478 lines
21 KiB
Plaintext
478 lines
21 KiB
Plaintext
ZDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD? IMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM; ZDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD?
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3 Founded By: 3 : Network Information Access : 3 Founded By: 3
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3 Guardian Of Time CD6 17APR90 GD4 Judge Dredd 3
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@DDDDDDDDBDDDDDDDDDY : Judge Dredd : @DDDDDDDDDBDDDDDDDDY
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3 : File 20 : 3
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3 HMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM< 3
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3 IMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM; 3
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@DDDDDD6 Executive Guide/Protection Of Information GDDDDY
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HMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM<
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Federal agencies are becoming increasingly
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dependent upon automated information systems to carry out their
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missions. While in the past, executives have taken a hands-off
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approach in dealing with these resources, essentially leaving the
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area to the computer technologist, they are now recognizing that
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computers and computer-related problems must be understood and
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managed, the same as any other resource.
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$_The success of an information resources protection
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program depends on the policy generated, and on the attitude of
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management toward securing information on automated systems.
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You, the policy maker, set the tone and the emphasis on how
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important a role information security will have within your
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agency. Your primary responsibility is to set the information
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resource security policy for the organization with the objectives
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of reduced risk, compliance with laws and regulations and
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assurance of operational continuity, information integrity, and
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confidentiality.
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$_Purpose of this Guide
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This guide is designed to help you, the policy
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maker, address a host of questions regarding the protection and
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safety of computer systems and data processed within your agency.
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It introduces information systems security concerns, outlines the
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management issues that must be addressed by agency policies and
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programs, and describes essential components of an effective
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implementation process.
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$_The Risks
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The proliferation of personal computers,
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local-area networks, and distributed processing has drastically
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changed the way we manage and control information resources.
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Internal controls and control points that were present in the
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past when we were dealing with manual or batch processes have not
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always been replaced with comparable controls in many of today's
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automated systems. Reliance upon inadequately controlled
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information systems can have serious consequences, including:
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Inability or impairment of the agency's ability to
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perform its mission
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Inability to provide needed services to the public
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Waste, loss, misuse, or misappropriation of funds
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Loss of credibility or embarrassment to an agency
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To avoid these consequences, a broad set of
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information security issues must be addressed effectively and
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comprehensively. Towards this end, executives should take a
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traditional risk management approach, recognizing that risks are
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taken in the day-to-day management of an organization, and that
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there are alternatives to consider in managing these risks. Risk
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is accepted as part of doing business or is reduced or eliminated
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by modifying operations or by employing control mechanisms.
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$_Executive Responsibilities
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Set the Security Policy of the Organization
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Protecting information resources is an important goal for all
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organizations. This goal is met by establishing an
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information resource security program. It will require staff,
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funding and positive incentives to motivate employees to
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participate in a program to protect these valuable assets.
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This information resource protection policy should
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state precisely:
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the value to the agency of data and information
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resources and the need to preserve their integrity, availability,
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and confidentiality
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the intent of the organization to protect the resources
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from accidental or deliberate unauthorized disclosure,
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modification, or destruction by employing cost-effective controls
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the assignment of responsibility for data security
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throughout the organization
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the requirement to provide computer security and
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awareness training to all employees having access to information
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resources
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the intent to hold employees personally accountable for
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information resources entrusted to them
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the requirement to monitor and assess data security via
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internal and external audit procedures
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the penalties for not adhering to the policy
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$_Executive Goals
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The policy established for securing information
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resources should meet the basic goals of reducing the risk,
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complying with applicable laws and regulations, and assuring
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operational continuity, integrity and confidentiality. This
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section briefly describes these objectives and how they can be
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met.
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$_Reduce Risk To An Acceptable Level
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The dollars spent for security measures to control
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or contain losses should never be more than the projected dollar
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loss if something adverse happened to the information resource.
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Cost-effective security results when reduction in risk is
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balanced with the cost of implementing safeguards. The greater
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the value of information processed, or the more severe the
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consequences if something happens to it, the greater the need
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for control measures to protect it. It is important that these
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trade-offs of cost versus risk reduction be explicitly
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considered, and that executives understand the degree of risk
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remaining after selected controls are implemented.
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$_Assure Operational Continuity
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With ever-increasing demands for timely
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information and greater volumes of information being processed,
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availability of essential systems, networks, and data is a major
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protection issue. In some cases, service disruptions of just a
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few hours are unacceptable. Agency reliance on essential
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computer systems requires that advance planning be done to allow
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timely restoration of processing capabilities in the event of
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severe service disruption. The impact due to inability to process
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data should be assessed, and action taken to assure availability
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of those systems considered essential to agency operation.
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$_Comply with Applicable Laws and Regulations
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As the pervasiveness of computer systems increases
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and the risks and vulnerabilities associated with information
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systems become better understood, the body of law and regulations
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compelling positive action to protect information resources
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grows. OMB Circular No. A-130, "Management of Federal Information
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systems," and Public Law 100-235, "Computer Security Act of 1987"
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are two documents where the knowledge of these laws provide a
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baseline for an information resources security program.
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$_Assure Integrity and Confidentiality
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An important objective of an information resource
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management program is to ensure that the information is accurate.
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Integrity of information means you can trust the data and the
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processes that manipulate it. A system has integrity when it
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provides sufficient accuracy and completeness to meet the needs
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of the user(s). It should be properly designed to automate all
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functional requirements, include appropriate accounting and
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integrity controls, and accommodate the full range of potential
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conditions that might be encountered in its operation.
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Agency information should also be protected from
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intruders, as well as from employees with authorized computer
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access privileges who attempt to perform unauthorized actions.
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Assured confidentiality of sensitive data is
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often, but not always, a requirement of agency systems. Privacy
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requirements for personal information are generally dictated by
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statute, while protection requirements for other agency
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information are a function of the nature of that information.
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Determination of requirements in the latter case is made by the
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official responsible for that information. The impact of
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wrongful disclosure should be considered in understanding
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confidentiality requirements.
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$_Information Protection Program Elements
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$_Need for Policies and Procedures
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Successful execution of the responsibilities previously outlined
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requires establishing agency policies and practices regarding
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information protection. The security policy
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directive facilitates consistent protection of information
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resources. Supporting procedures are most effectively
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implemented with top management support, through a program
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focused on areas of highest risk. A compliance assessment
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process ensures ongoing effectiveness of the information
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protection program throughout the agency.
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$_Scope
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Although the protection of automated information
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resources is emphasized in this publication, protection
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requirements will usually extend to information on all forms of
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media. Agency programs should apply safeguards to all
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information requiring protection, regardless of its form or
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location. Comprehensive information resource protection
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procedures will address: accountability for information,
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vulnerability assessment, data access, hardware/software control,
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systems development, and operational controls. Protection should
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be afforded throughout the life cycle of information, from
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creation through ultimate disposition.
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Accountability for Information
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An effective information resource protection
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program identifies the information used by the agency and assigns
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primary responsibility for information protection to the managers
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of the respective functional areas supported by the data. These
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managers know the importance of the data to the organization and
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are able to quantify the economic consequences of undesirable
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happenings. They are also able to detect deficiencies in data
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and know definitively who must have access to the data supporting
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their operations. A fundamental information protection issue is
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assignment of accountability. Information flows throughout the
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organization and can be shared by many individuals. This tends
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to blur accountability and disperse decision-making regarding
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information protection. Accountability should be explicitly
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assigned for determining and monitoring security for appropriate
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agency information.
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When security violations occur, management must be
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accountable for responding and investigating. Security
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violations should trigger a re-evaluation of access
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authorizations, protection decisions, and control techniques.
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All apparent violations should be resolved; since absolute
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protection will never be achieved, some losses are inevitable.
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It is important, however, that the degree of risk assumed be
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commensurate with the sensitivity or importance of the
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information resource to be protected.
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$_Vulnerability Assessment
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A risk assessment program ensures management that
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periodic reviews of information resources have considered the
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degree of vulnerability to threats causing destruction,
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modification, disclosure, and delay of information availability,
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in making protection decisions and investments in safeguards.
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The official responsible for a specific
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information resource determines protection requirements.
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Less-sensitive, less-essential information will require minimal
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safeguards, while highly sensitive or critical information might
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merit strict protective measures. Assessment of vulnerability is
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essential in specifying cost-effective safeguards; overprotection
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can be needlessly costly and add unacceptable operational
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overhead.
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Once cost-effective safeguards are selected,
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residual risk remains and is accepted by management. Risk status
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should be periodically re-examined to identify new threats,
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vulnerabilities, or other changes that affect the degree of risk
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that management has previously accepted.
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$_Data Access
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Access to information should be delegated
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according to the principles of need-to-know and least possible
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privilege. For a multi-user application system, only individuals
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with authorized need to view or use data are granted access
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authority, and they are allowed only the minimum privileges
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needed to carry out their duties. For personal computers with
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one operator, data should be protected from unauthorized viewing
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or use. It is the individual's responsibility to ensure that the
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data is secure.
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$_Systems Development
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All information systems software should be
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developed in a controlled and systematic manner according to
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agency standards. Agency policy should require that appropriate
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controls for accuracy, security, and availability are identified
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during system design, approved by the responsible official, and
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implemented. Users who design their own systems, whether on a
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personal computer or on a mainframe, must adhere to the systems
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development requirements.
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Systems should be thoroughly tested according to
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accepted standards and moved into a secure production environment
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through a controlled process. Adequate documentation should be
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considered an integral part of the information system and be
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completed before the system can be considered ready for use.
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$_Hardware/Software Configuration Control
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Protection of hardware and resources of computer
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systems and networks greatly contributes to the overall level of
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control and protection of information. The information
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protection policies should provide substantial direction
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concerning the management and control of computer hardware and
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software.
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Agency information should be protected from the
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potentially destructive impact of unauthorized hardware and
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software. For example, software "viruses" have been inserted
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into computers through games and apparently useful software
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acquired via public access bulletin boards; viruses can spread
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from system to system before being detected. Also, unauthorized
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hardware additions to personal computers can introduce unknown
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dial-in access paths. Accurate records of hardware/software
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inventory, configurations, and locations should be maintained,
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and control mechanisms should provide assurance that unauthorized
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changes have not occurred.
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To avoid legal liability, no unauthorized copying
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of software should be permitted. Agencies should also address
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the issue of personal use of Federal computer systems, giving
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employees specific direction about allowable use and providing
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consistent enforcement.
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$_Operational Controls
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Agency standards should clearly communicate
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minimum expected controls to be present in all computer
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facilities, computer operations, input/output handling, network
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management, technical support, and user liaison. More stringent
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controls would apply to those areas that process very sensitive
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or critical information.
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Protection of these areas would include:
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Security management;
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Physical security;
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Security of system/application software and data;
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Network security; and
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Contingency planning.
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The final section of this guide describes the
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organizational process of developing, implementing, and managing
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the ongoing information protection program.
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$_Information Protection Program Implementation
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$_Information Protection Management
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In most cases, agency executive management is not
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directly involved in the details of achieving a controlled
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information processing environment. Instead, executive action
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should focus on effective planning, implementation, and an
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ongoing review structure. Usually, an explicit group or
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organization is assigned specific responsibility for providing
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day-to-day guidance and direction of this process. Within this
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group an information security manager (ISM) should be identified
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as a permanent focal point for information protection issues
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within the agency.
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The ISM must be thoroughly familiar with the
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agency mission, organization, and operation. The manager should
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have sufficient authority to influence the organization and have
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access to agency executives when issues require escalation.
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$_Independence
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In determining the reporting relationship of the
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ISM, independence of functional areas within the agency is
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desirable. Plans and budget for the ISM function should be
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approved by agency management, rather than being part of any
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functional area budget. This approach avoids conflicts of
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interest and facilitates development and maintenance of a
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comprehensive and consistent protection program that serves the
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needs of agency management.
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Degree of Centralization
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The desirability of centralized versus
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decentralized security is heavily debated and largely depends on
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size, organizational structure, and management approach at the
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individual agency. A centralized approach to security has the
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advantages of being directly responsive to executive direction
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and specifically accountable for progress and status.
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A decentralized approach to security has the
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advantages of being close to the functional area involved. In
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the long term, decentralization may provide better integration of
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security with other entity functions.
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An effective combined approach offers advantages.
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A small dedicated resource at the agency level can direct the
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information protection program, while additional resources are
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utilized at the functional area level to implement the program in
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each area.
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$_Dedicated Staff
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The common practice of assigning responsibility
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for information security to existing staff with other major
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responsibilities is often unsuccessful. At least one dedicated
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staff member is recommended at the program management level.
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The need for additional full-time resources depends on the
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agency's computer environment. The number of information
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systems, their technical complexity, the degree of
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networking, the importance of information processed, adequacy of
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existing controls, and extent of agency dependence on information
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systems affect the resources needed.
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$_Implementation Stages
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Development of a comprehensive information
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protection program that is practiced and observed widely
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throughout a Federal agency occurs in stages and requires ongoing
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monitoring and maintenance to remain viable.
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First, organizational requirements for information
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protection are identified. Different agencies have varying
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levels of need for security, and the information protection
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program should be structured to most effectively meet those
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needs.
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Next, organizational policies are developed that
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provide a security architecture for agency operations, taking
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into consideration the information protection program elements
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discussed in the previous section of this guide. The policies
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undergo normal review procedures, then are approved by agency
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management for implementation.
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Activities are then initiated to bring the agency
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into compliance with the policies. Depending on the degree of
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centralization, this might require development of further plans
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and budgets within functional entities of the agency to implement
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the necessary logical and physical controls.
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$_Training
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Training is a major activity in the implementation
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process. Security violations are the result of human action, and
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problems can usually be identified in their earliest stages by
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people. Developing and maintaining personnel awareness of
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information security issues can yield large benefits in
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prevention and early detection of problems and losses.
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Target audiences for this training are executives
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and policy makers, program and functional managers, IRM security
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and audit personnel, computer management and operations, and end
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users. Training can be delivered through existing policy and
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procedures manuals, written materials, presentations and classes,
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and audio-visual training programs.
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The training provided should create an awareness
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of risks and the importance of safeguards, underscoring the
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specific responsibilities of each of the individuals being
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trained.
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$_Monitoring and Enforcement
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An ongoing monitoring and enforcement program
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assures continued effectiveness of information protection
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measures. Compliance may be measured in a number of ways,
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including audits, management reviews or self-assessments,
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surveys, and other informal indicators. A combination of
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monitoring mechanisms provides greater reliability of results.
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Variances from policy requirements should be
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accepted only in cases where the responsible official has
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evaluated, documented, and accepted the risk of noncompliance.
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Enforcement of agency policies and practices is important to the
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overall success of an information protection program.
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Inconsistent or lax enforcement quickly results in deterioration
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of internal controls over information resources.
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A positive benefit of an effective monitoring and
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enforcement process is an increased understanding of the degree
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of information-related risk in agency operations. Without such a
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feedback process, management unknowingly accepts too much risk.
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An effective information protection program allows the agency to
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continue to rely upon and expand the use of information
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technology while maintaining an acceptable level of risk.
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$_Maintenance
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As agency initiatives and operations change, and
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as the computer environment evolves, some elements of the
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information protection program will require change as well.
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Information protection cannot be viewed as a project with a
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distinct end; rather, it is a process that should be maintained
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to be realistic and useful to the agency. Procedures for review
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and update of policies and other program elements should be
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developed and followed.
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-JUDGE DREDD/NIA
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[OTHER WORLD BBS]
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