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==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Two, Issue 24, File 1 of 13
Phrack Inc. Newsletter Issue XXIV Index
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
February 25, 1989
Welcome to Phrack Inc. Issue 24. We're happy to be able to say that we've
been keeping with our proposed release dates recently as opposed to our
problems with delays in the past.
A little clearing up needs to be done briefly. We have received questions
about the volume number being only 2 when, year-wise, it should be at about 4.
In our opinion, a volume consists of 12 issues, ideally having 1 issue per
month. Unfortunately, we have not been able, in the past, to keep up the pace.
If you're looking forward to a volume change, though, watch for issue 25 to
lead into Volume 3 of Phrack Inc.
A brief announcement about SummerCon '89 appears in Phrack World News XXIV
and more details will be released as they develop.
As always, we ask that anyone with network access drop us a line to either
our Bitnet accounts or our Internet addresses (see signoff).
In this issue, we feature the conclusion of the Future Transcendent Saga
as well as a supplement file of sorts to it called Advanced Bitnet Procedures
submitted by VAXBusters International. We hope you enjoy it!
Taran King Knight Lightning
C488869@UMCVMB.BITNET C483307@UMCVMB.BITNET
C488869@UMCVMB.MISSOURI.EDU C483307@UMCVMB.MISSOURI.EDU
_______________________________________________________________________________
Table of Contents:
1. Phrack Inc. XXIV Index by Taran King and Knight Lightning
2. Phrack Pro-Phile XXIV Featuring Chanda Leir by Taran King
3. Limbo To Infinity; Chapter Three of FTSaga by Knight Lightning
4. Frontiers; Chapter Four of FTSaga by Knight Lightning
5. Control Office Administration Of Enhanced 911 Service by The Eavesdropper
6. Glossary Terminology For Enhanced 911 Service by The Eavesdropper
7. Advanced Bitnet Procedures by VAXBusters International
8. Special Area Codes by >Unknown User<
9. Lifting Ma Bell's Cloak Of Secrecy by VaxCat
10. Network Progression by Dedicated Link
11-13. Phrack World News XXIV by Knight Lightning
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Two, Issue 24, File 2 of 13
==Phrack Pro-Phile XXIV==
Created and Written by Taran King
Done on February 3, 1989
Welcome to Phrack Pro-Phile XXII. Phrack Pro-Phile was created to
bring information to you, the community, about retired or highly important/
controversial people. This issue, I present one of the more rare sights in the
world of phreaking and hacking...a female! She was vaguely active and had a
few contacts with people that were largely involved with the community...
Chanda Leir
~~~~~~~~~~~
Handle: Chanda Leir
Call Her: Karen
Past Handles: None
Handle Origin: An aunt of hers as a child wanted to use this name is she ever
became famous.
Date Of Birth: May 8, 1970
Current Age: Almost 19
Height: 5' 6"
Weight: 125 lbs. (providing Freshman 15 hasn't yet hit)
Eye Color: Green/Grey
Hair Color: Blond
Computers: Her father is a real estate broker, so she began on a TI 700
terminal (an MLS Terminal)... just a modem and a keyboard and a
scroll of PAPER)... then it was dad's business computer-- the
KAYPRO II... Now she uses the Macs and the Sun systems and the
IBM RT's located at CMU.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Karen started using BBSes in the D.C. area in 1983 (at the ripe age of 13). A
guy by the name of Hack-Man (she supposes this was the "original" H-M) was
running a board off of the dead side of the local 678 loop. Her introduction
to phone "stuff" began when she called the "board" one day and found instead 30
people on the line instead of a carrier.
She was dumbfounded, and being female, there were 30 guys on the conference
ready and willing to provide her with information as to origins of loops,
conferences, boxing, etc. Scott (Hack-Man) later filled her in on the rest,
gave her more numbers and such and that's where it all began.
The memorable phreakers or hackers that Karen has met include Cheshire Cat,
Tuc, Bioc Agent 003 and anyone else who was at the TAP meeting during
Thanksgiving of 1984.
She gained her experience by asking a LOT of questions to a lot of hard-up guys
who were willing to give her all kinds of info since she was a girl. She
attributes her information mostly to just taking in and remembering all of the
information that people gave her.
The two boards that Karen listed as memorable were both in Falls Church, VA.
which were Mobius Strip and Xevious II.
Currently she's a freshman at Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh (or as
she likes to call it, COMPUTER U.). Her major is probably "Policy &
Management."
Her major accomplishment is that she was probably the youngest girl ever to
attend a TAP meeting (at the age of 14) and probably one of the only people to
attend one with Mom, Dad, and Aunt Linda (how embarrassing).
One of the reasons she quit the phreak/hack world was because of a visit from
the Secret Service in February 1985... although they didn't really come for
her... A "friend" wanted for credit card fraud called her while his line was
hooked to a pin register.
The same weekend he called Karen, was Inauguration Weekend and she and her
brother called the 456 (White House) loop something like 21 times in the 4-day
weekend period... In any case the SS wanted to catch Eric and when her number
showed up in two places, they decided to investigate. Freaked out her parents!
The real reason she quit the phreak/hack world was because she transferred high
schools in 1985 and became one of the "popular" kids and gained a social life,
thus losing time and interest for the computer.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chanda Lier's Interests Include: MUSIC... specifically harDCore... (that would
be punk rock from Washington, DC). Most of
her friends are or were in DC bands... The
Untouchables, Teen Idles, Minor Threat, Youth
Brigade (DC), Grey Matter, Government Issue,
etc.
HORROR... novels, movies, comics.... Clive
Barker, Arcane Comix (of which her friend
Steve is publisher of), Peter Straub, Dean
Koontz, Whitely Streiber etc... that whole
genre...
And Flannery O'Connor rules...
Her most memorable experiences include the following:
Her parents used to "make" her start conferences for them whenever it was
a relative's birthday. They would get the whole family on the line and chat
and stuff. Everyone thought it was really cool....
Other fun times were when her dad would pull out his DoD (Department of
Defense) phonebook and they would hack around for modem lines....
Tuc coming to her grandmother's house in April 1985 and then going to see
"Desperately Seeking Susan"...
Some People to Mention:
"I guess, just Taran King, for this interview, and Knight Lightning...both
of whom contacted me here at CMU.... and TUC... and ...?"
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
And of course...that regular closing to the Phrack Pro-Phile... Are most of
the phreaks and hackers that you've met computer geeks? "YES... no doubt."
Thanks for your time, Karen.
Taran King
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Two, Issue 24, File 3 of 13
<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
<> <>
<> Limbo To Infinity <>
<> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ <>
<> Chapter Three of The Future Transcendent Saga <>
<> <>
<> Traversing The Barriers For Gateway Communication <>
<> <>
<> Presented by Knight Lightning <>
<> February 11, 1989 <>
<> <>
<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
Beyond Bitnet lies the other wide area networks. We will discuss more about
those networks in chapter four. Right now lets learn how to communicate with
those other realms.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Mailing To Other Networks - Gateway Communications
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Bitnet, as you already know, is not the only computer network in the world.
What you might be surprised to find out, however, is that when you have access
to Bitnet you also have access to many other networks as well. Unfortunately,
the methods for communicating with people in these other networks are not as
simple as the ones described earlier.
Bitnet's links to other networks give you access to people and services you
could not contact otherwise (or at least without great expense). This alone
should make learning a bit about them worthwhile.
In chapter one of this series, I showed you how some Bitnet nodenames can be
broken down into state abbreviations. To go a step further, try and think of
Bitnet as a country and the links between the Bitnet nodes as highways.
Another network (or country in this example) is connected to our highway system
at one point, which is called a "gateway." These borders do not let
interactive messages or files through; only mail is allowed past the gateway.
The people in these other networks have addresses just like yours, but you will
need to specify something extra in order to get mail to them. A userid@node
address is not enough, because that does not tell the Bitnet mail software what
network that node is in. Therefore, we can extend the network address with a
code that identifies the destination network. In this example, the destination
network is ARPAnet (a network I'm sure you have heard much about), the code for
which is ARPA.
TARAN@MSP-BBS.ARPA
+---- +------ +---
| | |
| | +-------------------- the network
| |
| +---------------------------- the node
|
+---------------------------------- the userid
That is about as simple as an address from another network gets. Generally
they are much more complex. Because of the variety of networks there can be no
example which will show you what a "typical" address might be. However, you
should not have to let it worry you too much. If someone tells you that his
network address is C483307@UMCVMB.MISSOURI.EDU, just use it like that with your
mail software. As long as you understand that the mail is going to another
network and that the transit time may be longer than usual (although in many
cases I have found that mail going to EDU addresses is delivered much faster
than Bitnet mail) you should not have many problems.
More On Gateways
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
I introduced the gateways in the previous section, but didn't get into too much
detail. This is because the subject can get more than a little complex at
times. Actually, understanding gateways isn't difficult at all, but
interpreting network addresses that use them can be.
In the previous example, an address for someone in another network looked like
this:
TARAN@MSP-BBS.ARPA
The ".ARPA" in the address tells your networking software that your letter
should go to someone in another network. What you might not realize is that
your networking software "knows" that the address for the gateway to ARPA may
be at, say INTERBIT. It might extend the address to look something like this:
TARAN%MSP-BBS.ARPA@INTERBIT
+---- +------ +--- +-------
| | | |
| | | +--------------- the node of the gateway
| | |
| | +-------------------- the network
| |
| +---------------------------- the node
|
+---------------------------------- the userid
The gateway is a server machine (userid@node) that transfers files between the
two networks. In this case, it is ARPA@INTERBIT. Note that the "%" replaces
the "@" from the previous example. This is because Bitnet networking software
cannot handle addresses with more than one AT sign (@). When your mail gets to
the gateway, the "@INTERBIT" would be stripped off, and the "%" would be turned
back into a "@".
Ok, so now you are asking, "If this is so automatic, why do you need to know
this?" In many cases your networking software is not smart enough to know that
the gateway for SCONNET is at STLMOVM. If this is the case, you have to type
out the whole address with all of the interesting special characters.
For example, sometimes, you may have to change the addresses around somewhat.
Let's say I'm talking to Lex Luthor one day and he tells me his address is
"lex@plover.COM". I have found that an address like "lex@plover.COM" would
actually be mailed to as "plover!lex@RUTGERS.EDU". Now this is just a specific
example of how it works from my particular system and other systems (not to
mention networks) will work differently (this is a guide for people using
Bitnet). The COM (Commercial) addresses are not recognized by the mailer at
UMCVMB and so I have to route them through Rutgers University. In chapter
four, I will discuss some of the other networks that are interconnected.
In many cases, a gateway to a network may be in another network. In this
example, we are sending mail to RED at node KNIGHT in HDENNET. The gateway to
the network is in, say, ARPAnet. Our networking software is smart enough to
know where ARPA gateway is, so the address might look something like this:
RED%KNIGHT.HDENNET@SRI-NIC.ARPA
+-- +----- +------ +------ +---
| | | | |
| | | | +----- the network of the gateway
| | | |
| | | +------------- the node of the gateway
| | |
| | +--------------------- the network
| |
| +---------------------------- the node
|
+-------------------------------- the userid
As you can see, these addresses can get pretty long and difficult to type.
Perhaps the only consolation is that your address probably looks just as bad to
the people in the destination network.
Foundations Abound
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Just as there are servers and services in Bitnet, there are similar
counterparts in the other networks as well. There are many electronic digests
and servers that are similar to Bitnet servers available on several of the
other networks.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Gateways To Non-Standard Networks - Intermail
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Intermail is perhaps the most interesting exception to standard gateways. It's
better to just show you what I mean rather than try to really technically
describe the process. With Intermail, you can access networks you probably
never thought were accessible.
I have included the instructions for using the Intermail system for
transmitting computer mail between users in the MCI-Mail system, the GTE
Telemail system, the Compmail/Dialcom 164 system, and the NFS-Mail/Dialcom 157
system to the ARPA-Mail system. The Intermail system may be used in either
direction.
Mail to be sent to MCI Mail, GTE Telemail, Compmail, or NSF-Mail is sent to the
"Intermail" mailbox on the local mail system. The Intermail system operates by
having a program service mailboxes in both the local and the destination mail
systems. When the right information is supplied at the beginning of a message,
the program forwards those messages into the other mail system.
In order for a message to be delivered to a mailbox in another mail system,
forwarding information must be included at the beginning of the text of each
message. This forwarding information tells the mail forwarding program which
mail system to forward the message to, and which mailboxes to send it to. This
information is in the form:
Forward: <mail system>
To: <user mailbox>
<blank line>
The syntax allowed on the "To:" line is that of the system being forwarded
into. In ARPA-Mail it is also possible to send to a list of CC recipients in
any of the mail gateway systems. See the examples for further details.
In either direction, the local Subject field of the message to Intermail is
used as the Subject field of the message delivered in the other mail system.
Sending To Non-Standard Networks From Bitnet
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In this direction, the Internet user must first send mail to the Intermail
mailbox on the ARPA-Internet. The address of "Intermail" is
"INTERMAIL@ISI.EDU". Next, the Mailbox forwarding information must be added at
the beginning of the text of each message. The names of the mailboxes are
MCI-MAIL, TELEMAIL (for GTE Telemail), COMPMAIL, and NSF-MAIL.
This information is in the form:
Forward: <Type name of mailbox here>
To: <a valid address on the system you're forwarding to>
<blank line>
<Message...>
Please Note: Although CompuServe (CIS), Telex, and FAX are accessible from
MCI-Mail, the Intermail gateway does not support these services.
However, there is a Bitnet-CompuServe gateway, but that will be
discussed in the next section of this file.
Sending To Bitnet From Non-Standard Networks
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Supposing that you have an account on MCI-Mail, GTE Telemail, Compmail, or
NSF-Mail and you would like to mail to someone on Bitnet, you would direct
your mail to one of the following addresses;
"INTERMAIL" (actually MCI-ID "107-8239") in MCI-Mail,
"INTERMAIL/USCISI" in GTE Telemail,
"164:CMP00817" in Compmail/Dialcom 164, and
"157:NSF153" in NSF-Mail
Once you have done this, you actually type the following as the first two lines
in the mail:
Forward: ARPA
To: KNIGHT%MSPVMA.BITNET@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU
<blank line>
<Message...>
In this example, KNIGHT is the userid and MSPVMA is the Bitnet node.
CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU is the Internet gateway to ARPAnet. It's really just that
simple.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
In case of questions or problems using Intermail, please send a message to
Intermail-Request@ISI.EDU.
_______________________________________________________________________________
CompuServe
~~~~~~~~~~
The gateway is not yet live as of this writing. Testing on it has been delayed
somewhat because of high-priority projects inside CompuServe. However, it
might be a safe bet that by the time you read this that the gateway will be
complete.
The specific mechanism is that the gateway machine, 3B2/400 named Loquat,
believes that it has a UUCP neighbor "compuserve" which polls it. In reality,
the UUCP connection is a lie all around, but the gateway starts up on an hourly
basis, pokes through the UUCP queue, finds mail aimed at CompuServe, and
creates script language on the fly suitable for a utility called Xcomm 2.2 to
call CompuServe, download any waiting mail, and upload any queued mail.
Appropriate header hacking is done so that CompuServe looks like just another
RFC-compliant entity on the Internet, and the Internet looks like yet another
gatewayed system from the perspective of the CompuServe subscriber - a very
minor modification to the usual syntax used in their mailer is needed, but
this project has provided the impetus for them to generalize the mechanism,
something they had apparently not needed before.
So that's where it stands. Loquat speaks with machines at Ohio State. At the
moment, there is a problem preventing mail passage except between CompuServe
and Ohio State, while they finish development and testing. Also, part of the
header hacking done is to make CompuServe IDs look right on the Internet - the
usual 7xxxx,yyy is a problem due to the presence of the ",".
_______________________________________________________________________________
Easynet
~~~~~~~
A mail gateway between Easynet and the UUCP network and DARPA Internet
(including CSNET) is provided by the Western Research Laboratory in Palo Alto,
California. Hopefully this service will provide improved communications
between the DEC community and the Usenet and Internet communities.
Mailing From A Bitnet Site To An Easynet Node
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
To mail a message from an Internet site to an Easynet node (say MSPVAX), you
type:
To: user%mspvax.dec.com@decwrl.dec.com
A few other forms are still accepted for backward compatibility, but their use
is discouraged and they will not be described here.
Mailing From Easynet To Bitnet
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
For people on Easynet who would like to mail to people on Bitnet the following
information may be of interest.
The gateway supports connection to Bitnet using a pseudo-domain syntax. These
addresses are translated by the gateway to the proper form to address the
gateway into Bitnet. To address users in Bitnet you type:
To: DECWRL::"user@host.bitnet"
(Example: To: DECWRL::KNIGHT@MSPVAX.BITNET)
_______________________________________________________________________________
Mailnet
~~~~~~~
The Bitnet-Mailnet Gateway no longer exists. EDUCOM's Mailnet Service was
discontinued after June 30, 1987 in agreement with MIT.
_______________________________________________________________________________
DASnet
~~~~~~
DASnet is one of the networks that is connected to AppleLink.
Sending to DASnet from Bitnet:
1. In the "TO" field, enter the DASnet gateway address: XB.DAS@STANFORD.BITNET
2. In the "SUBJECT" field, enter the DASnet user id (such as [1234AA]joe)
Example (0756AA is the DASnet address and randy is the user on that system):
To: XB.DAS@STANFORD.BITNET
Subject: [0756AA]randy
3. If you type a "!" after the address in the subject field, you can insert
comments, but the subject line must be limited to 29 characters.
Example; Subject: [0756AA]randy!Networks are cool
Sending to Bitnet from DASnet
1. In the "TO" field, enter the BITNET address followed by "@dasnet"
2. Use the "SUBJECT" field for comments.
Example:
To: knight@umcvmb.bitnet@dasnet#MSubject: Gateways
Don't be confused, there are two @s and a at the end.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Gateways Between Bitnet And Other Networks Not Previously Detailed
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
______________________________________________________
| | | |
| "u" = UserId | "h" = Host (Node) | "d" = Node (Host) |
|______________|___________________|___________________|
To: CSNET Phonenet <u>@<h>.csnet
To: JANET (Domains: U: uk) <u>%<d>.U@ac.uk
To: EAN (Domains: E: cdn, dfn, etc.) <u>@<d>.E
To: COSAC <h>/<u>@france.csnet
To: Xerox Internet (Domains: R: A registry) <u>.R@xerox.com
To: DEC's Easynet <*Detailed Earlier*> <u>%<h>.dec.com@decwrl.dec.com
To: IBM's VNET <u>@vnet
To: ACSNET (Domains: A: oz.au) <u>%<d>.A@<g>
To: UUCP h1!h2!<h>!<u>@psuvax1
To: JUNET (Domains: J: junet) <u>%<d>.J@csnet-relay.csnet
To: JANET <u>%U.<d>@ac.uk
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
To: BITNET
From
ARPA Internet <u>%<h>.bitnet@cunyvm.cuny.edu
CSNET Phonenet <u>%<h>.bitnet@relay.cs.net
JANET <u>%<h>@uk.ac.rl.earn
EAN <u>@<h>.bitnet
COSAC adi/<u>%<h>.bitnet@relay.cs.net
ACSNET <u>%<h>.bitnet@munnari.oz
UUCP psuvax1!<h>.bitnet!<u>
JUNET <u>@<h>.bitnet
_______________________________________________________________________________
Conclusion
~~~~~~~~~~
Now that you understand how to mail to the other networks by making use of the
gateways, we will begin looking at the other networks themselves. As my
greatest area of expertise is Bitnet, I will cover the other networks in less
detail. If they interest you, I'm sure you will find a way to learn more about
them. So read Chapter Four of The Future Transcendent Saga -- Frontiers.
:Knight Lightning
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Two, Issue 24, File 4 of 13
<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
<> <>
<> Frontiers <>
<> ~~~~~~~~~ <>
<> Chapter Four of The Future Transcendent Saga <>
<> <>
<> Beyond Bitnet Lies Infinity <>
<> <>
<> Presented by Knight Lightning <>
<> February 12, 1989 <>
<> <>
<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
Welcome to the final chapter of The Future Transcendent Saga... or is it? Can
there ever really be a final chapter to the future? In any case, I have
collected information on some of the various other networks that you may comes
across through your use of Bitnet. These listings are more of a summary than a
detail guide (like Utopia was for Bitnet). However, I think you'll make good
use of the information presented here. Much of the information in this file is
based on examination of research conducted in July, 1987. Any errors due to
the advancement in technology and the difference in time are apologized for.
The networks indexed in this file include the government agency networks
ARPANET, MILNET, MFENET, and NSFnet; and the user-formed networks CSNET,
HEANET, SPAN, TEXNET, UUCP, and USENET.
This file is not intended to be a hackers guide, but merely a directory of some
of the networks.
One last thing to mention... the major top level domains on the Internet are:
.EDU Educational Institutions
.COM Commercial
.GOV Government
.MIL Military
.ORG Miscellaneous Orgainizations (that don't fit elsewhere)
_______________________________________________________________________________
GOVERNMENT AGENCY NETWORKS
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
ARPANET and MILNET
In 1969 the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) began a research
program to advance computer networking. The experimental packet-switched
network that emerged was called ARPANET, and it allowed computers of different
types to communicate efficiently. Using ARPANET technology, the Defense Data
Network (DDN) was created in 1982 to encompass the existing ARPANET and other
Department of Defense (DoD) computer networks. The DDN uses the DoD Internet
Protocol Suite, including TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet
Protocol) and associated application protocols.
A splitting of the ARPANET was begun in 1983 and completed in 1984. The result
was two networks, an experimental research and development network called
ARPANET, and a non-classified operational military network called MILNET.
Gateways interconnect the two networks. The backbones of each of the networks
consist of Packet Switched Nodes (PSNs), most of which are connected with 56 Kb
terrestrial lines. As of January 1987, the ARPANET had 46 PSNs, and MILNET had
117 PSNs in the U.S. and 33 in Europe and the Pacific.
While ARPANET and MILNET make up part of the DDN, the DDN and other networks
works which share the same protocols make up the ARPA Internet. CSNET X25net,
which uses the TCP/IP protocols interfaced to the public X.25 network, is an
example of a network which is part of the ARPA Internet and is not a part of
the DDN.
________________________________________
| +--------------+ |
| | CSNET X25net | |
| +--------------+ |
| +---------------+ |
| | DDN | |
| | +---------+ | |
| | | Arpanet | | |
| | +---------+ | |
| | | |
| | +---------+ | |
| | | Milnet | | |
| | +---------+ | |
| +---------------+ ARPA Internet |
|________________________________________|
Policy, access control and funding for the ARPANET are provided by DARPA's
Information Processing Techniques Office (IPTO). ARPANET and MILNET operation
and management are provided by the Defense Communications Agency's DDN Program
Management Office (DDN PMO).
Use of the ARPANET is limited to users engaged in experimental research for the
U.S. government, or government-sponsored research at universities. Because it
is not meant to compete with commercial networks, it is not intended for
operational communication needs or use by the general public.
Services available on ARPANET and MILNET include remote login, file transfer,
mail, time, and date. Mail addressing on both of the networks is of the form
user@domain, where domain refers to a full qualified domain name composed of a
string of one or more subdomains separated by a period, ending with a top-level
domain. Examples of top-level domains: edu, com, gov, mil, net, org, jp, au,
uk. Examples of fully qualified domain names: kentarus.cc.utexas.edu,
relay.cs.net, icot.jp.
The DDN funds a Network Information Center (NIC), located at SRI International
in Menlo Park, California, which provides user services to DDN users via
electronic mail (NIC@SRI-NIC.ARPA), telephone (800-235-3155) and U.S. mail:
DDN Network Information Center, SRI International, Room EJ291, 333 Ravenswood
Avenue, Menlo Park, CA 94025. The telephone service is available Monday through
Friday, 7a.m to 4p.m., Pacific time.
Much information is also available on-line on SRI-NIC.ARPA, via telnet or
anonymous ftp (login "anonymous", password "guest"). The file
NETINFO:NETINFO-INDEX.TXT contains an index of these on-line files.
_______________________________________________________________________________
MFENET
MFEnet is the Department of Energy's (DOE) magnetic fusion energy research
network. It was established in the mid-1970's to support access to the MFE
Cray 1 supercomputer at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The
network uses 56-kbs satellite links, and is designed to provide terminal access
to the Cray time-sharing system (CTSS), also developed at the Lawrence
Livermore Laboratory. The network currently supports access to Cray 1, Cray
X-MP/2, Cray 2, and Cyber 205 supercomputers. The network uses special-purpose
networking software developed at Livermore, and, in addition to terminal
access, provides file transfer, remote output queuing, and electronic mail, and
includes some specialized application procedures supporting interactive
graphics terminals and local personal computer (PC)-based editing. Access to
the network is in general restricted to DOE-funded researchers. A couple of
years ago, the network was expanded to include the DOE-funded supercomputer at
Florida State University. MFEnet is funded by DOE and managed by Livermore.
MFEnet has been successful in supporting DOE supercomputer users. However,
the specialized nature of the communications protocols is now creating
difficulties for researchers who need advanced graphics workstations that use
the UNIX BSD 4.2 operating system and the TCP-IP protocols on LAN's. For these
and other reasons, DOE is examining how best to migrate MFEnet to the TCP-IP,
and later to the OSI, protocols.
The combination of the CTSS operating system and the MFEnet protocols creates
an effective interactive computing environment for researchers using Cray
supercomputers. For this reason, two of the new NSF national supercomputer
centers -- San Diego (SDSC) and Illinois -- have chosen the CTSS operating
system. In SDSC's case, the MFENET protocols have also been chosen to support
the SDSC Consortium network. In Illinois case, a project to implement the
TCP-IP protocols for the CTSS operating system has been funded by the NSFnet
program, and these developments will be shared with SDSC (and with DOE) to
provide a migration path for the SDSC Consortium network.
Mail can be sent to people on MFEnet by using this format;
user%site.MFENET@NMFEDD.ARPA
_______________________________________________________________________________
NSFNET
NSFnet began in 1986 as a communications network to facilitate access to
NSF-funded national supercomputer centers. It is evolving into a general
purpose internet for research and scientific information exchange. The network
has a three-level component structure comprised of a backbone, several
autonomously administered wide-area networks, and campus networks. The
backbone includes the following supercomputer centers:
- National Center for Supercomputing Applications, University of Illinois,
Urbana (UIUC)
- Cornell National Supercomputer Facility, Cornell University (Cornell)
- John von Neumann National Supercomputer Center, Princeton, New Jersey
(JVNC)
- San Diego Supercomputer Center, University of California, San Diego
(SDSC)
- Pittsburgh Supercomputer Center (Westinghouse Electric Corp,
Carnegie-Mellon University, University of Pittsburgh)
- Scientific Computing Division of the National Center for Atmospheric
Research, Boulder, Colorado (NCAR)
Upper layer protocols in use on the NSFnet backbone are the TCP/IP protocols.
The backbone became operational in July of 1986. It was composed of seven 56
kps links between six IP gateways. These gateways are LSI 11/73 systems. An
upgrade to T1 links (1.544 Mps) was established in the latter part of 1987.
There are plans to adopt the OSI networking protocols as the software becomes
available.
NSF-funded component networks include:
BARRNET - California's Bay Area Regional Research Network
MERIT - Michigan Educational Research Network
MIDNET - Midwest Network
NORTHWESTNET - Northwestern states
NYSERNET - New York State Educational and Research Network
SESQUINET - Texas Sesquicentennial Network
SURANET - Southeastern Universities Research Association Network
WESTNET - Southwestern states
JVNCNET - consortium network of JVNC
SDSCNET - consortium network of SDSC
PSCAAnet - consortium network of the Pittsburgh Supercomputer Center
Some of the component networks preceded NSFnet, and some of them have just
recently been established. Each of the component networks is connected to the
backbone. Information about the status of any NSFnet component network is
available from the NSFnet Network Service Center (NNSC). Monthly reports on
the status of the backbone and component networks are also available on-line
through the CSNET Info-Server. Send a message to info-server@sh.cs.net with
the following message body:
REQUEST: NSFNET
TOPIC: NSFNET-HELP
REQUEST:END
These reports may also be retrieved by anonymous ftp (login "anonymous",
password "guest") from sh.cs.net, in the directory "nsfnet." [FTP stands for
File Transfer Protocol]
Other autonomous networks connected to the NSFnet backbone include ARPANET,
BITNET, CSNET, and USAN (the University Satellite Network of the National
Center for Atmospheric Research).
Interesting projects associated with NSFnet include implementation of the gated
routing daemon which handles the RIP, EGP and HELLO routing protocols and runs
on 4.3BSD, Ultrix TM, GOULD UTX/32 TM, SunOS and VMS TM (Cornell University
Theory Center); implementation of TCP/IP for the CTSS operating system
supporting TELNET and FTP (University of Illinois); and a satellite experiment
providing 56 kps links between distant ethernets using Vitalink technology
(NCAR).
Management of the NSFnet is in an interim form with duties shared among The
University of Illinois, Cornell University, the University of Southern
California Information Sciences Institute, and University Corporation for
Atmospheric Research. The NSFnet project is administered by the Division of
Network and Communications Research and Infrastructure, which is part of the
Computer and Information Science and Engineering Directorate at NSF.
Further information is available from the NSFnet Network Service Center (NNSC),
BBN Laboratories Inc., 10 Moulton Street, Cambridge, MA 02238. Assistance can
also be obtained by electronic mail to nnsc@nnsc.nsf.net, or by calling
617-497-3400. The NNSC is run by Bolt, Beranek and Newman, and is an
NSF-funded project of the University Corporation for Atmospheric Research.
_______________________________________________________________________________
USER-FORMED NETWORKS
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
CSNET
In 1980 a proposal was presented to the National Science Foundation to fund a
computer science research network to link any university, commercial or
government organizations involved in research or advanced development in
computer science and computer engineering. NSF provided funding for the period
for 1981 to 1985, and CSNET was established. This single logical network today
connects approximately 200 computers on three physical networks. These
component physical networks are Phonenet, X25net and a subset of the ARPANET.
Phonenet is a store-and-forward network using MMDF software over public
telephone lines to provide electronic mail service. X25net utilizes the public
X.25 packet switched network Telenet, interfaced with TCP/IP, to provide
electronic mail, file transfer and remote login. Some ARPANET hosts are also
members of CSNET. The computers linked by CSNET are in the U.S., Europe,
Canada, Israel, Korea and Japan. Addressing in CSNET is in the ARPA Internet
domain style.
In 1981 a contract was arranged with Bolt, Beranek and Newman, Inc. to provide
information, user and technical services for CSNET, and the CSNET Coordination
and Information Center (CIC) was established. The CIC handles the daily
management of the network, and oversight is provided by the CSNET Executive
Committee. The network is supported by membership fees.
The CIC maintains a User Name Server database, which is accessible through the
ns command on CSNET hosts running appropriate software, or by telnet to the
CSNET service host, sh.cs.net (login "ns", no password required). There is
also much information available via anonymous ftp to sh.cs.net (login
"anonymous", password "guest"), particularly in the directory "info." The Info
Server also provides a means for retrieving this information. To utilize the
Info Server, send mail to infoserver@sh.cs.net with the following lines in the
message body:
REQUEST: INFO
TOPIC: HELP
REQUEST: END
The on-line information includes software, policy documents, information on
other networks, site lists and mailing list archives.
CSNET Foreign Affiliates and their gateways are:
CDNNET -- Canadian Academic Network, University of British Columbia.
SDN -- System Development Network (SDN) is an R&D computer network,
consisting of computers of R&D communities in Republic of Korea,
with a gateway at KAIST, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and
Technology, Seoul. It has mail connection to CSNET/Internet,
USENET/EUNET/UUCP Net and Pacific countries like Australia,
Indonesia, Hong Kong, Singapore and Japan.
SUNET -- Swedish University Network, Chambers University of Technology,
Gothenburg.
CHUNET -- Swiss University Network, ETH-Zentrum, Zurich.
Inria -- French University Network, Institute National de Recherce en
Informatique, Rocquencourt.
DFN -- Deutches Forschungsnetz, GWD-Gesellschaft fuer Mathematick und
Datenvararbiten, Schloss Birlinghoven, St. Augustin.
JUNET -- Japanese University Network, University of Tokyo.
Finnish University Network, Helsinki University, Helsinki.
AC.UK -- Academic Community, United Kingdom, University College, London.
ACSNET -- A UUCP-based academic network in Australia, University of
Melbourne.
New Zealand Academic Network, Waikato University, Hamilton.
Israeli Academic Network, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
For more information contact CSNET CIC, BBN Laboratories Inc., 10 Moulton
Street, Cambridge, MA 02238, or send electronic mail to cic@sh.cs.net
(cic@csnet-sh.arpa). A 24-hour hotline is also available, (617) 497-2777.
_______________________________________________________________________________
HEANET
HEAnet is a network linking the Universities and National Institutes for Higher
Education in the Republic of Ireland. The following institutions belong to
HEANET:
NIHED: National Institute for Higher Education, Dublin
NIHEL: National Institute for Higher Education, Limerick
MAY: St. Patrick's College, Maynooth
TCD: Trinity College, Dublin
UCC: University College, Cork
UCD: University College, Dublin
UCG: University College, Galway
The abbreviations on the left are used to form the network addresses for the
hosts belonging to each institution. Addresses use the form:
host.institution.IE (for example VAX2.NIHED.IE)
HEANET is connected to EARN/Bitnet/Netnorth by a gateway at University College,
Dublin. Mail for HEANET should be sent as a BSMTP "job" to MAILER at IRLEARN.
_______________________________________________________________________________
SPANet
The Space Physics Analysis Network (SPAN) became operational in 1981, and was
the result of a pilot project at Marshall Space Flight Center funded by NASA
(Space Plasma Physics Branch, Office of Space Science). The network is a
mission-independent data system testbed, intended to address problems of
exchanging data (raw and processed), analysis software, graphic images and
correspondence between researchers in several disciplines, including
Solar-Terrestrial, Interplanetary and Planetary Physics, Astrophysics,
Atmospherics, Oceans, Climate and Earth Science. A perception that
multidisciplinary correlative research in solar-terrestrial physics would
increase in the 1980's, that standards were lacking in scientific databases,
and that support was required for the display of device independent graphic
images, all motivated the establishment of SPAN. SPAN has therefore developed
to facilitate space data analysis and address significant unresolved problems
of scientific data exchange and correlation.
The Data Systems Users Working Group, formed in 1980, provides guidance and
policy recommendations to SPAN. Daily operation of the network is performed by
a network and project manager, a project scientist, routing center managers,
and managers at the local nodes.
SPAN nodes communicate using a variety of transmission media (fiber optics,
coax, leased telephone lines) and lower layer protocols (ethernet, X.25,
DDCMP), and nearly all SPAN hosts use the DECnetTM upper layer protocols. There
are plans to migrate to the emerging OSI protocols as software becomes
available.
Currently SPAN connects over 1200 computers throughout the United States,
Europe, Canada, and Japan (leading to all of the hacker related trouble on the
network, such as the Mathias Speer incident). The network backbone in the
United States consists of redundant 56 kps links between 5 DECnet routing
centers:
1. NASA's Johnson Space Center (Houston, Texas)
2. NASA and Cal Tech's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (Pasadena, California)
3. NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center (Huntsville, Alabama)
4. NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (Greenbelt, Maryland)
5. NASA's Ames Research Center (Moffett Field, California)
Tail circuits connect SPAN member institutions to the closest routing center,
in most cases with leased lines at a minimum of 9.6 kps.
SPAN is gatewayed to CSNET, ARPANET, BITNET, GTE Telenet, JANET and the NASA
Packet Switched System (NPSS). SPAN is joined to TEXNET, HEPnet and other
DECnetTM wide area networks. Services available to SPAN nodes include
electronic mail, remote file transfer and remote login.
Additional information is available from the SPAN Network Information Center
(SPAN-NIC) located at the National Space Science Data Center, NASA Goddard
Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Maryland 20771. Assistance is also available
by electronic mail at NSSDCA::SPAN_NIC_MGR.
_______________________________________________________________________________
TEXNET
Most of TEXNET became operational in 1986, although pieces of this network
existed earlier. The purpose of the network is to link computers at Texas
universities which run the DECnetTM upper layer protocols. Lower layer
protocols in use on the network are ethernet (IEEE 802.3) and DDCMP (Digital
Data Communication Message Protocol). TEXNET currently connects over 450
machines in 14 cities. The network backbone consists of DECnetTM routers, and
some synchronous links, connected via leased lines. 9600 bps and 56 Kbps lines
are used.
Gateways exist from TEXNET to SPAN, BITNET and the ARPA Internet. Services
provided include electronic mail, file transfer and remote login.
Operational and policy management of the network is by consensus of an informal
management group composed of managers from each member institution.
The following institutions are TEXNET members:
Baylor University
Houston Area Research Center
Pan American University
Sam Houston State University
Southwest Texas State University
Texas A & M University
University of Houston
University of Texas at Arlington
University of Texas at Austin
University of Texas at El Paso
University of Texas at Dallas
University of Texas at Permian Basin
University of Texas at San Antonio
University of Texas at Tyler
University of Texas Health Center at Tyler
University of Texas Health Science Center at Dallas
University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston
University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio
University of Texas Medical Branch Galveston
University of Texas System Cancer Center
University of Texas System Center for High Performance Computing
University of Texas Office of Land Management
_______________________________________________________________________________
UUCP and USEnet
The UUCP network was started in the 1970's to provide electronic mail and file
transfer between UNIX systems. The network is a host-based store-and-forward
network using dialup telephone circuits and operates by having each member site
dialup the next UUCP host computer and send and receive files and electronic
mail messages. The network uses addresses based on the physical path
established by this sequence of dialups connections. UUCP is open to any UNIX
system which chooses to participate. There are "informal" electronic mail
gateways between UUCP and ARPANET, BITNET, or CSNET, so that users of any of
these networks can exchange electronic mail.
USENET is a UNIX news facility based on the UUCP network that provides a news
bulletin board service. USEnet has both academic and commercial members and
affiliates in Europe, Asia, and South America. Neither UUCP nor USENET has a
central management; volunteers maintain and distribute the routing tables for
the network. Each member site pays its own costs and agrees to carry traffic.
Despite this reliance on mutual cooperation and anarchic management style, the
network operates and provides a useful, if somewhat unreliable, and low-cost
service to its members. Over the years the network has grown into a world-wide
network with thousands of computers participating.
"The Future Is Now"
______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Two, Issue 24, File 5 of 13
[][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][]
[] []
[] Control Office Administration []
[] Of Enhanced 911 Services For []
[] Special Services And Major Account Centers []
[] []
[] By The Eavesdropper []
[] []
[] March, 1988 []
[] []
[][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][]
Description of Service
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The control office for Emergency 911 service is assigned in accordance with the
existing standard guidelines to one of the following centers:
o Special Services Center (SSC)
o Major Accounts Center (MAC)
o Serving Test Center (STC)
o Toll Control Center (TCC)
The SSC/MAC designation is used in this document interchangeably for any of
these four centers. The Special Services Centers (SSCs) or Major Account
Centers (MACs) have been designated as the trouble reporting contact for all
E911 customer (PSAP) reported troubles. Subscribers who have trouble on an
E911 call will continue to contact local repair service (CRSAB) who will refer
the trouble to the SSC/MAC, when appropriate.
Due to the critical nature of E911 service, the control and timely repair of
troubles is demanded. As the primary E911 customer contact, the SSC/MAC is in
the unique position to monitor the status of the trouble and insure its
resolution.
System Overview
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The number 911 is intended as a nationwide universal telephone number which
provides the public with direct access to a Public Safety Answering Point
(PSAP). A PSAP is also referred to as an Emergency Service Bureau (ESB). A
PSAP is an agency or facility which is authorized by a municipality to receive
and respond to police, fire and/or ambulance services. One or more attendants
are located at the PSAP facilities to receive and handle calls of an emergency
nature in accordance with the local municipal requirements.
An important advantage of E911 emergency service is improved (reduced) response
times for emergency services. Also close coordination among agencies providing
various emergency services is a valuable capability provided by E911 service.
1A ESS is used as the tandem office for the E911 network to route all 911 calls
to the correct (primary) PSAP designated to serve the calling station. The
E911 feature was developed primarily to provide routing to the correct PSAP for
all 911 calls. Selective routing allows a 911 call originated from a
particular station located in a particular district, zone, or town, to be
routed to the primary PSAP designated to serve that customer station regardless
of wire center boundaries. Thus, selective routing eliminates the problem of
wire center boundaries not coinciding with district or other political
boundaries.
The services available with the E911 feature include:
Forced Disconnect Default Routing
Alternative Routing Night Service
Selective Routing Automatic Number Identification (ANI)
Selective Transfer Automatic Location Identification (ALI)
Preservice/Installation Guidelines
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
When a contract for an E911 system has been signed, it is the responsibility of
Network Marketing to establish an implementation/cutover committee which should
include a representative from the SSC/MAC. Duties of the E911 Implementation
Team include coordination of all phases of the E911 system deployment and the
formation of an on-going E911 maintenance subcommittee.
Marketing is responsible for providing the following customer specific
information to the SSC/MAC prior to the start of call through testing:
o All PSAP's (name, address, local contact)
o All PSAP circuit ID's
o 1004 911 service request including PSAP details on each PSAP
(1004 Section K, L, M)
o Network configuration
o Any vendor information (name, telephone number, equipment)
The SSC/MAC needs to know if the equipment and sets at the PSAP are maintained
by the BOCs, an independent company, or an outside vendor, or any combination.
This information is then entered on the PSAP profile sheets and reviewed
quarterly for changes, additions and deletions.
Marketing will secure the Major Account Number (MAN) and provide this number to
Corporate Communications so that the initial issue of the service orders carry
the MAN and can be tracked by the SSC/MAC via CORDNET. PSAP circuits are
official services by definition.
All service orders required for the installation of the E911 system should
include the MAN assigned to the city/county which has purchased the system.
In accordance with the basic SSC/MAC strategy for provisioning, the SSC/MAC
will be Overall Control Office (OCO) for all Node to PSAP circuits (official
services) and any other services for this customer. Training must be scheduled
for all SSC/MAC involved personnel during the pre-service stage of the project.
The E911 Implementation Team will form the on-going maintenance subcommittee
prior to the initial implementation of the E911 system. This sub-committee
will establish post implementation quality assurance procedures to ensure that
the E911 system continues to provide quality service to the customer.
Customer/Company training, trouble reporting interfaces for the customer,
telephone company and any involved independent telephone companies needs to be
addressed and implemented prior to E911 cutover. These functions can be best
addressed by the formation of a sub-committee of the E911 Implementation Team
to set up guidelines for and to secure service commitments of interfacing
organizations. A SSC/MAC supervisor should chair this subcommittee and include
the following organizations:
1) Switching Control Center
- E911 translations
- Trunking
- End office and Tandem office hardware/software
2) Recent Change Memory Administration Center
- Daily RC update activity for TN/ESN translations
- Processes validity errors and rejects
3) Line and Number Administration
- Verification of TN/ESN translations
4) Special Service Center/Major Account Center
- Single point of contact for all PSAP and Node to host troubles
- Logs, tracks & statusing of all trouble reports
- Trouble referral, follow up, and escalation
- Customer notification of status and restoration
- Analyzation of "chronic" troubles
- Testing, installation and maintenance of E911 circuits
5) Installation and Maintenance (SSIM/I&M)
- Repair and maintenance of PSAP equipment and Telco owned sets
6) Minicomputer Maintenance Operations Center
- E911 circuit maintenance (where applicable)
7) Area Maintenance Engineer
- Technical assistance on voice (CO-PSAP) network related E911 troubles
Maintenance Guidelines
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The CCNC will test the Node circuit from the 202T at the Host site to the 202T
at the Node site. Since Host to Node (CCNC to MMOC) circuits are official
company services, the CCNC will refer all Node circuit troubles to the SSC/MAC.
The SSC/MAC is responsible for the testing and follow up to restoration of
these circuit troubles.
Although Node to PSAP circuit are official services, the MMOC will refer PSAP
circuit troubles to the appropriate SSC/MAC. The SSC/MAC is responsible for
testing and follow up to restoration of PSAP circuit troubles.
The SSC/MAC will also receive reports from CRSAB/IMC(s) on subscriber 911
troubles when they are not line troubles. The SSC/MAC is responsible for
testing and restoration of these troubles.
Maintenance responsibilities are as follows:
SCC* Voice Network (ANI to PSAP)
*SCC responsible for tandem switch
SSIM/I&M PSAP Equipment (Modems, CIU's, sets)
Vendor PSAP Equipment (when CPE)
SSC/MAC PSAP to Node circuits, and tandem to PSAP voice circuits (EMNT)
MMOC Node site (Modems, cables, etc)
Note: All above work groups are required to resolve troubles by interfacing
with appropriate work groups for resolution.
The Switching Control Center (SCC) is responsible for E911/1AESS translations
in tandem central offices. These translations route E911 calls, selective
transfer, default routing, speed calling, etc., for each PSAP. The SCC is also
responsible for troubleshooting on the voice network (call originating to end
office tandem equipment).
For example, ANI failures in the originating offices would be a responsibility
of the SCC.
Recent Change Memory Administration Center (RCMAC) performs the daily tandem
translation updates (recent change) for routing of individual telephone
numbers.
Recent changes are generated from service order activity (new service, address
changes, etc.) and compiled into a daily file by the E911 Center (ALI/DMS E911
Computer).
SSIM/I&M is responsible for the installation and repair of PSAP equipment.
PSAP equipment includes ANI Controller, ALI Controller, data sets, cables,
sets, and other peripheral equipment that is not vendor owned. SSIM/I&M is
responsible for establishing maintenance test kits, complete with spare parts
for PSAP maintenance. This includes test gear, data sets, and ANI/ALI
Controller parts.
Special Services Center (SSC) or Major Account Center (MAC) serves as the
trouble reporting contact for all (PSAP) troubles reported by customer. The
SSC/MAC refers troubles to proper organizations for handling and tracks status
of troubles, escalating when necessary. The SSC/MAC will close out troubles
with customer. The SSC/MAC will analyze all troubles and tracks "chronic" PSAP
troubles.
Corporate Communications Network Center (CCNC) will test and refer troubles on
all node to host circuits. All E911 circuits are classified as official
company property.
The Minicomputer Maintenance Operations Center (MMOC) maintains the E911
(ALI/DMS) computer hardware at the Host site. This MMOC is also responsible
for monitoring the system and reporting certain PSAP and system problems to the
local MMOC's, SCC's or SSC/MAC's. The MMOC personnel also operate software
programs that maintain the TN data base under the direction of the E911 Center.
The maintenance of the NODE computer (the interface between the PSAP and the
ALI/DMS computer) is a function of the MMOC at the NODE site. The MMOC's at
the NODE sites may also be involved in the testing of NODE to Host circuits.
The MMOC will also assist on Host to PSAP and data network related troubles not
resolved through standard trouble clearing procedures.
Installation And Maintenance Center (IMC) is responsible for referral of E911
subscriber troubles that are not subscriber line problems.
E911 Center - Performs the role of System Administration and is responsible for
overall operation of the E911 computer software. The E911 Center does A-Z
trouble analysis and provides statistical information on the performance of the
system.
This analysis includes processing PSAP inquiries (trouble reports) and referral
of network troubles. The E911 Center also performs daily processing of tandem
recent change and provides information to the RCMAC for tandem input. The E911
Center is responsible for daily processing of the ALI/DMS computer data base
and provides error files, etc. to the Customer Services department for
investigation and correction. The E911 Center participates in all system
implementations and on-going maintenance effort and assists in the development
of procedures, training and education of information to all groups.
Any group receiving a 911 trouble from the SSC/MAC should close out the trouble
with the SSC/MAC or provide a status if the trouble has been referred to
another group. This will allow the SSC/MAC to provide a status back to the
customer or escalate as appropriate.
Any group receiving a trouble from the Host site (MMOC or CCNC) should close
the trouble back to that group.
The MMOC should notify the appropriate SSC/MAC when the Host, Node, or all Node
circuits are down so that the SSC/MAC can reply to customer reports that may be
called in by the PSAPs. This will eliminate duplicate reporting of troubles.
On complete outages the MMOC will follow escalation procedures for a Node after
two (2) hours and for a PSAP after four (4) hours. Additionally the MMOC will
notify the appropriate SSC/MAC when the Host, Node, or all Node circuits are
down.
The PSAP will call the SSC/MAC to report E911 troubles. The person reporting
the E911 trouble may not have a circuit I.D. and will therefore report the PSAP
name and address. Many PSAP troubles are not circuit specific. In those
instances where the caller cannot provide a circuit I.D., the SSC/MAC will be
required to determine the circuit I.D. using the PSAP profile. Under no
circumstances will the SSC/MAC Center refuse to take the trouble. The E911
trouble should be handled as quickly as possible, with the SSC/MAC providing as
much assistance as possible while taking the trouble report from the caller.
The SSC/MAC will screen/test the trouble to determine the appropriate handoff
organization based on the following criteria:
PSAP equipment problem: SSIM/I&M
Circuit problem: SSC/MAC
Voice network problem: SCC (report trunk group number)
Problem affecting multiple PSAPs (No ALI report from all PSAPs): Contact
the MMOC to check for NODE or Host
computer problems before further testing.
The SSC/MAC will track the status of reported troubles and escalate as
appropriate. The SSC/MAC will close out customer/company reports with the
initiating contact. Groups with specific maintenance responsibilities, defined
above, will investigate "chronic" troubles upon request from the SSC/MAC and
the ongoing maintenance subcommittee.
All "out of service" E911 troubles are priority one type reports. One link
down to a PSAP is considered a priority one trouble and should be handled as if
the PSAP was isolated.
The PSAP will report troubles with the ANI controller, ALI controller or set
equipment to the SSC/MAC.
NO ANI: Where the PSAP reports NO ANI (digital display screen is blank) ask if
this condition exists on all screens and on all calls. It is important to
differentiate between blank screens and screens displaying 911-00XX, or all
zeroes.
When the PSAP reports all screens on all calls, ask if there is any voice
contact with callers. If there is no voice contact the trouble should be
referred to the SCC immediately since 911 calls are not getting through which
may require alternate routing of calls to another PSAP.
When the PSAP reports this condition on all screens but not all calls and has
voice contact with callers, the report should be referred to SSIM/I&M for
dispatch. The SSC/MAC should verify with the SCC that ANI is pulsing before
dispatching SSIM.
When the PSAP reports this condition on one screen for all calls (others work
fine) the trouble should be referred to SSIM/I&M for dispatch, because the
trouble is isolated to one piece of equipment at the customer premise.
An ANI failure (i.e. all zeroes) indicates that the ANI has not been received
by the PSAP from the tandem office or was lost by the PSAP ANI controller. The
PSAP may receive "02" alarms which can be caused by the ANI controller logging
more than three all zero failures on the same trunk. The PSAP has been
instructed to report this condition to the SSC/MAC since it could indicate an
equipment trouble at the PSAP which might be affecting all subscribers calling
into the PSAP. When all zeroes are being received on all calls or "02" alarms
continue, a tester should analyze the condition to determine the appropriate
action to be taken. The tester must perform cooperative testing with the SCC
when there appears to be a problem on the Tandem-PSAP trunks before requesting
dispatch.
When an occasional all zero condition is reported, the SSC/MAC should dispatch
SSIM/I&M to routine equipment on a "chronic" troublesweep.
The PSAPs are instructed to report incidental ANI failures to the BOC on a PSAP
inquiry trouble ticket (paper) that is sent to the Customer Services E911 group
and forwarded to E911 center when required. This usually involves only a
particular telephone number and is not a condition that would require a report
to the SSC/MAC. Multiple ANI failures which our from the same end office (XX
denotes end office), indicate a hard trouble condition may exist in the end
office or end office tandem trunks. The PSAP will report this type of
condition to the SSC/MAC and the SSC/MAC should refer the report to the SCC
responsible for the tandem office. NOTE: XX is the ESCO (Emergency Service
Number) associated with the incoming 911 trunks into the tandem. It is
important that the C/MAC tell the SCC what is displayed at the PSAP (i.e.
911-0011) which indicates to the SCC which end office is in trouble.
Note: It is essential that the PSAP fill out inquiry form on every ANI
failure.
The PSAP will report a trouble any time an address is not received on an
address display (screen blank) E911 call. (If a record is not in the 911 data
base or an ANI failure is encountered, the screen will provide a display
noticing such condition). The SSC/MAC should verify with the PSAP whether the
NO ALI condition is on one screen or all screens.
When the condition is on one screen (other screens receive ALI information) the
SSC/MAC will request SSIM/I&M to dispatch.
If no screens are receiving ALI information, there is usually a circuit trouble
between the PSAP and the Host computer. The SSC/MAC should test the trouble
and refer for restoral.
Note: If the SSC/MAC receives calls from multiple PSAP's, all of which are
receiving NO ALI, there is a problem with the Node or Node to Host
circuits or the Host computer itself. Before referring the trouble the
SSC/MAC should call the MMOC to inquire if the Node or Host is in
trouble.
Alarm conditions on the ANI controller digital display at the PSAP are to be
reported by the PSAP's. These alarms can indicate various trouble conditions o
so the SSC/MAC should ask the PSAP if any portion of the E911 system is not
functioning properly.
The SSC/MAC should verify with the PSAP attendant that the equipment's primary
function is answering E911 calls. If it is, the SSC/MAC should request a
dispatch SSIM/I&M. If the equipment is not primarily used for E911, then the
SSC/MAC should advise PSAP to contact their CPE vendor.
Note: These troubles can be quite confusing when the PSAP has vendor equipment
mixed in with equipment that the BOC maintains. The Marketing
representative should provide the SSC/MAC information concerning any
unusual or exception items where the PSAP should contact their vendor.
This information should be included in the PSAP profile sheets.
ANI or ALI controller down: When the host computer sees the PSAP equipment
down and it does not come back up, the MMOC will report the trouble to the
SSC/MAC; the equipment is down at the PSAP, a dispatch will be required.
PSAP link (circuit) down: The MMOC will provide the SSC/MAC with the circuit
ID that the Host computer indicates in trouble. Although each PSAP has two
circuits, when either circuit is down the condition must be treated as an
emergency since failure of the second circuit will cause the PSAP to be
isolated.
Any problems that the MMOC identifies from the Node location to the Host
computer will be handled directly with the appropriate MMOC(s)/CCNC.
Note: The customer will call only when a problem is apparent to the PSAP.
When only one circuit is down to the PSAP, the customer may not be aware
there is a trouble, even though there is one link down, notification
should appear on the PSAP screen. Troubles called into the SSC/MAC from
the MMOC or other company employee should not be closed out by calling
the PSAP since it may result in the customer responding that they do not
have a trouble. These reports can only be closed out by receiving
information that the trouble was fixed and by checking with the company
employee that reported the trouble. The MMOC personnel will be able to
verify that the trouble has cleared by reviewing a printout from the
host.
When the CRSAB receives a subscriber complaint (i.e., cannot dial 911) the RSA
should obtain as much information as possible while the customer is on the
line.
For example, what happened when the subscriber dialed 911? The report is
automatically directed to the IMC for subscriber line testing. When no line
trouble is found, the IMC will refer the trouble condition to the SSC/MAC. The
SSC/MAC will contact Customer Services E911 Group and verify that the
subscriber should be able to call 911 and obtain the ESN. The SSC/MAC will
verify the ESN via 2SCCS. When both verifications match, the SSC/MAC will
refer the report to the SCC responsible for the 911 tandem office for
investigation and resolution. The MAC is responsible for tracking the trouble
and informing the IMC when it is resolved.
For more information, please refer to E911 Glossary of Terms.
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Two, Issue 24, File 6 of 13
[][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][]
[] []
[] Glossary Terminology []
[] For Enhanced 911 Services []
[] []
[] By The Eavesdropper []
[] []
[] March, 1988 []
[] []
[][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][][]
E911 - Enhanced 911: Features available include selective routing, selective
transfer, fixed transfer, alternate routing, default routing, Automatic
Number Display, Automatic Location Identification, night service,
default routing, call detail record.
End Office - Telephone central office which provides dial tone to the
subscriber calling 911. The "end office" provides ANI (Automatic
Number Identification) to the tandem office.
Tandem Office - Telephone central office which serves as a tandem (or hub) for
all 911 calls. Must be a 1AESS type of central office. The
tandem office translations contain the TN/ESN relationships
which route the 911 call to the proper SAP. The tandem office
looks up the ANI (TN) that it receives from the end office and
finds the ESN (routing information) which corresponds to a
seven digit number ringing in at a PSAP.
PSAP - Public Safety Answering Point, usually the police, fire and/or rescue
groups as determined by the local municipalities. A "ringin" will not
have ANI or ALI capabilities, but just receives calls or transferred
calls from another PSAP.
ESN - Emergency Service Number (XXX) that is assigned to the subscriber's
telephone number in the tandem office translations The ESN represents a
seven digit number by which the tandem office routes the call to the
proper PSAP. PSAPs with ALI capabilities also receive a display of the
ESN information which shows which police, fire and rescue agency serves
the telephone number calling 911. An ESN is a unique combination of
police, fire, and rescue service for purposes of routing the E911 call.
ANI - Automatic Number Identification corresponds to the subscriber's seven
digit telephone number. The ANI displays at the PSAP on the digital ANI
display console.
ALI - Automatic Location Identification provides for an address display of the
subscriber calling 911. With ALI, the PSAP receives the ANI display and
an ALI display on a screen. The ALI display includes the subscriber's
address, community, state, type of service and if a business, the name of
the business. The PSAP will also get a display of the associated ESN
information (police, fire, rescue).
Selective Routing - The capability to route a call to the particular PSAP
serving the address associated with the TN making the 911
call. Selective routing is achieved by building TN/ESN
translations in the tandem central office. These
translations are driven by the E911 data base which assigns
the ESN to each telephone number based on the customer's
address. Service order activity keeps the E911 data base
updated. The E911 data base, in turn, generates recent
change to the tandem office (through the SCC or RCMAC) to
update the TN/ESN translations in the tandem data base.
Selective Transfer - Provides the PSAP with the ability to transfer the
incoming 911 call to a fire or rescue service for the
particular number calling 911 by pushing one button for
fire or rescue. For example, if an incoming 911 call was
reporting a fire, the PSAP operator would push the fire
button on the ANI console; the call would go back to the
tandem office, do a lookup for the seven digit number
associated with fire department, for the ESN assigned to
the calling TN, and automatically route the call to that
fire department. This differs from "fixed" transfer which
routes every call to the same fire or rescue number
whenever the fire or rescue button is pushed. The PSAP
equipment is optioned to provide either fixed or selective
transfer capabilities.
Alternate Routing - Alternate routing provides for a predetermined routing for
911 calls when the tandem office is unable to route the
calls over the 911 trunks for a particular PSAP due to
troubles or all trunks busy.
Default Routing - Provides for routing of 911 calls when there is an ANI
failure. The call will be routed to the "default" ESN
associated with the he NNX the caller is calling from.
Default ESNs are preassigned in translations and are usually
the predominant ESN for a given wire center.
Night Service - Night service works the same as alternate routing in that the
calls coming into a given PSAP will automatically be routed to
another preset PSAP when all trunks are made busy due to the
PSAP closing down for the night.
Call Detail Record - When the 911 call is terminated by the PSAP operator, the
ANI will automatically print-out on the teletypewriter
located at the PSAP. The printout will contain the time
the call came into the PSAP, the time it was picked up by
an operator, the operator number, the time the call was
transferred, if applicable, the time the call was
terminated and the trunk group number associated with the
call. Printouts of the ALI display are now also
available, if the PSAP has purchased the required
equipment.
ANI Failure - Failure of the end office to identify the call and provide the
ANI (telephone number) to the tandem office; or, an ANI failure
between the tandem office and the PSAP.
Misroute - Any condition that results in the 911 call going to the wrong PSAP.
A call can be misrouted if the ESN and associated routing
information are incorrect in the E911 data base and/or tandem data
base. A call can also be misrouted if the call is an ANI failure,
which automatically default routes.
Anonymous Call - If a subscriber misdials and dials the seven digit number
associated with the PSAP position, they will come in direct
and ANI display as 911-0000 which will ALI as an anonymous
call. The seven digit numbers associated with the PSAP
positions are not published even to the PSAPs.
Spurious 911 Call - Occasionally, the PSAP will get a call that is not
associated with a subscriber dialing 911 for an emergency.
It could be a subscriber who has not dialed 911, but is
dialing another number, or has just picked up their phone
and was connected with the PSAP. These problems are
equipment related, particularly when the calls originate
from electromechanical or step by step offices, and are
reported by the E911 Center to Network Operations upon
receipt of the PSAP inquiry reporting the trouble. The
PSAP may get a call and no one is there; if they call the
number back, the number may be disconnected or no one home.
Again these are network troubles and must be investigated.
Cordless telephones can also generate "spurious" calls in
to the PSAPs. Generally, the PSAP will hear conversation
on the line, but the subscribers are not calling 911. The
PSAP may report spurious calls to to repair if they become
bothersome, for example, the same number ringing in
continually.
No Displays - A condition where the PSAP ALI display screen is blank. This
type of trouble should be reported immediately to the SSC/MAC.
If all screens at the PSAP are blank, it is an indication that
the problem is in the circuits from the PSAP to the E911
computer. If more than one PSAP is experiencing no display, it
may be a problem with the Node computer or the E911 computer.
The SSC/MAC should contact the MMOC to determine the health of
the HOST computer.
Record Not Found - If the host computer is unable to do a look up on a given
ANI request from the PSAP, it will forward a Record Not
Found message to the PSA ALI screen. This is caused by
service order activity for a given subscriber not being
processed into the E911 data base, or HOST computer system
problems whereby the record cannot be accessed at that point
in time.
No ANI - This condition means the PSAP received a call, but no telephone number
displayed on the ANI console. The PSAP should report this condition
immediately to the SSC/MAC.
PSAP Not Receiving Calls - If a PSAP cannot receive calls or request retrievals
from the E911 host computer, i.e., cable cut, the
calls into that PSAP must be rerouted to another
PSAP. The Switching Control Center must be notified
to reroute the calls in the tandem office E911
translations.
MSAG - Master Street Address Guide. The MSAG ledgers are controlled by the
municipality which has purchased the E911 ALI service, in that they
assign which police, fire or rescue agency will serve a given street and
number range. They do this by assigning an ESN to each street range,
odd, even, community that is populated in the county or municipality
served. These MSAGs are then used as a filter for service order
activity into the E911 computer data base to assign ESNs to individual
TN records. This insures that each customer will be routed to the
correct agency for their particular address. In a non-ALI County, TAR
codes are used by the Telephone company to assign ESNs to service
conductivity and the County does not control the ESN assignment. TAR
codes represent the taxing authority for the given subscriber which
should correspond to their police, fire and rescue agencies. The MG
method, of course, is more accurate because it is using the actual
service address of the customer to route the call and provides the
county with more flexibility in assigning fire and rescue district, etc.
The Customer Services E911 Group maintains the E911 computer data base
and interfaces with the County (customer) on all MSAG or data base
activity.
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Two, Issue 24, File 7 of 13
()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()
() ()
() Advanced Bitnet Procedures ()
() ()
() by ()
() ()
() VAXBusters International ()
() ()
()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()
Greetings! I have taken the time to write up a file about some of the more
complex operations on Bitnet. I hope you enjoy it! :-)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
You can send multiple messages to one user@node under VAX/VMS & JNET by just
typing;
$ SEND/REMOTE <host> <user>
This will collect messages from the terminal until an empty line or CTRL-Z is
entered.
Under Unix, the UREP package is popular to connect Unix boxes to Bitnet. The
important user commands are as follows:
Messages
~~~~~~~~
netwrite user@host
Send one or more messages to the specified Bitnet user. Netwrite reads
messages from it's standard input until an EOF is reached. If called from a
terminal, netwrite will terminate on an empty line as well.
When you receive Bitnet messages on a Unix host, UREP looks for an executable
file named .exwrite in your home directory. If it doesn't find such a file,
the message is simply spit on your terminal. If .exwrite is present, UREP
executes this program (which can be a shell script) with five parameters:
<To System> <To User> <From System> <From User> <Tty>
The <Tty> parameter tells the terminal to which UREP wanted to send the
message. UREP then feeds the messages to .exwrite as standard input. The
format of standard input is as follows:
<count (1 byte)><message (<count> bytes)>
To display these messages you need to have a "C" program, since a shell script
is not capable of handling single bytes painlessly. I included my exwrite.c at
the end of this file for a start.
Typically, .exwrite is used to log all incoming Bitnet messages. You can of
course blow it up to send messages back to the sender when you're out to lunch,
etc. BTW, .exwrite is called with the user ID of the receiving user, so it's no
real security hole.
File Transfer
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
netcopy user@host [ options ]
Copy a file to the specified Bitnet user. The most important option is
"name=<fname>.<ftype>", with which you can specify the file name to be used
at the recipient's machine. More details are in the manual page.
When you receive Bitnet files on a Unix machine running UREP, they will
be placed in your home directory under the name ":<fname>.<ftype>". These
files are in NETDATA format, and they have to be converted to ASCII text files
when you want to use them under Unix. This can be done with the command;
netdata [ <input_file> [ <output_file> ] ]
When <input_file> is unspecified, standard input is used. If <output_file> is
unspecified, standard output is used.
Bitnet Commands
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Though Bitnet has no remote login capability, you can execute a (restricted)
set of commands on remote hosts. These commands can be used to query node
status, lists of logged-on users, time and some other things.
This works as follows:
JNET: $ SEND/COMMAND <host> [ <command> ]
UREP: % netexec <host> [ <command> ]
CMS: SMSG <server> CMD <host> <command>
The <server> under CMS is the Bitnet control process. In Europe, it is
normally called "EARN." In the USA, it could be "BITNET" or maybe "RSCS."
You're on your own here.
The <host> is the Bitnet host name which you want to execute the <command>.
With JNET and UREP, you will be asked for multiple commands when you leave the
<command> field empty. Again, input is terminated with EOF or an empty line.
I have found the following commands useful in daily life:
CPQ N Get a list of the users currently logged in at the
<host>. This command is supposed to exist on every
Bitnet host, but some system managers like to restrict
it for security reasons. On JNET and UREP hosts,
FINGER performs a similar, but more elaborate function.
CPQ T Make <host> tell you the current time at it's location.
Q <otherhost> Make <host> tell you what the next hop to <otherhost>
is. This is useful when you're interested in the
network topology.
Q <ohost> A This makes <host> tell you what file is currently
active (being transmitted) for <ohost>. This only
works for machines which are directly connected to
<host>.
Q <ohost> Q This makes <host> show you the queue of files currently
waiting for transmission to <ohost>. This is useful
when you want to trace some file which you sent to the
network.
Q SYS This makes <host> tell you about the RSCS links it has.
Unfortunately, MVS-Hosts don't understand any of these commands, but simply
give an error message. You can recognize these things by the string "HASP"
somewhere in the error message.
Enjoy !
exwrite.c For Unix Hosts Running UREP
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
<-- cut here -->
/* exwrite.c - formatter for UREP rscs messages */
include <stdio.h>
include <sysexits.h>
include <pwd.h>
include <ctype.h>
main(argc, argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
struct passwd *pw;
char fname[255];
FILE *term;
FILE *log;
int count;
char buf[1024];
char *from_user;
char *from_host;
char *to_user;
char *to_host;
char *to_tty;
char *home_dir = "/tmp";
if (argc != 6)
fprintf(stderr, "%s: Invalid arguments\n", argv[0]);
exit(EX_USAGE);
/* initialise variables */
to_host = argv[1];
to_user = argv[2];
from_host = argv[3];
from_user = argv[4];
to_tty = argv[5];
/* convert the receiving user to lowercase. Under Unix, all *
* user names normally are lower case, and we need a valid *
* user name to determine the home directory */
for (; *to_user; to_user++)
*to_user = tolower(*to_user);
to_user = argv[2];
/* get the home directory of the receiving user */
if (pw = getpwnam(to_user))
home_dir = pw->pw_dir;
/* open the terminal, exit if the open fails */
sprintf(fname, "/dev/%s", to_tty);
if (!(term = fopen(fname, "w")))
exit(EX_OSERR);
/* open the rscs log file */
sprintf(fname, "%s/.rscslog", home_dir);
log = fopen(fname, "a");
/* if the message is not coming from the relay, write the *
* sending user and host name to the specified terminal */
if (strcmp(from_user, "RELAY"))
fprintf(term, "From %s@%s:\r\n", from_user, from_host);
/* read in the RSCS messages and send them to the terminal *
* and to the logfile if it has been opened. *
* In the log file, all lines are preceded by the sending user *
* and host name. */
while ((count = getchar()) != EOF)
if ((count = fread(buf, 1, count, stdin)) > 0)
fwrite(buf, 1, count, term);
fprintf(term, "\r\n");
if (log)
fprintf(log, "%s@%s: ", from_user, from_host);
fwrite(buf, 1, count, log);
fprintf(log, "\n");
exit(EX_OK);
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Two, Issue 24, File 8 of 13
/^\ /^\ /^\ /^\ /^\ /^\ /^\ /^\ /^\ /^\ /^\ /^\
/^\ /^\
/^\ Special Area Codes /^\
/^\ /^\
/^\ by >Unknown User< /^\
/^\ /^\
/^\ January 3, 1989 /^\
/^\ /^\
/^\ /^\ /^\ /^\ /^\ /^\ /^\ /^\ /^\ /^\ /^\ /^\
Greetings! I have compiled information about the SACs for your edification;
these include 700, 800, and 900.
Most telephone users from the United States are quite familiar with 800
service: A number that they dial and incur NO charge (not even message units
in most areas).
Then there is 900 service, which is what most people perceive as 'value added,'
i.e. you pay more for the information than for the transport of the call.
These vary typically from 35 cents to a few dollars for either a timed service,
or a 'as long as you like' duration-sensitive service. There are two
sub-species of 900 service: AT&T and "everybody else."
Finally, there is 700 service, which many people remember as Alliance
Teleconferencing. This is the third "canonical" SAC. With few limitations,
this SAC is given over to the IEC entirely.
Let's look at these in more detail.
800 Service
~~~~~~~~~~~
800 service is offered by various IECs. Each NXX in the 800 SAC is assigned to
a given carrier, who is responsible for assigning numbers from that block to
customers, and providing 10 digit translation.
The carrier must have Feature Group D presence for originating calls from the
originating exchange (either direct, or through an access tandem).
In the future, when CCIS becomes wide-spread, a query will be made in the
database [Who gets 1-800-985-1234?] and the call will be routed appropriately.
To clarify: Now the carrier is determined by the NNX. In the future, the
carrier will be determined by the entire 7 digits.
A similar situation exists with 900 service. Each carrier can reserve NXXs
from BellCore (the people who among a zillion other tasks are in charge of
handing out prefixes and area codes). They're not cheap! To get the actual
number is free (there are qualifications that I don't deal with), but to get it
'turned on' in a LATA costs you money, depending on:
(1) How many prefixes you're getting,
(2) Whether it's 800 or 900 service; and,
(3) How many Tandems/End Offices are in the LATA.
It requires a discrete amount of labor for EACH office, because EACH routing
table must be modified. However, I will be discussing 900 Service in more
detail later in this file.
When you, as Joe Customer, dial 1-800-222-1234 (made up number, please don't
bother them) it will initiate the following sequence:
1. If you are in an Electronic Office (DMS-100, DMS-200, 1A ESS, 5 ESS)
the 800-222 will be translated to "AT&T" and will search for an
opening in a trunk group marked for 800 origination. Should none be
found, bump to step 3.
2. If you are in a non-electronic office (SxS, XB, and some flavors of
ESS), it will go to the access tandem that your office 'homes' on,
where 800-222 will be translated to "AT&T."
Note: If at this point, the number doesn't have a translation, you
will get a "lose" recording from the CO.
3. Find a trunk in a trunk group marked for 800 origination. Should none
be found, give the customer a recording "Due to network congestion,
your 800 call could not be completed" or die, or whatever. (Depends
on phase of moon, etc.)
4. The end office will the send the following pulse-stream (in MF):
KP + II + 3/10D + ST + KP + 800 222 1234 + ST
Note: This is a simplification; there are some fine points of ANI
spills that are beyond the scope of this file.
II = 2 information digits. Typical values are:
00 normal ANI .. 10 digits follow
01 ONI line ... NPA follows
02 ANI failure ... NPA follows
3/10D = 3 or 10 digits. Either the NPA, or the entire 10 digit
number. KP and ST are control tones.
5. The carrier receives all of this (and probably throws the ANI into the
bit bucket) and translates the 800 number to what's called a PTN, or
Plant Test Number (for example, 617-555-9111). Then, the call is
routed AS IF the customer had dialed that 10 digit number. Of course,
the billing data is marked as an 800 call, so the subscriber receiving
the call pays the appropriate amount.
Of the 800 possible NXXs, 409 are currently assigned. A long-distance carrier
can get one 800 and four 900 numbers just for the paperwork. But to get more
than that, you have to show that you're 70% full now, and demonstrate a real
need for the capacity.
I have included the entire 800-NXX to long-distance carrier translation table.
Note that not every NXX is valid in every area.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Revised 800/OCN Translation Table
Effective October 10, 1988
221 ATX 222 ATX 223 ATX 224 LDL 225 ATX
226 MIC 227 ATX 228 ATX 229 TDX 230 NTK
231 ATX 232 ATX 233 ATX 234 MCI 235 ATX
236 SCH 237 ATX 238 ATX 239 DLT 240 SIR
241 ATX 242 ATX 243 ATX 244 --- 245 ATX
246 --- 247 ATX 248 ATX 249 --- 250 ---
251 ATX 252 ATX 253 ATX 254 TTU 255 ATX
256 LSI 257 ATX 258 ATX 259 --- 260 ---
261 SCH 262 ATX 263 CAN 264 ICT 265 CAN
266 CSY 267 CAN 268 CAN 269 FDG 270 ---
271 --- 272 ATX 273 --- 274 MCI 275 ITT
276 ONE 277 SNT 278 --- 279 MAL 280 ADG
281 --- 282 ATX 283 MCI 284 MCI 285 ---
286 --- 287 --- 288 MCI 289 MCI 290 ---
291 --- 292 ATX 293 PRO 294 --- 295 ---
296 --- 297 ARE 298 --- 299 CYT
321 ATX 322 ATX 323 ATX 324 HNI 325 ATX
326 UTC 327 ATX 328 ATX 329 TET 330 TET
331 ATX 332 ATX 333 MCI 334 ATX 335 SCH
336 ATX 337 FST 338 ATX 339 --- 340 ---
341 ATX 342 ATX 343 ATX 344 ATX 345 ATX
346 ATX 347 UTC 348 ATX 349 DCT 350 CSY
351 ATX 352 ATX 353 --- 354 --- 355 ---
356 ATX 357 --- 358 ATX 359 UTC 360 ---
361 CAN 362 ATX 363 CAN 364 HNI 365 MCI
366 UTC 367 ATX 368 ATX 369 TDD 370 TDD
371 --- 372 ATX 373 TDD 374 --- 375 TNO
376 --- 377 GTS 378 --- 379 --- 380 ---
381 --- 382 ATX 383 TDD 384 FDT 385 CAB
386 TBQ 387 CAN 388 --- 389 --- 390 ---
391 --- 392 ATX 393 EXF 394 --- 395 ---
396 --- 397 TDD 398 --- 399 ARZ
421 ATX 422 ATX 423 ATX 424 ATX 425 TTH
426 ATX 427 --- 428 ATX 429 --- 430 ---
431 ATX 432 ATX 433 ATX 434 AGN 435 ATX
436 IDN 437 ATX 438 ATX 439 --- 440 TXN
441 ATX 442 ATX 443 ATX 444 MCI 445 ATX
446 ATX 447 ATX 448 ATX 449 --- 450 USL
451 ATX 452 ATX 453 ATX 454 ALN 455 ---
456 MCI 457 ATX 458 ATX 459 --- 460 ---
461 CAN 462 ATX 463 CAN 464 --- 465 CAN
466 ALN 467 ICT 468 ATX 469 --- 470 ---
471 ALN 472 ATX 473 --- 474 --- 475 TDD
476 TDD 477 --- 478 AAM 479 --- 480 ---
481 --- 482 ATX 483 --- 484 TDD 485 TDD
486 TDX 487 --- 488 --- 489 TOM 490 ---
491 --- 492 ATX 493 --- 494 --- 495 ---
496 --- 497 --- 498 --- 499 ---
521 ATX 522 ATX 523 ATX 524 ATX 525 ATX
526 ATX 527 ATX 528 ATX 529 MIT 530 ---
531 ATX 532 ATX 533 ATX 534 --- 535 ATX
536 ALN 537 ATX 538 ATX 539 --- 540 ---
541 ATX 542 ATX 543 ATX 544 ATX 545 ATX
546 UTC 547 ATX 548 ATX 549 --- 550 CMA
551 ATX 552 ATX 553 ATX 554 ATX 555 ATX
556 ATX 557 ALN 558 ATX 559 --- 560 ---
561 CAN 562 ATX 563 CAN 564 --- 565 CAN
566 ALN 567 CAN 568 --- 569 --- 570 ---
571 --- 572 ATX 573 --- 574 AMM 575 ---
576 --- 577 GTS 578 --- 579 LNS 580 WES
581 --- 582 ATX 583 TDD 584 TDD 585 ---
586 ATC 587 LTQ 588 ATC 589 LGT 590 ---
591 --- 592 ATX 593 TDD 594 TDD 595 ---
596 --- 597 --- 598 --- 599 ---
621 ATX 622 ATX 623 --- 624 ATX 625 NLD
626 ATX 627 MCI 628 ATX 629 --- 630 ---
631 ATX 632 ATX 633 ATX 634 ATX 635 ATX
636 CQU 637 ATX 638 ATX 639 BUR 640 ---
641 ATX 642 ATX 643 ATX 644 CMA 645 ATX
646 --- 647 ATX 648 ATX 649 --- 650 ---
651 --- 652 ATX 653 --- 654 ATX 655 ---
656 --- 657 TDD 658 TDD 659 --- 660 ---
661 CAN 662 ATX 663 CAN 664 UTC 665 CAN
666 MCI 667 CAN 668 CAN 669 UTC 670 ---
671 --- 672 ATX 673 TDD 674 TDD 675 ---
676 --- 677 --- 678 MCI 679 --- 680 ---
681 --- 682 ATX 683 MTD 684 --- 685 ---
686 LGT 687 NTS 688 --- 689 --- 690 ---
691 --- 692 ATX 693 --- 694 --- 695 ---
696 --- 697 --- 698 NYC 699 PLG
720 TGN
721 --- 722 ATX 723 --- 724 RTC 725 SAN
726 UTC 727 MCI 728 TDD 729 UTC 730 ---
731 --- 732 ATX 733 UTC 734 --- 735 UTC
736 UTC 737 MEC 738 MEC 739 --- 740 ---
741 MIC 742 ATX 743 EDS 744 --- 745 ---
746 --- 747 TDD 748 TDD 749 TDD 750 ---
751 --- 752 ATX 753 --- 754 TSH 755 ---
756 --- 757 TID 758 --- 759 MCI 760 ---
761 --- 762 ATX 763 --- 764 AAM 765 ---
766 --- 767 UTC 768 SNT 769 --- 770 GCN
771 SNT 772 ATX 773 CUX 774 --- 775 ---
776 UTC 777 MCI 778 UTC 779 TDD 780 TDD
781 --- 782 ATX 783 ALN 784 ALG 785 SNH
786 *1 787 --- 788 --- 789 TMU 790 ---
791 --- 792 ATX 793 --- 794 --- 795 ---
796 --- 797 TID 798 TDD 799 ---
821 ATX 822 ATX 823 THA 824 ATX 825 MCI
826 ATX 827 UTC 828 ATX 829 UTC 830 ---
831 ATX 832 ATX 833 ATX 834 --- 835 ATX
836 TDD 837 TDD 838 --- 839 VST 840 ---
841 ATX 842 ATX 843 ATX 844 LDD 845 ATX
846 --- 847 ATX 848 ATX 849 --- 850 TKC
851 ATX 852 ATX 853 --- 854 ATX 855 ATX
856 --- 857 TLS 858 ATX 859 --- 860 ---
861 --- 862 ATX 863 ALN 864 TEN 865 ---
866 --- 867 --- 868 SNT 869 UTC 870 ---
871 --- 872 ATX 873 MCI 874 ATX 875 ALN
876 MCI 877 UTC 878 ALN 879 --- 880 NAS
881 NAS 882 ATX 883 --- 884 --- 885 ATX
886 ALN 887 ETS 888 MCI 889 --- 890 ---
891 --- 892 ATX 893 --- 894 --- 895 ---
896 TXN 897 --- 898 CGI 899 TDX
921 --- 922 ATX 923 ALN 924 --- 925 ---
926 --- 927 --- 928 CIS 929 --- 930 ---
931 --- 932 ATX 933 --- 934 --- 935 ---
936 RBW 937 MCI 938 --- 939 --- 940 TSF
941 --- 942 ATX 943 --- 944 --- 945 ---
946 --- 947 --- 948 --- 949 --- 950 MCI
951 BML 952 ATX 953 --- 954 --- 955 MCI
956 --- 957 --- 958 *2 959 *2 960 CNO
961 --- 962 ATX 963 SOC 964 --- 965 ---
966 TDX 967 --- 968 TED 969 TDX 970 ---
971 --- 972 ATX 973 --- 974 --- 975 ---
976 --- 977 --- 978 --- 979 --- 980 ---
981 --- 982 ATX 983 WUT 984 --- 985 ---
986 WUT 987 --- 988 WUT 989 TDX 990 ---
991 --- 992 ATX 993 --- 994 --- 995 ---
996 VOA 997 --- 998 --- 999 MCI
Notes
~~~~~
*1 -- Released For Future Assignment
*2 -- These NXX codes are generally reserved for test applications; They
may be reserved for Access Tandem testing from an End Office.
Note also: The following NXXs are dedicated for RCCP (Radio Common Carrier
Paging) under the discretion of the local exchange carrier:
202, 212, 302, 312, 402, 412, 502, 512, 602, 612, 702, 712, 802, 812, 902,
and 912.
OCN Reference List
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
ADG - Advantage Network, Inc. AGN - AMRIGON
ALG - Allnet Communication Services AMM - Access Long Distance
AAM - ALASCOM ARE - American Express TRS
ARZ - AmeriCall Corporation (Calif.) ATC - Action Telecom Co.
ATX - AT&T BML - Phone America
BUR - Burlington Tel. CAB - Hedges Communications
CAN - Telcom Canada CNO - COMTEL of New Orleans
CQU - ConQuest Comm. Corp CSY - COM Systems
CUX - Compu-Tel Inc. CYT - ClayDesta Communications
DCT - Direct Communications, Inc. DLT - Delta Communications, Inc.
EDS - Electronic Data Systems Corp. ETS - Eastern Telephone Systems, Inc.
EXF - Execulines of Florida, Inc. FDG - First Digital Network
FDN - Florida Digital Network FDT - Friend Technologies
FST - First Data Resources GCN - General Communications, Inc.
GTS - Telenet Comm. Corp. HNI - Houston Network, Inc.
ITT - United States Transmission System LDD - LDDS-II, Inc.
LDL - Long Distance for Less LGT - LITEL
LNS - Lintel Systems LSI - Long Distance Savers
LTQ - Long Distance for Less MAL - MIDAMERICAN
MCI - MCI Telecommunications Corp. MDE - Meade Associates
MEC - Mercury, Inc. MIC - Microtel, Inc.
MIT - Midco Communications MTD - Metromedia Long Distance
NLD - National Data Corp. NTK - Network Telemanagement Svcs.
NTS - NTS Communications ONC - OMNICALL, Inc.
ONE - One Call Communications, Inc. PHE - Phone Mail, Inc.
PLG - Pilgrim Telephone Co. PRO - PROTO-COL
RBW - R-Comm RTC - RCI Corporation
SAN - Satelco SCH - Schneider Communications
SDY - TELVUE Corp. SIR - Southern Interexchange Services
SLS - Southland Systems, Inc. SNH - Sunshine Telephone Co.
SNT - SouthernNet, Inc. SOC - State of California
TBQ - Telecable Corp. TDD - Teleconnect
TDX - Cable & Wireless Comm. TED - TeleDial America
TEM - Telesystems, Inc. TEN - Telesphere Network, Inc.
TET - Teltec Savings Communications Co TGN - Telemanagement Consult't Corp.
THA - Touch America TID - TMC South Central Indiana
TKC - TK Communications, Inc. TLS - TELE-SAV
TMU - Tel-America, Inc. TNO - ATC Cignal Communications
TOM - TMC of Montgomery TOR - TMC of Orlando
TSF - SOUTH-TEL TSH - Tel-Share
TTH - Tele Tech, Inc. TTU - Total-Tel USA
TXN - Tex-Net USL - U.S. Link Long Distance
UTC - U.S. Telcom, Inc. (U.S. Sprint) VOA - Valu-Line
VST - STAR-LINE WES - Westel
WUT - Western Union Telegraph Co.
NOTE: Where local telcos, such as Illinois Bell, offer 800 service, they
purchase blocks of numbers from AT&T on prefixes assigned to AT&T. They
are free to purchase blocks of numbers from any carrier of their choice
however.
This list also applies to the 900/OCN Translation Table (presented later
in this file).
900 Service
~~~~~~~~~~~
As I mentioned earlier there are two flavors of 900 service, AT&T and
"everybody else." Everybody else is handled exactly as the 800 service above,
except the IEC will probably use the ANI information to send you a bill
(either directly, or through your BOC, each situation governed by applicable
tariffs and contractual arrangements between the IEC and the BOC).
AT&T 900 is a curious monster indeed. It was designed as a "mass termination"
service. When you dial a 900 by AT&T (such as the "hear space shuttle
mission audio" number) you get routed to one of twelve "nodes" strewn
throughout the country. These nodes are each capable of terminating 9,000
calls >PER SECOND<. There are several options available where the customer
and/or the IP pay for all/part of the call. The big difference between 800 and
AT&T 900 is >NOT< "who pays for the call" (there are free 900 numbers), but
"how many people can it handle at once." The IP is responsible for providing
program audio. AT&T is prohibited from providing audio-program services (i.e.
tape recorded messages). As with any rule, there are exceptions to these as
well.
I have included the entire 900-NXX to long-distance carrier translation table.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Revised 900/OCN Translation Table
Effective October 10, 1988
Please note that this differs from the 800 table, because much fewer of the 900
NXXs are assigned.
NXX OCN NXX OCN NXX OCN NXX OCN NXX OCN
200 ATX 202 Ameritech 210 ATX 220 ATX 221 TDX
222 ONC 223 TDX 225 Pac. Bell 226 MCI 233 TDX
234 TEN 240 U.S. West 248 Ameritech 250 ATX 258 TEN
254 TTU 255 SNT 260 ATX 264 ADG 266 CSY
272 Bell Atl. 273 CAN 275 ITT 280 Ameritech 282 LGT
283 Pac. Bell 288 GTE N.west 297 CAN 300 ATX 301 Ameritech
302 Ameritech 303 Pac. Bell 321 TEN 322 TDX 327 ETS
328 ATX 331 TET 332 PLG 333 U.S. West 335 Bell Atl.
342 ATX 344 ATX 345 ALN 346 United Tel. 350 ATX
364 GTE N.West 366 ONC 369 TEN 370 ATX 377 GTS
386 United Tel. 388 SNT 399 ARZ 400 ATX 407 ATX
410 ATX 420 ATX 422 ALN 426 PLG 428 Ameritech
430 U.S. West 444 ONC 445 PHE 446 MCI 450 Ameritech
451 CAN 456 TEN 463 United Tel. 478 AAM 479 ARZ
480 ATX 483 GTE Midwest 488 ONC 490 U.S. West 500 ATX
505 Pac. Bell 520 ATX 529 MIT 536 BUR 540 ALN
543 ALN 545 GTE Calif. 550 ALN 555 ATX 567 ALN
580 U.S. West 590 ATX 595 CAN 600 ATX 620 Ameritech
624 Pac. Bell 626 CSY 628 Ameritech 630 CAN 633 MIT
639 PLG 643 CAN 645 CAN 650 ATX 654 TEN
656 SNT 660 ATX 661 United Tel. 663 MDE 665 ALN
666 ONC 670 CAN 677 CAN 678 MCI 680 ATX
686 LTG 690 CAN 698 NY Tel. 699 PLG 701 Bell Atl.
710 TGN 720 ATX 722 Pac. Bell 724 RTC 725 SNT
727 GTE Calif. 730 ATX 739 CSY 740 ATX 741 TEN
746 ITT 750 CAN 753 ALN 765 ALN 773 ATX
777 Pac. Bell 778 Ameritech 780 Ameritech 786 ATX 790 CAN
792 CAN 801 Bell Atl. 820 ATX 830 CAN 843 Pac. Bell
844 Pac. Bell 847 United Tel. 850 ATX 860 ATX 866 AAM
870 CAN 872 TEN 887 ETS 888 CIS 900 TDX
901 Bell Atl. 903 ATX 909 ATX 924 Ameritech 932 ATX
948 ARZ 949 MIC 963 TEN 970 MIC 971 MIC
972 MIC 973 MIC 974 ALN 975 ALN 976 ATX
988 MCI 990 MCI 991 ALG 993 SNT 999 TEN
700 Service
~~~~~~~~~~~
The last SAC we'll deal with is 700. I've seen ads on late-night television
for Group Access Bridging service (GAB) under 700 numbers, with an elephantine
dialing sequence. The one that comes to mind is 10041-1-700-777-7777. If you
were to dial 1-700-555-4141 you will hear a recording announcing your
Equal-Access carrier. (Some carriers ignore the last four digits, and any
700-555 number will give the announcement).
This is signalled the same as 800 service, and may or may not be billed
ENTIRELY at the discretion of the IEC. In New York, under PSC tariff, you can
order 900 and/or 700 blocking as well as 976, 970, 550, and 540 blocking in
various combinations.
What in ONE carrier might be a customer service hotline (Dial 1-700-I AM LOST)
might for another be a revenue product. There is LITTLE standardization of 700
usage from IEC to IEC.
The one last dialing pattern that is worth mentioning is what's called, "cut
through dialing." Try dialing 10220. If Western Union comes to your
town, you'll get a FG-A style dial tone. Presumably if you had a Western
Union "Calling Card" you could dial a call.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Glossary
~~~~~~~~
ANI - Automatic Number Identification. An MF sequence that identifies your
line for toll billing information. Often confused with ANAC (Automatic
Number Announcement Circuit) which reads your number back in a
synthesized voice.
BOC - Bell Operating Company. An often misused term that in general usage
means, "Your local exchange carrier." Since most of the telephones in
the country are served by what used to be the Bell system, we tend to use
the term. The proper term in this case, however IS "Exchange Carrier
[EC]" They provide service within your LATA.
FG-A - Feature Group A. Line Side termination for Long Distance carriers. The
old 555-1234 for Widget Telephone Company then dial an access code and
the number style dialing is called FG-A.
FG-B - Feature Group B. Trunk Side termination for Long Distance carriers.
(aka ENFIA B). 950 service. This is LATA wide service, and doesn't
cost the customer message units. ANI is only provided when the trunks
terminate in the End Office (as opposed to an access tandem).
FG-D - Feature Group D. Trunk Side termination. Provides 10xxx dialing, 1+
pre-subscription dialing, and Equal Access 800/900 service. Only
available in electronic offices and some 5XB offices (through a beastie
called an Adjunct Frame.)
GAB - Group Audio Bridging. Where several people call the same number, to talk
to other people calling the same number. "Party" or "Chat" lines.
IEC - Inter-Exchange Carrier. Someone who actually carries calls from place to
place. AT&T, Sprint, MCI are all IECs.
IP - Information Provider. Someone who sells a value-added service over the
telephone. Where you pay for the INFORMATION you're receiving, as well as
the cost of TRANSPORT of the call.
NXX - Notation convention for what used to be called a "prefix". N represents
the digits 2 through 9, and X represents the digits 0 through 9. There
are 800 valid NXX combinations, but some are reserved for local use.
(411 for Directory, 611 for Repair Bureau, 911 for emergency, etc.)
ONI - Operator Number Identification. In areas with some styles of party-line
service, the CO cannot tell who you are, and the operator will come on
and say, "What number are you calling from?". You can lie, they have to
trust you. They MAY know which PREFIX you're coming from, though.
PTN - Plant Test Number. A regular 10 digit number assigned with your inward
WATS line. This may NOT be a 'dialable' number from the local CO. (A
friend has a WATS line in Amherst, MA [413-549,
dial the PTN locally, but you can if you come in on a toll trunk.)
SAC - Special Area Code. Bellcore speak for area codes that aren't really
places, but classes of service.
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Two, Issue 24, File 9 of 13
/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
| |
| Lifting Ma Bell's Cloak Of Secrecy |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
| A New Look At Basic Telephone Systems |
| |
| by VaxCat |
| |
\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
Though telephones predate radio communications by many years, they aren't
nearly as simple as they appear at first glance. In fact, some aspects of
telephone systems are most interesting and quite ingenious. In this file, I
will describe some of these more interesting and perhaps less well-known areas
of telephone systems. Before going any further, let me explain and apologize
for the fact that some of the information in this file may not be altogether
complete, up to date, or even totally correct.
I do not work for any phone company, and therefore, I do not have unlimited
access to internal telephone company literature. Moreover, there is very
little material available in books or magazines which describes how United
States telephone systems work. Much of the information in this file has been
obtained piece-meal from many different sources such as books, popular
magazines, computer data communications journals, handbooks, and sometimes just
plain hearsay.
I have tried to correlate as much as possible all the little bits and pieces
into a coherent picture which makes sense, but there is no easy way to be sure
of all the little details. So think of this article as if it is a historical
novel - generally accurate and, regardless of whether it is completely true or
not, fascinating. With this out of the way, let's go on.
You, as a customer, are generally referred to as the "subscriber." Your
telephone connects to the Central Office through a two-wire cable which may be
miles long, and which may have a resistance on the order of hundreds or even
thousands of Ohms. This cable is essentially a balanced line with a
characteristic impedance of around 900 Ohms, but this varies greatly with
different cables, different weather conditions, and different calls. This is
why it is so hard to keep a hybrid phone-patch balanced.
The main power in the central office comes from 48 volt storage batteries which
are constantly kept trickle-charged. This battery is connected to your line
through a subscriber relay and a balanced audio transformer. The relay is
sensitive enough to detect even quite small currents through your line.
The buttons which stick up out of your telephone case when you lift the handset
activate the hook switch. The name probably dates back to the days when the
handset (or even earlier, the earpiece) hung on the side of the phone from a
hook. In any case, when your phone is hung up it is said to be on the hook,
and when you lift the handset to make a call it is said to go off the hook.
With the phone on hook, the line is connected only to the bell (called the
ringer). Because the bell circuit has a capacitor in it, no DC current can
flow through the phone. As a result, the subscriber relay back in the central
office will be de-energized, indicating to the central office (let's abbreviate
that as CO from now on) that your phone is hung up.
Since there is no current through your line or phone, there is no voltage drop
anywhere, and so if you measure the voltage across the phone line at your phone
you will see the entire 48 volts (or even more if the CO batteries are well
charged).
The positive (grounded) lead is called the tip and the negative lead is called
the ring; these names correspond to the tip and ring of a three-circuit phone
plug. Now suppose you want to place a call; You pick up the handset and the
phone goes off the hook. This completes the DC circuit through the dial,
microphone, and the hybrid network which is basically a complicated transformer
circuit.
At this point current starts to flow from the battery through your line and
phone, and the subscriber relay back at the CO pulls in. The line voltage
across your phone now drops to just a few volts because the line is loaded down
by the low resistance of the phone. The CO now searches for some idle dialing
circuits, and when it finds them, connects a dial tone back to your phone.
When you hear this, you start dialing.
So lets talk about rotary dial, the type of phone which you turn with your
finger (we will talk about Touchtone dials later). When you dial a number, the
dial acts as a short circuit until you release the dial and let the built-in
spring return it back to the resting position. As it is returning, it starts
to open and close the circuit in sequence to indicate the number you dialed.
If you dial a 1, it opens the circuit once; if you dial a 9 it opens the
circuit nine times. As the dial is returning it cause the subscriber relay to
open and close in step. This enables the CO to recognize the number you want.
When you finish dialing, the dial becomes just a plain short circuit which
passes current through the microphone and the hybrid network. Since the mike
is a carbon unit, it needs this current to work. When the CO receives he
complete number, it starts to process your call. If you dialed another
subscriber in the same area, it may connect you directly to that subscriber's
line. Calls to phones a little further away may have to be routed through
another CO, while long distance calls may go through one or more long distance
switching centers (called tandems) and possibly many other CO's before arriving
at the destination. At the completion of this process, you may get either a
ringing signal, indicating that the phone at the other end is ringing, one of
several types of busy signals, or possibly just silence, if something goes
wrong somewhere.
When you talk to the person at the other end, the cable carries audio in both
directions at the same time. Your carbon microphone varies the current in your
circuit, and this current variation is detected by a balanced transformer in
the CO. At the same time, audio coming back to your phone goes through the
hybrid network to your earphone. In phone company lingo they like to call the
mike a transmitter, and the earphone is called the receiver.
You may be interested in the makeup of the various tones you may hear on your
telephone; these tones are important to people such as computer communications
designers who have to build equipment which will recognize dial or other
signaling tones:
Dial tone in older exchanges may still be a combination of 120 and 600 Hz,
but the newer exchanges use a combination of 350 and 440 Hz. There is
often a slight change in the DC line voltage at the beginning of dial
tone, and this may also be detected.
Busy signal is a combination of 480 and 620 Hz which alternates for 1/2
second on and 1/2 second off (i.e., 60 interruptions per minute) when the
party you are calling is busy.
The same busy signal may be used for other conditions such as busy
interoffice or long distance circuits, but would then be interrupted
either 30 times a minute or 120 times per minute. This is a standard
agreed on by an international telecommunications organization called CCITT
(and I don't offhand remember the French words it stands for), but
occasionally other frequencies up to 2 kHz are used. A siren-like sound
varying between 200 and 400 Hz is often used for other error conditions.
The ringing tone, which you hear coming back to you when the phone rings
on the other end of the connection, is nowadays mostly a combination of
440 and 480 Hz, but there is great variation between CO's. Very often a
higher frequency such as 500 Hz is interrupted at 20 Hz, and other tones
are used as well. The tone is usually on for 2 seconds and off for 4
seconds.
The ringing current, actually used to ring the bell in a telephone, is an
AC voltage since it has to activate a ringer which has a capacitor in
series with it. Different companies use different ringing currents, but
the most common is 90 volts at 20 Hz. Since a typical phone may be
thousands of feet away from the CO, the thin wires used may have a fairly
high line resistance. Hence only a relatively small current can be
applied to the bell, certainly not enough to ring something like a
doorbell. This problem is solved by making the bell resonant mechanically
at the ringing frequency so that even a fairly small amount of power is
enough to start the striker moving hard enough to produce a loud sound.
This is the reason why a low-frequency AC is used. Although this raises
some problems in generating a 20 Hz signal at a high enough voltage, it
has the advantage that a bell will respond to a ringing current only if
the frequency is quite close to the bell's naturally resonant frequency.
If you build two bells, one resonant at 20 Hz and the other resonant at 30
Hz, and connect them together to the same line, you can ring just one bell
at a time by connecting a ringing current of the right frequency to the
line; this has some useful applications in ringing just one phone on a
party line.
Now let's look at some of the components of the phone itself. We will consider
the most common new phone, a model 500 C/D manufactured by Western Electric and
used by Bell System affiliated phone companies. This is the standard desk
phone, having modern rounded lines and usually having a G1 or G3 handset. It
was developed about 1950 and replaced the older 300-series phones which had the
older F1 handset and had sharper corners and edges. There was an in between
phone, where they took an old 300-series phone and put a new case on it which
resembled the 500-style case, but had a straight up and down back - the back of
the case came straight down right behind the handset cradle, whereas the true
500-style telephone has what looks like a set sticking out behind the cradle).
If you are still in doubt as to which phone you have, the bell loudness control
is a wheel on the 500-type phone and a lever on the 300-type. If you live in
the boondocks, you may still have the 200-type phone (sometimes called the
ovalbase) or maybe even the desk-stand type that looked like a candlestick,
with the microphone mounted on the top and the earpiece hanging on the side
from a hook.
Neither of these phones had a built in bell, and so you probably have a bell
box attached to your wall. If you have a phone with a handle on the side which
you crack to call the operator, the following does not apply to your phone!
Now lets discuss the bell circuit, which consists of a two-coil ringer and a
0.5 uF capacitor. On Western Electric phones the capacitor is mounted inside
the network assembly, which also has a large number of screws on top which act
as connection points for almost everything inside the phone. I have never
been able to find out why the ringer has two coils of unequal resistance, but
it apparently has something to do with determining which subscriber on a party
line makes which call. In most phones, the yellow and the green wires are
connected together at the wall terminal block so that the bell is connected
directly across the telephone line; disconnecting the yellow lead would turn
off the bell (although sometimes the connection is made internally by
connecting the black lead from the ringer directly to the L1 terminal, in which
case the yellow lead is disconnected.
You may wonder why a yellow lead is needed at all when only two wires are
normally used anyway. It is true that only two wires enter the house from the
outside; one of these is the tip and the other is the ring. In a non-party
line the ringing current as well as all talk voltages are applied between the
tip and the ring, and it doesn't actually matter which of the phone leads goes
to the tip and which to the ring if you have a rotary dial phone. If you have
a Touchtone dial, then you have to observe polarity so that the transistor
circuit in the dial works, in which case you have to make sure that the green
lead goes to the tip and the red lead goes to the ring.
The yellow lead is commonly used for party lines. On a two-party line ringing
current from the CO is applied not between the two lines, but between one line
and ground. In that case the yellow lead goes to ground while the other side
of the ringer (the red lead) is connected to either the tip or the ring,
depending on the party. In this way, it is possible to ring only one party's
bell at a time.
The remaining connections inside the telephone are varistors; the phone
companies must be the world's biggest users of these devices, which are
variable resistors whose resistance drops as the voltage across them rises.
Their function in the phone set is to short out parts of the set if the applied
voltage gets too high.
The hook switch actually has three sets of contacts, two normally open (open,
that is, when the hand set is on hook) which completes the DC circuit when you
pick up the handset, and a normally closed contact which is wired directly
across the earphone. This contact's function is to short the earphone during
the time that the DC circuit is being opened or closed through the phone - this
prevents you from being blasted by a loud click in the earphone.
The dial has two contacts. One of these is the pulsing contact, which is
normally closed and only opens during dialing on the return path of the dial
after you let go of it. The second contact (the off-normal contact), shorts
the earphone as soon as you start turning the dial, and releases the short only
after the dial returns back to the normal position. In this way you do not
hear the clicking of the dial in the phone as you dial. Finally, the phone has
the hybrid network which consists of a four-winding transformer and whole
collection of resistors, capacitors, and varistors. The main function of the
network is to attenuate your own voice to lower its volume in your earphone.
The simplest phone you could build would be just a series circuit consisting of
a dial, a mike, and an earphone. But the signals coming back from the other
party so much weaker than your own signals, that than earphone sensitive enough
to reproduce clearly and loudly the voice of the other person would then blast
your eardrums with the sound of your own voice. The function of the network is
to partially cancel out the signal produced by the local mike, while permitting
all of the received signal to go to the earphone. This technique is similar to
the use of the hybrid phone patch with a VOX circuit, where you want the voice
of the party on the telephone to go to your transmitter, but want to keep the
receiver signal out the transmitter.
In addition to the parts needed for the hybrid, the network also contains a few
other components (such as the RC network across the dial pulsing contacts) and
screwtype connection points for the entire phone.
A Touchtone phone is similar to the dial phone described above, except that the
rotary dial is replaced by a Touchtone dial. In addition to its transistorized
tone generator, the standard Touchtone pad has the same switch contacts to mute
the earphone, except that instead of completely shorting the earphone, as the
rotary dial does, the Touchtone dial switches in a resistor which only
partially mutes the phone.
It is fairly common knowledge as to what frequencies are used for Touchtone
signalling, but a it never hurts to reiterate information. Each digit is
composed of one frequency from the low group and one frequency from the high
group; for instance, the digit 6 is generated by producing a low tone of 770 Hz
(Hertz) and a high tone of 1477 Hz at the same time. The American Touchtone
pads generate both of these tones with the same transistor, while European pads
(yes, there are some) use two transistors, one for reach tone. In addition to
the first three high tones, a fourth tone of 1633 Hz has been decided on for
generating four more combinations. These are not presently in use, although
the standard phone Touchtone pad can easily be modified to produce this tone,
since the required tap on the inductor used to generate the the tone is already
present and only an additional switch contact is needed to use it.
What is not generally known is that the United States Air Force uses a
different set of Touchtone frequencies, in the range of 1020 to 1980 Hz. Since
many of the phones available for purchase in stores come from Department of
Defense surplus sales, it will be interesting when these phones become
available.
Another Touchtone dial presently used by amateurs is made up from a thin
elastomeric switch pad made by the Chomerics Corporation (77 Dragon Court,
Woburn, Mass. 01801) and a thick-film hybrid IC made by Microsystems
International (800 Dorchester Boulevard, Montreal, Quebec). The pad is the
Chomerics ER-20071, which measures about 2 1/4 inch wide by 3 inches high, and
only about 3/16 inch thick (Chomerics also makes a smaller model ER21289, but
it is very difficult to use and also apparently unreliable). Microsystems
International makes several very similar ICs in the ME8900 series, which use
different amounts of power and generate different amounts of audio. Some of
these also contain protection diodes to avoid problems if you use the wrong
polarity on the IC, and there are so many models to choose from that you should
get the technical data from the manufacturer before ordering one. There are a
number of United States distributors, including Newark Electronics, Milgray and
Arrow Electronics in New York.
One of the problems with any current IC oscillator is that the frequency
changes if rf gets near it. Many hams are having a hard time mounting such IC
pads on their 2 meter handie-Talkies. A solution seems in sight as Mostek, a
large IC company, is coming out with an IC Touchtone generator which has a
cheap 3.58 MHz external crystal as reference, and then produces the tone
frequencies by dividing the 3.58 MHz down with flip flops to get the required
tone frequencies. This approach not only promises to be more reliable in the
presence of rf, but should also be cheaper since it would not need the custom
(and expensive) laser trimming of components that the Microsystems
International IC needs to adjust the frequencies within tolerance.
At the other end of the telephone circuit, in the CO, various circuits are used
to decode the digit you dial into the appropriate signals needed to perform the
actual connection. In dial systems, this decoding is done by relay circuits,
such as steppers. This circuitry is designed for dialing at the rate of 10
pulses per second, with a duty cycle of about 60% open, 40% closed. The
minimum time between digits is about 600 milliseconds, although a slightly
greater time between digits is safer since it avoids errors.
In practice, many COs will accept dialing at substantially slower or faster
rates, and often you will see a dial that has been speeded up by changing the
mechanical governor to operate almost twice as fast; it depends on the type of
CO equipment.
Touchtone decoding is usually done by filter circuits which separate out the
Touchtone tones by filters and then use a transistor circuit to operate a
relay. A common decoder is the 247B, which is designed for use in small dial
switchboard systems of the type that would be installed on the premises of a
business for local communication between extensions. It consists of a limiter
amplifier, seven filters and relay drivers (one for each of the seven tones
commonly used) and some timing and checking circuitry. Each of the seven
relays has multiple contacts, which are then connected in various
series/parallel combinations to provide a grounding of one of ten output
contacts, when a digit is received. The standard 247B does not recognize the *
and digits, but can be modified easily enough if you have the unit diagram.
The 247B decoder is not very selective, and can easily be triggered by voice
unless some additional timing circuits are connected at the output to require
that the relay closure exceed some minimum time interval before it is accepted.
Slightly more complicated decoders which have the time delays built in are the
A3-type and the C-type Touchtone Receivers. both of these are used in
customer-owned automatic switchboards when a caller from the outside (via the
telephone company) wants to be able to dial directly into the private
switchboard to call a specific extension.
The C-type unit is similar to the 247B in that it has ten outputs one for each
digit. The A3-type does not have output relays, but instead has seven voltage
outputs, one for each of the seven basic tones, for activating external 48-volt
relays. The A-3 unit is ideal for activating a Touchtone encoder, which can
then be used to regenerate the Touchtone digits if the original input is noisy.
This might be very useful in a repeater autopatch, for cleaning up Touchtone
digits before they are sent into the telephone system.
In addition to the above, there are probably other types of units specially
designed for use in the CO, but information on these is not readily available.
It is also fairly easy to build a Touchtone decoder from scratch. Though the
standard telephone company decoders all use filter circuits, it is much easier
(though perhaps not as reliable) to use NE567 phase-locked-loop integrated
circuits.
An interesting sidelight to Touchtone operation is that it greatly speeds up
the process of placing a call. With a Touchtone dial it is possible to dial a
call perhaps 3 or 5 times faster than with a rotary dial. Since the CO
equipment which receives and decodes the number is only needed on your line
during the dialing time, this means that this equipment can be switched off
your line sooner and can therefore handle more calls. In fact, the entire
Touchtone system was invented so that CO operation would be streamlined and
less equipment would be needed for handling calls. It is ironic that the
customer should be charged extra for a service which not only costs the
telephone company nothing, but even saves it money.
Another practice which may or may not cost the company money is the connection
of privately-owned extension phones. You have probably seen these sold by mail
order houses and local stores. The telephone companies claim that connecting
these phones to their lines robs them of revenue and also may cause damage to
their equipment. There are others, of course, who hold the opinion that the
easy availability of extensions only causes people to make more calls since
they are more convenient, and that the companies really benefit from such use.
The question of damage to equipment is also not easily answered, since most of
the extension phones are directly compatible, and in many cases the same type
as the telephone company itself uses. Be that as it may, this may be a good
time to discuss such use.
Prior to an FCC decision to telephone company interconnection in the Carterfone
case in 1968, all telephone companies claimed that the connection of any
equipment to their lines was illegal. This was a slight misstatement as no
specific laws against such use were on the books. Instead, each local
telephone company had to file a tariff with the public service commission in
that state, and one of the provisions of that tariff was that no connection of
any external equipment was allowed. By its approval of that tariff, the public
service commission gave a sort of implicit legal status to the prohibition.
In the Carterfone case, however, the FCC ruled that the connection of outside
equipment had to be allowed. The phone companies then relaxed their tariff
wording such that connection of outside equipment was allowed if this
connection was through a connecting arrangement provided by the telephone
company for the purpose of protecting its equipment from damage. Although this
result has been challenged in several states, that seems to be the present
status. The strange thing is that some telephone companies allow
interconnection of customer equipment without any hassle whatsoever, while
others really make things difficult for the customer.
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Two, Issue 24, File 10 of 13
()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()
() ()
() Network Progression ()
() ()
() by Dedicated Link ()
() ()
() January 1989 ()
() ()
()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()()
This file provides a general overview of how networks have progressed from
phone lines to T1 lines.
There are numerous reasons to share networking facilities. The concept of
networking is to optimize all the aspects of voice and data transmission, and
to utilize all the amounts of space in the transmission lines.
Not long ago companies used AT&T's switching facilities for all local calls.
This means use of the Centrex, which is the switching of local calls by AT&T
(which is much more expensive than using your own switching facilities). Then
the larger organizations started to put in PBXes (Private Branch Exchange) to
enable them to switch local calls (class 5 ESS) without having anything to do
with AT&T. The process of using a PBX (or a Computerized Branch Exchange CBX)
is much more efficient if the phone traffic is high. This is the beginning of
a Local Area Network (LAN). Once an organization has it's own LAN it can lease
the extra transmission space to another company, because they are paying for it
anyway. Another method of bypassing AT&T's service is to use a foreign
exchange (FX) line. Which is a long distance dedicated point-to-point private
line, which is paid for on a flat rate basis. A FX line can be purchased from
AT&T or many other vendors. These private lines (PL) are used with voice and
data transmissions. Data transmission must have a higher grade quality than
voice because any minor break in the transmission can cause major, expensive
errors in data information being processed.
One of the most optimum ways of transmitting data is a T1 line which transmits
data at 1.544 megabits per second. Microwave, Satellite, and Fiber Optic
systems are being used for data transmission. These methods multiplex several
lines into one to create greater capacity of the transmission. A multiplexed
line has 24 channels that can be divided into the appropriate space needed to
utilize each transmission (i.e. a simple voice transmission which has about
300-3000 Hz uses a small portion of the multiplexed line). There are two types
of multiplexing; time-division and frequency. Time-division multiplexing
divides the channels into separate time slots. Frequency-division multiplexing
separates the different channels with the use of different bandwidths.
Typically, data is transmitted through digital systems rather than analog.
However, all the state-of-the-art equipment is now digital.
When the data is being processed from the computer to another computer there
must be a standard protocol for communicating the interexchange within the
network. The protocol is the set of rules that the computer says are necessary
to have in order for the other computer to connect to it. This is the standard
way of communicating (The American Standard Code for Interface Interexchange,
ASCII). Also, there are encryption codes which are used for security reasons.
Encryption codes can be scrambled on a hourly, daily, weekly, or monthly basis,
depending on the level of security.
The information that is being sent is organized by packet switching. The most
used packet switching is called X.25, and this is the interface that the CCITT
(Comittee Consultif Interaction Telephonique & Telegraphique) recommends to use
for connection between the Data Terminal Equipment (DTE) and the Data
Circuit-terminating Equipment (DCE).
Within this network it is crucial that there is software providing Automatic
Route Selection (ARS). There must be an ARS (the least cost path length)
programmed within the transmission. It is the job of the system analyst or
operator to assign the proper cost of each path where the transmission goes in
order for the packet to go through it's least cost route (LCR).
The packet travels through a path from it's source to it's final destination.
The system analyst or operator must have full knowledge of the exact path
length, the exact alternative path length, plus the exact third alternative
path length. The path length is measured in hops, which equals to the number
of circuits between central nodes. The system manager must set a maximum value
of hops at which the path can never exceed. This is the actual circuit cost
which is assigned to each possible path. It is important that the system
manager has knowledge of the circuit costs in order for the ARS to be
programmed effectively.
These are just some of the basics that are involved in transmitting information
over a network. I hope it helped you lots!
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Two, Issue 24, File 11 of 13
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
PWN PWN
PWN P h r a c k W o r l d N e w s PWN
PWN ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ PWN
PWN Issue XXIV/Part 1 PWN
PWN PWN
PWN February 25, 1989 PWN
PWN PWN
PWN Created, Written, and Edited PWN
PWN by Knight Lightning PWN
PWN PWN
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
Time And Time Again
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Greetings to everyone! This issue of Phrack Inc. marks the completion of the
plan I had conceived a little more than one year ago -- "The Phoenix Project."
No, not the bulletin board run by The Mentor (although the name of the board
came from this plan), my scheme to rebuild the hacking community from its
remaining ashes of the "Crisis of 1987." My plan had several parts that needed
to come together.
- Announce the plan and pour lots of hype into it to spur great enthusiasm.
- Hold SummerCon '88 in St. Louis, Missouri to get today's hackers to meet.
- Regain control of Phrack Inc. and put it back on its feet.
- Release the Vicious Circle Trilogy to expose and defeat our security
problems.
- Bring today's hackers into the next Millennium with The Future Transcendent
Saga (which helps to unite yesterday's hackers with the present).
And now...
Announcing The 3rd Annual...
SummerCon '89
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Saint Louis, Missouri
July 23-25, 1989
The date is a tentative one, but I would imagine that it will not change.
For more information please contact Taran King or Knight Lightning.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
On the lighter side, this issue of Phrack World News contains articles dealing
with Shadow Hawk, The Disk Jockey, Compaq, the FBI "Super" Database, the
Australian-American Hackers Ring, Computer Emergency Response Team, StarLink,
The Xenix Project, The Lost City of Atlantis, The Beehive BBS, and much more.
So read it and enjoy.
For any questions, comments, submissions of articles, or whatever, I can be
reached at C483307@UMCVMB.MISSOURI.EDU or C483307@UMCVMB.BITNET or whatever
bulletin board you can find me on.
:Knight Lightning
_______________________________________________________________________________
Explosives Expertise Found In Computer January 5, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
by Matt Neufeld (The Washington Times)
One of the four Bethesda youths killed in an explosion in the garage at the
home of the Brazilian Embassy's attache last weekend had access to a local
computer system's how-to listing of bombs and explosives, according to a system
member.
"He was highly involved with computers," said the computer operator of the
18-year-old Dov Fischman, one of the teens killed by the explosion. "Dov used
to go over to my friend's house," where they discussed various types of
software and computer systems, he said.
Located within an elaborate computer system of about 200 private bulletin
boards is a board titled "The Lost City of Atlantis" that contains files under
the following names: "Pipe Bombs," Gas Tank Bombs," "Make Smoke Bombs," "Soda
Bombs," "Explosive Info," "Kitchen Improvised Plastic Explosives," and "Plastic
Explosives," according to system files reviewed yesterday by the Washington
Times.
Details on committing mischief and various illegal activities fill the files of
Atlantis and other boards in the system. The Atlantis board is listed under
the heading, "The Rules of Anarchy."
The files on Atlantis, which is run locally, but could be accessed by computer
owners nationwide, include information and correspondence on how to buy various
chemicals and and explosives used to make bombs. Other files have explanations
on how to use these materials to fashion the bombs.
"Some or all of you reading this may have caught word from the grapevine that I
sell laboratory materials and/or chemicals," begins one message from a system
worker who operates under the pseudonym "The Pyromaniac."
"I can get for you almost any substance you would want or need," the message
says later. "Always remember that I am flexible; Your parents need not know
about the chemicals."
Mr. Fischman and the other teens have been described by friends and relatives
as highly intelligent, hard-working honor students. They were killed about
3:15 a.m. Saturday in an explosion at the home of attache Vera Machado in the
6200 block of Verne Street. A Montgomery County Police investigation
determined the cause was accidental and caused by the youths "experimenting
with some type of explosive."
Nitrates, peroxides and carbonates were found at Mr. Fischman's home, along
with literature on "resources for chemicals and appliances and recipes
utilized for explosive devices," said fire marshal's spokesman Mike Hall. "The
exact nature of resources and recipes has not been disclosed by the
investigative section, as the investigation is going on."
"I have no knowledge that any computer system information was used," but that
possibility will be investigated, Mr. Hall said. Mr. Fischman's father, Joel,
yesterday said his son and the other three youths were involved with computers.
But he said he was not aware of any connection between computers and the
explosion. He referred further questions to the police.
The local computer system operator said most users are 15 to 19 years old. The
operator, however, said it is common for users of the system to peruse the
files while their parents have no knowledge of the contents.
The boards and files are legal, and the bomb information is primarily confined
to "private" bulletin boards created by persons known as "system operators."
However, anyone with a home computer, a telephone and a modem can hook up to
the bulletin boards if they gain approval of the individual operators, the
operator said.
"I think this should be allowed, but not just for any kids," said the operator,
who is an adult. He said it's "really the parents' fault" for not supervising
their children's computer access.
Another board in the system, "Warp Speed," also provides information on
explosives. That board was shut down sometime between December 30, 1988 and
January 1, 1989 the operator said. That board is "host" to "Damage, Inc.,"
which is a "group of people who concentrate on explosives, things to screw
people up, damage," he said.
In the "Beehive" board the following message appears from "Mister Fusion:"
"low cost explosives are no problem. make them yourself. what do
you want rdx? detonators, low explosives? high explosives? i can
tell you what to do for some, but I would reccomend (sic) cia black
books 1-3."
Other boards and files in the system include information on computer hacking,
constructing a device to jam police radar detectors, picking locks, and
"phreaking," which is computer jargon for using computers to make free
telephone calls.
Some of these files are: "Making LSD," "Listing of common household chemicals,"
"Info on Barbiturates," "Make a mini-flame thrower," How to make a land mine,"
"How to Hot Wire a car," "Home Defense: part II, guns or friends," "How to have
fun with someone else's car," "Fun! with Random Senseless Violence," "Picking
up little girls," and "How to break into a house."
"A lot of the information is wrong, in the phreaker world, regarding ways to
defeat the telephone company," said the operator, who has been involved with
computers for at least six years. "But the bomb information is pretty much
accurate."
In the two page, "High Explosives" file, there are detailed explanations on how
to use the chemicals cacodyal, tetryl and mercury fulminate.
"This stuff is awesome," begins the section on cacodyal. "It is possesses
flammability when exposed to air. Plus it will release a cloud of thick white
smoke. The smoke just happens to be arsenic."
The file does offer this warning at the end: "Don't attempt to make these
things unless you are experienced in handling chemicals. They can be very
dangerous if not handled properly."
The "Kitchen Improvised Plastic Explosives" file, which instructs users on "how
to make plastique from bleach" and is credited to a Tim Lewis, warns that the
chemicals are dangerous."
_______________________________________________________________________________
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) January 23, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Excerpted from UNIX Today
WASHINGTON -- The federal government's newly formed Computer Emergency Response
Team (CERT) is hoping to sign up 100 technical experts to aid in its battle
against computer viruses.
CERT, formed last month by the Department of Defense's Advanced Research
Project Agency (DARPA), expects to sign volunteers from federal, military, and
civilian agencies to act as advisors to users facing possible network invasion.
DARPA hopes to sign people from the National Institute of Science and
Technology, the National Security Agency, the Software Engineering Institute,
and other government-funded university laboratories, and even the FBI.
The standing team of UNIX security experts will replace an ad hoc group pulled
together by the Pentagon last November to deal with the infection of UNIX
systems allegedly brought on by Robert Morris Jr., a government spokesman said.
CERT's charter will also include an outreach program to help educate users
about what they can do the prevent security lapses, according to Susan Duncal,
a spokeswoman for CERT. The group is expected to produce a "security audit"
checklist to which users can refer when assessing their network vulnerability.
The group is also expected to focus on repairing security lapses that exist in
current UNIX software.
To contact CERT, call the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie-Mellon
University in Pittsburgh at (412) 268-7090; or use the Arpanet mailbox address
cert@sei.cmu.edu.
_______________________________________________________________________________
The Xenix Project aka The Phoenix Project Phase II January 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
There are some big changes in store for everyone's favorite bulletin board.
As of January 25, 1989, The Mentor became the proud owner of the complete SCO
Xenix system, complete with the development kit and text utilities (a $1200
investment, but worth it). He has arranged for a UUCP mail and USENET
newsfeed, and is working on getting bulletin board software up and running on
it.
So what does this mean to you? As I have been illustrating throughout The
Future Transcendent Saga and a few other files/places, the future lies in the
wide area networks. So now for the first time ever, The Mentor is offering the
hackers a cheap, *LEGAL* way to access the gigabytes of information available
through USENET. Mail can be sent through BITNET, MILNET, ARPANET, and INTERNET
gateways to users all over the world. In short, connectivity has arrived and
the future grows ever closer.
The first thing that The Mentor wants to do is get a second hard disk drive.
There is no way the Xenix Project can run right now without it. His 40 meg has
a 20 meg Xenix partition, 17 megs of which is occupied by the /root/ file
system. The MS-DOS partition has 12 megs of the board, plus all the programs
he needs to exist (Pagemaker, Word, Microsoft C, Brief, etc). A *MINIMUM* of a
60 meg drive will be needed to support the newsfeed (USENET generated 50 megs
of traffic in the last 2 weeks). A 100+ meg drive would be better. Once a
hard disk is obtained, the system will go online as a single-line UNIX machine.
Hopefully, enough money will be generated to add a second phone line and modem
quickly. At this point the system will begin to take off.
The Mentor's eventual goal (inside 6 months) is to have 4-6 300-2400 baud lines
available for dialin on a hunt group, plus a 19.2Kbaud line for getting the
USENET feed. The estimated startup cost for a 5-line system is:
110 meg hard disk........................ $1000
4 2400 baud modems (I've got 1 already).. $ 525
Installation of 4 phone lines............ $ 450
MultiPort Serial Card.................... $ 300
SCO Xenix Software....................... $1200
~~~~~
$3475
Financing is a problem. The Mentor has already sunk the $1200 into the Xenix
package (plus his original purchase of the computer system), leaving him $2200
away from the best hacker system in the world. There are two ways that he
hopes on getting the money for the rest of the system.
A) Donations - Many users have already indicated that they will send in
anywhere from $10 to $100. Surprisingly enough, the security
people on The Phoenix Project have been extremely generous.
There *is* an incentive to donate, as will be shown below.
B) Monthly fees - There will be a $5-$12.50 charge per month to use the UNIX
side of the system, but the Phoenix Project BBS will remain
free! Here is how it works:
Level 1 - BBS Only. Anyone who wishes to use only The Phoenix Project will
call and log in to account name 'bbs.' They will be forced into the BBS
software, at which point they will log in as usual. As far as they're
concerned, this is just a change of software with the addition of the front
end password 'bbs.'
Level 2 - Individual Mail & News account. For $5 a month, a user will get
their own private account with full access to UUCP mail and USENET news.
They will be able to send mail all over the world and to read and post to
the hundreds of USENET newsgroups. Legally, for a change!
Level 3 - Individual Mail, News, Games, and Chat. The user will have all
the privileges of a Level 2 person, be able to access games such as Rogue,
Chase, and Greed, plus will have access to the multi-user chat system
similar to the one running on Altos in West Germany, allowing real-time
conferencing between hackers here in the states without having to have an
NUI to get to Datex-P. This will cost $10 per month.
Level 4 - Full Bourne Shell access. This will allow access to the full
system, including the C compiler, text utilities, and will include access to
the online laser printer for printing term papers, important documents, or
anything else (mailing will incur a small fee.) Level 4 access will be
restricted to people technically sophisticated enough to know how to use and
how not to use UNIX compilers. The entire Xenix Development System and
Text Processing Utilities are installed, including online manual pages. I
will aid people in debugging and testing code whenever needed. Charge is
$12.50 per month.
C) Why Donate? - Simple. You get a price break. Here are the charter
membership categories:
Contributing: $20 You receive 6 months of Level 2 access, a $10 savings
over the monthly fees.
Supporting: $45 You receive either 1 year of Level 2 access or 6 months
of Level 3 access.
Sustaining: $75 You receive 1 year of Level 3 access, or life time level
2 access.
Lifetime: $100 You receive lifetime Level 4 access. Contributions in
amounts less than $20 will be directly applied toward Level 2
access (e.g. A $10 donation will give you 2 months Level 2
access).
Hardware contributions will definitely be accepted in return for access.
Contact me and we'll cut a deal.
Information Provided by The Mentor
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
A Few Notes From The Mentor
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
People -- I am not trying to make a profit off of this. If I could afford the
hardware I'd buy it. The Phoenix Project has been committed to bringing you
the best in hack/phreak information available, and will continue to do so FREE.
I stress, even after the switch is made, The Phoenix Project BBS will be
available under a un-pass-worded login that anyone can log into and use. It's
only if you want to enter the world of networks in a *LEGAL* manner that I need
to get money .
The system will expand as interest in it expands. If I never get enough paid
users to add more than one line, it will remain a one-line system. I think
enough people will see the advantages of UUCP and USENET to be willing to shell
out the cost of a 6-pack of good beer to get access.
As a side note to UNIX hacks out there, this system will also offer a good
place to explore your UNIX hacking techniques. Unlike other systems that
penalize you for breaking security, I will reward people who find holes in my
security. While this will mostly only apply to Level 4 people (the only ones
not in a restricted shell), 3-6 months of free access will be given to people
discovering security loopholes. So if you've ever wanted an unrestricted
environment for learning/perfecting your UNIX, this is it!
For more information, I can be reached at:
The Phoenix Project: 512-441-3088
Shadowkeep II: 512-929-7002
Hacker's Den 88: 718-358-9209
Donations can be sent to: Loyd
PO Box 8500-615
San Marcos, TX 78666
(make all checks payable to Loyd)
+++The Mentor+++
"The Future is Forever!"
_______________________________________________________________________________
Breaking Into Computers Is A Crime, Pure And Simple December 4, 1988
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
By Edward A Parrish Jr., Past President, IEEE Computer Society
Originally printed in Los Angeles Times
During the last few years, much has been written to publicize the feats
of computer hackers. There was, for example, the popular movie War Games,
about a teen-ager who, using his home computer, was able to tap into a military
computer network and play games with the heart of the system. The games got
of control when he chose to play "thermonuclear war." The teen-ager, who was
depicted with innocent motives, eventually played a crucial role in solving the
problem and averting a real nuclear exchange, in the process emerging as hero.
A real-life example in early November involved a so-called computer virus
(a self-replicating program spread over computer networks and other media as a
prank or act of vandalism), which nearly paralyzed 6,000 military and academic
computers.
Unfortunately, perhaps because the effect of such "pranks" seems remote to most
people, it is tempting to view the hacker as something of a folk hero - a lone
individual who, armed with only his own ingenuity, is able to thwart the
system. Not enough attention is paid to the real damage that such people can
do. But consider the consequences of a similar "prank" perpetrated on our
air-traffic control system, or a regional banking system, or a hospital
information system. The incident in which an electronic intruder broke into an
unclassified Pentagon computer network, altering or destroying some files,
caused potentially serious damage.
We do not really know the full effect of the November virus incident that
brought many computers on the Cornell-Stanford network to a halt, but credible
published estimates of the cost in man-hours and computer time have been in the
millions of dollars. The vast majority of professional computer scientists and
engineers who design, develop, and use these sophisticated networks are
dismayed by this total disregard of ethical practice and forfeiture of
professional integrity.
Ironically, these hackers are perhaps driven by the same need to explore, to
test technical limits that motivates computer professionals; they decompose
problems, develop an understanding of them and then overcome them. But
apparently not all hackers recognize the difference between penetrating the
technical secrets of their own computer and penetrating a network of computers
that belong to others. And therein lies a key distinction between a computer
professional and someone who knows a lot about computers.
Clearly a technical degree is no guarantee of ethical behavior. And hackers
are not the only ones who abuse the power inherent in their knowledge. What,
then, can we do?
For one thing, we - the public at large - can raise our own consciousness;
Specifically, when someone tampers with someone else's data or programs,
however clever the method, we all need to recognize that such an act is at best
irresponsible and very likely criminal. That the offender feels no remorse, or
that the virus had unintended consequences, does not change the essential
lawlessness of the act, which is in effect breaking-and-entering. And
asserting that the act had a salutary outcome, since it lead to stronger
safeguards, has no more validity than if the same argument were advanced in
defense of any crime. If after experiencing a burglary I purchase a burglar
alarm for my house, does that excuse the burglar? Of course not. Any such act
should be vigorously prosecuted.
On another front, professional societies such as the IEEE Computer Society can
take such steps to expel, suspend, or censure as appropriate any member found
guilty of such conduct. Finally, accrediting agencies, such as the Computing
Sciences Accreditation Board and the Accreditation Board for Engineering and
Technology, should more vigorously pursue their standards, which provide for
appropriate coverage of ethical and professional conduct in university computer
science and computer engineering curriculums.
We are well into the information age, a time when the computer is at least as
vital to our national health, safety and survival as any other single resource.
The public must insist on measures for ensuring computer security to the same
degree as other technologies that are critical to its health and safety.
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Two, Issue 24, File 12 of 13
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
PWN PWN
PWN P h r a c k W o r l d N e w s PWN
PWN ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ PWN
PWN Issue XXIV/Part 2 PWN
PWN PWN
PWN February 25, 1989 PWN
PWN PWN
PWN Created, Written, and Edited PWN
PWN by Knight Lightning PWN
PWN PWN
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
Shadow Hawk Gets Prison Term February 17, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
An 18 year old telephone phreak from the northside/Rogers Park community in
Chicago who electronically broke into U.S. military computers and AT&T
computers, stealing 55 programs was sentenced to nine months in prison on
Tuesday, February 14, 1989 in Federal District Court in Chicago.
Herbert Zinn, Jr., who lives with his parents on North Artesian Avenue in
Chicago was found guilty of violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of
1986 by Judge Paul E. Plunkett. In addition to a prison term, Zinn must pay
a $10,000 fine, and serve two and a half years of federal probation when
released from prison.
United States Attorney Anton R. Valukas said, "The Zinn case will serve to
demonstrate the direction we are going to go with these cases in the future.
Our intention is to prosecute aggressively. What we undertook is to address
the problem of unauthorized computer intrusion, an all-too-common problem that
is difficult to uncover and difficult to prosecute..."
Zinn, a dropout from Mather High School in Chicago was 16-17 years old at
the time he committed the intrusions, using his home computer and modem. Using
the handle "Shadow Hawk," Zinn broke into a Bell Labs computer in Naperville,
IL; an AT&T computer in Burlington, NC; and an AT&T computer at Robbins Air
Force Base, GA. No classified material was obtained, but the government views
as 'highly sensitive' the programs stolen from a computer used by NATO which is
tied into the U.S. missile command. In addition, Zinn made unlawful access to a
a computer at an IBM facility in Rye, NY, and into computers of Illinois Bell
Telephone Company and Rochester Telephone Company, Rochester, NY.
Assistant United States Attorney William Cook said that Zinn obtained access to
the AT&T/Illinois Bell computers from computer bulletin board systems, which he
described as "...just high-tech street gangs." During his bench trial during
January, Zinn spoke in his own defense, saying that he took the programs to
educate himself, and not to sell them or share them with other phreaks. The
programs stolen included very complex software relating to computer design and
artificial intelligence. Also stolen was software used by the BOC's (Bell
Operating Companies) for billing and accounting on long distance telephone
calls.
The Shadow Hawk -- that is, Herbert Zinn, Jr. -- operated undetected for at
least a few months in 1986-87, but his undoing came when his urge to brag about
his exploits got the best of him. It seems to be the nature of phreaks and
hackers that they have to tell others what they are doing. On a BBS notorious
for its phreak/pirate messages, Shadow Hawk provided passwords, telephone
numbers and technical details of trapdoors he had built into computer systems,
including the machine at Bell Labs in Naperville.
What Shadow Hawk did not realize was that employees of AT&T and Illinois Bell
love to use that BBS also; and read the messages others have written. Security
representatives from IBT and AT&T began reading Shadow Hawk's comments
regularly; but they never were able to positively identify him. Shadow Hawk
repeatedly made boasts about how he would "shut down AT&T's public switched
network." Now AT&T became even more eager to locate him. When Zinn finally
discussed the trapdoor he had built into the Naperville computer, AT&T decided
to build one of their own for him in return; and within a few days he had
fallen into it. Once he was logged into the system, it became a simple matter
to trace the telephone call; and they found its origin in the basement of the
Zinn family home on North Artesian Street in Chicago, where Herb, Jr. was busy
at work with his modem and computer.
Rather than move immediately, with possibly not enough evidence for a good,
solid conviction, everyone gave Herb enough rope to hang himself. For over two
months, all calls from his telephone were carefully audited. His illicit
activities on computers throughout the United States were noted, and logs were
kept. Security representatives from Sprint made available notes from their
investigation of his calls on their network. Finally the "big day" arrived,
and the Zinn residence was raided by FBI agents, AT&T/IBT security
representatives and Chicago Police detectives used for backup. At the time of
the raid, three computers, various modems and other computer peripheral devices
were confiscated. The raid, in September, 1987, brought a crude stop to Zinn's
phreaking activities. The resulting newspaper stories brought humiliation and
mortification to Zinn's parents; both well-known and respected residents of the
Rogers Park neighborhood. At the time of the younger Zinn's arrest, his father
spoke with authorities, saying, "Such a good boy! And so intelligent with
computers!"
It all came to an end Tuesday morning in Judge Plunkett's courtroom in Chicago,
when the judge imposed sentence, placing Zinn in the custody of the Attorney
General or his authorized representative for a period of nine months; to be
followed by two and a half years federal probation and a $10,000 fine. The
judge noted in imposing sentence that, "...perhaps this example will defer
others who would make unauthorized entry into computer systems." Accepting the
government's claims that Zinn was "simply a burglar; an electronic one... a
member of a high-tech street gang," Plunkett added that he hoped Zinn would
learn a lesson from this brush with the law, and begin channeling his expert
computer ability into legal outlets. The judge also encouraged Zinn to
complete his high school education, and "become a contributing member of
society instead of what you are now, sir..."
Because Zinn agreed to cooperate with the government at his trial, and at any
time in the future when he is requested to do so, the government made no
recommendation to the court regarding sentencing. Zinn's attorney asked the
court for leniency and a term of probation, but Judge Plunkett felt some
incarceration was appropriate. Zinn could have been incarcerated until he
reaches the age of 21.
His parents left the courtroom Tuesday with a great sadness. When asked to
discuss their son, they said they preferred to make no comment.
Information Collected From Various Sources
_______________________________________________________________________________
FBI National Crime Information Center Data Bank February 13, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
By Evelyn Richards (Washington Post)
"Proposed FBI Crime Computer System Raises Questions on Accuracy, Privacy --
Report Warns of Potential Risk Data Bank Poses to Civil Liberties"
On a Saturday afternoon just before Christmas last year, U.S. Customs officials
at Los Angeles International Airport scored a "hit."
Running the typical computer checks of passengers debarking a Trans World
Airlines flight from London, they discovered Richard Lawrence Sklar, a fugitive
wanted for his part in an Arizona real estate scam.
As their guidelines require, Customs confirmed all the particulars about Sklar
with officials in Arizona - his birth date, height, weight, eye and hair color
matched those of the wanted man.
Sklar's capture exemplified perfectly the power of computerized crime fighting.
Authorities thousands of miles away from a crime scene can almost instantly
identify and nab a wanted person.
There was only one problem with the Sklar case: He was the wrong man. The
58-year old passenger - who spent the next two days being strip-searched,
herded from one holding pen to another and handcuffed to gang members and other
violent offenders - was a political science professor at the University of
California at Los Angeles.
After being fingered three times in the past dozen years for the financial
trickeries of an impostor, Sklar is demanding that the FBI, whose computer
scored the latest hit, set its electronic records straight. "Until this person
is caught, I am likely to be victimized by another warrant," Sklar said.
Nowhere are the benefits and drawbacks of computerization more apparent than
at the FBI, which is concluding a six-year study on how to improve its National
Crime Information Center, a vast computer network that already links 64,000 law
enforcement agencies with data banks of 19 million crime-related records.
Although top FBI officials have not signed off on the proposal, the current
version would let authorities transmit more detailed information and draw on a
vastly expanded array of criminal records. It would enable, for example,
storage and electronic transmission of fingerprints, photos, tattoos and other
physical attributes that might prevent a mistaken arrest. Though
controversial, FBI officials have recommended that it include a data bank
containing names of suspects who have not been charged with a crime.
The proposed system, however, already has enraged computer scientists and
privacy experts who warn in a report that the system would pose a "potentially
serious risk to privacy and civil liberties." The report, prepared for the
House subcommittee on civil and constitutional rights, also contends that the
proposed $40 million overhaul would not correct accuracy problems or assure
that records are secure.
Mostly because of such criticism, the FBI's revamped proposal for a new system,
known as the NCIC 2000 plan, is a skeleton of the capabilities first suggested
by law enforcement officials. Many of their ideas have been pared back, either
for reasons of practicality or privacy.
"Technical possibility should not be the same thing as permissible policy,"
said Marc Rotenberg, an editor of the report and Washington liaison for
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, a California organization.
The need to make that tradeoff - to weigh the benefits of technological
advances against the less obvious drawbacks - is becoming more apparent as
nationwide computer links become the blood vessels of a high-tech society.
Keeping technology under control requires users to double-check the accuracy of
the stored data and sometimes resort told-fashioned paper records or
face-to-face contact for confirmation. Errors have plagued the NCIC for many
years, but an extensive effort to improve record-keeping has significantly
reduced the problem, the FBI said.
Tapped by federal, state and local agencies, the existing FBI system juggles
about 10 inquiries a second from people seeking records on wanted persons,
stolen vehicles and property, and criminal histories, among other things. Using
the current system, for example, a police officer making a traffic stop can
fine out within seconds whether the individual is wanted anywhere else in the
United States, or an investigator culling through a list of suspects can peruse
past records.
At one point, the FBI computer of the future was envisioned as having links to
a raft of other data bases, including credit records and those kept by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Internal Revenue Service, the
Social Security Administration and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
One by one, review panels have scaled back that plan.
"There's a lot of sensitive information in those data bases," said Lt. Stanley
Michaleski, head of records for the Montgomery County [Maryland] police. "I'm
not going to tell you that cops aren't going to misuse the information."
The most controversial portion of the planned system would be a major expansion
to include information on criminal suspects - whose guilt has not yet been
established.
The proposed system would include names of persons under investigation in
murder, kidnapping or narcotics cases. It would include a so-called "silent
hit" feature: An officer in Texas, for instance, would not know that the
individual he stopped for speeding was a suspect for murder in Virginia. But
when the Virginia investigators flipped on their computer the next morning, it
would notify them of the Texas stop. To Michaleski, the proposal sounded like
"a great idea. Information is the name of the game." But the "tracking"
ability has angered critics.
"That [data base] could be enlarged into all sorts of threats - suspected
communists, suspected associates of homosexuals. There is no end once you
start," said Rep. Don Edwards (D-Calif.), whose subcommittee called for the
report on the FBI's system.
The FBI's chief of technical services, William Bayse, defends the proposed
files, saying they would help catch criminals while containing only carefully
screened names. "The rationale is these guys are subjects of investigations,
and they met a certain guideline," he said.
So controversial is the suspect file that FBI Director William Sessions
reportedly may not include it when he publicly presents his plan for a new
system.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
A case similar to Sklar's was that of Terry Dean Rogan, who was arrested five
times because of outstanding warrants caused by someone else masquerading as
him. He finally settled for $50,000 in damages.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Legal Clamp-Down On Australian Hackers February 14, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
By Julie Power (The Financial Review)
Federal Cabinet is expected to endorse today draft legislation containing tough
penalties for hacking into Commonwealth computer systems. It is understood
that the Attorney-General, Mr. Lionel Bowen, will be proposing a range of tough
new laws closely aligned with the recommendations of the Attorney-General's
Department released in December. Mr. Bowen requested the report by the Review
of Commonwealth Criminal Law, chaired by Sir Harry Gibbs, as a matter of
urgency because of the growing need to protect Commonwealth information and
update the existing legislation.
Another consideration could be protection against unauthorized access of the
tax file number, which will be stored on a number of Government databases.
If the report's recommendations are endorsed, hacking into Commonwealth
computers will attract a $48,000 fine and 10 years imprisonment. In addition,
it would be an offense to destroy, erase, alter, interfere, obstruct and
unlawfully add to or insert data in a Commonwealth computer system.
The legislation does not extend to private computer systems. However, the
Attorney-General's Department recommended that it would be an offense to access
information held in a private computer via a Telecom communication facility or
another Commonwealth communication facility without due authority.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Multi-Gigabuck Information Theft February 8, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
By Bob Mitchell (Toronto Star)(Edited for this presentation)
A man has been arrested and charged with unauthorized use of computer
information, following a 2-month police investigation. The suspect was an
associate of a "very big" Toronto company: "A company that people would know,
with offices across Canada." Police are keeping the company's name secret at
its request. They say the perpetrator acted alone.
A password belonging to the company was used to steal information which the
company values at $4 billion (Canadian). This information includes computer
files belonging to an American company, believed to contain records from
numerous companies, and used by large Canadian companies and the United States
government.
"We don't know what this individual was planning to do with the information,
but the potential is unbelievable. I'm not saying the individual intended to
do this, but the program contained the kind of information that could be sold
to other companies," said Lewers.
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Further investigation of the above details led to the following;
Multi-Gigabuck Value Of Information Theft Denied February 17, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Different facts about the information theft were reported two days after the
original story.
The information in this article is from the Toronto Globe & Mail. The article
is headlined "Computer Information Theft Detected By Security System, Company
Says." And it begins as follows:
"The theft of information from a company's computer program was
detected by the firm's own computer security system.
Mike Tillson, president of HCR Corporation, which specializes in
developing computer software, said yesterday an unusual pattern
of computer access was noticed on the company's system last week."
The article continues by saying that police reports valuing the "program" at $4
billion (Canadian) were called grossly exaggerated by Tilson: "It's more in
the tens of thousands of dollars range." He also said that the illegal access
had been only a week before; there was no 2-month investigation. And asked
about resale of the information, he said, "It's not clear how one would profit
from it. There are any number of purposes one could imagine to idle curiosity.
There is a possibility of no criminal intent."
The information not being HCR customer data, and Tilson declining to identify
it, the article goes on to mention UNIX, to mumble about AT&T intellectual
property, and to note that AT&T is not in the investigation "at this stage."
_______________________________________________________________________________
More Syracuse Busts February 6, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
St. Elmos Fire was arrested after a supposed friend turned him in to the police
and signed an affidavit. His crimes include hacking into his school's HP3000
and the FBI and Telenet are trying to get him for hacking into another HP3000
system in Illinois.
However, it was the "friend" that was actually the person responsible for the
damage done to the computer in Illinois. The problem is that Telenet traced
that calls to Syracuse, New York and because of the related crimes, the
authorities are inclined to believe that both were done by the same
individual.
St. Elmos Fire has already had his arraignment and his lawyer says that there
is very little evidence to connect SEF to the HP3000 in Syracuse, NY. However,,
nothing is really known at this time concerning the status of the system in
Illinois.
Information Provided by Grey Wizard
_______________________________________________________________________________
Television Editor Charged In Raid On Rival's Files February 8, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>From San Jose Mercury News
TAMPA, Fla. (AP) - A television news editor hired away from his station by a
competitor has been charged with unlawfully entering the computer system of his
former employer to get confidential information about news stories.
Using knowledge of the system to bypass a security shield he helped create,
Michael L. Shapiro examined and destroyed files relating to news stories at
Tampa's WTVT, according to the charges filed Tuesday.
Telephone records seized during Shapiro's arrest in Clearwater shoed he made
several calls last month to the computer line at WTVT, where he worked as
assignment editor until joining competitor WTSP as an assistant news editor in
October.
Shapiro, 33, was charged with 14 counts of computer-related crimes grouped into
three second-degree felony categories: Offenses against intellectual property,
offenses against computer equipment and offenses against computer users. He
was released from jail on his own recognizance.
If convicted, he could be sentenced to up to 15 years in prison and fined
$10,000 for each second-degree felony count.
Bob Franklin, WTVT's interim news director, said the station's management
discovered several computer files were missing last month, and Shapiro was
called to provide help. Franklin said the former employee claimed not to know
the cause of the problem.
At a news conference, Franklin said: "Subsequent investigation has revealed
that, at least since early January, WTVT's newsroom computer system has been
the subject of repeated actual and attempted 'break-ins.' The computers
contain highly confidential information concerning the station's current and
future news stories."
The news director said Shapiro was one of two people who had responsibility for
daily operation and maintenance of the computer system after it was installed
about eight months ago. The other still works at WTVT.
Terry Cole, news director at WTSP, said Shapiro has been placed on leave of
absence from his job. Shapiro did not respond to messages asking for comment.
Franklin said Shapiro, employed by WTVT from February 1986 to September, 1988,
left to advance his career. "He was very good at what he did," Franklin said.
"He left on good terms."
_______________________________________________________________________________
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume Two, Issue 24, File 13 of 13
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
PWN PWN
PWN P h r a c k W o r l d N e w s PWN
PWN ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ PWN
PWN Issue XXIV/Part 3 PWN
PWN PWN
PWN February 25, 1989 PWN
PWN PWN
PWN Created, Written, and Edited PWN
PWN by Knight Lightning PWN
PWN PWN
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
The Judas Contract Fulfilled! January 24, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"...the other thing that made me mad was that I consider myself, at
least I used to consider myself, a person who was pretty careful
about who I trust, basically nobody had my home number, and few
people even knew where I really lived..."
-The Disk Jockey
The following story, as told by The Disk Jockey, is a prime example of the
dangers that exist in the phreak/hack community when sharing trust with those
who have made The Judas Contract.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Let me briefly explain how I got caught...
A hacker named Compaq was busted after someone turned him in for using Sprint
codes. While executing the search warrant, the state police noticed that he
had an excessive amount of computer equipment which had origins that Compaq
could not explain.
After checking around (I imagine checking serial numbers that Compaq had not
removed), the police found that the equipment was obtained illegally. Compaq
then proceeded to tell the police that I, Doug Nelson (as he thought my name
was) had brought them to him (true).
Meanwhile, Compaq was talking to me and he told me that he was keeping his
mouth shut the entire time. Keep in mind that I had been talking to this guy
for quite a long time previously and thought that I knew him quite well. I
felt that I was quite a preceptive person.
As time went by, little did I know, Compaq was having meetings again and again
with the state police as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
concerning finding out who I was. He gave them a complete description of me,
and where I (correctly) went to school, but again, he was SURE my name was
Douglas Nelson, and since my phone had previously been in that name, he felt
assured that he was correct. The Police checked with Illinois and couldn't
find license plates or a driver's license in that name. He had remembered
seeing Illinois license plates on my car.
They were stuck until Compaq had a wonderful: He and I had went out to dinner
and over the course of conversation, I mentioned something about living in
Bloomfield Hills, Michigan.
After telling the state police this information, they wrote to Bloomfield Hills
and gave a description and asked for any pictures in their files that fit that
description.
The problem was that several years ago, some friends and I were arrested for
joyriding in a friend's snowmobile while he was on vacation. The neighbors
didn't know us and called the police. Charges were dropped, but our prints and
pictures were on file.
Bloomfield Hills sent back 12 pictures, which, according to the police report,
"Kent L. Gormat (Compaq) without hesitation identified picture 3 as the
individual he knows as Douglas Nelson. This individuals name was in fact
Douglas..."
A warrant was issued for me and served shortly afterwards by state, local and
federal authorities at 1:47 AM on June 27, 1988.
Lucky me to have such a great pal. In the 6 months that I was in prison, my
parents lived 400 miles away and couldn't visit me, my girlfriend could come
visit me once a month at best, since she was so far away, and Compaq, who lived
a whole 10 miles away, never came to see me once. This made me rather angry as
I figured this "friend" had a lot of explaining to do.
As you can see I am out of prison now, but I will be on probation until
December 15, 1989.
-The Disk Jockey
_______________________________________________________________________________
Bogus Frequent Flyer Scheme February 13, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>From Associated Press
An airline ticket agent piled up 1.7 million bonus air miles via computer
without leaving the ground, then sold the credits for more than $20,000,
according to a published report.
Ralf Kwaschni, age 28, was arrested Sunday when he arrived for work at Kennedy
International Airport and was charged with computer tampering and grand
larceny, authorities said.
Kwaschni, a ticket agent for Lufthansa Airlines, used to work for American
Airlines. Police said he used his computer access code to create 18 fake
American Airline Advantage Accounts - racking up 1.7 million bonus air miles,
according to the newspaper.
All 18 accounts, five in Kwaschni's name and 13 under fake ones, listed the
same post office box, according to the newspaper.
Instead of exchanging the bonus miles for all the free travel, Kwaschni sold
some of them for $22,500 to brokers, who used the credits to get a couple of
first class, round trip tickets from New York to Australia, two more between
London and Bermuda, and one between New York and Paris. It is legal to sell
personal bonus miles to brokers Port Authority Detective Charles Schmidt said.
Kwaschni would create accounts under common last names. When a person with one
of the names was aboard an American flight and did not have an Advantage
account, the passengers name would be eliminated from the flight list and
replaced with one from the fake accounts.
"As the plane was pulling away from the gate, this guy was literally wiping out
passengers," Schmidt said.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Massive Counterfeit ATM Card Scheme Foiled February 11, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
By Douglas Frantz (Los Angeles Times)
The U.S. Secret Service foiled a scheme to use more than 7,700 counterfeit ATM
cards to obtain cash from Bank of America automated tellers. After a
month-long investigation with an informant, five people were arrested and
charged with violating federal fraud statutes.
"Seized in the raid were 1,884 completed counterfeit cards, 4,900 partially
completed cards, and a machine to encode the cards with Bank Of America account
information, including highly secret personal identification numbers for
customers."
The alleged mastermind, Mark Koenig, is a computer programmer for Applied
Communications, Inc. of Omaha, a subsidiary of U.S. West. He was temporarily
working under contract for a subsidiary of GTE Corporation, which handles the
company's 286 ATMs at stores in California. Koenig had access to account
information for cards used at the GTE ATMs. According to a taped conversation,
Koenig said he had transferred the BofA account information to his home
computer. He took only Bank Of America information "to make it look like an
inside job" at the bank. The encoding machine was from his office.
Koenig and confederates planned to spread out across the country over six days
around the President's Day weekend, and withdraw cash. They were to wear
disguises because some ATMs have hidden cameras. Three "test" cards had been
used successfully, but only a small amount was taken in the tests, according to
the Secret Service.
The prosecuting US attorney estimated that losses to the bank would have been
between $7 and $14 million. Bank Of America has sent letters to 7,000
customers explaining that they will receive new cards.
_______________________________________________________________________________
STARLINK - An Alternative To PC Pursuit January 24, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
STARLINK is an alternative to PC Pursuit. You can call 91 cities in 28 states
during off-peak hours (7pm-6am and all weekend) for $1.50 per hour. All
connections through the Tymnet network are 2400 bps (1200 bps works too) with
no surcharge and there are no maximum hours or other limitations.
There is a one time charge of $50 to signup and a $10 per month account
maintenance fee. High volume users may elect to pay a $25 per month
maintenance fee and $1.00 per hour charge.
The service is operated by Galaxy Telecomm in Virginia Beach, VA and users may
sign up for the service by modem at 804-495-INFO. You will get 30 minutes free
access time after signing up.
This is a service of Galaxy and not TYMNET. Galaxy buys large blocks of hours
from TYMNET. To find out what your local access number is you can call TYMNET
at (800) 336-0149 24 hours per day. Don't ask them questions about rates,
etc., as they don't know. Call Galaxy instead.
Galaxy says they will soon have their own 800 number for signups and
information.
The following is a listing of the major cities covered. There are others that
are a local call from the ones listed.
Eastern Time Zone
Connecticut: Bloomfield Hartford Stamford
Florida: Fort Lauderdale Jacksonville Longwood Miami Orlando Tampa
Georgia: Atlanta Doraville Marietta Norcross
Indiana: Indianapolis
Maryland: Baltimore
Massachusetts: Boston Cambridge
New Jersey: Camden Englewood Cliffs Newark Pennsauken Princeton South
Brunswick
New York: Albany Buffalo Melville New York Pittsford Rochester
White Plains
North Carolina: Charlotte
Ohio: Akron Cincinnati Cleveland Columbus Dayton
Pennsylvania: Philadelphia Pittsburgh
Rhode Island: Providence
Virginia: Alexandria Arlington Fairfax Midlothian Norfolk Portsmouth
Central Time Zone
Alabama: Birmingham
Illinois: Chicago Glen Ellyn
Kansas: Wichita
Michigan: Detroit
Minnesota: Minneapolis St. Paul
Missouri: Bridgeton Independence Kansas City St. Louis
Nebraska: Omaha
Oklahoma: Oklahoma City Tulsa
Tennessee: Memphis Nashville
Texas: Arlington Dallas Fort Worth Houston
Wisconsin: Brookfield Milwaukee
Mountain Time Zone
Arizona: Mesa Phoenix Tucson
Colorado: Aurora Boulder Denver
Pacific Time Zone
California: Alhambra Anaheim El Segundo Long Beach Newport Beach
Oakland Pasadena Pleasanton Sacramento San Francisco
San Jose Sherman Oaks Vernon Walnut Creek
Washington: Bellevue Seattle
STARLINK is a service of Galaxy Telecomm Division, GTC, Inc., the publishers of
BBS Telecomputing News, Galaxy Magazine and other electronic publications.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Suspended Sentences For Computer Break-In February 20, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>From Personal Computing Weekly
"Police Officers Sentenced For Misuse Of Police National Computer"
Three police officers hired by private investigators to break into the Police
National Computer received suspended prison sentences at Winchester Crown
Court. The private investigators also received suspended (prison) sentences,
ranging from four to six months.
The police officers were charged under the Official Secrets Act of conspiring
to obtain confidential information from the Police National Computer at Hendon.
One of the police officers admitted the charge, but the other two and the
private investigators pleaded Not Guilty.
The case arose out of a Television show called "Secret Society" in which
private investigator Stephen Bartlett was recorded telling journalist Duncan
Campbell that he had access to the Police National Computer, the Criminal
Records Office at Scotland Yard and the DHSS (Department of Health & Social
Security).
Bartlett said he could provide information on virtually any person on a few
hours. He said he had the access through certain police officers at
Basingstoke, Hampshire. Although an investigation proved the Basingstoke
connection to be false, the trail led to other police officers and private
detectives elsewhere.
Most of the information gleaned from the computers was used to determine who
owned certain vehicles, who had a good credit record -- or even who had been in
a certain place at a certain time for people investigating marital infidelity.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Of course, the actions for which the officers and others were sentenced, were
not computer break-ins as such, but rather misuse of legitimate access.
_______________________________________________________________________________
Virus Hoax Caused As Much Panic As The Real Thing February 20, 1989
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>From Popular Computing Weekly
"A Virus Is Up And Running"
Michael Banbrook gave his college network managers a scare when he planted a
message saying that a virus was active on the college system.
Banbrook's message appeared whenever a user miskeyed a password; the usual
message would be
"You are not an authorized user."
It was replaced by the brief but sinister:
"A Virus is up and running."
When the message was discovered by the college network manager, Banbrook was
immediately forbidden access to any computers at the St. Francix Xavier College
at Clapham in South London.
Banbrook, 17, told "Popular Computing Weekly" that he believed the college
has over-reacted and that he had, in fact thrown a spotlight on the college's
lackluster network security. The college has a 64 node RM Nimbus network
running MS-DOS.
"All any has to do is change a five-line DOS batch file" says Banbrook.
"There is no security at all"
Banbrook admits his motives were not entirely related to enhancing security:
"I was just bored and started doodling and where some people would doodle with
a notepad, I doodle on a keyboard. I never thought anyone would believe the
message."
Banbrook was suspended from computer science A-level classes and forbidden to
use the college computers for a week before it was discovered that no virus
existed. Following a meeting between college principal Bryan Scalune and
Banbrook's parents, things are said to be "back to normal."
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Phrack World News -- Quicknotes
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
For those interested in the 312/708 NPA Split, the correct date for this
division is November 11, 1989. However, permissive dialing will continue until
at least February 9, 1990.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Anyone who is wondering what Robert Morris, Jr. looks like should have a look
at Page 66 in the January 1989 issue of Discover Magazine.
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