7809 lines
356 KiB
Plaintext
7809 lines
356 KiB
Plaintext
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==Phrack Inc.==
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Volume Four, Issue Thirty-Eight, File 1 of 15
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Issue XXXVIII Index
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___________________
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P H R A C K 3 8
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April 26, 1992
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___________________
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"Countdown to SummerCon '92"
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"Get ready for the biggest and best computer
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hacker PARTY conference of the year!"
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Phrack Inc. is proud to be the official sponsor of the 6th Annual SummerCon,
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but this year is something different.
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The date and location for this year's Summer Conference are for those with a
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need to know. SummerCon is a private party, its for our friends, and its our
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business and nobody elses'. Events from our past have made it necessary to
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keep the important specifics under wraps, so our theme this year is privacy.
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Would be informants, ignorant and biased security professionals, and little
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malicious rodent hackers can forget about receiving an invitation. We are
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making a list and checking it twice. If you would like to receive an
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invitation and details about SummerCon then send mail to
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"summer@stormking.com".
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Meanwhile, back at Phrack...
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It appears that Phrack is getting VERY popular. At last count we had well over
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775 people directly subscribed to the Phrack Mailing List. However, some
|
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people aren't overjoyed at Phrack's popularity. In recent postings to EFF
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newsgroups, complaints have been lodged that people downloading Phrack from
|
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"ftp.eff.org" account for more than 1/3 of all ftp traffic on that site. Some
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people at EFF have even suggested that Phrack be removed completely from their
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system. When the high and mighty defenders of Knight Lightning's First
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Amendment rights begin to balk, what does that say to the community at large
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about EFF and their agenda?
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In this issue of Phrack we feature "Cellular Telephony" by Brian Oblivion!
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Brian tells us to expect more files on this topic from him in the near future,
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but for now we can start with this very substantial taste. Additionally, this
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issue will wrap up Black Kat's 3-part series on VAX/VMS and Dispater's 2-part
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defense manual for police radar. Rambone is back with his second file on the
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Pirate community and Datastream Cowboy picks up where Taran King left off in
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Phrack 30 with Network Miscellany. And if that wasn't enough, Mycroft brings
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us a file on Wide Area Information Services (WAIS). Subtitled "How Do I Use It
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and Why Should I Care?" It tells you about the service in general and gives
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directions for using WAIS to review Phrack.
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Another spotlight file in this issue is "Standing Up To Fight The Bells."
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Knight Lightning brings forth a message and a warning about what is happening
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right now in the Congress and Senate of the United States, where the Bell
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Operating Companies are seeking to hold on to yet another monopoly to control.
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Be prepared to act and act fast or live forever with the consequences -- the
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future of information services controlled by Ma Bell.
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And finally the full details of Computers, Freedom, & Privacy II appear both in
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a special file by Max Nomad and in two smaller articles in Phrack World News
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(part 3).
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We're back and we're Phrack. Enjoy reading it because we enjoy writing it!
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Chief Editor: Dispater (dispater@stormking.com)
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Staff: Datastream Cowboy
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Digital Disciple
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NetLink
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Takkel Genius
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The Public
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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Table Of Contents
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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1. Introduction by Dispater 06K
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2. Phrack Loopback by Phrack Staff 12K
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3. Phrack Pro-Phile on Aristotle by Dispater 06K
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4. Pirates' Cove by Rambone 23K
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5. Network Miscellany IV by Datastream Cowboy 30K
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6. Beating The Radar Rap Part 2 of 2 by Dispater 15K
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7. Users Guide to VAX/VMS Part 3 of 3 by Black Kat 46K
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8. Wide Area Information Services by Mycroft 11K
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9. Cellular Telephony by Brian Oblivion 28K
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10. Standing Up To Fight The Bells by Knight Lightning 27K
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11. The Digital Telephony Proposal by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 34K
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12. PWN Special Report VI on CFP-2 by Max Nomad 18K
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13. PWN/Part 1 by Dispater and Datastream Cowboy 34K
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14. PWN/Part 2 by Dispater and Datastream Cowboy 32K
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15. PWN/Part 3 by Dispater and Datastream Cowboy 33K
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Total: 355K
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_______________________________________________________________________________
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==Phrack Inc.==
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Volume Four, Issue Thirty-Eight, File 2 of 15
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[-=:< Phrack Loopback >:=-]
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By Phrack Staff
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Phrack Loopback is a forum for you, the reader, to ask questions, air
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problems, and talk about what ever topic you would like to discuss. This is
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also the place Phrack Staff will make suggestions to you by reviewing various
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items of note; magazines, software, catalogs, hardware, etc.
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_______________________________________________________________________________
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Terminus Is Free
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Len Rose has been released from prison as of March 23, 1992. Those wishing to
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write him and send him U.S. mail:
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Len Rose
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Salvation Army Freedom Center
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105 Ashland
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Chicago, Illinois 60607
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He will remain at this address until May 23, 1992.
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_______________________________________________________________________________
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Date: March 4, 1992
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From: Sarlo
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To: Phrack Staff
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Subject: Loopback Correction
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While scanning the loopback section of Issue 37, I came across this letter:
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>:: Fed Proof Your BBS, NOT! ::
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>
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> I'm sure many of you have seen text files on making your BBS more secure.
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>One such file floating around is by Babbs Boy of Midnight Society. One of the
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>members of our Phrack Staff showed this document to EFF's Mike Godwin, who is
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>an attorney. He had the following comments:
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>- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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>
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>From: Mike Godwin
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>To: Phrack Inc.
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>
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>(In regards to some of the files about how to "fed-proof" your BBS:)
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>
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>> Let's start with the log on screen: If FEDZ want anything from your board,
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>> they are required to provide 100% accurate information.
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>
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>This is false. Ask the legislators who've been convicted in "sting"
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>operations. In fact, so far as I can tell in a brief run-through of this
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>document, absolutely no part of the so-called "legal" advice is true.
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>
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>Law enforcement agents who misrepresent their identities (e.g., "undercover
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>agents") produce admissible evidence all the time.
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>
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>--Mike
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Allow me to clear some things up. Babbs' Boy was a friend of mine a while back
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and was more of a Game Programmer than a "hacker" (or "cracker," if you want
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to be anal about it). Babbs' Boy was NEVER in MsU. He had asked me if he
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could write a file for the group. We informed him that he could if he wanted
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to, but he could in no way represent us. According to Babbs' Boy, he retrieved
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the information from a copy of the ECPA. Since we were not releasing that as a
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MsU file, we never bothered to check any of the said information out. In fact,
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MsU does not create files for public display, although individual members may.
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Apparently Babbs' Boy uploaded his copy of the document to Ripco, in which
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it went wideband from there. I am told that 3 other documents were released
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in MSU's name, by someone using one of my very old handles of Raistlin. I can
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assure you that these documents were not released by any legitimate (old or
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current) member of Midnight Society Underground.
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Again, to clear things up, Babbs' is not nor ever was a member of MsU, nor
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are there any legitimate public releases from our group.
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Besides, we don't let people in the group who spell Feds "FEDZ" ..the shit just
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ain't done.
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Sarlo of Midnight Society Underground [MsU]
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sarlo@gagme.chi.il.us
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_______________________________________________________________________________
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Date: March 22, 1992
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From: "Michael E. Marotta" <MERCURY@lcc.edu>
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Subject: Censorship in Cyberspace
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To: Phrack Staff
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I have been hired to write an article about the control of information in
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cyberspace. We all know that Fidonet moderators and sysops devote their OWN
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resources for us to use. There is no question about the "right" of the sysop
|
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or moderator to delete messages and users. The practice of censorship is
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nonetheless newsworthy.
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If YOU have experienced censorship on Fidonet or Usenet, Prodigy or CompuServe,
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or another BBS or network, I am interested in learning about your story. If
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you can supply downloads of actual encounters, so much the better.
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If you have ever been censored, send me physical world mail about the event.
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Michael E. Marotta
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5751 Richwood #34
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Lansing, Mich. 48911
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_______________________________________________________________________________
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Dear Phrack Staff,
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There are very serious negative consequences surrounding the use of modems
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and computers in our society. Because of this, all children under the age
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of 18 should be prohibited from using a computer in connection with a modem
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or that is connected to any computer service.
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Please read my attached news release and join me in spreading this message.
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-- Ron Hults
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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NEWS RELEASE March 18, 1992
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PEDOPHILIA, COMPUTERS, AND CHILDREN
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If you have children in your home and a home computer complete with a telephone
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modem, your child is in potential danger of coming in contact with deviant and
|
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dangerous criminals.
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Using the computer modem, these unsavory individuals can communicate directly
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with your child without your knowledge. Just as importantly, you should be
|
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concerned if your child has a friendship with other youth who has access to
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this equipment in an unsupervised environment.
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Using a computer and a modem, your child can readily access community "bulletin
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boards" and receive sexually explicit and graphic material from total strangers
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who can converse with your children, individuals you quite probably wouldn't
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even talk with.
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The concern becomes more poignant when stated otherwise; would you let a child
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molester, murderer, or convicted criminal into your home to meet alone with
|
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your child?
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According to Fresno Police Detective Frank Clark, "your child can be in real
|
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danger from pedophiles, rapists, satanic cultists and other criminals known to
|
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be actively engaged in computer conversation. Unwittingly, naive children with
|
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a natural curiosity can be victimized; emerging healthy sexual feelings of a
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child can be subverted into a twisted, unnatural fetish affecting youth during
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a vulnerable time in their lives."
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It is anticipated that parents, when armed with the knowledge that this
|
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activity exists and awareness that encounters with such deviant individuals
|
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can result in emotional and psychological damage to their child, will take
|
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appropriate measures to eliminate the possibility of strangers interacting with
|
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their children via a computer.
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For Further Information, contact Ron Hults (209)498-4568
|
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_______________________________________________________________________________
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|
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Date: March 30, 1992
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From: Anonymous
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To: Knight Lightning <kl@stormking.com>
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Subject: Thanks
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Dear Knight Lightning,
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I would like to thank you for the message you wrote to Dale (scumbag) Drew.
|
|
Although the fact is that he will only be slightly inconvenienced by having to
|
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dig up issues of Phrack on his own instead of having them delivered to his
|
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mailbox, his being refused to be added to the mailing list means a lot more. If
|
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I were him, I would consider it a slap in the face (since it seems almost as
|
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bad, IMO, as being blacklisted). :)
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May he run into 10 homosexual wrestlers in a dark alley.
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_______________________________________________________________________________
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|
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Review of Intertek Winter 1992
|
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
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325 Ellwood Beach, #3 Subscription Rates:
|
|
Goleta, CA 93117 US : 4 issues (2 year) $14.00.
|
|
Internet: steve@cs.ucsb.edu OS : 4 issues (2 year) $18.20.
|
|
Phone: 805-685-6557 Back issues : $5.00 ea.
|
|
|
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by Dispater
|
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|
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Intertek is the *SHARPEST* looking 'zine I've seen yet that directly
|
|
addresses the world of cyberspace. It's not "high res" color or artsy-fartsy
|
|
like Mondo 2000, but it is at least more interesting to read as a whole. I
|
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think it looks better and is more direct and to the point. You don't have to
|
|
wade through a bunch of trash to get to something interresting.
|
|
|
|
This issue of Intertek focused on "virtual communities." The topics
|
|
included: "Bury USENET," "Electropolis (IRC)," "Social Organization of the
|
|
Computer Underground" by Gordon Meyer, "Real World Kerberos," and "Mudding:
|
|
Social Phenomena in Text-Based Virtual Realities." Every issue also contains
|
|
the top news tidbits about some truly high-tech achievements that go unnoticed
|
|
by the mainstream media (I guess the Mike Tyson trial gets more ratings,
|
|
huh?). All in all, it was much more interesting to me than the last issue
|
|
(Volume 3.2). It's magazines like this that I hope will help make the
|
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mainstream media obsolete.
|
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|
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If you are looking for "how-to" techie projects or hacking tips, this is
|
|
NOT for you! Many hackers I know don't like it and think it's boring as hell;
|
|
2600 and Phrack it isn't. However, if you are interested in the "big picture"
|
|
of the cyberspace (what ever that means! :) or are, say, interested in studying
|
|
cyberspace from an uninvolved level, this is the magazine for you. Intertek is
|
|
full of social insight into what makes the cyberspace tick. It does this much
|
|
better than the feeble attempts other magazines have made. For only $7.00 a
|
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year, I think it's worth it.
|
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|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
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Hacking in Australia
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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By The Cure
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Australia has been very sparse after my BBS (Micromation) was closed down. A
|
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lot of people took it as a warning, and closed up shop as well. The Amiga
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warez BBSes still continue to flourish, as do some IBM ones. Because of the
|
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expense of phone lines ($300 installation of a line, $250 per year rental [in
|
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American dollars]) we tend to have a lot of BBSes that are dual purpose, i.e.
|
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both warez and phreak. Devastation Phase One is a great example: huge Amiga/
|
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IBM/phreak/etc. I, however, was devoted to phreak/hack/etc. We did have a few
|
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busts actually, and the police were called in to trace all calls through Vicnet
|
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and some people I know were caught. We've got a few warez-monger type people
|
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here that have been busted for "pitting" (climbing into telecom phone pits, and
|
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hooking up straight to the lines) - and I had my knuckles rapped by my
|
|
university. Phoenix's court case still hasn't been settled (he's had 35 of the
|
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47 charges against him dropped). Comserve has finally made it down under, and
|
|
they're footing the bill for the first year, allowing us to be on Comserve in
|
|
the States for a while. Our telephone company (Telecom) is a government
|
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monopoly, and we've only just passed legislation to allow competition. The
|
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first carrier allowed will be a company called Optus. Call waiting,
|
|
conferencing, etc. is almost standard here now.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
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Censorship in Iowa
|
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
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From: Mike Begley <spam@iastate.edu>
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|
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|
Hi. I got your name from Erik Bloodaxe. He said you might be able to help us
|
|
out with a minor problem we're having here. The computation center at Iowa
|
|
State University will very soon institute a policy of censorship of a number of
|
|
groups of questionable nature, specifically the alt.sex hierarchy, alt.drugs,
|
|
and a few other similar groups.
|
|
|
|
I wish to conduct a survey of the users of our computer system, but the
|
|
university specificly prohibits mass mailings.
|
|
|
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I'm frightened by censorship, and I want to fight this as best I can. If you
|
|
would be able to do this favor for us, you would be helping to fight electronic
|
|
censorship and suppression of free expression.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
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|
|
Phrack FTP Sites
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|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
quartz.rutgers.edu (128.6.60.6) mc.lcs.mit.edu (18.26.0.179)
|
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Location: /pub/computer/law Location: /its/ai/digex
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|
|
|
mintaka.lcs.mit.edu (18.26.0.36) coombs.anu.edu.au (130.56.96.2)
|
|
Location: /telecom-archives Location: /inbound
|
|
|
|
wuarchive.wustl.edu (128.252.135.4) ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4)
|
|
Location: /doc/policy/pub/cud/Phrack Location: /pub/cud/Phrack
|
|
|
|
nic.funet.fi (128.214.6.100) cs.dal.ca (129.173.4.5)
|
|
Location: /pub/doc/phrack Location: /pub/comp.archives
|
|
|
|
chsun1.spc.uchicago.edu (128.135.46.7) ftp.uu.net (137.39.1.9)
|
|
Location: /pub/cud/phrack Location: /tmp
|
|
|
|
rascal.ics.utexas.edu (128.83.138.20) relay.cs.toronto.edu (128.100.3.6)
|
|
Location: /misc/ra/sa/ULM.DE Location: /doc/telecom-archives
|
|
|
|
aix370.rrz.uni-koeln.de (134.95.132.2)
|
|
Location: /pub/usenet/comp.archives/hackers/journals
|
|
|
|
titania.mathematik.uni-ulm.de (134.60.66.21)
|
|
Location: /info
|
|
|
|
src.doc.ic.ac.uk (146.169.3.7)
|
|
Location: /usenet/comp.archives/hackers/journals
|
|
|
|
bric-a-brac.apple.com (130.43.2.3)
|
|
Location: /pub/stud_reps
|
|
|
|
faui43.informatik.uni-erlangen.de (131.188.31.3)
|
|
Location: /portal/mounts/cyber/pcd/freeware2/magazine
|
|
|
|
srawgw.sra.co.jp (133.137.4.3)
|
|
Location: /.a/sranha-bp/arch/arch/comp.archives/hackers/sites
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
What's Your NPA These Days?
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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|
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<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
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<> <>
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<> AREA CODE SPLITS OF 1991 <>
|
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<> Researched and Collected <>
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<> by <Flash!Point> <>
|
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<> <>
|
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<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
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|
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND
|
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C&P Telephone Company Report for 301 NPA Split
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NXXs Converting to NPA 410
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
|
|
Pacific Bell Customer Report For 415 NPA Split
|
|
|
|
NXXs Converting to NPA 510
|
|
|
|
204 208 210 215 222 223 226 228 229 231 233 234 235 236 237 238 245 248 251 253
|
|
254 256 261 262 263 264 265 268 269 271 272 273 275 276 277 278 279 283 284 287
|
|
293 294 295 297 298 302 307 309 310 313 317 339 351 352 356 357 370 372 373 374
|
|
376 385 410 412 414 416 417 419 420 422 423 425 426 427 428 429 430 432 436 437
|
|
438 439 440 443 444 446 447 448 449 451 452 455 458 460 462 463 464 465 466 471
|
|
475 481 482 483 484 486 487 489 490 498 504 509
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Four, Issue Thirty-Eight, File 3 of 15
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Pro-Phile==
|
|
|
|
Written by Dispater
|
|
|
|
Created by Taran King (1986)
|
|
|
|
|
|
Welcome to Phrack Pro-Phile. Phrack Pro-Phile is created to bring info to
|
|
you, the users, about old or highly important/controversial people. This
|
|
month, I bring to you the original of the controversial New TAP Magazine.
|
|
|
|
Aristotle
|
|
~~~~~~~~~
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Personal
|
|
~~~~~~~~
|
|
Handle: Aristotle
|
|
Call him: Kevin
|
|
Past handles: Ed, Bob, Bill, and a multitude of other lame handles.
|
|
Handle origin: Humanities class in high school.
|
|
Date of Birth: April 12, 1970
|
|
Age at current date: 22
|
|
Height: 5'10"
|
|
Weight: 145 lbs.
|
|
Eye color: Blue
|
|
Hair Color: Red
|
|
Computer: IBM-PS/2 55SX
|
|
Sysop/Co-Sysop of: ALL PAST: Digital Underground, Blitzkreig, some board on
|
|
a major packet switching network, a board on MIT's FSF
|
|
machines, and a bazillion other lame boards that I don't
|
|
care to mention.
|
|
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
I was one of those people that played with phones for as long as I can
|
|
remember. I guess you could say I started phreaking a few years before
|
|
WARGAMES came out. After the movie, I found out that other people were
|
|
interested in phones too. Due to the influx of "elite hackers" after the
|
|
movie, information became extrememly available. This lead to my existence in
|
|
the real world of hack/phreak.
|
|
|
|
Eventually I ended up writing articles for both 2600 and TAP. In the late
|
|
80s I restarted TAP with help from some friends and we started to revive one
|
|
of the first hack/phreak magzines that ever existed.
|
|
|
|
Having TAP helped us gain a special insight on how the system really
|
|
works. Some of our issues were cool enough to actually be censored at certain
|
|
institutions where avid censorship still exists. Also, we were allowed to see
|
|
how far you could go in expressing your opinion until some bigshot noticed.
|
|
|
|
Believe it or not though, running a periodical without any income is a
|
|
major pain. It was well worth it though as I got to meet a lot of cool people
|
|
and also was able to do something for the computer underground scene. If you
|
|
currently don't support magazines like 2600, etc., please do. They are doing a
|
|
lot of work for the community and without them, there would be a major gap in
|
|
the press regarding the truth about our community.
|
|
|
|
I exited the hack/phreak world when things got a bit hairy and Craig
|
|
(Knight Lightning) got nailed. I simply decided that a hobby is not worth
|
|
going to jail for and that it did not pay the bills either. Anyways, most old
|
|
hacks eventually reach the point where everything they see seems old and
|
|
boring. This is where I currently am.
|
|
|
|
Today I am employed at a computer lab at a large university where I am
|
|
working on a degree.
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Aristotle's Favorite Things
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
|
|
Women: Karen (To be married soon)
|
|
Cars: REAL Cars: '86 Mustang GT, '86 VW Golf, various Porsches.
|
|
Foods: Anything that you cannot get at a drive-thru.
|
|
Music: Metallica, Bach, Danzig, Anthrax.
|
|
Authors: All the posters of Alt.Sex
|
|
Books: The Art of War
|
|
Outdoor fun: Snowboarding
|
|
|
|
Most Memorable Experiences
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
o Getting engaged
|
|
o My first blue box call
|
|
o Watching some guy die after wrecking his car
|
|
o Being interviewed by the FBI for something I did not do and then pissing
|
|
them off by allowing them to prove that they were wrong.
|
|
o All of the SummerCons and other assorted h/p meetings.
|
|
|
|
Some People to Mention
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
o Bill from RNOC : Getting us kicked out of the museum at the Arch.
|
|
o Cheshire Catalyst : Help with restarting TAP.
|
|
o Slave Driver : For his hospitality and the infamous "Guess who/what died in
|
|
the couch" game.
|
|
o The Mentor : For the BBS and his non-snobbish attitude.
|
|
o J.R. "Bob" Dobbs : All the cool blue box info.
|
|
o The Not : All the help with Unix
|
|
o Taran King : For being an exception to the "Hackers are all geeks" rule.
|
|
o Knight Lightning : For sending back the pictures and generally being a cool
|
|
guy.
|
|
o Dispater : For having the no-bullshit attitude and actually getting the job
|
|
done.
|
|
o Nite Ranger : For helping me realize that lamers will always exist (not you
|
|
though).
|
|
o Predat0r : All the experiences.
|
|
o All the Legion of d0oDs : For adding to the entertainment at PartyCon.
|
|
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Of the general population of phreaks you have met, would you consider most
|
|
phreaks, if any, to be computer geeks?
|
|
|
|
Of the general population, I would consider about 89.9% to be nerds. I
|
|
would also consider 65% of the entire population nerds and/or strange. Phreaks
|
|
may be geeks but each usually has his/her cool qualities as everyone does.
|
|
Most are socially lacking though. Keep in mind that a hacker/phreak is ALWAYS
|
|
better than the average GIF viewing geek.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Four, Issue Thirty-Eight, File 4 of 15
|
|
|
|
Pirates' Cove
|
|
Issue Two
|
|
|
|
By Rambone
|
|
|
|
Welcome to Issue Two of Pirate's Cove. There is a lot going on in the
|
|
Pirate community, busts of pirates in the USA and Canada, and new software and
|
|
operating systems like IBM's OS/2. So sit back and absorb the news.
|
|
|
|
First on the agenda is to discuss the over-talked about, and hopefully
|
|
dead issue of the carding scam initiated by The Grim Reaper and The Not So
|
|
Humble Babe. The reason Phrack Magazine delayed publishing anything about this
|
|
bust was because we refused to publish any third party rumors and idle gossip.
|
|
Now that I have personally spoken with the Grim Reaper, we can shed some light
|
|
on this subject.
|
|
|
|
Mike "The Grim Reaper" obviously regrets what has transpired and would
|
|
like to put this part of his life behind him. At this point in time, he still
|
|
does not know what is going to happen, and is taking his arrest very seriously.
|
|
Mike asked me just to use the letter he has written. Some of you may have seen
|
|
this before, some may not.
|
|
|
|
*******************************************************************************
|
|
|
|
Statement by The Grim Reaper
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
|
|
"Lamer Pirate Magazines, Etc..."
|
|
By THE GRIM REAPER
|
|
|
|
This was originally going to be an article for iNSANITY Magazine #4 called
|
|
"Lamer Pirate Mags, Etc." to straighten out the complete bullshit and lies in
|
|
Badnews #7, but seeing as there are so many rumors floating around, and the
|
|
future of iNSANITY is undecided, I decided to just put out this text file to
|
|
explain what is really going on, less a few lamers out there spread all kinds
|
|
of bullshit and lies, as they seem to do so often.
|
|
|
|
Pretty much everything in Badnews #7 was a complete lie, as most of you
|
|
already know by now. They didn't have any backdoors to ViSiON-X, and there
|
|
aren't and weren't any that allowed someone to get the user list. What
|
|
happened on Showdown was the Sysop PW was given out to the wrong person, and
|
|
they used it, so again, nothing but B.S. and hype on their end. While I think
|
|
the FiRM overhyped themselves, they didn't deserve the ragging they got by BaD,
|
|
and BaD having failed in their own attempt at a pirate group has no right to
|
|
criticize ANYONE until they've accomplished the same. Perhaps a few of the
|
|
other groups could have said something to them (and many talked about it) but
|
|
they didn't deserve the 3rd Degree from a lamer mag.
|
|
|
|
The main reason for this article was that while many found the BaD Mag
|
|
to be so completely full of shit to the point that it was hilarious, some got
|
|
to thinking that down the line, someone might actually believe some of the B.S.
|
|
They claimed to be the group that caused the downfall of THG, PE and others,
|
|
which was a complete joke... They had absolutely nothing to do with any of
|
|
that. USA had killed off THG, etc... What else was there to straighten up?
|
|
|
|
|
|
"Did they shoot your Dog????"
|
|
- Anonymous Lamer
|
|
|
|
So what's up? Well, to make it short and blunt, The NotSoHumble Babe and
|
|
I were involved in a carding incident. She most likely was being watched by
|
|
certain people since she had been using false corporations and fake Tax ID
|
|
Numbers to order games and for suppliers for USA. The Secret Service either
|
|
stumbled across us that way, from one of the orders gone bad, or from the
|
|
illegal cash and hardware coming in to Enterprize. The NSH Babe (Amy) had a
|
|
cash flow from Dist Sites and other hot hardware from USA Sites totalling about
|
|
$3500-$5000 a month. She had sent one of her hot laptops she gets every month
|
|
to Optical Illusion in Canada, and asked him to sell it for her. He wanted to
|
|
be nice and tried to sell it. A local from his 416 area wanted to buy the
|
|
laptop. He went to sell it, and was busted by a plainclothes police officer
|
|
for possession of stolen property of over a $1000.
|
|
|
|
I found some CC #'s, she had a lot of experience with UPS and FedEx from
|
|
ordering games, and she thought of a way to pick up the packages. We both
|
|
placed orders (I placed about 2/3rds since she was picking up, and she placed
|
|
about a 1/3rd). Most of the stuff wasn't for myself, and was meant for other
|
|
people (trying to be nice, eh?). In any case, we shouldn't have done it. TNSH
|
|
Babe wanted to order a A LOT of stuff because, over time, she owed people in
|
|
USA a lot of hardware they had paid her for, and she had never sent any to
|
|
them. We ordered a bit too much, more than I thought we should have.
|
|
|
|
|
|
"They had Bulletproof Vests and Grenades??"
|
|
- Another |<-Rad D00D!!
|
|
|
|
So then what? Well, they found out the packages were coming and were
|
|
waiting for TNSH Babe to pick them up. They went back to her place and she
|
|
gave them permission to come in and search (dunno what happened in between
|
|
then). She talked to them and they wanted to have her give some of the stuff
|
|
to me that she got when we were supposed to meet for the first time at a
|
|
Meijers parking lot. There were some weird things going on at the time, and an
|
|
alarm was flashing in the back of my mind, but I decided to ignore it. Anyhow,
|
|
she handed me a hard drive or something, then, basically, they moved in. I saw
|
|
a car pulling up, and figured what was going on. One guy said, "Secret
|
|
Service" (about 6 people), and it kinda went downhill from there. But
|
|
seriously, they weren't that bad and I cooperated with them.
|
|
|
|
They wanted to go back to my house and look around, and wanted permission.
|
|
They said they would have gotten a search warrant, and it was in my best
|
|
interest to cooperate, so I let them come in. Basically there wasn't anything
|
|
in the house, I always throw everything out when I am done with it. As far as
|
|
the computer went, I didn't even have anything Unzipped on the Hard Drive that
|
|
I hadn't paid for. They wanted to look further on the computer and in the end
|
|
did take it, but gave me a receipt. I paid for my entire system, so don't
|
|
listen to some of the lamer textfiles floating around. There wasn't anything
|
|
on my system, so I might get lucky and they'll give it back. They also took 3
|
|
or 4 computers from Amy's place, but left Static with his. This was the first
|
|
time either of us had done anything like this. There had been a few attempts
|
|
in the past, but nothing that had ever been followed through, or had worked.
|
|
No no, I've never been busted for this before, or anything. I've never been
|
|
arrested for anything before.
|
|
|
|
"I formatted my Hard Drive 3 Times!!"
|
|
- Local 313 Sysop
|
|
|
|
I don't know if it was overreacting, but our dumb situation seemed to
|
|
affect a lot of other people. The locals over here went apeshit, and many of
|
|
them formatted their drives and deleted files (20+), and took their boards down
|
|
temporarily. Many of the major pirate boards decided to power down for a
|
|
while. Unfortunately many of the truly good boards in the world have gone
|
|
down, possibly forever. BBS-A-Holic has gone down, Enterprize is now PD Only,
|
|
many INC boards, LSD2 possibly for related reasons, The VOID of course, and
|
|
many others. Many big names are considering quitting the pirate scene because
|
|
they think it's not worth it, and they're right. Some of the boards may come
|
|
back. BBS-A-Holic was one of my favorites. Many considered The VOID one of
|
|
the Top 10 Boards in the world as far as quality went, and I appreciate the
|
|
users and the support. I worked hard to try to make it the best, and put my
|
|
heart into it. As are many others, Black Spyrit might be retiring, so I don't
|
|
know if another iNSANITY Issue will be coming out. It was truly a great mag if
|
|
you never saw it. The best.
|
|
|
|
|
|
"I heard they were thrown in jail, and fined $72 Million Dollars!!"
|
|
- Another Neverending Lamer
|
|
|
|
No matter what or who the issue, this never stops, eh? I wouldn't believe
|
|
any of the bullshit text files, mostly from jealous people and the few enemies
|
|
you get when you end up getting towards the top, especially the anonymous
|
|
(surprise) text file taken off of OOFNet (surprise again, huh? Heh). All are,
|
|
as always, complete B.S.
|
|
|
|
Try not to be a lamer. There are too many of 'em, and they do nothing for
|
|
the pirate world. If you are going to do anything, do SOMETHING. Organize a
|
|
group of some type, coordinate couriers, do some VGA or ANSI work, or get in a
|
|
group, but don't be a lamer. Call LD, establish a rep, and see what you are
|
|
missing. All locals aren't lamers, but 90% are.
|
|
|
|
A Lamer - A person who calls only local boards, does nothing but leeches files,
|
|
and doesn't contribute to groups in any ways.
|
|
|
|
Neither BaD, any locals, or Socrates had anything to do with us getting
|
|
into trouble in any way.
|
|
|
|
"Don't try this at home kids."
|
|
- Grim '92
|
|
|
|
All things considered, I wish it wouldn't have ended this way. I don't
|
|
think any of this was good for anyone in the pirate or BBS world. USA is now
|
|
pretty much a dead group. Many of the best boards have gone down, and others
|
|
are considering calling it quits because it just isn't worth it. INC never was
|
|
a for-profit group, and had no illegitimate cash flow, unlike USA.
|
|
|
|
*******************************************************************************
|
|
|
|
Rambone's Remarks
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Well that's the real story, straight from the horse's mouth. I've read at
|
|
least a dozen text file's after this one, and I tend to believe what Mike has
|
|
written. Now Amy (NotSoHumble Babe) tells a different story. According to her
|
|
text file, she had seldom carded or phreaked before, but no one seems to be
|
|
able to corroborate this information, and people that know her tend to say she
|
|
was in deeper than she cares to admit. It's also been brought to my attention
|
|
that Amy may be volunteering information to the feds about other people. What
|
|
she has done before or after the bust may or may not be true, but here is her
|
|
story.
|
|
|
|
*******************************************************************************
|
|
|
|
Statement by The Not So Humble Babe
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Well, I am sure you have all heard that I had a small legal problem
|
|
today, and I know how stuff gets blown out of proportion, so I thought I'd
|
|
explain the story myself. Here goes...
|
|
|
|
I have carded a few items in the past 3 days, and I have NEVER done this
|
|
before. The Grim Reaper got CBI accounts and placed orders, and I picked them
|
|
up. Well, one of the places Grim ordered from was Paradise Computers. They
|
|
knew it was a bogus order, but told us the package was shipped. Then they
|
|
called the FEDS. Anyhow, the Feds must have been watching the pickup spot,
|
|
then following me around until I met up with Grim to deliver his share of the
|
|
stuff. As soon as we went to make the exchange, the Secret Service, FBI, state
|
|
police, and local police were running at us with bulletproof vests and
|
|
automatic guns. They handcuffed us, separated us, and took each of us back to
|
|
our homes for them to search.
|
|
|
|
I haven't talked to Grim Reaper since I saw him lying next to me on the
|
|
ground being arrested. But here's my story. About 20 agents came to my
|
|
apartment and grabbed all computer equipment without a receipt. So we still
|
|
have 1 modem, and this computer system. Anyhow, they grabbed every piece of
|
|
paper they could find. Unfortunately, I am a very organized person, and had
|
|
"the who's who in the pirate world" written down for my use. So if you ever
|
|
gave me your real name, number, or address, it is now in the hands of the
|
|
Secret Service and FBI. This list was quite large, as it took 2 years to
|
|
compile.
|
|
|
|
These boys did their homework. They knew Enterprize was USA HQ and they
|
|
knew my handle, and they knew I supplied the group with software. They weren't
|
|
going for just anyone here guys; they knew they needed to bust a group leader.
|
|
Well, they did. Got me on carding, pirating, and a ton of other legal terms
|
|
having to do with both of these.
|
|
|
|
I was charged with 6 different counts, each holding a 5-30 year prison
|
|
sentence. It doesn't look good for me at all. I'll post a file as soon as I
|
|
get arraigned and let you guys know what is going on.
|
|
|
|
But I will say this now, and I MEAN it. I love the groups, the software,
|
|
and the competition. But regardless of what happens to me, I am done forever.
|
|
No more NotSoHumble Babe, no more USA. I hate to do this to everyone, but I
|
|
really don't have a choice. And regardless of who I am that got busted, be
|
|
strong and support what you believe in your hearts: PIRACY. Don't let them
|
|
win. You guys can all go on without me. Just promise me you won't give up and
|
|
throw in the towel. If anyone wants to contact me, you can leave e-mail on
|
|
Enterprize for me, or call voice AT YOUR OWN RISK. They told me they were
|
|
tapping the phone lines.
|
|
|
|
*******************************************************************************
|
|
|
|
News Flash: Mutli-Media Aggravation
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Mutli-Media games (CD-Rom) are being played on the hard drive. There
|
|
seems to be a trend of starting to send out huge CD-Rom games electronically
|
|
through BBSes, the first one being Battle Chess I, and taking as much as 30
|
|
megs of hard-drive space. Soon after, Steller 7, and Wing Commander I started
|
|
to show up. One of the reason for the start of this was a lack of programs
|
|
coming down the pike, and one group decided to send Battle Chess out. I
|
|
haven't seen anything lately, and hope programs meant for the CD-Rom will stay
|
|
that way.
|
|
|
|
*******************************************************************************
|
|
|
|
Another News Flash: OS/2 2.0 GA
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
IBM has released the long anticipated OS/2 (Operating System 2) 2.0 GA.
|
|
OS/2 2.0 is an alternative to DOS 3.3, 4.01, or the latest, 5.0, and implements
|
|
true 32 bit technology. There are several ways of using this operating system.
|
|
OS/2, implementing it's own version of FAT, Dual Boot (which will allow you to
|
|
be able to use DOS if necessary), and a Multi-Boot, brings up a prompt a when
|
|
booting up which allows you to choose which operating system you would like to
|
|
use (similar to Vpix for Unix and Xenix).
|
|
|
|
I had the opportunity to view a preview of OS/2 2.0 GA at our local IBM
|
|
Corporate Building, and to say the least, I was impressed. One of the points
|
|
stressed at the meeting was the diverse control over many programs at the same
|
|
time. OS/2 comes with its own operating system, along with a clone of sorts of
|
|
both DOS and Windows. This feature will enable a user to access a DOS
|
|
emulation without having to actually boot up DOS on the machine. It also has a
|
|
Windows emulation which will eradicate the need for a full blown version. The
|
|
one shortcoming of this is that it is Version 3.0, but I have been informed
|
|
that 3.1 is right around the corner, and actually saw a demonstration of it.
|
|
|
|
The true strong point of OS/2 is the mutli-tasking. After witnessing
|
|
15 windows open at the same time, all with programs running concurrently, I
|
|
truly can say this is a step into the future, and it is here now. My personal
|
|
experience running 2.0 is very impressive. Being able to properly run a
|
|
program with the BBS in the background is a welcome treat, and I see no reason
|
|
to ever support another operating system, until I get my hands on Windows NT.
|
|
|
|
*******************************************************************************
|
|
|
|
Industry News
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
The long awaited A-10 Avenger by Spectrum Holybyte has now been pushed
|
|
back till early next year. This was the next in a series of interactive
|
|
programs put out by SH to be played over the modem, the first being Falcon 3.0,
|
|
a 256VGA jet game.
|
|
|
|
UT (Ultra-Tech) and EMC (Electro-Magnetic Crackers) have now merged.
|
|
This merger will be beneficial to both groups, bringing lacking talents
|
|
together to form one of the largest cracking groups in the world, one with
|
|
strong software connections, and the other with cracking resources and existing
|
|
software support sites. Captain Tom of UT and Cyborg of EMC brought the whole
|
|
thing together as a reality, and this merger may point them in the same
|
|
direction as when INC formed their group from several smaller groups.
|
|
|
|
*******************************************************************************
|
|
|
|
BBS Bust in Canada
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
The Federal Investigations Section of the RCMP seized components of an
|
|
electronic bulletin board system (BBS) "90 North" at a West Island residence.
|
|
This is believed to be the first execution of a search warrant under the
|
|
Copyright Act of Canada against an electronic bulletin board system.
|
|
|
|
The seizure included 10 micro computers, seven modems and the software
|
|
present on these systems (approximate value of $25,000). An electronic
|
|
bulletin board is a service which allows personal computer users to exchange
|
|
messages and to exchange or receive computer files including software, text and
|
|
digitized images over telephone lines via a modem.
|
|
|
|
During a four-month investigation, it was established that the 90 North
|
|
BBS enabled users to obtain software in exchange for other files or for an
|
|
annual fee of $49.00. While some of the programs consisted of "shareware"
|
|
which may legally be distributed in this way, much of the available material
|
|
was protected under the Copyright Act including beta versions of commercial
|
|
software packages which have not yet been released on the market. More than
|
|
3,000 software programs were available to users of this BBS including
|
|
WordPerfect 5.0, Microsoft DOS 5.0, Windows 3.0, Lotus 1-2-3 for Windows,
|
|
Borland C++ 2.0, Quattro Pro 3.0, d-Base IV 1.1, SCO Xenix for DOS, Netware
|
|
3.11 and Clipper 5.0.
|
|
|
|
Charges of commercial distribution of pirated software are planned against
|
|
the owner and operator of 90 North. Paragraph 42 (1)(c) of the Copyright Act
|
|
states that "every person who knowingly distributes, infringes, copies of any
|
|
work in which copyright subsists either for the purpose of trade or to such
|
|
intent as to affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright, is guilty of an
|
|
offense and liable on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding $25,000 or to
|
|
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to both, or on conviction
|
|
on indictment, or a fine not exceeding $1 million or to imprisonment for a term
|
|
not exceeding five years or both."
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
More Details On The Canadian BBS Bust
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) has, for the first time under
|
|
the Copyright Act of Canada, seized all the components of an electronic
|
|
bulletin board (BBS), for providing illegal copies of copyrighted software to
|
|
its subscribers.
|
|
|
|
According to Allen Reynolds of the secretariat of the Canadian Alliance
|
|
Against Software Theft (CAAST), the Federal Investigations Section of the RCMP
|
|
has not laid formal charges against the West Island, Quebec owner and operator
|
|
of the BBS. Charges of commercial distribution of pirated software are planned
|
|
against the owner of 90 NORTH, he said.
|
|
|
|
CAAST is a Canadian organization made up of ASHTON-TATE CANADA, LOTUS
|
|
DEVELOMENT CANADA, MICROSOFT CANADA, NOVELL CANADA, and QUARTERDECK OFFICE
|
|
SYSTEMS CANADA. Its main objective is to educate the public and business about
|
|
the hazards of software piracy.
|
|
|
|
In the raid, the RCMP seized 10 Micro computers, seven modems, and about
|
|
$25,000 worth of software which was allegedly being distributed to users of the
|
|
90 NORTH BBS for an annual $49.00 fee, Reynolds said.
|
|
|
|
Some of the seized software packages were Wordperfect 5.0, MS-DOS 5.0,
|
|
Windows 3.0, Lotus 1-2-3 for Windows, dBase IV, Netware 3.11, and Qemm. If
|
|
charged and convicted on a summary conviction, the 90 NORTH owner could face
|
|
either a penalty or a fine not exceeding $25,000 or a jail term not exceeding
|
|
six months or both. If the 90 NORTH owner is convicted on indictment, the
|
|
penalty is a fine not exceeding $1 million or imprisonment for a term not
|
|
exceeding five years or both. "I don't know how long it will take to lay
|
|
charges," Reynolds said. He would not speculate when the RCMP would charge the
|
|
owner of 90 NORTH, but he did say that the users of the 90 NORTH BBS will not
|
|
be investigated by by the RCMP.
|
|
|
|
He added that there is reason to believe that a number of BBSes across
|
|
Canada are supplying beta test versions of products which can be dangerous to a
|
|
user's system because they are usually laced with bugs.
|
|
|
|
*******************************************************************************
|
|
|
|
Rambone's Remarks
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
I have been informed that there are several more bulletin boards,
|
|
especially those in the 416 NPA, that are under investigation right now. Most
|
|
of the sysops being busted are ones that charge for download credits, which is
|
|
a violation of the Copyright Act for reselling software.
|
|
|
|
*******************************************************************************
|
|
|
|
New Release
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Ultima UnderWorld by Origin
|
|
Name: The Stygian Abyss
|
|
Company: Origin
|
|
Graphics: 256VGA
|
|
Sound: SB/SB-Pro/Adlib/Roland
|
|
Rating: 10/10
|
|
Supplier: High Pockets/Red Runner
|
|
Copy Protection: None
|
|
Date: 3/26/92
|
|
|
|
Looking for virtual reality in a game? Didn't think you could find it?
|
|
Welcome to Origin's Ultima UnderWorld, "The Stygian Abyss." Don't let the name
|
|
fool you, this game does not have any attributes from the Ultima 1-6 series.
|
|
You start out in a dark room looking out into what would be called a 3-D
|
|
perspective. Picking up the bag in front of you would be your best bet -- it
|
|
may have things that you need. Once you are on your way, you will notice how
|
|
realistic the walls, ground, and ceiling look, almost like you are there.
|
|
Along the way in your adventure, you will encounter many items that will help
|
|
you along the way and some that may not, but you will have to decide. There
|
|
are also many cultures down below that will be friendly and not-so-friendly;
|
|
use your best judgement. Learn all your abilities. They will come in handy
|
|
down the road. Practice your magic, it may save your life, or help you walk
|
|
across water (hint). Learning how to jump correctly is important. You'll have
|
|
to be able to leap across flaming, volcanic ravines to be able to finish the
|
|
game. When you see writing on the wall or in a scroll with words and telling
|
|
you to chant this to the Mantra, you better copy them down: They build up your
|
|
attributes.
|
|
|
|
All in all, there are 7 levels, and one unexplored level, sporting true
|
|
256VGA graphics, SB-Pro support, and a riveting sound-track. This is this
|
|
closest thing to virtual reality graphics in the game market today, and it'll
|
|
be a while before you play anything else like it.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Four, Issue Thirty-Eight, File 5 of 15
|
|
|
|
Network Miscellany IV
|
|
Compiled from Internet Sources
|
|
by Datastream Cowboy
|
|
|
|
Network Miscellany created by Taran King
|
|
|
|
|
|
Special Internet Connections February 5, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Most Recent Update
|
|
Comments to: Scott Yanoff <yanoff@CSD4.CSD.UWM.EDU>
|
|
|
|
American Philosophy Association
|
|
telnet atl.calstate.edu or 130.150.102.33
|
|
Login: apa
|
|
OFFERS: BBS for APA.
|
|
|
|
Archie
|
|
telnet archie.mcgill.ca or 132.206.2.3 (Canada)
|
|
telnet archie.funet.fi or 128.214.6.100 (Finland/Europe)
|
|
telnet archie.au or 128.184.1.4 (Australia/New Zealand)
|
|
telnet cs.huji.ac.il or 132.65.6.5 (Israel)
|
|
telnet archie.doc.ic.ac.uk or 146.169.3.7 (United Kingdom/Ireland)
|
|
telnet archie.sura.net or 128.167.254.179 (Maryland, USA)
|
|
telnet archie.unl.edu (Password: archie1) (Nebraska, USA)
|
|
telnet archie.ans.net or 147.225.1.2 (New York, USA)
|
|
telnet archie.rutgers.edu or 128.6.18.15 (New Jersey, USA)
|
|
OFFERS: Internet anonymous FTP database. (Login: archie)
|
|
|
|
Archie Mail Servers
|
|
mail archie@<INSERT ONE OF ABOVE ADDRESSES HERE>
|
|
Subject: help
|
|
OFFERS: Alterative Archie access to those without ftp or telnet access.
|
|
|
|
Automated Data Service
|
|
telnet tycho.usno.navy.mil or 192.5.41.239
|
|
Login: ads
|
|
OFFERS: Navigational/Time/Astronomical Information.
|
|
|
|
CARL
|
|
telnet pac.carl.org or 192.54.81.128
|
|
OFFERS: Online database, book reviews, magazine fax delivery service.
|
|
|
|
CHAT
|
|
telnet debra.doc.ca or telnet 192.16.212.15
|
|
Login: chat
|
|
OFFERS: Conversion of Hypertext Access Technical information files.
|
|
|
|
Cheeseplant's House
|
|
telnet orchid.csv.warwick.ac.uk 2001 or 137.205.192.5
|
|
OFFERS: Online chat service in a very unique format.
|
|
|
|
Chess Server
|
|
telnet lark.utah.edu 5000 or telnet 128.110.128.72 5000
|
|
OFFERS: Play/watch real-time chess with human opponents.
|
|
Type "help" for help
|
|
|
|
C64 Archive Server
|
|
mail twtick@corral.uwyo.edu
|
|
Subject: Mail-Archive-Request Body-of-letter: help (hit return) end
|
|
|
|
Dante Project
|
|
telnet library.dartmouth.edu or 129.170.16.11
|
|
Login: connect dante
|
|
OFFERS: Divine Comedy and reviews.
|
|
|
|
Distance Educational Data
|
|
telnet sun.nsf.ac.uk or telnet 128.86.8.7
|
|
(Login: janet Hostname: uk.ac.open.acs.vax Username: icdl)
|
|
|
|
Document Site
|
|
ftp ocf.berkeley.edu or ftp 128.32.184.254
|
|
OFFERS: Many docs, including 5 purity tests, the Bible, lyrics.
|
|
|
|
Earthquake Information
|
|
finger quake@geophys.washington.edu
|
|
OFFERS: Recent quake information (location, time, magnitude, etc.)
|
|
|
|
E-Math
|
|
telnet 130.44.1.100 (Login: e-math Password: e-math)
|
|
OFFERS: American Math Society sponsored BBS with software and reviews.
|
|
|
|
FEDIX
|
|
telnet fedix.fie.com or telnet 192.111.228.1
|
|
Login: fedix
|
|
OFFERS: Information on scholarships, minority assistance, etc.
|
|
|
|
Freenet
|
|
telnet freenet-in-a.cwru.edu or 129.22.8.82 (Cleveland)
|
|
telnet yfn.ysu.edu or 192.55.234.27 (Youngstown)
|
|
OFFERS: USA Today Headline News, Sports, etc.
|
|
|
|
FTP Mail
|
|
mail ftpmail@decwrl.dec.com
|
|
Subject:(hit return) Body-of-letter: help (return) quit
|
|
OFFERS: ftp via e-mail
|
|
|
|
Genetics Bank
|
|
mail gene-server@bchs.uh.edu
|
|
Subject: help
|
|
OFFERS: Genetic database accessible via e-mail.
|
|
|
|
Geographic Server
|
|
telnet martini.eecs.umich.edu 3000 or 141.212.100.9 3000
|
|
|
|
Gopher
|
|
telnet consultant.micro.umn.edu
|
|
Login: gopher
|
|
OFFERS: Access to many interesting features.
|
|
|
|
Graf-Bib
|
|
mail graf-bib@decwrl.dec.com
|
|
Subject: help
|
|
Body-of-letter: send index
|
|
OFFERS: Graphics bibliography
|
|
|
|
Ham Radio Callbook
|
|
telnet marvin.cs.buffalo.edu 2000 or 128.205.32.4 2000
|
|
OFFERS: National ham radio call-sign callbook.
|
|
|
|
INFO - Rutgers CWIS
|
|
telnet hangout.rutgers.edu 98 or 128.6.26.25 98
|
|
OFFERS: Dictionary, thesaurus, CIA world fact book, quotations database.
|
|
|
|
Internet Resource Guide
|
|
ftp nnsc.nsf.net
|
|
OFFERS: Compressed/tar'd list of net resources in /resource-
|
|
guide.txt.tar.Z
|
|
|
|
IRC Telnet Client
|
|
telnet bradenville.andrew.cmu.edu or 128.2.54.2
|
|
OFFERS: Internet Relay Chat access.
|
|
|
|
Library of Congress
|
|
telnet dra.com or 192.65.218.43
|
|
OFFERS: COPY of Library of Congress
|
|
(Assumes terminal is emulating a vt100)
|
|
|
|
List of Lists
|
|
ftp ftp.nisc.sri.com or ftp 192.33.33.22
|
|
mail mlol-request@wariat.nshore.ncoast.org
|
|
OFFERS: List of interest groups/e-mail lists in /netinfo/interest-groups.
|
|
|
|
Lyric Server
|
|
ftp cs.uwp.edu
|
|
OFFERS: Lyrics (/pub/music/lyrics/files) in text files for anonymous ftp.
|
|
|
|
Mail Server/User Lookup
|
|
mail mail-server@pit-manager.mit.edu
|
|
Usage: In body of mail message: send usenet-addresses/[name searching for]
|
|
|
|
Melvyl
|
|
telnet melvyl.ucop.edu or 31.1.0.1
|
|
OFFERS: Access to various libraries.
|
|
Type "other" at prompt to see others.
|
|
|
|
NASA Headline News
|
|
Finger nasanews@space.mit.edu
|
|
OFFERS: Daily press releases from NASA.
|
|
|
|
NASA SpaceLink
|
|
telnet spacelink.msfc.nasa.gov or 128.158.13.250
|
|
OFFERS: Latest NASA news, including shuttle launches and satellite
|
|
updates.
|
|
|
|
NED
|
|
telnet ipac.caltech.edu or telnet 131.215.139.35
|
|
Login: ned
|
|
OFFERS: NASA Extragalactic Database.
|
|
|
|
NetLib
|
|
mail netlib@ornl.gov
|
|
Subject:(hit return)
|
|
Body-of-letter: send index
|
|
OFFERS: Math software.
|
|
|
|
Oceanic Information Center
|
|
telnet delocn.udel.edu or telnet 128.175.24.1
|
|
Login: info
|
|
|
|
Oracle
|
|
mail oracle@iuvax.cs.indiana.edu
|
|
OFFERS: The Usenet Oracle!
|
|
Mail with subject as "help" for more info.
|
|
|
|
PENpages
|
|
telnet psupen.psu.edu or telnet 128.118.36.5
|
|
Login: PNOTPA
|
|
OFFERS: Agricultural info (livestock reports, etc.)
|
|
|
|
SDDAS
|
|
telnet espsun.space.swri.edu 540 or telnet 129.162.150.99
|
|
OFFERS: SW Research Data Display & Analysis Center.
|
|
|
|
SERVICES
|
|
telnet wugate.wustl.edu or 128.252.120.1
|
|
Login: services
|
|
OFFERS: Access to nearly every listed service!
|
|
|
|
Software Server
|
|
telnet charlie.secs.csun.edu 5742 or 130.166.2.150 5742
|
|
OFFERS: Similar to Archie.
|
|
Type help for a list of commands.
|
|
|
|
StatLib Server
|
|
mail statlib@lib.stat.cmu.edu
|
|
Mail with line: send index.
|
|
OFFERS: Programs, Datasets, etc. for statisticians.
|
|
|
|
STIS
|
|
telnet stis.nsf.gov or 128.150.195.40
|
|
Login: public
|
|
OFFERS: Science & Technology Information System.
|
|
|
|
Supreme Court Rulings
|
|
ftp ftp.cwru.edu
|
|
OFFERS: ASCII files of Supreme Court rulings in directory /hermes
|
|
|
|
Usenet News MailServer
|
|
mail [newsgroup]@ucbvax.berkeley.edu
|
|
Allows you to post to a Usenet newsgroup via e-mail. Useful if you have
|
|
read-only access to Usenet news.
|
|
Note: .'s become -'s Ex. alt.test -> alt-test
|
|
|
|
UNC BBS
|
|
telnet samba.acs.unc.edu or 128.109.157.30
|
|
Login: bbs
|
|
OFFERS: Access to Library of Congress and nationwide libraries.
|
|
|
|
WAIStation
|
|
telnet quake.think.com or 192.31.181.1
|
|
Login: wais
|
|
OFFERS: Wide Area Information Service
|
|
FTP think.com for more info.
|
|
|
|
Weather Service
|
|
telnet madlab.sprl.umich.edu 3000 or 141.212.196.79 3000
|
|
OFFERS: City/State forecasts, ski conditions, earthquake reports, etc.
|
|
|
|
World-Wide Web
|
|
telnet info.cern.ch or telnet 128.141.201.74
|
|
OFFERS: Information service with access to various documents, lists, and
|
|
services.
|
|
|
|
* NOTE: NO LOGIN NAMES OR PASSWORDS ARE REQUIRED UNLESS STATED OTHERWISE! *
|
|
If it prompts you for a login name, you did something wrong, or are not
|
|
running on a machine that the system you telnetted to supports!
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
+++++ Zamfield's Wonderfully Incomplete, Complete Internet BBS List +++++
|
|
|
|
FOREWORD
|
|
~~~~~~~~
|
|
The following list has been compiled with the help of the wonderfully generous
|
|
crowd of folks who associate with Internet or UseNet. I owe them many thanks
|
|
and please keep the info coming.
|
|
|
|
I, and many others, have a few things to say about these BBSes in general. So
|
|
bear with me, or skip ahead, but do take a look later.
|
|
|
|
1). These BBSes are provided as a service to anyone on Internet. Not just you.
|
|
2). While you may not directly pay for these services someone does.
|
|
3). You are a guest, and please keep that in mind while using these BBSes.
|
|
|
|
Okay, that wasn't so bad after all.
|
|
|
|
Most of these BBSes offer services unique to BBSing. Some offer small scale
|
|
versions of standard Internet services. Keep in mind that mail or articles
|
|
posted on BBSes do not reach everyone in the world, and if you can get to
|
|
UseNet, you will probably find better responses. Most of the files on these
|
|
BBSes can be found by anonymous FTP, so don't tie up the system with files if
|
|
you have FTP. Do be considerate on these BBSes, some people aren't using
|
|
telnet or rlogin to get to these, some people still dial numbers with modems at
|
|
their homes. :-)
|
|
|
|
For users of JANET (UK), you may access these BBSes through first connecting to
|
|
UK.AC.NFSNET-RELAY.TELNET or PAD.UK.AC.NFSNET-RELAY.TELNET. Likewise, users of
|
|
Internet can get to JANET by telnet SUN.NFS.AC.UK, login as janet.
|
|
|
|
Zamfield@Dune.EE.MsState.Edu
|
|
|
|
==============================================================================
|
|
2/6/92
|
|
|
|
NAME ADDRESS LOGIN BBS Software
|
|
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
AfterFive winner.itd.com 9999
|
|
-- 128.160.2.248 9999
|
|
|
|
-- Hours: 5 p.m. to 8 a.m. CST. Please no logins during the day.
|
|
|
|
-- MUCK - enhanced tinymuck2.2.3d-beta. Based on Bourbon Street, New
|
|
Orleans. May not be appropriate for all ages, especially very young
|
|
children as the database is rather graphic in section describing strip
|
|
tease, and bars.
|
|
|
|
-- BBS is Citadel like Quartz and Grind. No HotKeys though. Supports 59
|
|
concurrent users.
|
|
|
|
-- This site is running on a very fast machine, but you might experience
|
|
network delays. Contact Howard, Darrel, Trish, Wolvercuss, Akbaar or
|
|
Captain, wizards, if you wish to work on any aspect of After-Five.
|
|
|
|
BadBoy's Inn 130.18.80.26 bbs Pirate 2.0
|
|
-- badboy.itd.msstate.edu
|
|
|
|
-- Boards, Talk, Chat, Mail
|
|
-- Test site for new Pirate Software.
|
|
-- Pirate 2.0 kicks, if it would work all the time!
|
|
|
|
Campus_d 35.204.192.2 LOGIN CAMPUS_D
|
|
-- umde.dbrn.umich.edu
|
|
|
|
-- Currently down and contemplating permanent removal. (8/2/91)
|
|
-- Send comments/condemnations/pleading/apologizing/reminiscing/etc. to
|
|
DEN@UMDE.DBRN.UMICH.EDU
|
|
|
|
Cimarron (in Spanish) bugs.mty.itesm.mx bbs Pirate 1.0
|
|
-- 131.178.17.60
|
|
|
|
-- Nice BBS, too bad it is all in Spanish. Good place to get acquainted with
|
|
if you are trying to learn Spanish, lots of conversations to look at.
|
|
Cimarron means Wild Dog or Untamed.
|
|
|
|
-- This BBS seems to be a limited access site. I have gained access only
|
|
during late hours CST. I will try to get more info on this.
|
|
|
|
Cleveland Free-Net 129.22.8.75 (cwns16.ins.cwru.edu) CWRUBBS
|
|
-- 129.22.8.76 (cwns9.ins.cwru.edu)
|
|
-- 129.22.8.82 (cwns10.ins.cwru.edu)
|
|
-- freenet-in-a.cwru.edu
|
|
-- freenet-in-b-cwru.edu
|
|
-- freenet-in-c-cwru.edu
|
|
|
|
-- Usenet, Internet, MUD, USA Today Online. Local mail, and Interest Groups.
|
|
|
|
CueCosy cue.bc.ca cosy Cosy 4.0
|
|
-- 134.87.11.200
|
|
|
|
-- Conferences and Topics, EAN Mail, Usenet, FTP, downloads Kermit & Xmodem,
|
|
Online Unix course, some local files.
|
|
|
|
Cybernet Waffle BBS 131.91.80.13 bbs Waffle
|
|
-- shark.cs.fau.edu
|
|
|
|
-- Nice BBS, but I still haven't gotten word on whether I have been validated
|
|
or not. And no response to my mail either. Lots of conferences, and
|
|
Magpie Chat. Information for Floridians, GNU, computers, alternate
|
|
PUBNET, recreational, science, social, Unix-PC; unsure about files, but
|
|
still nice.
|
|
|
|
Delft University BBS 130.161.180.68 BBS
|
|
-- tudrwa.tudelft.nl
|
|
|
|
-- In Holland, mostly Dutch.
|
|
-- Files, messages, chat areas
|
|
|
|
Endless Forest 137.48.1.5 2001
|
|
-- forest.unomaha.edu 2001
|
|
|
|
-- Boards, E-mail. Reminds me of WWIV BBS.
|
|
|
|
Hall of Doom servax.fiu.edu
|
|
-- 131.94.64.2
|
|
|
|
-- login as WEATHER, passwd WEATHER
|
|
-- select 666
|
|
-- login as new.
|
|
|
|
Heartland Peoria Illinois FreeNet
|
|
-- 136.176.10.10 fnguest
|
|
-- heartland.bradley.edu
|
|
|
|
-- Mail, Public Forum, Recreation, Calendar, Social services, Senior center,
|
|
Teen center, Local job & government information, Legal, Medical, Tax, &
|
|
Invest/Banking Forums SIGs, Library, Home & Garden, Science & Tech, &
|
|
Education Forums.
|
|
|
|
Hewlett-Packard BBS hpcvbbs.cv.hp.com
|
|
-- 15.255.72.16
|
|
|
|
-- has tech help, and 48SX files/programs.
|
|
|
|
IDS DataForum 192.67.241.11 guest
|
|
-- ids.jvnc.net
|
|
|
|
-- IDS DataForum is a public access system run on a DEC VAX. It is menu
|
|
driven, supports VT100, and ANSI graphics.
|
|
|
|
-- Features, TELNET, FINGER, Weather Underground, Ham Callsign Book. Adds
|
|
Internet Mail (VMS Mail).
|
|
|
|
-- Includes Entertainment, such as, International MUDs, local-only games,
|
|
CONQUEST & GALACTIC TRADER, and CB Simulator for CHATS.
|
|
|
|
-- RIME, PC-BBS messaging network, Usenet NEWS with "nearly" full newsfeed.
|
|
|
|
-- DialOut service, online Game Developer Conference, and BBS software
|
|
available as well.
|
|
|
|
-- Local access at (401)-884-9002, (V.32, Telebit/PEP, USR HST, V.42bis).
|
|
|
|
-- More info at ids-info@idsvax.ids.com
|
|
|
|
ISCA isca01.isca.uiowa.edu iscabbs DOC (Citadel)
|
|
-- grind.isca.uiowa.edu
|
|
-- 128.255.19.233
|
|
-- 128.255.19.175
|
|
|
|
Mars Hotel Mars.EE.MsState.Edu bbs Pirate
|
|
-- 130.18.64.3
|
|
|
|
-- Boards, Talk, Chat, IRC, Mail.
|
|
-- Fairly extensive files,
|
|
-- ftp'able, Kermit, XYZmodems,
|
|
|
|
-- Died recently due to irreparable hardware failures. This system will
|
|
probably remain down for a year or so, or indefinitely if another machine
|
|
is not found for it. I will continue to update its status if any changes
|
|
occur.
|
|
|
|
-- Mars is/was a Sparc 4/110 that lost a Mongo chip. The EE department might
|
|
consider ordering a replacement, but has no idea where to get one.
|
|
Information will be forwarded if sent to Zamfield@dune.ee.msstate.edu.
|
|
Also, if anyone has a spare 4/110 the EE department said that would do
|
|
just fine.
|
|
|
|
-- Further information, offerings, etc, contact Zamfield@dune.ee.msstate.edu
|
|
and I will facilitate the rebirth of Mars if possible.
|
|
|
|
National Education BBS testsun3.nersc.gov bbs Pirate
|
|
-- shadowfax.nersc.gov
|
|
-- 128.55.128.183
|
|
-- 128.55.128.64
|
|
|
|
-- Boards, Talk, Chat, Mail.'source' file section, but no files. HAS GONE
|
|
PRIVATE, or so I have been told. (9/22/91)
|
|
|
|
Netcom netcom.netcom.com guest + <CR> at passwd
|
|
-- 192.100.81.100
|
|
|
|
-- Full Unix service. Money for access. $15.50/month ($17.50 for invoiced
|
|
billing)
|
|
-- (408) 241-9760/9794 (San Jose, CA) and
|
|
-- (415) 424-0131 (Palo Alto, CA).
|
|
|
|
Nyx BBS isis.cs.du.edu new
|
|
-- 130.253.192.9
|
|
|
|
-- Full news feed, Local downloads, shell access (with validation), and Ftp.
|
|
It is a completely free public access Unix system fun by the University of
|
|
Denver's Math and Computer Science Department.
|
|
|
|
-- Sysop: Professor. Andrew Burt. The system is run by donations on a
|
|
donated Pyramid 90x with a homebrew menuing system
|
|
|
|
Olajier 129.31.22.7 Olajier <passwd Olajier>
|
|
-- leo.ee.ic.ac.uk
|
|
|
|
-- Capitals are important for both the login and passwd. This BBS is at
|
|
Imperial College in London.
|
|
|
|
OuluBox (Finnish) tolsun.oulu.fi box
|
|
-- 130.231.96.16
|
|
|
|
-- Can set English as preferred language, said to switch to Finnish at the
|
|
most inconvenient time. IRC.
|
|
|
|
The Picayune star96.nodak.edu 20
|
|
-- star24.nodak.edu or star12.nodak.edu for slower speeds.
|
|
-- 134.129.107.131
|
|
|
|
-- North Dakota Higher Education Computer Network.
|
|
-- Limited net news, file areas, tetris online, local e-mail.
|
|
|
|
-- A 386 running unix, 2 80 meg drives, 600 users give or take a few.
|
|
|
|
Quartz Quartz.Rutgers.Edu bbs Citadel
|
|
-- 128.6.60.6
|
|
|
|
-- Rooms/Boards.
|
|
-- Suggest MUD to chat.
|
|
|
|
Samba North Carolina 128.109.157.30 bbs Modified XBBS
|
|
-- samba.acs.unc.edu
|
|
-- (919)-962-9911
|
|
|
|
-- Offers vi, emacs, rn, NEWS, MAIL, local messaging, SIGS, Conferencing,
|
|
Files (Kermit/FTP), & INFO limited NewsFeed (8/2/91).
|
|
|
|
Softwords COSY softwords.bc.ca cosy Cosy
|
|
-- 134.87.11.1
|
|
|
|
SpaceLink BBS spacelink.msfc.nasa.gov
|
|
-- 128.158.13.250
|
|
|
|
Spies In The Wires doomsday.spies.com bbs
|
|
-- 130.43.2.220
|
|
|
|
-- Full UseNet NewsFeed, Posting to UseNet.
|
|
-- IRC (for validated users).
|
|
|
|
-- Appears to have shut down. 12/6/91
|
|
|
|
TriState Online 129.137.100.1 visitor FreeNetIII
|
|
-- tso.uc.edu
|
|
|
|
-- new FreeNet site.
|
|
|
|
Virginia Tech Cosy vtcbx.csn.vt.edu cosyreg
|
|
-- 128.173.5.10 bbs (for list)
|
|
|
|
-- Virginia Tech Conferencing System. Offers local conferencing, up to date
|
|
listing of local BBSes and read only Usenet NEWS. Tons of messages.
|
|
|
|
Youngstown Free-Net yfn.ysu.edu visitor
|
|
-- 192.55.234.27
|
|
|
|
Unknown centaur.ucsd.edu bbs
|
|
-- 128.54.16.14
|
|
|
|
The World world.std.com new
|
|
-- 192.74.137.5
|
|
|
|
-- Public access Unix system. 19.2, 9600, 2400, & 1200 baud modem
|
|
connections. 3 GB disk storage. CompuServe Packet Network access and
|
|
SLIP connection up to T1.
|
|
|
|
-- Signup, dial 617-739-WRLD, type new. Basic rates are $2/hr 24 hrs/day and
|
|
$5 monthly fee. 20/20 plan, $20 for 20 hrs, including monthly fee. Also
|
|
available from Compuserve Packet Network. $5.60 surcharge is added to
|
|
monthly bill. Further info at staff@world.std.com
|
|
|
|
-- E-mail to Internet, UUCP, BITNET, CSNET, EUNET, JANET, JUNET, Fidonet,
|
|
BIX, Compuserve, Applelink and MCImail.
|
|
|
|
-- USENET, ClariNet, Electronic Mailing Lists, Chatting, Unix Software, GNU
|
|
Software, Games, Online Book Initiative, AlterNet Access, Internet.
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
SERVICES
|
|
~~~~~~~~
|
|
The following is a list of useful services that most BBSers are interested in.
|
|
I have not checked any of these except Archie. If you have more info about
|
|
these or if you know of other to add, please mail me:
|
|
|
|
Zamfield@Dune.EE.MsState.EDU.
|
|
|
|
==============================================================================
|
|
|
|
Service Address Login
|
|
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Archie quiche.cs.mcgill.ca archie
|
|
-- 132.206.2.3
|
|
|
|
Cheeseplant's House 137.205.192.5 2001
|
|
-- orchid.csv.warwick.ac.uk
|
|
|
|
-- This is a dedicated Chat program run by Daniel Stephens in Warwick
|
|
University in England.
|
|
|
|
Cat Chat 137.205.192.5 2000
|
|
|
|
-- Another ChatServer. See Cheeseplant's House.
|
|
|
|
DDN Network Information Center
|
|
-- nic.ddn.mil
|
|
-- 192.67.67.20
|
|
|
|
-- TACNEWS, WHOIS Server, NIC
|
|
|
|
|
|
GeoServer Martini.eecs.umich.edu 3000
|
|
-- 141.212.100.9
|
|
|
|
IRC Client bradenville.andrew.cmu.edu
|
|
-- 128.2.54.2
|
|
|
|
-- not all IRC commands supported.
|
|
|
|
Library Systems ->FTP<- vaxb.acs.unt.edu
|
|
|
|
-- This site contains a huge, 100-150 page, guide to Internet libraries.
|
|
The file is under the library directory. Send thanks and responses to
|
|
Billy Barron, BILLY@vaxb.acs.unt.EDU.
|
|
|
|
Lyric Server ->FTP<- cs.uwp.edu
|
|
|
|
-- These files are available via anonymous ftp. This is not really a Telnet
|
|
service, but it is nice to know about so I included it.
|
|
|
|
National Ham Radio Call-Sign Callbook
|
|
-- 128.205.32.4 2000
|
|
-- marvin.cs.Buffalo.Edu
|
|
|
|
-- I am very impressed with this service I heard that people had trouble
|
|
logging into this site, but I never encountered a login prompt, I just
|
|
started using it.
|
|
|
|
NCSU Services ccvax1.cc.ncsu.edu INFO or PUBLIC
|
|
-- 128.109.153.4
|
|
|
|
Network Information Service (Univ. of California at Berkeley)
|
|
-- mailhost.berkeley.edu 117
|
|
-- 128.32.136.9, 117
|
|
-- 128.32.136.12, 117
|
|
-- 128.32.206.9 117
|
|
-- 128.32.206.12 117
|
|
|
|
OCEANIC 128.175.24.1
|
|
-- delocn.udel.edu
|
|
|
|
-- Ocean info center, from the U. of Delaware. Contains technical and
|
|
scientific info on oceanic research. DOS software for viewing
|
|
oceanographic graphics. Type <$> to logout (no brackets).
|
|
|
|
Slugnet chat system cons1.mit.edu
|
|
-- 18.80.0.88, 2727
|
|
|
|
-- sorta like IRC.
|
|
|
|
UM-Weather Service madlab.sprl.umich.edu 3000
|
|
-- 141.212.196.79 3000
|
|
|
|
Vatech Server 128.173.16.6
|
|
-- vtcbx.cc.vt.edu
|
|
|
|
WAIS server hub.nnsc.nsf.net wais
|
|
-- 192.31.103.7
|
|
|
|
-- Gives access to online documents. More info can be obtained from
|
|
THINK.COM.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Thomas A. Kreeger (Zamfield@Dune.EE.MsState.Edu)
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
nixpub short listing
|
|
Open Access UNIX (*NIX) Sites [both Fee and No Fee]
|
|
[ September 13, 1991 ]
|
|
|
|
|
|
Legend: fee/contribution ($), no fee (-$), hours (24), not (-24)
|
|
shell (S), USENET news (N), e-mail (M), multiple lines (T)
|
|
Telebit PEP speed on main number (+P), Telebit on other line[s] (P)
|
|
Courier HST 9600 bps on main number (+H), Courier on other line[s] (H)
|
|
V.32 on main number (+V), V.32 on other line[s] (V)
|
|
anonymous uucp (A), archive site ONLY - see long form list (@)
|
|
|
|
Updated
|
|
Last Telephone # Sys-name Location Baud Legend
|
|
----- ------------ -------- ----------- ------- ---------
|
|
08/91 201-759-8450^ tronsbox Belleville NJ 3-96 24 -$ MN+PST
|
|
04/91 203-661-2873 admiral Greenwich CT 3/12/24/96 24 -$ AHMN+PT+V
|
|
09/91 206-328-4944^ polari Seattle WA 12 24 $ MNPST
|
|
05/91 206-367-3837^ eskimo Seattle WA 3/12/24 24 $ MNST
|
|
04/91 209-952-5347 quack Stockton CA 3/12/24/96 24 $ MN+PS
|
|
12/90 212-420-0527^ magpie NYC NY 3/12/24/96 24 -$ APT
|
|
12/90 212-431-1944^ dorsai NYC NY 3/12/24 24 $ MNT
|
|
12/90 212-675-7059^ marob NYC NY 3/12/24/96 24 -$ APT
|
|
12/90 213-397-3137^ stb Santa Monica CA 3/12/24/96 24 -$ A+PS
|
|
01/91 215-336-9503^ cellar Philadelphia PA 3/12/24/96 24 $ +HMN+V
|
|
06/91 215-348-9727 lgnp1 Doylestown PA 3/12/24/96 24 -$ AMN+P
|
|
12/90 216-582-2460^ ncoast Cleveland OH 12/24/96 24 $ MNPST
|
|
07/91 217-789-7888 pallas Springfield IL 3/12/24/96 24 $ HMNSTV
|
|
07/91 219-289-0282 nstar Notre Dame IN 24/96 24 $ +HMNPST+V
|
|
08/91 301-625-0817 wb3ffv Baltimore MD 12/24/96 24 -$ AHNPT+V
|
|
07/91 303-871-4824^ nyx Denver CO 3/12/24 24 -$ MNST
|
|
08/91 312-248-0900 ddsw1 Chicago IL 3/12/24/96 24 $ AMNPSTV
|
|
04/90 312-283-0559^ chinet Chicago IL 3/12/24/96 24 $ HNPT
|
|
10/89 312-338-0632^ point Chicago IL 3/12/24/96 24 -$ HNPST
|
|
09/90 312-714-8568^ gagme Chicago IL 12/24 24 $ MNS
|
|
06/90 313-623-6309 nucleus Clarkston MI 12/24 24 -$ AM
|
|
10/90 313-994-6333 m-net Ann Arbor MI 3/12/24 24 $ T
|
|
08/89 313-996-4644^ anet Ann Arbor MI 3/12 24 $ T
|
|
08/89 314-474-4581 gensis Columbia MO 3/12/24/48/ 24 -$ MS
|
|
08/90 401-455-0347 anomaly Esmond RI 3/12/24/96 24 -$ MN+PS
|
|
09/91 407-299-3661^ vicstoy Orlando FL 12/24 24 -$ MNS
|
|
06/91 407-438-7138^ jwt Orlando FL 12/24/96 24 -$ MNP
|
|
11/90 408-241-9760^ netcom San Jose CA 12/24/96 24 $ MNPST
|
|
09/89 408-245-7726^ uuwest Sunnyvale CA 3/12/24 24 -$ N
|
|
08/91 408-423-9995 cruzio Santa Cruz CA 12/24 24 $ MNPT
|
|
07/91 408-458-2289 gorn Santa Cruz CA 3/12/24/96 24 -$ MN+PST
|
|
10/89 408-725-0561^ portal Cupertino CA 3/12/24 24 $ MNT
|
|
12/90 408-739-1520^ szebra Sunnyvale CA 3/12/24/96 24 -$ MN+P
|
|
07/91 408-867-7400^ spies Saratoga CA 12/24 24 -$ MNST
|
|
09/91 408-996-7358^ zorch Cupertino CA 12/24/96 24 $ MNPT
|
|
06/91 412-431-8649^ eklektik Pittsburgh PA 3/12/24 24 $ MNST
|
|
06/91 414-241-5469^ mixcom Milwaukee WI 12/24/96 24 $ MNST
|
|
09/91 414-734-2499 edsi Appleton WI 3/12/24 24 $ MN
|
|
01/91 415-223-9768^ barbage El Sobrante CA 3/12/24/48 24 -$
|
|
11/90 415-294-8591 woodowl Livermore CA 12/24/19.2 24 -$ MN+P
|
|
11/89 415-332-6106^ well Sausalito CA 12/24 24 $ MNST
|
|
06/91 415-623-8652^ jack Fremont CA 3/12/24/96 24 -$ MN+PST
|
|
06/91 415-826-0397^ wet San Francisc CA 12/24 24 $ MNPSTV
|
|
04/91 415-949-3133^ starnet Los Altos CA 3/12/24/96 24 $ MNPSTV
|
|
05/90 415-967-9443^ btr Mountain Vie CA 3/12/24 24 $ HMNPSTV
|
|
11/89 416-452-0926 telly Brampton ON 12/24/96 24 $ MN+P
|
|
12/88 416-461-2608 tmsoft Toronto ON 3/12/24/96 24 $ MNS
|
|
02/90 502-957-4200 disk Louisville KY 3/12/24 24 $ MNST
|
|
08/91 503-254-0458^ bucket Portland OR 3/12/24/96 24 -$ MN+PST+V
|
|
02/91 503-297-3211^ m2xenix Portland OR 3/12/24/96 24 -$ MN+PST+V
|
|
03/91 503-640-4262^ agora PDX OR 12/24/96 24 $ MNST
|
|
05/90 503-644-8135^ techbook Portland OR 12/24 24 $ MNST
|
|
09/91 508-655-3848 unixland Natick MA 12/24/96 24 $ HMNPSTV
|
|
06/91 512-346-2339^ bigtex Austin TX 96 24 -$ A+PS
|
|
10/89 513-779-8209 cinnet Cincinnati OH 12/24/96 24 $ MN+PS
|
|
08/90 514-844-9179 tnl Montreal PQ 3/12/24 24 -$ MS
|
|
01/90 517-487-3356 lunapark E. Lansing MI 12/24 24 -$
|
|
12/88 518-346-8033 sixhub upstate NY 3/12/24 24 $ MNST
|
|
07/91 602-293-3726 coyote Tucson AZ 3/12/24/96 24 -$ MN+P
|
|
07/91 602-649-9099^ telesys Mesa AZ 12/24/96 24 $ AMN+PS
|
|
12/90 602-941-2005^ xroads Phoenix AZ 12/24 24 $ NT
|
|
11/90 604-576-1214 mindlink Vancouver BC 3/12/24/96 24 $ HMNPT
|
|
12/90 604-753-9960 oneb Nanaimo BC 3/12/24/96 24 $ MN+PT
|
|
08/89 605-348-2738 loft386 Rapid City SD 3/12/24/96 24 $ MN+PS
|
|
04/91 606-263-5106 lunatix Lexington KY 3/12/24 24 -$ MNST
|
|
08/88 608-273-2657 madnix Madison WI 3/12/24 24 -$ MNS
|
|
09/90 612-473-2295^ pnet51 Minneapolis MN 3/12/24 24 -$ MNT
|
|
12/90 613-237-0792 latour Ottawa ON 3/12/24/96 24 -$ AMN+PS+V
|
|
12/90 613-237-5077 micor Ottawa ON 3/12/24/96 24 -$ MN+P
|
|
06/91 614-868-9980^ bluemoon Reynoldsburg OH 3/12/24/96 24 -$ +HMNPT
|
|
07/91 615-288-3957 medsys Kingsport TN 12/24/96 24 -$ AN+P
|
|
04/91 615-896-8716 raider Murfreesboro TN 12/24/96 24 -$ MNST+V
|
|
11/90 616-457-1964 wybbs Jenison MI 3/12/24/96 24 -$ MN+PST
|
|
06/91 617-471-9675^ fcsys Quincy MA 3/12/24/96 24 -$ AMN+V
|
|
12/90 617-739-9753^ world Brookline MA 3/12/24/96 24 $ MNPST
|
|
01/90 619-259-7757 pnet12 Del Mar CA 3/12/24/96 24 -$ MNPT
|
|
07/88 619-444-7006^ pnet01 El Cajon CA 3/12/24 24 $ MNST
|
|
06/91 703-239-8993^ tnc Fairfax Stat VA 3/12/24/96 24 -$ MNPT
|
|
12/89 703-281-7997^ grebyn Vienna VA 3/12/24 24 $ MNT
|
|
05/91 708-833-8126^ vpnet Villa Park IL 12/24/96 24 -$ MN+PST
|
|
06/91 713-438-5018^ sugar Houston TX 3/12/24/96 24 -$ N+PT
|
|
08/91 713-568-0480^ taronga Hoston TX 3/12/24 24 -$ MNST
|
|
10/89 713-668-7176^ nuchat Houston TX 3/12/24/96 24 -$ MN+PS
|
|
04/91 714-278-0862 alchemy Corona CA 12/24/96 24 -$ MN+PS
|
|
01/91 714-635-2863^ dhw68k Anaheim CA 12/24/96 24 -$ MN+PST
|
|
12/90 714-821-9671^ alphacm Cypress CA 12/24/96 24 -$ A+PT
|
|
12/90 714-842-5851^ conexch Santa Ana CA 3/12/24 24 $ AMNS
|
|
01/91 714-894-2246^ stanton Irvine CA 3/12/24 24 $ MNS
|
|
03/90 717-657-4997 compnect Harrisburg PA 3/12/24 24 -$ MNT
|
|
06/91 718-424-4183^ mpoint New York NY 3/12/24/96 24 $ +HMNS+V
|
|
04/91 718-832-1525^ panix New York Cit NY 12/24/96 24 $ MNPST
|
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12/89 719-632-4111 oldcolo Colo Spgs CO 12/24/96 24 $ HMNT
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12/90 808-735-5013 pegasus Honolulu HI 12/24/96/19 24 -$ MN+PST+V
|
|
12/90 812-333-0450 sir-alan Bloominingto IN 12/24/19.2/ 24 -$ A+HMPTV
|
|
08/91 812-421-8523 aquila Evansville IN 12/24 24 $ AM
|
|
06/91 818-401-9611^ abode El Monte CA 24/96 24 $ MN+PST
|
|
03/91 900-468-7727 uunet Falls Church VA 3/12/24/96 24 $ AMN+PT+V
|
|
07/91 904-456-2003 amaranth Pensacola FL 12/24/96 24 -$ MN+P
|
|
09/91 906-228-4399 lopez Marquette MI 12/24 24 $ MN
|
|
06/91 908-297-8713^ kb2ear Kendall Park NJ 3/12/24/96 24 -$ AMNS+V
|
|
05/90 908-846-2460^ althea New Brunswic NJ 3/12/24 24 -$ MNS
|
|
08/91 916-649-0161^ sactoh0 Sacramento CA 12/24/96 24 $ MN+PSTV
|
|
01/91 919-248-1177^ rock RTP NC 3/12/24/96 24 $ MN
|
|
10/89 919-493-7111^ wolves Durham NC 3/12/24 24 $ MNS
|
|
08/91 +33-1-40-35-23-49 gna Paris FR 12 24 -$ AMN+PT+V
|
|
11/90 +39-541-27858 xtc Rimini (Fo) IT 3/12/24/96 24 -$ HN+PT
|
|
09/91 +41-61-8115492 ixgch Kaiseraugst CH 3/12/24 24 -$ AMN+P
|
|
02/91 +44-81-853-3965 dircon London UK 3/12/24 24 $ MN
|
|
11/90 +44-81-863-6646 ibmpcug Middlesex UK 3/12/24/96 24 $ MST+V
|
|
06/91 +49-30-691-95-20 scuzzy Berlin DE 3/12/24/96 24 -$ A+HS
|
|
06/91 +49-8106-34593 gold Baldham DE 3/12/24/96 24 -$ AHMN+PT+V
|
|
01/91 +64-4-642-260 cavebbs Wellington NZ 12/24 24 -$ MNT
|
|
11/90 +64-4-895-478 actrix Wellington NZ 3/12/24/96 24 $ +HMNST
|
|
02/91 +64-9-645-593 delphi Auckland NZ 3/12/24/96 24 -$ MNT+V
|
|
02/91 +64-9-817-3725 kcbbs Auckland NZ 12/24/96 24 -$ MN+PTV
|
|
|
|
NOTE: ^ means the site is reachable using PC Pursuit.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Four, Issue Thirty-Eight, File 6 of 15
|
|
|
|
_____ BEATING THE RADAR RAP _____
|
|
/ / \ / / \
|
|
( 5/5 ) Part 2 of 2 : "The Technical Side" ( 5/5 )
|
|
\_/___/ \_/___/
|
|
by Dispater
|
|
______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
| |
|
|
| Introduction | Welcome to the second installment in this series where we
|
|
|______________| will briefly explore some of the technical sides to the
|
|
operations, error analysis of the police traffic RADAR
|
|
unit, the basics of how this technology was developed, then how it was
|
|
implemented, a list of common RADAR errors, and finally the technical analysis
|
|
of various types of traffic RADAR by National Highway Safety Administration.
|
|
|
|
RADAR stands for Radio Detecting And Ranging. A traffic speed RADAR works
|
|
under the principle of physicals called the "Doppler effect." This theory
|
|
means that when a signal is reflected off of an object moving toward you, the
|
|
signal will be at a higher frequency when it is closer to you than when the
|
|
object is farther away or at the initial position. So the "Doppler effect" is
|
|
THE basis for the use of the traffic speed RADAR.
|
|
|
|
Right now in the United States, there are three bands that are allocated by the
|
|
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for "field disturbance sensors." These
|
|
three bands have non-technical names, and all operate in the GigaHertz range
|
|
(GigaHertz is a measure of frequency, i.e. 1 GHz = 1 billion cycles per
|
|
second). The following is a list of the RADAR bands (as a point of reference
|
|
FM radio modulates at 0.088 GHz to 0.108 GHz).
|
|
|
|
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
|
|
BAND : FREQUENCY NOTE ABOUT SPECIFIC BAND
|
|
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
|
|
X-Band : 10.525 GHz This is the frequency in which most RADAR units operate.
|
|
K-Band : 24.150 GHz K-Band was developed to give a longer range of the beam.
|
|
Ka-Band : 26.450 GHz This bandwidth is primarily for use with RADAR units
|
|
that are used for "photo-speed traps."
|
|
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
|
|
|
|
"So if RADAR is so unreliable," you ask, "why don't we have planes crashing on
|
|
a daily basis?" In the first place, TRAFFIC RADAR operates on a COMPLETELY
|
|
different basis than, say, the type of RADAR that tracks weather or airplanes.
|
|
|
|
The technology of traffic RADAR can in no way be compared to the accuracy of
|
|
other types of RADAR. Traffic RADAR does NOT "sweep" like a regular RADAR.
|
|
"Sweeping" means that the RADAR is picking up every single return signal it
|
|
gets and plots them proportionally on a two-dimensional cathode ray tube. On
|
|
the other hand, traffic RADAR uses a stationary beam. Also, traffic RADAR does
|
|
not use a modulated beam like regular RADAR; it uses a constant beam. ***This
|
|
is an important distinction because this means that if there are multiple
|
|
images, the constant RADAR beam cannot distinguish between them!***
|
|
|
|
Furthermore, traffic RADAR is limited to things such as size. It must be able
|
|
to fit inside a patrol car and it is also subject to cost. That means a
|
|
municipality usually picks up the lowest bid it can get from various
|
|
manufacturers.
|
|
______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
| |
|
|
| Implementation of Traffic RADAR | It is important to note at this time that
|
|
|_________________________________| while government standards for accuracy
|
|
for military and commercial airline RADAR
|
|
exist, traffic RADAR is NOT subject to ANY government standards whatsoever. An
|
|
attempt was made to do this by the police and two government agencies, but were
|
|
refused any type of compliance with traffic speed RADAR manufacturers and the
|
|
Reagan administration.
|
|
|
|
In the late 1970s, there was wide-spread publicity of about RADAR errors,
|
|
including the well known tree clocked at 86-MPH in Florida. So, in 1979 the
|
|
National Highway Safety Administration (NHSA) assigned to the National Bureau
|
|
of Standards the task of testing all brands of traffic RADAR in use at that
|
|
time for the purpose of discovering the source of these errors and proposing
|
|
federal standards to eliminate them. In January of 1981, the proposed
|
|
standards were published in the Federal Register. However, the Reagan
|
|
administration took no action on the proposal (the last part of this file
|
|
contains the profile from this report of various RADAR units).
|
|
|
|
After THREE years of government inaction on the problem, the International
|
|
Association of the Chief of Police (IACP) provided non-government standards by
|
|
which all traffic RADAR units could be tested to assure accuracy: Volume I of
|
|
the standards was published in April, 1984 and Volume II in June, of 1984.
|
|
|
|
In June of 1986, the traffic RADAR manufacturers announced the formation of
|
|
their own trade association, saying that they would not submit traffic RADAR
|
|
units for IACP testing! Instead, they said they would use their own standards.
|
|
|
|
So far, NO ONE has any idea of what these standards are; not the police, not
|
|
the government and, most importantly, not the public! Basically, there are no
|
|
performance requirements or standards for traffic RADAR and the claims of
|
|
86-MPH trees and 28-MPH houses cannot be refuted.
|
|
______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
| |
|
|
| Common Traffic Radar Errors | Below is a list of common errors and how they
|
|
|_____________________________| occur. This is the part of the article that
|
|
must be used in conjunction with the previous
|
|
file in this series. You must attempt, while pleading your case, to tie in
|
|
some of the following errors to the situation you found yourself in when you
|
|
got your speeding ticket. See Phrack #37 file #5 for details.
|
|
|
|
"The Look-Past Error" Even when the RADAR operator aims his gun properly, the
|
|
RADAR is subject to this type of error. This is caused by the RADAR reflecting
|
|
off of a larger surface area in the background rather than the smaller
|
|
reflective surface in the foreground. Evidence of this the Look-Past Error was
|
|
printed in the October 1979 issue of "Car and Driver." The author measured the
|
|
effectiveness of KR11 RADAR system against various vehicles. The author showed
|
|
that the typical sedan did not show up on the RADAR until it was less that 1200
|
|
feet away, however, a Ford 9000 semi tractor trailer could be picked up at 7600
|
|
feet.
|
|
|
|
"The Road Sign Error" Due to the reflectability of microwaves, road signs,
|
|
buildings, billboards, large trees, and other stationary objects are a source
|
|
of errors.
|
|
|
|
"Radio Interference Error" According to the Texas Department of Public
|
|
Safety, "UHF frequencies broadcast today can force RADAR to read various
|
|
numbers when transmitted within the area." This type of interference could
|
|
come from the radio within the patrol car, citizens band radio, or television
|
|
stations.
|
|
|
|
"Fan Interference Error" When the antenna is mounted inside the patrol car,
|
|
"RADAR will have the tendency to read the pulse of the fan motor (air
|
|
conditioner, heater, defroster)." This is a statement provided by the Texas
|
|
Department of Public Safety who conducted a study of RADAR guns in 1987. The
|
|
Texas Department of Public Safety offered no safeguard for this error.
|
|
|
|
"Beam Reflection Error" Since microwaves are so readily reflected, the Texas
|
|
Department of Public Safety cautioned mounting the antenna within the patrol
|
|
car. One instructor said, "It is possible that a reflective path can be set up
|
|
through the rear view mirror that will produce RADAR readings on the vehicles
|
|
behind the patrol car when the RADAR is aimed forward. And those vehicles can
|
|
be either coming or going since traffic RADAR cannot distinguish between the
|
|
direction."
|
|
|
|
"Double Bounce Error" Again, since microwaves are easily reflected, the
|
|
operator must be aware of a "bad bounce" and an ordinary reflection. And, as
|
|
stated before, since large objects are more efficient than smaller ones,
|
|
microwaves are attracted to them more. So, in effect, you could have an
|
|
initial RADAR bounce off of the target vehicle, then from the target vehicle to
|
|
a house or a truck going the opposite direction, and finally back to the patrol
|
|
car. This error will mathematically get larger the slower the target vehicle
|
|
is moving.
|
|
|
|
"The Cosine Error" This is a mathematical error that takes place when the
|
|
RADAR gun attempts to calculate the trigonomic equation that is programmed into
|
|
it. The RADAR gun measures the angle at which the target enters a point and
|
|
then exits a point (i.e. 25 degrees). The cosine of 25 is .9063. The RADAR
|
|
gun was designed to calculate the speed of the patrol car by multiplying the
|
|
speed of the patrol car (i.e. 50 mph) and the cosine of the angle (.9063) and
|
|
it gets the false speed of the patrol vehicle as 45mph. Therefore, when you
|
|
subtract the patrol speed from the target speed (i.e. 50, the same as the
|
|
patrol car) you get the false sense that the target vehicle is traveling 5mph
|
|
faster than the patrol car.
|
|
______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
| |
|
|
| Technical Analysis Report | Below is a copy of the report mentioned above
|
|
|___________________________| was conducted by the NHSA. But first I will
|
|
explain what some of the criteria were under the
|
|
testing conditions. It is also important to note that ALL RADAR units were
|
|
subject to "panning error" except the CMI Speedgun-6 and Speedgun-8 models.
|
|
Panning error occurs when the RADAR antenna is aimed at it's own display
|
|
console. Unintentional errors of this sort can be eliminated when police
|
|
officers are given adequate training.
|
|
|
|
TEST UNIT : Model and manufacturer of the police speed RADAR
|
|
unit in question.
|
|
|
|
BAND : The short hand used for determining the broadcast
|
|
frequency of the RADAR unit. X-Band is 8.2-12.4 GHz.
|
|
K-Band is 18.0-26.5 GHz.
|
|
|
|
BEAM WIDTH : The number that is 1/2 of the actual beam width.
|
|
In other words, if a RADAR manufacturer says the beam
|
|
width is 24 degrees, the actual beam width is
|
|
48 degrees. Very deceptive, eh?
|
|
|
|
SHADOWING ERROR : This occurs in moving mode only. It is the result
|
|
of the RADAR mistaking another vehicle for it's
|
|
ground reference and adding speed to the target
|
|
reading.
|
|
|
|
POWER SURGE : This occurs when the RADAR unit is first turned on.
|
|
This also occurs when the "kill switch" is used to
|
|
defeat RADAR detectors. Lag time for kill in the
|
|
moving mode ranges from 1.5-5 seconds.
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE : The NBS test only used CB radio and police-band radio
|
|
for "external interference." There are many other
|
|
kinds of outside electromagnetic interference that
|
|
may effect police RADAR.
|
|
|
|
INTERNAL INTERFERENCE : Internal interference "may be caused by ANY
|
|
electrical component or accessory in the vehicle,
|
|
especially when the patrol car's primary power source
|
|
is used to operate the RADAR.
|
|
|
|
[It should be noted that TWO of MPH's K-55 RADAR units were tested. This
|
|
demonstrates that each RADAR unit can contain its own quirks regardless of the
|
|
fact that it can be from the same model from the same manufacturer.]
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS SUMMARY ON TRAFFIC RADAR
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
TEST UNIT BAND BEAM WIDTH SHADOWING ERROR
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
Kustom Signals MR-9 K 13.3 Minor
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
POWER SURGE EXTERNAL INTERF. INTERNAL INTERF.
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
Switch-ON gave CB radio caused false CB radio caused
|
|
stray reading of 7mph readings of up to 25' erroneous readings
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
TEST UNIT BAND BEAM WIDTH SHADOWING ERROR
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
MPH Industries K-55 X 20.4 Added 12mph to target in one
|
|
(first of two units) test
|
|
|
|
|
|
POWER SURGE EXTERNAL INTERF. INTERNAL INTERF.
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
No valid reading for CB radio caused false CB radio many
|
|
2.4 sec in moving mode readings of up to 20' erroneous readings
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
TEST UNIT BAND BEAM WIDTH SHADOWING ERROR
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
MPH Industries K-55 X 24.6 Increased target speed 12-15mph
|
|
(second of two units) about 20% of the time
|
|
|
|
|
|
POWER SURGE EXTERNAL INTERF. INTERNAL INTERF.
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
2 sec delay in moving mode, CB radio caused false CB radio cause many
|
|
2.5 sec in stationary mode alarms up to 175' away erroneous readings
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
TEST UNIT BAND BEAM WIDTH SHADOWING ERROR
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
Decatur MV-715 X 17.5 Added 8-23mph to target in
|
|
repeated testing
|
|
|
|
|
|
POWER SURGE EXTERNAL INTERF. INTERNAL INTERF.
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
No valid reading for Not effected by external Extreme interference
|
|
2+ seconds in moving mode CB radio from heater fan,
|
|
ignition, & CB radio
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
TEST UNIT BAND BEAM WIDTH SHADOWING ERROR
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
CMI Speedgun-6 X 18.8 Very severe, added 12-20 mph
|
|
to target
|
|
|
|
POWER SURGE EXTERNAL INTERF. INTERNAL INTERF.
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
7 sec delay in moving mode, Not effected by external CB radio and police
|
|
2 sec delay in stationary CB radio radio boosts
|
|
readings 20mph
|
|
_____________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
TEST UNIT BAND BEAM WIDTH SHADOWING ERROR
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
CMI Speedgun-8 X 18.6 target traveling 41mph shown as
|
|
74mph; target 30mph shown as
|
|
41mph
|
|
|
|
POWER SURGE EXTERNAL INTERF. INTERNAL INTERF.
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
2 sec delay in moving mode, Not effected by external No adverse effect
|
|
1.2 sec delay in stationary CB radio noted
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
TEST UNIT BAND BEAM WIDTH SHADOWING ERROR
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
Kustom Signals MR-7 X 14.3 No effects noted
|
|
|
|
|
|
POWER SURGE EXTERNAL INTERF. INTERNAL INTERF.
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
25.4 sec delay in moving mode, Not effected by external Police band radio
|
|
0.6 sec delay in stationary CB radio caused intermittent
|
|
increases of 10mph
|
|
______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
| |
|
|
| In Closing... | I hope you have learned a little about how police speed
|
|
|_______________| RADAR operates, the errors that they frequently incur, and
|
|
possibly a way to avoid the highway robbery that occurs
|
|
each time Officer Friendly decides to make a little extra dough for his "job
|
|
security."
|
|
|
|
Also, if you are interested in obtaining cheap traffic RADAR equipment to play
|
|
with, you can write to: AIS SATELLITE INC., 106 N. Seventh Street, Perkasie,
|
|
PA 18944. You can also call them for a catalog at (215)453-1400 or place
|
|
orders at (800)AIS-2001.
|
|
______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
== Phrack Inc. ==
|
|
|
|
Volume Four, Issue Thirty-Eight, File 7 of 15
|
|
|
|
<:=--=:><:=--=:><:=--=:><:=--=:>\|/<:=--=:><:=--=:><:=--=:><:=--=:>
|
|
<:=--=:> <:=--=:>
|
|
<:=--=:> >>>>>=-* Users Guide to VAX/VMS *-=<<<<< <:=--=:>
|
|
<:=--=:> <:=--=:>
|
|
<:=--=:> Part III of III <:=--=:>
|
|
<:=--=:> <:=--=:>
|
|
<:=--=:> Part E: DCL Command Reference <:=--=:>
|
|
<:=--=:> Part F: Lexical Function Reference <:=--=:>
|
|
<:=--=:> <:=--=:>
|
|
<:=--=:> By Black Kat <:=--=:>
|
|
<:=--=:> <:=--=:>
|
|
<:=--=:><:=--=:><:=--=:><:=--=:>/|\<:=--=:><:=--=:><:=--=:><:=--=:>
|
|
|
|
|
|
Index
|
|
~~~~~
|
|
Part E contains information on DCL Command Reference
|
|
Part F contains information on Lexical Function Reference
|
|
|
|
|
|
<:=- Part E : DCL Command Reference -=:>
|
|
|
|
|
|
DCL Command Reference
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
@ file_spec [p1 p2...p8]
|
|
Executes a DCL command procedure.
|
|
|
|
Qualifier:
|
|
/OUTPUT=file_spec
|
|
|
|
|
|
ACCOUNTING file_spec[,...]
|
|
Invokes the VAX/VMS Accounting Utility to collect and report accounting
|
|
information.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ACCOUNT /ADDRESS /BEFORE /BINARY /ENTRY
|
|
/FULL /IDENTIFICATION /IMAGE /JOB /LOG
|
|
/NODE /OUTPUT /OWNER /PRIORITY /PROCESS
|
|
/QUEUE /REJECTED /REMOTE_ID /REPORT /SINCE
|
|
/SORT /STATUS /SUMMARY /TERMINAL /TITLE
|
|
/TYPE /UIC /USER
|
|
|
|
|
|
ALLOCATE device_name: [logical_name]
|
|
Provides exclusive use of a device and, optionally, establishes a logical
|
|
name for that device. While a device is allocated, other users may access
|
|
the device until you DEALLOCATE it or log out.
|
|
|
|
Qualifier:
|
|
/GENERIC
|
|
|
|
|
|
ANALYZE
|
|
Invokes various VAX/VMS utilities to examine components of the system. The
|
|
default function is to examine a module (ANALYZE/OBJECT).
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/CRASH_DUMP /DISK_STRUCTURE /ERROR_LOG /IMAGE
|
|
/MEDIA /OBJECT /PROCESS_DUMP /RMS_FILE
|
|
/SYSTEM
|
|
|
|
|
|
APPEND input_file_spec[,...] output_file_spec
|
|
Adds the contents of one or more input files to the end of a file.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ALLOCATION /BACKUP /BEFORE /BY_OWNER /CONFIRM
|
|
/CONTIGUOUS /CREATED /EXCLUDE /EXPIRED /EXTENSION
|
|
/LOG /MODIFIED /NEW_VERSION /READ_CHECK /SINCE
|
|
/WRITE_CHECK
|
|
|
|
|
|
ASSIGN
|
|
Equates a logical name to a physical device name, file specification or
|
|
another logical name.
|
|
|
|
|
|
ASSIGN/MERGE
|
|
Merges the contents of one queue with another.
|
|
|
|
|
|
ASSIGN/QUEUE
|
|
Assigns a logical queue to a device queue.
|
|
|
|
|
|
ATTACH [process_name]
|
|
Enables you to transfer control from the current process to another process
|
|
created by you (see SPAWN).
|
|
|
|
Qualifier:
|
|
/IDENTIFICATION
|
|
|
|
|
|
BACKUP input_spec output_spec
|
|
Invokes the VAX/VMS Backup Utility to perform one of the following file
|
|
operations:
|
|
o Copy disk files.
|
|
o Save disk files as a save set (a single data file) on a disk or
|
|
magnetic tape volume.
|
|
o Restore files from a save set.
|
|
o Compare files.
|
|
o Display information about files contained in a save set.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/BACKUP /BEFORE /BLOCK_SIZE /BRIEF
|
|
/BUFFER_COUNT /COMMENT /COMPARE /CONFIRM
|
|
/CRC /CREATED /DELETE /DENSITY
|
|
/EXCLUDE /EXPIRED /FAST /FULL
|
|
/GROUP_SIZE /IGNORE /IMAGE /INCREMENTAL
|
|
/INITIALIZE /INTERCHANGE /JOURNAL /LABEL
|
|
/LIST /LOG /MODIFIED /NEW_VERSION
|
|
/OVERLAY /OWNER_UIC /PHYSICAL /PROTECTION
|
|
/RECORD /REPLACE /REWIND /SAVE_SET
|
|
/SELECT /SINCE /TRUNCATE /VERIFY
|
|
/VOLUME
|
|
|
|
|
|
CALL label [p1 p2...p8]
|
|
Transfers command procedure control to a labeled subroutine in the procedure.
|
|
|
|
Qualifier:
|
|
/OUTPUT
|
|
|
|
|
|
CANCEL [process_name]
|
|
Cancels a scheduled wake_up request for the specified process.
|
|
|
|
Qualifier:
|
|
/IDENTIFICATION
|
|
|
|
|
|
CLOSE logical_name
|
|
Closes a file opened for input/output with the OPEN command, and deassigns
|
|
the logical name created for the file.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ERROR /LOG
|
|
|
|
|
|
CONNECT virtual_terminal_name
|
|
Connects a physical terminal to a virtual terminal connected to another
|
|
process.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/CONTINUE /LOGOUT
|
|
|
|
|
|
CONTINUE
|
|
Resumes execution of a DCL command, program or command procedure
|
|
interrupted by pressing <Ctrl-Y> or <Ctrl-C>. You can abbreviate the
|
|
CONTINUE command to the letter C.
|
|
|
|
|
|
COPY input_file_spec[,...] output_file_spec
|
|
Creates a new file from one or more existing files. The COPY command can be
|
|
used to:
|
|
o Copy an input file to an output file, optionally changing its name and
|
|
location.
|
|
o Copy a group of input files to a group of output files.
|
|
o Concatenate two or more files into a single new file.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ALLOCATION /BACKUP /BEFORE /BY_OWNER /CONCATENATE
|
|
/CONFIRM /CONTIGUOUS /CREATED /EXCLUDE /EXPIRED
|
|
/EXTENSION /LOG /MODIFIED /OVERLAY /PROTECTION
|
|
/READ_CHECK /REPLACE /SINCE /TRUNCATE /VOLUME
|
|
/WRITE_CHECK
|
|
|
|
|
|
CREATE file_spec
|
|
Creates one or more sequential disk files from records that follow in the
|
|
input stream (i.e., the keyboard, a modem...). To terminate input and close
|
|
the file, enter <Ctrl-Z>.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/LOG /OWNER_UIC /PROTECTION /VOLUME
|
|
|
|
|
|
CREATE/DIRECTORY directory_spec[,...]
|
|
Creates a new directory or subdirectory for cataloging files.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/LOG /OWNER_UIC /PROTECTION /VERSION_LIMIT /VOLUME
|
|
|
|
|
|
CREATE/FDL=fdl_file_spec [file_spec]
|
|
Invokes the FDL (File Definition Language) Utility to use the
|
|
specifications in a definition file to create a new (empty) data file.
|
|
|
|
Qualifier:
|
|
/LOG
|
|
|
|
|
|
DEALLOCATE device_name:
|
|
Releases a previously allocated device to the pool of available devices.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ALL
|
|
|
|
|
|
DEASSIGN logical_name[:]
|
|
Deletes logical name assignments made with the ALLOCATE, ASSIGN, DEFINE, or
|
|
MOUNT command.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ALL /EXECUTE_MODE /GROUP /JOB
|
|
/PROCESS /SUPERVISOR_MODE /SYSTEM /TABLE
|
|
/USER_MODE
|
|
|
|
|
|
DEASSIGN/QUEUE logical_queue_name[:]
|
|
Deassigns a logical queue from its printer or terminal queue assignment and
|
|
stops the associated logical queue.
|
|
|
|
|
|
DEBUG
|
|
Invokes the VAX/VMS Debugger.
|
|
|
|
|
|
DEFINE logical_name equivalence_name[,...]
|
|
Creates a logical name entry and assigns it an equivalence string, or a list
|
|
of equivalence strings, to the specified logical name.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/EXECUTIVE_MODE /GROUP /JOB
|
|
/LOG /NAME_ATTRIBUTES /PROCESS
|
|
/SUPERVISOR_MODE /SYSTEM /TABLE
|
|
/TRANSLATION_ATTRIBUTES /USER_MODE /CHARACTERISTIC
|
|
/FORM /KEY
|
|
|
|
|
|
DEFINE/KEY key_name string
|
|
Associates a character string and a set of attributes with a function key.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ECHO /ERASE /IF_STATE /LOCK_STATE /LOG
|
|
/SET_STATE /TERMINATE
|
|
|
|
|
|
DELETE file_spec[,...]
|
|
Deletes one or more files from a mass device.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/BACKUP /BEFORE /BY_OWNER /CONFIRM /CREATED
|
|
/ERASE /EXCLUDE /EXPIRED /LOG /MODIFIED
|
|
/SINCE
|
|
|
|
|
|
DELETE/CHARACTERISTIC characteristic_name
|
|
Deletes the definition of a queue characteristic that previously was
|
|
established with the DEFINE/CHARACTERISTIC command.
|
|
|
|
|
|
DELETE/ENTRY=(queue_entry_number[,...]) queue_name[:]
|
|
Deletes one or more job entries from the named queue.
|
|
|
|
|
|
DELETE/KEY key_name
|
|
Deletes a key definition established by the DEFINE/KEY command.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ALL /LOG /STATE
|
|
|
|
|
|
DELETE/QUEUE queue_name[:]
|
|
Deletes the specified queue from the system.
|
|
|
|
|
|
DELETE/SYMBOL symbol_name
|
|
Removes a symbol definition from a local or global symbol table or removes
|
|
all symbol definitions in a symbol table.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ALL /GLOBAL /LOCAL /LOG
|
|
|
|
|
|
DEPOSIT location=data[,...]
|
|
Over-writes the contents of a specified location or series of locations in
|
|
virtual memory. The DEPOSIT and EXAMINE commands are used (mostly) while
|
|
debugging programs interactively.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ASCII /BYTE /DECIMAL /HEXADECIMAL
|
|
/LONGWORD /OCTAL /WORD
|
|
|
|
|
|
DIFFERENCES master_file_spec [revision_file_spec]
|
|
Compares the contents of two disk files and creates a listing of those
|
|
records that do not match.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/CHANGE_BAR /COMMENT_DELIMITER /IGNORE
|
|
/MATCH /MAXIMUM_DIFFERENCES /MERGED
|
|
/MODE /NUMBER /OUTPUT
|
|
/PARALLEL /SEPARATED /SLP
|
|
/WIDTH /WINDOW
|
|
|
|
|
|
DIRECTORY [file_spec[,...]]
|
|
Provides a list of files or information about a file or group of files.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ACL /BACKUP /BEFORE /BRIEF /BY_OWNER
|
|
/COLUMNS /CREATED /DATE /EXCLUDE /EXPIRED
|
|
/FILE_ID /FULL /GRAND_TOTAL /HEADING /MODIFIED
|
|
/OUTPUT /OWNER /PRINTER /PROTECTION /SECURITY
|
|
/SELECT /SINCE /SIZE /TOTAL /TRAILING
|
|
/VERSIONS /WIDTH
|
|
|
|
|
|
DISCONNECT
|
|
Disconnects a physical terminal from a virtual terminal that has been
|
|
connected to a process. The virtual terminal, and its associated process
|
|
will remain on the system when the physical terminal is disconnected from it.
|
|
|
|
Qualifier:
|
|
/CONTINUE
|
|
|
|
|
|
DISMOUNT device_name[:]
|
|
Dismounts a disk or magnetic tape volume that previously was mounted with a
|
|
MOUNT command.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ABORT /CLUSTER /UNIT /UNLOAD
|
|
|
|
|
|
DUMP file_spec[,...]
|
|
Displays the contents of files or volumes in ASCII, decimal, hexadecimal or
|
|
octal representation.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ALLOCATED /BLOCKS /BYTE /DECIMAL /FILE_HEADER
|
|
/FORMATTED /HEADER /HEXADECIMAL /LONGWORD /NUMBER
|
|
/OCTAL /OUTPUT /PRINTER /RECORDS /WORD
|
|
|
|
|
|
EDIT/ACL file_spec
|
|
Invokes the Access Control List Editor to create or update access control
|
|
list information for a specified object.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/JOURNAL /KEEP /MODE /OBJECT /RECOVER
|
|
|
|
|
|
EDIT/EDT file_spec
|
|
Invokes the VAX/VMS EDT text editor. The /EDT qualifier is not required, as
|
|
EDT is the default editor.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/COMMAND /CREATE /JOURNAL /OUTPUT /READ_ONLY
|
|
/RECOVER
|
|
|
|
|
|
EDIT/FDL file_spec
|
|
Invokes the VAX/VMS FDL (File Definition Language) Editor to create or modify
|
|
File and FDL files.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ANALYSIS /CREATE /DISPLAY /EMPHASIS
|
|
/GRANULARITY /NOINTERACTIVE /NUMBER_KEYS /OUTPUT
|
|
/PROMPTING /RESPONSES /SCRIPT
|
|
|
|
|
|
EDIT/TPU file_spec
|
|
Invokes the VAX/VMS Text Processing Utility. The EVE (Extensible VAX Editor)
|
|
is the default interface for TPU. To invoke TPU with the EDT emulator
|
|
interface, define the logical TPUSECII to point to the section file for the
|
|
EDT interface as follows:
|
|
$ DEFINE TPUSECINI EDTSECINI
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/COMMAND /CREATE /DISPLAY /JOURNAL
|
|
/OUTPUT /READ_ONLY /RECOVER /SECTION
|
|
|
|
|
|
EOD
|
|
Signals the end of an input stream when a command, program or utility is
|
|
reading data from an input device other than a terminal.
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXAMINE location[:location]
|
|
Displays the contents of virtual memory.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ASCII /BYTE /DECIMAL /HEXADECIMAL
|
|
/LONGWORD /OCTAL /WORD
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXIT [status_code]
|
|
Terminates the current command procedure. If the command procedure was
|
|
executed from within another command procedure, control will return to the
|
|
calling procedure.
|
|
|
|
|
|
GOSUB label
|
|
Transfers command procedure control to a labeled subroutine.
|
|
|
|
|
|
GOTO label
|
|
Transfers control to a labeled statement in a command procedure.
|
|
|
|
|
|
HELP
|
|
Invokes the VAX/VMS Help Utility to display information about a VMS command
|
|
or topic.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/INSTRUCTIONS /LIBLIST /LIBRARY /OUTPUT
|
|
/PAGE /PROMPT /USERLIBRARY
|
|
|
|
|
|
IF logical_expression THEN dcl_command
|
|
Tests the value of a logical expression and executes the command following
|
|
the THEN keyword if the test is true.
|
|
|
|
|
|
INITIALIZE device_name[:] volume_label
|
|
Formats and writes a label on a mass storage volume.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ACCESSED /BADBLOCKS /CLUSTER_SIZE /DATA_CHECK
|
|
/DENSITY /DIRECTORIES /ERASE /EXTENSION
|
|
/FILE_PROTECTION /GROUP /HEADERS /HIGHWATER
|
|
/INDEX /LABEL /MAXIMUM_FILES /OVERRIDE
|
|
/OWNER_UC /PROTECTION /SHARE /STRUCTURE
|
|
/SYSTEM /USER_NAME /VERIFIED /WINDOWS
|
|
|
|
|
|
INITIALIZE/QUEUE queue_name[:]
|
|
Creates and initializes queues. This command is used to create and assign
|
|
names and attributes to queues. When creating a batch queue, the qualifier
|
|
/BATCH is required.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/BASE_PRIORITY /BATCH /BLOCK_LMIT /CHARACTERISTICS
|
|
/CPUDEFAULT /CPUMAXIMUM /DEFAULT /DISABLE_SWAPPING
|
|
/ENABLE_GENERIC /FORM_MOUNTED /GENERIC /JOB_LIMIT
|
|
/LIBRARY /ON /OWNER_UIC /PROCESSOR
|
|
/PROTECTION /RECORD_BLOCKING /RETAIN /SCHEDULE
|
|
/SEPARATE /START /TERMINAL /WSDEFAULT
|
|
/WSEXTENT /WSQUOTA
|
|
|
|
|
|
INQUIRE symbol_name [prompt]
|
|
Provides interactive assignment of a value for a local or global symbol in a
|
|
command procedure.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/GLOBAL /LOCAL /PUNCTUATION
|
|
|
|
|
|
LIBRARY library_file_spec [input_file_spec[,...]]
|
|
Invokes the VAX/VMS Librarian Utility to create, modify, or describe a macro,
|
|
object, help, text or shareable image library.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/BEFORE /COMPRESS /CREATE /CROSS_REFERENCE
|
|
/DATA /DELETE /EXTRACT /FULL
|
|
/GLOBALS /HELP /HISTORY /INSERT
|
|
/LIST /LOG /MACRO /NAMES
|
|
/OBJECT /ONLY /OUTPUT /REMOVE
|
|
/REPLACE /SELECTIVE_SEARCH /SHARE /SINCE
|
|
/SQUEEZE /TEXT /WIDTH /MODULE
|
|
|
|
|
|
LINK file_spec[,...]
|
|
Invokes the VAX/VMS Linker to link object modules into a VMS program image.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/BRIEF /CONTIGUOUS /CROSS_REFERENCE /DEBUG
|
|
/EXECUTABLE /FULL /HEADER /MAP
|
|
/IMAGE /PROTECT /SHAREABLE /SYMBOL_TABLE
|
|
/SYSLIB /SYSSHR /SYSTEM /TRACEBACK
|
|
/USERLIBRARY /INCLUDE /LIBRARY /OPTIONS
|
|
/SELECTIVE_SEARCH /SHAREABLE
|
|
|
|
|
|
LOGOUT
|
|
Terminates an interactive terminal session with VMS.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/BRIEF /FULL /HANGUP
|
|
|
|
|
|
MACRO file_spec[,...]
|
|
Invokes the VAX/VMS MACRO assembler to assemble MACRO assembly language
|
|
source programs.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/CROSS_REFERENCE /DEBUG /DISABLE /ENABLE
|
|
/LIBRARY /LIST /OBJECT /SHOW
|
|
/UPDATE
|
|
|
|
|
|
MAIL [file_spec] [recipient_name]
|
|
Invokes the VAX/VMS Personal Mail Utility, which is used to send messages to,
|
|
and receive messages from, other users of the system.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/SUBJECT /EDIT /SELF
|
|
|
|
|
|
MERGE input_file_spec1,input_file_spec2[,...] output_file_spec
|
|
Invokes the VAX/VMS Sort Utility to combine up to 10 similarly sorted input
|
|
files. The input files to be merged must be in sorted order before invoking
|
|
MERGE.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/CHECK_SEQUENCE /COLLATING_SEQUENCE /DUPLICATES
|
|
/KEY /SPECIFICATION /STABLE
|
|
/STATISTICS /FORMAT /ALLOCATION
|
|
/BUCKET_SIZE /CONTIGUOUS /FORMAT
|
|
/INDEXED_SEQUENTIAL /OVERLAY /RELATIVE
|
|
/SEQUENTIAL
|
|
|
|
|
|
MESSAGE file_spec[,...]
|
|
Invokes the VAX/VMS Message Utility to compile message definition files.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/FILE_NAME /LIST /OBJECT /SYMBOLS /TEXT
|
|
|
|
|
|
MONITOR [class_name[,...]]
|
|
Invokes the VAX/VMS Monitor Utility to monitor various classes of system
|
|
performance data. Data can be analyzed from a running system or from a
|
|
previously created recording file. You can execute a single MONITOR request,
|
|
or enter MONITOR interactive mode to execute a number of requests. The
|
|
interactive mode is entered by entering the MONITOR command with no
|
|
parameters or qualifiers. A MONITOR request is terminated by entering
|
|
<Ctrl-C> or <Ctrl-Z>. Pressing <Ctrl-C> causes MONITOR to enter interactive
|
|
mode, while <Ctrl-Z> returns control to DCL.
|
|
|
|
Parameters:
|
|
ALL_CLASSES CLUSTER DECNET
|
|
DISK DLOCK FCP
|
|
FILE_SYSTEM_CACHE IO LOCK
|
|
MODES PAGE POOL
|
|
PROCESSES SCS STATES
|
|
SYSTEM
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/BEGINNING /BY_NODE /COMMENT
|
|
/DISPLAY /ENDING /FLUSH_INTERVAL
|
|
/INPUT /INTERVAL /NODE
|
|
/RECORD /SUMMARY /VIEWING_TIME
|
|
|
|
Class Name Qualifiers:
|
|
/ALL /AVERAGE /CPU
|
|
/CURRENT /ITEM /MAXIMUM
|
|
/MINIMUM /PERCENT /TOPBIO
|
|
/TOPCPU /TOPDIO /TOPFAULT
|
|
|
|
|
|
MOUNT device_name[:][,...] [volume_label[,...]] [logical_name[:]]
|
|
Invokes the VAX/VMS Mount Utility to make a disk or tape volume available for
|
|
use.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ASSIST /ACCESSED /AUTOMATIC
|
|
/BIND /BLOCKSIZE /CACHE
|
|
/CLUSTER /COMMENT /CONFIRM
|
|
/COPY /DATA_CHECK /DENSITY
|
|
/EXTENSION /FOREIGN /GROUP
|
|
/HDR3 /INITIALIZE /LABEL
|
|
/MESSAGE /MOUNT_VERIFICATION /OVERRIDE
|
|
/OWNER_UIC /PROCESSOR /PROTECTION
|
|
/QUOTA /REBUILD /RECORDZIDE
|
|
/SHADOW /SHARE /SYSTEM
|
|
/UNLOAD /WINDOWS /WRITE
|
|
|
|
|
|
ON condition THEM dcl_command
|
|
Defines the DCL command to be executed when a command or program executed
|
|
with a command procedure encounters an error condition or is interrupted by
|
|
the user pressing <Ctrl-Y>.
|
|
|
|
|
|
OPEN logical_name[:] file_spec
|
|
Opens a file for input/output. The OPEN command assigns a logical name to
|
|
the file and places the name in the process logical name table.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/APPEND /ERROR /READ /SHARE /WRITE
|
|
|
|
|
|
PATCH file_spec
|
|
Invokes the VAX/VMS Patch Utility to patch an executable image, shareable
|
|
image or device driver image.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ABSOLUTE /JOURNAL /NEW_VERSION /OUTPUT /UPDATE
|
|
/VOLUME
|
|
|
|
|
|
PHONE [phone_command]
|
|
Invokes the VAX/VMS Phone Utility. PHONE provides the facility for you to
|
|
communicate with other users on the system or for any other VAX/VMS system
|
|
connected to your system via a DECnet network.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/SCROLL /SWITCH_HOOK /VIEWPORT_SIZE
|
|
|
|
|
|
PRINT file_spec[,...]
|
|
Queues-up one or more files for printing.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/AFTER /BACKUP /BEFORE /BURST
|
|
/BY_OWNER /CHARACTERISTICS /CONFIRM /COPIES
|
|
/CREATED /DELETE /DEVICE /EXCLUDE
|
|
/EXPIRED /FEED /FLAG /FORM
|
|
/HEADER /HOLD /IDENTIFY /JOB_COUNT
|
|
/LOWERCASE /MODIFIED /NAME /NOTE
|
|
/NOTIFY /OPERATOR /PAGES /PARAMETERS
|
|
/PASSALL /PRIORITY /QUEUE /REMOTE
|
|
/RESTART /SETUP /SINCE /SPACE
|
|
/TRAILER /USER
|
|
|
|
|
|
PURGE [file_spec[,...]]
|
|
Deletes all but the highest versions of the specified files.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/BACKUP /BEFORE /BY_OWNER /CONFIRM /CREATED
|
|
/ERASE /EXCLUDE /EXPIRED /KEEP /LOG
|
|
/MODIFIED /SINCE
|
|
|
|
|
|
READ logical_name[:] symbol_name
|
|
The READ command inputs a single record from the specified input file and
|
|
assigns the contents of the record to the specified symbol name.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/DELETE /END_OF_FILE /ERROR /INDEX /KEY
|
|
/MATCH /NOLOCK /PROMPT /TIME_OUT
|
|
|
|
|
|
RECALL [command_specifier]
|
|
Recalls previously entered commands for reprocessing or correcting.
|
|
|
|
Qualifier:
|
|
/ALL
|
|
|
|
|
|
RENAME input_file_spec[,...] output_file_spec
|
|
Modifies the file specification of an existing disk file or disk directory.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/BACKUP /BEFORE /BY_OWNER /CONFIRM /CREATED
|
|
/EXCLUDE /EXPIRED /LOG /MODIFIED /NEW_VERSION
|
|
/SINCE
|
|
|
|
|
|
REPLY ["message"]
|
|
Allows a system operator to communicate with system users.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ABORT /ALL /BELL /BLANK_TAPE
|
|
/DISABLE /ENABLE /INITIALIZE_TAPE /LOG
|
|
/NODE /NOTIFY /PENDING /SHUTDOWN
|
|
/STATUS /TEMPORARY /TERMINAL /TO
|
|
/URGENT /USERNAME /WAIT
|
|
|
|
|
|
REQUEST "message"
|
|
Writes a message on the system operator's terminal, and optionally requests a
|
|
reply.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/REPLY /TO
|
|
|
|
|
|
RETURN [status_code]
|
|
Terminates a GOSUB statement and returns control to the command following the
|
|
GOSUB command.
|
|
|
|
|
|
RUN
|
|
Performs the following functions:
|
|
o Places an image into execution in the process.
|
|
o Creates a subprocess or detached process to run a specified image.
|
|
|
|
|
|
RUNOFF
|
|
Performs the following functions:
|
|
o Invokes the DIGITAL Standard Runoff text formatter to format one or more
|
|
ASCII files.
|
|
o Invokes the DIGITAL Standard Runoff text formatter to generate a table of
|
|
contents for one or more ASCII files.
|
|
o Invokes the DIGITAL Standard Runoff text formatter to generate an index
|
|
for one or more ASCII files.
|
|
|
|
|
|
SEARCH file_spec[,...] search_string[,...]
|
|
Searches one or more files for the specified string(s) and lists all the
|
|
lines containing occurrences of the strings.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/EXACT /EXCLUDE /FORMAT /HEADING /LOG
|
|
/MATCH /NUMBERS /OUTPUT /REMAINING /STATISTICS
|
|
/WINDOW
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET ACCOUNTING
|
|
Enables or disables logging various accounting activities in the system
|
|
accounting log file SYS$MANAGER:ACCOUNTING.DAT. The SET ACCOUNTING command
|
|
is also used to close the current accounting log file and to open a new one
|
|
with a higher version number.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/DISABLE /ENABLE /NEW_FILE
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET ACL object_name
|
|
Allows you to modify the ACL (access control list) of a VMS object.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ACL /AFTER /BEFORE /BY_OWNER /CONFIRM
|
|
/CREATED /DEFAULT /DELETE /EDIT /EXCLUDE
|
|
/JOURNAL /KEEP /LIKE /LOG /MODE
|
|
/NEW /OBJECT_TYPE /RECOVER /REPLACE /SINCE
|
|
|
|
SET AUDIT
|
|
Enables or disables VAX/VMS security auditing.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ALARM /DISABLE /ENABLE
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET BROADCAST = (class_name[,...])
|
|
Allows you to block out various terminal messages from being broadcast to
|
|
your terminal.
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET COMMAND [file_spec[,...]]
|
|
Invokes the VAX/VMS Command Definition Utility to add, delete or replace
|
|
commands in your process command table or a specified command table file.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/DELETE /LISTING /OBJECT /OUTPUT /REPLACE
|
|
/TABLE
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET [NO]CONTROL[=(T,Y)]
|
|
Defines whether or not control will pass to the command language interpreter
|
|
when <Ctrl-Y> is pressed and whether process statistics will be displayed
|
|
when <Ctrl-T> is pressed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET DAY
|
|
Used to reset the default day type specified in the user authorization file
|
|
for the current day.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/DEFAULT /LOG /PRIMARY /SECONDARY
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET DEFAULT device_name:directory_spec
|
|
Changes the default device and/or directory specification. The new default
|
|
is used with all subsequent file operations that do not explicitly include a
|
|
device or directory name.
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET DEVICE device_name[:]
|
|
Establishes a printer or terminal as a spooled device, or sets the error
|
|
logging status of a device.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/AVAILABLE /DUAL_PORT /ERROR_LOGGING /LOG
|
|
/SPOOLED
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET DIRECTORY directory_spec[,...]
|
|
Modifies directory characteristics.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/BACKUP /BEFORE /BY_OWNER /CONFIRM
|
|
/CREATED /EXCLUDE /EXPIRED /LOG
|
|
/MODIFIED /OWNER_UIC /SINCE /VERSION_LIMIT
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET FILE file_spec[,...]
|
|
Modifies file characteristics.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/BACKUP /BEFORE /BY_OWNER /CONFIRM
|
|
/CREATED /DATA_CHECK /END_OF_FILE /ENTER
|
|
/ERASE_ON_DELETE /EXCLUDE /EXPIRATION_DATE /EXTENSION
|
|
/GLOBAL_BUFFER /LOG /NODIRECTORY /OWNER_UIC
|
|
/PROTECTION /REMOVE /SINCE /UNLOCK
|
|
/TRUNCATE /VERSION_LIMIT
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET HOST node_name
|
|
Connects your terminal, via your host processor, to another processor in a
|
|
DECnet network.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/LOG /DTE /HSC
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET KEY
|
|
Changes the current key definition state. Keys are defined by the DEFINE/KEY
|
|
command.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/LOG /STATE
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET LOGINS
|
|
Defines the number of users who may gain access to the system. This command
|
|
also displays the current interactive level.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/INTERACTIVE
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET MAGTAPE device_name[:]
|
|
Defines default characteristics to be associated with a magnetic tape device
|
|
for subsequent file operations.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/DENSITY /END_OF_FILE /LOG /LOGSOFT /REWIND
|
|
/SKIP /UNLOAD
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET MESSAGE [file_spec]
|
|
Allows you to specify the format of messages, or to override or supplement
|
|
system messages.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/DELETE /FACILITY /IDENTIFICATION /SEVERITY /TEXT
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET [NO]ON
|
|
Controls command interpreter error checking. If SET NOON is in effect, the
|
|
command interpreter will ignore errors in a command procedure and continue
|
|
processing.
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET OUTPUT_RATE [=delta_time]
|
|
Defines the rate at which output will be written to a batch job log file.
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET PASSWORD
|
|
Permits to change password in a VAX/VMS account
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/GENERATE /SECONDARY /SYSTEM
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET PRINTER printer_name[:]
|
|
Defines characteristics for a line printer.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/CR /FALLBACK /FF /LA11 /LA180
|
|
/LOWERCASE /LOG /LP11 /PAGE /PASSALL
|
|
/PRINTALL /TAB /TRUNCATE /UNKNOWN /UPPERCASE
|
|
/WIDTH /WRAP
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET PROCESS [process_name]
|
|
Modifies execution characteristics associated with the named process for the
|
|
current login session. If a process is not specified, changes are made to
|
|
the current process.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/CPU /DUMP /IDENTIFICATION /NAME
|
|
/PRIORITY /PRIVILEGES /RESOURCE_WAIT /RESUME
|
|
/SUSPEND /SWAPPING
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET PROMPT [=string]
|
|
Defines a new DCL prompt for your process. The default prompt is a dollar
|
|
sign ($).
|
|
|
|
Qualifier:
|
|
/CARRIAGE_CONTROL
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET PROTECTION [=(code)] file_spec[,...]
|
|
Modifies the protection applied to a particular file or to a group of files.
|
|
The protection of a file limits the access available to various groups of
|
|
system users. When used without a file specification, it establishes the
|
|
default protection for all the files subsequently created during the login
|
|
session. May also be used to modify the protection of a non-file-oriented
|
|
device.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/CONFIRM /LOG /PROTECTION /DEFAULT /DEVICE
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET QUEUE queue_name
|
|
Used to modify the current status or attributes of a queue, or to change the
|
|
current status or attributes of a job that is not currently executing in a
|
|
queue.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/BASE_PRIOTITY /BLOCK_LIMIT /CHARACTERISTICS /CPUDEFAULT
|
|
/CPUMAXIMUM /DEFAULT /DISABLE_SWAPPING /ENABLE_GENERIC
|
|
/FORM_MOUNTED /JOB_LIMIT /OWNER_UIC /PROTECTION
|
|
/RECORD_BLOCKING /RETAIN /SCHEDULE /SEPARATE
|
|
/WSDEFAULT /WSEXTENT /WSQUOTA /ENTRY
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET RESTART_VALUE=string
|
|
Defines a test value for restarting portions of a batch job after a system
|
|
failure.
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET RIGHTS_LIST id_name[,...]
|
|
Allows you to modify the process or system rights list.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ATTRIBUTES /DISABLE /ENABLE /IDENTIFICATION /PROCESS
|
|
/SYSTEM
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET RMS_DEFAULT
|
|
Used to set default values for the multiblock and multibuffer counts, network
|
|
transfer sizes, prologue level and extend quantity used by RMS for various
|
|
file operations.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/BLOCK_COUNT /BUFFER_COUNT /DISK
|
|
/EXTEND_QUANTITY /INDEXED /MAGTAPE
|
|
/NETWORK_BLOCK_COUNT /PROLOG /RELATIVE
|
|
/SEQUENTIAL /SYSTEM /UNIT_RECORD
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET SYMBOL
|
|
Controls access to local and global symbols within command procedures.
|
|
|
|
Qualifier:
|
|
/SCOPE
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET TERMINAL [device_name[:]]
|
|
Modifies interpretation of various terminal characteristics.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ADVANCED_VIDEO /ALTYPEAHD /ANSI_CRT
|
|
/APPLICATION_KEYPAD /AUTOBAUD /BLOCK_MODE
|
|
/BRDCSTMBX /BROADCAST /CRFILL
|
|
/DEC_CRT /DEVICE_TYPE /DIALUP
|
|
/DISCONNECT /DISMISS /DMA
|
|
/ECHO /EDIT_MODE /EIGHT_BIT
|
|
/ESCAPE /FALLBACK /FRAME
|
|
/FORM /FULLDUP /HALFDUP
|
|
/HANGUP /HARDCOPY /HOSTSYNC
|
|
/INQUIRE /INSERT /LFFILL
|
|
/LINE_EDITING /LOCAL_ECHO /LOWERCASE
|
|
/MANUAL /MODEM /NUMERIC_KEYPAD
|
|
/OVERSTRIKE /PAGE /PARITY
|
|
/PASTHRU /PERMANENT /PRINTER_PORT
|
|
/PROTOCOL /READSYNC /REGIS
|
|
/SCOPE /SET_SPEED /SECURE_SERVER
|
|
/SIXEL_GRAPHICS /SOFT_CHARACTERS /SPEED
|
|
/SWITCH /SYSPASSWORD /TAB
|
|
/TTSYNC /TYPE_AHEAD /UNKNOWN
|
|
/UPPERCASE /WIDTH /WRAP
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET TIME [=time]
|
|
Resets the system time to be used with all time-dependent activities in the
|
|
VAX/VMS operating system.
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET UIC uic
|
|
Establishes a new default user identification code (UIC).
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET [NO]VERIFY [=([NO]PROCEDURE,[NO]IMAGE)]
|
|
Controls whether command and data lines, in a command procedure, are
|
|
displayed as they are processed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET VOLUME device_spec[:][,...]
|
|
Modifies the characteristics of a mounted Files-11 volume.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ACCESSED /DATA_CHECK /ERASE_ON_DELETE
|
|
/EXTENSION /FILE_PROTECTION /HIGHWATER_MARKING
|
|
/LABEL /LOG /MOUNT_VERIFICATION
|
|
/OWNER_UIC /PROTECTION /REBUILD
|
|
/RETENTION /UNLOAD /USER_NAME
|
|
/WINDOWS
|
|
|
|
|
|
SET WORKING_SET
|
|
Sets the default working set size for the current process, or sets an upper
|
|
limit to which the working set size can be changed by an image that the
|
|
process executes.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ADJUST /EXTENT /LIMIT /LOG /QUOTA
|
|
|
|
|
|
SHOW ACCOUNTING
|
|
Displays items for which accounting is enabled.
|
|
|
|
Qualifier:
|
|
/OUTPUT
|
|
|
|
|
|
SHOW ACL
|
|
Permits you to display the access control list (ACL) of a VAX/VMS object.
|
|
|
|
Qualifier:
|
|
/OBJECT_TYPE
|
|
|
|
|
|
SHOW AUDIT
|
|
Supplies a display that identifies enable security auditing features and the
|
|
events that they will report.
|
|
|
|
Qualifier:
|
|
/OUTPUT
|
|
|
|
|
|
SHOW BROADCAST
|
|
Displays messages classes that currently are being affected by the SET
|
|
BROADCAST command.
|
|
|
|
Qualifier:
|
|
/OUTPUT
|
|
|
|
|
|
SHOW DEFAULT
|
|
Displays the current default device and directory specification, along with
|
|
any equivalence strings that have been defined.
|
|
|
|
|
|
SHOW DEVICES [device_name[:]]
|
|
Displays the status of a device on the running VAX/VMS system.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ALLOCATED /BRIEF /FILES /FULL /MOUNTED
|
|
/OUTPUT /SYSTEM /WINDOWS /SERVED
|
|
|
|
|
|
SHOW ERROR
|
|
Displays an error count for all devices with an error count greater than 0.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/FULL /OUTPUT
|
|
|
|
|
|
SHOW KEY [key_name]
|
|
Displays the key definition for the specified key.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ALL /BRIEF /DIRECTORY /FULL /STATE
|
|
|
|
|
|
SHOW LOGICAL [logical_name[:],[...]]
|
|
Displays logical names from one or more logical name tables, or displays the
|
|
equivalence string(s) assigned to the specified logical names(s).
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ACCESS_MODE /ALL /DESCENDANTS /FULL
|
|
/GROUP /JOB /OUTPUT /PROCESS
|
|
/STRUCTURE /SYSTEM /TABLE
|
|
|
|
|
|
SHOE MAGTAPE device_name[:]
|
|
Displays the characteristics and status of a specified magnetic tape device.
|
|
|
|
Qualifier:
|
|
/OUTPUT
|
|
|
|
|
|
SHOW MEMORY
|
|
Displays availability and use of memory-related resources.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ALL /FILES /FULL /OUTPUT
|
|
/PHYSICAL_PAGES /POOL /SLOTS
|
|
|
|
|
|
SHOW NETWORK
|
|
Displays node information about the DECnet network of which your host
|
|
processor is a member.
|
|
|
|
Qualifier:
|
|
/OUTPUT
|
|
|
|
|
|
SHOW PRINTER device_name[:]
|
|
Displays characteristics defined for a system printer.
|
|
|
|
Qualifier:
|
|
/OUTPUT
|
|
|
|
|
|
SHOW PROCESS [process_name]
|
|
Displays information about a process and any of its subprocesses.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ACCOUNTING /ALL /CONTINUOUS /IDENTIFICATION /MEMORY
|
|
/OUTPUT /PRIVILEGES /QUOTAS /SUBPROCESSES
|
|
|
|
|
|
SHOW PROTECTION
|
|
Displays the file protection that will be applied to all new files created
|
|
during the current login session.
|
|
|
|
|
|
SHOW QUEUE [queue_name]
|
|
Displays information about queues and the jobs currently in queue.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ALL /BATCH /BRIEF /DEVICE
|
|
/FILES /FULL /OUTPUT /CHARACTERISTICS
|
|
/FORM
|
|
|
|
|
|
SHOW QUOTA
|
|
Displays the disk quota that is currently authorized for a specific user on a
|
|
specific disk.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/DISK /USER
|
|
|
|
|
|
SHOW RMS_DEFAULT
|
|
Displays the default multiblock count, multibuffer count, network transfer
|
|
size, prologue level and extend quantity that RMS will use for file
|
|
operations.
|
|
|
|
Qualifier:
|
|
/OUTPUT
|
|
|
|
|
|
SHOW STATUS
|
|
Displays status information for the current process.
|
|
|
|
|
|
SHOW SYMBOL [symbol_name]
|
|
Displays the value of a local or global symbol.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ALL /GLOBAL /LOCAL /LOG
|
|
|
|
|
|
SHOW SYSTEM
|
|
Displays a list of processes currently running on a system.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/BATCH /FULL /NETWORK /OUTPUT /PROCESS
|
|
/SUBPROCESS
|
|
|
|
|
|
SHOW TERMINAL [device_name[:]]
|
|
Displays the characteristics of a specified terminal.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/OUTPUT /PERMANENT
|
|
|
|
|
|
SHOW TIME
|
|
Displays the current system date and time.
|
|
|
|
|
|
SHOW TRANSLATION logical_name
|
|
Searches the logical name tables for a specified logical name, then returns
|
|
the first equivalence name of the match found.
|
|
|
|
Qualifier:
|
|
/TABLE
|
|
|
|
|
|
SHOW USERS [username]
|
|
Displays a list of all users currently using the system and their terminal
|
|
names, usernames and their process identification codes.
|
|
|
|
Qualifier:
|
|
/OUTPUT
|
|
|
|
|
|
SHOW WORKING_SET
|
|
Displays the current working set limit, quota and extent assigned to the
|
|
current process.
|
|
|
|
Qualifier:
|
|
/OUTPUT
|
|
|
|
|
|
SORT input_file_spec[,...] output_file_spec
|
|
Invokes the VAX/VMS Sort Utility to reorder records in a file into a defined
|
|
sequence.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/COLLATING_SEQUENCE /DUPLICATES /KEY
|
|
/PROCESS /SPECIFICATION /STABLE
|
|
/STATISTICS /WORK_FILES /FORMAT
|
|
|
|
Output File Qualifiers:
|
|
/ALLOCATION /BUCKET_SIZE /CONTIGUOUS
|
|
/FORMAT /INDEXED_SEQUENTIAL /OVERLAY
|
|
/RELATIVE /SEQUENTIAL
|
|
|
|
|
|
SPAWN [command_string]
|
|
Creates a subprocess to the current process.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/CARRIAGE CONTROL /CLI /INPUT
|
|
/KEYPAD /LOG /LOGICAL_NAMES
|
|
/NOTIFY /OUTPUT /PROCESS
|
|
/PROMPT /SYMBOLS /TABLE
|
|
/WAIT
|
|
|
|
|
|
START/QUEUE queue_name
|
|
Starts or restarts the specified queue.
|
|
|
|
|
|
STOP process_name
|
|
Specifies the name of a process to be deleted from the system. If the
|
|
/IDENTIFICATION qualifier is used, the process name is ignored.
|
|
|
|
Qualifier:
|
|
/IDENTIFICATION
|
|
|
|
|
|
STOP/QUEUE queue_name[:]
|
|
Causes the specified queue to pause.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ABORT /ENTRY /MANAGER
|
|
/NEXT /REQUEUE /RESET
|
|
|
|
|
|
SUBMIT file_spec[,...]
|
|
Enters a command procedure(s) into a batch queue.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/AFTER /BACKUP /BEFORE /BY_OWNER
|
|
/CHARACTERISTICS /CLI /CONFIRM /CPUTIME
|
|
/CREATED /DELETE /EXCLUDE /EXPIRED
|
|
/HOLD /IDENTIFY /KEEP /LOG_FILE
|
|
/MODIFIED /NAME /NOTIFY /PARAMETERS
|
|
/PRINTER /PRIORITY /QUEUE /REMOTE
|
|
/RESTART /SINCE /USER /WSDEFAULT
|
|
/WSEXTENT /WSQUOTA
|
|
|
|
|
|
SYNCHRONIZE [job_name]
|
|
Places the process issuing the command into a wait state until the specified
|
|
job completes execution.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ENTRY /QUEUE
|
|
|
|
|
|
TYPE file_spec[,...]
|
|
Displays the contents of a file or group of files on the current output
|
|
device (normally your terminal screen).
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/BACKUP /BEFORE /BY_OWNER /CONFIRM /CREATED
|
|
/EXCLUDE /EXPIRED /MODIFIED /OUTPUT /PAGE
|
|
/SINCE
|
|
|
|
|
|
UNLOCK file_spec[,...]
|
|
Makes a file that has been made inaccessible as a result of being improperly
|
|
closed accessible.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/CONFIRM /LOG
|
|
|
|
|
|
WAIT delta_time
|
|
Places the current process in a wait state until a specified period of time
|
|
has passed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
WRITE logical_name expression[,...]
|
|
Writes the specified data record to the output file indicated by the logical
|
|
name.
|
|
|
|
Qualifiers:
|
|
/ERROR /SYMBOL /UPDATE
|
|
|
|
|
|
<:=- Part E : Lexical Function Reference -=:>
|
|
|
|
|
|
Introduction
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Part F is a Lexical Function Reference. Parameters for the lexicals are in
|
|
parenthesis after the function name, and parenthesis are required whether or
|
|
not the lexical function requires parameters.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Lexical Function Reference
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
F$CVSI (bit_position, width, string)
|
|
Used to extract bit fields from a character string. The result is converted
|
|
to a signed integer value.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$CFTIME (input_time, output_time, field)
|
|
Converts absolute or combination time to the format yyyy-mm-dd
|
|
hh:mmm:ss.cc. This function can also be used to return information about an
|
|
absolute, combination, or delta time string.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$CVUI (bit_position, width, string)
|
|
Extracts bit fields from a character string and converts the result to an
|
|
unsigned integer value.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$DIRECTORY ()
|
|
Returns the default directory name as a character string.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$EDIT (string, edit_list)
|
|
Used to edit a character string based on the parameters specified in the
|
|
edit_list.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$ELEMENT (element_number, delimiter, string)
|
|
Extracts an element from a character string in which the elements are
|
|
separated by some specified delimiter.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$ENVIRONMENT (item)
|
|
Returns information about the DCL command environment.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$EXTRACT (offset, length, string)
|
|
Extracts a substring from a given character string.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$FAO (control_string[,arg1,art2...arg15])
|
|
Calls the $FAO system service to convert a specified control string to
|
|
formatted ASCII. This function may be used to insert variable character
|
|
string data into an output string or convert integer values to ASCII and
|
|
substitute the result into the output string.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$FILE_ATTRIBUTES (file_spec, item)
|
|
Returns attribute information for the specified file.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$GETDVI (device, item)
|
|
Calls the $GETDVI system service to return an item of information on a
|
|
specified device. This function allows a process to obtain information for a
|
|
device to which the process has not necessarily allocated or assigned a
|
|
channel.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$GETJPI (pid, item)
|
|
Calls the $GETJPI system service to return status and identification
|
|
information about the running system or about a node in the VAXcluster (if
|
|
the system is a VAXcluster).
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$IDENTIFIER (identifier, conversion_type)
|
|
Converts an identifier into its integer equivalent, or vice versa. An
|
|
identifier is a name or number that identifies a category of data resource
|
|
users. The system uses identifiers to determine user access to a system
|
|
resource.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$INTEGER (expression)
|
|
Returns the integer value of the result of the specified expression.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$LENGTH (string)
|
|
Returns the length of a specified character string.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$LOCATE (substring, string)
|
|
Locates a character or character substring within a string and returns its
|
|
offset within the string. If the character or character substring is not
|
|
found, the function returns the length of the string that was searched.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$MESSAGE (status_code)
|
|
Returns a character string containing the message associated with a system
|
|
status code.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$MODE ()
|
|
Returns a character string displaying the mode in which a process is
|
|
executing.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$PARSE (file_spec[,related_spec][,field][,parse_type])
|
|
Calls the $PARSE RMS service to parse a file specification and return either
|
|
its expanded file specification or a particular file specification field that
|
|
you have specified.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$PID (context_symbol)
|
|
Returns a process identification number (PID), and updates the context symbol
|
|
to point to the current position in the system's process list.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$PRIVILEGE (priv_states)
|
|
Returns a value of true or false depending on whether your current process
|
|
privileges match the privileges listed in the parameter argument.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$PROCESS ()
|
|
Obtains the current process name as a character string.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$SEARCH (file_spec[,stream_id])
|
|
Calls the $SEARCH RMS service to search a directory and return the full file
|
|
specification for a specified file.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$SETPRV (priv_states)
|
|
Returns a list of keywords indicating current user privileges. In addition,
|
|
this function may be used to call the $SETPRV system service to enable or
|
|
disable specified user privileges. The return string indicates the status of
|
|
the user privileges before any changes have been made with the F$SETPRV
|
|
function.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$STRING (expression)
|
|
Returns the character string equivalent of the result of the specified
|
|
expression.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$TIME ()
|
|
Returns the current date and time string.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$TRNLNM (logical_name[,table][,index][,mode][,case][,item])
|
|
Translates a logical name to its equivalence string, or returns the requested
|
|
attributes of the logical name. The equivalence string is not checked to
|
|
determine if it is a logical name or not.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$TYPE (symbol_name)
|
|
Returns the data type of a symbol.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$USER ()
|
|
Returns the user identification code (UIC), in named format, for the current
|
|
user. The F$USER function has no arguments.
|
|
|
|
|
|
F$VERIFY ([procedure_value][,image_value])
|
|
Returns an integer value which indicates whether procedure verification mode
|
|
is currently on or off. If used with arguments, the F$VERIFY function can
|
|
turn verification mode on or off. You must include the parentheses after the
|
|
F$VERIFY function, whether or not you specify arguments.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Default File Types
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
These file types are conventions set by DEC and may not be followed by other
|
|
software companies.
|
|
|
|
Type Contents
|
|
~~~~ ~~~~~~~~
|
|
ANL Output file from the ANALYZE command
|
|
BAS Source input file for BASIC compiler
|
|
CLD Command line interpreter command description file
|
|
COM Command procedure file
|
|
DAT Data file (input or output)
|
|
DIF Output file from the DIFFERENCES command
|
|
DIR Subdirectory
|
|
DIS MAIL distribution list
|
|
DMP Output from the DUMP command
|
|
EDT EDT editor initialization file
|
|
EXE VAX/VMS executable program created with the LINK command
|
|
FDL File Definition language file created with the EDIT/FDL or
|
|
ANALYZE/RMS/FDL command
|
|
FOR Source input for FORTRAN compiler
|
|
HLB Help text library
|
|
HLP Help text file, usually as source input to help text library file
|
|
JNL EDT editor journal file
|
|
LIS List file created by an assembler or compiler
|
|
LOG Information file created by a batch job, DECnet, etc.
|
|
MAI Mail message storage file
|
|
MAR Source input file for MACRO assembler
|
|
MLB MAXCRO source library
|
|
OBJ Intermediate object file created by a compiler or assembler
|
|
OLB Object module library
|
|
OPT Option input file for the LINK command
|
|
STB Symbol table
|
|
SYS System image
|
|
TJL Journal file created by the TPU editor
|
|
TLB Text library
|
|
TMP General purpose temporary file
|
|
TPU Command input file for the TPU editor
|
|
TXT Text file
|
|
|
|
|
|
Device Names
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
The following are common VAX/VMS device codes and their corresponding types.
|
|
|
|
Code Device Type
|
|
~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
CS Console boot/storage device
|
|
DA RC25 (25 MB fixed/25 MB removable)
|
|
DB RP05, RP06 disk
|
|
DD TU58 tape
|
|
DJ RA60 disk
|
|
DL RL02 disk
|
|
DR RM03 RM05, RM80, RP07 disk
|
|
DU RA80, RA81, RA82 disk
|
|
DX RX01 floppy
|
|
DY RX02 floppy
|
|
LC Line printer device on DMF32
|
|
LP Line printer device on LP11
|
|
LT Local area terminal (LAT)
|
|
MB Mailbox device
|
|
MF TU78 magnetic tape drive
|
|
MS TS11 magnetic tape drive
|
|
MT TU45, TU77, TE16 magnetic tape drive
|
|
MU TK50, TA78, TA81, TU81 magnetic tape drive
|
|
NL Null device
|
|
OP Operators console device
|
|
RT Remote terminal (via DECnet)
|
|
TT Interactive terminal device
|
|
TX Interactive terminal device
|
|
VT Virtual terminal
|
|
XE DEUNA
|
|
XQ DEQNA
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Four, Issue Thirty-Eight, File 8 of 15
|
|
|
|
Wide Area Information Servers
|
|
|
|
How Do I Use It and Why Should I Care?
|
|
|
|
by Mycroft
|
|
mycroft@gnu.ai.mit.edu
|
|
|
|
|
|
Introduction
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
This file serves as an introduction to "information servers," and in
|
|
particular to the WAIS system from Thinking Machines Corp.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Overview
|
|
~~~~~~~~
|
|
The Wide Area Information Server (or WAIS) system provides a way for
|
|
people ("providers") to make information sources ("sources") accessible via a
|
|
network, with a very simple interface to search for and retrieve particular
|
|
pieces of information ("documents").
|
|
|
|
Essentially, you pick a source and specify a few keywords, and the WAIS
|
|
search engine tries to find documents that match those specific keywords. Each
|
|
document is scored, and the highest scoring documents are listed first. In
|
|
addition, there is a mechanism ("relevance feedback") for feeding information
|
|
back to the server about which documents are most interesting to you, and
|
|
having it narrow the search based on this.
|
|
|
|
To summarize: WAIS gives you a fast and easy way to search vast amounts
|
|
of information, and to provide access to it to other users on a network.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Why Should I Care?
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
You should care because I, through the goodness of my heart, have made all
|
|
the issues of Phrack Inc. available through WAIS. :-) I'll soon be adding
|
|
issues of the LOD/H TJ, NARC, NIA, Worldview, and a lot of other files. If
|
|
anyone would care to donate files, I'd appreciate it.
|
|
|
|
There are also many other sources currently available that will probably
|
|
be of interest to you.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Step 1: Compiling A Client
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
To use WAIS, you need a client program. There are currently 4 available
|
|
that I know of:
|
|
|
|
Xwais - for the X Window System
|
|
SWAIS - terminal-based
|
|
Mac WAIStation
|
|
NeXT WAIStation
|
|
(I vaguely recall something about a Windows client.)
|
|
|
|
Xwais and SWAIS both come in the standard distribution, with the search
|
|
and index engines.
|
|
|
|
You can FTP any of the above from think.com, in directory /wais. The
|
|
relevant files are:
|
|
|
|
wais-8-b4.tar.Z - contains the search and index engines, as well Xwais and
|
|
SWAIS
|
|
WAIStation-0-63.sit.hqx - the Mac WAIStation
|
|
WAIStation-NeXT-1.0.tar.Z - the NeXT WAIStation
|
|
|
|
After you choose a client and get the source, compile it. There are
|
|
decent directions on how to do this in each package.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Step 2: Finding An Information Source
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
To find a source, you just do a search in the "directory of servers" -- a
|
|
source containing pointers to all the registered WAIS sources on the net.
|
|
|
|
For example, if you're using Xwais:
|
|
|
|
(I am *not* going to go into the details of how to use the scrollbars and
|
|
whatnot. If you're stuck, ask a Mac weenie for help.)
|
|
|
|
Tell me about:
|
|
.----------------------------------------------------------------. .------.
|
|
|phrack | |Search|
|
|
`----------------------------------------------------------------' `------'
|
|
In Sources: Similar to:
|
|
.------------------------. .----------------------------------------------.
|
|
|directory-of-servers.src| | |
|
|
`------------------------' `----------------------------------------------'
|
|
.----------. .-------------. .------------+ .---------------. .----. .----.
|
|
|Add Source| |Delete Source| |Add Document| |Delete Document| |Help| |Done|
|
|
`----------' `-------------' `------------' `---------------' `----' `----'
|
|
.+------------------------------------------------------------.
|
|
Resulting || 1000 551 phrack.src /proj/wais/wais-sources/ |
|
|
documents: || |
|
|
.----. || |
|
|
|View| || |
|
|
`----' `+------------------------------------------------------------'
|
|
.-----------------------------------------------------------------.
|
|
Status: |Found 1 document. |
|
|
`-----------------------------------------------------------------'
|
|
|
|
The lines in the "Resulting documents:" window break down into three
|
|
parts:
|
|
|
|
Score -- How well it matched your query, as compared to other
|
|
documents.
|
|
Size -- <In bytes> of the document.
|
|
Headline -- The "headline" is generated while building the index.
|
|
|
|
For source files, it's broken down by filename and path. For the p/h/c/a
|
|
server, it's the title of the article, the authors, and the issue and file
|
|
number.
|
|
|
|
So double-click on the document, and you'll get another window (shortened
|
|
a bit):
|
|
|
|
Source Edit
|
|
|
|
Name: phrack.src
|
|
Server: hal.gnu.ai.mit.edu
|
|
Service: 8000
|
|
Database: /src/wais/wais-sources/phrack
|
|
Cost: 0
|
|
Units: :free
|
|
Maintainer: mycroft@hal.gnu.ai.mit.edu
|
|
Description:
|
|
.+------------------------------------------------------------------------.
|
|
||Server created with WAIS release 8 b3.1 on Jan 31 12:30:28 1992 by mycro|
|
|
|| |
|
|
||Here are all the issues of Phrack for your edification. |
|
|
|| |
|
|
||Phrack is an old hacking, cracking, phreaking, and general anarchy |
|
|
||newsletter. Articles range from how the phone system works to making |
|
|
||------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|
|
`+------------------------------------------------------------------------'
|
|
.----. .------.
|
|
|Save| |Cancel|
|
|
`----' `------'
|
|
|
|
The fields work like this:
|
|
|
|
Name: Filename to store this source under on *your* machine.
|
|
Server, Service, Database: Where the source lives (my machine).
|
|
Cost, Units: How much it will cost you to access the information.
|
|
Maintainer: Me!
|
|
Description: What is there.
|
|
|
|
You really want this one, so just click the "Save" button. This will
|
|
create a "source file" on your machine, which you can then access with the "Add
|
|
Source" button of the question window. This setup is sort of a lose, because
|
|
your copy could get out of date and not work. I've proposed a way to fix this
|
|
problem, but so far it hasn't been implemented. This bit me once when I moved
|
|
the files to their current location.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Step 3: A Query
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Now, let's make another query. I can't remember where I saw this, so:
|
|
|
|
Tell me about:
|
|
.----------------------------------------------------------------. .------.
|
|
|that night with tuc | |Search|
|
|
`----------------------------------------------------------------' `------'
|
|
In Sources: Similar to:
|
|
.------------------------. .----------------------------------------------.
|
|
|phrack.src | | |
|
|
`------------------------' `----------------------------------------------'
|
|
.----------. .-------------. .------------+ .---------------. .----. .----.
|
|
|Add Source| |Delete Source| |Add Document| |Delete Document| |Help| |Done|
|
|
`----------' `-------------' `------------' `---------------' `----' `----'
|
|
.+------------------------------------------------------------.
|
|
Resulting || 1000 24.9K "Phrack World News Issue XIV, Part 2", compiled |
|
|
documents: || 967 29.9K "Phrack World News Special Edition III", compile|
|
|
.----. || 800 74.9K "Phrack World News Special Edition II", compiled|
|
|
|View| || 467 6.1K "Phrack Pro-Phile V: Tuc", by Taran King (issue |
|
|
`----' `+------------------------------------------------------------'
|
|
.-----------------------------------------------------------------.
|
|
Status: |Found 40 documents. |
|
|
`-----------------------------------------------------------------'
|
|
|
|
All you have to do is double-click on one of the documents. After a while
|
|
you'll get another window:
|
|
|
|
.+------------------------------------------------------------------------.
|
|
|| |
|
|
||"Phrack World News Issue XIV, Part 2", compiled by Knight Lightning (iss|
|
|
|| |
|
|
|| |
|
|
|| PWN ^*^ PWN ^*^ PWN { SummerCon '87 } PWN ^*^ PWN ^*^ PWN |
|
|
|| ^*^ ^*^ |
|
|
|| PWN Phrack World News PWN |
|
|
|| ^*^ Issue XIV/2 ^*^ |
|
|
|| PWN PWN |
|
|
|| ^*^ "SummerCon Strikes" ^*^ |
|
|
|| PWN PWN |
|
|
||------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|
|
`+------------------------------------------------------------------------'
|
|
.-----------. .--------. .----. .--------. .------------. .----.
|
|
|Add Section| |Find Key| |Next| |Previous| |Save To File| |Done|
|
|
`-----------' `--------' `----' `--------' `------------' `----'
|
|
|
|
Status:
|
|
|
|
The "Add Section" button is used for relevance feedback. You select a
|
|
region of text and press "Add Section" and it will show up in the "Similar to:"
|
|
box in the question window.
|
|
|
|
"Find Key," "Next," and "Previous" are used to search for the keywords in
|
|
the document. The rest is pretty obvious.
|
|
|
|
|
|
What Else?
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
There are more powerful ways to use WAIS. For example, using the "waisq"
|
|
and "waisretrieve" programs, you could query the directory of servers nightly
|
|
to get the latest copy of phrack.src. This would ensure that yours is never
|
|
more than a day out of date. (I recommend subscribing to the wais-discussion
|
|
list and/or reading alt.wais instead, though, since it's more interesting and
|
|
won't put a load on the directory of servers.)
|
|
|
|
Or if you keep an archive of your mail, you could use it to index that.
|
|
(I know several people who do this, including Brewster.)
|
|
|
|
Or whatever. Take a look at some of the existing sources to get an idea.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Conclusion
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
WAIS is a very useful tool for finding information. It is still under
|
|
development, though, and there a few rough edges that need to be worked out.
|
|
In particular:
|
|
|
|
* Source files getting out of date.
|
|
* Multiple servers for a single source (for reliability and speed).
|
|
* Multiple indices for the same source on a given server (for transient
|
|
information).
|
|
* Index overhead. (The Phrack index, for example, is currently larger
|
|
than the text itself!)
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Four, Issue Thirty-Eight, File 9 of 15
|
|
|
|
***************************************************************************
|
|
* *
|
|
* Cellular Telephony *
|
|
* *
|
|
* by *
|
|
* Brian Oblivion *
|
|
* *
|
|
* *
|
|
* Courtesy of: Restricted-Data-Transmissions (RDT) *
|
|
* "Truth Is Cheap, But Information Costs." *
|
|
* *
|
|
* *
|
|
***************************************************************************
|
|
|
|
The benefit of a mobile transceiver has been the wish of experimenters since
|
|
the late 1800's. To have the ability to be reached by another man despite
|
|
location, altitude, or depth has had high priority in communication technology
|
|
throughout its history. Only until the late 1970's has this been available to
|
|
the general public. That is when Bell Telephone (the late Ma Bell) introduced
|
|
the Advanced Mobile Phone Service, AMPS for short.
|
|
|
|
Cellular phones today are used for a multitude of different jobs. They are
|
|
used in just plain jibber-jabber, data transfer (I will go into this mode of
|
|
cellular telephony in depth later), corporate deals, surveillance, emergencies,
|
|
and countless other applications. The advantages of cellular telephony to the
|
|
user/phreaker are obvious:
|
|
|
|
1. Difficulty of tracking the location of a transceiver (especially if the
|
|
transceiver is on the move) makes it very difficult to locate.
|
|
|
|
2. Range of the unit within settled areas.
|
|
|
|
3. Scrambling techniques are feasible and can be made to provide moderate
|
|
security for most transmissions.
|
|
|
|
4. The unit, with modification can be used as a bug, being called upon by the
|
|
controlling party from anywhere on the globe.
|
|
|
|
5. With the right knowledge, one can modify the cellular in both hardware and
|
|
software to create a rather diversified machine that will scan, store and
|
|
randomly change.
|
|
|
|
6. ESN's per call thereby making detection almost impossible.
|
|
|
|
|
|
I feel it will be of great importance for readers to understand the background
|
|
of the Cellular phone system, mainly due to the fact that much of the
|
|
pioneering systems are still in use today. The first use of a mobile radio
|
|
came about in 1921 by the Detroit police department. This system operated at
|
|
2MHz. In 1940, frequencies between 30 and 40MHz were made available too and
|
|
soon became overcrowded. The trend of overcrowding continues today.
|
|
|
|
In 1946, the FCC declared a "public correspondence system" called, or rather
|
|
classified as "Domestic Public Land Mobile Radio Service" (DPLMRS) at 35 - 44
|
|
MHz band that ran along the highway between New York and Boston. Now the 35-
|
|
44MHz band is used mainly by Amateur radio hobbyists due to the bands
|
|
susceptibility to skip-propagation.
|
|
|
|
These early mobile radio systems were all PTT (push-to-talk) systems that did
|
|
not enjoy today's duplex conversations. The first real mobile "phone" system
|
|
was the "Improved Mobile Telephone Service" or the IMTS for short, in 1969.
|
|
This system covered the spectrum from 150 - 450MHz, sported automatic channel
|
|
selection for each call, eliminated PTT, and allowed the customer to do their
|
|
own dialing. From 1969 to 1979 this was the mobile telephone service that
|
|
served the public and business community, and it is still used today.
|
|
|
|
IMTS frequencies used (MHz):
|
|
|
|
Channel Base Frequency Mobile Frequency
|
|
|
|
VHF Low Band
|
|
|
|
ZO 35.26 43.26
|
|
ZF 35.30 43.30
|
|
ZH 35.34 43.34
|
|
ZA 35.42 43.32
|
|
ZY 34.46 43.46
|
|
ZC 35.50 43.50
|
|
ZB 35.54 43.54
|
|
ZW 35.62 43.62
|
|
ZL 35.66 43.66
|
|
|
|
VHF High Band
|
|
|
|
JL 152.51 157.77
|
|
YL 152.54 157.80
|
|
JP 152.57 157.83
|
|
YP 152.60 157.86
|
|
YJ 152.63 157.89
|
|
YK 152.66 157.92
|
|
JS 152.69 157.95
|
|
YS 152.72 157.98
|
|
YA 152.75 158.01
|
|
JK 152.78 158.04
|
|
JA 152.81 158.07
|
|
|
|
UHF Band
|
|
|
|
QC 454.375 459.375
|
|
QJ 454.40 459.40
|
|
QO 454.425 459.425
|
|
QA 454.45 459.45
|
|
QE 454.475 459.475
|
|
QP 454.50 459.50
|
|
QK 454.525 459.525
|
|
QB 454.55 459.55
|
|
QO 454.575 459.575
|
|
QA 454.60 459.60
|
|
QY 454.625 459.625
|
|
QF 454.650 459.650
|
|
|
|
VHF high frequencies are the most popular frequencies of all the IMTS band.
|
|
VHF low bands are used primarily in rural areas and those with hilly terrain.
|
|
UHF bands are primarily used in cities where the VHF bands are overcrowded.
|
|
Most large cities will find at least one station being used in their area.
|
|
|
|
ADVANCED MOBILE PHONE SYSTEM
|
|
|
|
The next step for mobile telephone was made in 1979 by Bell Telephone, again
|
|
introducing the Advanced Mobile Phone Service. This service is the focus of
|
|
this document, which has now taken over the mobile telephone industry as the
|
|
standard. What brought this system to life were the new digital technologies
|
|
of the 1970's. This being large scale integrated custom circuits and
|
|
microprocessors. Without these technologies, the system would not have been
|
|
economically possible.
|
|
|
|
The basic elements of the cellular concept have to do with frequency reuse and
|
|
cell splitting.
|
|
|
|
Frequency re-use refers to the use of radio channels on the same carrier
|
|
frequency to cover different areas which are separated by a significant
|
|
distance. Cell splitting is the ability to split any cell into smaller cells
|
|
if the traffic of that cell requires additional frequencies to handle all the
|
|
area's calls. These two elements provide the network an opportunity to handle
|
|
more simultaneous calls, decrease the transmitters/receivers output/input
|
|
wattage/gain and a more universal signal quality.
|
|
|
|
When the system was first introduced, it was allocated 40MHz in the frequency
|
|
spectrum, divided into 666 duplex radio channels providing about 96 channels
|
|
per cell for the seven cluster frequency reuse pattern. Cell sites (base
|
|
stations) are located in the cells which make up the cellular network. These
|
|
cells are usually represented by hexagons on maps or when developing new
|
|
systems and layouts. The cell sites contain radio, control, voice frequency
|
|
processing and maintenance equipment, as well as transmitting and receiving
|
|
antennas. The cell sites are inter-connected by landline with the Mobile
|
|
Telecommunications Switching Office (MTSO).
|
|
|
|
In recent years, the FCC has added 156 frequencies to the cellular bandwidth.
|
|
This provides 832 possible frequencies available to each subscriber per cell.
|
|
All new cellular telephones are built to accommodate these new frequencies, but
|
|
old cellular telephones still work on the system. How does a cell site know if
|
|
the unit is old or new? Let me explain.
|
|
|
|
The problem of identifying a cellular phones age is done by the STATION CLASS
|
|
MARK (SCM). This number is 4 bits long and broken down like this:
|
|
|
|
Bit 1: 0 for 666 channel usage (old)
|
|
1 for 832 channel usage (new)
|
|
|
|
Bit 2: 0 for a mobile unit (in vehicle)
|
|
1 for voice-activated transmit (for portables)
|
|
|
|
Bit 3-4: Identify the power class of the unit
|
|
|
|
Class I 00 = 3.0 watts Continuous Tx's 00XX...DTX <> 1
|
|
Class II 01 = 1.2 watts Discont. Tx's 01XX...DTX = 1
|
|
Class III 10 = 0.6 watts reserved 10XX, 11XX
|
|
Reserved 11 = --------- Letters DTX set to 1 permits
|
|
use of discontinuous trans-
|
|
missions
|
|
|
|
|
|
Cell Sites: How Cellular Telephones Get Their Name
|
|
|
|
Cell sites, as mentioned above are laid out in a hexagonal type grid. Each
|
|
cell is part of a larger cell which is made up of seven cells in the following
|
|
fashion:
|
|
|
|
|---| ||===|| |---| |---| |---| |---
|
|
/ \ // \\ / \ / \ / \ /
|
|
| |===|| 2 ||===|| ||===|| |---| |---|
|
|
\ // \ / \\ // \\ / \ / \
|
|
|---|| 7 |---| 3 ||==|| 2 ||==|| pc |---| |---|
|
|
/ \\ / \ // \ / \\ Due to the \
|
|
| ||---| 1 |---|| 7 |---| 3 ||--| difficulty of |
|
|
\ // \ / \\ / \ // \ representing /
|
|
|--|| 6 |---| 4 ||--| 1 |---|| |graphics with |
|
|
/ \\ / \ // \ / \\ / ASCII characters\
|
|
| ||==|| 5 ||==|| 6 |---| 4 ||--| I will only show |
|
|
\ / \\ // \\ / \ // \ two of the cell /
|
|
|---| ||===|| ||===|| 5 ||==|| |types I am trying-
|
|
/ \ / \ / \\ // \ / to convey. \
|
|
| |---| |---| ||==|| |---| |---| |
|
|
\ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /
|
|
|---| |---| |---| |---| |---| |---|
|
|
|
|
As you can see, each cell is a 1/7th of a larger cell. Where one (1) is the
|
|
center cell and two (2) is the cell directly above the center. The other cells
|
|
are number around the center cell in a clockwise fashion, ending with seven
|
|
(7). The cell sites are equipped with three directional antennas with an RF
|
|
beamwidth of 120 degrees providing 360 degree coverage for that cell. Note
|
|
that all cells never share a common border. Cells which are next to each other
|
|
are obviously never assigned the same frequencies. They will almost always
|
|
differ by at least 60 KHz. This also demonstrates the idea behind cell
|
|
splitting. One could imagine that the parameter of one of the large cells was
|
|
once one cell. Due to a traffic increase, the cell had to be sub-divided to
|
|
provide more channels for the subscribers. Note that subdivisions must be made
|
|
in factors of seven.
|
|
|
|
There are also Mobile Cell sites, which are usually used in the transitional
|
|
period during the upscaling of a cell site due to increased traffic. Of
|
|
course, this is just one of the many uses of this component. Imagine you are
|
|
building a new complex in a very remote location. You could feasibly install a
|
|
few mobile cellular cell sites to provide a telephone-like network for workers
|
|
and executives. The most unique component would be the controller/transceiver
|
|
which provides the communications line between the cell site and the MTSO. In
|
|
a remote location such a link could very easily be provided via satellite
|
|
up/down link facilities.
|
|
|
|
Let's get into how the phones actually talk with each other. There are several
|
|
ways and competitors have still not set an agreed upon standard.
|
|
|
|
Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA)
|
|
|
|
This is the traditional method of traffic handling. FDMA is a single channel
|
|
per carrier analog method of transmitting signals. There has never been a
|
|
definite set on the type of modulation to be used. There are no regulations
|
|
requiring a party to use a single method of modulation. Narrow band FM, single
|
|
sideband AM, digital, and spread-spectrum techniques have all been considered
|
|
as a possible standard, but none have yet to be chosen.
|
|
|
|
FDMA works like this: Cell sites are constantly searching out free channels to
|
|
start out the next call. As soon as a call finishes, the channel is freed up
|
|
and put on the list of free channels. Or, as a subscriber moves from one cell
|
|
to another, the new cell they are in will hopefully have an open channel to
|
|
receive the current call in progress and carry it through its location. This
|
|
process is called handoff, and will be discussed more in depth further along.
|
|
|
|
Other proposed traffic handling schemes include Time-Division Multiple Access
|
|
(TDMA), Code-Division Multiple Access (CDMA), and Time-Division/Frequency
|
|
Division Multiple Access (TD/FDMA).
|
|
|
|
Time Division Multiple Access
|
|
|
|
With TDMA, calls are simultaneously held on the same channels, but are
|
|
multiplexed between pauses in the conversation. These pauses occur in the way
|
|
people talk and think, and the telephone company also injects small delays on
|
|
top of the conversation to accommodate other traffic on that channel. This
|
|
increase in the length of the usual pause results in a longer amount of time
|
|
spent on the call. Longer calls result in higher costs of the calls.
|
|
|
|
Code Division Multiple Access
|
|
|
|
This system has been used in mobile military communications for the past 35
|
|
years. This system is digital and breaks up the digitized conversation into
|
|
bundles, compresses, sends, then decompresses and converts back into analog.
|
|
There are said increases of throughput of 20 : 1 but CDMA is susceptible to
|
|
interference which will result in packet retransmission and delays. Of course,
|
|
error correction can help in data integrity, but will also result in a small
|
|
delay in throughput.
|
|
|
|
Time-Division/Frequency Division Multiple Access
|
|
|
|
TD/FDMA is a relatively new system which is an obvious hybrid of FDMA and TDMA.
|
|
This system is mainly geared towards the increase of digital transmission over
|
|
the cellular network. TD/FDMA make it possible to transmit signals from base
|
|
to mobile without disturbing the conversation. With FDMA, there are
|
|
significant disturbances during handoff which prevent continual data
|
|
transmission from site to site. TD/FDMA makes it possible to transmit control
|
|
signals by the same carrier as the data/voice thereby ridding extra channel
|
|
usage for control.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Cellular Frequency Usage and channel allocation
|
|
|
|
|
|
There are 832 cellular phone channels which are split into two separate bands.
|
|
Band A consists of 416 channels for non-wireline services. Band B consists
|
|
equally of 416 channels for wireline services. Each of these channels are
|
|
split into two frequencies to provide duplex operation. The lower frequency is
|
|
for the mobile unit while the other is for the cell site. 21 channels of each
|
|
band are dedicated to "control" channels and the other 395 are voice channels.
|
|
You will find that the channels are numbered from 1 to 1023, skipping channels
|
|
800 to 990.
|
|
|
|
I found these handy-dandy equations that can be used for calculating
|
|
frequencies from channels and channels from frequencies.
|
|
|
|
N = Cellular Channel # F = Cellular Frequency
|
|
B = 0 (mobile) or B = 1 (cell site)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CELLULAR FREQUENCIES from CHANNEL NUMBER:
|
|
|
|
|
|
F = 825.030 + B * 45 + ( N + 1 ) * .03
|
|
where: N = 1 to 799
|
|
|
|
F = 824.040 + B * 45 + ( N + 1 ) * .03
|
|
where: N = 991 to 1023
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CHANNEL NUMBER from CELLULAR FREQUENCIES
|
|
|
|
|
|
N = 1 + (F - 825.030 - B * 45) / .03
|
|
|
|
where: F >= 825.000 (mobile)
|
|
or F >= 870.030 (cell site)
|
|
|
|
N = 991 + (F - 824.040 - B * 45) / .03
|
|
|
|
where: F <= 825.000 (mobile)
|
|
or F <= 870.000 (base)
|
|
|
|
|
|
Now that you have those frequencies, what can you do with them? Well, for
|
|
starters, one can very easily monitor the cellular frequencies with most
|
|
hand/base scanners. Almost all scanners pre-1988 have some coverage of the
|
|
800 - 900 MHz band. All scanners can monitor the IMTS frequencies.
|
|
|
|
Remember that cellular phones operate on a full duplex channel. That means
|
|
that one frequency is used for transmission and the other is used for
|
|
receiving, each spaced exactly 30 KHz apart. Remember also that the base
|
|
frequencies are 45MHz higher than the cellular phone frequencies. This can
|
|
obviously make listening rather difficult. One way to listen to both parts of
|
|
the conversation would be having two scanners programmed 45 MHz apart to
|
|
capture the entire conversation.
|
|
|
|
The upper UHF frequency spectrum was "appropriated" by the Cellular systems in
|
|
the late 1970's. Televisions are still made to receive up to channel 83. This
|
|
means that you can receive much of the cellular system on you UHF receiver. One
|
|
television channel occupies 6MHz of bandwidth. This was for video, sync, and
|
|
audio transmission of the channel. A cellular channel only takes up 24 KHz
|
|
plus 3KHz set up as a guard band for each audio signal. This means that 200
|
|
cellular channels can fit into one UHF television channel. If you have an old
|
|
black and white television, drop a variable cap in there to increase the
|
|
sensitivity of the tuning. Some of the older sets have coarse and fine tuning
|
|
knobs.
|
|
|
|
Some of the newer, smaller, portable television sets are tuned by a variable
|
|
resistor. This make modifications MUCH easier, for now all you have to do is
|
|
drop a smaller value pot in there and tweak away. I have successfully done
|
|
this on two televisions. Most users will find that those who don't live in a
|
|
city will have a much better listening rate per call. In the city, the cells
|
|
are so damn small that handoff is usually every other minute. Resulting in
|
|
chopped conversations.
|
|
|
|
If you wanted to really get into it, I would suggest you obtain an old
|
|
television set with decent tuning controls and remove the RF section out of the
|
|
set. You don't want all that hi-voltage circuitry lying around (flyback and
|
|
those caps). UHF receivers in televisions downconvert UHF frequencies to IF
|
|
(intermediate frequencies) between 41 and 47 MHz. These output IF frequencies
|
|
can then be run into a scanner set to pick-up between 41 - 47 MHz. Anyone who
|
|
works with RF knows that it is MUCH easier to work with 40MHz signals than
|
|
working with 800MHz signals. JUST REMEMBER ONE THING! Isolate the UHF
|
|
receiver from your scanner by using a coupling capacitor (0.01 - 0.1 microfarad
|
|
<50V minimum> will do nicely). You don't want any of those biasing voltages
|
|
creeping into your scanner's receiving AMPLIFIERS! Horrors. Also, don't
|
|
forget to ground both the scanner and receiver.
|
|
|
|
Some systems transmit and receive the same cellular transmission on the base
|
|
frequencies. There you can simply hang out on the base frequency and capture
|
|
both sides of the conversation. The handoff rate is much higher in high
|
|
traffic areas leading the listener to hear short or choppy conversations. At
|
|
times you can listen in for 5 to 10 minutes per call, depending on how fast the
|
|
caller is moving through the cell site.
|
|
|
|
TV Cell & Channel Scanner TV Oscillator Band
|
|
Channel Freq.& Number Frequency Frequency Limit
|
|
===================================================================
|
|
73 (first) 0001 - 825.03 45.97 871 824 - 830
|
|
73 (last) 0166 - 829.98 41.02 871 824 - 830
|
|
74 (first) 0167 - 830.01 46.99 877 830 - 836
|
|
74 (last) 0366 - 835.98 41.02 877 830 - 836
|
|
75 (first) 0367 - 836.01 46.99 883 836 - 842
|
|
75 (last) 0566 - 841.98 41.02 883 836 - 842
|
|
76 (first) 0567 - 842.01 46.99 889 842 - 848
|
|
76 (last) 0766 - 847.98 41.02 889 842 - 848
|
|
77 (first) 0767 - 848.01 46.99 895 848 - 854
|
|
77 (last) 0799 - 848.97 46.03 895 848 - 854
|
|
|
|
All frequencies are in MHz
|
|
|
|
You can spend hours just listening to cellular telephone conversations, but I
|
|
would like to mention that it is illegal to do so. Yes, it is illegal to
|
|
monitor cellular telephone conversations. It just another one of those laws
|
|
like removing tags off of furniture and pillows. It's illegal, but what the
|
|
hell for? At any rate, I just want you to understand that doing the following
|
|
is in violation of the law.
|
|
|
|
Now back to the good stuff.
|
|
|
|
Conversation is not only what an avid listener will find on the cellular bands.
|
|
One will also hear call/channel set-up control data streams, dialing, and other
|
|
control messages. At times, a cell site will send out a full request for all
|
|
units in its cell to identify itself. The phone will then respond with the
|
|
appropriate identification on the corresponding control channel.
|
|
|
|
Whenever a mobile unit is turned on, even when not placing a call, whenever
|
|
there is power to the unit, it transmits its phone number and its 8-digit ID
|
|
number. The same process is done when an idling phone passes from one cell to
|
|
the other. This process is repeated for as long as there is power to the unit.
|
|
This allows the MTSO to "track" a mobile through the network. That is why it
|
|
is not a good reason to use a mobile phone from one site. They do have ways of
|
|
finding you. And it really is not that hard. Just a bit of RF Triangulation
|
|
theory and you're found. However, when the power to the unit is shut off, as
|
|
far as the MTSO cares, you never existed in that cell, of course unless your
|
|
unit was flagged for some reason. MTSO's are basically just ESS systems
|
|
designed for mobile applications. This will be explained later within this
|
|
document.
|
|
|
|
It isn't feasible for the telephone companies to keep track of each customer on
|
|
the network. Therefore the MTSO really doesn't know if you are authorized to
|
|
use the network or not. When you purchase a cellular phone, the dealer gives
|
|
the unit's phone ID number to the local BOC, as well as the number the BOC
|
|
assigned to the customer. When the unit is fired up in a cell site its ID
|
|
number and phone number are transmitted and checked. If the two numbers are
|
|
registered under the same subscriber, then the cell site will allow the mobile
|
|
to send and receive calls. If they don't match, then the cell will not allow
|
|
the unit to send or receive calls. Hence, the most successful way of
|
|
reactivating a cellular phone is to obtain an ID that is presently in use and
|
|
modifying your ROM/PROM/EPROM for your specific phone.
|
|
|
|
RF and AF Specifications:
|
|
|
|
Everything that you will see from here on out is specifically Industry/FCC
|
|
standard. A certain level of compatibility has to be maintained for national
|
|
intercommunications, therefore a common set of standards that apply to all
|
|
cellular telephones can be compiled and analyzed.
|
|
|
|
Transmitter Mobiles: audio transmission
|
|
|
|
- 3 KHz to 15 KHz and 6.1 KHz to 15 KHz.
|
|
- 5.9 KHz to 6.1 KHz 35 dB attenuation.
|
|
- Above 15 KHz, the attenuation becomes 28 dB.
|
|
- All this is required after the modulation limiter and before the
|
|
modulation stage.
|
|
|
|
Transmitters Base Stations: audio transmission
|
|
|
|
- 3 KHz to 15 KHz.
|
|
- Above 15 KHz, attenuation required 28 dB.
|
|
- Attenuation after modulation limiter - no notch filter required.
|
|
|
|
RF attenuation below carrier transmitter: audio transmission
|
|
|
|
- 20 KHz to 40 KHz, use 26 dB.
|
|
- 45 KHz to 2nd harmonic, the specification is 60 dB or 43 + 10 log of
|
|
mean output power.
|
|
- 12 KHz to 20 KHz, attenuation 117 log f/12.
|
|
- 20 KHz to 2nd harmonic, there is a choice: 100 log F/100 or 60 dB or
|
|
43 log + 10 log of mean output power, whichever is less.
|
|
|
|
Wideband Data
|
|
|
|
- 20 KHz to 45 KHz, use 26 dB.
|
|
- 45 KHz to 90 KHz, use 45 dB.
|
|
- 90 KHz to 2nd harmonic, either 60 dB or 43 + 10 log mean output
|
|
power.
|
|
- all data streams are encoded so that NRZ (non-return-to-zero) binary
|
|
ones and zeroes are now zero-to-one and one-to-zero transitions
|
|
respectively. Wideband data can then modulate the transmitter
|
|
carrier by binary frequency shift keying (BFSK) and ones and zeroes
|
|
into the modulator must now be equivalent to nominal peak frequency
|
|
deviations of 8 KHz above and below the carrier frequency.
|
|
|
|
Supervisory Audio Tones
|
|
|
|
- Save as RF attenuation measurements.
|
|
|
|
Signaling Tone
|
|
|
|
- Same as Wideband Data but must be 10 KHz +/- 1 Hz and produce a
|
|
nominal frequency deviation of +/- 8 KHz.
|
|
|
|
|
|
The previous information will assist any technophile to modify or even
|
|
troubleshoot his/her cellular phone. Those are the working guidelines, as I
|
|
stated previously.
|
|
|
|
|
|
UNIT IDENTIFICATION
|
|
|
|
Each mobile unit is identified by the following sets of numbers.
|
|
|
|
The first number is the Mobile Identification Number (MIN). This 34 bit binary
|
|
number is derived from the unit's telephone number. MIN1 is the last seven
|
|
digits of the telephone number and MIN2 is the area code.
|
|
|
|
For demonstrative purposes, we'll encode 617-637-8687.
|
|
|
|
Here's how to derive the MIN2 from a standard area code. In this example, 617
|
|
is the area code. All you have to do is first convert to modulo 10 using the
|
|
following function. A zero digit would be considered to have a value of 10.
|
|
|
|
100(first number) + 10(second) +1(third) - 111 = x
|
|
|
|
100(6) + 10(1) + 1(7) - 111 = 506
|
|
|
|
(or you could just - 111 from the area code.)
|
|
|
|
Then convert it to a 10-bit binary number: 0111111010.
|
|
|
|
To derive MIN1 from the phone number is equally as simple. First
|
|
encode the next three digits, 637.
|
|
|
|
100(6) + 10(3) + 1(7) - 111 = 526
|
|
|
|
Converted to binary: 1000001110
|
|
|
|
The remainder of the number 8687, is processed further by taking the
|
|
first digit, eight (8) and converting it directly to binary.
|
|
|
|
8 = 1000 (binary)
|
|
|
|
The last three digits are processed as the other two sets of three
|
|
numbers were processed.
|
|
|
|
100(6) + 10(8) + 1(7) - 111 = 576
|
|
|
|
Converted to binary: 1001000000.
|
|
|
|
So the completed MIN number would look like this:
|
|
|
|
|--637---||8-||---687--||---617--|
|
|
1000001110100010010000000111111010
|
|
\________/\__/\________/\________/
|
|
|
|
|
|
A unit is also identifiable by its Electronic Serial Number or ESN. This
|
|
number is factory preset and is usually stored in a ROM chip, which is soldered
|
|
to the board. It may also be found in a "computer on a chip," which are the
|
|
new microcontrollers which have ROM/RAM/microprocessor all in the same package.
|
|
This type of set-up usually has the ESN and the software to drive the unit all
|
|
in the same chip. This makes is significantly harder to dump, modify and
|
|
replace. But it is far from impossible.
|
|
|
|
The ESN is a 4 byte hex or 11-digit octal number. I have encountered mostly
|
|
11-digit octal numbers on the casing of most cellular phones. The first three
|
|
digits represent the manufacturer and the remaining eight digits are the unit's
|
|
ESN.
|
|
|
|
The Station Class Mark (SCM) is also used for station identification by
|
|
providing the station type and power output rating. This was already discussed
|
|
in a previous section.
|
|
|
|
The System IDentification (SID number is a number which represents the mobile's
|
|
home system. This number is 15-bits long and a list of current nationwide
|
|
SID's should either be a part of this file or it will be distributed along with
|
|
it.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Four, Issue Thirty-Eight, File 10 of 15
|
|
|
|
Standing Up To Fight The Bells
|
|
|
|
by Knight Lightning
|
|
kl@stormking.com
|
|
|
|
Did you hear about 1-800-54-Privacy? Did you decide to call? I did and the
|
|
following is the information I received a few weeks later. It outlines some of
|
|
the serious ramifications of what is going to happen if we do not actively
|
|
support Congressional bills S 2112 and HR 3515.
|
|
|
|
The information comes from the American Newspaper Publisher's Association
|
|
(ANPA). Keep in mind, they have a vested financial interest in information
|
|
services as do many others, and in many ways, the newspaper industry can be and
|
|
has been just as bad as the Regional Bell Operating Companies. However, in
|
|
this particular situation, the ANPA has the right idea and does a pretty good
|
|
job in explaining why we need to act now and act fast.
|
|
|
|
You know who I am, and what I've been through. My experiences have given me a
|
|
unique perspective and insight into the methods and goals of the Regional Bell
|
|
Operating Companies. They are inherently deceptive and if given even the
|
|
slightest chance, they will screw the consumer and engage in anti-competitive
|
|
market practices. Additionally, their tactics threaten our personal privacy as
|
|
well.
|
|
|
|
The RBOCs must be stopped before it's too late.
|
|
|
|
|
|
:Knight Lightning
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
1-800-54-Privacy
|
|
444 N. Michigan Avenue
|
|
Suite 900
|
|
Chicago, Illinois 60611
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
February 14, 1992
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Dear Consumer:
|
|
|
|
If you're like many people, you may have been hesitant about leaving your name
|
|
and address on our 1-800-54-PRIVACY phone line.
|
|
|
|
Why?
|
|
|
|
Quite simply, no one wants to give out information about themselves without
|
|
knowing exactly how that information is going to be used.
|
|
|
|
But the truth is, you reveal information about yourself EACH AND EVERY TIME YOU
|
|
PICK UP THE PHONE. By tracking who you call, how often you call and how long
|
|
each conversation lasts, the seven regional Bell telephone companies have the
|
|
capability to learn and know more about you than even the IRS.
|
|
|
|
In fact, with modern computer technology, there is practically no limit to what
|
|
the Bells can learn about your personal life every time you pick up the phone.
|
|
And there is virtually no limit -- only one's imagination -- to the ways they
|
|
can take advantage of all the information they glean.
|
|
|
|
Of course its one thing to have the capability to do this snooping. It's
|
|
another thing to have the incentive to actually do it.
|
|
|
|
Until October 7, 1991, the incentive just didn't exist for the Bells. Prior to
|
|
this date, the vast electronic networks of the Bell monopolies were just
|
|
neutral carriers of phone messages, data, and other companies' fax, audiotex,
|
|
and videotex services.
|
|
|
|
For example, when you last called a 1-900 or 1-800 line to get the latest stock
|
|
quotes, sports scores, or headlines, your local phone company served simply as
|
|
the pipeline for moving the billions of electrons in your call. The company
|
|
that provided you with the information over the phone line was not -- and by
|
|
law, could not be -- the phone company.
|
|
|
|
And that's the way things had been since 1984, when U.S. District Court Judge
|
|
Harold Greene issued his now-famous decree breaking up the AT&T monopoly and
|
|
spinning off control of local phone service to seven regional Bell companies.
|
|
|
|
In the decree, the Court expressly prohibited the individual Bells from
|
|
entering three businesses -- cable TV, telephone manufacturing, and electronic
|
|
information services.
|
|
|
|
Why?
|
|
|
|
After presiding over the lengthy AT&T anti-trust case and being exposed to
|
|
hundreds upon hundreds of monopolistic abuses by AT&T, Judge Greene's Court was
|
|
firmly convinced that, if allowed to enter any of these three current areas,
|
|
the Bells would undoubtedly engage in the same monopolistic behavior that
|
|
characterized their former parent.
|
|
|
|
In other words, while cutting off the hydra-like AT&T head, Judge Greene was
|
|
fearful that, given too much leeway, AT&T's seven so-called "Baby Bell"
|
|
off-spring might become equal or worse monsters themselves.
|
|
|
|
>From day one, however, the Bells undertook a long-term, multi-million dollar
|
|
lobbying campaign to fight Judge Greene's ruling and try to convince the
|
|
Justice Department, the higher courts, and even the U.S. Congress that they
|
|
should be permitted to enter the content end of the information service
|
|
business.
|
|
|
|
And, so, on October 7, 1991, after years of heavy lobbying, a higher court came
|
|
through for the Bells and practically ordered Judge Greene to overturn his 1984
|
|
decree and open up the information services industry to the Bells.
|
|
|
|
In the 71-page ruling, a very reluctant Judge Greene devoted two-thirds of his
|
|
decision to explaining why allowing the Bells to sell information services was
|
|
bad for consumers and bad for America.
|
|
|
|
For example, he went to great length to discount the Bells' claim that, once
|
|
given the green light, they would be better able to serve the public than the
|
|
thousands of already existing electronic information services. To quote from
|
|
his decision.
|
|
|
|
"In the first place, the contention that it will take the Regional
|
|
Companies (the Bells) to provide better information services to the
|
|
American public can only be described as preposterous."
|
|
|
|
Judge Green also wrote:
|
|
|
|
"Moreover, the Court considers the claim that the Regional Companies'
|
|
entry into information services would usher in an era of sophisticated
|
|
information services available to all as so much hype."
|
|
|
|
His decision also contains a warning regarding the prices consumers will be
|
|
forced to pay for Bell-provided services:
|
|
|
|
"The Regional Companies would be able to raise price by increasing their
|
|
competitors' costs, and they could raise such costs by virtue of the
|
|
dependence of their rivals' information services on local network access."
|
|
|
|
Finally, here's what Judge Greene had to say about his court's decision and the
|
|
public good:
|
|
|
|
"Were the Court free to exercise its own judgment, it would conclude
|
|
without hesitation that removal of the information services restriction
|
|
is incompatible with the decree and the public interest."
|
|
|
|
If Judge Greene's warnings as well as his profound reluctance to issue this
|
|
ruling scare you, they should.
|
|
|
|
That's because the newly freed Bells now have the incentive, which they never
|
|
had before, to engage in the anti-competitive, anti-consumer practices that
|
|
Judge Greene feared.
|
|
|
|
Besides using your calling records to sell you information services they think
|
|
you're predisposed to buy, the Bell's may well try to auction off your phone
|
|
records to the highest bidder.
|
|
|
|
As a result, anyone who ever uses a phone could well be a potential victim of
|
|
the Bell's abuse.
|
|
|
|
Consider the simple act of making a telephone call to an auto repair shop to
|
|
schedule body work or a tune-up. By knowing that you made that call, your
|
|
phone company might conclude that you're in the market for a new car and sell
|
|
your name to local car dealers.
|
|
|
|
Another example. Think about calling a real estate broker for information on
|
|
mortgage rates. Knowing you must be in the market for a house, the Bells could
|
|
sell your name to other brokers. Or they could try to sell you their own
|
|
electronic mortgage rate service.
|
|
|
|
Now let's say you and your spouse are having some problems and one of you calls
|
|
a marriage counselor. Tipped off by information purchased from the phone
|
|
company, a divorce lawyer shows up on your doorstep the next morning.
|
|
|
|
Finally, think about calling your favorite weather service hotline -- a
|
|
competitor to the weather service operated by your local phone company. By
|
|
keeping track of people who use its competitor's service, the phone company
|
|
might just try to get you to buy its weather service instead.
|
|
|
|
Far-fetched? Not at all.
|
|
|
|
Nefarious? You bet.
|
|
|
|
That doesn't mean that, starting tomorrow, your phone company is going to start
|
|
tracking who you call, how long your calls last, and who calls you. However,
|
|
they could do it if they wanted to. And, based on past experience, some of
|
|
them probably will do so at one point or another.
|
|
|
|
That's because the protest of gaining an unfair edge over the competition --
|
|
companies that have no choice but to depend upon the Bells' wires -- is just
|
|
too tantalizing a temptation for the Bells to ignore.
|
|
|
|
As you might expect, the Bells claim that these fears are totally unfounded and
|
|
that strict regulations are in place to prevent them from abusing your
|
|
telephone privacy.
|
|
|
|
However, there simply aren't enough regulators in the world to control the
|
|
monopolistic tendencies and practices of the Bells. Every single one of the
|
|
seven Bells has already abused its position as a regulated monopoly. There is
|
|
no reason to believe they won't in the future.
|
|
|
|
For example, the Georgia Public Service Commission recently found that
|
|
BellSouth had abused its monopoly position in promoting its MemoryCall voice
|
|
mail system. Apparently, operators would try to sell MemoryCall when customers
|
|
called to arrange for hook-up to competitors' voice-mail services. Likewise,
|
|
while on service calls, BellSouth repair personnel would try to sell MemoryCall
|
|
to people using competitors' systems. BellSouth even used competitors' orders
|
|
for network features as sales leads to steal customers.
|
|
|
|
In February 1991, US West admitted it had violated the law by providing
|
|
prohibited information services, by designing and selling telecommunications
|
|
equipment and by discriminating against a competitor. The Justice Department
|
|
imposed a $10 million fine -- 10 times larger than the largest fine imposed in
|
|
any previous anti-trust division contempt case.
|
|
|
|
In February 1990, the Federal Communications Commission found that one of
|
|
Nynex's subsidiaries systematically overcharged another Nynex company $118
|
|
million for goods and services and passed that extra cost on to ratepayers.
|
|
|
|
The abuses go on and on.
|
|
|
|
In this brave new world, however, it's just not consumers who will suffer.
|
|
Besides invading your privacy, the Bells could abuse their position as
|
|
monopolies to destroy the wide range of useful information services already
|
|
available.
|
|
|
|
Right now, there are some 12,000 information services providing valuable news,
|
|
information, and entertainment to millions of consumers. Every one of these
|
|
services depends on lines owned and controlled by Bell monopolies.
|
|
|
|
This makes fair competition with the Bells impossible.
|
|
|
|
It would be like saying that Domino's Pizzas could only be delivered by Pizza
|
|
Hut.
|
|
|
|
It would be like asking a rival to deliver a love note to your sweetheart.
|
|
|
|
It would be a disaster.
|
|
|
|
If the Bells aren't stopped, they will make it difficult -- if not impossible
|
|
-- for competitors to use Bell wires to enter your home.
|
|
|
|
They could deny competitors the latest technological advances and delay the
|
|
introduction of new features. They could even undercut competitor's prices by
|
|
inflating local phone bills to finance the cost of their own new information
|
|
services.
|
|
|
|
In the end, the Bells could drive other information services out of business,
|
|
thereby dictating every bit of information you receive and depriving the
|
|
American public out of the diversity of information sources it deserves and
|
|
that our form of government demands.
|
|
|
|
Can something be done to stop the Bells?
|
|
|
|
Yes, absolutely.
|
|
|
|
You can take several immediate steps to register your views on this issue.
|
|
Those steps are described in the attached "Action Guidelines" sheet. Please
|
|
act right away.
|
|
|
|
In the meantime, on behalf of our growing coalition of consumer groups,
|
|
information services providers, and newspapers, thank you for your interest in
|
|
this important issue.
|
|
|
|
Sincerely,
|
|
|
|
Cathleen Black
|
|
President and Chief Executive Officer
|
|
American Newspaper Publishers Association
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
ACTION GUIDELINES
|
|
|
|
Something is very wrong when a monopoly is put into the position where it can
|
|
abuse your privacy, drive competitors from the market, and even force you, the
|
|
captive telephone ratepayer, to subsidize the costs of new information services
|
|
ventures.
|
|
|
|
Can something be done to stop this potential abuse?
|
|
|
|
Absolutely.
|
|
|
|
WHAT YOU CAN DO. The first step is to call or write your local telephone
|
|
company to assert your right to privacy.
|
|
|
|
The second step is to write your U.S. Representative and U.S. Senators and urge
|
|
them to support House bill 3515 and Senate bill 2112.
|
|
|
|
Since the purpose of both HR 3515 and S 2112 is to prevent the Bells from
|
|
abusing their monopoly position, not to prevent legitimate competition, the
|
|
Bells would be free to sell information services in any area of the country
|
|
where they do not have a monopoly -- in other words, 6/7 of the country.
|
|
|
|
However, the bills would delay entry of the Bell companies into the information
|
|
services industry in their own regions until they no longer held a monopoly
|
|
over local phone service. As soon as consumers were offered a real choice in
|
|
local phone service -- whether it be cellular phones, satellite communications,
|
|
or other new technology -- the Bells would be free to offer any information
|
|
services they wanted.
|
|
|
|
Both bills are fair to everyone. They protect consumer privacy and ensure that
|
|
the thriving information services industry will remain competitive.
|
|
|
|
Quick action is need to pass these bills. A hand-written letter stating your
|
|
views is the most effective way of reaching elected officials. It is proof
|
|
positive that you are deeply concerned about the issue.
|
|
|
|
|
|
POINTS TO MAKE IN YOUR LETTER
|
|
|
|
You may wish to use some or all of the following points:
|
|
|
|
A phone call should be a personal and private thing -- not a sales
|
|
marketing tool for the phone company.
|
|
|
|
The Bells should not be allowed to take unfair advantage of information
|
|
they can obtain about you by virtue of owning and controlling the wires
|
|
that come into homes.
|
|
|
|
The Bells must not be allowed to abuse their position as monopolies to
|
|
drive existing information services out of business.
|
|
|
|
The Bells should not be permitted to engage in activities that would
|
|
deprive Americans of the information diversity they deserve and that our
|
|
form of government demands.
|
|
|
|
The Bells should not be permitted to finance information services ventures
|
|
by inflating the phone bills of captive telephone ratepayers.
|
|
|
|
|
|
AFTER YOU'VE WRITTEN YOUR LETTER
|
|
|
|
After you've written your letter or made your phone call, please send us a
|
|
letter and tell us. By sending us your name and address, you'll receive
|
|
occasional updates on the massive effort underway to prevent the Bells from
|
|
invading your privacy and turning into the monopolistic monsters that Judge
|
|
Greene warned about.
|
|
|
|
There's one more thing you can do. Please ask your friends, relatives,
|
|
neighbors, and co-workers to urge their U.S. Representatives and Senators to
|
|
support HR 3515 and S 2112. We need everyone's help if we're going to stop the
|
|
Bells.
|
|
|
|
1-800-54-PRIVACY
|
|
444 N. Michigan Avenue
|
|
Suite #900
|
|
Chicago, Illinois 60611
|
|
|
|
* * * * * * ** * * * * * ** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
|
|
|
|
Support HR 3515 and S 2112
|
|
|
|
by Toby Nixon
|
|
tnixon@hayes.com
|
|
|
|
February 7, 1992
|
|
|
|
|
|
DISCLAIMER: The following is my personal position on this matter, and not
|
|
necessarily that of my employer.
|
|
|
|
I am appalled at the RBOC's disinformation regarding HR 3515/S 2112, which
|
|
propose to limit RBOC entry into information services until fair competition is
|
|
possible. Every time one of the RBOC ads has played on the TV or radio,
|
|
appeared in the newspaper, and now in the information they mailed to me, I
|
|
can't help but stand up out of my chair and scream because of the contemptible
|
|
lies.
|
|
|
|
Clearly, all of the services they claim are being held back are, or could be,
|
|
available TODAY. We are IN the Information Age; where have they been? It's
|
|
HERE, not "just over the horizon." We don't need the RBOCs to provide these
|
|
services; all the RBOCs need to do is continue to provide the transmission
|
|
services, which they do today. Unfortunately, the majority of the citizens of
|
|
the USA don't know that these services are already available WITHOUT RBOC HELP
|
|
-- and the RBOCs are taking advantage of this lack of knowledge to try to gain
|
|
popular support for their positions.
|
|
|
|
What would happen if the RBOCs were to enter these markets? It is clear to me,
|
|
based on their past performance in similar situations (such as voicemail) that
|
|
they would leverage their monopoly on local telephone service to force
|
|
competitors out of the market. They will use their guaranteed return on
|
|
investment income from their monopoly on POTS to subsidize their information
|
|
services (even providing co-location with central office switches is a
|
|
subsidy), thereby indeed providing the "affordability" they talk about -- until
|
|
the competition is driven out of the marketplace. Then the RBOCs will be free
|
|
to raise the rates as high as they wish! With their monopoly on access, they
|
|
could easily sabotage access to competitive services and make the RBOC services
|
|
look better (just being co-located will provide better circuit quality and
|
|
response times). While all of the competition would have to pay exorbitant
|
|
rates for ONA services (to obtain ANI information, billing to phone accounts,
|
|
etc.), the phone company has this free. Free competition? Hardly!
|
|
|
|
Many of you know that I am a Libertarian, and strongly oppose government
|
|
regulation of business. The logical position for a Libertarian might appear to
|
|
be to support the RBOC's fight against further regulation. But the fact is
|
|
that they've enjoyed this GOVERNMENT-IMPOSED monopoly for decades; in too many
|
|
ways, the RBOCs function as though they were an arm of the government. They
|
|
have effectively no competition for local access. Every competitive service
|
|
MUST use the RBOCs' facilities to reach their customers. This places the RBOCs
|
|
in the position of being able to effectively control their competition --
|
|
meaning there would be no effective competition at all.
|
|
|
|
Despite their protestations that the proposed legislation would limit "consumer
|
|
choice" and "competition", the reality is that provision of such services by
|
|
RBOCs, so long as they remain the sole provider of local telephone service in
|
|
most of the country, would be anti-choice and anti-competitive, plain and
|
|
simple. It would be ABSOLUTELY UNFAIR for the government to turn them loose to
|
|
use their monopoly-guaranteed income to try to put independent information
|
|
services (even BBSes) out of business, when it is the government that has
|
|
permitted (required!) them to get the monopoly in the first place.
|
|
|
|
It absolutely disgusts me that in their printed materials the RBOCs go so far
|
|
as to forment class warfare. They talk about "the spectre of 'information
|
|
rich' versus 'information poor'". They say that minorities, the aged, and the
|
|
disabled support their position, to raise liberal guilt and stir up class envy
|
|
(but without disclosing what have certainly been massive contributions to these
|
|
groups in return for their support). They further stir up class envy by making
|
|
the point that Prodigy and CompuServe customers are "... highly educated
|
|
professionals with above average incomes, owning homes valued above national
|
|
norms ... the world's most affluent, professional, and acquisitive people," as
|
|
though this were somehow evil! They attack, without stating any evidence, the
|
|
alleged "reality" that the only reason this legislation is proposed is to prop
|
|
up newspaper advertising revenues (the whole attitude of "evil profits" is so
|
|
hypocritical coming from those for whom profits are guaranteed, and whom never
|
|
mention the fact that they're not entering information services out of altruism
|
|
but only because they seek to expand their own profits!). They invoke
|
|
jingoistic fervor by talking about services "already being enjoyed by citizens
|
|
of other countries" (but at what incredible cost?).
|
|
|
|
The materials are packed with this politically-charged rhetoric, but completely
|
|
lacking in facts or reasonable explanation of the basis for the positions of
|
|
either side. Their letter isn't written for a politically and technologically
|
|
aware audience, but for those who are attuned to the anti-capitalistic culture
|
|
of envy and redistribution. It isn't written for those trying to make an
|
|
informed decision on the issues, but is intended simply to rally the ignorant
|
|
into flooding Congressional offices with demands for services that most of the
|
|
writers wouldn't know the first thing to do with, and which the writers don't
|
|
realize are available without the RBOCs.
|
|
|
|
They talk about some supposed "right" of individuals to participate in "the
|
|
Information Age", regardless of, among other things, INCOME. Does all of this
|
|
appeal to the plight of the poor and disadvantaged mean that these services
|
|
will be available regardless of ability to pay? Hardly! WE, the taxpayers,
|
|
WE, the RBOC customers, without any choice of who provides our local phone
|
|
service, will pay -- through the nose -- either in the form of cross-
|
|
subsidization of "lifeline" (!) information services by those of us paying
|
|
"full" residential rates or business rates, or by tax-funded government
|
|
subsidies or credits going directly to the RBOCs. Does anybody really think
|
|
that the RBOCs will cover the cost of providing these services to the
|
|
"information poor" out of their profits? What a ridiculous idea!
|
|
|
|
The fact that the RBOC position is supported by groups like the NAACP and the
|
|
National Council on Aging -- representing the most politically-favored, most
|
|
tax-subsidized groups in America -- make it clear that they fully intend for
|
|
the cost of such services to be born by the middle class and small business-
|
|
people of America. Once again, the productive segments of society get screwed.
|
|
Once again, private businesses which have fought to build themselves WITHOUT
|
|
any government-granted monopoly will be forced out, to be replaced with
|
|
politically-favored and politically-controllable socialized services. Once
|
|
again, America edges closer to the fascist system which has been so soundly
|
|
rejected elsewhere. When will we ever learn?
|
|
|
|
We SHOULD all write to our Congressmen and Senators. We should demand that
|
|
they pass HR 3515 and S 2112, and keep them in force unless and until the RBOCs
|
|
give up their local telephone monopolies and allow truly free competition --
|
|
which means long after the monopolies are broken up, until the lingering
|
|
advantages of the monopoly are dissipated. Of course, the RBOCs could spin off
|
|
entirely independent companies to provide information services -- with no
|
|
common management and no favored treatment in data transmission over the other
|
|
independent information services -- and I would cheer. But so long as they
|
|
have a chokehold on the primary _delivery vehicle_ for information services in
|
|
America, their protestations for "free competition" ring incredibly hollow.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Toby Nixon | Voice +1-404-840-9200 Telex 151243420
|
|
2595 Waterford Park Drive | Fax +1-404-447-0178 CIS 70271,404
|
|
Lawrenceville, Georgia 30244 | BBS +1-404-446-6336 AT&T !tnixon
|
|
USA | Internet tnixon@hayes.com
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
RHC Tactics Blamed For Failure Of Information Services Bill April 1, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Taken from Communications Daily (Page 4)
|
|
|
|
Rep. Cooper (D-Tenn.) said that his legislation to put conditions on RHC
|
|
provision of information services (HR-3515) didn't have much chance of success
|
|
>from time bill was introduced. At panel discussion in Washington sponsored by
|
|
National Press Forum, he said outlook for bill was "pretty grim," and that only
|
|
hope for success would be if powerful committee chairman came to rescue. That's
|
|
unlikely, he said.
|
|
|
|
Cooper said he has about 48 co-sponsors for bill and Senate version (S-2112)
|
|
has none. In strong attack on RHCs, he said RHCs were responsible for lack of
|
|
support and said members of Congress were intimidated by ad campaign against
|
|
sponsors and co-sponsors of HR-3515 -- what he termed "a $150,000 penalty" for
|
|
sponsoring legislation. Cooper also criticized RHCs for sponsoring
|
|
organizations without letting the public know of their interest, naming
|
|
specifically Small Business for Advertising Choice, with headquarters in
|
|
Washington. He said he didn't mind legitimate "grass-roots" campaigns, but
|
|
objected to "Astroturf campaigns."
|
|
|
|
Disputes with RHCs broke into the open dramatically during Cooper's intense
|
|
exchange with Southwestern Bell Vice-President Horace Wilkins, head of RHC's
|
|
Washington office. Cooper said that if RHCs were truly interested in providing
|
|
information services, they would push for sponsorship of amendment to cable
|
|
reregulation legislation to allow telco entry. But Bells were "AWOL" on issue,
|
|
Cooper said, even though there are members of House Telecom Subcommittee who
|
|
would introduce such amendment if RHCs asked. Wilkins said one House chairman,
|
|
whom he declined to name, had told RHCs not to participate by pushing telco
|
|
entry amendment. Cooper responded: "Who told you?" He told Wilkins: "You
|
|
have the opportunity of a lifetime."
|
|
|
|
Wilkins challenged Cooper: "Why don't you take the lead" and introduce
|
|
amendment? Cooper replied he would do so if SWB would promise its support.
|
|
Wilkins responded: "If it's the right thing, we'll be with you." Cooper
|
|
replied that RHCs reportedly had been told not to push for such amendment, and
|
|
neither he nor Wilkins would say which powerful House figure was against telco
|
|
entry. Without RHC backing, any introduction of telco entry amendment "would
|
|
have zero support," Cooper said. He said RHCs have backed away from active
|
|
support of legislation to lift the MFJ manufacturing bar because they're afraid
|
|
his measure might be attached to it. Wilkins disagreed, saying RHCs were
|
|
backing the bill.
|
|
|
|
Mark MacCarthy, Cap/ABC vice-president, said the strongest argument against RHC
|
|
entry into information services is that there's no evidence that "new and
|
|
better information" would be provided to public. RHCs could provide more
|
|
efficient network architectures and distribution, he said, but "not better
|
|
programming." There's a historical example of "dark side of diversity" in
|
|
which radio programmers once supported live symphony orchestras and provided
|
|
quality content, MacCarthy said, but now, in an era in which there are many
|
|
competitors, most stations obtain most of their programming free, on tape from
|
|
record companies.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Four, Issue Thirty-Eight, File 11 of 15
|
|
|
|
The Digital Telephony Proposal
|
|
|
|
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
|
|
|
|
|
|
Phone Tapping Plan Proposed March 6, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By Associated Press
|
|
|
|
Law Enforcement Agencies Would Have Easier Access
|
|
|
|
WASHINGTON -- The Bush administration wants you to pay a little more for
|
|
telephone service to make it easier for the FBI or local police to listen in on
|
|
the conversations of suspected criminals.
|
|
|
|
The Justice Department is circulating a proposal in Congress that would force
|
|
telephone companies to install state-of-the-art technology to accommodate
|
|
official wiretaps. And it would authorize the Federal Communications
|
|
Commission to grant telephone companies rate increases to defray the cost.
|
|
|
|
A copy of the legislation was obtained by The Associated Press.
|
|
|
|
Attorney General William Barr discussed the proposal last week with Senator
|
|
Ernest Hollings, D-S.C., chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, which
|
|
oversees the FCC according to congressional sources who spoke on condition of
|
|
anonymity.
|
|
|
|
Justice Department spokesman Paul McNulty refused to comment on the proposal.
|
|
|
|
The bill was drafted by the FBI and the Justice Department in response to
|
|
dramatic changes in telephone technology that make it difficult for traditional
|
|
wiretapping methods to pick up conversations between two parties on a telephone
|
|
line.
|
|
|
|
The Justice Department's draft proposal states that the widespread use of
|
|
digital transmission, fiber optics and other technologies "make it increasingly
|
|
difficult for government agencies to implement lawful orders or authorizations
|
|
to intercept communications in order to enforce the laws and protect the
|
|
national security."
|
|
|
|
The FBI has already asked Congress for $26.6 million in its 1993 fiscal year
|
|
budget to help finance a five-year research effort to help keep pace with the
|
|
changes in telephone technology.
|
|
|
|
With the new technology that is being installed nationwide, police can no
|
|
longer go to a telephone switching center and put wiretap equipment on
|
|
designated lines.
|
|
|
|
The advent of so-called digital transmission means that conversations are
|
|
broken into bits of information and sent over phone lines and put back together
|
|
at the end of the wire.
|
|
|
|
The bill would give the FCC 180 days to devise rules and standards for
|
|
telephone companies to give law enforcement agencies access to conversations
|
|
for court-ordered wiretapping.
|
|
|
|
The attorney general would be empowered to require that part of the rulemaking
|
|
proceedings would be closed to the public, to protect the security of
|
|
eavesdropping techniques used by law enforcement.
|
|
|
|
Phone companies would have 180 days to make the necessary changes once the FCC
|
|
issues the regulations.
|
|
|
|
The bill would prohibit telephone companies and private exchanges from using
|
|
equipment that doesn't comply with the new FCC technology standards.
|
|
|
|
It would give the attorney general power to seek court injunctions against
|
|
companies that violate the regulations and collect civil penalties of $10,000 a
|
|
day.
|
|
|
|
It also would give the FCC the power to raise telephone rates under its
|
|
jurisdiction to reimburse carriers. The FCC sets interstate long distance
|
|
rates and a monthly end-user charge -- currently $2.50 -- that subscribers pay
|
|
to be connected to the nationwide telephone network.
|
|
|
|
Telephone companies will want to examine the proposal to determine its impact
|
|
on costs, security of phone lines and the 180-day deadline for implementing the
|
|
changes, said James Sylvester, director of infrastructure and privacy for Bell
|
|
Atlantic.
|
|
|
|
Though no cost estimates were made available, Sylvester estimated it could cost
|
|
companies millions of dollars to make the required changes. But rate hikes for
|
|
individual customers would probably be quite small, he said.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
As Technology Makes Wiretaps More Difficult, F.B.I. Seeks Help March 8, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By Anthony Ramirez (New York Times)(Page I12)
|
|
|
|
The Department of Justice says that advanced telephone equipment in wide use
|
|
around the nation is making it difficult for law-enforcement agencies to
|
|
wiretap the phone calls of suspected criminals.
|
|
|
|
The Government proposed legislation requiring the nation's telephone companies
|
|
to give law-enforcement agencies technical help with their eavesdropping.
|
|
Privacy advocates criticized the proposal as unclear and open to abuse.
|
|
|
|
In the past, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other agencies could
|
|
simply attach alligator clips and a wiretap device to the line hanging from a
|
|
telephone pole. Law-enforcement agents could clearly hear the conversations.
|
|
That is still true of telephone lines carrying analog transmissions, the
|
|
electronic signals used by the first telephones in which sounds correspond
|
|
proportionally to voltage.
|
|
|
|
But such telephone lines are being steadily replaced by high-speed, high-
|
|
capacity lines using digital signals. On a digital line, F.B.I. agents would
|
|
hear only computer code or perhaps nothing at all because some digital
|
|
transmissions are over fiber-optic lines that convert the signals to pulses of
|
|
light.
|
|
|
|
In addition, court-authorized wiretaps are narrowly written. They restrict the
|
|
surveillance to particular parties and particular topics of conversation over a
|
|
limited time on a specific telephone or group of telephones. That was
|
|
relatively easy with analog signals. The F.B.I. either intercepted the call or
|
|
had the phone company re-route it to an F.B.I. location, said William A. Bayse,
|
|
the assistant director in the technical services division of the F.B.I.
|
|
|
|
But tapping a high-capacity line could allow access to thousands of
|
|
conversations. Finding the conversation of suspected criminals, for example,
|
|
in a complex "bit stream" would be impossible without the aid of phone company
|
|
technicians.
|
|
|
|
There are at least 140 million telephone lines in the country and more than
|
|
half are served in some way by digital equipment, according to the United
|
|
States Telephone Association, a trade group. The major arteries and blood
|
|
vessels of the telecommunications network are already digital. And the
|
|
greatest part of the system, the capillaries of the network linking central
|
|
telephone offices to residences and businesses, will be digital by the mid-
|
|
1990s.
|
|
|
|
Thousand Wiretaps
|
|
|
|
The F.B.I. said there were 1,083 court-authorized wiretaps -- both new and
|
|
continuing -- by Federal, state, and local law-enforcement authorities in 1990,
|
|
the latest year for which data are available.
|
|
|
|
Janlori Goldman, director of the privacy and technology project for the
|
|
American Civil Liberties Union, said she had been studying the development of
|
|
the F.B.I. proposal for several months.
|
|
|
|
"We are not saying that this is not a problem that shouldn't be fixed," she
|
|
said, "but we are concerned that the proposal may be overbroad and runs the
|
|
risk that more information than is legally authorized will flow to the F.B.I.
|
|
|
|
In a news conference in Washington on Friday, the F.B.I. said it was seeking
|
|
only to "preserve the status quo" with its proposal so that it could maintain
|
|
the surveillance power authorized by a 1968 Federal law, the Omnibus Crime
|
|
Control and Safe Streets Act. The proposal, which is lacking in many details
|
|
is also designed to benefit state and local authorities.
|
|
|
|
Under the proposed law, the Federal Communications Commission would issue
|
|
regulations to telephone companies like the GTE Corporation and the regional
|
|
Bell telephone companies, requiring the "modification" of phone systems "if
|
|
those systems impede the Government's ability to conduct lawful electronic
|
|
surveillance."
|
|
|
|
In particular, the proposal mentions "providers of electronic communications
|
|
services and private branch exchange operators," potentially meaning all
|
|
residences and all businesses with telephone equipment.
|
|
|
|
Frocene Adams, a security official with US West in Denver is the chairman of
|
|
Telecommunications Security Association, which served as the liaison between
|
|
the industry and the F.B.I. "We don't know the extent of the changes required
|
|
under the proposal," she said, but emphasized that no telephone company would
|
|
do the actual wiretapping or other surveillance.
|
|
|
|
Computer software and some hardware might have to be changed, Ms. Adams said,
|
|
but this could apply to new equipment and mean relatively few changes for old
|
|
equipment.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
FBI Wants To Ensure Wiretap Access In Digital Networks March 9, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Taken from Communications Daily (Page 1)
|
|
|
|
Proposed legislation being floated by Justice Dept. and FBI would require RHCs
|
|
and equipment manufacturers to reengineer their products so that federal, state
|
|
and local law enforcement agencies could wiretap digital communications systems
|
|
of all types, Bureau said. The proposal is a "collaborative effort" at
|
|
"highest levels" involving law enforcement officials, government agencies,
|
|
telephone executives and equipment manufacturers, said John Collingwood of
|
|
FBI's office for legislative affairs. It seeks to authorize FCC to grant
|
|
telcos rate increases to defray the cost of reengineering the network to bring
|
|
it into compliance.
|
|
|
|
Associated Press reported Attorney General William Barr discussed the proposal
|
|
last week with Sen. Hollings (D.-S.C.), chairman of Senate Commerce Committee;
|
|
however, Committee staffers wouldn't comment. Sources at FCC said they hadn't
|
|
heard of the proposal, and neither had several RHCs we contacted.
|
|
|
|
The bill was drafted by FBI and Department in response to what FBI Director
|
|
William Sessions said were dramatic changes in telephone technology that have
|
|
"outpaced" government ability to "technologically continue" its wiretapping
|
|
activities. James Kallestrom, FBI's chief of technical services section, said
|
|
the bill wouldn't extend the Bureau's "court-authorized" electronic
|
|
surveillance authority, but would seek simply to maintain status quo with
|
|
digital technology. New legislation is needed because law enforcement agencies
|
|
no longer can go into a switching center and place a tap on single phone line,
|
|
owing to complex digital multiplexing methods that often route number and voice
|
|
signals over different channels. Kallestrom said digital encoding also doesn't
|
|
allow specific wiretap procedures, unlike analog systems, which use wave forms.
|
|
Bureau wants telephone companies and equipment manufacturers to "build in" the
|
|
ability to "give us what we want." He said legislation wouldn't mandate how
|
|
companies comply, only that they do. William Bayse, chief of FBI's Technical
|
|
Services Division, said the reengineering process would be "highly complex" but
|
|
could be done at the software level.
|
|
|
|
The FBI said it has been in contact with all telcos and "several" equipment
|
|
manufacturers to get their input to determine feasibility. Bayse said FBI had
|
|
done preliminary cost analysis and estimated changes would run into "tens of
|
|
millions," declining to narrow its estimates further. The bill would give FCC
|
|
the authority to allow RHCs to raise rates in order to make up the costs of
|
|
implementing the new procedures. Although FBI didn't have any specifics as to
|
|
how FCC would go about setting those rates, or whether state PUCs would be
|
|
involved in the process, they speculated that consumer telephone rates wouldn't
|
|
go up more than 20 cents per month.
|
|
|
|
The bill would give FCC 120 days to devise rules and standards for telcos to
|
|
bring the public network into compliance. However, the Commission isn't a
|
|
standards-making body. When questioned about the confusing role that the bill
|
|
would assign to FCC, FBI's Collingwood said: "The FCC is the agency that deals
|
|
with phone companies, so we put them in charge." He acknowledgedn that the
|
|
bill "needs work" but said the FBI was "surprised" by the leak to press.
|
|
However, he said that the language was in "very early stages" and that FBI
|
|
wasn't averse to any changes that would bring swifter passage.
|
|
|
|
Other confusing aspects of proposal: (1) Short compliance time (120 days)
|
|
seems to bypass FCC's traditional rulemaking procedures, in which the public is
|
|
invited to submit comments; (2) No definition is given for "telecommunications
|
|
equipment or technology;" (3) Provision that the attorney general direct that
|
|
any FCC proceeding concerning "regulations, standards or registrations issued
|
|
or to be issued" be closed to the public again would violate public comment
|
|
procedures.
|
|
|
|
FBI said legislation is the "least costly alternative" in addressing the issue.
|
|
It said software modifications in equipment now would save "millions of
|
|
dollars" over making changes several years from now. However, the agency
|
|
couldn't explain how software programming changes grew more expensive with
|
|
time. FBI's Kallestrom said: "Changes made now can be implemented easier over
|
|
time, rather than having to write massive software changes when the network
|
|
gets much more complicated." FBI already has asked Congress for $26.6 million
|
|
in its proposed 1993 budget to help finance a 5-year research effort to help
|
|
keep pace with changes in telephone technology. Asked why that money couldn't
|
|
be used to offset the price of government-mandated changes as the bill would
|
|
require, FBI declined to comment, saying: "We may look at having government
|
|
offset some of the cost as the bill is modified."
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
CPSR Letter on FBI Proposal March 9, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By David Banisar (CPSR) <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>
|
|
|
|
CPSR and several other organizations sent the following letter to Senator
|
|
Patrick Leahy regarding the FBI's recent proposal to undertake wire
|
|
surveillance in the digital network.
|
|
|
|
If you also believe that the FBI's proposal requires further study at a public
|
|
hearing, contact Senator Hollings at the Senate Committee on Commerce. The
|
|
phone number is (202)224-9340.
|
|
|
|
Dave Banisar,
|
|
CPSR Washington Office
|
|
====================================================
|
|
|
|
|
|
March 9, 1992
|
|
|
|
Chairman Patrick Leahy
|
|
Senate Subcommittee on Law and Technology
|
|
Committee on the Judiciary
|
|
United States Senate
|
|
Washington, DC 20510
|
|
|
|
Dear Senator Leahy,
|
|
|
|
We are writing to you to express our continuing interest in communications
|
|
privacy and cryptography policy. We are associated with leading computer and
|
|
telecommunication firms, privacy, civil liberties, and public interest
|
|
organizations, as well as research institutions and universities. We share a
|
|
common concern that all policies regarding communications privacy and
|
|
cryptography should be discussed at a public hearing where interested parties
|
|
are provided an opportunity to comment or to submit testimony.
|
|
|
|
Last year we wrote to you to express our opposition to a Justice
|
|
Department sponsored provision in the Omnibus Crime Bill, S. 266, which would
|
|
have encouraged telecommunications carriers to provide a decrypted version of
|
|
privacy-enhanced communications. This provision would have encouraged the
|
|
creation of "trap doors" in communication networks. It was our assessment that
|
|
such a proposal would have undermined the security, reliability, and privacy of
|
|
computer communications.
|
|
|
|
At that time, you had also convened a Task Force on Privacy and Technology
|
|
which looked at a number of communication privacy issues including S. 266. The
|
|
Task Force determined that it was necessary to develop a full record on the
|
|
need for the proposal before the Senate acted on the resolution.
|
|
|
|
Thanks to your efforts, the proposal was withdrawn.
|
|
|
|
We also wish to express our appreciation for your decision to raise the
|
|
issue of cryptography policy with Attorney General Barr at his confirmation
|
|
hearing last year. We are pleased that the Attorney General agreed that such
|
|
matters should properly be brought before your Subcommittee for consideration.
|
|
|
|
We write to you now to ask that you contact the Attorney General and seek
|
|
assurance that no further action on that provision, or a similar proposal, will
|
|
be undertaken until a public hearing is scheduled. We believe that it is
|
|
important to notify the Attorney General at this point because of the current
|
|
attempt by the administration to amend the Federal Communications Commission
|
|
Reauthorization Act with provisions similar to those contained in S. 266.
|
|
|
|
|
|
We will be pleased to provide assistance to you and your staff.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Sincerely yours,
|
|
|
|
Marc Rotenberg,
|
|
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
|
|
|
|
David Peyton,
|
|
ITAA
|
|
|
|
Ira Rubenstein,
|
|
Microsoft
|
|
|
|
Jerry Berman,
|
|
Electronic Frontier Foundation
|
|
|
|
Michael Cavanaugh,
|
|
Electronic Mail Association
|
|
|
|
Martina Bradford,
|
|
AT&T
|
|
|
|
Evan Hendricks,
|
|
US Privacy Council
|
|
|
|
Professor Dorothy Denning,
|
|
Georgetown University
|
|
|
|
Professor Lance Hoffman,
|
|
George Washington University
|
|
|
|
Robert L. Park,
|
|
American Physical Society
|
|
|
|
Janlori Goldman,
|
|
American Civil Liberties Union
|
|
|
|
Whitfield Diffie,
|
|
Sun Microsystems
|
|
|
|
John Podesta,
|
|
Podesta and Associates
|
|
|
|
Kenneth Wasch,
|
|
Software Publishers Association
|
|
|
|
John Perry Barlow,
|
|
Contributing Editor, Communications of the ACM
|
|
|
|
David Johnson,
|
|
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering
|
|
|
|
|
|
cc: Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr
|
|
Senator Hank Brown
|
|
Senator Ernest F. Hollings
|
|
Senator Arlen Specter
|
|
Senator Strom Thurmond
|
|
Representative Don Edwards
|
|
Attorney General Barr
|
|
Chairman Sikes, FCC
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
FBI, Phone Firms in Tiff Over Turning on the Taps March 10, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By John Mintz (Washington Post)(Page C1)
|
|
|
|
Technology Has Made Eavesdropping Harder
|
|
|
|
The FBI says technology is getting ahead of taps.
|
|
|
|
The bureau says the digital technology in new telephone networks is so
|
|
complicated -- it translates voices into computerized blips, then retranslates
|
|
them into voices at the other end -- that agents can't capture conversations.
|
|
|
|
So the FBI wants a law requiring phone companies to re-engineer their new phone
|
|
networks so the taps work again.
|
|
|
|
But the phone companies warn that the proposal could raise ratepayers' monthly
|
|
bills.
|
|
|
|
And civil liberties groups say the technological changes sought by the FBI
|
|
could have an unintended effect, making it easier for criminals, computer
|
|
hackers and even rogue phone company employees to tap into phone networks.
|
|
|
|
"We have grave concerns about these proposals," said Jim McGann, a spokesman
|
|
for AT&T. "They would have the effect of retarding introduction of new
|
|
services and would raise prices."
|
|
|
|
Bell Atlantic Corporation, owner of Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company
|
|
here, said the changes could cost its own ratepayers as much as hundreds of
|
|
millions of dollars.
|
|
|
|
The cause of the FBI's concern is a new generation of digital technologies in
|
|
which phone conversations are translated into the computer language of zeroes
|
|
and ones, then bundled with other conversations for speedy transmission, and
|
|
finally retransformed into voices.
|
|
|
|
Another problem for the FBI is fiber-optic technology, in which conversations
|
|
are changed into pulses of light zapped over hair-thin strands of glass. The
|
|
U.S. government has delayed sales of fiber-optic equipment to the former Soviet
|
|
Union because of the difficulty of tapping it.
|
|
|
|
The FBI proposed a law requiring phone companies to modify their networks to
|
|
make wiretaps easier. The agency would still have to obtain a court order to
|
|
tap a line, as it does now. It also proposed allowing the Federal
|
|
Communications Commission to let the phone companies pass the costs on to
|
|
consumers and letting the FCC consider the issues in closed-door hearings to
|
|
keep secret the details of phone system security.
|
|
|
|
"Without an ultimate solution, terrorists, violent criminals, kidnappers, drug
|
|
cartels and other criminal organizations will be able to carry out their
|
|
illegal activities using the telecommunications system without detection," FBI
|
|
Director William S. Sessions said in a prepared statement. "This proposal is
|
|
critical to the safety of the American people and to law enforcement officers."
|
|
|
|
In the past, investigators would get the phone company to make adjustments at
|
|
switching facilities, or would place taps at junction boxes -- hard metal
|
|
structures on concrete blocks in every neighborhood -- or even at telephone
|
|
junction rooms in the basements of office and apartment buildings.
|
|
|
|
But sometimes tappers get only bursts of electronic blipping. The FBI said the
|
|
new technologies have defeated wiretap attempts on occasion -- but it declined
|
|
to provide details.
|
|
|
|
To get the blips retranslated back into conversation, tappers have to place
|
|
their devices almost right outside the targeted home or office. Parking FBI
|
|
trucks outside targets' houses "could put agents in danger, so it's not
|
|
viable," said Bell Atlantic spokesman Kenneth A. Pitt.
|
|
|
|
"We don't feel our ratepayers should pay that money" to retool networks, said
|
|
Bill McCloskey, spokesman for BellSouth Corporation, a major phone company
|
|
based in Atlanta.
|
|
|
|
Since there are 150 million U.S. phone lines, a cost of $ 1 billion that's
|
|
passed on to ratepayers could translate into about $ 6.60 per consumer,
|
|
industry officials said.
|
|
|
|
Rather than charge ratepayers, Pitt said, the government should pay for the
|
|
changes. Bell Atlantic prefers continued FBI and industry talks on the subject
|
|
to a new law.
|
|
|
|
The FBI proposes that within 120 days of enactment of the law it seeks, the FCC
|
|
would issue regulations requiring technological changes in the phone system and
|
|
that the modifications be made 60 days after that. The FCC rarely moves on
|
|
even the simplest matter in that time, and this could be one of the most
|
|
complex technological questions facing the government, congressional and
|
|
industry sources said.
|
|
|
|
Given the huge variety of technologies that could be affected -- regular phone
|
|
service, corporate data transmissions, satellite and microwave communications,
|
|
and more -- one House staffer said Congress "will have to rent RFK Stadium" to
|
|
hold hearings.
|
|
|
|
Marc Rotenberg, a lawyer who has attended meetings with FBI and phone company
|
|
officials on the proposal, said the FBI, by taking the issue to congressional
|
|
communications committees, is trying to make an end run around the judiciary
|
|
committees.
|
|
|
|
Last year, the Senate Judiciary Committee, responding to civil libertarians'
|
|
protests, killed an FBI proposal to require that encrypted communications --
|
|
such as banks' secret data transmissions -- be made available in decoded form.
|
|
|
|
Representative Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), who chairs the House subcommittee
|
|
handling the latest FBI proposal, said the plan has troubling overtones of "Big
|
|
Brother" about it.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Let's Blow the Whistle on FBI Phone-Tap Plan March 12, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Editorial taken from USA Today (Page 6A)
|
|
|
|
OUR VIEW - Congress should disconnect this unneeded and dangerous eavesdropping
|
|
scheme as soon as possible
|
|
|
|
The FBI -- lambasted in the past for wiretapping and amassing files on
|
|
thousands of "subversives" such as Martin Luther King -- seems determined to
|
|
prove that consistency is a virtue.
|
|
|
|
The Bureau wants phone companies to make costly changes that critics say could
|
|
let agents eavesdrop on your phone calls without detection -- and boost your
|
|
phone bill to pay for it.
|
|
|
|
The FBI says that this new law is needed because it can't wiretap all calls
|
|
transmitted with the new digital technology. It also wants the public barred
|
|
when it explains all this to Congress.
|
|
|
|
Wisely, lawmakers show signs of balking. They're already preparing for high-
|
|
profile hearings on the proposal.
|
|
|
|
Congress, though, should go much further. It should pin the FBI's wiretap plan
|
|
to the wall and use it for target practice. Here are just a few of the spots
|
|
at which to take aim:
|
|
|
|
*Rights: The FBI says it is still would get court approval before
|
|
tapping, but experts say if the agency gets its way, electronic
|
|
eavesdropping would be far easier and perhaps untraceable. The
|
|
FBI's plan, they say, could make a mockery of constitutional
|
|
rights to privacy and against unreasonable searches.
|
|
|
|
*Need: Some phone companies say they are already meeting FBI wiretap
|
|
requirements and question whether the agency really needs a new
|
|
law -- or just would find it convenient. The FBI says it can't
|
|
tap some digital transmissions -- but it hasn't given any
|
|
specifics.
|
|
|
|
*Honesty: The FBI tried to evade congressional review by financing its
|
|
plan with a charge to phone users.
|
|
|
|
The bureau must have realized the reception this shady scheme could expect: It
|
|
tried to slip it though Congress' side door, avoiding the committees that
|
|
usually oversee FBI operations.
|
|
|
|
Over the decades, wiretaps have proved invaluable in snaring lawbreakers. Used
|
|
selectively and restrained by judicial oversight, they're a useful weapon,
|
|
especially against organized crime.
|
|
|
|
But if catching gangsters never should take precedence over the rights the
|
|
Constitution guarantees the citizens who try to follow the law, not break it.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Back to Smoke Signals? March 26, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
An editorial from The Washington Post
|
|
|
|
The Justice Department spent years in court breaking up the nation's
|
|
telecommunications monopoly in order to foster competition and technological
|
|
advances. Now the same department has gone to Congress asking that
|
|
improvements in telecommunications technology be halted, and in some cases even
|
|
reversed, in the name of law enforcement. The problems facing the FBI are
|
|
real, but the proposed solution is extreme and unacceptable on a number of
|
|
grounds.
|
|
|
|
Wiretaps are an important tool in fighting crime, especially the kind of
|
|
large-scale, complicated crime -- such as drug conspiracies, terrorism and
|
|
racketeering -- that is the responsibility of the FBI. When they are installed
|
|
pursuant to court order, taps are perfectly legal and usually most productive.
|
|
But advances in phone technology have been so rapid that the government can't
|
|
keep up. Agents can no longer just put a tap on phone company equipment a few
|
|
blocks from the target and expect to monitor calls. Communications occur now
|
|
through regular and cellular phones via satellite and microwave, on fax
|
|
machines and computers. Information is transmitted in the form of computer
|
|
digits and pulses of light through strands of glass, and none of this is easily
|
|
intercepted or understood.
|
|
|
|
The Justice Department wants to deal with these complications by forbidding
|
|
them. The department's proposal is to require the Federal Communications
|
|
Commission to establish such standards for the industry "as may be necessary to
|
|
maintain the ability of the government to lawfully intercept communications."
|
|
Any technology now in use would have to be modified within 180 days, with the
|
|
costs passed on to the rate payers. Any new technology must meet the
|
|
suitable-for-wiretap standard, and violators could be punished by fines of
|
|
$10,000 a day. As a final insult, commission proceedings concerning these
|
|
regulations could be ordered closed by the attorney general.
|
|
|
|
The civil liberties problems here are obvious, for the purposeful designing of
|
|
telecommunications systems that can be intercepted will certainly lead to
|
|
invasions of privacy by all sorts of individuals and organizations operating
|
|
without court authorization. Further, it is an assault on progress, on
|
|
scientific endeavor and on the competitive position of American industry. It's
|
|
comparable to requiring Detroit to produce only automobiles that can be
|
|
overtaken by faster police cars. And it smacks of repressive government.
|
|
|
|
The proposal has been drafted as an amendment rather than a separate bill, and
|
|
there is some concern that it will be slipped into a bill that has already
|
|
passed one house and be sent quietly to conference. That would be
|
|
unconscionable. We believe, as the industry suggests, that the kind of
|
|
informal cooperation between law enforcement agencies and telecommunications
|
|
companies that has always characterized efforts in the past, is preferable to
|
|
this stifling legislation. But certainly no proposal should be considered by
|
|
Congress without open and extensive hearings and considerable debate.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
The FBI's Latest Idea: Make Wiretapping Easier April 19, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By Anthony Ramirez (New York Times)(Section 4, Page 2)
|
|
|
|
Civil libertarians reacted quickly last month when the Federal Bureau of
|
|
Investigation proposed new wiretapping legislation to cope with advanced
|
|
telephone equipment now being installed nationwide.
|
|
|
|
The FBI, which has drafted a set of guidelines, but has as yet no sponsor in
|
|
Congress, said the latest digital equipment was so complicated it would hinder
|
|
the agency's pursuit of mobsters, terrorists and other criminals. But civil
|
|
liberties groups like the American Civil Liberties Union, joined by several
|
|
major telephone companies like American Telephone and Telegraph Company,
|
|
described the proposal as unclear, open to abuse and possibly retarding the
|
|
pace of technological innovation.
|
|
|
|
Civil libertarians fear a shift from a world where wiretaps are physically
|
|
onerous to install, therefore forcing the FBI to think twice about their use,
|
|
to a world where surveillance is so easy that a few pecks on an FBI key pad
|
|
would result in a tap of anyone's telephone in the country.
|
|
|
|
The inventive computer enthusiasts who call themselves hackers are also calling
|
|
the legislation unnecessary. If teenagers can quickly cope with such equipment,
|
|
they argue, so can the FBI.
|
|
|
|
"The easier it is to use, the easier it is to abuse," said Eric Corley, editor
|
|
of 2600 magazine, a quarterly publication "by and about computer hackers."
|
|
|
|
According to the FBI, in 1990, the latest year for which data are available,
|
|
there were 1,083 court-authorized wiretaps -- both new and continuing -- by
|
|
Federal, state and local law-enforcement authorities. Robert Ellis Smith,
|
|
publisher of Privacy Journal, said the relatively small number of wiretaps
|
|
reflects the difficulty of obtaining judicial permission and installing the
|
|
devices. Moreover, he said, many cases, including the John Gotti case, were
|
|
solved with eavesdropping devices planted in rooms or on an informant.
|
|
|
|
Besides, Mr. Smith said, complicated digital equipment shares similarities with
|
|
obstacles free of technology. "Having a criminal conversation on a digital
|
|
fiber-optic line," he said, "is no different from taking a walk in the park and
|
|
having the same conversation." And no one, he added, would think of requiring
|
|
parks to be more open to electronic surveillance.
|
|
|
|
At issue are the latest wonders of the telecommunications age -- digital
|
|
transmission and fiber-optic cables. In the standard analog transmission,
|
|
changes in electrical voltage imitate the sound of a human voice. To listen
|
|
in, the FBI and other agencies attach a device to a line from a telephone pole.
|
|
|
|
A Computer Hiss or Nothing
|
|
|
|
Today phone systems are being modernized with high-speed, high-capacity digital
|
|
lines in which the human voice is converted into computer code. Moreover, a
|
|
fiber-optic line in digital mode, which carries information as pulses of light,
|
|
carries not only clear conversations but a myriad of them. Using a wiretap on
|
|
a digital line, FBI agents would hear only a computer hiss on a copper cable,
|
|
nothing at all on a fiber-optic line.
|
|
|
|
There are at least 140 million telephone lines in the country, and more than
|
|
half are served in some way by digital equipment, according to the United
|
|
States Telephone Association, a trade group. However, less than 1 percent of
|
|
the network is fiber optic.
|
|
|
|
The legislation proposed by the FBI would, in effect, require the licensing of
|
|
new telephone equipment by the Federal Government so the agency could wiretap
|
|
it. Telephone companies would have to modify computers and software so that
|
|
agents could decipher the digital bit stream. The cost of the modification
|
|
would be passed on to rate payers.
|
|
|
|
"Phone companies are worried about the sweep of this legislation," said Jerry
|
|
Berman, director of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, who solicited the
|
|
support of the phone companies for a protest letter to Congress. By requiring
|
|
the FCC to clear new technology, innovation could be slowed, he said. "We're
|
|
not just talking about just local and long-distance calls," Mr. Berman said.
|
|
"We're talking about CompuServe, Prodigy and other computer services,
|
|
electronic mail, automatic teller machines and any change in them."
|
|
|
|
Briefcase-Size Decoders
|
|
|
|
One telecommunications equipment manufacturer said he was puzzled by the FBI
|
|
proposal. "The FBI already has a lot of technology to wiretap digital lines,"
|
|
he said, on condition of anonymity.
|
|
|
|
He said four companies, including such major firms as Mitel Corporation, a
|
|
Canadian maker of telecommunications equipment, can design digital decoders to
|
|
convert computer code back into voice. A portable system about the size of a
|
|
large briefcase could track and decode 36 simultaneous conversations. A larger
|
|
system, the size of a small refrigerator, could follow up to 1,000
|
|
conversations. All could be done without the phone company.
|
|
|
|
James K. Kallstrom, the FBI's chief of technology, acknowledged that the agency
|
|
was one of Mitel's largest customers, but said the equipment hackers and others
|
|
describe would be "operationally unfeasible."
|
|
|
|
The FBI was more worried about emerging technologies like personal
|
|
communications networks and services like call forwarding. "Even if we used
|
|
the equipment the hackers say we should use," Mr. Kallstrom said, "all a
|
|
criminal would have to do is call-forward a call or use a cellular telephone or
|
|
wireless data transfer to defeat me."
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Four, Issue Thirty-Eight, File 12 of 15
|
|
|
|
PWN ^*^ PWN ^*^ PWN ^*^ { CFP-2 } ^*^ PWN ^*^ PWN ^*^ PWN
|
|
^*^ ^*^
|
|
PWN P h r a c k W o r l d N e w s PWN
|
|
^*^ ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ ^*^
|
|
PWN Special Edition Issue Six PWN
|
|
^*^ ^*^
|
|
PWN Computers, Freedom, & Privacy II PWN
|
|
^*^ ^*^
|
|
PWN March 18-20, 1992 PWN
|
|
^*^ ^*^
|
|
PWN Written by Max Nomad PWN
|
|
^*^ ^*^
|
|
PWN ^*^ PWN ^*^ PWN ^*^ { CFP-2 } ^*^ PWN ^*^ PWN ^*^ PWN
|
|
|
|
|
|
Computers, Freedom, & Privacy II
|
|
Random Notes and Mission X Telegraphs from the Nation's Capitol
|
|
|
|
by Max Nomad
|
|
|
|
Originally, when I read the brochure on the second "Computers, Freedom, and
|
|
Privacy Conference," I saw opportunity knocking at my door: Three days at the
|
|
Loew's L'Enfant Plaza Hotel in Washington, D.C. stalking around a series of
|
|
meetings all geared toward telecommunications, as well as the high potential
|
|
for mischief; techno-gurus, privacy advocates, computer outlaws, corporate
|
|
bigwigs, and lastly feds, a few of which who were casually walking around with
|
|
automatic weapons disguised as black tote-bags. There was no telling what
|
|
those hackers were capable of, I'm sure, so the beefed up security was
|
|
necessary.
|
|
|
|
Upon learning that Basil Rouland, Inc., an information systems security firm,
|
|
had secured a press pass and transportation, my excitement grew. I wasn't sure
|
|
what kind of story I would bring back from the trip, or if I would find a
|
|
unique story at all. Fortunately, the conference topics provided dozens of
|
|
angles to take on, more than I care list. My previous article and notes alone
|
|
on the event were upwards of 25k, mostly filled with mundane excerpts and
|
|
quotes from various panelists. If you're interested in a blow-by-blow account
|
|
of CFP-2, it's available on VHS; contact bkoball@well.sf.ca.us for more
|
|
details.
|
|
|
|
For the readers of PHRACK, a different perspective was in order. The following
|
|
commentary has been taken strictly from my notes and thoughts on the
|
|
underground showing.
|
|
|
|
Overall, this year's CFP was a success. The panel discussions on everything
|
|
>from the issues of privacy to Internet to cryptography and security were
|
|
informative, even enlightening. After three days of non-stop conferences on
|
|
these subjects I realized just how much of a runaway horse technology is to our
|
|
federal government. Big Brother is definitely out there, but he's got fast
|
|
competition coming up from the private sector. And special thanks to CRAIG
|
|
NEIDORF, who graciously donated his name to modern science and the EFF. This
|
|
individual's case was referred to more times than Roe v. Wade; personally,
|
|
Craig, if I were you, I'd put a trademark on it and charge by the usage. In
|
|
any case, this year's CFP conference was a success. Congrats are in order for
|
|
the organizers and volunteers. Anyone who is seriously interested in computer
|
|
networks, security, and what the big fish are up to should attend. Also,
|
|
members of the press are welcome.
|
|
|
|
Daily, in the aftermath of the conferences, "Birds of a Feather" sessions were
|
|
held in the meeting rooms. At best, these were well structured discussions for
|
|
people of similar interests. At worst, they were lame farces, such as the "Why
|
|
Don't They Understand" discussion, where unofficial representatives of the
|
|
underground were given a forum to supposedly voice their opinions.
|
|
|
|
The panel consisted of Glen Tenney (organizer of the annual Hacker's
|
|
conference), Knight Lightning (founder of Phrack, abused civil rights poster
|
|
child for the EFF), Dispater (current publisher of Phrack), Emmanuel Goldstein
|
|
(editor/publisher of 2600 magazine, host of "Off the Hook" [WBAI radio, New
|
|
York]), Phiber Optik (hacker/phreak currently receiving a great deal of "fan
|
|
harassment" by the authorities), Steven Levy (MacWorld, author of _Hackers_),
|
|
Dorothy Denning (Computer Science Department, Georgetown University), and the
|
|
panel chair was John McMullen of McMullen & McMullen. Aside from a few hackers
|
|
and law officials in the audience, the curious and uninformed filled the
|
|
meeting room to capacity. There was definitely a sense of anticipation prior
|
|
to the start of the discussion; it didn't take a private eye to know that one
|
|
way or the other, this was going to be a show.
|
|
|
|
And it was.
|
|
|
|
Steven Levy gave a neutral dissertation to the meaning of the word "hacker" as
|
|
it was when he published his book by the same name back in 1986: programmers
|
|
and electronics hobbyists supposedly with purer intentions, many of which that
|
|
went on to make revolutionary waves in the computer industry. Hackers and
|
|
phone phreaks like Wozniak and Jobs are two of those heroes of yesteryear's
|
|
underground. But as with the rest of society, nostalgia always casts a darker
|
|
tint on the present. Those heroes would be considered the maniacal high-tech
|
|
terrorists of today, thanks to a combination of media sensationalism, a few
|
|
malicious idiots on both sides of the law, and the general public opinion that
|
|
hackers are to be feared like hardened outlaws -- all of which stems from
|
|
varying degrees of ignorance.
|
|
|
|
Dorothy Denning appended Levy's statement with an objective view, pointing out
|
|
the fact that neither side seems to fully understand what it's like to walk in
|
|
the other's shoes, befitting the title of the next session. Another perfect
|
|
neutrality. Tenney interjected with a somewhat polished speech about what it
|
|
was to be a hacker (i.e. programmer) back in his day, uttered a few slants
|
|
directed at certain people, both of which smoothly establishing the slight
|
|
anti-hack tone that would end up carrying on until this session ended. Upon
|
|
finding out this man is supposedly running for Congress in some state, I was
|
|
even less surprised. It was as if he smelled what the crowd wanted to hear,
|
|
then cooked it up enough to feed everyone. He's pretty good. He'll probably
|
|
get the seat he's shooting for.
|
|
|
|
In his best radio voice, Emmanuel Goldstein immediately returned the volley to
|
|
previous statements, also adding a few interpretations of his own: the feeling
|
|
of learning and exploring, even in forbidden regions, how it is unhealthy to
|
|
put restrictions on thought and discovery, and how it is the complacency of the
|
|
other side that the underground is making use of. He also brought up a very
|
|
good point concerning the Dutch and how many of the system administrators over
|
|
there are making use of hackers in the bullet-proofing of their systems. The
|
|
distrust of most American sysadmins along with the level of arrogance in some
|
|
cases almost makes such cooperation ludicrous over here in the states. Shame.
|
|
|
|
Each underground member of the panel eventually made his or her statement,
|
|
including Phiber Optik's tale of how a certain New York State Police officer
|
|
and gang rolled up on his home like the DEA and awakened him from his sleep at
|
|
gun point. Whether by coincidence or not, the officer in charge of the arrest
|
|
was standing in the back of the room. Of course, the voice of authority had to
|
|
make a statemental come-back on the topic. In that instant it became obvious
|
|
that having hacks and law enforcement in the same room wasn't the best vehicle
|
|
for accurately portraying views. Neither side was prone to be open and honest
|
|
with the other watching with anticipation. Any hack who was not under
|
|
investigation wouldn't dare open up and speak, and any hack currently under
|
|
investigation couldn't speak honestly; no one wants to speak his piece bad
|
|
enough to get indicted. The feds were in the same boat, since they couldn't
|
|
openly discuss any pending cases, as well as keeping a lid on any of their
|
|
trade secrets; a catch-22 that further solidified the misconceptions of those
|
|
in the middle: the image of hackers as chaotic compu-hoodlums and law
|
|
enforcement officials as determined yet uninformed trackers.
|
|
|
|
In all honesty, this session came off like a side show, and the hackers like
|
|
circus freaks. With two prominent underground publishers, an ex-hack/publisher
|
|
turned representative of the EFF, and a hack/phreak currently under
|
|
investigation, there was no alternative but to stutter and give vague answers
|
|
to delicate questions and even then that only applied to those occasions where
|
|
they could speak their minds uninterrupted. Self-preservation and the
|
|
felonious core of this topic made every answer a forfeited one before it was
|
|
given. Any well-informed spectator knew this. So did the feds, who were
|
|
probably chuckling to themselves the entire time. Absolutely no resolutions
|
|
were made either way. Truthfully, the feds gained brownie points on this one.
|
|
The hacker perspective wasn't accurately presented and the masses would
|
|
continue to live ignorance of the underground.
|
|
|
|
The next night, random reports of strange activity churned through the rumor
|
|
mill shortly after the hackers hijacked one of the meeting rooms for Knight
|
|
Lightning's "Frank" Party, the kind of talk most people weren't bold enough to
|
|
investigate or so "unthinkable" that no one wanted their name attached. The
|
|
room itself was easy to identify -- "Fire Line Do Not Cross" tape covered the
|
|
front doors, as well as a chaotic chatter that roared from within. There was
|
|
no agenda to speak of. Most of the hackers I've met during my travels were
|
|
leaders and rugged individualists and here was no different. None wanted to
|
|
take charge -- to do so would have been useless. Each generally did his own
|
|
thing and, if it looked interesting enough, others would follow. Some of the
|
|
name-tagged feds would have probably wandered in if they weren't already having
|
|
a session of their own. Speculatively, they were discussing matters about
|
|
targeted individuals present at our gathering.
|
|
|
|
The evening's entertainment was an old cult-classic tape, Frank & The Phunny
|
|
Phone Call, the hilarious and unexpurgated recordings of an old man driven to
|
|
aggravated dementia by some anonymous phone phreaks making his phone "go
|
|
berzerk." Earlier at one of the literature tables, free promotional 2-in-1
|
|
screwdrivers were given away (a gift from Hayes Modem Corporation) and it
|
|
seemed that every hack in here had at least one or two. Granted, these tools
|
|
are handy for any computer buff, but a room full of hacks and phreaks with them
|
|
was almost as unpredictable as handing out matches at a Pyromaniacs Anonymous
|
|
meeting. Soon, RJ-11 phone jacks were being unscrewed from the wall and
|
|
studied. Lineman's Test Phones appeared, soon followed by a small expedition
|
|
stalking around the service hallways and finding the unlocked telephone closet
|
|
for the hotel. The rest is, shall we say, up to reader interpretation as to
|
|
what happened after that, ironically ten yards and a set of double doors away
|
|
>from a room full of state cops and feds.
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Last Day
|
|
|
|
Instead of rushing the microphone during the final statements in the main
|
|
conference room, our rogue gang had coagulated in the hall (next to the
|
|
payphones no less) around an Air Force special investigator and Phiber Optik.
|
|
At first the mood resembled that of a James Bond movie, where Bond and an arch
|
|
nemesis would meet and chat, each anticipating the downfall of the other
|
|
beneath polite exteriors. This seemed to be the sublime tension between all
|
|
the feds and hacks who talked at the conference, but it was especially delicate
|
|
in this case -- Phiber was high on the priority list this agent's department
|
|
was currently investigating. Eventually the mood lightened, and an impromptu
|
|
Q&A pow-wow session between the hacks and the agent broke out, spawning all
|
|
sorts of conversations that seemed much more interesting than the finale taking
|
|
place inside. And, like clockwork, a little mischief came into play. As a
|
|
show of good faith and a sign that the hackers would be returning for next
|
|
year's conference, several prominent organizers found that the answer messages
|
|
on their hotel voice mailboxes had been mysteriously "changed." Sources say
|
|
the culprit was described as an old Yiddish, but all reports on this matter
|
|
were unconfirmed. Shortly after this impromptu gathering, it was apparent that
|
|
the conference had finally adjourned. Except for the underground types and a
|
|
few observers, the halls were thinning out, and eventually we all wandered our
|
|
separate ways. And once again, this environment began to take the look of a
|
|
hotel.
|
|
|
|
|
|
To The Underground At Large:
|
|
|
|
This was just one conference; the feds will continue to do what they do and so
|
|
will we. After the hacker panel fiasco, I overheard John Markoff (New York
|
|
Times reporter and co-author of the book _Cyberpunk_) and Steve Levy talking
|
|
about how topics like this were being discussed in conferences like this ten
|
|
years ago. Only the names and circumstances had changed -- the song and dance
|
|
steps remained the same. Chances are, ten years from now these same subjects
|
|
will share some portion of the limelight in regard to growth and development of
|
|
cyberspace. As society becomes more technologically complex, the bugs,
|
|
loopholes, and defaults will exist and the underground will thrive. Whether
|
|
the masses choose to acknowledge this or not, we are a subculture of and to
|
|
ourselves, much like the Grateful Dead followers. Some will move on, die off,
|
|
or fade away, and others will stream in to fill the empty spaces. A few words
|
|
of interpretive advice to the newbees: study everything you touch carefully,
|
|
covet and respect the knowledge you gain like a gun, and never drive faster
|
|
than you can think. The feds are out there and, trust me, these motherfuckers
|
|
didn't come to play.
|
|
|
|
|
|
To The Feds And Hacker Trackers Present At The Conference:
|
|
|
|
There isn't much that can be said. You have a much better understanding of the
|
|
computer underworld than most, even than by some of those in it. By virtue of
|
|
the job you do, this is a given. Respect is due to you for your showing at
|
|
CFP-2, how you presented yourselves, and the subtle way you furthered the
|
|
brainwashed concepts of "the hacker" in the public eye. You knew the
|
|
presentations would be slanted in your favor, and probably took great pride in
|
|
this. Smooth. Very smooth.
|
|
|
|
|
|
To The Uninformed:
|
|
|
|
Don't blindly believe the hype. Whether you wish to face it or not, hackers
|
|
and phone phreaks are an integral part of this technological revolution.
|
|
Advancement cannot come without the need for change and to improve, both micro-
|
|
and macroscopically. Positive direction is the result of an equal but opposite
|
|
force that presses it forward. Because of the hackers (old, new, and even the
|
|
malicious), software and hardware developers have made radical improvements on
|
|
the networks and supermachines that are undeniably molding the foundation of
|
|
tomorrow's world. Our society is based on complacency. And any social
|
|
institution or machinery that seems to work without weight to tip the scales of
|
|
change simply goes unchecked, eventually to become a standard. The hijinx that
|
|
Congress gets away with and how little the public truly reacts is a perfect
|
|
example. If hackers didn't truly love computers and telecommunications or have
|
|
an unnatural need to explore and learn, the technological growth curve would be
|
|
stunted. Long after these embryotic times have faded into our grandchildren's
|
|
history books, hackers will exist, and the bulk of high-tech crimes will
|
|
continue to be perpetrated by minions of the people in power, the elite white-
|
|
collar.
|
|
|
|
Regardless of the long-term insight, computer intrusion is still an illegal art
|
|
and science.
|
|
|
|
There is no rationale for why hackers hack, at least nothing that will
|
|
withstand the scrutiny of the unenlightened masses or one's inner beliefs.
|
|
"Hackers," like any other subculture, yield a range of personalities and
|
|
perspectives from the careful explorer to the callous marauder. Inexperienced
|
|
sociologists would probably try to classify this underground sect as a
|
|
movement, possibly even subversive in its intentions. The problem with this
|
|
lies in the fact that a movement needs a leader or spokesman. Aside from the
|
|
individual nature of these people, anyone who becomes a mouthpiece for this
|
|
culture cannot rightly be a hacker, or at least hacking around with anything
|
|
unlawful. Chances are, others would shy away from such a person, seeing him as
|
|
either an informant or too dangerous to be around; the feds would pursue him
|
|
passionately, like tracking a trophy-sized bull in a deer hunt. Hackers cannot
|
|
be categorized as a movement, fad, or pre-packaged subculture like bubble-gum
|
|
rock music or the pseudo-hippies of the 90's. Most hackers have their own
|
|
directions and forward momentum. It is a shared mindset, ironically
|
|
paralleling that of the feds that chase them. One group has no rules or set
|
|
channels to adhere to. The other is backed by the establishment and a badge.
|
|
|
|
This statement was not intended to rationalize their actions, only give insight
|
|
to the uninitiated. To summarize the spectrum of motives with the hacker
|
|
intellect, I give this analogy: the need to come onto someone else's property,
|
|
some for peaceful exploration, others to inhabit, and in some instances to
|
|
misuse or destroy is not a new phenomena. The early settlers of this country
|
|
did the same thing to the Native Americans.
|
|
|
|
|
|
I\/Iax I\Iomad
|
|
|
|
[Mission X Tribe Out]
|
|
|
|
[---------]
|
|
|
|
Thanks and respect are due to:
|
|
|
|
Basil Rouland Inc. (for getting me there) and URban Lividity, Jet Heller,
|
|
Silkworm, and the rest of the "In The Flesh" (804-489-7031) posse that couldn't
|
|
make the trip. mXt.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Four, Issue Thirty-Eight, File 13 of 15
|
|
|
|
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Phrack World News PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Issue XXXVIII / Part One of Three PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Compiled by Dispater & Friends PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Special Thanks to Datastream Cowboy PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
|
|
|
|
|
|
Warning: Multiplexor/The Prisoner Tells All April 10, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
On approximately April 3, 1992, Multiplexor (a/k/a The Prisoner) illegally used
|
|
credit card information obtained from CBI/Equifax to purchase an airline ticket
|
|
to San Diego, California from his home in Long Island, New York. Upon his
|
|
arrival, MP was met by several agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
|
|
|
|
After his apprehension, MP was taken first to a computer store where agents
|
|
allegedly picked up a computer from the store manager who is a friend of either
|
|
one of the agents or a federal prosecutor involved in the case.
|
|
|
|
At the taxpayer's expense, Multiplexor was put up for at least a week at a
|
|
Mariott Hotel in San Diego while he told all that he ever knew about anyone to
|
|
the FBI. It is believed that "Kludge," sysop of the San Diego based BBS
|
|
Scantronics has been implicated, although reportedly his board does not contain
|
|
ANY illegal information or other contraband.
|
|
|
|
It is widely known that card credit abusing scum like Multiplexor are
|
|
inherently criminal and will probably exaggerate, embellish and otherwise lie
|
|
about other people in order to escape prosecution themselves. If you have ever
|
|
come into contact with Multiplexor -- beware. He may be speaking about you.
|
|
|
|
Incidentally, Multiplexor had this year submitted a poorly written and ill-
|
|
conceived article to Phrack about voice mail hacking. His article was denied
|
|
publication.
|
|
|
|
And now this is the final result...
|
|
|
|
Nationwide Web of Criminal Hackers Charged April 20, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By Barbara E. McMullen & John F. McMullen (Newsbytes)
|
|
|
|
San Diego -- According to a San Diego Union-Tribune report, San Diego police
|
|
have uncovered "an electronic web of young computer hackers who use high-tech
|
|
methods to make fraudulent credit card charges and carry out other activities."
|
|
|
|
The Friday, April 17th story by Bruce V. Bigelow and Dwight C. Daniels quotes
|
|
San Diego police detective Dennis Sadler as saying that this informal
|
|
underground network has been trading information "to further their political
|
|
careers." He said that the hackers know how to break computer security codes,
|
|
create credit card accounts, and make fraudulent credit card purchases. Sadler
|
|
estimated that as many as 1,000 hard-core hackers across the United States have
|
|
shared this data although he said that it's unclear how many have actually used
|
|
the information to commit crimes.
|
|
|
|
Sadler added that he estimated that illegal charges to credit cards could total
|
|
millions of dollars.
|
|
|
|
While the police department did not release details to support the allegations,
|
|
saying that the investigation is continuing, Sadler did say that cooperation
|
|
>from an "out-of-state hacker," picked up in San Diego, provided important
|
|
information to the police and the FBI. Although police would not release the
|
|
identity of this individual or his present whereabouts, information gathered
|
|
by Newsbytes from sources within the hacker community identifies the so-called
|
|
hacker as "Multiplexer", a resident of Long Island, NY, who, according to
|
|
sources, arrived in San Diego on a airline flight with passage obtained by
|
|
means of a fraudulent credit card purchase. The San Diego police, apparently
|
|
aware of his arrival, allegedly met him at the airport and took him into
|
|
custody. The same sources say that, following his cooperation, Multiplexer was
|
|
allowed to return to his Long Island home.
|
|
|
|
The Union-Tribune article linked the San Diego investigation to recent federal
|
|
search and seizures in the New York, Philadelphia and Seattle areas. Subjects
|
|
of those searches have denied to Newsbytes any knowledge of Multiplexer,
|
|
illegal credit card usage or other illegal activities alleged in the Union-
|
|
Tribune story. Additionally, law enforcement officials familiar with on-going
|
|
investigations have been unwilling to comment, citing possible future
|
|
involvement with the San Diego case.
|
|
|
|
The article also compared the present investigation to Operation Sun-Devil, a
|
|
federal investigation into similar activities that resulted in a massive search
|
|
and seizure operation in May 1990. Although individuals have been sentenced in
|
|
Arizona and California on Sun Devil related charges, civil liberties groups,
|
|
such as the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, have been
|
|
critical about the low number of criminal convictions resulting from such a
|
|
large operation.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Sun-Devil Becomes New Steve Jackson Game March 25, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By Steve Jackson
|
|
|
|
It couldn't have been more than a week after the initial raid when people
|
|
started saying, "Hey, why don't you make a game out of it?" The joke wore thin
|
|
quickly, as I heard it over and over and over during the next year. Then I
|
|
realized that I was in serious danger of losing my sense of humor over this...
|
|
and that actually, it would be possible to do a pretty good game about hacking.
|
|
So I did.
|
|
|
|
In 1990, the Secret Service raided Steve Jackson Games when a "hacker hunt"
|
|
went out of control. Loss of our computers and unfinished game manuscripts
|
|
almost put this company out of business.
|
|
|
|
It's been two years. We're back on our feet. And ever since the raid, fans
|
|
have been asking, "When are you going to make a game out of it?"
|
|
|
|
Okay. We give up. Here it is.
|
|
|
|
The game has enough fanciful and pure science-fiction elements that it's not
|
|
going to tutor anyone in the arcane skills. Neither is it going to teach the
|
|
sysadmin any protective tricks more sophisticated than "don't leave the root
|
|
set to default." But it is, I think, a good simulation of the *social*
|
|
environment of High Hackerdom. You want to outdo your rivals -- but at the
|
|
same time, if you don't share knowledge with them, you'll never get anywhere.
|
|
And too many wannabes on the same system can mess it up for everybody, so when
|
|
you help somebody, you ask them to try it out *somewhere else* . . . and
|
|
occasionally a hacker finds himself doing the sysadmin's housecleaning, just to
|
|
preserve his own playground against later intruders. I like the way it plays.
|
|
|
|
In HACKER, players compete to invade the most computer systems. The more
|
|
systems you crack, the more you learn, and the easier the next target is. You
|
|
can find back doors and secret phone lines, and even crash the systems your
|
|
rivals are using. But be careful. There's a Secret Service Raid with your
|
|
name on it if you make too many enemies.
|
|
|
|
Designed by Steve Jackson, the game is based on the award-winning ILLUMINATI.
|
|
To win at HACKER requires guile and diplomacy. You must trade favors with your
|
|
fellow hackers -- and get more than you give away. But jealous rivals will try
|
|
to bust you. Three busts and you're out of the game. More than one player can
|
|
win, but shared victories are not easy!
|
|
|
|
HACKER is for 3-6 players. Playing time is under an hour for the short game
|
|
and about 2 hours for the regular game. Components include a rule book, 110
|
|
cards, marker chips, 6 console units, system upgrades, Bust markers, and Net
|
|
Ninja marker, two dice and a Ziplock bag.
|
|
|
|
Hacker began shipping March 30, and has a suggested retail price of $19.95.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
"Peter The Great " Had An Overbyte January 10, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By Kay Kusumoto (The Seattle Times)(Page B1)
|
|
|
|
"Teenage Hacker Ring Bigger Than Thought"
|
|
|
|
Bellevue, Washington -- Imagine you're a 17-year-old computer whiz who has
|
|
figured out how to get into the phone-company computer to make long-distance
|
|
calls for free.
|
|
|
|
Imagine finding at the tip of your fingers step-by-step instructions on how to
|
|
obtain credit-card numbers.
|
|
|
|
And imagine once more the name you use to log on to a computer system isn't
|
|
really your own, but actually a tag, or moniker -- like, say, that of a Russian
|
|
czar.
|
|
|
|
Bellevue police say that's the name an Issaquah teenager used when sending
|
|
messages to fellow hackers all over the country.
|
|
|
|
They first arrested "Peter the Great" a month ago for investigation of
|
|
attempted theft in using an unauthorized credit-card number to try to purchase
|
|
a $4,000 computer from a store in Bellevue.
|
|
|
|
But now police, who are still investigating and have not yet filed charges,
|
|
believe they're on to something much larger than first suspected. They say
|
|
they are looking for one or two additional youths involved with the 17-year-old
|
|
in a large computer-hacking ring that uses other people's credit-card numbers
|
|
to purchase computers and software.
|
|
|
|
In the youth's car, police say, they found another $4,000 computer obtained
|
|
earlier that day from a Seattle computer store. They also claim to have found
|
|
documents suggesting the youth had used credit information illegally.
|
|
|
|
Police Lt. Bill Ferguson of Bellevue's white-collar crime unit said detectives
|
|
don't know how many people are involved in the scam or how long it has been
|
|
going on. And police may never know the dollar loss from businesses and
|
|
individuals, he said.
|
|
|
|
"You can guess as high as you want," Ferguson said. "He had connections clear
|
|
across the country."
|
|
|
|
After the youth was arrested, police say, he admitted to being a hacker and
|
|
using his parents' home computer and telephone to call boards.
|
|
|
|
An elaborate type of e-mail -- the bulletin boards offer the user a electronic
|
|
messaging -- system, one may gain access to a "pirate" bulletin directory of
|
|
"how to" articles on ways of cracking computer systems containing everything
|
|
>from credit records and phone accounts to files in the University of
|
|
Washington's chemistry department.
|
|
|
|
Once the youth decided which articles he wanted most, he would copy them onto
|
|
his own disk, said Ferguson. Now police are poring over hundreds of disks,
|
|
confiscated from his parents' house, to see just how much information he had.
|
|
The parents knew nothing of what was going on, police say. Ferguson said
|
|
police also seized a copy of a New York-based magazine called 2600, aimed at
|
|
hackers. Like the bulletin boards, the magazine provides readers with a
|
|
variety of "how to" articles.
|
|
|
|
The teenager, who was released to his parents' custody the day of his December
|
|
3 arrest, told police the magazine taught him how to use a device that can
|
|
imitate the sound of coins dropping into a pay phone. With that, he could dial
|
|
outside computers for free.
|
|
|
|
Police confiscated the device.
|
|
|
|
"Hackers are difficult to trace because they don't leave their name on
|
|
anything," Ferguson said, adding that a federal investigation may follow
|
|
because detectives found copies of government documents on the youth's disks.
|
|
|
|
"This kid (copied) hundreds of pages of articles, left messages and shared
|
|
(computer) information with other hackers," said Ferguson.
|
|
|
|
"What's common about the hacker community is that they like to brag about their
|
|
accomplishments -- cracking computer systems. They'll tell each other so
|
|
others can do it."
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
Hotel Credit Doesn't Compute January 22, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By Stephen Clutter and Kay Kusumoto (The Seattle Times)(Page D1)
|
|
|
|
"Kirkland Police Suspect Hacker"
|
|
|
|
Kirkland, Washington -- Police are investigating yet another potential computer
|
|
hacking case, this one at the Woodmark Hotel in Kirkland.
|
|
|
|
Someone, according to hotel officials, got into the Woodmark's computer system
|
|
and gave themselves a $500 credit for a hotel room earlier this month.
|
|
|
|
Police say a 19-year-old Bellevue man is the main suspect in the case, although
|
|
no arrests have been made.
|
|
|
|
The incident surfaces at the same time as Bellevue police press their
|
|
investigation into their suspicions that a 17-year-old Issaquah youth, using
|
|
the computer name "Peter the Great," got access to credit-card numbers to
|
|
purchase computers and software. That suspect was arrested but is free pending
|
|
charges.
|
|
|
|
"The deeper we get into Peter's files, the more we're finding," Bellevue police
|
|
Lt. Bill Ferguson said.
|
|
|
|
After arresting the youth last month on suspicion of trying to use an
|
|
unauthorized credit-card number to purchase a $4,000 computer from a Bellevue
|
|
store, police confiscated hundreds of computer disks and have been searching
|
|
the electronic files for evidence.
|
|
|
|
"We've been printing one file out for three hours now -- and it's still
|
|
printing," Ferguson said yesterday.
|
|
|
|
The file, Ferguson estimated, contains at least 10,000 names of individuals,
|
|
with credit-card numbers and expiration dates, addresses, phone numbers and
|
|
Social-Security numbers.
|
|
|
|
Detectives will meet with the Bellevue city prosecutor later this week to
|
|
discuss charges.
|
|
|
|
In the Kirkland incident, the 19-year-old Bellevue man stayed in the hotel the
|
|
night of January 11, according to Kirkland Detective Sgt. Bill O'Brien.
|
|
|
|
The man apparently made the reservation by phone a few days earlier and was
|
|
given a confirmation number. When he went to check into the hotel on January
|
|
11, the receptionist found that a $500 credit had been made to his room
|
|
account, O'Brien said.
|
|
|
|
Woodmark officials, fearing they had a hacker problem, contacted Bellevue
|
|
police last week after reading news accounts of the arrest of "Peter the
|
|
Great."
|
|
|
|
"The hotel said they had read the story, and discovered what appeared to be a
|
|
break-in to their computer system," said Ferguson. "They wanted to know if
|
|
maybe it was related to our "Peter the Great" case."
|
|
|
|
Police don't know, Ferguson said -- and that's one of the things under
|
|
investigation.
|
|
|
|
The main suspect in the Woodmark case had worked at the hotel for five days in
|
|
1990, police say, and may have had access to the hotel's computer access code.
|
|
Hotel officials suspected they had a hacker on their hands because phone
|
|
records indicate that the $500 credit was made via a telephone modem and not by
|
|
a keyboard at the hotel, Ferguson said. The problem was discovered after an
|
|
audit showed the $500 was never paid to the hotel.
|
|
|
|
So what happened during the free night at the Woodmark?
|
|
|
|
"They partied and made various phone calls, including nine to the University of
|
|
Washington," O'Brien said.
|
|
|
|
The calls to the university went to an answering machine at the Medical Center,
|
|
police say, and there is no indication the men were able to hack their way into
|
|
the university's computer system.
|
|
|
|
They were up to something, though, and police want to know what. "We're going
|
|
to start with the (19-year-old Bellevue) kid, and start from there," O'Brien
|
|
said.
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
Hacker Charged With Fraud February 14, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By Kay Kusumoto (The Seattle Times)(Page F3)
|
|
|
|
"Teen Computer Whiz May Be Part Of A Ring"
|
|
|
|
"Peter the Great" played courier for "Nighthawk."
|
|
|
|
He was supposed to pick up a couple computers purchased with an unauthorized
|
|
credit-card number from a computer store in Bellevue, Washington last December.
|
|
|
|
He never finished the transaction. A suspicious clerk called police and
|
|
"Peter" was arrested for attempted theft.
|
|
|
|
But that was only the beginning.
|
|
|
|
The Issaquah teenager who went by the computer name "Peter the Great" was
|
|
charged yesterday in King County Juvenile Court with attempted theft,
|
|
possession of stolen property, telephone fraud and computer trespass..
|
|
|
|
The arrest of the 17-year-old computer whiz led Bellevue police on an
|
|
investigation into the underground world of computer hacking.
|
|
|
|
Police are still investigating the case and say they believe it involves
|
|
members of a large computer-hacking ring who use other people's credit-card
|
|
numbers to purchase computers and software.
|
|
|
|
Court documents allege the youth was after two $1,800 computers on December 3,
|
|
1991, the day he walked into a Bellevue computer store to pick up an order for
|
|
an unknown associate who went by the hacker moniker "Nighthawk."
|
|
|
|
The computers had been ordered with a credit-card number given over the phone
|
|
by a man identifying himself as Manuel Villareal. The caller told the clerk
|
|
that another man named Bill Mayer would pick up the order later in the day.
|
|
|
|
But a store clerk became suspicious when the youth, who said he was Bill Mayer,
|
|
"appeared very nervous" while he was inside the store, court papers state.
|
|
|
|
When the youth couldn't provide enough identification to complete the
|
|
transaction, the clerk told him to have Villareal come into the store and sign
|
|
for the computers himself.
|
|
|
|
After the youth left, the clerk called police, and "Peter" was arrested later
|
|
that day.
|
|
|
|
A search of his car revealed a torn up VISA card, several computer disks, two
|
|
more computers, a receipt from a computer store in Seattle and several pieces
|
|
of paper with credit-card numbers on them, court papers state.
|
|
|
|
The youth also had in his possession a red box, a device that simulates the
|
|
sound of coins dropping into a pay phone.
|
|
|
|
After his arrest, the youth told police that "Nighthawk" had telephoned the
|
|
computer store and used Villareal's name and credit-card number to make the
|
|
purchase in Bellevue.
|
|
|
|
The teen admitted to illegally using another credit-card number to order a
|
|
computer from a store in Seattle. The computer was picked up later by another
|
|
unknown associate.
|
|
|
|
The youth also told police that another associate had hacked his way into the
|
|
computer system of a mail-order house and circulated a list of 14,000 credit
|
|
card numbers through a computer bulletin board.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Computer Hackers Nabbed January 29, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By Michael Rotem (The Jerusalem Post)
|
|
|
|
Four computer hackers were arrested and their equipment seized in raids by
|
|
police and Bezek security officers on four homes in the center and north of the
|
|
country. They were released on bail yesterday after questioning.
|
|
|
|
The four, two minors and two adults, are suspected of purloining passwords and
|
|
then breaking the entry codes of international computer services and toll-free
|
|
international telephone switchboards, stealing thousands of dollars worth of
|
|
services.
|
|
|
|
The arrests were made possible after National Fraud Squad officers joined
|
|
Bezek's efforts to discover the source of tampering with foreign computer
|
|
services.
|
|
|
|
A Bezek source told The Jerusalem Post that all four suspects had used personal
|
|
computers and inexpensive modems. After fraudulently obtaining several
|
|
confidential passwords necessary to enter Isranet -- Israel's national computer
|
|
network -- the four reportedly linked up to foreign public data banks by
|
|
breaking their entrance codes.
|
|
|
|
This resulted in enormous bills being sent to the password owners, who had no
|
|
idea their personal secret access codes had been stolen.
|
|
|
|
The four are also suspected of illegally obtaining secret personal credit
|
|
numbers used by phone customers to call abroad. The suspects reportedly made
|
|
numerous telephone conversations abroad worth thousands of shekels.
|
|
|
|
A police spokesman said cooperation between Bezek's security department and the
|
|
police National Fraud Squad will continue, in order to "fight these felonies
|
|
that cause great financial damage." Bezek spokesman Zacharia Mizrotzki said
|
|
the company is considering changing the secret personal passwords of network
|
|
users on a frequent basis.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Hackers Get Free Credit February 24, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By Doug Bartholomew (Information Week)(Page 15)
|
|
|
|
Banks and retail firms aren't the only ones peeking at consumers' credit
|
|
reports. Equifax Inc., one of the nation's three major credit bureaus admitted
|
|
that some youthful computer hackers in Ohio had penetrated its system,
|
|
accessing consumers' credit files. And if it wasn't for a teenager's tip, they
|
|
would still be at it.
|
|
|
|
"We do not know how the hackers obtained the access codes, but we do know the
|
|
confidentiality requirements for membership numbers and security pass-codes
|
|
were breached," says a spokesman at Equifax. The company, which had revenue of
|
|
$1.1 billion in 1991, possesses a database of some 170 million credit files.
|
|
|
|
A customer number and access code must have been given to the teenagers, or
|
|
stolen by them, adds the spokesman, who says Equifax "plans to increase the
|
|
difficulty of accessing the system." Theft of computer access codes is a
|
|
federal crime.
|
|
|
|
Virtually No Protection
|
|
|
|
Critics of the credit agencies say such breaches are common. "There is
|
|
virtually no protection for those systems," says a spokesman for the Computer
|
|
Professionals for Social Responsibility, a Washington association. "If some
|
|
car salesman leaves the information sitting on his desk, someone could just
|
|
pick up the codes."
|
|
|
|
As of last week, Dayton police had made no arrests. But they searched the
|
|
homes of two young men, age 18 and 15, confiscating half a dozen PCs and
|
|
numerous floppy disks.
|
|
|
|
The two are thought by police to be part of a group of up to 50 hackers
|
|
believed to be behind the systems break-in. The group is also under
|
|
investigation for allegedly making $82,000 worth of illegal phone calls using
|
|
an 800 number provided to business customers of LDDS Communications Inc., a
|
|
long-distance service in Jackson, Mississippi. LDDS was forced to disconnect
|
|
the 800 number on November 15, 1991.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Two Cornell Students Charged In Virus Attacks February 26, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By Grant Buckler (Newsbytes)
|
|
Also see Phrack 37, File 11 -- Phrack World News
|
|
|
|
Ithaca, New York -- Charges have been laid against two Cornell University
|
|
students accused of planting a virus that locked up Apple Macintosh computers
|
|
at Cornell, at Stanford University in California, and in Japan.
|
|
|
|
David S. Blumenthal and Mark Andrew Pilgrim, both aged 19, were charged in
|
|
Ithaca City Court with one count each of second-degree computer tampering, a
|
|
Class A misdemeanor. The investigation is continuing and additional charges
|
|
are likely to be laid, said Cornell University spokeswoman Linda Grace-Kobas.
|
|
Both students spent the night in jail before being released on bail February
|
|
25, Grace-Kobas added.
|
|
|
|
The MBDFA virus apparently was launched February 14 in three Macintosh computer
|
|
games: Obnoxious Tetris, Tetriscycle, and Ten Tile Puzzle. Apparently, a
|
|
computer at Cornell was used to upload the virus to the SUMEX-AIM computer
|
|
archive at Stanford University and an archive in Osaka, Japan.
|
|
|
|
MBDFA is a worm, a type of computer virus that distributes itself in multiple
|
|
copies within a system or into connected systems. MBDFA modifies systems
|
|
software and applications programs and sometimes results in computer crashes,
|
|
university officials reported.
|
|
|
|
Reports of the MBDFA virus have been received from across the United States and
|
|
>from around the world, including the United Kingdom, a statement from the
|
|
university said.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Judge Orders Hacker To Stay Away From Computers March 17, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By Jim Mallory (Newsbytes)
|
|
|
|
DENVER, COLORADO -- A computer hacker who pleaded guilty to breaking into space
|
|
agency computer systems was ordered to undergo mental health treatment and not
|
|
use computers without permission from his probation officer.
|
|
|
|
The 24 year-old man, a resident of suburban Lakewood, was sentenced to three
|
|
years probation in what is said to be one of only five prosecutions under the
|
|
federal computer hacker law.
|
|
|
|
The man pleaded guilty last year to one count of breaking into a National
|
|
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) computer, after NASA and the
|
|
Federal Bureau of Investigation agents tracked him down in 1990. Prosecutors
|
|
said the man had spent four years trying to get into computer systems,
|
|
including those of some banks.
|
|
|
|
Prosecutors said the man had gained access to a Defense Department computer
|
|
through the NASA system, but declined to give any details of that case. The
|
|
indictment did not explain what had occurred.
|
|
|
|
In the plea bargain agreement, the man admitted he gained access to NASA's
|
|
computers "by exploiting a malfunction in a public access NASA computer
|
|
bulletin board service."
|
|
|
|
The man was described as an unemployed loner who had spent most of his time
|
|
using a computer at home. The prosecutor was quoted as saying the man needed
|
|
counselling "on a social level and for personal hygiene."
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
Hacker Journeys Through NASA's Secret World March 24, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By Scripps Howard (Montreal Gazette)(Page A5)
|
|
|
|
"It became more like a game. How many systems can you break into?"
|
|
|
|
While tripping through NASA's most sensitive computer files, Ricky Wittman
|
|
suddenly realized he was in trouble. Big trouble.
|
|
|
|
He had been scanning the e-mail, electronic messages sent between two
|
|
scientists at one of NASA's space centers. They were talking about the
|
|
computer hacker who had broken into the system. They were talking about
|
|
Wittman.
|
|
|
|
Curiosity collapsed into panic.
|
|
|
|
"Logoff now!" 24-year-old Wittman remembers thinking as he sat alone in his
|
|
apartment, staring at his computer screen, in May 1990. "Hang up the phone.
|
|
Leave the house."
|
|
|
|
By then it was too late. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's
|
|
computer detectives were on the trail. After 400 hours of backtracking phone
|
|
records, they found the Sandpiper Apartments in Westminster, Colorado.
|
|
|
|
And they found the inconspicuous third-floor apartment where Wittman -- using
|
|
an outdated IBM XT computer -- perpetrated the most massive hacking incident in
|
|
the history of NASA.
|
|
|
|
Last week a federal judge sentenced Wittman to three years' probation and
|
|
ordered him to undergo psychiatric counselling.
|
|
|
|
But perhaps the most punishing aspect to Wittman was the judge's order that he
|
|
not use computers without permission from a probation officer.
|
|
|
|
"That's going to be the toughest part," Wittman said. "I've become so
|
|
dependent on computers. I get the news and weather from a computer."
|
|
|
|
In his first interview since a federal grand jury indicted him in September,
|
|
Wittman expressed regret for what he had done.
|
|
|
|
But he remained oddly nonchalant about having overcome the security safeguards
|
|
designed by NASA's best computer minds.
|
|
|
|
"I'll level with you. I still think they're bozos," Wittman said. "If they had
|
|
done a halfway competent job, this wouldn't have happened."
|
|
|
|
Prosecutors didn't buy Wittman's argument.
|
|
|
|
"No software security system is foolproof," wrote assistant U.S. attorney
|
|
Gregory Graf. "If a thief picks the lock on the door of your home, is the
|
|
homeowner responsible because he didn't have a pick-proof lock on the front
|
|
door?"
|
|
|
|
Breaking into the system was just that easy, Wittman said, so much so that it
|
|
took him a while to realize what he had done.
|
|
|
|
He had been fooling around inside a public-access NASA computer bulletin-board
|
|
service in 1986, looking for information on the space-shuttle program. He
|
|
started toying with a malfunction.
|
|
|
|
"The software went blooey and dumped me inside," Wittman said. "At first, I
|
|
didn't know what happened. I pressed the help key. I realized after a while
|
|
that I was inside."
|
|
|
|
Somehow, Wittman -- then 18 -- had found a way to break out of the bulletin
|
|
board's menu-driven system and into a restricted-access area full of personal
|
|
files.
|
|
|
|
Once past the initial gate, it didn't take Wittman long to find the file of a
|
|
security manager. Wittman picked up a password for another system, and the
|
|
romp began.
|
|
|
|
"Then I started looking around, and it became more like a game," he recalled.
|
|
"How many systems can you break into?"
|
|
|
|
By the federal government's count, Wittman eventually hacked his way into 115
|
|
user files on 68 computer systems linked by the Space Physics Analysis Network.
|
|
His access extended as far as the European Southern Observatory in Munich,
|
|
Germany.
|
|
|
|
Given the chance, Wittman could have gone even farther, prosecutors contend. In
|
|
an interview with the FBI, Wittman told agents he accidently had come across
|
|
the "log on" screen for the U.S. controller of the currency. Wittman said he
|
|
didn't try to crack that password.
|
|
|
|
"The controller of the currency is a little out of my league," he said.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Georgia Teenage Hacker Arrested March 19, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By Jim Mallory (Newsbytes)
|
|
|
|
LAWRENCEVILLE, GEORGIA -- A Georgia teenager has been arrested on charging of
|
|
illegally accessing data files of several companies in a attempt to inject a
|
|
computer virus into the systems.
|
|
|
|
The alleged computer hacker, who was originally charged with the illegal access
|
|
charges two weeks ago, was re-arrested on felony charges at his high school
|
|
this week on the additional charges of attempting to infect the computer
|
|
systems.
|
|
|
|
The 18-year old boy allegedly broke into computers of BellSouth, General
|
|
Electric Company, IBM, WXIA-TV in Atlanta, and two Gwinnett County agencies,
|
|
who were not identified.
|
|
|
|
The boy's 53-year-old mother was also arrested, charged with attempting to
|
|
hinder her son's arrest by trying to have evidence against him destroyed.
|
|
|
|
Computer users' awareness of computer viruses was heightened recently over the
|
|
so-called Michelangelo virus, which some computer security experts thought
|
|
might strike tens of thousands of computers, destroying data stored on the
|
|
system's hard disk. Perhaps due to the massive publicity Michelangelo
|
|
received, only a few hundred PCs in the US were struck.
|
|
|
|
Hackers access computers through telephone lines. Passwords are sometimes
|
|
obtained from underground bulletin boards, are guessed, or can be obtained
|
|
through special software programs that try thousands of combinations, hoping to
|
|
hit the right one.
|
|
|
|
A recent Newsbytes story reported the conviction of a Denver area resident, who
|
|
was sentenced to three years probation and ordered not to use computers without
|
|
permission after attempting to break into a NASA (National Aeronautics and
|
|
Space Administration) computer.
|
|
|
|
Officials and victims are usually reluctant to give details of computer break-
|
|
ins for fear of giving other would-be hackers ideas.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Hacker Surveillance Software March 21, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By Susan Watts, Technology Correspondent for The Independent (Page 6)
|
|
|
|
"Hacker 'Profiles' May Curb Computer Frauds"
|
|
|
|
The Federal Bureau of Investigation is dealing with computer hackers as it
|
|
would rapists and murderers -- by building "profiles" of their actions.
|
|
|
|
Its computer researchers have discovered that, in the same way that other
|
|
offenders often favour the same weapons, materials or times of day to
|
|
perpetrate their crimes, hackers prefer to use trusted routines to enter
|
|
computer systems, and follow familiar paths once inside. These patterns can
|
|
prove a rich source of information for detectives.
|
|
|
|
The FBI is developing a modified version of detection software from SRI
|
|
International -- an American technology research organization. Teresa Lunt, a
|
|
senior computer scientist at SRI, said hackers would think twice about breaking
|
|
into systems if they knew computer security specialists were building a profile
|
|
of them. At the very least, they would have to constantly change their hacking
|
|
methods. Ms. Lunt, who is seeking partners in Britain to help develop a
|
|
commercial version of the software, believes hackers share with psychotic
|
|
criminals a desire to leave their hallmark.
|
|
|
|
"Every hacker goes through a process peculiar to themselves that is almost a
|
|
signature to their work," she said. "The FBI has printed out long lists of the
|
|
commands hackers use when they break in. Hackers are surprisingly consistent
|
|
in the commands and options they use. They will often go through the same
|
|
routines. Once they are in they will have a quick look around the network to
|
|
see who else is logged on, then they might try to find a list of passwords."
|
|
|
|
SRI's software, the development of which is sponsored by the US Defense
|
|
Department, is "intelligent" -- it sits on a network of computers and watches
|
|
how it is used. The software employs statistical analysis to determine what
|
|
constitutes normal usage of the network, and sets off a warning if an
|
|
individual or the network behaves abnormally.
|
|
|
|
A more sophisticated version of the program can adapt itself daily to
|
|
accommodate deviations in the "normal" behavior of people on the network. It
|
|
might, for example, keep track of the number of temporary files created, or how
|
|
often people collect data from an outside source or send out information.
|
|
|
|
The program could even spot quirks in behavior that companies were not
|
|
expecting to find.
|
|
|
|
The idea is that organizations that rely on sensitive information, such as
|
|
banks or government departments, will be able to spot anomalies via their
|
|
computers. They might pick up money being laundered through accounts, if a
|
|
small company or individual carries out an unusually large transaction.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Four, Issue Thirty-Eight, File 14 of 15
|
|
|
|
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Phrack World News PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Issue XXXVIII / Part Two of Three PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Compiled by Dispater & Friends PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Special Thanks to Datastream Cowboy PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
|
|
|
|
|
|
What's Wrong With The Computer Crime Statute? February 17, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By Thomas A. Guidoboni (ComputerWorld)(Page 33)
|
|
|
|
"Defense and prosecution agree the 1986 Computer Fraud
|
|
and Abuse Act is flawed but differ on how to fix it."
|
|
|
|
It has become an annual ritual, since the birth of the Internet worm, for
|
|
Congress to consider amendments to the 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. At
|
|
this point, the U.S. Department of Justice can be expected to advocate three
|
|
things: an expansion of the federal role in the investigation and prosecution
|
|
of computer crimes, the creation of new categories of offenses, and harsher
|
|
penalties, including perhaps the current darling of the department, forfeiture
|
|
of property.
|
|
|
|
Since the law is of recent origin, was substantially revised in 1986 and proved
|
|
more than adequate to prosecute and convict Robert T. Morris, there seems
|
|
little justification for expansion of its coverage.
|
|
|
|
Nevertheless, if Congress is determined to review and revise the provisions of
|
|
the act, there are several narrow, but significant, amendments that are clearly
|
|
warranted. Of primary importance is the definition of terms. The core of the
|
|
law suffers from a lack of clarity. Offenses are described by reference to
|
|
"authorized" or "unauthorized access," yet these terms are not defined
|
|
anywhere.
|
|
|
|
Perilously Vague
|
|
|
|
In a universe that consists of broad computer networks, bulletin boards, E-mail
|
|
and anonymous file-transfer protocols, and one in which permissions and rights
|
|
are established by custom, usage and private understandings, a person is left
|
|
to speculate at his peril as to what conduct is permitted and what is
|
|
prohibited by this vague language.
|
|
|
|
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act should be amended to give precise content to
|
|
the concepts of "access" and "authorization," thereby providing fair warning of
|
|
illegal conduct.
|
|
|
|
A second change for the better regarding the act would be to create a
|
|
distinction between those computer intruders who unintentionally cause a
|
|
monetary loss and those who maliciously cause such harm.
|
|
|
|
The present law, as interpreted in the Morris case, recognizes no such
|
|
distinction. This is contrary to long-standing notions of fairness in our
|
|
system of criminal law, which acknowledges that between two persons who cause
|
|
the same harm, the one who intended that result is more culpable than the one
|
|
who did not.
|
|
|
|
A third part of the statute that needs revision relates to computerized medical
|
|
records. It is too broad because it includes as felonious conduct the
|
|
unauthorized access to such records that "potentially modifies or impairs"
|
|
medical treatment or care. Virtually every unauthorized access to computers
|
|
containing medical records carries this potential. A better solution would be
|
|
simply to make any "unauthorized access" of computerized medical records data a
|
|
misdemeanor, with the intentional modification or destruction of such data
|
|
designated as a felony.
|
|
|
|
Amend, But Don't Expand
|
|
|
|
These slight but important amendments would serve to clarify and improve a
|
|
basically sound law without stifling the creativity of persons akin to those
|
|
who have been responsible for many of the advances in computer technology in
|
|
this country. More expansive revisions are ill-advised, as they may
|
|
unnecessarily encroach on evolving privacy and free-expression interests.
|
|
|
|
A broadening of federal involvement is also inappropriate. Nearly every state
|
|
has enacted laws against computer fraud and abuse and, as Congress recognized
|
|
in 1986, federal jurisdiction should be limited to cases where there is a
|
|
compelling federal interest. This might include instances where computers
|
|
belonging to the federal government or to financial institutions are involved,
|
|
or cases where the crime itself is interstate in nature. Furthermore, other
|
|
computer crimes should be left to prosecution by the individual states, as is
|
|
presently the case.
|
|
|
|
In sum, the 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act would benefit from some
|
|
clarification, but expansion of its coverage and wholesale revisions are both
|
|
ill-advised and unnecessary.
|
|
|
|
Note: Thomas A Guidoboni is an attorney with Bonner & O'Connell in Washington,
|
|
D.C. He represented Robert T. Morris in the Internet virus case.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Private Social Security Data Sold to Information Brokers February 29, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By R.A. Zaldivar (San Jose Mercury News)
|
|
|
|
Washington, D.C. -- The privacy of 200 million Americans with records at the
|
|
Social Security Administration is threatened by an illegal trade in pilfered
|
|
computer files. Computerization has dramatically improved our ability to serve
|
|
the public," Social Security Deputy Commissioner Louis Enoff told a Senate
|
|
panel. "However, it has also made confidentiality more difficult."
|
|
|
|
Two executives of Nationwide Electronic Tracking, a Tampa, Florida, company,
|
|
pleaded guilty to conspiracy charges in January for their part in a national
|
|
network selling Social Security records. Twenty-three people, including agency
|
|
employees and police officials, have been indicted in the case -- the largest
|
|
known theft of government computer data. "Information brokers" will pay Social
|
|
Security employees $25 for a person's earnings history and then sell the data
|
|
for as much as $300. Their growing list of customers includes lawyers, private
|
|
investigators, employers, and insurance companies.
|
|
|
|
Social Security records contain a mother lode of information that includes not
|
|
only a person's past earnings but names of employers, family history and even
|
|
bank account numbers of people who receive benefits by direct deposit. The
|
|
information can be used to find people or to make decisions on hiring, firing,
|
|
suing or lending, said Larry Morey, deputy inspector general of the Health and
|
|
Human Services Department.
|
|
|
|
"Here we have a large-scale invasion of the Social Security system's
|
|
confidentiality," said Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, D-N.Y., chairman of the
|
|
Social Security subcommittee.
|
|
|
|
Information from other government data bases with records on individuals --
|
|
such as the FBI's National Criminal Information Center -- is also available on
|
|
the underground market. All a broker needs is the cooperation of a clerk at a
|
|
computer terminal.
|
|
|
|
Congress may revise privacy laws to increase penalties for illegally disclosing
|
|
information in the private files of individuals.
|
|
|
|
Enoff said Social Security is studying ways to improve computer security, as
|
|
well as keeping closer tabs on employees with access to files, and stressing to
|
|
its workers that unauthorized disclosure of information is a federal crime.
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
Related articles can be found in Phrack World News, Issue 37, Part One:
|
|
|
|
Indictments of "Information Brokers" January 1992
|
|
Taken from The Privacy Journal
|
|
|
|
SSA, FBI Database Violations Prompt Security Evaluations January 13, 1992
|
|
By Kevin M. Baerson (Federal Computer Week)(Pages 1, 41)
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Back to Act I March 3, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Taken from Communications Daily (Page 2)
|
|
|
|
"Supreme Court Lets Stand Ruling That FCC Ban On Indecency Is Unconstitutional"
|
|
|
|
FCC's 24-hour ban on indecent programming is unconstitutional, U.S. Supreme
|
|
Court ruled in refusing to consider unanimous U.S. Appeals Court, D.C.,
|
|
decision. Supreme Court action also effectively overruled December 1988 rider
|
|
to Senate appropriations bill directing FCC to ban all indecent programming.
|
|
Last summer, en banc Appeals Court had refused to reconsider May decision by
|
|
unanimous 3-judge panel that FCC ban is unconstitutional.
|
|
|
|
FCC, with support of Justice Department, had asked Supreme Court to reconsider
|
|
case. Coalition of 14 intervenors, including Action for Children's TV (ACT),
|
|
had opposed FCC in Appeals Court and Supreme Court. En banc Appeals Court said
|
|
that none of 13 judges who participated "requested the taking of a vote" on
|
|
whether to rehear case. On Supreme Court, Justices Sandra O'Connor and Byron
|
|
White voted to reconsider case. FCC's definition of indecency: "Language or
|
|
material that depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
|
|
contemporary community standards . . . sexual or excretory activities or
|
|
organs." Agency has fined several stations for indecent programming in the
|
|
last year.
|
|
|
|
With loss in Supreme Court, FCC official told us "we don't have any choices
|
|
left" but to permit such programming to be broadcast. "We're back to Act I."
|
|
Source predicted, and other FCC officials agreed, that agency soon will issue
|
|
rulemaking to make a ban on indecent programming later than 8 p.m. Same
|
|
sources expect Congress once again to take up issue.
|
|
|
|
ACT President Peggy Charren said: "It's very exciting for ACT to have won one
|
|
for the First Amendment. We always knew it's preposterous for the FCC to try
|
|
to ban speech at 3 o'clock in the morning to protect children . . . It's very
|
|
satisfying to have this particular [conservative] Supreme Court agree with us."
|
|
NAB (which also was intervernor in case) Associate General Counsel Steve
|
|
Bookshester said Supreme Court "correctly" acted in not reviewing lower court
|
|
decision: "Now, it's up to the Commission to adopt new procedures to determine
|
|
when such material is permitted to be broadcast." Washington attorney Timothy
|
|
Dyk, who represented intervenors, said: "I think it's a very happy result . . .
|
|
The Court of Appeals decision is exactly where it should be in terms of a safe
|
|
harbor."
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Drug Enforcement Data Are Vulnerable Through Phone Lines March 4, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Taken from Communications Daily (Page 5)
|
|
|
|
Classified information in computers of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is
|
|
at risk, General Accounting Office (GAO) said in a report. It said DEA doesn't
|
|
provide adequate protection of classified information because too many people
|
|
have access to computers that store data, and computers with classified
|
|
information are hooked into nonsecure telephone lines, making them vulnerable
|
|
to outside intrusion.
|
|
|
|
Report, Computer Security: DEA Is Not Adequately Protecting National Security
|
|
Information (GAO/IMTEC-92-31), said it found several instances of lax physical
|
|
and electronic security at DEA computers in several locations. Although there
|
|
are no known instances of security breaches, "these disturbing security
|
|
weaknesses pose serious risks that could potentially hinder DEA's mission and
|
|
threaten the lives of federal agents," the report said. The report found that
|
|
DEA isn't complying with standard security guidelines outlined by National
|
|
Security Agency.
|
|
|
|
In preliminary findings, GAO was so concerned with security weaknesses that it
|
|
called in Department of Justice on January 9 and furnished it with a "limited
|
|
official use" version of its report to give DEA time to correct problems, said
|
|
Rep. Wise (D-W.Va.), chairman of House Government Operations Subcommittee, who
|
|
ordered the investigation. He said other government agencies should be wary of
|
|
sharing information with DEA until security problems have been eliminated.
|
|
Calls to DEA on progress of follow-up security procedures weren't returned.
|
|
Findings are "indicative" of typical "apathetic security attitude" that the
|
|
government has, said David Banisar, security expert for Computer Professionals
|
|
for Social Responsibility.
|
|
|
|
GAO investigators found DEA couldn't adequately identify what computers used
|
|
classified information. "DEA cannot ensure that adequate safeguards are in
|
|
place for protecting national security information," report said. In spite of
|
|
federal guidelines, GAO found that DEA hasn't "completed a risk analysis" of
|
|
computer system. Some classified computers were found to be operated in areas
|
|
where contractors -- with no security clearances -- moved around with no
|
|
restrictions. No computers were found to be "tempest" hardened, meaning
|
|
electronic emissions from keyboards can't be picked up.
|
|
|
|
In light of concern on outside intrusion from "hackers," GAO found several DEA
|
|
computers were connected by phone lines "that are not encrypted" -- which it
|
|
described as clear violation of national security guidelines. The report said
|
|
"unauthorized individuals can intercept or monitor information emanating from
|
|
and transmitted by" the agency without being detected. Classified information
|
|
was found to be stored on hard disks in an "inadvertent" manner, allowing for
|
|
the possibility that computers, when resold, still might hold data. One such
|
|
occurrence, recorded by GAO in its report, occurred last year when sensitive
|
|
grand jury information on informants was left on surplus computers sold by DoJ
|
|
at a public auction.
|
|
|
|
The report said that DEA has acknowledged weaknesses "and is taking action to
|
|
correct them."
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
BBS Controversy Brews Close To Home March 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Taken from Puget Sound Computer User
|
|
Special Thanks: Peter Marshall in Telecom Digest
|
|
|
|
In a case before the Public Utility Commission of Oregon, US West is
|
|
maintaining three phone lines connected to a free-access BBS in a residence
|
|
should be billed at business rates. Because of the similarities in tariffs
|
|
>from state to state and US West's position in the case, many are predicting
|
|
that if US West prevails, the company will be authorized to raise all Oregon
|
|
BBS lines to business rates and try to raise rates for BBS lines in US West's
|
|
remaining 13 states.
|
|
|
|
The case started when Tony Wagner, a Portland system operator, received a
|
|
letter from US West in October, 1991. In the letter, Communications Consultant
|
|
Sandi Ouelette said "Bulletin board services are considered a business,
|
|
therefore, subject to business rates ..."
|
|
|
|
One Seattle attorney interested in telecommunications said these attempts by
|
|
the phone companies to raise rates for BBSes are "just another attempt to swipe
|
|
people's communication."
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
1-800-54-PRIVACY March 10, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Taken from Communications Daily
|
|
|
|
American Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA) President Cathleen Black asked
|
|
American Paper Institute to support the newspaper industry's fight against
|
|
RHCs, warning that the market for paper could drop if phone companies are
|
|
allowed to expand activities into information services. Increased electronic
|
|
classified ads and other services could lead to cutbacks in demand for
|
|
newsprint, Black said. Newspaper producers, traditionally allied with ANPA,
|
|
said they would study the matter.
|
|
|
|
Meanwhile, full-page newspaper ads placed by ANPA and allied Consumer
|
|
Federation, Graphic Communications International Union, National Newspaper
|
|
Association, and Weatherline have generated thousands of calls to an 800 number
|
|
>from readers concerned about potential invasions of privacy by telephone
|
|
companies. The latest ad ran in the March 7 Washington Post, under the
|
|
headline: "Unless they're stopped, the Bells will know more about you than
|
|
even the IRS." The ad advised callers to dial 1-800-547-7482, referred to in
|
|
the telephone message as "1-800-54-privacy."
|
|
|
|
Gary Slack, of the Chicago PR firm Slack, Brown & Myers, which is coordinating
|
|
the 800 campaign, said that the angle in the ad has become an effective weapon
|
|
against RHCs because "there are a lot of people concerned about privacy."
|
|
Callers are sent a 4-page letter signed by Black and "action guidelines" for
|
|
asking legislators to support bills by Representative Cooper (D-Tenn.)
|
|
(HR-3515) and Senator Inouye (D-Hawaii) (S-2112) that would restrict RHC entry
|
|
into information services. ANPA has argued that, through data on telephone
|
|
bills, information can be collected about callers.
|
|
|
|
RHCs didn't have the incentive to use that data before, but now with the
|
|
ability to offer information services, they do, ANPA said. ANPA generally
|
|
doesn't pay for ads, but offers them to newspapers to run when they have space,
|
|
a spokesman said. Pacific Telesis Vice-President Ronald Stowe said ANPA ads
|
|
"show desperation and questionable ethics." He said ANPA is using some of same
|
|
tactics it has accused RHCs of using, including collecting information on
|
|
subscribers. ANPA ads are "really sewer-level stuff," Stowe said: "There are
|
|
enough legitimate issues that ought to be debated."
|
|
|
|
*** Editor's Note: For more information on this story, please see "Standing Up
|
|
To Fight The Bells" by Knight Lightning in this issue of Phrack.
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
Missouri Bulletin Board Case Settled March 24, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Taken from Communications Daily (Page 6)
|
|
|
|
Southwestern Bell in Missouri has filed a new tariff with the Missouri Public
|
|
Service Commission (PSC) to allow computer bulletin board (BBS) operators to
|
|
use residential lines. The tariff would take effect April 10 if there are no
|
|
complications. Under proposal, the BBS operators at homes would be allowed to
|
|
continue to use residence lines if they don't "solicit or require any
|
|
remuneration, directly or indirectly, in exchange for access" and use 4 or
|
|
fewer residential lines priced at flat rates.
|
|
|
|
BBSes that don't meet those requirements would be required to use business
|
|
lines. The tariff, negotiated between SWB and representatives of BBS
|
|
operators, defines a BBS as "a data calculating and storage device(s) utilized
|
|
as a vehicle to facilitate the exchange of information through the use of
|
|
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company facilities." BBS language is part of a
|
|
high-grade Information Terminal Service originally aimed at business users with
|
|
computers, but interpreted by BBS operators as targeted at them. SWB
|
|
originally had wanted to make the new service mandatory for computers with
|
|
modems, but the new proposal, submitted March 11, makes it optional.
|
|
|
|
*** Editor's Note: For more information, please see the numerous articles on
|
|
this topic in Phrack World News, Issue 37, Part 3.
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
In a surprising turn of events, the April 14, 1992 issue of Communications
|
|
Daily reports that U.S. West in the state of Washington has decided not to
|
|
follow the example of Oregon attempt to raise rates for electronic bulletin
|
|
board (BBS) hobbyists.
|
|
|
|
Patsy Dutton, consumer affairs manager for Washington Utilities &
|
|
Transportation Commission (WUTC), asked U.S. West about its policy after
|
|
receiving request from BBS operators.
|
|
|
|
In a letter dated March 31 to system operator Bruce Miller, Dutton said she had
|
|
reviewed U.S. West tariff and had talked with company representatives as to
|
|
current and future plans for BBS service: "The company indicates it has no
|
|
intention of changing its current procedure." Residential service would be
|
|
available for hobbyists, with business rates applying under other conditions.
|
|
|
|
An Oregon PUC law judge is currently considering complaint against U.S. West
|
|
for raising rates of bulletin board operators there.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Congress Explores Dropping Subsidy of Federal Science Network March 13, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Taken from Communications Daily (Page 6)
|
|
|
|
"Fairness For All Is Urged"
|
|
|
|
In hearing, Representative Boucher (D-Va.) questioned National Science
|
|
Foundation (NSF) on its management policies and future direction of NSFnet,
|
|
national research network. He said it's "essential" that NSFnet be structured
|
|
so all commercial providers of network services "receive equal treatment" and
|
|
that government policy for managing the network "not favor any provider" or set
|
|
of providers.
|
|
|
|
The current process of using federal money to subsidize NSFnet is "obsolete"
|
|
said Mitchell Kapor, representing Commercial Internet Exchange (CIX)
|
|
Association, a consortium of commercial network services suppliers. Although
|
|
federal money was necessary in the "early stages," when technology for building
|
|
the network still was "experimental," now that the network is in place,
|
|
government subsidy should stop, Kapor said. He said CIX members can provide
|
|
"any level of service" needed by the same community served by NSFnet --
|
|
research and education. Kapor said CIX members could build and service
|
|
national backbones with "off-the-shelf" technology; however, he said, because
|
|
federal money goes to support the current network backbone, NSFnet users are
|
|
allowed on the network free and don't have an incentive to use commercial
|
|
services.
|
|
|
|
William Schrader, president of Performance Systems International (PSI), said
|
|
government could level the playing field by providing money directly to
|
|
individual universities and letting them choose, on a "free-market" basis,
|
|
which network service provider to use. That system, he said, would provide
|
|
incentive for several suppliers to upgrade networks in efforts to corral most
|
|
customers. Kapor said it also would "push the envelope" of technology to an
|
|
even greater level. With the current system in place, the technological level
|
|
of the network will evolve more slowly because there would be no incentive to
|
|
provide a higher level of service, he said.
|
|
|
|
Current users of NSFnet spoke against changing the status quo. Michael
|
|
Roberts, VP-networking for Educom, a task force of 48 universities, said that
|
|
removing funding for the network would be "horrendous." By requiring
|
|
individual universities to seek out their own service providers, he said,
|
|
government would have to institute another level of bureaucracy, creating
|
|
"thousands of entitlements," which would be impossible logistically. Douglas
|
|
Van Houweling, speaking for NSFnet manager Merit, said removal of funding most
|
|
likely would upset the networks' level of stability, leading to disruption in
|
|
service that "millions of users" have become accustomed to. By letting "any
|
|
number" of commercial providers supply network services, there would be no
|
|
guarantee of level of service, which is a "vital" mission of research labs,
|
|
universities and federal agencies now using the network, Van Houweling said.
|
|
|
|
Federal agencies would rather have a stable network than improved service, said
|
|
Stephen Wolff, director of NSF's Networking & Communications Division. He told
|
|
Boucher that federal agencies didn't want the network open to competition
|
|
because they feared it would degrade the quality of service. Wolff said NSF
|
|
would proceed with its plan to commercialize network "within 5 years" as
|
|
requested under the recently voted High-Performance Computing Act. He also
|
|
said he had presented to universities the idea of providing them with federal
|
|
money and letting them purchase network services in the free market. The
|
|
proposal was "soundly rejected," he said, because universities didn't feel they
|
|
were able to make such decisions. Instead, they supported NSF's current
|
|
proposal of rebidding network management so that 2 network providers would be
|
|
in place. The new system would operate on model of government's FTS 2000
|
|
program. NSF would grant awards for network services to 2 companies and have an
|
|
independent 3rd party act as "traffic manager" to ensure one network provider
|
|
wasn't favored over another.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
MCI and Sprint Take Steps To Cut Off Swindlers April 1, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By Kent Gibbons (The Washington Times)(Page C1)
|
|
|
|
MCI and Sprint are cracking down on telephone fraud.
|
|
|
|
The two long-distance carriers are tackling different kinds of swindles,
|
|
though:
|
|
|
|
* MCI said it will stop sending out bills for pay-per-call operators who
|
|
promise help getting a loan, credit, a credit card or a job.
|
|
|
|
* Sprint said it will offer large business customers a form of liability
|
|
insurance against unauthorized use of corporate switchboard lines.
|
|
|
|
MCI Communications Corporation of the District said it wanted to protect
|
|
consumers who might be gulled into overpaying for some "900-number" services
|
|
during economic troubles.
|
|
|
|
But long-distance carriers are also guarding their own bottom lines by
|
|
tightening up pay-per-call standards, said telecommunications analyst James
|
|
Ivers.
|
|
|
|
"They're acting fiscally responsibly because traditionally, these were the
|
|
types of programs that created a high level of uncollectible" bills when
|
|
ripped-off consumers refused to pay, said Mr. Ivers, senior analyst with
|
|
Strategic Telemedia, a consulting firm in New York.
|
|
|
|
Last September, Sprint Corporation, of Kansas City, MO, told more than 90
|
|
percent of its 900-number customers it would no longer do their billing. Long-
|
|
distance firms cannot refuse to carry pay-per-call services, but most 900-
|
|
number operators do not want the expense and trouble of doing their own
|
|
collections.
|
|
|
|
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., of New York, said it has set up strict
|
|
guidelines for all 900-number firms, such as disclosing in advertising any fees
|
|
charged for credit processing.
|
|
|
|
AT&T spokesman Bob Nersesian said: "We still think there are legitimate
|
|
providers of this kind of service and our guidelines keep the dishonest guys
|
|
off the network."
|
|
|
|
Sprint's switchboard-fraud liability protection is aimed at big customers,
|
|
whose Sprint bills are more than $30,000 per month.
|
|
|
|
For an installation fee (up to $5,000) and a monthly charge (also up to
|
|
$5,000), Sprint will absorb fraudulent phone charges above $25,000 per
|
|
switchboard. The customer pays the first $25,000. Sprint's liability ends at
|
|
$1 million.
|
|
|
|
Large and medium-sized companies can rack up huge bills if their private
|
|
switches, known as private branch exchanges or PBXes, are broken into and used
|
|
to make calls to other countries.
|
|
|
|
In a recent case, more than 20,000 calls were made on a company's PBX over a
|
|
weekend, with the charges estimated at more than $1 million, said M.R. Snyder,
|
|
executive director of Communications Fraud Control Association, a Washington
|
|
trade group.
|
|
|
|
"It is certainly a fraud target that is ripe for being abused," Ms. Snyder
|
|
said, especially since telephone carriers have improved their ability to spot
|
|
unauthorized credit-card calls more quickly.
|
|
|
|
Overall, telecommunications fraud costs phone carriers and customers an
|
|
estimated $1.2 billion per year, although the figure is really just a
|
|
"guesstimate," Ms. Snyder said.
|
|
|
|
Company PBXes often have features that allow traveling employees, or distant
|
|
customers, to call in and tap an outgoing line. With computer programs,
|
|
hackers can randomly dial numbers until they hit security codes.
|
|
|
|
Sometimes the codes are only four digits, so hackers don't even need a
|
|
computer, said Bob Fox, Sprint's assistant vice president of corporate
|
|
security.
|
|
|
|
Along with the fees, customers must agree to take certain precautions. Those
|
|
include using security codes at least eight digits long and eliminating the
|
|
ability to tap outside lines through voice mail. In return, Sprint will also
|
|
monitor PBX use every day, instead of the five days per week currently done
|
|
free for customers, Mr. Fox said.
|
|
|
|
MCI spokesman John Houser said his company will be watching Sprint to see if
|
|
the program is a success. Spokesman Andrew Myers said AT&T offers fraud
|
|
protection to some corporate customers, but is not considering extending that
|
|
to cover PBX abuse.
|
|
|
|
AT&T is currently involved in several lawsuits over disputed PBX charges that
|
|
total "many millions" of dollars, Mr. Myers said. Sprint officials said they
|
|
have not sued any customers to collect on PBX fraud bills.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Sprint Offers Liability Limit For Corporate Phone Fraud April 1, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By Edmund L. Andrews (New York Times)(Page D4)
|
|
|
|
The Sprint Communications Company, the nation's third-largest long-distance
|
|
carrier, said that it would limit the liability of large corporate customers
|
|
for the huge bills rung up by phone-service thieves who manipulate a company's
|
|
telephone switching equipment and voice-mail systems.
|
|
|
|
Typically, such thieves call into a company on one of its toll-free "800"
|
|
numbers and then figure out the codes necessary to obtain an outgoing line that
|
|
can be used to call anywhere in the world. These telephone "hackers" often
|
|
sell plundered telephone codes to illegal operators who then sell overseas
|
|
calls to hundreds of people at a time. Sprint officials said this sort of
|
|
fraud approached $1 billion a year.
|
|
|
|
The new Sprint plan would be available to companies that signed two-year
|
|
contracts to buy at least $30,000 of international long-distance service a
|
|
month and agreed to adopt a series of protective measures. These include
|
|
installing longer telephone codes that are harder for thieves to crack and new
|
|
limits on the ability of voice-mail systems to obtain outgoing lines.
|
|
|
|
In exchange, customers would be held responsible for no more than $25,000 in
|
|
stolen calls for each round of break-ins, and a maximum limit of $1 million a
|
|
year. Although that is still a substantial sum, it is much less than many
|
|
companies have lost in recent years from theft of service by telephone hackers.
|
|
|
|
A Point of Contention
|
|
|
|
Thieves broke into the switchboard of Mitsubishi International in New York in
|
|
1990, for example, and ran up $430,000 in overseas telephone calls. Procter &
|
|
Gamble lost $300,000 in a similar incident in 1988. Had either company been
|
|
operating under the new Sprint plan, its liability would have been limited to
|
|
$25,000.
|
|
|
|
Long-distance carriers and their corporate customers have long argued over who
|
|
should bear responsibility for the huge bills caused by service theft. The
|
|
carriers have maintained that their customers are responsible for these bills,
|
|
even if fraud is undisputed, arguing that the thieves took advantage of
|
|
weaknesses in the customers' equipment, rather than in the weaknesses of the
|
|
long-distance network itself.
|
|
|
|
But some corporate victims have argued that they had no idea their systems were
|
|
vulnerable, while others contend that they incurred big losses even after
|
|
adopting special security procedures.
|
|
|
|
MCI Moves Against '900' Fraud
|
|
|
|
In a separate issue involving telephone fraud, MCI Communications Corporation
|
|
said it would no longer provide billing services for companies that use "900"
|
|
numbers to offer credit cards, and that it would place tough new restrictions
|
|
on the use of 900 numbers to sell job-placement services, contests and
|
|
sweepstakes.
|
|
|
|
The long-distance company said its decision was based on numerous complaints
|
|
about abusive and fraudulent sales practices. Companies that provide
|
|
information through the use of telephone numbers with the 900 area code charge
|
|
callers a fee each time they call the number. MCI and other long-distance
|
|
companies carry these calls and bill customers on behalf of the company that
|
|
provides the information service.
|
|
|
|
Pam Small, an MCI spokeswoman, declined to say how much revenue the company
|
|
would lose because of the suspension. But she said the 900 services that would
|
|
be affected represented a small part of its pay-per-call business.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume Four, Issue Thirty-Eight, File 15 of 15
|
|
|
|
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Phrack World News PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Issue XXXVIII / Part Three of Three PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Compiled by Dispater & Friends PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Special Thanks to Datastream Cowboy PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
|
|
|
|
|
|
CFP-2: Sterling Speaks For "The Unspeakable" March 25, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By Barbara E. McMullen & John F. McMullen (Newsbytes)
|
|
|
|
WASHINGTON, D.C. -- Bruce Sterling, the prime luncheon speaker at the 2nd
|
|
Annual Conference On Computers Freedom & Privacy (CFP-2), fulfilled his program
|
|
billing as "Speaking for the Unspeakable" by taking on three separate persona
|
|
and delivering what might have been their messages.
|
|
|
|
Sterling, best known as a science fiction writer, spoke for three characters, a
|
|
"a malicious hacker," a Latin American police official, and a Hong Kong
|
|
businessman, who were, in his words, "too venal, violent, treacherous, power-
|
|
mad, suspicious, or meanspirited to receive (or accept) an invitation to
|
|
attend."
|
|
|
|
Sterling began his speech by introducing himself and then saying, "When the CFP
|
|
committee asked me if I might recommend someone to speak here at CFP-2, I had
|
|
an immediate candidate. I thought it would be great if we could all hear from
|
|
a guy who's been known as Sergei. Sergei was the KGB agent runner for the
|
|
Chaos Computer Club group who broke into Cliff Stoll's computer in the famous
|
|
Cuckoo's Egg case. Now Sergei is described as a stocky bearded Russian
|
|
espionage professional in his mid-40s. He's married, has kids and his hobby
|
|
is fishing, in more senses than one, apparently. Sergei used to operate out of
|
|
East Berlin, and, as far as I personally know, Sergei's operation was the
|
|
world's first and only actual no-kidding, real-life case of international
|
|
computer espionage. So I figured -- why not send Yelsin a fax and offer Sergei
|
|
some hard currency; things are pretty lean over at KGB First Directorate these
|
|
days. CFP could have flown this guy in from Moscow on a travel scholarship and
|
|
I'm sure that a speech from Sergei would be far more interesting than anything
|
|
I'm likely to offer here. My proposal wasn't taken up and instead I was asked
|
|
to speak here myself. Too bad!
|
|
|
|
"This struck me as rather a bad precedent for CFP which has struggled hard to
|
|
maintain a broad universality of taste. Whereas you're apparently willing to
|
|
tolerate science fiction writers, but already certain members of the computer
|
|
community, KGB agents, are being quietly placed beyond the pale. But you know,
|
|
ladies and gentlemen, just because you ignore someone doesn't mean that person
|
|
ceases to exist -- and you've not converted someone's beliefs merely because
|
|
you won't listen. But instead of Comrade Sergei, here I am -- and I am a
|
|
science fiction writer and, because of that, I rejoice in a complete lack of
|
|
any kind of creditability!
|
|
|
|
"Today I hope to make the best of that anomalous position. Like other kinds of
|
|
court jesters, science fiction writers are sometimes allowed to speak certain
|
|
kinds of unspeakable truth, if only an apparent parody or metaphor. So today,
|
|
ladies and gentlemen, I will exercise my inalienable civil rights as a science
|
|
fiction writer to speak up on behalf of the excluded and the incredible. In
|
|
fact, I plan to abuse my talents as a writer of fiction to actually recreate
|
|
some of these excluded, incredible unspeakable people for you and to have them
|
|
address you today. I want these people, three of them, to each briefly address
|
|
this group just as if they were legitimately invited here and just as if they
|
|
could truly speak their mind right here in public without being arrested."
|
|
|
|
Sterling then went on to assure the crowd that he was not speaking his personal
|
|
conviction, only those of his characters, and warned the group that some of the
|
|
material might be offensive. He then launched into the delivery of his
|
|
characters' speeches -- speeches which had the hacker talking about real damage
|
|
-- "the derailing of trains"; the Latin police official, a friend and admirer
|
|
of Noriega, discussing the proper way of dealing with hackers; and the
|
|
businessman explaining way, in the age of high speed copiers, laser printers
|
|
and diskette copying devices, the US copyright laws are irrelevant.
|
|
|
|
Often intercepted by laughter and applause, Sterling received a standing
|
|
ovation at the conclusion of the speech. Computer Press Association newsletter
|
|
editor Barbara McMullen was overhead telling Sterling that he had replaced
|
|
"Alan Kay as her favorite luncheon speaker," while conference chair Lance
|
|
Hoffman, who had received an advance copy of the speech a few weeks before,
|
|
described the speech as "incredible and tremendous".
|
|
|
|
Sterling, relaxing after the talk with a glass of Jack Daniels, told Newsbytes
|
|
that the speech had been fun but a strain, adding, "Next time they'll really
|
|
have to get Sergei. I'm going back to fiction."
|
|
|
|
Sterling's non-fiction work on computer crime, "The Hacker Crackdown" is due
|
|
out from Bantam in the fall and an audio tape of the CFP-2 speech is available
|
|
>from Audio Archives. He is the author of "Islands In The Net" and is the co-
|
|
author, with William Gibson, of the presently best-selling "The Difference
|
|
Engine."
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
The Bruce Sterling luncheon video tape is now available, sizzling, and
|
|
affordable to the Phrack readers.
|
|
|
|
$19.95 + $4 (shipping and handling)
|
|
|
|
Call now: (800)235-4922
|
|
or
|
|
CFP Video Library Project
|
|
P.O. Box 912
|
|
Topanga, CA 90290
|
|
|
|
Tell them you heard about it from The WELL and you'll get the above price.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
CFP-2 Features Role-Playing FBI Scenario March 25, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By Barbara E. McMullen (Newsbytes)
|
|
|
|
WASHINGTON, D.C.-- As part of the "Birds-of-a-Feather" (BOF) sessions featured
|
|
at the 2nd Conference on Computers, Freedom & Privacy (CFP-2), FBI Agent J.
|
|
Michael Gibbons, acting as a live gamemaster, orchestrated the play-acting of
|
|
an investigation by federal agents into allegations of computer intrusion and
|
|
criminal activity.
|
|
|
|
The scenario, set up by Gibbons to show the difficulties faced by investigators
|
|
in balancing the conducting of an investigation with a protection of the rights
|
|
of the individual under investigation, was acted out with non-law enforcement
|
|
officials cast in the role of investigators; New York State Police Senior
|
|
Investigator Donald Delaney as "Doctor Doom," the suspected ringleader of the
|
|
computer criminals; Newsbytes New York Bureau Chief John McMullen as a
|
|
magistrate responsible for considering the investigators' request for a search
|
|
warrant; and author Bruce Sterling as a neighbor and possible cohort of Doctor
|
|
Doom.
|
|
|
|
Gibbons, in his role of Gamemaster, regularly intercepted the action to involve
|
|
the audience in a discussion of what the appropriate next step in the scenario
|
|
would be -- "Do you visit the suspect or get a search warrant or visit his
|
|
school or employer to obtain more information? Do you take books in the search
|
|
and seizure? Printers? Monitors? etc." During the discussion with the
|
|
audience, points of law were clarified by Mike Godwin, Electronic Frontier
|
|
Foundation in-house counsel, and Alameda County Assistant District Attorney
|
|
Donald Ingraham.
|
|
|
|
The role-playing session immediately followed a BOF panel, "Hackers: Why Don't
|
|
They Understand" which attempted to present a hacker view of on-line ethics.
|
|
The panel, moderated by McMullen, was composed of Steven Levy, MacWorld
|
|
columnist and author of "Hackers"; Dorothy Denning, Chair of Computer Science
|
|
at Georgetown University; Glenn Tenney, California Congressional candidate and
|
|
chair of the annual "Hacker's Conference"; Craig Neidorf, defendant in a
|
|
controversial case involving the electronic publishing of a stolen document;
|
|
"Dispater," the publisher of the electronic publication "Phrack"; Emmanuel
|
|
Goldstein, editor and publisher of "2600: The Hacker Quarterly," and hacker
|
|
"Phiber Optik."
|
|
|
|
During the panel discussion, Levy, Denning and Tenney discussed the roots of
|
|
the activities that we now refer to as hacking, Goldstein and Dispater
|
|
described what they understood as hacking and asked for an end to what they see
|
|
as overreaction by the law enforcement community, Neidorf discussed the case
|
|
which, although dropped by the government, has left him over $50,000 in debt;
|
|
and Phiber Optik described the details of two searches and seizures of his
|
|
computer equipment and his 1991 arrest by Delaney.
|
|
|
|
In Neidorf's talk, he called attention to the methods used in valuing the
|
|
stolen document that he published as $78,000. He said that it came out after
|
|
the trial that the $78,000 included the full value of the laser printer on
|
|
which it was printed, the cost of the word processing system used in its
|
|
production and the cost of the workstation on which it was entered. Neidorf's
|
|
claims were substantiated by EFF counsel Godwin, whose filing of a motion in
|
|
the Steve Jackson cases caused the release of papers including the one referred
|
|
to by Neidorf. Godwin also pointed out that it was the disclosure by
|
|
interested party John Nagle that the document, valued at $78,000, was
|
|
obtainable in a book priced at under $20.00 that led to the dropping of the
|
|
charges by the US Attorney's office.
|
|
|
|
SRI security consultant Donn Parker, one of the many in the audience to
|
|
participate, admonished Phiber and other hackers to use their demonstrated
|
|
talents constructively and to complete an education that will prepare them for
|
|
employment in the computer industry. Another audience member, Charles Conn,
|
|
described his feeling of exhilaration when, as a 12-year old, he "hacked" into
|
|
a computer at a local Kentucky Fried Chicken. Conn said "It was wonderful. It
|
|
was like a drug. I just wanted to explore more and more."
|
|
|
|
Parker later told Newsbytes that he thought that it was a mistake to put
|
|
hackers such as Phiber Optik and those like Craig Neidorf who glorify hackers
|
|
on a panel. Parker said, "Putting them on a panel glorifies them to other
|
|
hackers and makes the problem worse."
|
|
|
|
The Birds-of-a-Feather sessions were designed to provide an opportunity for
|
|
discussions of topics that were not a part of the formal CFP-2 program.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Computer Revenge A Growing Threat March 9, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By Tom Steinert-Threlkeld (Dallas Morning News)
|
|
Article in the Chicago Tribune, Page C3
|
|
|
|
The "downsizing" of corporate America is not only making companies lean and
|
|
mean.
|
|
|
|
It's doing the same thing to employees losing their jobs, said Thomas F. Ellis,
|
|
a partner in Arthur Andersen & Co.'s Computer Risk Management Services.
|
|
|
|
He looks at the latest form of revenge by employee against former employer.
|
|
Fraud, embezzlement and theft of secrets are no longer the only forms of
|
|
frustrated payback. The calling card in the digital age is computer sabotage.
|
|
|
|
It's an invisible epidemic that corporations don't like to talk about while
|
|
they're trying to convince banks and creditors they are becoming more efficient
|
|
by downsizing, said Ellis and William Hugh Murray, information systems security
|
|
consultant to Deloitte & Touche, another of the Big Six accounting firms.
|
|
|
|
"A lot of the business trends in the U.S. are really threatening data
|
|
security," said Sanford M. Sherizen, a Natick, Massachusetts computer security
|
|
consultant. "Corporations are paying a huge price for it," without disclosing
|
|
it.
|
|
|
|
The downsizing has led to inadequate attention to security precautions, argues
|
|
Sherizen. The underlying trend: Fewer and fewer people are being given more
|
|
and more responsibility for information systems.
|
|
|
|
That breeds opportunity for revenge, said Sherizen. No longer does only the
|
|
supposedly misfit hacker, gulping down Cokes and Fritos in the middle of the
|
|
night, merit watching. Sherizen's worldwide set of clients have found that the
|
|
middle manager wearing the white shirt and tie in the middle of the day also
|
|
deserves scrutiny, he says.
|
|
|
|
Those managers, if mistreated, find it inviting to strike back creatively. The
|
|
VTOC, for example.
|
|
|
|
This is jargon for the Volume Table of Contents. This is a directory a
|
|
computer compiles to keep track of where programs and data are stored. A large
|
|
Andersen client was paralyzed recently when a VTOC in its information system
|
|
was scrambled by a downsizing victim, Ellis said.
|
|
|
|
"If you destroy the VTOC in a mainframe system, then you destroy the computer's
|
|
ability to go out and find programs and data, so you can pretty effectively
|
|
devastate a computer installation by destroying the VTOC, without ever touching
|
|
the programs and data," he said.
|
|
|
|
But those bent on revenge are not above leaving time bombs in computer systems
|
|
that will go off after their departure, destroying programs and data.
|
|
|
|
They also are appropriating information from magnetic memories and selling it
|
|
at hefty prices in the burgeoning field known euphemistically as "commercial
|
|
business intelligence," said Sherizen.
|
|
|
|
Most companies hush up these cases, because they fear copycat avengers will
|
|
strike when their vulnerability is exposed. They also don't like to be
|
|
publicly embarrassed, the security experts say.
|
|
|
|
Technical safeguards don't hold a candle to human safeguards, said Murray.
|
|
|
|
The best way to protect against sabotage is to prevent disaffection in the
|
|
first place. Treat as well as possible those who are being fired. Compensate
|
|
fairly those who are staying.
|
|
|
|
Show appreciation, day in and day out. Most revenge is slow to boil and comes
|
|
>from employees who finally conclude that their contributions are going
|
|
unrecognized, said Murray.
|
|
|
|
"Saying 'please' and 'thank you' are an incredibly important control" against
|
|
sabotage, he said.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Computer Crime Problem Highlighted March 9, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By Oscar Rojo (Toronto Star)(Page B3)
|
|
|
|
With the growing corporate dependence on computers, "information crimes" have
|
|
become easier to commit but harder to detect, says a Toronto-based security
|
|
company.
|
|
|
|
"Electronic intrusion is probably the most serious threat to companies that
|
|
rely on computerized information systems," Intercon Security Ltd. says in its
|
|
Allpoints publication.
|
|
|
|
Allpoints cited a study of 900 businesses and law enforcement agencies in
|
|
Florida showing that one of four businesses had been the victim of some form of
|
|
computer crime.
|
|
|
|
"While most of the media attention has focused on "hackers," individuals who
|
|
deliberately and maliciously try to disrupt business and government systems,
|
|
one estimate indicates that 75 per cent plus of electronic intrusion crimes may
|
|
be "insider attacks" by disgruntled employees," the publication said.
|
|
|
|
In Intercon's experience, vice-president Richard Chenoweth said the company is
|
|
as likely to find a corporate crime committed by a disgruntled employee as one
|
|
perpetrated by an outsider.
|
|
|
|
Intercon said the technology exists to guard against most electronic
|
|
intrusions. "The problem is that many information managers still don't believe
|
|
there is a risk, so they are not making the best possible use of what is
|
|
available."
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Criminals Move Into Cyberspace April 3, 1992
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
By Mick Hurrell (The Times)(Features Section)
|
|
|
|
The hacker and the virus programmer embodied the popular notion of computer
|
|
crime in the 1980s, and they are still the most widely known criminal acts in
|
|
computer technology.
|
|
|
|
The advent of new technologies over the past decade has created a whole new
|
|
casebook of serious crimes, but they have yet to gain the notoriety of computer
|
|
viruses such as Friday 13th or Michelangelo.
|
|
|
|
More then 3,000 computer crimes around the world in the past 20 years have now
|
|
been documented by SRI International (SRII), a Californian information security
|
|
consultancy. They include attempted murder, fraud, theft, sabotage, espionage,
|
|
extortion, conspiracy and ransom collection.
|
|
|
|
Against this disturbing background, Donn Parker, SRII's senior international
|
|
security consultant, is telling businesses they will be under increasing attack
|
|
>from sophisticated criminals using computer technology and from others intent
|
|
on causing disruption.
|
|
|
|
"New technology brings new opportunities for crime," he says. "We must
|
|
anticipate future types of crime in our security efforts before they become
|
|
serious problems."
|
|
|
|
His prospective list ranges from the annoying to the fraudulent, and includes
|
|
small computer theft, desktop forgery, digital imaging piracy, voice and
|
|
electronic mail terrorism, fax graffiti attacks, electronic data interchange
|
|
fraud, and placement of unauthorized equipment in networks.
|
|
|
|
Some of these crimes are more obvious than others. The advanced digital
|
|
imaging systems now being used in the television and film industry to create
|
|
spectacular special effects, for example, could become a new target for crime.
|
|
As digital imaging can alter video images seamlessly, the possibilities for
|
|
sophisticated fraud are numerous.
|
|
|
|
The theft of small computers and components has already increased. "I think
|
|
it will be worse than the typewriter theft problem of the 1970s and 1980s," Mr.
|
|
Parker says. "We are now teaching information-security people that they have
|
|
to learn how to protect small objects of high value. The content of the
|
|
computers could be more valuable than the hardware itself.
|
|
|
|
"I do not think the criminal community is yet aware of a computer's value other
|
|
than on the used equipment market, but ultimately some are going to figure out
|
|
that the contents the data are more valuable, which could lead to information
|
|
being used for extortion."
|
|
|
|
Desktop forgery is another crime that looks certain to boom and plague
|
|
businesses of all types. Desktop publishing software, combined with the latest
|
|
color laser printers and photocopiers, is proving an ideal forger's tool. Gone
|
|
is the dingy cellar with printing plates and press: Forgers can work from
|
|
comfortable offices or their own homes and produce more accurate fakes than
|
|
ever before.
|
|
|
|
Original documents can be fed into a computer using a scanner, then subtly
|
|
altered before being printed out. Business documents such as purchase orders
|
|
and invoices are obvious targets for the forgers, as are checks. The quality
|
|
of a forgery is now limited only by the paper on which it is printed.
|
|
|
|
Mr. Parker says: "As the technology gets cheaper and more available, this is
|
|
something that could flourish."
|
|
|
|
But although many of these new forms of computer crime bring with them the
|
|
possibility of increased business losses, one threat overshadows them all. "The
|
|
big security issues are going to involve networks and the connection of
|
|
computers to many others outside an organization," says Rod Perry, a partner
|
|
with Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte, the consultants.
|
|
|
|
The fear is that sophisticated criminals will take advantage of a clash between
|
|
the desire for system flexibility and the constraint necessarily imposed by
|
|
security. Mr. Perry adds: "The business need is paramount, and people will
|
|
accept the risk up to a point."
|
|
|
|
Networks are attractive because they allow information to be easily transferred
|
|
between users, and give free and easy access to data bases from many locations
|
|
within an organization that can extend across countries and continents. Making
|
|
them secure against interference from both outside and within is difficult.
|
|
|
|
Mr. Parker says: "Today's microcomputers and local and global networks have
|
|
left information security far behind. We are dealing with what we call
|
|
cyberspace. We are connecting our networks so that we now have a single
|
|
worldwide network of data communications.
|
|
|
|
"We have inadvertently freed the criminal from proximity to the crime. A
|
|
criminal can be anywhere in the world, enter cyberspace by computer, and commit
|
|
a crime anywhere else. The criminal is free to choose the jurisdiction area
|
|
>from which he works, to minimize the punishment if he gets caught."
|
|
|
|
The great concern, he says, is if technological advances result in an "anarchy
|
|
of conflicting security efforts. Consistent security practices should be
|
|
applied uniformly as well as globally.
|
|
|
|
"When organizations in different countries with different national laws,
|
|
different ways of valuing information assets, and different national ethical
|
|
customs, use equipment from different manufacturers in their networks, they
|
|
face the problem of matching their levels of security. They use the lowest
|
|
common denominator, which in some instances may be practically non-existent."
|
|
|
|
Some computer security consultants believe that network security headaches will
|
|
involve some restriction in how they are used. All agree that passwords no
|
|
longer offer appropriate forms of security.
|
|
|
|
Professor Roger Needham, of the University of Cambridge computing laboratory,
|
|
says: "At the moment, there is a lot of shoddy computer use, but it will
|
|
become more usual to take security seriously. In the world of doing business
|
|
with paper, there are a tremendous number of rules of practice and conduct that
|
|
are second nature; security procedures in the electronic medium will also have
|
|
to become second nature."
|
|
|
|
SRII is developing software for what it says will be the world's most
|
|
sophisticated detection system, designed to identify criminal users as they
|
|
commit their crime.
|
|
|
|
Called IDES (Intruder Detection using Expert Systems), it works on the basis
|
|
that a system intruder is likely to show a different behavior pattern from that
|
|
of a legitimate user. IDES is programmed with a set of algorithms that build
|
|
up profiles of how particular employees typically use the system. It can then
|
|
inform the company's security division if it identifies any significant
|
|
deviation.
|
|
|
|
IDES also monitors the whole system for failed log-in attempts and the amount
|
|
of processor time being used, and compares this with historical averages.
|
|
|
|
A future refinement will allow the system to profile groups of subjects so that
|
|
it can tell, for example, when a secretary is not behaving like a "typical"
|
|
secretary.
|
|
|
|
Business crime and computer crime will increasingly become one and the same,
|
|
Mr. Parker says. Security will be increasingly built in to systems and
|
|
"transparent" to the user.
|
|
|
|
"I think the overall loss to business from computer crime will decrease," he
|
|
says. "But the loss per incident will increase because the risks and the
|
|
potential gains will be greater."
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
PWN QuickNotes
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
1. New Law Enforcement Bulletin Board (Government Technology, January 1992,
|
|
Page 17) -- St. Paul, Minnesota -- The International Association of Chiefs
|
|
of Police (IACP) and LOGIN Information Services has announced IACP NET, a
|
|
new computer network that will link law enforcement professionals
|
|
nationwide. The network uses advanced computer capabilities to foster and
|
|
empower IACP's belief that strength through cooperation is the key to the
|
|
success of law enforcement endeavors.
|
|
|
|
Communications services will be the interaction focus. An electronic mail
|
|
feature allows private messaging among IACP NET members. Exchange of ideas
|
|
will be encouraged and facilitated through electronic bulletin boards on
|
|
general subject areas and computer conferencing on specific topics.
|
|
Anchoring the communications service is the Quest-Response Service, a
|
|
service created and proven successful by LOGIN that allows members to post
|
|
and respond to requests for information in a formatted and accessible
|
|
manner.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
2. ATMs Gobble Bankcards In Colorado (Denver Post, February 19, 1992) -- About
|
|
1,000 Colorado ATM users had their Visas and Mastercards abruptly terminated
|
|
in February by an out-of-control computer system.
|
|
|
|
For 90 minutes during the President's Day weekend, the Rocky Mountain
|
|
Bankcard System software told ATMS around the state to eat the cards instead
|
|
of dishing out cash or taking deposits. The "once-in-a-decade" glitch went
|
|
unnoticed because it occurred as programmers were patching in a correction
|
|
to a different problem.
|
|
|
|
The company is rushing new plastic and letters of apology to customers who
|
|
got terminated.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
3. Minister Denies Hackers Tampered With Licence Records (Chris Moncrieff,
|
|
Press Association, January 27, 1992) -- Allegations that computer experts
|
|
hacked into the records of the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency in
|
|
Swansea are without substance and are to be retracted, Roads and Traffic
|
|
Minister Christopher Chope said.
|
|
|
|
He was responding in a Commons-written reply to Donald Anderson (Lab Swansea
|
|
East), who had asked what investigations had been made following a report
|
|
that hackers had been able to erase driving convictions from DVLA computer
|
|
files. Mr. Chope said, "The Agency has discussed the recent allegations
|
|
about unauthorized access to its computer records with the author of the
|
|
original Police Review article, who has confirmed that there is no substance
|
|
to them. "The author has agreed to retract the allegations in his next
|
|
article." Mr. Anderson commented, "The importance of this reply is that it
|
|
underlines the integrity of the system of driver-licence records held in
|
|
Swansea in spite of the allegations."
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
4. Software Virus Found At INTEL (New York Times News Service, March 3, 1992)
|
|
-- Intel Corporation said it had stopped shipping a computer network
|
|
software program because some units were found to be infected with the
|
|
"Michelangelo" virus, a program that infects IBM and compatible personal
|
|
computers and can potentially destroy data.
|
|
|
|
A division of Intel in Hillsboro, Oregon, said it had shipped more than 800
|
|
copies of the program, called LANSpool 3.01, which inadvertently contained
|
|
the virus. The virus is designed to activate on March 6, Michelangelo's
|
|
birthday, and can erase data and programs if it is not detected with
|
|
antiviral software.
|
|
|
|
The company said it had checked its software with a virus-scanning program
|
|
before shipping it, but that it had failed to detect the virus.
|
|
|
|
A number of computer makers and software publishers have issued similar
|
|
alerts about the Michelangelo program and a variety of companies are now
|
|
offering free software to check for the virus.
|
|
|
|
There are more than 1,000 known software viruses that can copy themselves
|
|
from computer to computer by attaching to programs and files.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
5. Army Wants Virii (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 1991, Page 5)
|
|
|
|
"Attention Hackers, Uncle Sam Wants You!"
|
|
|
|
The U.S. Army has caught the computer virus bug and is now expanding its
|
|
interest in germ warfare to include electronic germs.
|
|
|
|
The Army Center for Signal Warfare is soliciting proposals for the
|
|
development of a "weaponized virus" or a piece of "malicious software" that
|
|
could destroy an enemy's computers or software (_Technology Review_, October
|
|
1991). As project engineer Bob Hein explained, "This is the army. We're in
|
|
the weapons business."
|
|
|
|
Hein said the army first became interested in the potential of computer
|
|
viruses as offensive weapons after Myron Cramer's 1989 article in _Defense
|
|
Electronics_ suggested that computer viruses offered "a new class of
|
|
electronic warfare." But Gary Chapman, director of Computer Professionals
|
|
for Social Responsibility, thinks it is more likely that the army's interest
|
|
was piqued by a French science fiction novel, _Soft War_, describing army
|
|
infiltration of Soviet computers.
|
|
|
|
Chapman, who called that army's plan to design killer computer viruses a
|
|
"stupid policy," said that any viruses the army comes up with are more
|
|
likely to paralyze the heavily networked U.S. computer system than to
|
|
infiltrate enemy computers.
|
|
|
|
Hein insisted that the army will develop only controllable and predictable
|
|
bugs that will not threaten U.S. computer users. Chapman pointed out that,
|
|
like the biological agents they are named for, computer viruses are, by
|
|
their very nature, uncontrollable.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
6. BellSouth's MobilComm and Swiss watchmaker Swatch said they will form joint
|
|
venture to market wristwatch pager. The watch will cost about $200 and will
|
|
be sold in department stores. It will bear name of "Piepser," the German
|
|
word for "beeper," using 4 tones to signal the wearer. Each signal is
|
|
activated by a telephone number that owner assigns. In the 4th quarter of
|
|
year, Swatch said it plans to introduce a model that can display telephone
|
|
numbers. (Source: Communications Daily, March 5, 1992, Page 4)
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
7. U.S. District Judge Harold Greene denied several new motions by Nynex in a
|
|
criminal case being brought by the Justice Department, charging the phone
|
|
company with violating MFJ (Modified Final Judgment) through subsidiary
|
|
Telco Research. The government also filed a new motion of its own, later
|
|
denied, requesting Greene to hold a pretrial hearing to look into "actual or
|
|
potential conflicts of interest" resulting from individuals to be called as
|
|
witnesses for prosecution being represented by Nynex's law firm, Davis, Polk
|
|
& Wardwell. DoJ said: "It appears that Davis, Polk represents present and
|
|
former employes of Nynex in addition to the corporation." Nynex issued a
|
|
statement saying it's "confident" that the trial would "confirm to our
|
|
customers," shareholders, and the public that it has fully met its
|
|
responsibilities under MFJ. Greene, having dismissed Nynex motions, set
|
|
an April 6 trial date. (Communications Daily, March 24, 1992, Page 5)
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
8. US West has formed a subsidiary, US West Enhanced Services, that launched
|
|
its first product, Fax Mail. The subsidiary will develop other products for
|
|
the enhanced-services market, including voice, fax and data applications,
|
|
the company said. Test marketing of Fax Mail was conducted in Boise and was
|
|
product-introduced in Denver. US West described its new product as "voice
|
|
mail for faxes," in that it stores incoming faxes until the subscriber calls
|
|
in and instructs the service to print the waiting fax. Each fax mail
|
|
subscriber is supplied with a personal fax telephone number. When a fax is
|
|
received, Fax Mail can notify the subscriber automatically by depositing a
|
|
message in voice mail or beeping a pager. The service costs $19.95 per
|
|
month, US West said. (Communications Daily, March 24, 1992, Page 6)
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
9. Hacker Insurance -- Worried about the integrity of your bank's data network?
|
|
Relax. Commercial banks and other depository institutions can now obtain up
|
|
to $50 million in coverage for losses due to computer-related crime. A new
|
|
policy from Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. offers insurance against computer
|
|
viruses, software piracy, and toll-call fraud, among other high-tech rip-
|
|
offs. The Hartford, Connecticut insurer will also cover liabilities due to
|
|
service bureau and communications failures with Aetna Coverage for Computer
|
|
and Electronic Network Technology. Paul A. Healy, VP of Aetna's fidelity
|
|
bond unit, says "the policy will help institutions manage the risk
|
|
associated with the changing technology." (Information Week, March 30,
|
|
1992, Page 16)
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|