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************************************************************
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************************************************************
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*** EFF News #1.02 (February 1, 1991) ***
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*** The Electronic Frontier Foundation, Inc. ***
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************************************************************
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************************************************************
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IN THIS ISSUE:
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Article 1: SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: A DIALOG ON THE WELL
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Article 2: PRODIGY RESPONSES AND LETTER TO THE TIMES
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Article 3: COMPUTERS, FREEDOM, & PRIVACY--A CONFERENCE
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------------------------------------------------------------
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Editors: Mitch Kapor (mkapor@eff.org)
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Mike Godwin (mnemonic@eff.org)
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REPRINT PERMISSION: Material in EFF News may be reprinted if you
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cite the source. Where an individual author has asserted copyright in
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an article, please contact her directly for permission to reproduce.
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E-mail subscription requests: effnews-request@eff.org
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Editorial submissions: effnews@eff.org
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We can also be reached at:
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Electronic Frontier Foundation
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155 Second St.
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Cambridge, MA 02141
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(617) 864-0665
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(617) 864-0866 (fax)
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USENET readers are encouraged to read this publication in the moderated
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newsgroup comp.org.eff.news. Unmoderated discussion of topics discussed
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here is found in comp.org.eff.talk.
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This publication is also distributed to members of the mailing list
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eff@well.sf.ca.us.
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************************************************************
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*** Art. 1: SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: A DIALOG ON THE WELL ***
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************************************************************
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[Editors' Note: The EFF believes it is important to establish a dialog
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between the law enforcement community and those who are concerned that
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law enforcement's investigation and prosecution of computer crimes
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properly acknowledges our civil liberties.
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A step toward such a dialog was taken recently on The Well (Whole
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Earth 'Lectronic Link), the Sausalito-based BBS/conferencing system
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associated with the Whole Earth Review. Gail Thackeray, an assistant
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attorney general from Arizona who has been central to Operation Sun
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Devil, initiated an exchange about search-and-seizure procedures that
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highlighted the different perspectives on this issue.
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Although Thackeray was bound by the confidentiality obligations of
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her position not to discuss specific cases, she was more than willing to
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offer her position on several general issues raised by computer searches
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and seizures.]
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#191: Gail Thackeray (gailt) Sat, Dec 1, '90 (11:23) 23 lines
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A general comment on search warrants: from some of the mail I've
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received, there seems to be a press-fostered (?) misconception that
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there have been "no-knock" warrants in hacker cases. I do not know of
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ANY, served by ANY agency. A "no-knock" warrant requires special
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permission of the court, and is very unusual. Standard search procedure
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(and I have witnessed more than I can count, both state & fed.) is to
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try to time it so that someone (preferably a grownup) is home, often a
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LOCAL unformed officer goes to the door, so that the occupants will
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recognize a uniform they know. This avoids the strangers-at-mydoor
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problem so well publicized by a late-60's FBI incident. The officers
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knock, explain that they are there to serve a search warrant, and the
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next step is to let the person read the warrant and ask questions.
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The first thing which happens inside is called "securing the scene" --
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the people in the residence/business are gathered together away from the
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possible evidence locations (computers, etc.). Hate to spoil the
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stories, but in the vast majority of cases, (and all the ones I have
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personally witnessed), everything is really quite calm. The teams I work
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with, once the scene is secure, will sit down and answer questions about
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procedure, what comes next, whether arrests are also being made
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(preferably not, in high-volume white-collar cases -- the search is
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usually NOT done at the "end" of an investigation, but is part of the
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overall investigation.)
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People have asked why in a white-collar case, the cops carry/use guns.
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Most departments have established policies governing this issue. Until
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the "scene is secure" the cops may have their guns out -- this phase
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usually takes about 2 minutes in the usual residence search -- it
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doesn't take long to find out who's in the house and establish that
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there is no danger. The single most dangerous police function (greatest
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number of police deaths) is the traffic stop: the lowest level of
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offense, in most states not really a crime, even. The second most
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dangerous is the domestic complaint -- not necessarily any crime
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involved.
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People are most secure in their own homes & cars -- and that's where
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they have the readiest access to weapons. That's when most danger to
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cops & bystanders arises. Miami Vice has it all backwards -- hardly any
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shootouts, statistically, in those cases, compared with traffic stops.
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Contrary to the underground-board chatter, it is not S.O.P. to hold
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shotguns to people's heads during the entire period of the search -- for
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one thing, their arms would get tired! I know of one incident where an
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adult who wouldn't calm down and sit and talk had to be physically
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restrained briefly, but the goal is just that -to get everybody in the
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place as quickly as possible away from the evidence and into an area
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where they can read the warrant and ask questions.
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Then the search team goes to work, while the people either leave or
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wait. Obviously, we prefer to have a responsible adult stay (if there
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isn't one there, we try to reach them and get them to come over) and
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read the warrant, receive the inventory of items taken, etc.
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Another commonly-asked question is, why was it necessary to have 5, 10
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etc. people on the search team? Usually, as soon as the scene has been
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secured, any extra people, like the uniformed officer who helps
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detectives with the entry, leave. In a typical residence search, there
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will remain enough officers to "find" and "record" the items to be
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taken, and others to pack them up and put them in the vehicles.
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There will also be someone, usually, with the occupants, identifying
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them and answering questions. If we brought only two officers, the
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intrusion into the home would last longer than it does when we have half
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a dozen. The search teams in our office (led by very experienced)
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officers) generally complete a residence search in somewhere around
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three hours -- from knocking on the door to leaving a copy of the
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inventory of items seized. Every case is different, and we never know
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who/what we will encounter until we get there, but all of the above is
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standard, with minor variations between agencies. The goal is to go in,
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do the job as quickly as possible, and leave as soon as possible.
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When everything works well, that's it. It is a good idea not to throw
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things at the officers -- it makes them nervous, and they make more
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mistakes when they're nervous...
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And finally, we really, truly, do a certain amount of "counselling" --
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especially where the likely target is a juvenile, whose parents have no
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idea what he's been up to. We explain the nature of the investigation,
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usually have to explain how the crime under investigation occurred, and
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answer lots of questions like, "what happens next?" Yes, we do,
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definitely, allow them to call their attorneys if they want (I actively
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encourage this, as it reassures them about the process). We answer as
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many questions as we can and refer them to available services.
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Obviously, no one enjoys the experience of having their home/office
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searched, but our teams are regularly thanked by parents for the way
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they handled the situation. (Cross my heart & hope to die, it's true.)
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Of course it doesn't always work this smoothly. But then, I am fortunate
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in working with outstanding officers, who are very good at this aspect
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of their jobs.
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#194: Bob Bickford (rab) Sat, Dec 1, '90 (13:28) 29 lines
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I respectively submit that your very interesting description of the
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process is contradicted by reliable testimony of numerous witnesses both
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in the Sun Devil cases and in many other sets of cases. You may protest
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that these examples are "atypical" but as far as those people are
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concerned the only thing that was 'typical' was what happened to them.
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Your perspective is that of someone who sees these frequently, and is
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probably quite used to the routine, and thus you have the benefit of
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seeing lots of "smooth" ones. The people who experience "non-smooth"
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invasions of their homes have a very different story to tell.
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Some of the most egregious examples of such "non-smooth" searches happen
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in drug cases, where it always seems that the officers in question
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entirely forget such niceties as the Constitutional rights of the
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accused, or indeed even those of the property owner or his/her guests.
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Even if we assume, arguendo, that there is some rational basis for the
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existing and rather extreme anti-drug laws, still there ought to be some
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respect in these procedures. I can only hope that a few of the injured
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parties will win multi-million dollar lawsuits against the government
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AND against the responsible officers and officials; that might tend to
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force the problem people back into line.
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(Uh, none of the latter is directed at Gail; I have no particular reason
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to think that she has had any unusual involvement in drug cases, nor to
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think that she would have behaved in the grossly unConstitutional ways I
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allude to even if she was involved.)
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(I hate having to make disclaimers, you know that?)
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#196: Gail Thackeray (gailt) Sat, Dec 1, '90 (16:04) 30 lines
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DEFINING TERMS:
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SUNDEVIL: a primarily-Secret-Service investigation into financial crimes
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(fraud, credit-card fraud, communications service losses, etc.) led by
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the Phoenix Secret Service office, with task force participation by the
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Arizona U.S. Attorney's office and the Arizona Attorney General's
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office.
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The Neidorf case was an independent investigation handled by the Secret
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Service and the U.S. Attorney's office in Chicago; the L.O.D.(BellSouth)
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cases were handled by the Secret Service/U.S. Atty in Atlanta. Other
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non-Sun Devil cases are several separate investigations centering around
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New York (NY State police, et al.), California, and points in between.
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You would never figure this out from the mainstream press, because no
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matter how many times they're told, they go for the sound bite (sound
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byte?) and not the facts. What I described above in my "search warrant"
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responses is everything I have witnessed, which includes Arizona and the
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Sundevil group of cases -and, if you check with your local P.D.,
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standard textbook procedure in most agencies.
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As to last comment, I can't think offhand what is meant by "forced
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entry" -- most search warrants permit that if all else fails, but since
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we usually try to find/get someone home first, it's rare -especially in
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the kind of cases we're especially interested in here. If by "forced
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entry" is meant the "sorry, don't want any" reaction to salesmen, then I
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guess we'd have to call most of them that. The only truly "reliable"
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accounts of anything are those tested in court & passed on by the trier
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of fact (jury, judge) -- in legalsystem terms. (Within that system,
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until it's been so tested, it's only opinion, no matter whose.)
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I guess I was right in assuming that raising the UGLY SPECTRE of search
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warrant procedure would get the conversation moving... :-)
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#199: Craig M. Neidorf (knight) Sat, Dec 1, '90 (19:58) 23 lines
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I'm glad that somebody official points out which cases were and were not
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Operation Sun-Devil. However, I personally doubt that any kid's parents
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are thanking the Secret Service for raiding their homes or wherever.
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Even if they appear to thank you, it is probably just their way of
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trying to make it look like they are being cooperative and hoping the
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gov will be cool with them, like thanking a cop that pulls you over for
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speeding and trying to be real nice so you don't get a ticket.
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Believe me, my parents do not thank Foley or Bill Cook for the hell they
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put us all through, and I think that I stand as a representative victim
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for all involved.
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Even the Secret Service admits that their standard operating procedures
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like restraining everyone involved and shoving their faces into the
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floor are out of place when dealing with these computer kids, but they
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have done little to adjust their tactics -- mostly I imagine because
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they don't care and a bunch of middle class kids who are more worried
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about convictions are not going to start a fight over being man-handled
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when they are hoping for the government to drop charges and so forth.
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They just want to be left alone.
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#200: Glenn S. Tenney (tenney) Sat, Dec 1, '90 (23:43) 24 lines
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I think that once you start looking objectively from the other side of
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the fence (regardless of which side you are on) you will understand the
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other side.
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Sure, every young cracker you (generic you) know isn't going to pull a
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gun, but standard procedures are in place to protect the lives of folks
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who do this day in and day out and *DO* face the odd life threatening
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situation. That does not mean that it would be a comfortable, relaxing
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situation to be a young cracker served with a warrant, but do try to see
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things from the other side. If it were you putting your life on the
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line, all it takes is once.
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Beyond the initial phase, the evidence has to be gathered. Now you might
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think, for example, why take a laser printer or a fax machine or an
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answering machine? Come on, open your view and see that during an
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investigation your computer might not start up properly if the printer
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isn't attached (I've known some gear that way), or the fax machine might
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have nasty numbers stored in it, or the answering machine might have a
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nasty message... Again, I'd hate to be on the wrong side of a seizure,
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but much of what happens makes sense.
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Sheesh! Am I sounding conservative? Uh, oh -- better turn in my old ACLU
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card :-)
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#201: Emmanuel Goldstein (emmanuel) Sun, Dec 2, '90 (02:47) 61 lines
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Almost EVERY case I've been acquainted with over the years involves some
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miscarriage of justice somewhere along the line. We simply cannot ignore
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the plain and simple fact that the punishment inflicted in these cases
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far outweighs whatever offense has been committed, if any. And that
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punishment begins the moment the knock on your door comes. Police
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officers do not pull their guns every time they pull over a motorist.
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They don't have guns drawn when they respond to a domestic argument. I
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see no reason therefore to employ such tactics when investigating a kid
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making free calls. It tells me that law enforcement has absolutely no
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idea what they're getting into when they encounter such a case. Is it a
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14 year old kid or the leader of a terrorist group? Come on. I really
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think law enforcement is capable of telling the difference.
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Why was it necessary in the summer of 1987 for agents to pretend they
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were the United Parcel Service, complete with a truck? Did they really
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think they'd be refused entry if it was known they were the law? Or were
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they just having a good time playing with the perpetrators? How come it
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was necessary in that same year to completely break down a door in New
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York City with a battering ram? The family came home to find their door
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leaning against the wall! Is that a proper way to carry out a search
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warrant when people aren't home? Seems a bit heavy-handed to me.
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But that's minor compared to the numerous cases of guns being pulled.
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In one case, a kid awoke to find guns pointed at him. In another, guns
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were pulled on a kid coming out of the shower! In the ZOD case in New
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York this past summer, the kid's mother was terrified when a dozen
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strange men pushed by her waving guns and not bothering to clearly
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identify themselves. She thought they were about to be murdered and
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cried out to her neighbors to call the police before someone finally
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thought to say, "We ARE the police." This kind of treatment is
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inexcusable. Sooner or later somebody is going to get killed because of
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such a misunderstanding.
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Then there are the countless cases of equipment being mishandled,
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abused, and damaged. I'm sure Steve Jackson can fill in some of those
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details. I have firsthand accounts of agents dropping equipment on the
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floor and then saying "So sue me" to the suspect. There are so many more
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cases but I really think I've made the point. That being that law
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enforcement is handling this all wrong. You must remember the different
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perspectives at work here. Young teenagers have a completely different
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view of the world than most of us. They believe themselves to be
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invincible much of the time. They do not respond well to "messages"
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beamed at them through the media. It does not apply to them, in their
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view. To break through this, you have to reach them on a personal level,
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to show them that they are in very real danger. There are many ways of
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doing this. Currently, law enforcement seems to be using the most
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extreme methods.
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What do you think happens to someone who has been through a traumatic
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experience like the above? Do they suddenly fall into step and become
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good citizens? No. They become bitter and cynical. They believe the
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legal system is full of hypocrisies and double standards. You cannot
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possibly know the fear that is permanently etched into somebody when
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they undergo such an experience. I am thankful that I don't. But too
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many young kids today know this fear -- it's becoming almost normal in
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the hacker world. By using this approach, and by pledging to send
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hackers to jail, an opportunity is being lost. It IS possible to reach
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these people, but intimidation and incarceration are two strikes against
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that goal.
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--End of Article 1--
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************************************************************
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*** Art. 2: PRODIGY RESPONSES AND A LETTER TO THE TIMES ***
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************************************************************
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[Editors' Note: In EFF News 1.00, we editorialized about the Sears/IBM-
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sponsored information service, Prodigy. We criticized Prodigy's
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editorial policies and suggested that Prodigy's problems signify a need
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for government policies that promote the establishment by private
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entities of more responsive information services. The following are two
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responses to the editorial, as well as a letter to the New York Times by
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Jerry Berman of the American Civil Liberties Union and Marc Rotenberg of
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Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility.]
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Response 1: FROM JOHN AHRENS:
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I have just received the first issue of EFF News. Let me be among the
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first to congratulate you on the quality of both the layout and the
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writing. I was beginning to fear that Cyberspace would be a realm
|
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without formatting and without grammar. EFF News sets a standard.
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In the spirit of the frontier that EFF wants to "civilize" (surely you
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don't really mean this), I would like to comment on one of the articles.
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Article 6 observes that the Prodigy debacle "illustrates the fallacy
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that 'pure' market forces always can be relied upon to move
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manufacturers and service providers in the direction of open
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communication," and calls for a national network-access policy. But
|
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surely this has it backwards.
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The market *is* providing open communications. Only ten years after the
|
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appearance of personal computers, we have thousands of BBSs, the fidonet
|
||
which connects many of them and is gatewayed to the Internet, and
|
||
systems such as the Cleveland Free-net. Virtually every self-respecting
|
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institution of higher education is connected to BitNet or the Internet,
|
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and provides more or less unrestricted access to faculty, and slightly
|
||
more limited access to students. Soon, children in elementary and
|
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secondary schools will be joining the network in large numbers. And
|
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there are all of the abuses and crimes and generally rowdy activities
|
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that one would expect in such a situation.
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A national network-access policy, would regulate services offered to the
|
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public to ensure that they met certain standards of reliability and
|
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confidentially, and to ensure that everyone was charged a fair price.
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Such regulations would have a chilling effect on the emerging Cyberspace
|
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free zones. They would ensure that we get what the bureaucrats think we
|
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need, rather than what we want.
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I suggest that EFF and its supporters should give priority to resisting
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the emergence of any policy--national, state, or local--on networking.
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Let's not civilize the frontier. Let's push back its boundaries, all the
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way to the edge of the world.
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--John Ahrens
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| Internet: AHRENS%UHAVAX.DECNET@UHASUN.HARTFORD.EDU |
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------------------------------------------------------------------------
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| BitNet: ahrens@hartford | Snail: Department of Philosophy |
|
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| ahrensj@sjc | University of Hartford |
|
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| Phone: 203-243-4743 | West Hartford, CT 06117 |
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| 203-236-6891 | |
|
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------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Response 2: FROM BRAD TEMPLETON:
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Subject: EFF and Prodigy
|
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In article <1990Dec10.211625.9536@eff.org> mkapor@eff.org (Mitch Kapor)
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writes:
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>Although EFF is not involved at the moment in any activities
|
||
>directly relating to the Prodigy dispute, we believe that the dispute
|
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>touches some basic issues with which we are very concerned, and that it
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>illustrates the potential dangers of allowing private entities such as
|
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>large corporations to try and dictate the market for online electronic
|
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>services.
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|
||
My personal opinion is that the EFF can do little but stand (almost)
|
||
wholly behind Prodigy on this one, as distasteful as that may sound to
|
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some.
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||
|
||
It is my impression that one of the EFF's goals is to get lawmakers to
|
||
realize that electronic publication deserves all the rights and
|
||
protections that more traditional forms get.
|
||
|
||
That means full first amendment protection for electronic publication,
|
||
and no government interference. We must realize that the 1st amendment
|
||
to your constitution is a double-edge sword, however. You must be
|
||
prepared to vigourously defend the right to publish in ways you don't
|
||
like.
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||
|
||
Prodigy has made it clear from day 1 that they view themselves as an
|
||
edited publication. I feel it goes against what I feel are the EFF's
|
||
principles to even suggest to them what they should or should not
|
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publish. The EFF should be fighting for their right to publish and
|
||
operate as they see fit. Only the market and the will of Prodigy's
|
||
owners should influence it.
|
||
|
||
(I do not say that Mitch was attempting to tell Prodigy what to publish
|
||
and what not to. I merely say that I think the EFF's role should be to
|
||
defend their right to make that decision.)
|
||
|
||
The one mitigating factor here is that Prodigy made a serious mistake
|
||
and actually told people to take discussions into E-mail. They did not
|
||
realize how much traffic that would generate, with some users sending
|
||
thousands of messages per day. So we can sympathise with those users who
|
||
were told to go to E-mail and later told that this avenue would only be
|
||
open to them at a high added cost. But this was a bad business decision,
|
||
and nothing more, in my opinion. It will lose them customers.
|
||
|
||
Many people don't realize the economics of offering flat-rate service.
|
||
Flat-rate services only pretend to offer unlimited use. They do this
|
||
under the assumption that few, if anybody, we really take them to the
|
||
limit. If too many people take you up on it (as happened with PC
|
||
Pursuit and now Prodigy) you just can't offer flat rate any more. It's a
|
||
fact of business life.
|
||
|
||
The problem is that computers magnify this difficulty. With a computer
|
||
you can use far more of a flat rate service than a human being could
|
||
alone. Thus PC-Pursuit broke down when people started making permanent
|
||
connections or running USENET feeds.
|
||
|
||
We can, of course, encourage Prodigy to offer a more unrestricted
|
||
service. In fact GEnie, where I am a SYSOP, is getting a lot of mileage
|
||
out of the fact that their new flat-rate service offers things that are
|
||
more a forum than a magazine. But it must be up to the market, in the
|
||
end, to decide between Prodigy, GEnie and a zillion other forum services
|
||
of all kinds. -Brad Templeton, ClariNet Communications Corp. Waterloo,
|
||
Ontario 519/884-7473
|
||
|
||
|
||
Letter to The New York Times: JERRY BERMAN AND MARC ROTENBERG:
|
||
|
||
Marc Rotenberg writes:
|
||
|
||
Jerry Berman (ACLU) and I wrote a short article that appeared in the New
|
||
York Times this morning (Sunday, 1/6/91, business section). It was a
|
||
response to the article by Prodigy's Geoff Moore. Comments/criticisms
|
||
would be welcome/appreciated.
|
||
|
||
Here's the NYT article:
|
||
|
||
"Business Forum: Free Speech in an Electronic Age", The New York Times,
|
||
January 6, 1991
|
||
|
||
- Three weeks ago, Geoffrey E. Moore, director of marketing and
|
||
communications at Prodigy Services Company, wrote in the Forum that
|
||
Prodigy has no First Amendment obligation to carry every message its
|
||
subscribers post on the company's electronic bulletin board. Jerry
|
||
Berman of the American Civil Liberties Union and Marc Rotenberg of
|
||
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility argue that there is
|
||
more to the controversy.
|
||
|
||
"Prodigy's Forum article on its electronic service and the First
|
||
Amendment tells only part of the story. The recent criticism that
|
||
brought Prodigy into the national spotlight was not about Prodigy's
|
||
decision to curtail public postings about suicide, crime, sex or
|
||
pregnancy, as Prodigy suggests. It was rather Prodigy's effort to
|
||
suppress a consumer protest that began when Prodigy announced a hefty
|
||
increase in the cost of electronic mail.
|
||
|
||
"When some of Prodigy's subscribers learned of the proposed rate
|
||
hike, they posted public messages on the Prodigy bulletin board
|
||
available to other subscribers. In early November, Prodigy told
|
||
subscribers that they would no longer allow the public posting of
|
||
messages about Prodigy's fee policy. So Prodigy subscribers turned to
|
||
the private electronic mail to continue their protest. Besides sending
|
||
private messages to each other, these subscribers also sent private
|
||
messages to businesses which sell or advertise products on Prodigy.
|
||
Then prodigy stepped in and ended the protesters' memberships without
|
||
notice. Recently, Prodigy instituted a rule prohibiting all electronic-
|
||
mail communications with merchants except those directly related to
|
||
orders and purchase.
|
||
|
||
"The Prodigy dispute resembles some of the free speech cases
|
||
involving shopping centers. Although shopping centers are private
|
||
property and established for commercial activity, state courts have
|
||
recognized that they may also be a public forum where free speech may be
|
||
exercised. As services like Prodigy attract more and more people to
|
||
shop in their electronic mall, they are also creating a new way for
|
||
people to communicate with each other. The courts may some day hold
|
||
that electronic shopping networks like Prodigy are the public forums of
|
||
the 21st century.
|
||
|
||
"Prodigy contends that there are many other electronic forums to
|
||
satisfy free speech needs. Most of these services are small mom-and-pop
|
||
operations that can hardly compete with Prodigy which has invested about
|
||
one billion dollars to reach a mass market with its easy-to-use service.
|
||
Prodigy also says that it is not a common carrier, like the local phone
|
||
companies, required to carry all messages. That may be true, but it
|
||
raises further concerns about free speech. If the big electronic
|
||
networks are run on Prodigy's "family hour" principles, and if the
|
||
networks are carved-up among private providers with no common carrier
|
||
obligations, electronic free speech and public debate will be
|
||
significantly limited.
|
||
|
||
"Prodigy's dispute with its subscribers show why, to protect
|
||
First Amendment rights in the electronic age, we need to press Congress
|
||
to establish the infrastructure for an accessible public form and
|
||
electronic mail service operating under common carrier principles."
|
||
|
||
|
||
--End of Article 2--
|
||
|
||
|
||
************************************************************
|
||
*** Art. 3: COMPUTERS, FREEDOM, & PRIVACY--A CONFERENCE ***
|
||
************************************************************
|
||
|
||
************************************
|
||
* The First Conference *
|
||
* on *
|
||
* COMPUTERS, FREEDOM & PRIVACY *
|
||
************************************
|
||
|
||
|
||
Pursuing Policies for the Information Age in the
|
||
Bicentennial Year of the Bill of Rights
|
||
|
||
Tutorials & Conference, Limited to 600 Participants
|
||
Monday-Thursday, March 25-28, 1991
|
||
|
||
SFO Airport Marriott Hotel, Burlingame, CA, On the San Francisco
|
||
Peninsula
|
||
|
||
Co-sponsors & cooperating organizations include:
|
||
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers-USA
|
||
Association for Computing Machinery Electronic Networking
|
||
Association
|
||
Electronic Frontier Foundation Videotex Industry Association
|
||
American Civil Liberties Union Cato Institute
|
||
IEEE Intellectual Property Committee ACM SIG on Software
|
||
ACM Special Interest Group on Computers & Society
|
||
ACM Committee on Scientific Freedom and Human Rights
|
||
IEEE-USA Committee on Communications and Information Policy
|
||
Autodesk, Inc. Apple Computer, Inc. The WELL Portal
|
||
Communications
|
||
|
||
Sponsored by Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
|
||
A nonprofit, educational corporation (415)322-3778
|
||
e-mail: cfp@well.sf.ca.us fax: (415)851-2814
|
||
|
||
The sponsoring & cooperating organizations support this project to
|
||
enhance communication, understanding and consensus about these crucial issues,
|
||
but do not necessarily endorse views that may be expressed by participants.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
ABOUT COMPUTERS, FREEDOM & PRIVACY --
|
||
|
||
We are at a crossroads as individuals, organizations and governments
|
||
increasingly use and depend on computers and computer networks. Within
|
||
ten years, most information will be utilized and exchanged
|
||
electronically.
|
||
|
||
We are in the pivotal decade when computer facilities and
|
||
policies,worldwide, will mature. They can allow and encourage mass
|
||
access to and useof great information processing and networking power,
|
||
and control potential
|
||
abuse.
|
||
|
||
For potent personal benefit, business improvement and national well-
|
||
being,information and its efficient access are becoming economically
|
||
available to individuals, organizations and governments. Such access
|
||
can greatly enhancesound decisions based on timely access to essential
|
||
knowledge.
|
||
|
||
Data on individuals and groups is being collected, computerized
|
||
andexchanged at an exponentially increasing rate within numerous
|
||
agencies and organizations.This has great legitimate value, but has also
|
||
prompted increasing concerns regarding issues of personal privacy.
|
||
|
||
To assure sound and equitable decisions, the public, the press and a
|
||
broad range of policy-makers must understand and openly discuss these
|
||
issues, their interactions and their implications for the future.
|
||
|
||
To protect the fundamental freedoms and personal privacy that are the
|
||
foundation of any free people, all parties must be informed, and all
|
||
must share in shaping and enhancing the great potential of the
|
||
Information Age.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
ABOUT THE TUTORIALS (Monday) --
|
||
|
||
Seminars on March 25th offer parallel introductions to different
|
||
disciplines that converge in this conference. These are surveys for
|
||
individuals not already expert in the topics presented. They are half-
|
||
day tutorials, a.m. and p.m. Lecturers, topics, descriptions and times
|
||
were confirmed as of a late January press deadline, but may be subject
|
||
to change.
|
||
|
||
HOW COMPUTER CRIME IS INVESTIGATED
|
||
This reviews investigation, search, seizure and evidence requirements
|
||
for pursuing computer crime. It is for computer users, computer owners,
|
||
BBS sysops and investigators and attorneys unfamiliar with computer
|
||
crime practices. [p.m.]
|
||
-- Don Ingraham, nationally-known computer crime prosecutor,
|
||
Asst. District Attorney, Alameda County, California.
|
||
|
||
INFORMATION SECURITY
|
||
A primer for managers, lawyers and educators, this surveys computer
|
||
crime,risks, due care, trusted systems, safeguards & other security
|
||
issues.[p.m.]
|
||
-- Donn Parker, a leading consultant in information security
|
||
and computer crime, SRI International.
|
||
|
||
HOW COMPUTER CRACKERS CRACK!
|
||
Reviews real cases and how to recognize, prevent and investigate
|
||
computer security breaches. For computer center managers,
|
||
administrators, sysops, law enforcement and press . [a.m.]
|
||
-- Russell Brand, computer security specialist; programmer, Reasoning
|
||
Sys..
|
||
|
||
COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS & THE GLOBAL MATRIX
|
||
Survey of electronic-mail and teleconferencing services, access to
|
||
networked information services and remote computing applications, and an
|
||
overview of the worldwide computer matrix. [a.m.]
|
||
-- John Quarterman, author of, *The Matrix: Computer Networks &
|
||
Conferencing Systems Worldwide*; Texas Internet Consulting.
|
||
|
||
LOW-COST NETWORKS & COMPUTER BULLETIN BOARD SYSTEMS
|
||
(BBS)
|
||
Electronic-mail, bulletin board systems and tele-conferencing
|
||
alternatives with personal computers; outlines low-cost PC networks and
|
||
gateways to the global matrix. [p.m.]
|
||
-- Mark Graham, co-founder of Institute for Global Communications,
|
||
PeaceNet and EcoNet; Pandora Systems; and
|
||
-- Tim Pozar, well-known expert on the 10,000-computer FidoNet.
|
||
|
||
FEDERAL LEGISLATION IMPACTING COMPUTER USE
|
||
Detailed review of landmark federal statutes impacting access to
|
||
information, privacy of personal information, computer security and
|
||
computer crime. [p.m.]
|
||
-- Marc Rotenberg, former congressional counsel and expert on federal
|
||
computer legislation, CPSR, Washington DC.
|
||
|
||
COMPUTER-RELATED LEGISLATION WITHIN STATES
|
||
Survey of states' differing statutes that impact access to
|
||
information, privacy of information, computer security and computer
|
||
crime. [a.m.]
|
||
-- Buck Bloombecker, nationally-known researcher, lecturer and
|
||
consultant on computer security, crime & legislation.
|
||
|
||
IMPACTS ON THE U.S. OF OTHER NATIONS' PRIVACY INITIATIVES
|
||
European Economic Community and other international privacy and data
|
||
protection plans affecting trans-border data-flow and computer
|
||
communications, greatly impacting U.S. information practices and
|
||
international business. [a.m.]
|
||
-- Ron Plesser, former General Counsel, U.S. Privacy Protection Study
|
||
Commission; attorney, Piper & Marbury, Washington, DC.
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
ABOUT THE CONFERENCE SESSIONS (Tuesday-Thursday) --
|
||
|
||
Single-track Conference & banquet sessions Mar.26th through Mar.28th
|
||
offer diverse speakers & panel discussions including:
|
||
|
||
Key speakers include:
|
||
|
||
* Laurence H. Tribe,
|
||
Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School [Tuesday morning]:
|
||
"The Constitution in Cyberspace: Law & Liberty Beyond the Electronic
|
||
Frontier".
|
||
|
||
* Eli M. Noam,
|
||
Director, Center for Telecommunications & Information Studies, Columbia
|
||
University [Tuesday banquet]:
|
||
"Network Environments of the Future: Reconciling Free Speech and
|
||
Freedom of Association".
|
||
|
||
* William A. Bayse,
|
||
FBI's Assistant Director, Technical Services Division [Wednesday
|
||
banquet]:
|
||
"Balancing Computer Security Capabilities with Privacy and Integrity".
|
||
|
||
|
||
THE CONSTITUTION IN THE INFORMATION AGE [opening session]
|
||
Introductory remarks. Major policy proposals regarding electronic
|
||
communications and Constitutional protections, by Prof. Laurence Tribe.
|
||
|
||
ELECTRONIC SPEECH, PRESS & ASSEMBLY
|
||
Freedoms and responsibilities regarding electronic speech, public and
|
||
private electronic assembly, electronic publishing; issues of prior
|
||
restraint and chilling effects of monitoring.
|
||
|
||
COMPUTER-BASED SURVEILLANCE OF INDIVIDUALS
|
||
Monitoring electronic-mail, public & private teleconferences,
|
||
electronic bulletin boards, publications and subscribers; monitoring
|
||
individuals, work performance, buying habits and lifestyles.
|
||
|
||
PERSONAL INFORMATION & PRIVACY
|
||
Government and private collection, sharing, marketing, verification,
|
||
use, protection of, access to and responsibility for personal data,
|
||
including buying patterns, viewing habits, lifestyle, work, health,
|
||
school, census, voter, tax, financial and consumer information.
|
||
|
||
ETHICS & EDUCATION
|
||
Ethical principles for individuals, system administrators,
|
||
organizations, corporations and government; copying of data, copying of
|
||
software, distributing confidential information; relations to computer
|
||
education and computer law.
|
||
|
||
TRENDS IN COMPUTER NETWORKS
|
||
Overview and prognosis of computing capabilities and networking as
|
||
they impact personal privacy, confidentiality, security, one-to-one and
|
||
many-to-one communications, and access to information about government,
|
||
business and society.
|
||
|
||
LAW ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES & PROBLEMS
|
||
Issues relating to investigation, prosecution, due process and
|
||
deterring computer crimes, now and in the future; use of computers to
|
||
aid law enforcement.
|
||
|
||
LAW ENFORCEMENT & CIVIL LIBERTIES
|
||
Interaction of computer crime, law enforcement and civil liberties;
|
||
issues of search, seizure and sanctions, especially as applied to shared
|
||
or networked information, software and equipment.
|
||
|
||
LEGISLATION & REGULATION
|
||
Legislative and regulatory roles in protecting privacy and insuring
|
||
access; legal problems posed by computing and computer networks;
|
||
approaches to improving related government processes.
|
||
|
||
ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
|
||
Implementing individual and corporate access to federal, state & local
|
||
information about communities, corporations, legislation,
|
||
administration, the courts and public figures; allowing access while
|
||
protecting confidentiality.
|
||
|
||
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES & IMPACTS
|
||
Other nations' models for protecting personal information and
|
||
communications, and for granting access to government information;
|
||
existing and developing laws including EC'92; requirements for trans-
|
||
national data-flow and their potential impacts; implications for
|
||
personal expression; accountability issues.
|
||
|
||
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? [closing session]
|
||
Perspectives, recommendations and commitments of participants from the
|
||
major interest groups, proposed next steps to protect personal privacy,
|
||
protect fundamental freedoms and encourage responsible policies and
|
||
action.
|
||
|
||
ALSO: Tuesday and Wednesday will include structured opportunities for
|
||
attendees to identify groups with whom they want to establish contact
|
||
and, if they wish, announce topics they would like to discuss, one on
|
||
one.
|
||
|
||
|
||
ABOUT JUST SOME OF THE CONFERENCE SPEAKERS --
|
||
|
||
Ken Allen, Senior Vice President for Governmental Relations, Information
|
||
Industries Association (IIA).
|
||
|
||
Sharon Beckman, civil rights and criminal defense attorney and
|
||
Electronic Frontier Foundation litigation counsel, Silverglate & Good.
|
||
|
||
Jerry Berman, Director of the ACLU's Project on Information Technology
|
||
and Communications Policy Fellow, Benton Foundation.
|
||
|
||
Paul Bernstein, columnist, *Trial* mag.; Electronic Bar Assn. Legal
|
||
Info. Network administrator; LawMUG BBS sysop; edits on-line lawyers'
|
||
newsletter.
|
||
|
||
Sally Bowman, promotes responsible computing practices through school
|
||
teaching units; Director, Computer Learning Foundation.
|
||
|
||
David Burnham, author, *Rise of the Computer State*; former New York
|
||
Times investigative reporter; specialist in IRS & Freedom of Information
|
||
Act.
|
||
|
||
Mary Culnan, co-authored major credit reporting policies presented to
|
||
Congress; School of Business Administration, Georgetown University.
|
||
|
||
Dorothy Denning, received Aerospace's 1990 Distinguished Lecturer in
|
||
Computer Security award; author, *Cryptography & Data Security*.
|
||
|
||
Peter Denning, Editor, 1990 *Computers Under Attack*; past President,
|
||
ACM; founding Director, RIACS; editor, *Communications of the ACM*.
|
||
|
||
Dave Farber, co-founder, CSNET; member, National Research Council's
|
||
Computer Science & Telecommunications Board; University of
|
||
Pennsylvania.
|
||
|
||
Cliff Figallo, Director of the WELL (the Whole Earth 'Lectronic Link),
|
||
one of the best-reputed of the public teleconferencing systems.
|
||
|
||
David Flaherty, Canadian surveillance expert, Professor of History and
|
||
Law at the University of Western Ontario.
|
||
|
||
John Ford, Public Relations Director for Equifax, one of the nation's
|
||
largest providers of personal and credit information.
|
||
|
||
Bob Gellman, Chief Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives Governmental
|
||
Information Subcommittee.
|
||
|
||
Janlori Goldman, Director of the ACLU's Project on Privacy and
|
||
Technology, Washington, DC.
|
||
|
||
Harry Hammit, Editor, Access Reports, focusing on access to and freedom
|
||
of information, Washington, DC.
|
||
|
||
Martin Hellman, identified potential hazards in federal DES national
|
||
encryption standard; co-invented public-key encryption; Stanford.
|
||
|
||
Evan Hendricks, Editor/Publisher *Privacy Times* newsletter, Washington,
|
||
DC.
|
||
|
||
Lance Hoffman, public policy researcher and Professor of Electrical
|
||
Engineering & Computer Science at George Washington University.
|
||
|
||
Don Ingraham, wrote the first-ever search warrant for magnetic media,
|
||
computer crime prosecutor; Asst. District Attorney, Alameda County.
|
||
|
||
Bob Jacobson, former Prin. Consultant, California State Assembly
|
||
Utilities & Commerce Committee; drafted landmark computer
|
||
communications legislation.
|
||
|
||
Mitch Kapor, co-founder, Electronic Frontier Foundation; founder, Lotus
|
||
Corp.; received DPMA's 1990 Distinguished Information Science Award.
|
||
|
||
Tom Mandel, Director of the Leading Edge Values & Lifestyles Program at
|
||
SRI International.
|
||
|
||
John McMullen, well-known on-line journalist; co-authors "Newsbytes"
|
||
column on GEnie and Online America.
|
||
|
||
Peter Neumann, member, National Research Councils's 1990 *Computers at
|
||
Risk* comm.; Chair, ACM Comm.on Computers & Public Policy; moderates
|
||
RISKS Forum.
|
||
|
||
Donn Parker, perhaps the best-known international consultant and author
|
||
on information security and computer crime, SRI International.
|
||
|
||
Ron Plesser, former General Counsel, U.S. Privacy Protection Study
|
||
Commission; attorney, Piper & Marbury, Washington DC.
|
||
|
||
John Quarterman, author of the definitive study, *The Matrix: Computer
|
||
Networks and Conferencing Systems Worldwide*; Texas Internet Consulting.
|
||
|
||
Jack Rickard, Editor of *Boardwatch* magazine, perhaps the best news
|
||
source about computer bulletin boards; runs online information service.
|
||
|
||
Tom Riley, Canadian specialist in international computer communications
|
||
and privacy issues; Riley Information Services, Inc.
|
||
|
||
Lance Rose, co-author of *Syslaw*, about the law applied to on-line
|
||
situations; attorney, Wallace & Rose.
|
||
|
||
Marc Rotenberg, expert in federal computer and privacy law; Computer
|
||
Professionals for Social Responsibility, Washington office Director.
|
||
|
||
Noel Shipman, attorney for plaintiffs in electronic-mail privacy
|
||
landmark 1990 litigation against Epson America.
|
||
|
||
Harvey Silverglate, Electronic Frontier Foundation litigation counsel,
|
||
specialist in criminal defense and civil rights, Silverglate & Good.
|
||
|
||
Gail Thackeray, computer crime prosecutor; involved in Secret Service's
|
||
"Operation Sun Devil", former Arizona Asst. State Attorney General.
|
||
|
||
Robert Veeder, Acting Chief, Information Policy Branch, Office of
|
||
Information Regulatory Affairs, U.S. Office of Management & Budget
|
||
(OMB).
|
||
|
||
Willis Ware, Chair, U.S. Computer Systems Security & Privacy Advisory
|
||
Board established by Congress in 1987; Fellow, RAND Corporation.
|
||
|
||
Alan Westin, leader in early privacy legislation; co-authored landmark
|
||
*Equifax Report on Consumers in the Information Age*; Columbia
|
||
University.
|
||
|
||
Sheldon Zenner, former federal prosecutor in Chicago; defended *Phrack*
|
||
electronic publisher, Craig Neidorf; Katten, Muchin & Zavis.
|
||
|
||
CONFERENCE CHAIR
|
||
Jim Warren, Autodesk, Inc. & MicroTimes
|
||
415-851-7075, jwarren@well.sf.ca.us / e-mail
|
||
|
||
PROGRAM COMMITTEE
|
||
Dorothy Denning, Digital Equipment Corporation
|
||
Peter Denning, Research Inst. for Advanced Comp.Sci.
|
||
Les Earnest, Midpeninsula ACLU & Stanford U., ret.
|
||
Elliot Fabric, Attorney at Law
|
||
Mark Graham, Pandora Systems
|
||
Don Ingraham, Alameda County District AttyUs Office
|
||
Bruce Koball, Motion West
|
||
Marc Rotenberg, Comp. Prof. for Social Responsibility
|
||
Glenn Tenney, Fantasia Systems & The Hackers Conf.
|
||
|
||
ADVISORS
|
||
Ron Anderson, ACM SIGCAS & Univ. of Minnesota
|
||
John Perry Barlow, Electronic Frontier Foundation
|
||
Jerry Berman, ACLU & Benton Foundation
|
||
Dave Caulkins, USSR GlasNet
|
||
Vint Cerf, Corp.for National Research Initiatives
|
||
Margaret Chambers, Electronic Networking Assn.
|
||
Steve Cisler, Apple Computer, Inc.
|
||
Whit Diffie, Northern Telecom
|
||
Mary Eisenhart, MicroTimes
|
||
Dave Farber, University of Pennsylvania
|
||
Cliff Figallo, The WELL
|
||
John Gilmore, Cygnus Support
|
||
Adele Goldberg, ParcPlace Systems
|
||
Terry Gross, Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, et al
|
||
Keith Henson, consultant & Alcor
|
||
Lance Hoffman, George Washington University
|
||
Dave Hughes, Chariot Communications
|
||
Bob Jacobson, Human Interface Technology Lab.
|
||
Mitch Kapor, Electronic Frontier Foundation
|
||
Roger Karraker, Santa Rosa College
|
||
Tom Mandel, SRI International
|
||
John McMullen, NewsBytes
|
||
Peter Neumann, SRI International
|
||
Dave Redell, Digital Equipment Corporation
|
||
Ken Rosenblattt, Santa Clara Cnty. Dist. Atty's Office
|
||
Paul Saffo, Institute for the Future
|
||
Gail Thackeray, Arizona Attorney GeneralUs Office
|
||
Jay Thorwaldson, Palo Alto Medical Foundation
|
||
Terry Winograd, CPSR & Stanford University
|
||
Sheldon Zenner, Katten, Muchin, & Zavis
|
||
Affiliations are listed only for identification purposes.
|
||
|
||
|
||
****************************
|
||
* Application to Attend *
|
||
****************************
|
||
|
||
First Conference on Computers, Freedom & Privacy, March 25-28, 1991
|
||
Monday: Tutorials, Tuesday-Thursday: Conference Sessions & Banquets
|
||
SFO Marriott Hotel, 1800 Old Bayshore Hwy., Burlingame CA 94010
|
||
For hotel reservations at a special $99 Conference rate, call: (800)228-
|
||
9290
|
||
|
||
Due to the size of the facility, Conference registration is limited to
|
||
600 people. Tutorials registration is also limited. Balanced
|
||
participation from all of the diverse interest groups is being actively
|
||
encouraged.
|
||
Interested individuals should apply early to assure
|
||
acceptance.Applications will be accepted primarily on a first-come,
|
||
first-served basis, while encouraging balanced participation.
|
||
|
||
|
||
REGISTRATION FEES: If payment received: by Feb.8 2/8-3/15 after 3/15
|
||
Conference (3 days, incl.luncheons, banquets) $295 $350 $400
|
||
Tutorials (full day, 1 or 2 seminars) $95 $145 $195
|
||
Please circle fee and date selections.
|
||
Please make checks payable to "Computers, Freedom & Privacy / CPSR".
|
||
Please do not send cash. (If space is sold out, the uncashed check will
|
||
be voided and promptly returned.)
|
||
|
||
Check the "[x]" if information should NOT appear in the published
|
||
Attendee Roster. (Roster will greatly assist ongoing communications.)
|
||
[ ] name:
|
||
[ ] title:
|
||
[ ] organization:
|
||
[ ] mailing address:
|
||
[ ] city ST Zip:
|
||
[ ] phone(s):
|
||
[ ] fax:
|
||
[ ] e-mail:
|
||
Name-tag name:
|
||
Name-tag title:
|
||
Name-tag organization:
|
||
Expect to stay at SFO Marriott? [ ]yes [ ]no
|
||
|
||
To aid in balancing participation among groups,
|
||
please check all significantly applicable items.
|
||
[ ] user of computers or computer networking
|
||
[ ] user of electronic-mail services
|
||
[ ] user of teleconferencing services
|
||
[ ] user of direct marketing services
|
||
[ ] user of computerized personal information
|
||
[ ] user of government information
|
||
[ ] computer professional
|
||
[ ] BBS sysop (bulletin board system operator)
|
||
[ ] systems administrator / infosystems manager
|
||
[ ] network administrator
|
||
[ ] computer / communications security specialist
|
||
[ ] provider of data communications services
|
||
[ ] provider of electronic-mail services
|
||
[ ] provider of teleconferencing services
|
||
[ ] provider of direct marketing services
|
||
[ ] provider of computerized personal information
|
||
[ ] provider of government information
|
||
[ ] legislative official or staffqfederalqstate
|
||
[ ] regulatory official or staff [ ]federal [ ]state
|
||
[ ] law enforcement [ ]federal [ ]state [ ]local
|
||
[ ] prosecutor [ ]federal [ ]state [ ]local
|
||
[ ] judicial representative [ ]federal [ ]state [ ]local
|
||
[ ] criminal defense attorney
|
||
[ ] corporate or litigation attorney
|
||
[ ] civil liberties specialist
|
||
[ ] journalist [ ]newspaper [ ]television [ ]radio [ ]other
|
||
[ ] other:
|
||
[ ] other:
|
||
|
||
Privacy Notice:
|
||
This information will not be sold, rented, loaned, exchanged or used for
|
||
any purpose other than official CPSR activity. CPSR may elect to send
|
||
information about other activities, but such mailings will always
|
||
originate with CPSR.
|
||
|
||
Please mail form and payment to Conference office:
|
||
CFP Conference, 345 Swett Road, Woodside CA 94062
|
||
e-mail: cfp@well.sf.ca.us; fax: (415)851-2814
|
||
Conference Chair: Jim Warren, (415)851-7075
|
||
|
||
Sponsor: Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility,
|
||
415)322-3778, a nonprofit, educational corporation [Internal
|
||
Revenue Code 501(c)(3)]
|
||
|
||
|
||
OTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THIS PREMIER CONFERENCE --
|
||
|
||
This is an intensive, multi-disciplinary survey Conference for those
|
||
concerned with computing, teleconferencing, electronic mail,
|
||
computerized personal information, direct marketing information,
|
||
government data, etc. -- and those concerned with computer-related
|
||
legislation, regulation, computer security, law enforcement and national
|
||
and international policies that impact civil liberties, responsible
|
||
exercise of freedom and equitable protection of privacy in this global
|
||
Information Age.
|
||
|
||
For the first time, this 4-day event will bring together
|
||
representatives from all of these groups and more, all in one place, all
|
||
at one time.
|
||
|
||
Many of the recognized leaders and strongest advocates among the
|
||
various groups interested in the issues of the conference will discuss
|
||
their concerns and proposals.
|
||
|
||
Attendance will be limited to 600 people. Balanced representation
|
||
from the diverse groups interested in these issues is being encouraged.
|
||
Please see the enclosed application for details.
|
||
|
||
To inform participants about topics beyond their specialties, a number
|
||
of half-day seminars are scheduled in parallel for the first day
|
||
(Monday, March 25th). These tutorials will explore relevant issues in
|
||
computing, networking, civil liberties, regulation, the law and law
|
||
enforcement. Each tutorial is designed for those who are experienced in
|
||
one area, but are less expert in the tutorials' topics.
|
||
|
||
To explore the interactions and ramifications of the issues,
|
||
conference talks and panel discussions are scheduled in a single track
|
||
for the remaining three days (Tuesday-Thursday, March 26th-28th). These
|
||
will emphasize balanced representation of all major views, especially
|
||
including probing questions and discussion.
|
||
|
||
Explicit Conference events to foster communication across disciplines
|
||
are planned. Working luncheons, major breaks and two evening banquets
|
||
will further encourage individual and small-group discussions.
|
||
|
||
Please copy, post & circulate! [version 2.7, updated 1/26/91]
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
--End of Article 3--
|
||
|
||
:
|
||
|
||
|
||
Downloaded From P-80 International Information Systems 304-744-2253
|