2227 lines
108 KiB
Plaintext
2227 lines
108 KiB
Plaintext
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==Phrack Inc.==
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Volume One, Issue Eight, Phile #1 of 9
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Index
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Welcome to the long-awaited Phrack Inc. Issue 8. I'm quite sorry for
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all of the delays, but it's time to go back to school and it's been a hectic
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summer. Unfortunately, over the summer, Fatal Error of 617 died in a
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motorcycle accident. He was the sysop of Metropolis Elite and was around a
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while back. This issue is released in memory of him, regardless of any
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personal opinions.
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Taran King
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Sysop of Metal Shop Private
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Contents:
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#1 Phrack Inc. Index by Taran King (1k)
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#2 Phrack Pro-Phile V on Tuc by Taran King (6k)
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#3 City-Wide Centrex by The Executioner (14k)
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#4 The Integrated Services Digital Network by Dr. Doom (18k)
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#5 The Art of Junction Box Modeming by Mad Hacker 616 (6k)
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#6 Compuserve Info by Morgoth and Lotus (8k)
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#7 Fun with Automatic Tellers by The Mentor (7k)
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#8 Phrack World News VII Part I by Knight Lightning (25k)
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#9 Phrack World News VII Part II by Knight Lightning (26k)
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===============================================================================
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==Phrack Inc.==
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Volume One, Issue Eight, Phile #2 of 9
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==Phrack Pro-Phile V==
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Written and Created by Taran King
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June 25, 1986
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Welcome to Phrack Pro-Phile V. Phrack Pro-Phile is created to bring
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information to you, the users, about old or highly important/controversial
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people. This month, I bring to you one of the most influential users of our
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times and of days of old...
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TUC
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~~~
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Tuc is the sysop of RACS III (TUCBBS), a telecom enthusiasts' bulletin board in
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Stony Point, N.Y. (914).
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Personal
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~~~~~~~~
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Handle: Tuc
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Call him: Scott Jeffrey Ellentuch
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Past handles: None
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Handle origin: Nickname in high school derived from teachers calling him
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EllenTOUCH, EllenTOOK, and his corrections were phrased
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"TUCK!"
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Date of Birth: 10/10/65
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Age at current date: 20-1/2 years old
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Height: 6'3-1/2"
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Weight: About 195 lbs.
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Eye color: Brown
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Hair Color: Black
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Computers: TRS Model I, then, 2 Atari 800's, then, countless Apple
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II+'s, then, finally, 1 IBM PC.
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Sysop/Co-Sysop of: RACS III (TUCBBS), Phreak Advisor: Sherwood Forest II
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Tuc started out in the BBS world in July 1980 when he first got his modem, a
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Novation Acoustic. In August of 1981, Connection-80 of Stony Point, his first
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bulletin board, was launched into the BBS world. It started on a TRS-80 Model
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I, Epson MX-80 printer, 2 single density disk drives, a Novation Acoustic
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modem, and a home built auto-answer module. At the time, he didn't even know
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what phreaking was, so it was a general public board. A software switch to
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RACS III occurred on January 10, 1982, running until January 10, 1985. The hard
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drive arrived a few months ago to build it to the board that it currently is.
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Members of the elite world which he has met include King Blotto, Lex Luthor,
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Dr. Who, Crimson Death, The Videosmith, Jester Sluggo, The Sprinter, Mark
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Tabas, BIOC Agent 003, Agrajag, Telenet Bob, Big Brother, Cheshire Catalyst,
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Egyptian Lover, Magnetic Surfer, Paul Muad'Dib, Lord Digital, Sir Knight, 2600
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Editor (Emanuelle Goldstein [sp.]), Susan Thunder, Modem Rider, Sharp Razor,
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Hertz Tone, The Flying Avocado, and The Ace.
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His phreak experience began in March of 1982 through the new board's software
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having a section called "Phreak-80". People started calling and paying
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attention to it, including one caller by the name of Susan Thunder, which is
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how he personally began to phreak. She lead him around the scene which
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included the infamous 8 BBS and to other people such as Larry Kelly. Some of
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the memorable phreak boards he was on included 8 BBS, MOM, OSUNY, The Private
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414 Board (as in THE 414's), Blottoland, The Connection, L.O.D., Plovernet,
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Pirate 80, Sherwood Forest I, II, and III, WOPR, IROC, Pirate Trek, Pirate's
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I/O, Datanet, Stalag 13, A.I. Labs, and Hell Phrozen Over. He gives credit
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for his phreak knowledge to Susan Thunder and the people that she put him in
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touch with.
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Tuc's work is as a computer and communications security freelance consultant.
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He's done lots of programming in basic for the TRS-80, and assembly language
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for the IBM 370.
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Tuc does hack and phreak, but with his employer's consent. Tuc attends the TAP
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meetings in New York occasionally, but in the past he was a regular. He's
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attended all Phreak-Con's, he was an assistant editor of the original TAP, and
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was a pioneer in the phreak world before blue boxing and Alliance
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Teleconferencing was common knowledge. Besides that, he was the one on West
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57th Street labeled "Scott Jeffrey Ellentuch". He was hard to find on that
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particular program.
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Tuc has been involved with various groups in his lifetime including (in the
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order that he joined them) The Warelords, The Knights of Shadow, Apple Mafia,
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and, at the same time as Apple Mafia, Fargo 4A.
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Interests: Telecommunications (modeming, phreaking, hacking), martial arts
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(weaponry), radio controlled cars and airplanes, and video games.
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Tuc's Favorite Things
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---------------------
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Women: A quiet evening with the girlfriend.
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Cars: MG-TD Kit Car.
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Foods: Anything vegetarian.
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Music: The Hooters, and any band he worked for.
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Leisure: Having just a "good old time".
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Most Memorable Experiences
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--------------------------
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Car ride with 8 phreaks in Tuc's VW Super Beetle at a Phreak Con.
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The Fargo 4A stunt (getting all Fargo, N.D. DA's to go home).
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Some People to Mention
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----------------------
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Susan Thunder (for getting him started)
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All those that helped him while he was coming up in the world (too many to
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mention)
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Tuc is 150% against credit carding. He thinks that is out and out criminal
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activity, something that is totally against the code of ethics of phreaking and
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hacking. He also doesn't appreciate the fighting between phreaks that occurs
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so often in the phreak world today. He thinks the modern community is
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crumbling.
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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I hope you enjoyed this phile, look forward to more Phrack Pro-Philes coming in
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the near future. And now for the regularly taken poll from all interviewees.
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Of the general population of phreaks you have met, would you consider most
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phreaks, if any, to be computer geeks? No names mentioned, but yes, a few of
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the ones he has met are computer geeks. Thank you for your time, Tuc.
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Taran King
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Sysop of Metal Shop Private
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==Phrack Inc.==
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Volume One, Issue Eight, Phile #3 of 9
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^ ^
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/ + \ / + \
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%PLP%>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>PLP<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<%PLP%
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%---% %---%
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% P % The Executioner % P %
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% h % % h %
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% a % and the % a %
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% n % % n %
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% t % PhoneLine Phantoms! % t %
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% o % - - - % o %
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% m % % m %
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% s % Present: The City Wide Centrex % s %
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%---% %---%
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[PLP]>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>PLP<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<[PLP]
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The CWC (City-Wide Centrex) feature provides multiple location large
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business customers with centrex features, attendant features, and dialing
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capabilities that are transparent across geographic locations and are
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independent of the configuration of the #1AESS switches providing the service.
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Historically, centrex customers have been somewhat limited to the bounds of the
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servicing switch. Customers could be built across switches, but with
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limitations. Multiple locations could be arranged to share some features in
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common only when placed in a centrex complex served by a single switch.
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Obviously, for this to be feasible, the locations had to be geographically near
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each other. The CWC feature expands the concept of the centrex group by
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allowing a multi-located business to function as a single centrex arrangement
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called a CWC group. Although each customer location remains a part of its own
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switch with its own individual capabilities, it now functions as part of the
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CWC group. Selected centrex features that were defined to operate within the
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bounds of a serving switch centrex group are now redefined to operate within
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the bounds of the CWC group. The outer boundary of the CWC cannot exceed the
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boundary of the LATA due to LCCIS constraints.
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The CWC feature provides a comprehensive communications package for a
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multiple location centrex customer. Some advantages are:
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o Extension to Extension (Intercom) dialing.
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o Concentration of private facilities access at one location.
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o Elimination of dedicated facilities between locations within the
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CWC group.
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o Transparency of feature operation across switches.
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Use of CCIS trunks to replace tie trunks results in the need for fewer total
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trunks and trunk groups. Remote access reduces the total number of customer
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trunks required and centralizes customer facilities at one location. All
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switches need LCCIS so that information can be passed between locations.
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==================
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=Intercom Dialing=
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==================
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Intercom dialing gives the customer the ability to dial extension numbers
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(intercom) to other locations. This is done either by dialing the interlocation
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intercom number or by a speed call code which contains an interlocation
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intercom number. The customer has the option of routing these interlocation
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intercom calls via simulated private or public facilities. After determining
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the intercom number dialed is in location, the originating office routes the
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call to that location. The call is identified in the centrex customer's digit
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interpreter tables as an interlocation intercom call and normal interoffice
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call processing determines routing. A decision is made as to whether simulated
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facilities are used for routing the call based on the location identification
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of the called line. If needed, a simulated facility is seized. This is
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determined by a distant line status request on the called line at the end of
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dialing. The originating offices sends information to the terminating office
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identifying the call as interlocation intercom call. The CWC group and
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location identifier of the calling party are also sent. This is done by using
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the RCLDN (retrieval of calling line directory number) to transmit this
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information. The terminating office recognizes as incoming call as such. If the
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two-way simulated private facilities are used, the count on facilities at the
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terminating office is incremented. The use of 2 way simulated pricate
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facilities for a call is based on the location identifier of the calling line
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and whether simulated private facilities were used on the outgoing side.
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===========================
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=Centrex Attendant Console=
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===========================
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The tie trunks are replaced by CCIS trunks, therefore some changes are
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required in the use of the attendant console. The changes are as follows:
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o Busy Verification and attendant call through tests are not applicable
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since there will no longer be specific trunks dedicated to the customer.
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o The existing trunk group busy lamps are replaced with busy lamps for the
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simulated facilities between locations.
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The digit interpreter table entry at each remote location contains the
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"Dial 0" DN for the attendant. This is done to process interlocation intercom
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calls which terminate to the attendant. If the attendant console uses a centrex
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data link, the line equipment assigned to the DN should specify the call
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indicator lamp to be used. A different DN should be used for each location if
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separate call indicator lamps are desired for calls from each location. This
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call indicator lamp flashes at the intragroup rate of 120ipm (interruptions per
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minute) to indicate interlocation intercom calls.
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The RCLDN primitive is used to transmit information for intercom dialing
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between locations. In addition, the RDLS priminitive is used to provide CWC
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information to obtain the CWC group and location identifier of the called line.
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The originating, incoming, and CCIS incoming registers are used to save
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information at both he originating and terminating offices. These registers
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include the CWC group, CWC location identifier, a CWC call type, and an
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indicator whether simulated facilities were used at the originating.
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==========================
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=Remote Access to Private=
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= Facilities =
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==========================
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Remote access to private facilities allows the CWC customer to access
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physical private trunks and simulated facilities at a single location. This
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allows customers to consolidate their private facilities at one location. The
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number of trunks required is reduced. Any station can access these facilities
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by dialing the same access code as the main location. If a station dials the
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access code for a private facility, the call is routed to the main location
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using the same facility as an interlocation intercom call. It is then routed
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out from the main location. The CWC feature does not allow the customer to use
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the ACOF (Attendant Control of facilities) feature from a remote location. The
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types of private facilities which are accessible are:
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o Tie Trunks
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o FX (Foreign Exchange)
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o CCSA (Commmon Control switching arrangement)
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o ETS (Electronic Tandem Switching)
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o WATS (Wide Area Telecommunications system)
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o FRS (Flexible Route selection)
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o EEDP (expanded electronic tandem switching dialing plan)
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The CCIS direct signalling messages are used to communicate between the
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remote and main locations during the digit collection and analysis of out-going
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calls. Once the voice path has been established, a CCIS banded signalling
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message transmits the digits collected. A remote access register is used to
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store information retrieved during the processing of the signal requests. This
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register belongs to the OR (Originating Register) pool at the main location.
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The remote location is responsible for digit collection and transmission
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of collected digits. A remote access data CCIS direct signalling message
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transmits the digits from the remote to the main location, which returns
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instructions for the next action to be performed. The following items are sent
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from the remote to the main location:
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o The digits collected.
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o The FRL(facility restriction level) of orig. line.
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o A FRL present indicator
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o A customer changeable speed call indicator.
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o A call forwarding over private facilities indic.
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o An add-on indicator.
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o The CC location identifier of remote location.
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o The remote access register # of the main location.
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o An abandon remote access request indicator.
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The main location analyzes the information transmitted and returns the
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next set of instructions to the remote location. The full analysis of a call
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may require several direct signalling messages with information saved from the
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previous direct signalling messages. This is required to process the current
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direct signalling message being saved in the remote register. The information
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gathered is used to establish the voice path for the call. Upon receipt of a
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direct signalling request, processing is done in accordance with the function
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indicated in the remote register. The types are as follows:
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o Translate access code
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o Translate prefix digit
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o "1+" dialing check
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o Check for possible account code
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o Complete account code received
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o 3 digit translation
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o 6 digit translation
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o 10 digit translation
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o Analyze authorization code
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o FRS 3 Digit translation
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o CCSA translation
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o Abandon call
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After processing at the main location is complete, the remote access
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register is set up to identify the next type of function. Then, the main
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location returns a CCIS remote message to the remote location. The information
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returned from the main location is always in the same format and is saved on
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the OR.
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==========
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=Features=
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==========
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The CWC group is allowed many features, here is a list of them.
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1. Call Forwarding Variable: Users can forward their calls to remote stations
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located in another office by dialing the access code and the intercom
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number of the CWC station.
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2. Call Forwarding Busy Line: Provides for the forwarding of calls to any
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interlocation station within the CWC group upon encountering a busy station.
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3. Call Forwarding Don't Answer: Provides for the forwarding of calls that are
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not answered within a predetermined number of ringing cycles.
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4. Call Transfer: Allows the station user to transfer any established call to
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any other station within the CWC group with the following constraints.
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o Dropback rules do not permit 2 outgoing trunks to be involved in the
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final 2 party connection. However, 2 outgoing trunks can be involved in
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a 3 way conversation.
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o On interoffice calls involving a fully restricted station, flash
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capability is allowed. However, the controller is not permitted to
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connect the fully-restricted station to any other station, either in
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dropback or a 3 way conversation.
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Cross network call transfer transparency requires that each location be
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provided the Call Transfer-Individual or Call Transfer-Individual-All calls
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feature. The CTO (call transfer outside) option may be provided.
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5. Call Waiting feature provides a burst of tone when the called party is busy
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on another call. The types of Call Waiting features and CWC interactions are:
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o Call Waiting Originating: allows a CWC calling station to direct a call
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waiting tone toward a busy station within the same CWC group.
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o Call Waiting Intragroup: gives call waiting tone to a called party
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which has call waiting terminating on all intragroup calls.
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o Dial Call Waiting: Allows originating CWC station users to invoke call
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waiting on CWC intragroup calls by dialing an access code followed by
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the extension number of the station to be call waited.
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6. Distinctive Ringing/CW Tone: Allows a CWC station user to determine the
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source of a call incoming to the station. This is done by associating a
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distinctive ringing or tone pattern with the incoming call based on its source.
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Interlocation CWC calls receive intragroup treatment.
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7. Message Desk Service: Provides centralized and personalized call coverage or
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message answering capabilities which can serve the needs of all CWC locations.
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The Call Forwarding Variable and Call Forwarding Busy Line/Don't Answer feature
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are needed of forwarding calls from stations within the CWC group.
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8. LASS (Local Area Signalling Service): Provides the called party with call
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management and security services. Local CCIS is required for multiple-office
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grouping within a LATA for intercom calls. The following features comprise the
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LASS offering :
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o Automatic Recall: Enables a station user to place a call to the LCDN
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(Last Call Directory Number) currently associated with the users fone.
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The LCDN can either be the last party called by the station user or the
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last party to call the station user.
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o Distinctive Alerting: Allows the station user to prespecify a set of
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numbers which activate a distinctive ring or distinctive call waiting
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tone. The CWC extension numbers can be entered on the screen list. When
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the user receives a call from one of these numbers, the phone if idle,
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will ring with a special distinctive ringing pattern. If a call waiting
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customer's line is busy, a special tone notifies the customer of the
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impending call.
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o ICLID: provides the number which is calling the station user. (Explained
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in other files)
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o Selective Call Forwarding: (Explained in other file)
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o Selective Call Rejection: Provides the user with the capability of not
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being alerted by calls from a specified set of numbers. The user inputs
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the numbers to be rejected from the station set. These numbers are
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specified either directly (dialed in) or as the number of the last call
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received. The CWC extensions are allowed on the screen list.
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===========================================================
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=(C) 1986 The Executioner and The Egyptian Lover and PLP =
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===========================================================
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This file is based on the AT&T document for the CWC.
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==Phrack Inc.==
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Volume One, Issue Eight, Phile #4 of 9
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The Integrated Services Digital Network
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---==> By Dr. Doom <==---
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ISDN or Integrated Services Digital Network has been talked about off and on
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by AT&T and until now has just been a demented AT&T fantasy, but it is to soon
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become a reality. This phile is the second I have written on the subject and
|
|
is a cumulation of information from three basic sources :
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<1> The ISDN AT&T Technical Journal
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<2> An interview with an AT&T Long Distance Operations Center Supervisor who
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will be referred to as Mr. R.
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<3> and some general ISDN articles from Southwestern Bell Newsletters.
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ISDN Definition
|
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===============
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CCITT Definition : An end to end digital network that supports a wide range of
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services accessed by a set of standard multipurpose user-network interfaces.
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ISDN will allow for incredible new services that will drastically change the
|
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telecommunications industry and everyone's lives. For example, one new service
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ISDN will bring about is calling party identification. This will allow
|
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businesses and individuals who subscribe to that service to know exactly what
|
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number you are calling from before they even decide whether or not to answer
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the phone.
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In the case of dialups like MCI, the originating # will be stored in a computer
|
|
along with whatever code and number that person dialed which would greatly
|
|
hinder abuse of codes from a home phone.
|
|
|
|
This is just the tip of the iceberg as far as ISDN is concerned. This phile
|
|
will analyze and describe how The Integrated Services Digital Network will
|
|
operate when it is implemented.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Out of Band Signalling
|
|
======================
|
|
|
|
Essential to a network capable of providing such enhanced services as calling
|
|
party identification is out-of-band signalling. Until the late 70's, when AT&T
|
|
introduced the 4ESS toll switch and CCIS into the national network, switches
|
|
had communicated with each other over the same channels in which our voice or
|
|
data was transmitted (in-band). During this time, all signalling between
|
|
switches had to be limited to a type that could be accommodated in the 'voice'
|
|
channel thus making it impossible to offer any advanced services.
|
|
|
|
The development of the separate Common Channel Interoffice Signaling (CCIS)
|
|
network allowed for more freedom and flexibility and thus came about the AT&T
|
|
Calling Card service.
|
|
|
|
ISDN brings an interface from the network to the subscriber's equipment. This
|
|
is a completely digital interface subdivided into two types of channels :
|
|
|
|
The 'D' Channels are those used for sending signalling and control information
|
|
across the interface. The 'B' Channels are those used only for customer
|
|
information which can be in the form of voice, data, or video.
|
|
|
|
The 'D' Channel hence manages the information or 'B' Channels making the
|
|
signalling 'out-of-band' and not 'in-band' as it is now. This approach allows
|
|
for two distinct benefits :
|
|
|
|
<1> All the capacity in the information bearing channels is available for
|
|
customer use.
|
|
<2> The 'D' Signaling channel allows for distributed processing across the ISDN
|
|
Network.
|
|
|
|
ISDN Interfaces
|
|
---------------
|
|
|
|
The CCITT has defined two major interfaces that will be used in conjunction
|
|
with the 'D' and 'B' channels :
|
|
|
|
The Basic Rate Interface (BRI) consists of one D Channel and two B Channels.
|
|
This interface is used for locations where information transport is relatively
|
|
small like a residence.
|
|
|
|
The Primary Rate Interface (PRI) consists of one 'D' Channel and 23 'B'
|
|
Channels. It is used for large capacity vehicles such as PBX's.
|
|
|
|
Notice that there are 2 DIFFERENT 'B' Channels in the Basic Rate Interface.
|
|
This allows TWO different types of data to be sent over the same connection at
|
|
the same time. For example, you could be ULing files to a board on Channel 1
|
|
while talking to the SYSOP on Channel 2.
|
|
|
|
So, if both you and a board both have a BRI ISDN Interface, next time the SYSOP
|
|
says 'Go Voice', you simply pick up the handset, switch it to channel 2, and
|
|
start talking...
|
|
|
|
These multiple channels are also the foundation for the widespread use of Video
|
|
Phones. Just like you were sending data over channel 1, and talking voice on
|
|
channel 2, you can be sending video over channel 1 (allowing the party's to see
|
|
each other) and talking on channel 2.
|
|
|
|
ISDN Devices
|
|
============
|
|
|
|
AT&T Technologies, Advanced Micro Devices, and Intel are all in the process
|
|
of designing equipment that will be compatible with ISDN. So far, the two main
|
|
designs talked about through SWB and AT&T are :
|
|
|
|
<1> The Voice/Data Terminal This will look like any regular computer terminal
|
|
with the exception that it has a handset on the side of the terminal and a
|
|
couple of switches that will allow you to decide which channel is for DATA
|
|
and which channel is for VOICE. This will also (of course), allow two
|
|
customers with a V/D Terminal to be exchanging DATA over one channel while
|
|
talking voice over the other one.
|
|
|
|
<2> The Video Phone
|
|
This is where (yes) Big Brother is arriving... The Video Phone will work
|
|
pretty much just like it does in Science Fiction movies like 'Aliens' or
|
|
whatever. If two ISDN customers have video phones, they can talk and see
|
|
each other or whatever they want to show each other (HAHA) at the same time.
|
|
Video Phones obviously open up new frontiers for those with entrepreneurial
|
|
instincts. You can bet there will be some interesting Video Phone Sex lines
|
|
around... Then, you can have things like 'Dial a Movie...Please enter (1) to
|
|
view Rambo'..etc... The list goes on. This also leads to a whole new world
|
|
of problems for the telephone company like 'Obscene Video Calls'. This is
|
|
again where Calling ID becomes important.
|
|
|
|
Each of these units, and others that will work with ISDN will have some sort of
|
|
a special viewing screen that will contain the necessary information about
|
|
incoming calls which includes the originating number and can include such
|
|
things as :
|
|
|
|
<1> The name of the owner of that #
|
|
<2> The city and state
|
|
<3> The whole address for that #
|
|
|
|
|
|
AT&T ISDN Building Blocks
|
|
=========================
|
|
|
|
AT&T has designated certain 'building blocks' that will eventually be laid in
|
|
place across the entire country to form ISDN.
|
|
|
|
|
|
<1> AT&T Communications Service Node
|
|
------------------------------------
|
|
The service node is the customer's gateway to the AT&T Communications nodal
|
|
family of services, including MEGACOM, MEGACOM 800, and Acunet. The first
|
|
service node went into service in 1985 in Philadelphia, PA.
|
|
|
|
<2> Integrated Access
|
|
---------------------
|
|
This allows customers to integrate switched and private line services over a
|
|
single DS-1 link to the Service Node.
|
|
|
|
<3> Out-of-Band Signaling
|
|
-------------------------
|
|
Discussed earlier.
|
|
|
|
<4> CCS7
|
|
--------
|
|
The CCS7 Common Channel Signaling Network will soon replace CCIS as an
|
|
out-of-band signalling between AT&T Network Communications Facilities. Because
|
|
of its longer message format and layered structure, the CCS7 will support the
|
|
new features.
|
|
|
|
<5> Digital Backbone Network
|
|
----------------------------
|
|
This nationwide AT&T Network includes extensive lightwave and digital radio
|
|
routes. By the end of 1988, these Digital Lightwave routes will extend to
|
|
Europe with the TAT-8 lightwave system, and across the Pacific with
|
|
HAW-4/TPC-3.
|
|
|
|
<6> Intelligent Software Controlled
|
|
AT&T Communications Network
|
|
-----------------------------------
|
|
This brings about more advanced software related services listed in #1.
|
|
|
|
|
|
AT&T ISDN Operations
|
|
====================
|
|
|
|
|
|
Access Transport
|
|
----------------
|
|
Your DS-1 signal is transported from your ISDN equipment to an AT&T
|
|
Communications Service Node somewhere.
|
|
Your line gets to AT&T by tariff from the local exchange carrier (i.e...
|
|
Southwestern Bell, GTE, or whomever happens to own your local switch...) or
|
|
AT&T. The direct link to the AT&T Service Node bypasses your local switching.
|
|
|
|
AT&T Service Node
|
|
-----------------
|
|
Your local AT&T Service Node is a service office that acts as a gateway to
|
|
all the new AT&T Nodal ISDN services. This service node is typically composed
|
|
of :
|
|
|
|
<1> A Refinished 4ESS Switch
|
|
<2> CNI Ring (Common Net.-Interface)
|
|
<3> Digital Access and Cross Connect System (DACS)
|
|
|
|
Here is a diagram of how a customer location either goes to a local switch or
|
|
AT&T's node :
|
|
|
|
Key
|
|
---
|
|
CL = Customer Location
|
|
= = DS-1 Line
|
|
! = DS-1 Line
|
|
> = Exiting out to AT&T Network
|
|
|
|
--------
|
|
- -
|
|
**** - Bell -
|
|
*CL*=======- 5ESS -
|
|
**** - -
|
|
--------
|
|
!
|
|
!
|
|
!
|
|
!
|
|
**** !
|
|
*CL* --------!--------
|
|
****===========4ESS=====>
|
|
- 4ESS=
|
|
**** - ! ! !
|
|
*CL*======DACS=! ! CNI==>
|
|
**** -DACS ! CNI
|
|
-DACS= !
|
|
- ! 1PSS====>
|
|
- !=1PSS
|
|
-
|
|
-----------------
|
|
AT&T Service
|
|
Node
|
|
|
|
|
|
The above diagram shows first how an AT&T Customer with ISDN can either
|
|
continue service with his local telephone co. or go with a direct link to the
|
|
AT&T Service Mode. All lines going to an AT&T Service Node whether through
|
|
Bell or a direct link terminate on either the 4ESS or the DACS.
|
|
When a line terminates on a DACS it serves as an Integrated Access
|
|
Distributor and sends the call to the 1PSS (Packet Switch) for Acunet Packet
|
|
Service or to the 4ESS and then eventually out to the AT&T Network.
|
|
|
|
The AT&T Internodal Network
|
|
---------------------------
|
|
In the internodal network facility, AT&T is in the process of deploying both
|
|
digital lightwave and digital radio systems.
|
|
|
|
Lightguide Systems :
|
|
|
|
In areas where growth is low, the FT3C and FTX180 Single mode terrestrial
|
|
lightguide systems will be used between nodes.
|
|
|
|
On high growth routes AT&T will install fiber pairs at line rates of 1.7Gb/s
|
|
with 20 mile repeater spacings.
|
|
|
|
Digital Radio :
|
|
|
|
In the digital radio area, 4Gb/s systems such as the TD-90 and the TD-180
|
|
provide a vehicle for rapid expansion of digital connectivity.
|
|
|
|
|
|
ISDN and Digital Switches
|
|
=========================
|
|
|
|
AT&T has redesigned the 5E Switching Modules in such a way that they are
|
|
fully compatible with ISDN, but many of the existing 5E's and other switches
|
|
were manufactured without ISDN capability. To meet this need, AT&T has
|
|
produced ISDN interfaces that modularly connect to the system. Here is a
|
|
diagram of a 5ESS Switching Module with interfaces :
|
|
|
|
Key
|
|
---
|
|
$ = ISDN V/D Terminal or Video Phone
|
|
% = Standard Telephone
|
|
= = Digital Line
|
|
< = In-Band Line
|
|
ISLU = Integrated Services Line Unit
|
|
PSIU = Packet Switch Interface Unit
|
|
|
|
|
|
--------------------------
|
|
- 5ESS -
|
|
- Switching -
|
|
- Module -
|
|
- -
|
|
------------=----=--------
|
|
- = = -
|
|
$====-----======== = -
|
|
- - = -
|
|
$====- - --------=--- -
|
|
-ISLU- - - -
|
|
%<<<<- ===== PSIU - -
|
|
- - - - -
|
|
$====--------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
|
The two new hardware additions are :
|
|
|
|
<1> Integrated Services Line Unit and
|
|
|
|
<2> The Packet Switch Interface Unit
|
|
|
|
These units allow a LOCAL 5ESS (or other digital) Switch to serve both ISDN
|
|
and non-ISDN customers. These interfaces are integrated into a switching module
|
|
in a way that will allow ISDN customers to maintain all their previous Bell
|
|
services like Local Calling. Notice also that all lines, whether ISDN or not,
|
|
terminate on the ISLU.
|
|
|
|
Calling Party Identification
|
|
============================
|
|
|
|
Discussed briefly in the preface of this phile, the ISDN enhanced Calling
|
|
Party Identification service offered by AT&T ISDN will be into service along
|
|
with the ISDN.
|
|
This quote out of the AT&T ISDN Technical reference should give you a good
|
|
idea of the impact ISDN will have on hacking and phreaking :
|
|
|
|
'One example of an enhanced service which has already been included in the
|
|
ISDN signaling protocol and will have a fundamental impact on day to day
|
|
telecommunications is the provisions of calling party identification.
|
|
Calling party ID will help us decide whether or not to answer incoming calls
|
|
and will minimize instances of nuisance calls and COMPUTER FRAUD via
|
|
telephone.'
|
|
|
|
Mr. R, our AT&T Supervisor has been attending ISDN Conferences that include
|
|
representatives from all the major LD Companies (AT&T, MCI, GTE, LDS, etc..),
|
|
the Regional Bells, and other concerned parties. He said quote 'One of the
|
|
controlling factors behind The Integrated Services Digital Network is the
|
|
simple fact that AT&T, MCI, and other long distance companies are losing
|
|
MILLIONS to Phone Phraud.' Once ISDN is realized, so will network wide Calling
|
|
Party Identification.
|
|
Again, our friend Mr. R will enlighten us on the subject of ISDN Calling
|
|
Party ID and a simple explanation of how it will work :
|
|
|
|
'Right now, when you pick up the phone in your home, Port Isabel South
|
|
Western Bell knows that you did. Then, when you dial a number, they know
|
|
what number you dialed. So they send that information along to us (the AT&T
|
|
Toll Switch). We then send that along through the network to the person you
|
|
are calling.'
|
|
|
|
Of course, there is one transaction between AT&T and a Bell Office at the end
|
|
that he left off, but if the person or computer you are calling has ISDN
|
|
Calling Party ID service, your originating # will be sent along the DS-1 Line
|
|
Interface from Bell to his equipment and show up on his screen after traveling
|
|
through the network like Mr. R described.
|
|
|
|
This is rather simple when you think about it and is one example of how a once
|
|
shattered network is working together.
|
|
|
|
Some Sample CP ID Uses
|
|
----------------------
|
|
This can be used by large telephone ordering companies to instantly display a
|
|
record of that persons credit, previous orders, etc... before the call is even
|
|
answered on the attendant's terminal.
|
|
|
|
When someone logs onto a computer, the originating # is listed on the user log
|
|
along with the account name, etc... so that if there is an unauthorized login,
|
|
they can contact the authorities to do whatever or monitor that number until
|
|
they get enough evidence to prosecute. The same thing holds true with LD
|
|
Dialups. They will record the originating number along with the code and bill
|
|
making MCI use rather dangerous.
|
|
|
|
|
|
SWB ISDN News
|
|
=============
|
|
|
|
The following article was extracted from The Southwestern Bell Texas
|
|
Publication of Telephone Times and is entitled 'User Forum simplifies ISDN' :
|
|
|
|
" Houston---Houston Marketing employees played show and tell with two customers
|
|
and all three groups are better off for it.
|
|
Marketing Representatives, with support from Bell Comm. Research, Illinois
|
|
Bell, AT&T, and McDonald's Corp. met with Shell and Tenneco to discuss ISDN.
|
|
'ISDN is an evolving technology' said Bob Campbell, division manager
|
|
marketing business sales. 'It's still in the developmental stage. These User
|
|
Forums will give customers input on how it's deployed and what it will look
|
|
like.'
|
|
ISDN is an all digital network that transmits voice and data messages
|
|
simultaneously over a single telephone line.
|
|
'The User Forums allow customers to share information on specific problems
|
|
concerning implementation, training, customer premise equipment and
|
|
applications,' Campbell said.
|
|
Linda Hobson, manager marketing administrative and coordinator of the event,
|
|
said not only will User Forums be standard practice in Houston, but probably
|
|
will become the national standard.
|
|
'We're doing it quarterly here, but as more people become interested, we may
|
|
meet more often,' Hobson said.
|
|
Shell and Tenneco, who have signed letters of intent to purchase ISDN, were
|
|
specifically interested in such topics as trial status (SWBT's ISDN trials will
|
|
begin soon in St. Louis and Texas), available features, power requirements, and
|
|
future enhancements.
|
|
'In the past, we bought the available enhancements, then sold them to the
|
|
customer,' said Hobson. 'That's changing. We have to find out what the
|
|
customer wants, then deliver the service that meets the specific needs'"
|
|
|
|
That concludes the nice little article which by the way, contained some
|
|
interesting little tidbits of information.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Conclusion
|
|
==========
|
|
|
|
ISDN is a VERY complicated plan that will drastically change the
|
|
telecommunications scene in this country and abroad. Although AT&T has boasted
|
|
in it's Technical Journals of being able to have its ISDN Capable Network
|
|
completed by Early 1987, this date seems to keep getting postponed back
|
|
according to our friend Mr. R (The AT&T Supervisor) and he is shooting for
|
|
large scale ISDN no earlier that late 1988 or 1989. Whenever ISDN does become
|
|
reality, people will probably just put out files with lists of computers that
|
|
subscribe to ISDN Calling Party Identification, and tell people not to call
|
|
them from their home.
|
|
|
|
I hope you have enjoyed reading this phile on ISDN, I will be on the outlook
|
|
for more information on it.
|
|
|
|
If you don't already have the # and New User Passwords to Metromedia BBS, send
|
|
me (Dr. Doom) mail on any of the boards I am on.
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume One, Issue Eight, Phile #5 of 9
|
|
|
|
**************************************************************************
|
|
******************** The Art of Junction Box Modeming ********************
|
|
******** Written Exclusively For: ********
|
|
******** PHRACK INC.! ********
|
|
**************************************************************************
|
|
* by Mad Hacker of 616 *
|
|
* Watch for Thieve's World ][ coming soon, now with 33 megs! *
|
|
**********************************************************************
|
|
|
|
This file will detail the use of a rural junction box to fraud the
|
|
phone company and make all the free phone calls you want to BBS or AE by.
|
|
|
|
There are two basic types of rural junction boxes: Residential and
|
|
Group boxes. I will first discuss Residential as they are easier to find
|
|
and easier to use. There are a couple of requirements before you can make
|
|
full use of a Junction Box. First you must have some kind of portable
|
|
computer with a built-in modem or at least a hand phone if all you want to
|
|
do is make free calls to your friends. For computer I would recommend
|
|
something like a Model 100 from Radio Shack. Small, inexpensive but only
|
|
300 baud and only 32K of total storage.
|
|
|
|
Anyway you can find residential junction boxes in most any rural area
|
|
just a few feet off the road and usually covered over with local weeds. Fish
|
|
your way thru the weeds and open it up. Some just open with a twist or a
|
|
turn, others are actually locked and require a little more patience. Anyway
|
|
once you have it open, you should see at least 4 pairs (possibly more) of
|
|
wires. You are only concerned with the pair containing both a red and a green
|
|
wire.
|
|
|
|
Now you need to make a choice: Do you want to totally cut off the
|
|
regular owners of the phone line and do actual damage to this junction box or
|
|
leave them connected but have the possibility of them picking up their phone
|
|
and hearing your carrier?
|
|
|
|
Usually you will want to cut them out totally, so simply find a bit of
|
|
slack in the line and cut both wires. Now in most boxes the connection to the
|
|
outside world comes from the bottom of the box, but sometimes you will find
|
|
one that doesn't conform. Simply attach a hand phone to the wires (matching
|
|
up colors, of course) and see if you get a dial tone. Anyway once you have
|
|
the proper pair then hook up to your modem line and dial anyway. Meanwhile
|
|
the lawful owners of the line will get a dead line on their end, so try to
|
|
do this only when you think no one would be using the phone, like 11PM to 7AM
|
|
or else they will probably call their LOC and tell them to fix the line and
|
|
when they see the cut wires, they will wonder what went on there. Finally be
|
|
a good guy and when you are done, resplice the wires together and shut the
|
|
box.
|
|
|
|
Now usually you don't want to cause permanent damage to the box, so
|
|
simply strip off the insulation on the line and attach the red and green ends
|
|
of your modem cord to them. Now when you cut in, it will be much like an
|
|
extension was picked up. Simply dial away and have fun. Of course if anyone
|
|
at the house picks up the line they will get your carrier and will wonder, so
|
|
try to limit your activities also to the same hours mentioned above, unless you
|
|
know who you are ripping off and when they use the phone. The advantages of
|
|
this method is that once you strip the wires, there is little work to do each
|
|
time you use the box again.
|
|
|
|
Now what do you do if you are lucky enough to find a Group box? Well
|
|
first you are confronted with a multitude of wires, anywhere from 10 pairs up
|
|
to 100 if you use a box on the edge of a small town. Finding a pair of the
|
|
right wires is a little more difficult unless your LOC has done repairs at
|
|
this box in the last couple of months, in which case a lot of the wires will
|
|
already be paired off. If you aren't so lucky find a couple of wires and try
|
|
them out. Once again you have the choice of stripping or cutting the wires,
|
|
but the advantage here is that you can use this box for about 4-6 months
|
|
without having to find a new one.
|
|
|
|
What is the this junk about having to find a new box? Well you see
|
|
when you use a junction box in this manner, you are basically adding an
|
|
illegal extension to a private line. Any calls you make will show up on the
|
|
rightful owners bill. If you are only using the box for one or two short to
|
|
medium length calls a week, then you might not have any problems. However if
|
|
you use a box too much and the people keep calling the billing office about
|
|
the extra calls, the billing office will call those numbers and hear the
|
|
carrier. This will tip them off to the fact that someone is either lying at
|
|
the rightful owner's house or that someone has tapped into their phone line.
|
|
At this present time in the Midwest, it take about 2-3 months for the LOC to
|
|
realize that someone is playing with their junction box. What they do is come
|
|
out and repair the wires and usually put a newer lockable box on the site to
|
|
discourage illegal use. I haven't yet really pushed the LOC to any limits
|
|
yet, but one might suspect that has Junction boxing catches on to those of us
|
|
who have access to laptop computers, the LOC may find some way of catching us
|
|
at our little game.
|
|
|
|
If anyone has any new information on how your LOC is handling this use
|
|
of their junction boxes please let us know by leaving mail for Thomas Covenant
|
|
on any Metal Shop board.
|
|
|
|
[Postscriptum note by Thomas Covenant: I'd recommend one of those so-
|
|
called "portable" AT-compatibles. Great clock speed, 1200 baud, and a bigger
|
|
screen. And why not pack a picnic lunch and some booze? You'll be there all
|
|
day once you get started!]
|
|
|
|
^Z, or "EOF"
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume One, Issue Eight, Phile #6 of 9
|
|
|
|
COMPUSERVE INFO
|
|
---------------
|
|
Compiled and
|
|
Related by:
|
|
Morgoth and Lotus
|
|
-----------------
|
|
|
|
Since its rather humble beginnings in Dublin, Ohio some years ago,
|
|
Compuserve, or CIS, as it will be referred to in this article, has grown to
|
|
become the largest entertainment/public user oriented system in the country.
|
|
This file is divided into two parts. The first is how to get your own CIS ID
|
|
number, and make it last a relatively long time. This part may seem like old
|
|
hat to some of you out there. The second part is information on what to do
|
|
once you are on the system...tricks and tips to keep you out of trouble, or
|
|
cause trouble.
|
|
A Compuserve identification number is divided into two parts; a project
|
|
number and a programmer number. An example would be 70007,1460. This ID is
|
|
what you will be known by at all times on the system. When you log on, you
|
|
will also be prompted for a password, in addition to your user ID. The
|
|
password is divided into two words, kept apart by a separator (-,:,.,etc). The
|
|
password may be any two words the user desires, including garbage, which makes
|
|
gaining an ID by hacking the password almost, if not totally, impossible.
|
|
The most popular, and about the only way left, of gaining an ID is by buying
|
|
what the system calls a snapak. These are the little goodies you see in the
|
|
store in the introductory packets. With this, you can gain access to most, but
|
|
not all of the system.
|
|
The first ID, or the "intro" ID will last about a week, at which time,
|
|
Compuserve automatically changes the password, and sends the new one to you via
|
|
the US Postal service. This is a key point to the ID scam. You MUST have
|
|
valid Credit Card information to be able to continue using the ID. I have
|
|
heard of intro IDs going bad in a matter of 2 or 3 days due to having non-valid
|
|
credit card info. So you need to set up a location to which your second
|
|
password can be mailed. This second password should last about a month,
|
|
depending on how much credit the CC holder has on his card.
|
|
When applying credit to a Visa or Mastercard, Compuserve will submit the
|
|
charges about once a week. If you run up about $500 in connect charges, and
|
|
the credit card cannot hold it, the ID will go bad. This is the most common
|
|
way for an account to run out.
|
|
Your first password has some limits. Due to hackers using snapaks,
|
|
Compuserve has installed a system which prohibits IDs without the second
|
|
password from entering any type of game online. This ranges from the
|
|
ever-popular MegaWars, to YGI, all the way down to Casino. This is one reason
|
|
why the second password is so important.
|
|
If more than one person will be using the account, which is usually the case,
|
|
there are also some limits to be observed. The same ID can no longer enter the
|
|
CB simulator more than once. If it is tried, the message "exceeding job limit"
|
|
will occur, and you will be taken back to the prior menu. The same ID can go
|
|
into a SIG at the same time, but both people cannot enter COnference mode while
|
|
on the SIG. The best way to talk to another user who is on the same ID is to
|
|
go into any forum, say CBMART, and have one of them enter COnference mode.
|
|
There, the two users can use the /SEN command to relay messages between the SIG
|
|
and COnference. This is kind of complicated, but it is the only way. Also,
|
|
anytime the message "exceeding job limit" goes to your screen, the people at
|
|
CIS put a small "red mark" by your name. If it occurs too frequently, they
|
|
look into the situation to find out if more than one person may be using the
|
|
same ID.
|
|
Special IDs -- Ok, now that you are on Compuserve, what should you look out
|
|
for? As mentioned before, the user ID is divided into [project
|
|
number,programmer number] format. The Programmer number is of no importance,
|
|
but the Project number is. Some of the ones you should be aware of while
|
|
online are:
|
|
|
|
70000,xxxx Compuserve Security
|
|
70003,xxxx Compuserve Employee
|
|
70004,xxxx Same as above
|
|
70005,xxxx Radio Shack demo account
|
|
70006,xxxx Customer service, or "Wizard" number (see below)
|
|
70007,xxxx Complimentary account
|
|
76703,xxxx SIG SysOp, or Forum Info Provider
|
|
|
|
While on CB, look out for the 70000 IDs, and especially the 70006, or
|
|
"wizard" numbers. The Wizard ids have some very special functions. The main
|
|
one is called autogag, or /GAG. This allows the bearer of this ID to banish
|
|
any user from the system, in a way. What it actually does is to keep the
|
|
/GAGged person out of everyone's view. They will not show up on the /ust list,
|
|
and anything they type will not show up on anybody else's screen. Kind of like
|
|
a mute button on a television. The Chief of CIS security is Dan Pisker, and on
|
|
CB he uses the handles "Dan'l", or "Ghost", with a 70000 id.
|
|
Monitoring -- This is a very popular subject with the users of Compuserve,
|
|
but when broken down, it is quite simple. CIS is capable of monitoring
|
|
ANYTHING that is said on the system. This doesn't mean that they do, however.
|
|
For /TALK to be monitored in a Forum or on CB, CIS must first have a court
|
|
order...it is supposedly as illegal as tapping a phone line. This has been
|
|
done before to catch some major hackers on the system. /SEN in a SIG is not
|
|
supposedly monitorable....the status on it is the same as on /TALK. /SCR mode
|
|
on CB or on a SIG is definitely monitorable, especially if the the /SCR key is
|
|
typed on open channel. Keep /SCR conversations to a minimum. As far as
|
|
anything else goes, anything said on open channel is quite definitely seen by
|
|
SOMEBODY in the big chair up in Ohio. It would not surprise me at all if they
|
|
hire people to go through CB Transcripts every day to look for that kind of
|
|
thing. Also, when you are in COnference mode in a SIG, always check the
|
|
/STAtus of the channel. If /STA EVER returns that there are more people on the
|
|
channel you are on than the /USERS function does, then you can rest assured
|
|
that the channel is being monitored.
|
|
Nodes -- When you log on through CIS, you are going through a node. The node
|
|
takes the form of 3 letters, designating the site of the computer through which
|
|
you are connecting through Compuserve. An example would be "NYJ" (New York
|
|
City). There are some special nodes you should know about, though.
|
|
Tymnet - Anybody logging on through Tymnet will be assigned one of these
|
|
nodes - QAI, QAJ, QAK, QAC, QAM, QAN, QAO, QCA, QCB, QCC, QCE, QCF, QCH. This
|
|
cannot identify where you are calling from, just that you are logging in
|
|
through the Tymnet network.
|
|
Telenet - QBA, QBC, QBD, QBG, QBF, QEN, QEI, QEP.
|
|
Also, another special node would be DB- (DBA, DBB, DBC, etc), which means
|
|
that the user is logging on from Compuserve's Headquarters in Dublin.
|
|
The way to tell what node somebody is in is by typing /UST on either CO mode
|
|
on a SIG, or CB...the result is like this....
|
|
Job User Id Ch. Node Handle
|
|
--- ---------- --- ---- ------
|
|
1) 12 70003,1295 17 CSG Red Leather
|
|
2) 133 70006,1293 1s BAF Surf's Up!
|
|
3) 69 76703,1211 Tlk BOO JOE CUFFS
|
|
4) 22 70000,1959 30* DBA Pig
|
|
Now, you can tell something specific about each of these four people based on
|
|
the info given above. Red is in Columbus, Ohio, and is on Channel 17. She is
|
|
also a Compuserve Employee. Surf is in Bakersfield, California, and is a
|
|
Customer service personnel. He is also using /SCRamble. Joe is in Talk, is a
|
|
sysop on a SIG, and is in Boston, Massachusetts. This is the format for Talk
|
|
on CB. Pig is on talk in a SIG, and is a security personnel from Dublin, Ohio.
|
|
The format for showing if somebody is in /Talk is different on a SIG than in
|
|
regular CB. Also, the /SEN command is not implemented on CB.
|
|
Have fun with this...hope it helps. Distribute the file however you want,
|
|
but make sure the credits stay at the bottom.
|
|
|
|
(c) 1986 Morgoth/Lotus
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume One, Issue Eight, Phile #7 of 9
|
|
|
|
Fun with Automatic Tellers
|
|
by
|
|
+++The Mentor+++
|
|
|
|
Preface: This is not a particularly easy scam to pull off, as it
|
|
requires either advanced hacking techniques (TRW or banks) or serious balls
|
|
(trashing a private residence or outright breaking & entering), but it can
|
|
be well worth your while to the tune of $500 (five hundred) a day.
|
|
Laws that will be broken: Credit Fraud, Wire Fraud, Bank Fraud, Mail
|
|
Fraud, Theft Over $200, Forgery, and possibly a few others in the course of
|
|
setting the scheme up (rape and murder are optional, but recommended.)
|
|
This all grew from an idea that Poltergeist had about a year ago be-
|
|
fore he turned fed on Extasyy, and Cisban Evil Priest (Android Pope) and my-
|
|
self were implementing it with great success before our untimely arrest and
|
|
recruitment into the service of the State. It is risky, but no more so than
|
|
some of the more elaborate carding routines floating around.
|
|
The first step is to target your victim. The type person you are
|
|
looking for is rich. Very rich.
|
|
Now, don't go trying to hit on J.P. Getty or Johnny Carson or some-
|
|
one who carries a high name recognition. This will just get you into trouble
|
|
as everyone notices a famous person's name floating across their desk.
|
|
Instead look for someone who owns a chain of hog feed stores or some-
|
|
thing discreet like that. We targeted a gentleman who is quite active in the
|
|
silver market, owning several mines in South Africa and not wanting this to
|
|
be widely known (he had no desire to be picketed.)
|
|
Next step, take out a p.o. box in this person's name. Extasyy wrote
|
|
a good file on obtaining a box under a fake name, I don't know if it's still
|
|
around. If not, there are several others out there. (Yeah, I know, this has
|
|
already weeded out the weak of spirit. Anyone who has gotten this far without
|
|
panic is probably going to get away with it.)
|
|
Now comes the fun part, requiring some recon on your part. You need
|
|
to know some fairly serious details about this person's bank dealings.
|
|
1) Find out what bank he deals with mainly. This isn't too dif-
|
|
ficult, as a quick run through his office trash will usually let
|
|
you find deposit carbons, withdrawal receipts, or *anything* that
|
|
has the bank name on it.
|
|
2) Find out the account number(s) that he has at the bank. This can
|
|
usually be found on the above-mentioned receipts. If not, you can
|
|
get them in TRW (easier said than done) or you can con them out of
|
|
a hassled bank teller over the phone (Use your imagination. Talk
|
|
slowly and understandingly and give plausible excuses ["I work for
|
|
his car dealership, we need to do a transfer into his account"].)
|
|
2a) [optional] If you can, find out if he has an ATM (Automatic
|
|
Teller) card. You don't need to know numbers or anything, just
|
|
if a card exists. This can also be ascertained over the phone
|
|
if you cajole properly.
|
|
3) Armed with this information, go into action.
|
|
a) Obtain some nice (ivory quality) stationary. It doesn't
|
|
have to be engraved or anything, but a $5 or $10 invest-
|
|
ment to put a letterhead with his initials or something
|
|
on it couldn't hurt. But the most important thing is that
|
|
it look good.
|
|
b) Type a nice letter to the bank notifying them of your
|
|
address change. Some banks have forms you have to fill out
|
|
for that sort of thing, so you need to check with the bank
|
|
first (anonymously, of course). You will have to have a
|
|
good copy of his signature on hand to sign all forms and
|
|
letters (again, trash his office).
|
|
c) Call the bank to verify the new address.
|
|
d) IMMEDIATELY upon verifying the change of address, send a
|
|
second letter. If he already has an ATM card, request a
|
|
second card with the business name engraved in it be sent
|
|
for company use. If he doesn't have an ATM card, the let-
|
|
ter should request one for account number xxxxxx. Ask for
|
|
two cards, one with the wife's name, to add authenticity.
|
|
e) Go to the bank and ask for a list of all ATM's on the
|
|
bank's network. Often the state has laws requiring *all*
|
|
machines take *all* cards, so you'll probably be in good
|
|
shape.
|
|
f) Await the arrival of your new card. The PIN (personal
|
|
identification number) is included when they send out a
|
|
card. After picking up the card, forget that you ever
|
|
even *knew* where the p.o. box was, and make sure you
|
|
didn't leave fingerprints.
|
|
g) Begin making the maximum daily withdrawal on the card
|
|
(in most cases $500/day), using a different machine
|
|
each time. Since many of these machines have cameras
|
|
on them, wear a hat & jacket, or a ski mask to be really
|
|
paranoid. To cut the number of trips you have to make
|
|
in half, be at an ATM a few minutes before midnight. Make
|
|
one $500 withdrawal right before midnight, and another one
|
|
right after. This cuts down on the number of trips, but
|
|
police or bank officials may spot the pattern and start
|
|
watching machines around midnight. Use your own judgement.
|
|
Conclusion: Before using the card, make sure that all fingerprints are
|
|
wiped from it. Usually the first hint you will have that they have caught on
|
|
to your scam is that the machine will keep the card. Also, avoid using mach-
|
|
ines in your own town unless it is a big city (Chicago, Milwaukee, Dallas,
|
|
etc...).
|
|
|
|
Well, I hope this file has proved interesting. Of course, it is only
|
|
intended for entertainment, and I heartily discourage anyone from even *think-
|
|
ing* about trying such a thing. Jail isn't fun, as I can testify. So I take
|
|
no responsibility for the misapplication of this information.
|
|
(But if someone else pulls it off, I wouldn't be averse to hearing
|
|
about it...)
|
|
+++The Mentor+++
|
|
June 20
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume One, Issue Eight, Phile #8 of 9
|
|
|
|
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Phrack World News PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Issue Seven/Part One PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Compiled and Written by Knight Lightning PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
|
|
|
|
On The Home Front
|
|
-----------------
|
|
Well lots of things have been happening around here in the past few weeks.
|
|
For starters, I received a call from Ralph Meola. Apparently someone had left
|
|
his secretary with a message that I had called. Prior to this, someone named
|
|
Steve had left a message as well which Ralph had assumed was Slave Driver. He
|
|
called Steve first, mainly to discuss the letter that was sent to him via PWN
|
|
issue V. Well eventually he got around to calling me. Not too much was said,
|
|
but he wanted to clear up some misconceptions about his encounter with Sigmund
|
|
Fraud. Meola claims that he never threatened Sigmund Fraud about getting his
|
|
account to Stronghold East. Futhermore, he claims only to have called him
|
|
because SF had posted several AT&T Calling Cards on an unnamed west coast bbs.
|
|
Sigmund Fraud still publicly claims that what he said originally was true,
|
|
but privately admitted that he was lying.
|
|
|
|
Some other developments would include an imposter of myself who is running
|
|
around on bulletin boards. Two of the boards that he is on include Elite
|
|
Connection (303) and Green Galaxy (714). I have never called these boards and
|
|
I advise the sysops to remove "my" accounts as this is not me.
|
|
|
|
On the lighter side, Metal Shop Private now has 20 Megs of online storage. The
|
|
G-phile library has been re-installed including most of the files from Metal
|
|
Shop AE and Metal Shop Private is once again the official Phrack distribution
|
|
center.
|
|
|
|
Metal Shop AE is down for the time being because Cheap Shades has left for
|
|
college, but he has since brought forth a new system known as the Quick Shop.
|
|
All former MS AE members have been entered into QS's bbs log. Metal Shop
|
|
Brewery has lost its modem and its hard drive is fried, so it will be gone for
|
|
a while.
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
>From TeleComputist Staff:
|
|
|
|
We apologize for the unoriginality of the free issue. The free issue was put
|
|
out with the intentions of gaining the trust of the public and in doing so we
|
|
neglected to come up with completely original material. However, future
|
|
issues will be much shorter and contain only original information from the
|
|
editor's themselves.
|
|
|
|
TeleComputist no longer consists of set writers and anyone may submit articles.
|
|
Please note that if you submit an article, make sure that it has not been
|
|
distributed or seen by anyone else, otherwise we will not accept it.
|
|
|
|
For subscription information and submission of articles;
|
|
|
|
TeleComputist Newsletter
|
|
P.O. Box 2003
|
|
Florissant, Missouri 63032
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Boston Busts August 9, 1986
|
|
------------
|
|
A couple of weeks prior to the above date, Dr. Who came to visit Recent Change
|
|
and The Clashmaster. Well, he apparently had cashed roughly 16 checks belonging
|
|
to one John Martino (a man who lives down the street from him). Around August
|
|
4, 1986, Dr. Who and Telenet Bob were picked up in a store in North Adams,
|
|
Massachusetts. They were trying to pass off another check.
|
|
|
|
The police were on the scene very shortly and they were taken in. Dr. Who told
|
|
the police inspector about a PDP-11/23 when asked about it. He had frauded
|
|
this at Harvard University and told them that RC Modeler (also known as Recent
|
|
Change) had it. They converged on a sleeping RC who confessed everything.
|
|
|
|
Dr. Who is being charged with 16 counts of theft.
|
|
RC Modeler is being charged with larceny & possibly as an accomplice to theft.
|
|
Telenet Bob is being charged with 1 count of attempted theft.
|
|
|
|
Dr. Who and RC Modeler are reportedly out of the scene permanently and Dr. Who
|
|
may be serving some prison time. Also, RC Modeler, when being questioned, was
|
|
asked about Legion of Doom. This is VERY strange since we cannot figure out
|
|
quite WHY this was asked.
|
|
|
|
Sysops are asked to clear their accounts form any bbs they were on.
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
The following is the interpretation of the same events as described by the
|
|
Concord Journal. The real names of the phreaks involved have been censored.
|
|
|
|
Computer Theft Charge
|
|
---------------------
|
|
An 18-year-old Concord man was charged on August 5, 1986 with stealing a $3,300
|
|
computer [PDP-11/23 with Venix software] from Harvard University and a portable
|
|
stereo from an unknown store by using checks, police allege he knew to be
|
|
forged, to pay for the items, police said.
|
|
|
|
RC Modeler, was charged with two counts of larceny over $100, police said.
|
|
[Also, accessory to the crime, RC says.]
|
|
|
|
Police issued a warrant for RC's arrest after being tipped-off by the North
|
|
Adam's police that he had allegedly made purchases with checks they alleged to
|
|
be stolen and forged.
|
|
|
|
North Adam's police, according to reports, arrested Doctor Who, of Lenox, MA.
|
|
[and Telenet Bob], and charged him with using stolen and forged checks earlier
|
|
this month. Police said Who told them about RC's purchases. They said Who
|
|
wrote checks for the purchase of the computer equipment and the stereo for RC.
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
Well, RC might get off with 3 years of probation (including possible drug
|
|
testing according to RC.). Dr. Who's court set is set for August 25, 1986.
|
|
He will most likely be doing some prison time unfortunately. Please address
|
|
all further questions to The Clashmaster.
|
|
|
|
Information Provided By The Clashmaster
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
|
|
Portrait Of The Typical Computer Criminal August 11, 1986
|
|
-----------------------------------------
|
|
from PC Week Magazine
|
|
|
|
In studying the typical computer criminal, the National Center for Computer
|
|
Crime Data, in L.A., may have recently shattered some common myths.
|
|
|
|
Rather than being some genius computer programmer, according to the center's
|
|
recently published report, the typical computer criminal is just that: quite
|
|
typical. He's most often a male, with an average age of 22, and if not, he's
|
|
next likely to be 19. Chances are he's a programmer, but if that job
|
|
description doesn't fit, he's most likely a student or an input clerk.
|
|
|
|
Less than 5% of the time, this criminal will be either unskilled or unemployed,
|
|
and less than 2% of the time will he be a computer executive.
|
|
|
|
In more than 40% of the cases that the center studied, criminals stole money,
|
|
and if cash wasn't their style, they split between stealing information or
|
|
programs and damaging software.
|
|
|
|
For these crimes, 4/5ths of those caught had to pay a fine or do community
|
|
service or both, or serve less than 6 months in jail. In close to 1/5th of the
|
|
cases, the criminal's only punishment was to make restitution.
|
|
|
|
Some notes from Sally Ride:::Space Cadet
|
|
----------------------------------------
|
|
Pisses me off! How dare they suggest we are not GENIUS computer programmers! Oh
|
|
wait a minute, I know why they screwed up the statistics! They haven't caught
|
|
the geniuses, so we throw off the statistical skew since we're still free.
|
|
|
|
Also I think it's high time computer executives start accounting for their fair
|
|
share of computer crime! They probably don't get in the statistics either since
|
|
they pull off the really big money rip-offs and it doesn't get published by the
|
|
high power companies they work for so the public keeps faith in them.
|
|
|
|
Information Provided By Sally Ride:::Space Cadet
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Dan Pasquale: Still Hostile or Ancient History? September 8, 1986
|
|
------------------------------------------------
|
|
Some updated information on Sergeant Dan Pasquale (Fremont, CA Police
|
|
Department) aka The Revenger here. Supposedly he has been calling Oryan QUEST
|
|
on several occasions and filling in Oryan as to his plans on whom to bust.
|
|
However, an investigation into the truth of this matter shows otherwise.
|
|
|
|
Most recently, Oryan QUEST informed me that Dan Pasquale was trying to gain
|
|
information on The Yakuza. I told The Yakuza about this and had him call Dan
|
|
himself to find out what was going on.
|
|
|
|
Apparently he had no idea of who he was and had no idea of what he was talking
|
|
about. He just said he'd no idea what I was talking about. He also said that
|
|
he'd heard about a Shooting Shark incident much like this one. The Rocker of
|
|
Speed Demon Elite also has called him claiming a similar story. The weird
|
|
thing is, he also claims to not have talked to Oryan QUEST since around the
|
|
beginning of summer. [Please note that Shooting Shark and The Rocker have been
|
|
disliked by Oryan QUEST for some time and that situation has not changed].
|
|
|
|
Dan seemed pretty lax, didn't get excited, and seemed like a decent person all
|
|
around. He said he hadn't been on a board for at least 3 months and that board
|
|
was a legit one at that. He concluded by saying he didn't know who or why
|
|
these rumors were starting up.
|
|
|
|
Some last things to add, Dan said that he isn't into busting phreaks/hackers
|
|
and all that stuff anymore. He just proved his point with Phoenix Phortress,
|
|
took his raise, and got out of the deal. He is now teaching at the academy and
|
|
is doing patrols. But, aside from that, he claims to have nothing at all to do
|
|
with the modem world.
|
|
|
|
Information Provided By [%] The Yakuza [%]
|
|
|
|
Please refer to past issues of Phrack World News for more
|
|
information on Dan Pasquale and/or Phoenix Phortress
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Zigmond Exposed September 1, 1986
|
|
---------------
|
|
Finally after months of confusion and question, the truth about Daniel Zigmond
|
|
is out. It would appear that Zigmond is not an on-staff programmer at Carnegie
|
|
Mellon University after all, but instead was a sort of part time worker there.
|
|
Indeed, Daniel just graduated high school with the class of 1986 and currently
|
|
attends the University of Pittsburgh this fall. He started part time work at
|
|
CMU on April 1, 1984 (April Fools? Not this time).
|
|
|
|
He does have a book coming out on Lisp programming which is what he did at
|
|
Carnegie Mellon. All of this information came from his boss at CMU. As for
|
|
Amiga World, Daniel has submitted a few articles, but he isn't "on staff."
|
|
This came from his Amiga World editor.
|
|
|
|
The reason there is nothing listed in his TRW account now is obvious since he
|
|
is not old enough to have obtained credit cards, bought a car/house, or much of
|
|
anything else.
|
|
|
|
Zigmond says he lied about his age because he thought he would get more
|
|
respect. He thought that people would think he was a rodent if they knew he
|
|
was only 17 years old.
|
|
|
|
Daniel Zigmond received(s) quite a lot of prank phone calls, including a bomb
|
|
threat that brought the police to his house, and I ask everyone to stop. He
|
|
tried to screw around with the phreak/hack community, but no damage was done.
|
|
Its time to leave him alone because ragging serves no purpose.
|
|
|
|
As for his article...only time will tell, but the general idea is that he made
|
|
that up too just so he could become involved with the phreak/hack community.
|
|
|
|
Information Provided and Researched by Lucifer 666
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Maxfield Strikes Again August 20, 1986
|
|
---------------------- ---------------
|
|
Many of you probably remember a system known as "THE BOARD" in the Detroit 313
|
|
NPA. The number was 313-592-4143 and the newuser password was
|
|
"HEL-N555,ELITE,3" (then return). It was kind of unique because it was run off
|
|
of an HP2000 computer.
|
|
|
|
On the Private Sector BBS (Sponsored by 2600 Magazine), Bill From RNOC had
|
|
posted a list of numbers that were related to John Maxfield and while none of
|
|
the numbers were anything close to the bbs number listed above, Bill reminded
|
|
us that Maxfield was the proud owner of an HP2000 computer.
|
|
|
|
This started started several people (including Sally Ride:::Space Cadet and
|
|
myself) thinking that there might be a connection. Using resources that I
|
|
cannot reveal, I was able to prove that "THE BOARD" was indeed a
|
|
Maxfield/BoardScan operation. I also had learned that the BBS number itself
|
|
really had call forwarding to one of Maxfield's own numbers. On August 15,
|
|
1986 I made this knowledge semi-public and warned Sally Ride:::Space Cadet and
|
|
Ax Murderer (who lives locally to Maxfield). Unfortunately these warnings were
|
|
in vain because on August 20, 1986 the following messages were found and sent
|
|
to me by Sally Ride.
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
Welcome to MIKE WENDLAND'S I-TEAM sting board!
|
|
(Computer Services Provided By BOARDSCAN)
|
|
66 Megabytes Strong
|
|
|
|
300/1200 baud - 24 hours.
|
|
|
|
Three (3) lines = no busy signals!
|
|
Rotary hunting on 313-534-0400.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Board: General Information & BBS's
|
|
Message: 41
|
|
Title: YOU'VE BEEN HAD!!!
|
|
To: ALL
|
|
From: HIGH TECH
|
|
Posted: 8/20/86 @ 12.08 hours
|
|
|
|
Greetings:
|
|
|
|
You are now on THE BOARD, a "sting" BBS operated by MIKE WENDLAND of the
|
|
WDIV-TV I-Team. The purpose? To demonstrate and document the extent of
|
|
criminal and potentially illegal hacking and telephone fraud activity by the
|
|
so-called "hacking community."
|
|
|
|
Thanks for your cooperation. In the past month and a half, we've received all
|
|
sorts of information from you implicating many of you to credit card fraud,
|
|
telephone billing fraud, vandalism, and possible break-ins to government or
|
|
public safety computers. And the beauty of this is we have your posts, your
|
|
E-Mail and--- most importantly ---your REAL names and addresses.
|
|
|
|
What are we going to do with it? Stay tuned to News 4. I plan a special
|
|
series of reports about our experiences with THE BOARD, which saw users check
|
|
in from coast-to-coast and Canada, users ranging in age from 12 to 48. For our
|
|
regular users, I have been known as High Tech, among other ID's. John Maxfield
|
|
of Boardscan served as our consultant and provided the HP2000 that this "sting"
|
|
ran on. Through call forwarding and other conveniences made possible by
|
|
telephone technology, the BBS operated remotely here in the Detroit area.
|
|
|
|
When will our reports be ready? In a few weeks. We now will be contacting
|
|
many of you directly, talking with law enforcement and security agents from
|
|
credit card companies and the telephone services.
|
|
|
|
It should be a hell of a series. Thanks for your help. And don't bother
|
|
trying any harassment. Remember, we've got YOUR real names.
|
|
|
|
Mike Wendland
|
|
The I-team
|
|
WDIV, Detroit, MI.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Board: General Information & BBS's
|
|
Message: 42
|
|
Title: BOARDSCAN
|
|
To: ALL
|
|
From: THE REAPER
|
|
Posted: 8/20/86 @ 12.54 hours
|
|
|
|
This is John Maxfield of Boardscan. Welcome! Please address all letter bombs
|
|
to Mike Wendland at WDIV-TV Detroit. This board was his idea.
|
|
|
|
The Reaper (a.k.a. Cable Pair)
|
|
|
|
|
|
Board: General Information & BBS's
|
|
Message: 43
|
|
Title: BOARDSCAN
|
|
To: ALL
|
|
From: AX MURDERER
|
|
Posted: 8/20/86 @ 13.30 hours
|
|
|
|
Hey guys, he really had us for awhile. For any of you who posted illegal shit,
|
|
I feel sorry for you. I just can't wait to see his little news article. Cable
|
|
Pair, do you have some sort of problem? If you've noticed, just about
|
|
*everything* posted on this board is *legal*!!! So fuck off! You wanna get
|
|
nasty? Well go ahead, call my house! Threaten me! HaHaHa, so what are you
|
|
gonna do, take me to court for calling a bbs? Freedom of speech. YOU lose!
|
|
|
|
Ax Murderer
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
Your guess is as good as mine as to what happens next. For those of you who
|
|
are interested, Mike Wendland can be reached at WDIV-TV, 313-222-0444,
|
|
313-222-0540, 313-222-5000, 313-222-0532.
|
|
|
|
Information Provided by
|
|
|
|
Ax Murderer/John Maxfield/Sally Ride:::Space Cadet/Knight Lightning
|
|
and the PWN Special Investigation Team
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
Maxfield is in general pretty proud of his efforts with THE BOARD. He says
|
|
that a lot of the people that he voice verified should have known it was him.
|
|
However, it is believed that he had a kid helping him do some of the
|
|
validations.
|
|
|
|
According to John F. Maxfield the only reason this sting board was done was to
|
|
show "What is currently happening in the phreak/hack community." He said no
|
|
legal action will be taken at all, and besides, its fattened his "dossiers" on
|
|
a lot of people!
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
PWN Quicknotes
|
|
--------------
|
|
There is a bulletin board called Alpha Center in the 514 NPA (Canada) that is
|
|
being run by a guy named Mike Holmes who is writing a book on the personalities
|
|
of phreakers and hackers. Mike will ask for your real name, address, phone
|
|
number and other things, but it is not completely required. The board is 300
|
|
baud only.
|
|
|
|
The name of the book is reported to be "Phreak me out!" and it is supposed to
|
|
be "not about how to phreak or hack, but about hackers lives and their trials
|
|
and tribulations." If you would like to find out more about this board or the
|
|
book before calling, either contact Attila the Hun or leave Mike Holmes a
|
|
message at his voice mailbox (214)733-5283. For the general password contact
|
|
anyone of the below contributors, myself or Taran King.
|
|
|
|
Information Provided By (8/1/86)
|
|
|
|
Attila The Hun/Ryche/Sticky Fingers/The Pyro
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
People in foreign countries will soon be able to have the benefits of our
|
|
famous 800 (toll free) numbers. In place of the 800 number, foreign callers
|
|
will dial 196. This will be followed by a unique prefix and the line number
|
|
from the company's domestic 800 service.
|
|
|
|
It would work like this: 196-NXX-XXXX. AT&T will bill and record all these
|
|
calls. This will give our overseas (and maybe Canada too) friends the
|
|
opportunity to take advantage of the US toll network.
|
|
|
|
Information Provided By Sally Ride:::Space Cadet (8/1/86)
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
Mountain States Telephone and Pacific North West Bell are trialing work
|
|
stations to be used to allow operators to work from home via the personal
|
|
computer. Mountain States Telephone has over 100 people in various occupations
|
|
working from home now, while Pacific North West has just built one entire
|
|
operating office equipped with IBMs and have several employees working remotely
|
|
using the same technology.
|
|
|
|
Information Provided By Sally Ride:::Space Cadet (8/8/86)
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
Supposedly, Bug Byter, Soft Jock, Street Urchin, the Bandit, the Gray Elf,
|
|
Sea-Saw, and Quick Zipper have all were busted on August 5, 1986. It has also
|
|
been reported that Street Urchin has to pay $7000 in restitution.
|
|
|
|
Information Provided By Silent Assault (8/8/86)
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
A Commodore Hacker, Hackin Hank was busted for abusing MCI codes and had to pay
|
|
a $2000 phone bill. He was caught after a person he called was called by MCI
|
|
Investigations. This person got scared and told them everything he knew.
|
|
|
|
Information Provided By Red Baron (8/8/86)
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
The following two phreaks were sentenced about 2 months prior to the date.
|
|
|
|
MOB RULES, who was busted for MF Scanning that he had done 2 years previous,
|
|
got 90 days in jail, 360 hours of community service, and 5 years probation.
|
|
|
|
Video Vance has been given a flat 90 days in jail for being caught with 11
|
|
cases of dynamite.
|
|
|
|
Information Provided By <S><C><A><N><M><A><N> (8/8/86)
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
There is a bulletin board in Australia with many users interested in learning
|
|
to phreak and hack. They need experienced people to converse with. Tell the
|
|
sysop that you are calling from America. The number is 61-3-509-9611.
|
|
|
|
Information Provided By Mad Madness (8/14/86)
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
Shadow Hawk 1 was busted for hacking two RSTSs in Chicago. They acquired all
|
|
of his printouts and disks with information on it. Info by Shadow Hawk 1.
|
|
(8/11/86)
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
The Prophet, formally of the PhoneLine Phantoms, was recently contacted by
|
|
authorities for as yet unknown reasons. He has had his computer equipment
|
|
confiscated, but as of this writing he has not been formally charged. And to
|
|
clear up the rumor, I did not have anything to do with it.
|
|
|
|
Information Provided By Solid State (8/23/86)
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
Some notes about Night Stalker's bust here, I haven't really talked much to him
|
|
because his phone line is bugged, I could tell that much from all of the clicks
|
|
that I heard after he had hung up while I was still on the line.
|
|
|
|
Some of the reasons that he may have been busted were that credit Card numbers
|
|
were frequently posted on The Underground and two months ago a member of the
|
|
Underground called the White House with a bomb threat and was later visited by
|
|
the U.S. Secret Service. They knew this person had used illegal extenders and
|
|
codes to make the call. They inquired to where he obtained them and he told
|
|
them all about The Underground.
|
|
|
|
He is currently under surveillance, the Secret Service thinks he is
|
|
transferring funds and have been following him and taking pictures, especially
|
|
when he visited his bank. That's about all I know...end of the investigation.
|
|
|
|
Information Provided By Night Stalker
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
In the last week of July, Cyclone II mistakenly was playing with a local VAX
|
|
and became a bit careless with his methods. He was caught. You may have
|
|
noticed that he hasn't been calling around for quite awhile. He won't be until
|
|
this mess is cleared up, which should be in the near future.
|
|
|
|
His computer was confiscated, as well as all of his files, papers, notes, and
|
|
anything else the authorities could find that was illegal. He is laying low
|
|
and would prefer not to receive too many calls.
|
|
|
|
Information Provided by Cyclone II (8/4/86)
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
For those of us that subscribe to Home Box Office (HBO), did any of you see the
|
|
HBO movie, Apology? Well the movie was based on fact and being that Apology
|
|
can be accessed from a phone line I feel that it could be considered as
|
|
possibly having something to do with phreaking. This Apology differs a little
|
|
from the movie, because with this one you can hear other people's Apology's as
|
|
well including the statements made from two phreaks in the Southern Bell area.
|
|
|
|
These two phone phreaks/hackers/credit carders/anarchists as they described
|
|
themselves apologized for all sorts of crimes including $200,000 phone bills to
|
|
their phone company, bomb threats to their school, and prank calls to Hong
|
|
Kong, Egypt, and London. One of the phreaks identified themselves as "The
|
|
Cop." Just thought you might be interested to know about it...-KL
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
Received: (from LISTSERV@PSUVM for TK0EEE1@UCLAMAIL via NJE)
|
|
(LISTSE00-2058; 567 LINES); Wed, 20 Dec 89 01:22:33 CST
|
|
Date: Wed, 20 Dec 89 01:22 CST
|
|
To: TK0EEE1
|
|
From: LISTSERV@PSUVM
|
|
|
|
==Phrack Inc.==
|
|
|
|
Volume One, Issue Eight, Phile #9 of 9
|
|
|
|
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Phrack World News PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Issue Seven/Part Two PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN Compiled and Written by Knight Lightning PWN
|
|
PWN PWN
|
|
PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
|
|
|
|
P-80: Sting Board? August 28, 1986
|
|
------------------
|
|
Below is a compilation of miscellaneous messages taken from the Communication/
|
|
Phreak section and the Elite user section of Pirate 80 Systems, a BBS run by
|
|
Scan Man, also known as Scott Higgonbotham. Everything in []s are notes from
|
|
Sally Ride and myself.
|
|
|
|
*******************
|
|
****** ******
|
|
****** *******
|
|
****** ********
|
|
****** ******
|
|
*****************
|
|
******
|
|
******
|
|
****** E I G H T Y
|
|
******
|
|
******
|
|
|
|
FOR THE SERIOUS COMMUNICATIONS HOBBYIST
|
|
WELCOME ABOARD
|
|
|
|
<><><><><><><><><><><><>
|
|
<> Knowledge is Power <>
|
|
<> Thomas Jefferson <>
|
|
<><><><><><><><><><><><>
|
|
|
|
[Enter: An up and coming young phreaker named Shawn.]
|
|
|
|
Msg#: 7284 *COMMUNICATIONS*
|
|
05/28/86 19:43:24 (Read 42 Times)
|
|
From: SHAWN
|
|
To: ALL
|
|
Subj: CODES
|
|
|
|
OK HERE WE GO 800 446 4462 SKYLINE (CODE: XXXXXXX)
|
|
800 626 9600 CODE (XXXXXXX)
|
|
800 222 4482 CODE (XXXXXX)
|
|
800 521 8400 CODE (XXXXXXXX)
|
|
800 227 0073 CODES (xxxxXxx X=0-9)
|
|
METRO CODES: XXXXXX, XXXXXX, XXXXXX, XXXXXX, XXXXXX
|
|
PBX: 312 455 7287 (CODE XXXX+Y)
|
|
503 652 6016: ID: XXX,XXX PASS ****
|
|
|
|
later,
|
|
Shawn
|
|
|
|
[In the above message, the numbers were followed by codes that I have since
|
|
censored out. This magazine will *NOT* publish codes.]
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
[It's common knowledge that a BBS userlog must be blanked before a BBS can be
|
|
used as a sting board. I've also heard that law enforcement officials have
|
|
been trying to bust P-80 and Scan Man for a long time, but have not been able
|
|
to accomplish anything. Even the infamous Detective Dan Pasquale {See past
|
|
issues of Phrack World News, "Phoenix Phortress Stings 7" and "Oryan QUEST Vs.
|
|
Dan Pasquale"} and John Maxfield, head of BoardScan, are frustrated at being
|
|
unable to deal with Scan Man. On June 20, 1986, or thereabouts, the following
|
|
message appeared in the logon to P-80;
|
|
|
|
"BI-ANNUAL USERLOG CLEANUP IN
|
|
EFFECT. ALL MEMBERS PLEASE
|
|
RE-LOGIN AS A NEW USER..."]
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Msg#: 7870 *COMMUNICATIONS*
|
|
06/20/86 22:04:41 (Read 50 Times)
|
|
From: ICARUS 1
|
|
To: ALL
|
|
Subj: TMC BUST
|
|
|
|
TMC has just nailed a hacker associate of mine for $935. The destination
|
|
numbers were called and someone spilled their guts. The guy who got busted
|
|
is worried because the Alliance bills have not come in yet. TMC users beware.
|
|
Make sure your friends are amnesiacs as the phreaker's bible says.
|
|
|
|
Icarus
|
|
|
|
[Some friendly advice from Icarus 1, too bad not everyone heeded the message.]
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Msg#: 7894 *COMMUNICATIONS*
|
|
06/21/86 19:44:09 (Read 44 Times)
|
|
From: ICARUS 1
|
|
To: SCAN MAN (Rcvd)
|
|
Subj: REPLY TO MSG# 7870 (TMC BUST)
|
|
|
|
He was busted by TMC in the state of Nebraska.
|
|
|
|
Icarus
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Msg#: 7898 *COMMUNICATIONS*
|
|
06/21/86 20:43:10 (Read 43 Times)
|
|
From: MAX MADDNESS
|
|
To: ICARUS 1 (Rcvd)
|
|
Subj: REPLY TO MSG# 7870 (TMC BUST)
|
|
|
|
Hey check it out, I use TMC in Youngstown, Ohio (216-743-6533), but when TMC
|
|
calls my phreak friends, they think the calls originate from Akron, Ohio which
|
|
is 60 or so miles away. So when TMC calls and asks, "Do you know anyone in
|
|
Akron?" people usually are honest and just say no. So even if I call
|
|
+relatives, etc. usually I'm safe.
|
|
|
|
Max
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Msg#: 7880 *COMMUNICATIONS*
|
|
06/21/86 05:30:37 (Read 51 Times)
|
|
From: THE FALCON
|
|
To: ALL
|
|
Subj: TMC
|
|
|
|
What is the number to TMC? I just want to know so that I'm sure not to use it.
|
|
Oh well, thanx and later.
|
|
|
|
\_The Falcon_/
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Msg#: 7952 *COMMUNICATIONS*
|
|
06/23/86 13:06:23 (Read 44 Times)
|
|
From: SHAWN
|
|
To: ICARUS 1 (Rcvd)
|
|
Subj: REPLY TO MSG# 7870 (TMC BUST)
|
|
|
|
Well I told you guys a while ago that this would happen so stay away from them.
|
|
|
|
Icarus
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Msg#: 7961 *COMMUNICATIONS*
|
|
06/23/86 17:15:41 (Read 47 Times)
|
|
From: BLADE RUNNER
|
|
To: ALL
|
|
Subj: TMC
|
|
|
|
I was wandering around some guys hard drive this weekend and found some AT&T
|
|
mail regarding TMC. From what I understand TMC is involved in the AT&T
|
|
AGETRIAL project. Which indicates to me that TMC is also into computers and
|
|
consequently knows what a hacker is. Another thing that was found was some
|
|
information on the 1PSS switch that has been developed by AT&T and has already
|
|
been deployed in dome BOCS and other communications networks. This troubles me
|
|
in that this is the first that I have heard about it. I meant to say that it
|
|
has been deployed on some networks already. If you have any valid information
|
|
on the 1PSS SWITCH please post it and it will show up in the P.H.I.R.M. update
|
|
issue for July, giving you credit for the information of course.
|
|
|
|
BLADE RUNNER (PRESIDENT)
|
|
P.H.I.R.M.
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Msg#: 8456 *COMMUNICATIONS*
|
|
07/13/86 13:48:51 (Read 75 Times)
|
|
From: SCAN MAN
|
|
To: SHAWN (Rcvd)
|
|
Subj: REPLY TO MSG# 7691 (GENERAL)
|
|
|
|
GOT ANY CODES FOR 800-451-2300?
|
|
|
|
[***IMPORTANT*** This is TMC's Miami, Florida dial-up. An interesting request
|
|
from the sysop of one of the nation's top code boards. For those of you who
|
|
remember it was Scan Man who asked the infamous Whacko Cracko Brothers, Inc.
|
|
{See PWN Issue II, "The Life And Crimes of The Whacko Cracko Brothers, Inc."}
|
|
to scan some codes on a certain dial-up just before they were arrested. Now he
|
|
is asking Shawn for TMC codes, kinda interesting that Shawn got investigated
|
|
less than a week later by TMC Security Department isn't it?]
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Msg#: 8970 *COMMUNICATIONS*
|
|
08/10/86 06:41:48 (Read 34 Times)
|
|
From: SHAWN
|
|
To: SCAN MAN (Rcvd)
|
|
Subj: REPLY TO MSG# 8456 (GENERAL)
|
|
|
|
Well sorry it took me so long to find this message I kept forgetting to look at
|
|
this one. Anyway if you really need some [codes, referring to the last
|
|
message] I can dig some up easy enough well hack some I should say noting you
|
|
can get about 100 in a matter a 10 or 15 minutes so its no big deal to me
|
|
either way also watch 800 637 7377 I'm telling you now people that this company
|
|
has tracing stuff and I have talked with them they offer me a job and I'm goin
|
|
to take it but dont worry I'm not goin to be busting people I have to make it
|
|
so you guys cant get in notin it is very easy to make it at least very hard to
|
|
do ho well be careful.
|
|
|
|
[Be careful indeed! 800-637-7377 is TMC's Las Vegas dial-up. What would you do
|
|
if you were about to lose your computer and maybe your freedom? Work for the
|
|
other side? The kid really has a way with words, I haven't seen spelling and
|
|
grammer like that since first grade. As for his not busting people, isn't that
|
|
a laugh, he has already stated that he will bust anyone he can starting with
|
|
the lower level phreaks who are only into code abuse.]
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Msg#: 8974 *COMMUNICATIONS*
|
|
08/10/86 13:14:13 (Read 34 Times)
|
|
From: JOHNNY ROTTEN
|
|
To: ALL
|
|
Subj: PHREAKERS QUEST
|
|
|
|
To all users of Phreaker's Quest...
|
|
|
|
What happened to it? It just rings. If you have any info. Leave mail or
|
|
whatever.
|
|
<Johnny Rotten>
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Msg#: 9058 *COMMUNICATIONS*
|
|
08/13/86 06:58:12 (Read 30 Times)
|
|
From: SHAWN
|
|
To: JOHNNY ROTTEN
|
|
Subj: REPLY TO MSG# 8974 (PHREAKERS QUEST)
|
|
|
|
Well you see I came very close to getting busted they called my voice line that
|
|
is TMC of 800 637 7377 and I have never given it out to anyone at all [I bet!]
|
|
so I knew that i was in for it they told me they knew I ran a board and they
|
|
said they could not get in I kept deleted them haha anyways I had 2 choices 1
|
|
take it down 2 get busted.
|
|
|
|
[Wonder how they got your home number Shawn? Did you give it out for
|
|
validation on Pirate-80? Maybe around the time of the "Bi-annual userlog
|
|
cleanup"? Or, could it be the cops are smart enough to ask the phone company
|
|
for any other line running into a house where a suspect BBS is running?]
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Msg#: 9052 *COMMUNICATIONS*
|
|
08/12/86 19:10:47 (Read 29 Times)
|
|
From: JIM RATH
|
|
To: ALL
|
|
Subj: TMC
|
|
|
|
Listen people... it is time to stop screwing with TMC.. (7377 number). Our
|
|
good friend Shawn of Phreakers Quest just had his BBS put down from them.
|
|
Shawn met some guy from TMC, and they have had ANI on the number for months
|
|
now. If you value your own security, throw away any and all TMC information
|
|
NOW, or you might be suffering the consequences later.
|
|
|
|
For details on the "Bust" call Theives Underground II. It's SCARY!
|
|
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Msg#: 9054 *COMMUNICATIONS*
|
|
08/12/86 23:50:02 (Read 28 Times)
|
|
From: SCAN MAN
|
|
To: JIM RATH (Rcvd)
|
|
Subj: REPLY TO MSG# 9052 (TMC)
|
|
|
|
Where is Thieves Underground located?
|
|
|
|
[Why is Scan Man so interested in what Shawn is saying about his experience
|
|
with TMC? I mean plenty of people on Pirate-80 have run-ins with some form of
|
|
security everyday and he doesn't go researching them, why is this "TMC Run-IN"
|
|
so important to him? Maybe he has a personal reason to be interested, then
|
|
again maybe not.]
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
Msg#: 9086 *COMMUNICATIONS*
|
|
08/14/86 13:36:37 (Read 25 Times)
|
|
From: JIM RATH
|
|
To: SCAN MAN (Rcvd)
|
|
Subj: REPLY TO MSG# 9054 (TMC)
|
|
|
|
I believe TU is in Texas somewhere.. dunno where exactly (never really bothered
|
|
remembering).. 214 AC though
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Msg#: 9110 *COMMUNICATIONS*
|
|
08/15/86 03:54:20 (Read 16 Times)
|
|
From: SHAWN
|
|
To: JIM RATH (Rcvd)
|
|
Subj: REPLY TO MSG# 9052 (TMC)
|
|
|
|
If you want some details why dont you just ask me seeing as though i would be
|
|
the one to ask the TU only knows what i tell him and scan man i need to talk
|
|
with you about this they did have an idea of some things going on here and so
|
|
one i would rather say it to yo then type it in
|
|
|
|
shawn
|
|
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
Indeed, what is going on here Shawn? Just what did TMC mention about
|
|
Pirate-80? And why not post it in on the public boards? For the answer to
|
|
that maybe one could talk to Jeff Namey who works for TMC and is very proud to
|
|
acclaim the efforts of one Scott Higgonbotham and his sting BBS Pirate 80 which
|
|
has, in his own words, "Saved my company from near bankruptcy at the hands of
|
|
the hackers."
|
|
|
|
It is also interesting to note that Scan Man recently admitted to being a
|
|
computer security consultant in Phrack Pro-Phile IV. He said his boss didn't
|
|
know about his outside phreak/hack interests.
|
|
|
|
Scan Man also claims to have infiltrated various security organizations. I
|
|
wonder if he has infiltrated or simply joined as a regular member.
|
|
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
The following are highlights of a conversation with Ben Graves of TMC, around
|
|
August 25th or 26th (SR=Sally Ride BG=Ben Graves):
|
|
|
|
SR: Mr. Graves I need to talk to you about one of your employee's a Scott
|
|
Higgonbotham (Scan Man).
|
|
|
|
BG: What about Scott?
|
|
|
|
SR: Well, my company is concerned with the impact of computer hackers on our
|
|
business. Scott attended a convention in Miami around January and gave
|
|
his business card to one of our security people. I'm following up on
|
|
their conversation with the idea that perhaps my company could be given
|
|
access to Scott's electronic bulletin board. In this way we could monitor
|
|
for hackers abusing our codes.
|
|
|
|
BG: That may be something we can arrange. I know that Scott has been a great
|
|
help to TMC since we were able to pick him up. We began to have a big
|
|
problem with hackers awhile back and Scott seems to have some of the
|
|
answers. He's not in right now, can I have your number and I'll have him
|
|
call you back?
|
|
|
|
SR: You sure can. So, Scott's bulletin board has helped you reduce your
|
|
losses to toll fraud?
|
|
|
|
BG: Well, that's just one of the ways Scott has used to work on the problem.
|
|
But, he has been very effective.
|
|
|
|
SR: Thanks, Ben, I'll be waiting for the call.
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
The following are highlights of conversation with Pauline Frazier of TMC from
|
|
around September 5, 1986 (Sally Ride: SR Pauline Frazier: PF)
|
|
|
|
Operator: TMC, may I help you?
|
|
|
|
SR: Yes, Ben Graves, please.
|
|
|
|
Operator: I'm sorry, Mr. Graves is no longer employed here.
|
|
|
|
SR: Oh!? Well, is Scott Higgonbotham in?
|
|
|
|
Operator: One moment, please.
|
|
|
|
PF: Hello, this is Pauline Frazier, I'm the office manager, may I help you?
|
|
|
|
SR: Well, maybe, I was trying to reach Ben Graves, I just talked to him last
|
|
week about another one of your employees, Scott Higgonbotham, now the
|
|
receptionist says Ben no longer works here.
|
|
|
|
PF: Yes, that is true, and neither does Mr. Higgonbotham.
|
|
|
|
SR: May I ask why?
|
|
|
|
PF: I'm really not able to say much, I think you should talk to our
|
|
Regional Security Director, Kevin Griffo, he's on 804-625-1110. He could
|
|
tell you much more than I can.
|
|
|
|
SR: O.K., but maybe I should tell you why I'm interested. I was talking to
|
|
Ben about an electronic bulletin board Scott is running. My company has
|
|
someone on it and we're concerned that things might not be legal on there.
|
|
There are access codes being posted of my company's and yours'. Could
|
|
that be why they're no longer employed?
|
|
|
|
PF: Do you mean he is posting TMC codes on there?
|
|
|
|
SR: Well, I can't say he's the one posting the codes, but he is letting them
|
|
be posted, along with a lot of other information such as computer logins
|
|
and passwords.
|
|
|
|
PF: Well, you know I never did like it when they hired that fellow. And,
|
|
I told them so, too. When he started we had a problem with toll fraud,
|
|
but nothing like it is now. He was able to catch a few of those hackers
|
|
while he was here, and we pressed charges, but the problem just seemed to
|
|
get worse and worse.
|
|
|
|
SR: So, he actually had some hackers arrested?
|
|
|
|
PF: Yes, several. He started working here in Charleston and then they
|
|
sent him to New York when things got bad up there. But, things never
|
|
have gotten any better since he's started here or in New York either.
|
|
Sir, please, call Mr. Griffo about all this he can tell you more than I.
|
|
|
|
SR: I will. Do you think he'd be in now?
|
|
|
|
PF: Well, it's late here and he's probably gone home, try Monday.
|
|
|
|
SR: Thanks, I will.
|
|
|
|
(But you told me plenty, sweetheart!)
|
|
|
|
[For the record I had a VERY similar chat with Pauline Frazier, it turned up
|
|
the same results.]
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
The following are highlights of a conversation with Kevin Griffo, TMC,
|
|
September 9th (Sally Ride: SR Kevin Griffo: KG).
|
|
|
|
Oper: TMC, may I help you?
|
|
|
|
SR: Yes, Kevin Griffo, please.
|
|
|
|
Oper: His line is busy now, can he call you back?
|
|
|
|
SR: Well, this is urgent, may I hold?
|
|
|
|
Oper: Certainly, I'll let him know you're holding.
|
|
|
|
KG: Hello, this is Kevin.
|
|
|
|
SR: Mr. Griffo I've been referred to you by one of your Charleston employees,
|
|
Pauline Frazier. She felt I should tell you what I told her yesterday
|
|
about one of your now former employees, I think, Scott Higgonbotham.
|
|
|
|
KG: Yeah, we let him go just last week. What about him?
|
|
|
|
SR: My company feels Scott is running an illegal BBS and has for sometime been
|
|
allowing access codes to be posted. Codes for your company's toll
|
|
switches as well as ours and other's are being entered on his system as
|
|
well as computer system logins and passwords.
|
|
|
|
KG: Well, I'm not surprised. I have been to Scott's home to see the bulletin
|
|
board. I knew codes were being posted, but I thought he was taking care
|
|
of reporting them.
|
|
|
|
SR: May I ask why you let him go?
|
|
|
|
KG: Certainly, Scott just wasn't solving our problems. In fact, some of our
|
|
people have thought he was somewhat to blame for many of them. Even
|
|
though, at first, he appeared to be the answer. He was able to identify
|
|
several computer hackers for us.
|
|
|
|
SR: So, he did bust some hackers? Has he done so recently? I think a young
|
|
man using the name Shawn on the bulletin boards was recently identified by
|
|
your company.
|
|
|
|
KG: No, he hasn't gotten anyone recently that I'm aware of, but he could have
|
|
turned them over to one of the local franchises. You see TMC is a
|
|
franchise operation. We try to help the franchises, but many do their
|
|
own thing. We wouldn't necessarily know about all that goes on.
|
|
|
|
SR: I'm sorry to hear you had this trouble. Perhaps, my company could
|
|
be of assistance. We do work of a similar nature.
|
|
|
|
KG: I'd certainly be interested in any help you could give. Can you put
|
|
together a written proposal?
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
I also had an interesting conversation with Larry Algard of Pacific Northwest
|
|
Bell. He confirmed that he had met Scott Higgonbotham at the Miami CFCA
|
|
conference last January. He also mentioned that Scott had told him about his
|
|
"sting" bulletin board, Pirate-80 in West Virginia.
|
|
|
|
For those who are interested:
|
|
|
|
TMC (Charleston Office).......................304-345-7275
|
|
Pauline Frazier, Office Manager (TMC).........See above
|
|
Jeff Namey, Accounts Receivable (TMC).........304-744-6555
|
|
TMC (Miami Office)............................305-371-3544
|
|
TMC (Tidewater)...............................804-625-1110
|
|
Larry Algard (Pacific North West Bell)........503-242-8862
|
|
Pacific North West Bell (Employee Directory)..800-426-7039
|
|
|
|
Or write to; TMC
|
|
405 Capitol St.
|
|
Parlor Suite
|
|
Charleston, West Virginia 25301
|
|
|
|
All the thoughts in []'s and other information are the insane ramblings of
|
|
Sally Ride:::Space Cadet and Knight Lightning, you tell me, are we spaced out
|
|
or what?! The TMC employee interviews were by Sally Ride:::Space Cadet with
|
|
me doing the background information.
|
|
|
|
It was at this point in time that we decided to have a talk with Scan Man
|
|
directly and give him a chance to clear his name and reputation.
|
|
|
|
Unfortunately, Scan Man was very uncooperative and constantly avoided answering
|
|
the questions I asked him. He also added that everything said in the
|
|
interviews were lies. He claims that Kevin Griffo has never been to his house,
|
|
he doesn't know Ben Graves, and Pauline Frazier hated him because she knew he
|
|
was a hacker.
|
|
|
|
He then went on to imply that Sally Ride:::Space Cadet was actually an employee
|
|
of some communications carrier himself because of the terminology he used in
|
|
some of his posts on P-80.
|
|
|
|
Scan Man claimed that he has been telling people that he worked for TMC for
|
|
quite some time and he only needed the codes from Shawn because he was going to
|
|
be in Miami later that week. In other words, Shawn's near bust and his asking
|
|
for TMC codes may have been a simple coincidence.
|
|
|
|
He claims to have done system analysis for TMC, but also admitted to securing
|
|
some of their computer systems, which isn't a crime.
|
|
|
|
As for his being at the Miami CFCA conference, I will assume that he was
|
|
infiltrating the con and was spotted as being a hacker. In order to gain the
|
|
respect and confidence of the security officials, he told them that his
|
|
bulletin board was a sting. Now, that story completely is believable with the
|
|
exception of how he arrived, a plane trip paid for by TMC.
|
|
|
|
Scan Man's last words contained a threat that if this affected his home life,
|
|
he would personally track down the writers and contributors and shoot them with
|
|
his rifle.
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
Notes from KL:
|
|
|
|
One thing that I should mention is the fact that Pirate-80 has *NEVER* been
|
|
busted or investigated. I mean its not hard to get onto and there are codes
|
|
plastered everywhere you look. How many boards do you know of that have been
|
|
busted for having codes on them? One example of this is with the credit card
|
|
numbers owned by Richard Sandza, author of "The Night Of The Hackers" and "The
|
|
Revenge Of The Hackers," both printed in Newsweek Magazine.
|
|
|
|
"It wasn't long before I found out what was being done with my credit-card
|
|
numbers, thanks to another friendly hacker who tipped me to Pirate 80, a
|
|
bulletin board in Charleston, W. Va., where I found this: 'I'm sure you guys
|
|
have heard about Richard Standza [sic] or Montana Wildhack. He's the guy who
|
|
wrote the obscene story about phreaking in NewsWeek [sic]. Well, my friend
|
|
did a credit card check on TRW...try this number, it's a VISA...Please nail
|
|
this guy bad...Captain Quieg [sic].'"
|
|
|
|
See this? This was published in "The Revenge Of The Hackers" in Newsweek
|
|
Magazine! And what happened to P-80? Nothing! Here Richard Sandza has just
|
|
announced to thousands of people that P-80 has credit card numbers posted on it
|
|
and nothing happened. Why? The answer to that is left to the reader.
|
|
|
|
There are a few other things to mention about Scan Man/P-80/TMC. Supposedly
|
|
all of the computer equipment that P-80 runs on was donated by TMC themselves.
|
|
It is also believed that Scan Man's only duty to the company was to report TMC
|
|
codes so that they could be turned off. It would appear that this had changed
|
|
but, we at Phrack Inc. in no way take any opinion whatsoever about the
|
|
innocence or guilt of Scan Man. We leave it to the reader to decide for
|
|
him/herself.
|
|
|
|
I'm sure all parties concerned would appreciate you NOT calling the above
|
|
numbers if all you plan to do is harass people or anything else among those
|
|
same lines. After all a job is a job and harassing someone wouldn't do
|
|
anyone any good either, it would just make them mad. If you are going to call,
|
|
make sure it is for knowledge purposes only! Above all do NOT call Scan Man to
|
|
harass him or his innocent family. My suggestion is that if you feel that Scan
|
|
Man is an informant or whatever, then stop just calling his board.
|
|
|
|
One last thing, a *VERY* big thank you to Sally Ride:::Space Cadet for a job
|
|
well done and for all the time he spent working on the article.
|
|
|
|
Information Provided by
|
|
|
|
Knight Lightning & Sally Ride:::Space Cadet
|
|
|
|
and directly/indirectly by
|
|
|
|
Blade Runner/Evil Jay/Forest Ranger/Icarus 1/Jack The Ripper/Jim Rath
|
|
Johnny Rotten/Larry Algard/Max Madness/Oryan QUEST/P-80 Systems/Scan Man/Shawn
|
|
Suicidal Nightmare/Taran King/The Falcon/TMC Staff
|
|
|
|
and other Anonymous Sources
|
|
|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
PS: For those interested, this investigation was sparked by the interception of
|
|
a memo from Larry Algard (Pacific Northwest Bell) to his boss, George Reay.
|
|
What was in the memo? Several things, but mostly it spoke of the January
|
|
CFCA (Communications Fraud Control Association) conference in Miami,
|
|
Florida where Larry met one Scott Higgonbotham, Security Director for TMC
|
|
(Tele-Marketing Company) who told him that he operated a "sting" bulletin
|
|
board named Pirate 80 in West Virginia.
|
|
_______________________________________________________________________________
|
|
|