541 lines
28 KiB
Plaintext
541 lines
28 KiB
Plaintext
ú Newsgroup: comp.org.eff.talk
|
|
ú Message-ID: <1993Apr2.214920.10432@eff.org>
|
|
ú Subject: EFFector Online 5.05
|
|
|
|
-==--==--==-<>-==--==--==-
|
|
In this issue:
|
|
Keys to Privacy in the Digital Information Age
|
|
What's Important About the Medphone Libel Case?
|
|
-==--==--==-<>-==--==--==-
|
|
|
|
Keys to Privacy in the Digital Information Age
|
|
by Jerry Berman and Daniel J. Weitzner
|
|
|
|
With dramatic increases in reliance on digital media for
|
|
communications, the need for comprehensive protection of privacy in
|
|
these media grows. For many reading this newsletter, the point may
|
|
seem trite, but the scope of the digital communications revolution (of
|
|
which we only stand at the very beginning), poses major new
|
|
challenges for those concerned about protecting communications
|
|
privacy. Communication carried on paper through the mail system,
|
|
or over the wire-based public telephone network, is relatively secure
|
|
from random intrusion by others. But the same communication
|
|
carried, for example, over a cellular or other wireless communication
|
|
system is vulnerable to being intercepted by anyone who has very
|
|
inexpensive, easy-to-obtain, scanning technology. If designed and
|
|
deployed properly, communications technology has the potential to
|
|
actually support and enhance the level of privacy that we all enjoy.
|
|
But if, in the design process, privacy concerns are slighted, whether
|
|
consciously or not, privacy may be compromised.
|
|
|
|
Public policy has a critical impact on the degree of privacy
|
|
protection afforded by the new communications systems now being
|
|
designed and deployed for public use. Two ongoing public policy
|
|
issues present the challenges of digital privacy protection in sharp
|
|
relief. In the first case, government policy seeks to limit the
|
|
introduction of robust encryption technologies. Motivated by
|
|
national security concerns, the National Security Agency is using
|
|
export control regulations to discourage the widespread foreign and
|
|
domestic adoption of strong encryption systems. The NSA's
|
|
reasoning is if uncrackable encryption is available, the NSA will be
|
|
powerless to intercept the communications of foreign espionage
|
|
agents operating in and around the United States. However, the
|
|
NSA's restriction on the use of powerful encryption systems limits
|
|
the ability of all who rely on electronic communication systems to
|
|
protect their privacy.
|
|
|
|
Second, on the domestic front, the FBI has proposed a
|
|
comprehensive licensing regime that would require all new
|
|
communications systems to be certified as "wire-tappable" before
|
|
their introduction into the market. This proposal threatens to force
|
|
the widespread use of communications systems that have "back
|
|
doors" in them that make them inherently insecure and to expand
|
|
the scope of the FBI's wiretapping authority to an unspecified degree.
|
|
Although these two proposals are now being pursued in independent
|
|
policy arenas, it is critical to view them together in order to
|
|
appreciate the full implications for privacy.
|
|
|
|
Encryption Policy
|
|
For the individual who relies on digital communications media,
|
|
reliable privacy protection cannot be achieved without the protection
|
|
of robust encryption technology. While legal restrictions on the use
|
|
of scanners or other technology that might facilitate such invasions of
|
|
privacy seem to be attractive preventative measures, these are not
|
|
lasting or comprehensive solutions. We should have a guarantee --
|
|
with physics and mathematics, not only with laws -- that we can
|
|
give ourselves real privacy of personal communications through
|
|
technical means. We already know how to do this, but we have not
|
|
made encryption technology widely available for public use because
|
|
of public policy barriers. The actual debate going on involves both
|
|
the National Security Agency and the National Institute of Standards
|
|
and Technology. They are in the process of deciding what version of
|
|
a particularly strong type of encryption system ought to be promoted
|
|
for public use. Called Public Key Encryption systems, these coding
|
|
systems derive their strength, in part, from the size of the ÒkeyÓ used
|
|
to encrypt the message.
|
|
|
|
In examining discrete issues such as the desirability of various
|
|
cryptography standards, we take a comprehensive view of "digital
|
|
privacy" policy as a whole. Such a comprehensive view requires a
|
|
clear vision of the underlying civil liberties issues at stake: privacy
|
|
and free speech. It also requires looking beyond the cryptography
|
|
questions raised by many to include some of law enforcement's
|
|
recent concerns about the pace of digital infrastructure innovation.
|
|
For the sake of promoting innovation and protecting civil liberties,
|
|
we must also bear in mind the principle that computer security
|
|
policy is fundamentally a concern for domestic, civilian agencies.
|
|
|
|
Inasmuch as digital privacy policy has broad implications for
|
|
constitutional rights of free speech and privacy, these issues must be
|
|
explored and resolved in an open, civilian policy context. This
|
|
principle is clearly articulated in the Computer Security Act of 1987.
|
|
These questions are simply too important to be decided by the
|
|
national security establishment alone. The structure of the Act arose,
|
|
in significant part, from the concern that the national security
|
|
establishment was exercising undue control over the flow of public
|
|
information and the use of information technology. When
|
|
considering the law in 1986, the Congress asked the question,
|
|
"Whether it is proper for a super-secret agency [the NSA] that
|
|
operates without public scrutiny to involve itself in domestic
|
|
activities...?" The answer was a clear no, and the authority for
|
|
establishing computer security policy was vested in NIST (then the
|
|
National Bureau of Standards).
|
|
|
|
In this context, we need a robust public debate over our
|
|
government's continuing heavy-handed efforts to control
|
|
commercially developed cryptography. It is no secret that
|
|
throughout the cold war era, the Defense and State Departments and
|
|
the National Security Agency have used any and all means, including
|
|
threats of prosecution, control over research and denial of export
|
|
licenses, to prevent advanced secret coding capabilities from getting
|
|
into the hands of our adversaries. NSA does this to maximize its
|
|
ability to intercept and crack all international communications of
|
|
national security interest.
|
|
|
|
Now the Cold War is over, but the practice continues. In recent
|
|
years, Lotus, Microsoft, and others have developed or tried to
|
|
incorporate powerful encryption means into mass market software to
|
|
enhance the security and privacy of business, financial, and personal
|
|
communications. In an era of computer crime, sophisticated
|
|
surveillance technologies and industrial espionage, it is a laudable
|
|
goal.
|
|
|
|
Although NSA does not have the authority to interfere with
|
|
domestic distribution encryption systems, its licensing stranglehold
|
|
over foreign distribution has significant domestic consequences.
|
|
United States firms have been unable to sell competitive security and
|
|
privacy products in international markets. More important, because
|
|
the cost of producing two different products is often prohibitive, NSA
|
|
policy encourages firms to produce a single product for both
|
|
domestic and worldwide use, resulting in sub-standard privacy and
|
|
security for users both here and abroad.
|
|
|
|
While we all recognize that NSA has legitimate national security
|
|
concerns in the post cold war era, this is a seriously flawed process.
|
|
Foreign countries or entities who want to obtain advanced encryption
|
|
technology can purchase it through intermediaries in the United
|
|
States or from companies in a host of foreign countries who are not
|
|
subject to US export restrictions. By taking a page out of the
|
|
Emperor's New Clothes, NSA opts to act as if the process works by
|
|
continuing to block export.
|
|
|
|
In order to get some improvement in mass market encryption, the
|
|
computer industry had to resort to using the threat of legislation to
|
|
get NSA to engage in the negotiations that finally led NSA to agree to
|
|
expedited clearance for the export of encryption software of limited
|
|
key lengths. Still, all concede that the agreement does not go far
|
|
enough and that far more powerful products are commonly available
|
|
in the US. The remaining limits specifying maximum key lengths
|
|
offers little long-term security given advances in computer
|
|
processing power.
|
|
|
|
Does this kind of policy make any sense in the post Cold War era?
|
|
Mass market products offer limited security for our citizens.
|
|
Determined adversaries can obtain much more powerful products
|
|
from foreign countries or by purchasing it here in the US. Is the NSA
|
|
policy of slowing down the pace of encryption use by foreigners and
|
|
adversaries -- and there's some debate as to whether the NSA policy
|
|
really does slow down that pace -- any longer worth the significant
|
|
price we pay in terms of failing to meet our own communications
|
|
privacy and security needs? We don't think so.
|
|
|
|
FBI's Digital Telephony Proposal
|
|
The public policy debate on electronic privacy issues over the last
|
|
few years has demonstrated that a comprehensive approach to
|
|
digital privacy policy cannot be complete without examining both
|
|
questions regarding the availability of encryption technology and the
|
|
corresponding infrastructure issues, such as those raised by the FBI's
|
|
Digital Telephony Proposal.
|
|
|
|
Last year, the FBI first proposed a "Sense of the Congress"
|
|
resolution stating that communications firms and computer and
|
|
communications equipment manufacturers were obligated to provide
|
|
law enforcement access to the "plain text" of all voice, data and video
|
|
communications, including communications using software
|
|
encryption. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) played an
|
|
active and leading role both in opposing such a law and in seeking to
|
|
find more acceptable means for meeting legitimate law enforcement
|
|
needs. Because of our advocacy and coalition-building efforts with
|
|
communications and privacy groups, we were successful in
|
|
persuading Senate Judiciary Chairman Joseph Biden to remove the
|
|
Sense of the Congress Resolution from active consideration as part of
|
|
Omnibus crime legislation last year.
|
|
|
|
Putting aside its attempt to control the use of encryption systems,
|
|
last year the FBI proposed legislation that would require telephone
|
|
companies, electronic information providers, and computer and
|
|
communications equipment manufacturers to seek an FCC "license" or
|
|
Attorney General "certification" that their technologies are
|
|
susceptible to electronic surveillance. EFF fears we are in danger of
|
|
creating a domestic version of the export control laws for computer
|
|
and communications technology.
|
|
|
|
While the FBI claims that neither of last year's proposals address
|
|
encryption issues, the Bureau has made it clear it plans to return to
|
|
|
|
this issue in the future. A broad-based coalition of public interest
|
|
and industry groups, coordinated by the Electronic Frontier
|
|
Foundation, has called on the FBI to explore more realistic, less
|
|
vague, and less potentially onerous policy options for meeting
|
|
legitimate law enforcement needs. The EFF-coordinated coalition
|
|
includes over 30 industry groups (including AT&T, Lotus, Microsoft,
|
|
Sun Microsystems, IBM and Digital Equipment) along with public
|
|
interest organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union and
|
|
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility. Last year the
|
|
coalition was successful at stopping two separate FBI legislative
|
|
attempts, but we fully expect that the Digital Telephony proposal will
|
|
be back on the table.
|
|
|
|
TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE VISION OF COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY
|
|
IN THE INFORMATION AGE
|
|
At times, the arcana of encryption standards, export control laws,
|
|
and technical specifications of new digital telephony equipment may
|
|
unfortunately obscure the critical issues at stake in protecting
|
|
individual privacy. Many people are already relying on digital media
|
|
-- whether electronic mail, bulletin board systems, or other new
|
|
media -- for a plethora of personal, political, professional, and
|
|
cultural communications tasks. To provide adequate privacy
|
|
protection in the future, we will have to learn to wrestle with both
|
|
technical details and constitutional principles together, simply
|
|
because more and more of our personal activities will be pursued
|
|
through new digital media.
|
|
|
|
The multi-front battle being waged about digital privacy creates
|
|
formidable roadblocks to a final resolution of the policy disputes at
|
|
issue. Neither the restrictions of encryption, nor the FBI's wiretap
|
|
concerns, can be thoroughly addressed independent of the other.
|
|
Those who seek greater privacy and security cannot trust a
|
|
settlement on one front, because their victory is likely to be
|
|
undermined by action on the other issue. And law enforcement and
|
|
national security concerns cannot be adequately addressed without a
|
|
sense of the overall solution being proposed on both the encryption
|
|
and infrastructure fronts. It is time for policymakers to conduct a
|
|
comprehensive review of digital privacy and security policy, with a
|
|
consideration of both of these sets of issues.
|
|
|
|
In the case of the FBI's Digital Telephony proposal, we must tread
|
|
carefully. Current laws governing wiretapping authority, for
|
|
example, reflect a subtle balance between the guarantees of privacy
|
|
and security from state intervention embodied in our constitutional
|
|
tradition on the one hand, and the needs of law enforcement, on the
|
|
other. The rule developed for one medium -- voice telephony --
|
|
cannot be mechanically extended to the host of new communications
|
|
options now becoming available. Rather, we must give careful
|
|
consideration to the scope of wiretap authority that is appropriate to
|
|
the new media that the FBI seek to sweep under their wiretap
|
|
authority. In the case of encryption policy, it is critical that private
|
|
citizens have access to affordable, effective, and legal encryption
|
|
technology. In the information age, concerns for protecting
|
|
individual privacy should take precedence over outmoded national
|
|
security concerns left over from the Cold War.
|
|
|
|
-==--==--==-<>-==--==--==-
|
|
|
|
"What's Important About the Medphone Libel Case?"
|
|
|
|
By Mike Godwin
|
|
|
|
Online conferencing seems so much like informal conversation that
|
|
it may come as a surprise to some people to discover that they may
|
|
be bound by the same libel law that applies to The New York Times.
|
|
It certainly came as a surprise to Peter DeNigris, who is now being
|
|
sued for statements he made while participating in a forum on
|
|
Prodigy. But a look at the law of defamation (of which libel law is a
|
|
major part) makes clear that there's no reason to believe that online
|
|
statements are "immune" from libel lawsuits.
|
|
|
|
_What is defamation and what is libel?_
|
|
|
|
A communication is considered defamatory if it tends to damage
|
|
someone's reputation. Some legal definitions of "defamation" also
|
|
specify that the communication has to be false. If a communication is
|
|
both false and it defames someone, the person whose reputation is
|
|
injured can sue for damages. In general, if the defamation is
|
|
*spoken* in the direct presence of an audience, it's called "slander";
|
|
defamation in print or in other media is normally called "libel."
|
|
|
|
Libel law is an area of great interest for the people who run online
|
|
forums. If a newspaper or TV station "republishes" a false
|
|
defamatory statement, the defamed person can sue the newspaper or
|
|
the station for damages *in addition* to suing the person who made
|
|
the original false statement. The big question for online forum
|
|
operators, like CompuServe and Prodigy, is the extent to which the
|
|
services will be treated like newspapers and TV stations and made
|
|
responsible for "republication" of libel.
|
|
|
|
A possible answer to this question appeared in a recent case called
|
|
Cubby Inc. v. CompuServe. In that case, which took place in a federal
|
|
district court in New York, the judge dismissed a libel suit that had
|
|
been brought against CompuServe as a "republisher." In that case,
|
|
the judge held that CompuServe is less like a newspaper or TV
|
|
station than like a library or bookstore owner or book distributor.
|
|
Although libel law, as limited by the First Amendment, allows print
|
|
and TV "republishers" to be liable for defamation, it does not allow
|
|
such liability for those who run bookstores or libraries; holding the
|
|
latter liable would create a burden on these parties to review every
|
|
book they carry for defamatory material. This burden would "chill"
|
|
the distribution of books (not to mention causing some people to get
|
|
out of the bookstore or library business) and thus would come into
|
|
serious conflict with the First Amendment.
|
|
|
|
But the issues raised in this new libel suit involving Prodigy are
|
|
different from those in Cubby v. CompuServe.
|
|
|
|
_The facts of Medphone v. DeNigris_
|
|
|
|
Peter DeNigis is being sued by the medical-instrument
|
|
manufacturer Medphone for statements he made in the Money Talk
|
|
forum on Prodigy. Medphone is claiming that DeNigris engaged in a
|
|
"systematic program for defamation and trade disparagement"
|
|
against the company, and is suing on business-libel and securities-
|
|
fraud theories. The company decided to sue DeNigris after its stock
|
|
price plummeted in a way that seemed "not objectively related to the
|
|
company's performance"--according to the company's press release,
|
|
its sales had been going up, and it had recently formed two
|
|
important business alliances. Medphone was alerted to the possible
|
|
cause of the stock decline when a stockholder notified the company
|
|
about DeNigris's "frequent" statements about the company on
|
|
Prodigy.
|
|
|
|
One example of a DeNigris posting (on Sept. 7), appeared in the LOS
|
|
ANGELES TIMES account of the story: "Is the end near for
|
|
Medphone?????????? Stock is quoted 25 cents to 38 cents. Closed at
|
|
a new low Friday, at (38 cents). My research indicated company is
|
|
really having a difficult time. No case, no sales, no profits, and
|
|
terrible management. This company appears to be a fraud. Probably
|
|
will cease operations soon."
|
|
|
|
Note that this statement does not prove that DeNigris has
|
|
committed libel. DeNigris is reported to have lost $9000 on
|
|
Medphone stock that he sold in November, so he may have good-
|
|
faith reasons to believe what he was saying about the company. He
|
|
insists his opinions, as stated, are "fair" and "can be documented" by
|
|
leading publications. If his statements turn out to be true, or even if
|
|
it turns out that they're false but that he had a good-faith belief that
|
|
the statements are true, it could mean that he'll win the libel case
|
|
against him.
|
|
|
|
This does not mean, however, that there is not a credible case
|
|
against him. For one thing, the comment about "fraud" is a very
|
|
serious and extreme charge and arguably cannot be based merely on
|
|
the stock's or company's underperformance. For another, DeNigris is
|
|
alleged to have called Prodigy several times a day to post negative
|
|
statements about Medphone, which could be credibly interpreted as
|
|
a plan to affect the company's reputation and stock price.
|
|
|
|
_Does this case raise any new legal issues?_
|
|
|
|
The major difference between Medphone v. DeNigris and Cubby
|
|
Inc. v. CompuServe is that there has been no effort to hold the online
|
|
forum (Prodigy) liable as a republisher. This means that the
|
|
complicated legal issue of "republisher liability" doesn't arise.
|
|
|
|
This makes the case a lot simpler legally. It is a well-settled legal
|
|
principle that the person who *originates* a defamatory statement
|
|
may be held liable for defamation. Although the Electronic Frontier
|
|
Foundation and other groups have taken the position (consistent with
|
|
Cubby) that the owners and operators of digital forums, as
|
|
*republishers*, deserve the same protections as republishers in other
|
|
media, none of these groups has taken the position that there is
|
|
something different about a defamatory statement on a digital forum
|
|
that makes it less damaging or less libelous than if it appears in
|
|
other media.
|
|
|
|
Some people argue, however, that Prodigy *should* be a party to
|
|
this lawsuit, or perhaps to another lawsuit. They argue that since
|
|
Prodigy prescreens its messages, it's less like a bookstore and more
|
|
like, say, USA Today. And they're troubled by the fact that Prodigy
|
|
turned over records of some of its subscribers' messages to
|
|
Medphone's and DeNigris's lawyers--isn't this a violation of the
|
|
subscribers' privacy rights?
|
|
|
|
Let's address these criticisms in detail:
|
|
|
|
Some Prodigy subscribers apparently are arguing that Prodigy
|
|
should be a codefendant along with DeNigris, a position that seems
|
|
grounded in part on a simplistic understanding of traditional libel
|
|
law and in part on subscribers' innate sympathy to the plight of
|
|
another subscriber. There are two good reasons to disagree with this
|
|
position: a) In general, when republishers are held liable for
|
|
defamation, it tends to create a chilling effect on their medium. b) In
|
|
particular, Prodigy now says it does not prescreen messages for
|
|
content (other than bouncing postings with profane language--this is
|
|
apparently done through software). Following Cubby v. CompuServe,
|
|
and absent any facts to the contrary, there is no reason to think
|
|
Prodigy should be a party. (Nor is there any legal reason to think
|
|
|
|
that Peter DeNigris cannot be a defendant.) And even if there were a
|
|
good reason for Prodigy to be a party, it's up to Medphone and its
|
|
lawyers, not to anyone else, whether to sue Prodigy.
|
|
|
|
With regard to the privacy rights of subscribers, it should be noted
|
|
that Prodigy turned over records of subscriber messages to
|
|
Medphone's lawyers (and, apparently, to DeNigris's lawyers) *in
|
|
response to subpoenas.* This suggests that there is no violation of the
|
|
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, which authorizes disclosure
|
|
of stored electronic communications in response to subpoena. What's
|
|
more, Prodigy could have been held in contempt of court had it *not*
|
|
complied with the subpoenas.
|
|
|
|
At this point, at least, it seems that the Medphone case does not
|
|
raise any of the complicated legal issues we might expect to find in a
|
|
libel lawsuit involving an online forum.
|
|
|
|
_What is significant about this case?_
|
|
|
|
But even if the case does not raise new legal issues, it certainly
|
|
seems to have raised a new social issue. Specifically, it shows that the
|
|
very same technology that empowers people to be their own
|
|
reporters and editors has also created a new potential for them to be
|
|
defendants. In the old days, individuals who didn't work for
|
|
newspapers or TV stations rarely had to think about the potential
|
|
that they might be sued for libel--after all, there wasn't much risk
|
|
that even an intentionally irresponsible statement was going to do a
|
|
significant fraction of the damage that might be done through a
|
|
libelous newspaper article or TV broadcast.
|
|
|
|
But just as the increasingly common phenomenon of online forums
|
|
creates the possibility for each of us to reach vast, new audiences, it
|
|
also creates the potential for us to commit defamation on a vast new
|
|
scale. And there isn't any legal ambiguity about whether we can be
|
|
sued for the defamation that we create ourselves.
|
|
|
|
So, the Medphone case does turn out to be significant in a major
|
|
way--not because it breaks any new legal ground, but because it
|
|
serves as a warning signal for the increasing number of Americans
|
|
who publish their opinions online. Absent some new legislation that
|
|
would give online discussions *more* freedom than the traditional
|
|
press, participants in online forums will have to learn the same rules
|
|
that generations of professional journalists have already learned--
|
|
say something defamatory about somebody to a large audience, and
|
|
that statement may come back to haunt you.
|
|
|
|
=============================================================
|
|
|
|
EFFector Online is published by
|
|
The Electronic Frontier Foundation
|
|
666 Pennsylvania Ave., Washington, DC 20003
|
|
Phone: +1 202 544-9237 FAX: +1 202 547 5481
|
|
Internet Address: eff@eff.org
|
|
Coordination, production and shipping by Cliff Figallo, EFF
|
|
Online Communications Coordinator (fig@eff.org)
|
|
Reproduction of this publication in electronic media is encouraged.
|
|
Signed articles do not necessarily represent the view of the EFF.
|
|
To reproduce signed articles individually, please contact the authors
|
|
for their express permission.
|
|
|
|
*This newsletter is printed on 100% recycled electrons*
|
|
=============================================================
|
|
|
|
MEMBERSHIP IN THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
|
|
|
|
In order to continue the work already begun and to expand our
|
|
efforts and activities into other realms of the electronic frontier, we
|
|
need the financial support of individuals and organizations.
|
|
|
|
If you support our goals and our work, you can show that support by
|
|
becoming a member now. Members receive our bi-weekly electronic
|
|
newsletter, EFFector Online (if you have an electronic address that
|
|
can be reached through the Net), and special releases and other
|
|
notices on our activities. But because we believe that support should
|
|
be freely given, you can receive these things even if you do not elect
|
|
to become a member.
|
|
|
|
Your membership/donation is fully tax deductible.
|
|
|
|
Our memberships are $20.00 per year for students and $40.00 per
|
|
year for regular members. You may, of course, donate more if you
|
|
wish.
|
|
|
|
Our privacy policy: The Electronic Frontier Foundation will never,
|
|
under any circumstances, sell any part of its membership list. We
|
|
will, from time to time, share this list with other non-profit
|
|
organizations whose work we determine to be in line with our goals.
|
|
But with us, member privacy is the default. This means that you
|
|
must actively grant us permission to share your name with other
|
|
groups. If you do not grant explicit permission, we assume that you
|
|
do not wish your membership disclosed to any group for any reason.
|
|
|
|
=============================================================
|
|
Mail to: The Electronic Frontier Foundation, Inc.
|
|
238 Main St.
|
|
Cambridge, MA 02142
|
|
|
|
I wish to become a member of the EFF. I enclose: $_______
|
|
$20.00 (student or low income membership)
|
|
$40.00 (regular membership)
|
|
|
|
[ ] I enclose an additional donation of $_______
|
|
|
|
Name:
|
|
|
|
Organization:
|
|
|
|
Address:
|
|
|
|
City or Town:
|
|
|
|
State: Zip: Phone: ( ) (optional)
|
|
|
|
FAX: ( ) (optional)
|
|
|
|
Email address:
|
|
|
|
I enclose a check [ ].
|
|
Please charge my membership in the amount of $
|
|
to my Mastercard [ ] Visa [ ] American Express [ ]
|
|
|
|
Number:
|
|
|
|
Expiration date:
|
|
|
|
Signature: ________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Date:
|
|
|
|
I hereby grant permission to the EFF to share my name with
|
|
other non-profit groups from time to time as it deems
|
|
appropriate [ ].
|
|
Initials:___________________________
|
|
|
|
--
|
|
<<*>><<*>><<*>><<*>><<*>><<*>>
|
|
Cliff Figallo fig@eff.org
|
|
Electronic Frontier Foundation (617)576-4500 (voice)
|
|
Online Communications Coordinator (617)576-4520 (fax)
|
|
|
|
Path: channel1!uupsi!psinntp!uunet!gatech!usenet.ins.cwru.edu!agate!spool.mu.edu!uwm.edu!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!sol.ctr.columbia.edu!eff!fig
|
|
From: fig@eff.org (Cliff Figallo)
|
|
Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.news,comp.org.eff.talk
|
|
Subject: EFFector Online 5.05
|
|
Message-ID: <1993Apr2.214920.10432@eff.org>
|
|
Date: Fri, 2 Apr 1993 21:49:20 GMT
|
|
Sender: usenet@eff.org (NNTP News Poster)
|
|
Organization: The Electronic Frontier Foundation
|
|
Lines: 519
|
|
Approved: fig@eff.org
|
|
Originator: fig@eff.org
|
|
Nntp-Posting-Host: eff.org
|
|
|
|
Downloaded From P-80 International Information Systems 304-744-2253
|