying extensive coverage of the Clipper Chip issue,
|
|
including Dorothy Denning attempting to defend the Clipper.
|
|
|
|
Sci.crypt and alt.security.clipper still have more messages, but
|
|
comp.risks seems to be the place I check first. Being a digest,
|
|
though, a new one only appears a few times a week.
|
|
|
|
-Tim
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
..........................................................................
|
|
Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
|
|
tcmay@netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
|
|
408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
|
|
W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments.
|
|
Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.
|
|
|
|
________________________________________________________________________
|
|
________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
The SURFPUNK Technical Journal is a dangerous multinational hacker zine
|
|
originating near BARRNET in the fashionable western arm of the northern
|
|
California matrix. Quantum Californians appear in one of two states,
|
|
spin surf or spin punk. Undetected, we are both, or might be neither.
|
|
________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Send postings to <surfpunk@osc.versant.com>, subscription requests
|
|
to <surfpunk-request@osc.versant.com>. MIME encouraged.
|
|
Xanalogical archive access soon. Charming, but may be counterproductive.
|
|
________________________________________________________________________
|
|
________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
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