284 lines
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Plaintext
284 lines
19 KiB
Plaintext
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T h e G R E E N Y w o r l d D o m i n a t i o n T a s k F o r c e ,
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I n c o r p o r a t e d
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Presents:
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"Language Acquisition: Philosophical Variations on a Theme by Steven Pinker"
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by Bob the Master of the World
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----- GwD: The American Dream with a Twist -- of Lime ***** Issue #92 -----
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----- release date: 01-03-01 ***** ISSN 1523-1585 -----
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I. Introduction
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Language acquisition, though seemingly a purely scientific phenomenon,
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profoundly affects the way in which philosophers understand what sort of thing
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language is and through what intellectual paradigm it might best be
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comprehended. Does language, in both its acquisition and subsequent usage,
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manifest some basic human instinct, such that human beings obtain it and employ
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it before or without considering its pragmatic utility in reacting to their
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environment? Or is language learned in response to some overwhelming
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communicative need imposed on humanity by the circumstances in which they find
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themselves, and, while perhaps augmenting the fundamental human constitution, is
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not an "essential" ability, in the nebulous, ontological sense of the word, and
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does not arise in the absence of external stimuli? Answers to these questions
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could shed light on how linguistic rules arise, whether these rules constitute
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language or should be thought of merely as ad hoc descriptions of an essential
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unknowable natural process, and whether possessing language is an incidental or
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essential feature of human beings, to name but a few queries of philosophical
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import.
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Steven Pinker, a cognitive scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of
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Technology, has recently written an article entitled "Language Acquisition,"
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soon to be published as a chapter in An Invitation to Cognitive Science, Second
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Edition, Volume One (1) and presenting a well-detailed overview of, and
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commentary on, the latest research that either directly contributes to the issue
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of language acquisition or addresses concerns posed at the periphery of language
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acquisition. Pinker attempts two separate tasks in this article: first, he
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seeks to summarize the available scientific knowledge pertaining to language
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acquisition; secondly, and perhaps more importantly, he then draws conclusions
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from the established empirical facts illuminated by the first task.
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Furthermore, in setting out the empirical data gleaned by cognitive science, he
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also presents the paradigm through which he interprets the data, which
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consequently has a bearing on the content and form of his subsequent inferences.
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I do not seek to challenge the actual data presented by Pinker nor even his
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commentary on that data; instead, I wish to elucidate the existence of possible
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alternative interpretive paradigms as well as examine the validity of the
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implications that Pinker constructs. In effect, as the title suggests, I desire
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to simply bring out concerns and problems of philosophical interest that lie
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dormant in Pinker's analysis, veiled under the well-meaning shroud of scientific
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rhetoric. I will not attempt herein to investigate the entirety of "Language
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Acquisition," given the antecedently constrained scope of this assignment and
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the relative girth of that chapter, nor shall I dare to introduce or recommend a
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rival account of the body of knowledge that constitutes language acquisition,
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since I find Pinker's work, despite its need for philosophical emendation,
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rather sound, well-considered, and reasonably well-supported by the empirical
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observations of cognitive science. Instead, I will examine what I consider to
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be the sections of greatest philosophical interest and those that incidentally
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come closest to the paper topic on language acquisition that had been given to
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the class, namely specific subsections of the sections entitled "The Biology of
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Language Acquisition" and "Explaining Language Acquisition."
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II. The Biology of Language Acquisition: Evolution of Language (2)
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Pinker begins his discussion of language acquisition by examining the
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adaptation of the human vocal tract to the "demands of speech" as a function of
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evolutionary progress. Pinker relies on the evolutionary paradigm to initiate
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his argument for an account of language that underscores its innate position in
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the constitution of a human being. Yet, evolution can merely demonstrate a
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correlation between a feature of humanity and its contribution to human
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survival; it fails, at a purely scientific level, to manifest a causal
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connection between some human need and the acquisition of a trait to satisfy
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that need. The aforementioned trait might arise because of some other, less
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obvious, evolutionary interest, or it might simply have been acquired for the
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purposes of some future need rather than an existing one. Furthermore, one may
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note that the structure of the human vocal tract and its consequent ability to
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produce linguistic utterances may be entirely the product of evolutionary coin-
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cidence; perhaps the peculiar shape of human vocal tracts has some other natural
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function, of which language is merely important but subsidiary and unforeseen
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consequence.
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Pinker appears to assume that the design of the human vocal tract is optimal
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for the use of spoken language, and this assumption is critical to his
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establishment of the evolutionary link between the two. However, an alternative
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design of the human vocal tract might facilitate speech to an even greater
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degree; merely because the scientific community has not witnessed a more
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efficient tract design does not mean that a more efficient one does not exist,
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one that might even make a human being's relatively advanced tract construction
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seem primitive and inefficient.
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Pinker concludes by observing that "the evolutionary selective advantages
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for language must have been very large to outweigh such a disadvantage [the
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"sacrifice of efficiency for breathing, swallowing, and chewing"]." (3) In this
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claim, Pinker assumes that the ability to produce audible sounds necessitated a
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"sacrifice of efficiency," when in fact the efficient functioning of both
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abilities might be perfectly compatible; the current human vocal tract design
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may be deficient for this very reason, insofar as it hampers those other
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essential human functions.
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Furthermore, Pinker suggests that language caused what he perceives to be
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the human vocal tract's manifest inefficiencies. Pinker seems to imply that the
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need for language altered the vocal tract design through evolution instead of
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the design itself antecedently allowing the production of aural utterances; in
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essence, Pinker chooses one possible line of causation, from language to
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biology, instead of an equally plausible and possible one, from biology to
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language. Pinker does not provide evidence to support his interpretation over
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the rival account nor does there appear to be a justifiable way to arbitrate
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between the conflicting views. Since human beings already possess language and
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an anatomy that provides for the production of language, how can we come to know
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which one caused the other, if any causal connection between the two actually
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exists, an empirical fact that currently lacks conclusive confirmation?
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Pinker continues by discussing recent efforts to locate language in our
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closest biological relatives, the primates. He maintains that, in this effort,
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one must keep in mind that "the scientific question is whether the chimps'
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abilities are homologous to human language." (4) Why, one might ask, should
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this question be the relevant one? Pinker denies that an analogous system to
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our linguistic system, meaning one that possesses a similar function, should be
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permitted to be subsumed under the category of language. Why should analogy be
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rejected as a criterion for categorization? Airplanes are radically different
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from automobiles, in the same sort of way that the wings of bats are different
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from the "wings" of gliding rodents (Pinker denies that the latter are truly
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wings), since, in both examples, the entities in question reflect "a different
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evolutionary history." (5) However, do we not take both airplanes and
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automobiles to satisfy the basic definition of a vehicle, despite their overt
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dissimilarities? The definition provided for "vehicle" by The Random House
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Dictionary of the English Language yields the following: "any means in or by
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which someone travels or something is carried or conveyed." By this definition,
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even the legs of animals would count as vehicles, though they evince no apparent
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homology whatsoever with automobiles. Analogy in function in the case of
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vehicles seems to provide for equal satisfaction of the definition; why might
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the case not be the same for language, however different the methods of
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communication of chimps and human beings might appear to be? Also, it seems
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relevant to remark that the speech of chimps and human beings appears to differ
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only as a matter of degree and not of kind, the speech of chimps being
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noticeably less complex than the speech of human beings but retaining the atomic
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form of short sounds.
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Furthermore, Pinker appears to arbitrarily appoint one thing as the
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paradigmatic satisfier of a definition to the exclusion of another and by which
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that other should be compared against for satisfaction; he takes the
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communication of humans to be this ultimate satisfier and consequently rejects
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that which is not homologous to human communication. Why might not the
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rudimentary communication of animals be taken as the "default" empirical
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satisfaction of the term "language"? By what right or through what means does
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human communication acquire this exalted status? Pinker provides no
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justification for judging what is or is not a language against the standard of
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human communication. Thus, not only does he promote homology as the criterion
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for categorization to the exclusion of the more common-sense criterion of
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analogy, he further takes it as given that, for anything to count as a language,
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it must be in agreement, not merely analogously but also and necessarily
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homologously, with the communication peculiar to human beings.
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Pinker observes a common scientific belief that human beings developed
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language out of evolutionary need yet assumes that chimps are incapable of
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producing a linguistic system as complex as that of human beings. Perhaps
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chimps and other primates never needed, as a matter of evolution, to develop
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anything beyond their rudimentary system of communication. The current
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simplicity of the speech of chimps does not by itself preclude their future
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ability to advance their system beyond this primitive state. Given an
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evolutionary impetus, chimps and other primates might develop more sophisticated
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speech but perhaps not otherwise. This scenario would account for the
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documented failure of scientists' efforts to recreate human speech in chimps.
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Furthermore, why should we assume that our language represents the only kind of
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language? Perhaps chimps cannot learn human language because that language was
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designed precisely for human beings and not chimps; scientists have attempted to
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make chimps speak a human language rather than a chimp language and consequently
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should not be surprised by their failure. This attempt seems analogous in its
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futility to the project of getting a baby duck to swim by attaching fins to it.
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Chimps may not be able to learn our language, but such inability does not imply
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that they might not be able to learn another language of some sort, a language
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particularly suited to their unique constitution.
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III. Explaining Language Acquisition: Learnability Theory
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In this section, Pinker proffers a method for understanding language
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acquisition through an application of the learnability theory, a branch of
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theoretical computer science that provides for the circumstances in which and by
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which learning may be said to have successfully occurred. Pinker realizes that
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learning a language possesses a difficulty common to all "'induction problems',
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[in that] there are an infinite number of hypotheses consistent with any finite
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sample of environmental information." (6) Pinker believes that it is "the role
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of negative evidence" (7) that reduces the "infinite number" of possible
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grammatical sentences into a finite set that becomes a communal language.
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Pinker takes negative evidence to occur when "human children...[are] corrected
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every time they speak ungrammatically" (8); the problem arises because of the
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fact that children are not typically corrected on every single occasion of
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ungrammatical utterance. Pinker asserts, correctly, it seems, that this
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situation never obtains, and, consequently, some other explanation is necessary
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to account for the development of the speech of children into the standardized
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speech of adult members of a linguistic community, one that focuses on some sort
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of internal grammatical mechanism.
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Yet, it seems that negative evidence might exist in a different form and
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consequently obviate the scientific need to look inward for an explanation of
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proper language development in children. Children learn language not only
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through direct communication but also, and primarily, through observing the
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linguistic interactions between adults. Given their possible and even frequent
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possession of a superset of the language used in their community, children might
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perceive that the superfluous elements of their language are not used, and hence
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not endorsed, by the adults whose speech patterns they perceive. In such a way,
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after repeated exposure to the conversations of adults and the absence of the
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child's linguistic excesses in those conversations, the child might comprehend
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that those extra utterances of his contrivance are not accepted in the
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mainstream language and gradually eliminate them from his speech, wishing to
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mimic his linguistic exemplars as much as possible in the aim of correct speech.
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This account, which seems plausible on the face of it, would only require the
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standard mechanism by which children learn that a dog is not a cat, by
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repeatedly perceiving that only certain entities are called "dogs" while certain
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dissimilar entities are called "cats" and consequently learning the correct
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application of those words. Pinker appears to be too eager to discount the
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model of language acquisition as simply a subset of general learning in favor of
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postulating a separate internal mechanism specifically designed for language
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acquisition. Why does he choose this route, which appears at first glance to be
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the more difficult path, given the enormous difficulties associated in defending
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the existence of innate mental constructs? Pinker's acceptance of an internal
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linguistic mechanism might have the unfortunate consequence of allowing him to
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appeal to innate structures as first options for solutions to any kind of mental
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phenomenon, such answers being easier to construct than through the often
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difficult task of locating the source of whatever phenomenon is in question in
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the external world; this approach becomes problematic insofar as explanations
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that center in the working of inner processes seem more difficult to confirm or
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disprove than empirical explanations and therefore are of lesser scientific
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value, despite the relative ease with which they might be produced. Such a
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perspective may yield a certain kind of scientific complacency in which
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scientists immediately turn to innate mechanisms as soon as any kind of
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difficulty is encountered in finding an external, empirical solution. I do not
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wish to assert herein that Pinker is wrong; in fact, he continues throughout the
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rest of "Language Acquisition" to demonstrate the plausibility and probability
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of his account. I do wish to contend, however, that this perspective on
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language acquisition may be a slippery slope in which scientific investigation
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yields to scientific speculation and consequently loses a great deal of its
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potential for and utility in the advancement of knowledge.
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IV. Conclusion
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I may be criticized for not covering, in the commentary above, the breadth
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of Pinker's article, nor even its essential contentions. However, I do not
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believe such criticism is just, for I consider myself justified in examining
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those issues that I feel require philosophical elaboration and on which I had
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something meaningful to say. A large portion of "Language Acquisition" is
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concerned merely with presenting the accumulated empirical data for a given
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hypothesis, and with such I could do little in the way of philosophical
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commentary. I have sought herein only the modest goal of illuminating some of
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Pinker's assumptions as well as challenging some of these assumptions for their
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lack of adequate justification in the hopes of encouraging further rumination on
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his work.
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-----
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-=[Footnotes]=-
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1. Edited by L. R. Gleitman, M. Liberman, and D. N. Osherson and soon to be
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published by the MIT Press in Cambridge, Massachusetts. I discovered
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Pinker's article at the following URL:
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http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Py104/pinker.langacq.html
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2. For convenience, the section headings of this essay will correspond to the
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sections of "Language Acquisition" on which they comment.
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3. Pinker, 3.
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4. Ibid.
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5. Ibid.
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6. Ibid, 9.
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7. Ibid.
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8. Ibid.
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-----------------------------<GwD Command Centers>------------------------------
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E-Mail: gwd@GREENY.org
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* GwD, Inc. - P.O. Box 16038 - Lubbock, Texas 79490 *
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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"Semantics."
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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-+- F Y M -+-
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GR33NY LIK3S mash3d p0tat03s
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MORE THAN FIVE YEARS of ABSOLUTE CRAP! /---------------\
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copyright (c) MM Bob the Master of the World/GwD Publications :SHIT YOUR PANTS:
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copyright (c) MM GwD, Inc. : GwD :
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All rights reserved \---------------/
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