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DIGITAL FREE PRESS
|
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
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Volume 1.0 Issue 3.0
|
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
* A Publication of The Underground Computing Foundation (UCF) *
|
||
|
||
* Send Subscription Requests to: dfp-req%underg@uunet.uu.net *
|
||
|
||
* Send Submissions to: hackers%underg@uunet.uu.net *
|
||
|
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* Editor: Max Cray (max%underg@uunet.uu.net) *
|
||
|
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* BBS: The Underground (401) 847-2603 (v.32) *
|
||
|
||
Back issues can be found in the CUD archives at EFF.ORG.
|
||
|
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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|
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Statement of Purpose and Disclaimer
|
||
|
||
The Digital Free Press is an uncensored forum to document current
|
||
activities in and of the world of modern technology. It is published under the
|
||
premise that it is better to know, rather than not know, so no attempt is made
|
||
to hide any information no matter how dangerous it may be. Information is a
|
||
double edged sword. It is neither good nor bad, and can be used for either
|
||
good or bad. Warning: Some information in this document could be used for
|
||
illegal activities. Use at your own risk. Articles are the opinion of the
|
||
authors listed, and not of the editor (unless of course the editor wrote
|
||
it).
|
||
|
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
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In this Issue:
|
||
|
||
1. Mail to Max
|
||
2. Viral Footprints by GodNet Raider
|
||
3. Character Codes by The BBC
|
||
4. Mail Insecurity on Telegard BBS Systems by Hard Rock
|
||
5. The NNSC Info Server by Max Cray
|
||
|
||
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
Mail to Max:
|
||
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
To: max%underg@underg.UUCP
|
||
Subject: Re: Digital Free Press #2
|
||
Newsgroups: alt.bbs,alt.cyberpunk,comp.org.eff.talk,ri.cug
|
||
Organization: The Puzzle Palace, UKentucky
|
||
Date: Mon, 9 Mar 92 15:03:42 GMT
|
||
From: Wes Morgan <uunet!ms.uky.edu!morgan>
|
||
Sender: uunet!ms.uky.edu!morgan
|
||
|
||
In article <wVe0gB2w164w@underg.UUCP> you write:
|
||
|
||
>[Editor's note: Lesson here is be sure you know your upstream sysadmin's
|
||
>policy on distribution of controversial material. I was able to get the uucp
|
||
>connection back, but only after agreeing not to distribute DFP anymore
|
||
>through his site.]
|
||
|
||
I was glad to see this comment. Given the fact that "the net" now en-
|
||
compasses everything from Crays to AppleIIs, cooperation between admins
|
||
and users (even in mundane matters such as electronic mail) is more
|
||
necessary than ever before.
|
||
|
||
I was puzzled, however, when I continued reading this issue of DFP. Even
|
||
after you alluded to the importance of foreknowledge, discussion, and
|
||
cooperation, you wrote this:
|
||
|
||
>Accessing and using equipment that you do not own is okay as long as
|
||
>you do not prevent those who own it from using it, or damage anything.
|
||
|
||
How does a remote hacker KNOW the results of his actions? How will the
|
||
remote hacker KNOW if he causes damage? How does the remote hacker KNOW
|
||
that he is using one of a limited number of access ports? The simple answer,
|
||
in many cases, is that he does not, and will not, know the results of many
|
||
of his actions.
|
||
|
||
I have watched hackers attempt to bring my system to a halt through both
|
||
subtle and gross methods. I have watched hackers muck about aimlessly in
|
||
user files, erasing/corrupting them at random. There are some types of
|
||
files which can be corrupted by simply opening them with an editor!
|
||
|
||
[ Editor's comment: How does a hacker know? By trying it and seeing what
|
||
happens, of course, or by reading information, asking others. Same way
|
||
everyone else learns. Now why would a hacker try to bring down your system?
|
||
Hackers *LIKE* computers. Just because someone was trying to cause you harm
|
||
does not mean that all hackers are vandals. Perhaps you could post some
|
||
guidelines on your machine, for example a list of files not to be opened
|
||
with the editor, and ways that those files could be viewed, etc.]
|
||
|
||
>Sure he got the source code for VMS, but is there any evidence
|
||
>that he used this information for personal gain, or did he simply use the
|
||
>information to improve his understanding of the VMS operating system?
|
||
|
||
This is a moot point. The source code for VMS (or any commercial operating
|
||
system) is a copyrighted work. By securing his own copies, he violated that
|
||
copyright law and deprived DEC of revenue. There are any number of books
|
||
available for loan/purchase which give details of operating system design.
|
||
I have seen several such texts which explicitly document VMS internals.
|
||
Why weren't those texts an acceptable alternative?
|
||
|
||
[ Editor's comment: You mean Kevin M. would have bought a copy of VMS,
|
||
but since he was able to just take it, he deprived them of revenue? I do
|
||
not think so. He never would have bought it. DEC has the same amount of
|
||
money no matter if Kevin had the code, or not.
|
||
However, I would be interested in that information you have on the
|
||
VMS internals.]
|
||
|
||
>Who owns the Internet?
|
||
|
||
There is no single entity to which we can assign the label "Internet". The
|
||
"Internet" is, in reality, is a conglomerate of cooperating networks. Some
|
||
of these networks, such as SURANet, are regional networks; these are funded
|
||
by their members. Others, such as THEnet, are limited to a single state;
|
||
these are often funded by the government of the State in question. Others
|
||
are not really "networks" at all; uucp, which is based on store-and-forward
|
||
via telephone calls (rather than a constant connection over a leased line),
|
||
is a good example. There is a "backbone" which connects many of these par-
|
||
ticipating networks; it is known as NSFnet, and it is maintained by the
|
||
National Science Foundation. Many nets which participate in the "Internet"
|
||
are commercial; HP, DEC, and IBM have gatewayed their internal networks to
|
||
the "Internet".
|
||
|
||
There may be parts of this conglomerate for which we can determine owner-
|
||
ship. Obviously, HP's network belongs to HP, while THEnet belongs to the
|
||
State of Texas. Their participation in large-scale networking does NOT
|
||
effect any change in their ownership of their own networks/systems.
|
||
|
||
>Is it some mysterious 'them'
|
||
>or is it our net?
|
||
|
||
It is, most assuredly, NOT "our net". The mere fact that we can access
|
||
a facility does NOT imply that we have any rights/privileges whatsoever
|
||
on that facility.
|
||
|
||
Actually, the fact that a network connects two sites is irrelevant. The
|
||
question is a simple one: Have the operators/owners of that site granted
|
||
me any privileges to use that system? If the system in question has a
|
||
GUEST login or, perhaps, an anonymous FTP service, then I have been granted
|
||
a certain "privilege of use"; if not, I have neither the privilege nor the
|
||
right to attempt access to that system. As I said, the existence of a
|
||
connective network is irrelevant; the same rules would apply to me if I
|
||
walked into the machine room at that remote site, wouldn't they?
|
||
|
||
[ Editor's comment: Ok so what good is having access if you don't have any
|
||
rights or privledges? Who decides what those rights or privledges are?
|
||
Are these rights or privledges stated anywhere? Who said Morris did not
|
||
have authorization to write a self-propagating program?]
|
||
|
||
>If it is our net, then we should be able to try some stuff
|
||
>on it, and to heck with 'them' if they can't take a joke.
|
||
|
||
When someone's "stuff" results in downtime, corrupted files, and trashed
|
||
systems, it is NOT a joke. I know sysadmins who spent days recovering from
|
||
hacker "exploration" of their system. If it's a commercial site (one which
|
||
charges for access), it may lose thousands of dollars in revenue during
|
||
recovery. If it's an academic site, hundreds (or thousands) of users may
|
||
suffer; research grinds to a halt, academic assignments cannot be finished,
|
||
electronic mail stops in its tracks, and all users are displaced by hackers'
|
||
exploration. Is this a "joke"? Is your "exploration" and "learning" more
|
||
important than the work of hundreds, or thousands, of others?
|
||
|
||
[Editor's comment: Hey mistakes happen. That is part of life. If you can't
|
||
handle it then you should not be a sysadmin, and if you do decide to quit
|
||
your job let me know. I would love to be a sysadmin and get to work with big
|
||
computers.If its a commercial site my heart bleeds for them. If its an
|
||
academic site, then maybe everyone learned something from the experience.]
|
||
|
||
> It is my contention that hackers did not change. Society changed, and it
|
||
>changed for the worse. The environment the early hackers were working in
|
||
>correctly viewed these activities as the desire to utilize technology in a
|
||
>personal way.
|
||
|
||
There is an important distinction between the "early hackers" and those of
|
||
today. The early hackers did not operate on any system they could find;
|
||
their activities were restricted to local machines. In a sense, this limita-
|
||
tion made them responsible for their activities. RMS didn't go looking for
|
||
systems to "explore" at other universities. Today, hackers rarely operate
|
||
on their own systems; most of them prefer to anonymously wander the networks,
|
||
looking for systems which they can use/misuse/abuse. To me, that "crosses
|
||
the line" between "good" and "bad" hacking. In addition, most of today's
|
||
hackers refuse to accept responsibility for their actions. The Dutch hacker
|
||
conglomerate, for instance, believes that they can hack any system in the
|
||
world, since hacking is currently legal under Dutch law. They saw no prob-
|
||
lem in hacking/cracking/crashing systems throughout Europe and the USA. In
|
||
fact, one of them said in an interview, "In the real world, I would never
|
||
commit a crime."; this person has a badly skewed set of morals, in my opinion.
|
||
|
||
[ Editor's comment: I do not really see much of a distinction here. Why is it
|
||
okay to hack on a local machine that does not belong to you, but not a
|
||
networked machine that does not belong to you?
|
||
I agree with you about the responsibility thing. I do think hackers
|
||
should be responsible for thier actions, even in cyberspace.]
|
||
|
||
>By definition hackers believe in the free access to computers
|
||
>and to the freedom of information.
|
||
|
||
This definition, sadly, is no longer correct. Today's hackers believe
|
||
that computing should be free FOR THEMSELVES; they don't really care
|
||
about others. RMS kept to his principles; the gnu.ai.mit.edu systems
|
||
provide access for almost anyone who asks. Some other ex-hackers have
|
||
set up public access sites, such as Nyx; these are in keeping with the
|
||
hacker ethic of the past.
|
||
|
||
Today's hackers, on the other hand, don't want to expend any of their
|
||
own resources. In a recent email conversation with a hacker, he claimed
|
||
that his lack of resources gave him the "right" (his word) to hack on
|
||
other systems through the networks. That's ridiculous.
|
||
|
||
I've even been hacked from MIT, a site which has far greater compu-
|
||
ting resources than mine. Why would someone at MIT *need* to hack my
|
||
systems, when so much is available to them there? The only conclu-
|
||
sion I can reach is that those hackers do not want to accept respon-
|
||
sibility for their actions. Are you arguing that I have some obli-
|
||
gation to condone/support/accept such irresponsibility?
|
||
|
||
[Editors comment: Perhaps many of today's hackers do not believe in the
|
||
hacker ethic of the past. I believe one of the main points of my editorial
|
||
was that we should reinforce the hacker ethic. Encourage them to contribute
|
||
and be responsible. Perhaps they could perform some sort of service for you
|
||
on your machine, in exchange for its use?
|
||
Of course they did not *need* to hack your system. A hacker does not
|
||
*need* to do anything. There was probably something about your system
|
||
they liked. Consider it a compliment.]
|
||
|
||
>Current bad mouthing of hackers is simply snobbery.
|
||
|
||
Hardly; I know that my attitude toward today's hackers comes from my
|
||
obligation and responsibility to the owners of my systems, as well as
|
||
my obligation to the legitimate users.
|
||
|
||
[ Editors's comment: You are sounding an awful lot like a suit...]
|
||
|
||
We had a local hacking incident last year. After tracking down the
|
||
responsible parties, I offered to give them full access to a small
|
||
Unix system (an AT&T 3B2/310), with only one condition; they would
|
||
be responsible for the actions taken with that system. None of the
|
||
individuals involved wanted to assume responsibility, even though I
|
||
was willing to give them root access to a Unix system.
|
||
|
||
[ Editors comment: ? Got me. I would have taken it. Was it networked? Of
|
||
course networked machines are always more interesting.]
|
||
|
||
>Rather than cracking down on the modern hacker, we
|
||
>should reinforce the hacker ethic, a code of conduct not based upon greed and
|
||
>lust for the almighty dollar, but instead for personal growth through the free
|
||
>access of computers and information, and a respect for technology.
|
||
|
||
How about adding "respect for the property of others" to that statement?
|
||
If I purchased a Porsche, would you assume that you have the "right" to
|
||
open up the hood and start tinkering with the engine? I don't think so.
|
||
Why should my purchase of, say, a Convex C240 be treated any differently?
|
||
|
||
[ Editor's comment: Hmm maybe you are right. Maybe they should not be
|
||
treated differently. Where do you park it? :) ]
|
||
|
||
In closing, let me address the question of resources. Many hackers have
|
||
told me that "they don't have the money for a Unix system"; in fact, this
|
||
is often one of their cardinal arguments in defense of their actions. A
|
||
Unix system for 286/386 microcomputers may be purchased for US$99. I find
|
||
it very difficult to believe that these people cannot afford that small
|
||
amount of money. Most of today's hackers would prefer to siphon their
|
||
needs from the monies and efforts spent by the owners/operators of other
|
||
systems. They want someone else to fund their "exploration".
|
||
|
||
[ Editor's comment: The old 'Coherent is just as good as my mainframe'
|
||
argument. It is just not the same. Ok, I want to learn VMS. So how about
|
||
a $99 VMS clone for my PC?]
|
||
|
||
My systems are intended for use by a particular group of users; we cannot
|
||
fund the needs of the world. No single site can afford to support everyone.
|
||
If I could afford to support such activities, I would set up a public access
|
||
system. I can't afford that, so I expect others to respect my policies.
|
||
|
||
This entire discussion boils down to a single question, and no one has been
|
||
able to provide a suitable answer:
|
||
|
||
Why should a site be expected to provide access to anyone
|
||
other than those for whom it is purchased/maintained?
|
||
|
||
Best,
|
||
Wes Morgan
|
||
|
||
--
|
||
morgan@ms.uky.edu |Wes Morgan, not speaking for| ....!ukma!ukecc!morgan
|
||
morgan@engr.uky.edu |the University of Kentucky's| morgan%engr.uky.edu@UKCC
|
||
morgan@ie.pa.uky.edu |Engineering Computing Center| morgan@wuarchive.wustl.edu
|
||
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
[Editor's note: Thanks for your e-mail Wes. And to answer your question, I do
|
||
not think a site should be expected to provide access to anyone other than
|
||
those for whom it is purchased/maintained. However it would be nice if it
|
||
did.]
|
||
|
||
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
##############################################################################
|
||
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
From: gnr@tsf.UUCP (GodNet Raider)
|
||
Subject: virus scanner codes.
|
||
Organization: The CyberUnderground
|
||
|
||
|
||
-=[ The 'McAfee scan' viral footprint codes ]=-
|
||
|
||
-or-
|
||
|
||
/*******************************************/
|
||
/* A fool and his scanner, can part a user */
|
||
/* from his hard earned money. */
|
||
/*******************************************/
|
||
|
||
- written by -
|
||
GodNet Raider
|
||
- of -
|
||
The CyberUnderground
|
||
|
||
-=[ "Information is the greatest weapon of power to the modern wizard." ]=-
|
||
|
||
]----------------------------------------------------------------------------[
|
||
|
||
Introduction:
|
||
-------------
|
||
|
||
Recently I began to wonder about the usefulness of 'virus scanners'
|
||
and what if any difference do they have with a simple text/hex search
|
||
program (like Nortons filefind/ts). And if there was no real DIFFERENCE,
|
||
how secure is the system that used them.
|
||
|
||
Problems with scanning:
|
||
-----------------------
|
||
|
||
The first question I had to ask was, What does a 'virus scanner' actually
|
||
look for? Does it only look for one string of codes or several at different
|
||
places in the file?
|
||
|
||
To answer this question I called a local BBS an dl'ed McAfee's
|
||
Scan3.7v64 (to evaluate and after my tests, it was erased for its lack of
|
||
offering any real protection). Then I went to my archives to retrieve some
|
||
viruses I have experimented with in the past (of which where Jerusalem B and
|
||
Dark Avenger).
|
||
|
||
I ran scan to verify that the virus files where viruses (3 of which did
|
||
not set off any alarm even tho there was a listing in the documentation for
|
||
them, so I removed them from the test). Then using a sector editor looked at
|
||
the source for the McAfee asso. Scan3.7v64 (here after know just as Scan64)
|
||
to find that the footprint information was encoded. Needless to say this did
|
||
not stop me (for the sake of those who are into the tech aspects of things,
|
||
the actual method used to get the codes are included at the end of the
|
||
article with the codes found), It took less than an hour to get the codes I
|
||
was looking for (without disassembling the code but by looking into the
|
||
memory allocated to the program).
|
||
|
||
What I found out was that Scan was just a simple hex searcher (that kept
|
||
its data locked up till needed). It could also be fooled by any program
|
||
that contained the same hex string as a real virus (this was proved when,
|
||
using a sector editor, I added the Scan64 footprint for the Jerusalem B
|
||
into the top of a text file (a place this code would never show up in a real
|
||
infection) then renamed it to *.com; Scan64 reported it as infected).
|
||
|
||
Once the codes where obtained, using Debug directly on a virus file,
|
||
I was able to mutate the virus to no longer be detectable by Scan64 without
|
||
destroying the integrity of it. For the virus was still able to infect files,
|
||
and Scan64 could no longer track it. I was still able to track and control it
|
||
using Norton's filefind, diskmon, diskedit, and (of course) DOS erase.
|
||
|
||
So it seems my question was answered. Some 'virus scanners' just scan
|
||
for a single string of hex character. This is fine if viruses NEVER changed
|
||
or programs would NEVER use code similar to what a virus would (the smaller
|
||
the footprint string the bigger the chance of mistaken alarms). For if
|
||
a 'virus scanner' programer just keeps making a new release each time there
|
||
is a new virus (an I will not get into the morality of charging customers
|
||
the full price of an software upgrade rather than allowing them to buy/dl
|
||
new footprint data files as they become available) for the program will
|
||
eventually grow to unwieldy sizes. An it should be noted there are other
|
||
programs that may do the same job faster, more upward compatibility, and
|
||
you may already have them on hand.
|
||
|
||
A possible solution:
|
||
--------------------
|
||
|
||
One thing that I think is a good idea is when a program allows users
|
||
to add new footprint data to it (like Nortons' virus package). For now
|
||
users don't need to buy new releases for detection of viruses they may not
|
||
get/be able to detect. Instead for the cost of a call to a support bbs (part
|
||
of the original software agreement?) the user can get new data as it becomes
|
||
available or when they fine a new one on their system they can immediately
|
||
add the new footprint rather than wait for the next version to be released.
|
||
|
||
Method used to obtain footprints:
|
||
---------------------------------
|
||
|
||
After finding the data I was looking for was encoded I thought, How can
|
||
I get the data I wanted for my tests?
|
||
|
||
Disassembling was out, not for any MORAL reason but, for the time
|
||
involved. So I thought it must have to decode the data for it's own use
|
||
and to save time it would do it all before the scan rather than slow the
|
||
process down by doing a full decode. So I needed to look at the memory
|
||
image of the running program. Thanks to DOS 5.0 and Dosshell I was able to
|
||
do this.
|
||
|
||
After spawning the scan task under the dos shell I used alt-tab to
|
||
swap back to the shell. Once back in the shell I used the shell commands to
|
||
copy the ~tmpxxx.swp to foo.img and terminating Scan64 and Dosshell.
|
||
|
||
Then using a sector editor I searched though the temp file created by
|
||
the dos shell. I found an area of data that contained the virus names and
|
||
non ascii text data separating them. Even though the strings of ascii data
|
||
(virus names) ended with a zero character (as variable strings have a
|
||
tendency to), the random data did not end with a common signal character (as
|
||
expected for code can be any character). There was also no character count
|
||
stored (the data length varied so it could not be assumed by the scan
|
||
program as well). So I continued to search though the data.
|
||
|
||
I eventually found another area that had the same text strings (virus
|
||
names). This time the first character of the none ascii data gave the count
|
||
of the data size to the following text string. I knew I had found it so I
|
||
extracted this data to another file (starting at 0 offset in the new file).
|
||
Then wrote down the some codes and checked them against viruses I had.
|
||
|
||
The codes I had did not seem match. This did not stop me. I took one
|
||
virus (that my understanding said scan was only looking for 6 consecutive
|
||
bytes to match) and started zapping bytes (in a file scan said was infected)
|
||
to find what it was looking for. The processes involved zapping one sector
|
||
at a time till scan said it was not infected, then half of that sector, then
|
||
half of a half, and so on. It came down to 6 CONSECUTIVE bytes as I expected.
|
||
But they where DIFFERENT from the ones I had.
|
||
|
||
So I went to the windows calculator (it allows byte arithmetic in hex,
|
||
ie.. 0xff + 0x04 = 0x03 (rollover, carry is ignored), it would be outside
|
||
the scope of this ARTICLE to explain why I thought byte arithmetic was
|
||
important). Some quick subtraction found a 0x93 (decimal 147) DIFFERENCE
|
||
between the actual codes and the ones from the allocated memory uses by
|
||
scan.
|
||
|
||
So taking another virus that scan said was infected I did the minor
|
||
hex math on the codes in the allocated memory used by scan and found the
|
||
codes. Then i zapped only the codes and ran scan on the updated virus file.
|
||
It said there was no infection. I knew I now had the right codes (after a few
|
||
more checks).
|
||
|
||
So I created a simple C program (see below) to convert the extract file I
|
||
created and converted the codes to a readable form (output from program
|
||
listed at end of ARTICLE). Then tested other viruses against the list. An
|
||
found the same results.
|
||
|
||
Binary to hex program:
|
||
----------------------
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
fp2txt.c
|
||
Convert footprint binary information to text.
|
||
by GodNet Raider
|
||
|
||
Notes:
|
||
Please forgive the unrefined/un annotated nature of this code it was
|
||
designed as a one shot.
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||
#include <stdio.h>
|
||
|
||
#define TRUE 1
|
||
#define MAGICNUM 0x93
|
||
|
||
void
|
||
main (void);
|
||
|
||
void main (void)
|
||
{
|
||
unsigned char
|
||
sVirusFP [128],
|
||
*ptVirusInfo,
|
||
szVirusName [128];
|
||
register unsigned int
|
||
nTmpCnt;
|
||
FILE
|
||
*Stream;
|
||
|
||
Stream = fopen ("fp2.img", "rb");
|
||
while (!feof (Stream))
|
||
{
|
||
ptVirusInfo = sVirusFP;
|
||
if (!(*sVirusFP = getc (Stream)))
|
||
exit (0);
|
||
nTmpCnt = (unsigned int) *sVirusFP;
|
||
while (nTmpCnt--)
|
||
*(++ptVirusInfo) = ((unsigned char) getc (Stream)) - MAGICNUM;
|
||
ptVirusInfo = szVirusName;
|
||
while ((*(ptVirusInfo++) = getc (Stream)));
|
||
printf ("\n%s:\n ", szVirusName);
|
||
ptVirusInfo = sVirusFP;
|
||
nTmpCnt = (unsigned int) *sVirusFP;
|
||
while (nTmpCnt--)
|
||
{
|
||
printf ("0x%02x ", (unsigned int) *(++ptVirusInfo));
|
||
if (nTmpCnt && !((*sVirusFP - nTmpCnt) % 8))
|
||
printf ("\n ");
|
||
}
|
||
printf ("\n");
|
||
getc (Stream);
|
||
}
|
||
exit (0);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
Footprints discovered:
|
||
----------------------
|
||
|
||
The following is a list of the footprint codes found in McAfee asso.
|
||
Scan3.7v64.
|
||
|
||
1008 Virus [1008]:
|
||
0x81 0xed 0x38 0x00 0xe8 0xc3
|
||
|
||
Stoned-II Virus [S-2]:
|
||
0x9c 0x2e 0xff 0x1e 0x09 0x00
|
||
|
||
VHP-2 Virus [VHP2]:
|
||
0x1c 0x8c 0x44 0x02 0xb8 0x24 0x35 0xcd
|
||
0x21 0x89
|
||
|
||
VHP Virus [VHP]:
|
||
0x07 0x89 0x7e 0x8a 0x8d 0x7e 0x90 0x89
|
||
0x7e 0x88
|
||
|
||
Taiwan3 Virus [T3]:
|
||
0x17 0x0f 0x32 0x0a 0x32 0x0a 0x90 0x0b
|
||
0xfb 0x08
|
||
|
||
Armagedon Virus [Arma]:
|
||
0xb8 0x00 0x43 0xcd 0x21 0x2e 0x89 0x0e
|
||
0x48 0x01
|
||
|
||
1381 Virus [1381]:
|
||
0x1e 0x06 0x8c 0xc8 0x8e 0xd8 0xb8 0x40
|
||
0x00 0x8e
|
||
|
||
Tiny Virus [Tiny]:
|
||
0xb4 0x40 0x8d 0x94 0xab 0x01 0xb9 0x02
|
||
0x00 0xcd
|
||
|
||
Subliminal Virus [Sub]:
|
||
0x8b 0x3e 0x25 0x01 0x8b 0xd7 0x2e 0x8e
|
||
0x06 0x27
|
||
|
||
Sorry Virus [Sorry]:
|
||
0xeb 0x96 0x83 0x2e 0x12 0x00 0x40 0x83
|
||
0x2e 0x03
|
||
|
||
1024 Virus [1024]:
|
||
0xc8 0x75 0xed 0x8b 0xd1 0xb8 0x00 0x42
|
||
0xcd 0x21 0x72
|
||
|
||
RedX Virus [RedX]:
|
||
0x52 0x8b 0x9c 0x17 0x04 0xb9 0x19 0x03
|
||
0x8d 0x94
|
||
|
||
VP Virus [VP]:
|
||
0x21 0x89 0x1e 0x22 0x03 0x8c 0x06 0x24
|
||
0x03 0xb4
|
||
|
||
Print Screen-2 [P-2]:
|
||
0x74 0x01 0xbf 0x03 0x00 0xb9 0x20 0x00
|
||
0xf3 0xa4
|
||
|
||
Joshi Virus [Joshi]:
|
||
0xf3 0xa4 0x8c 0xc0 0x05 0x20 0x00 0x8e
|
||
0xc0 0xbb
|
||
|
||
Microbes Virus [Micro]:
|
||
0x8e 0xd0 0xbc 0x00 0xf0 0xfb 0xa1 0x13
|
||
0x04 0x2d 0x04
|
||
|
||
Print Screen Virus [Prtscr]:
|
||
0xcd 0x05 0xfe 0xc8 0xa2 0x60 0x01 0xc3
|
||
0x6f 0x6e 0x2d
|
||
|
||
Form Virus [Form]:
|
||
0xe8 0xb2 0x00 0x5a 0x5e 0x1f 0x33 0xc0
|
||
0x50 0xb8 0x00 0x7c
|
||
|
||
June 13th Virus [J13]:
|
||
0x12 0x00 0xb9 0xb1 0x04 0x2e 0x30 0x04
|
||
0x46 0xe2
|
||
|
||
JoJo Virus [JoJo]:
|
||
0x4d 0x2b 0xd0 0x4a 0x45 0x03 0xe8 0x45
|
||
0x8e 0xc5
|
||
|
||
Victor Virus [Victor]:
|
||
0x74 0x26 0x80 0xfc 0x5b 0x74 0x21 0x80
|
||
0xfc 0x39
|
||
|
||
5120 Virus [5120]:
|
||
0x10 0xa2 0xf6 0x0f 0xe8 0xd0 0xfe 0x80
|
||
0x3e 0x4a 0x10 0x02 0x7d 0x22 0xc6 0x46
|
||
|
||
W-13 Virus [W13]:
|
||
0xf3 0xa4 0x8b 0xfa 0xb4 0x30 0xcd 0x21
|
||
0x3c 0x00
|
||
|
||
Slow Virus [Slow]:
|
||
0x81 0xc6 0x1b 0x00 0xb9 0x90 0x06 0x2e
|
||
0x80 0x34
|
||
|
||
Liberty Virus [Liberty]:
|
||
0xe8 0xfd 0xfe 0x72 0x2a 0x3b 0xc1 0x7c
|
||
0x27 0xe8
|
||
|
||
Fish Virus [Fish]:
|
||
0x0e 0x01 0xcf 0xe8 0x00 0x00 0x5b 0x81
|
||
0xeb 0xa9
|
||
|
||
Shake Virus [Shake]:
|
||
0x31 0xd2 0x8b 0xca 0xcd 0x21 0x3d 0x00
|
||
0xf0 0x73
|
||
|
||
Murphy Virus [Murphy]:
|
||
0x81 0x7c 0xfe 0x2e 0x43 0x75 0xed 0xb8
|
||
0x02 0x3d
|
||
|
||
V800 Virus [V800]:
|
||
0x51 0xad 0x33 0xd0 0xe2 0xfb 0x59 0x31
|
||
0x15 0x47
|
||
|
||
Kennedy Virus [Kennedy]:
|
||
0x8c 0x55 0x02 0xb8 0x01 0x43 0x33 0xc9
|
||
0xcd 0x21
|
||
|
||
Yankee Two Virus [Doodle2]:
|
||
0x73 0x03 0x5a 0x5e 0xc3 0x8b 0xf2 0xf6
|
||
0x44 0x15
|
||
|
||
1971 Virus [1971]:
|
||
0x33 0xd2 0xb8 0x00 0x42 0xcd 0x21 0x72
|
||
0x26 0x81 0x7c
|
||
|
||
June 16th Virus [June16]:
|
||
0x4d 0xa9 0xa5 0x2e 0x70 0x66 0x2e 0x57
|
||
0x09 0x0f
|
||
|
||
AIDS II Virus [A2]:
|
||
0xa4 0x00 0x55 0x89 0xe5 0x81 0xec 0x02
|
||
0x02 0xbf 0xca 0x05 0x0e 0x57 0xbf 0x3e
|
||
0x01
|
||
|
||
1210 Virus [1210]:
|
||
0xc4 0x74 0xf0 0x2e 0x80 0x3e 0x2f 0x04
|
||
0x01 0x75
|
||
|
||
1720 Virus [1720]:
|
||
0xd8 0x2e 0xa1 0x2c 0x00 0xa3 0xfc 0x03
|
||
0x2e 0xa0
|
||
|
||
Saturday 14th Virus [Sat14]:
|
||
0x0e 0x1f 0xb8 0x24 0x35 0xcd 0x21 0x8c
|
||
0x06 0x6f
|
||
|
||
XA1 (1539) Christmas Virus [XA1]:
|
||
0xfa 0x8b 0xec 0x58 0x32 0xc0 0x89 0x46
|
||
0x02 0x81
|
||
|
||
1392 (Amoeba) Virus [1392]:
|
||
0x16 0xa3 0x21 0x01 0x8b 0x44 0x14 0xa3
|
||
0x23 0x01
|
||
|
||
Vcomm Virus [Vcomm]:
|
||
0x77 0x02 0xb9 0x20 0x00 0xb4 0x4e 0xcd
|
||
0x21
|
||
|
||
ItaVir Virus [Ita]:
|
||
0xb8 0x58 0x45 0x89 0x40 0x02 0xb0 0x00
|
||
0x88 0x40 0x04
|
||
|
||
Korea Virus [Korea]:
|
||
0x8e 0xd0 0xbc 0xf0 0xff 0xfb 0xbb 0x13
|
||
0x04
|
||
|
||
Solano Virus [Solano]:
|
||
0x12 0x75 0x0e 0x2e 0x8b 0x0e 0x03 0x01
|
||
|
||
V2000 Virus [2000]:
|
||
0x51 0xe8 0x39 0xfd 0x8e 0xc3 0x26 0x8b
|
||
|
||
12 Tricks Trojan [Tricks]:
|
||
0x64 0x02 0x31 0x94 0x42 0x01 0xd1 0xc2
|
||
0x4e 0x79 0xf7
|
||
|
||
12 Tricks Trojan [Tricks-B]:
|
||
0xe4 0x61 0x8a 0xe0 0x0c 0x80 0xe6 0x61
|
||
|
||
1559 Virus [1559]:
|
||
0x03 0x26 0x89 0x1e 0x92 0x00 0xfb 0xc3
|
||
0x50 0x53 0x51 0x52 0x06
|
||
|
||
512 Virus [512]:
|
||
0x01 0x8c 0x45 0x70 0x1f 0x89 0x57 0x14
|
||
0x8c 0xca 0x8e 0xda
|
||
|
||
EDV Virus [EDV]:
|
||
0x75 0x1c 0x80 0xfe 0x01 0x75 0x17 0x5b
|
||
0x07 0x1f 0x58 0x83
|
||
|
||
Icelandic-3 Virus [Ice-3]:
|
||
0x24 0x2e 0x8f 0x06 0x3b 0x03 0x90 0x2e
|
||
0x8f 0x06
|
||
|
||
Perfume Virus [Fume]:
|
||
0x04 0x06 0xbf 0xba 0x00 0x57 0xcb 0x0e
|
||
0x1f 0x8e 0x06
|
||
|
||
Joker Virus [Joke]:
|
||
0x56 0x07 0x45 0x07 0x21 0x07 0x1d 0x49
|
||
0x27 0x6d 0x20 0x73 0x6f 0x20 0x6d 0x75
|
||
0x63
|
||
|
||
Virus-101 [101]:
|
||
0xb3 0x01 0xb4 0x36 0x70 0xb7 0x01 0xb4
|
||
0x36 0x70 0x8b 0x37 0xb4 0x36 0x70 0xb3
|
||
0x03 0xb4 0x36 0x70 0x03 0xf3 0xb4
|
||
|
||
Halloechen Virus [Hal]:
|
||
0x8c 0xd0 0x8b 0xd4 0xbc 0x02 0x00 0x36
|
||
0x8b 0x0e
|
||
|
||
Taiwan Virus [Taiwan]:
|
||
0x8a 0x0e 0x95 0x00 0x81 0xe1 0xfe 0x00
|
||
0xba 0x9e
|
||
|
||
Oropax Virus [Oro]:
|
||
0x3e 0x01 0x1d 0xf2 0x77 0xd1 0xba 0x00
|
||
|
||
Chaos Virus [Chaos]:
|
||
0xa1 0x49 0x43 0x68 0x41 0x4f 0x53 0x50
|
||
0x52 0x51 0xe8
|
||
|
||
4096 Virus [4096]:
|
||
0xf6 0x2e 0x8f 0x06 0x41 0x12 0x2e 0x8f
|
||
0x06 0x43
|
||
|
||
Virus-90 [90]:
|
||
0x81 0xb8 0xfe 0xff 0x8e 0xd8 0x2d 0xcc
|
||
|
||
AIDS Information Trojan [Aids]:
|
||
0x31 0x30 0x30 0x2c 0x36 0x32 0x2c 0x33
|
||
0x32 0x00
|
||
|
||
Devil's Dance Virus [Dance]:
|
||
0x5e 0x1e 0x06 0x8c 0xc0 0x48 0x8e 0xc0
|
||
0x26
|
||
|
||
Amstrad Virus [Amst]:
|
||
0x72 0x02 0xeb 0x36 0x76 0xba 0x80 0x00
|
||
0xb4 0x1a 0xcd 0x21 0x80 0x3e
|
||
|
||
Datacrime II-b Virus [Crime-2B]:
|
||
0x2e 0x8a 0x07 0x32 0xc2 0xd0 0xca 0x2e
|
||
|
||
Holland Girl Virus [Holland]:
|
||
0x36 0x03 0x01 0x33 0xc9 0x33 0xc0 0xac
|
||
|
||
Do Nothing Virus [Nothing]:
|
||
0x72 0x04 0x50 0xeb 0x07 0x90 0xb4 0x4c
|
||
|
||
Lisbon Virus [Lisb]:
|
||
0x8b 0x44 0x79 0x3d 0x0a 0x00 0x72 0xde
|
||
|
||
Sunday Virus [Sunday]:
|
||
0x75 0x10 0x07 0x2e 0x8e 0x16 0x45 0x00
|
||
0x2e 0x8b
|
||
|
||
Typo COM virus [Typo]:
|
||
0x99 0xfe 0x26 0xa1 0x5a 0x00 0x2e 0x89
|
||
|
||
DBASE Virus [Dbase]:
|
||
0x80 0xfc 0x6c 0x74 0xea 0x80 0xfc 0x5b
|
||
0x74 0xe5
|
||
|
||
Ghost Virus :
|
||
0x90 0xea 0x59 0xec 0x00 0xf0 0x90 0x90
|
||
|
||
Jerusalem Virus Strain B [Jeru]:
|
||
0x47 0x00 0x33 0xc0 0x8e 0xc0 0x26 0xa1
|
||
0xfc 0x03
|
||
|
||
Alabama Virus [Alabama]:
|
||
0x8f 0x06 0x18 0x05 0x26 0x8f 0x06 0x1a
|
||
|
||
1701/1704 Virus - Version B [170X]:
|
||
0x31 0x34 0x31 0x24 0x46 0x4c
|
||
|
||
Datacrime Virus [Crime]:
|
||
0x36 0x01 0x01 0x83 0xee 0x03 0x8b 0xc6
|
||
0x3d 0x00
|
||
|
||
Stoned Virus [Stoned]:
|
||
0x00 0x53 0x51 0x52 0x06 0x56 0x57 0xbe
|
||
|
||
Vacsina virus [Vacs]:
|
||
0xb8 0x01 0x43 0x8e 0x5e 0x0e 0x8b 0x56
|
||
0x06 0x2e
|
||
|
||
Den Zuk Virus :
|
||
0x8e 0xc0 0xbe 0xc6 0x7c 0xbf 0x00 0x7e
|
||
|
||
Ping Pong Virus (old string):
|
||
0x59 0x5b 0x58 0x07 0x1f 0xea
|
||
|
||
Pakistani Brain Virus [Brain]:
|
||
0x8e 0xd8 0x8e 0xd0 0xbc 0x00 0xf0 0xfb
|
||
0xa0 0x06
|
||
|
||
Yale/Alameda Virus [Alameda]:
|
||
0xb4 0x00 0xcd 0x13 0x72 0x0d 0xb8 0x01
|
||
|
||
Lehigh Virus [Lehigh]:
|
||
0x5e 0x83 0xee 0x03 0x8b 0xde 0x81 0xeb
|
||
0x91 0x01
|
||
|
||
Pakistani Brain/Ashar Virus [Brain]:
|
||
0x20 0x8c 0xc8 0x8e 0xd8 0x8e 0xd0
|
||
|
||
Fu Manchu Virus - Version A [Fu]:
|
||
0x26 0xc7 0x06 0xfc 0x03 0xf3 0xa4 0x26
|
||
0xc6 0x06
|
||
|
||
Ping Pong Virus - Version B [Ping]:
|
||
0@xa1 0@xf5 0x81 0@xa3 0@xf5 0x7d 0x8b 0x36
|
||
0xf9 0x81
|
||
|
||
1536 (Zero Bug) Virus [Zero]:
|
||
0xeb 0x2b 0x90 0x5a 0x45 0xcd 0x60 0x2e
|
||
|
||
Vienna (DOS 62) Virus - Version B [Vienna]:
|
||
0x8b 0@xfe 0x36 0x6f 0xc7 0x1f 0x36 0x6f
|
||
0x8b 0@xde 0x36 0x6f 0xc6 0x1f
|
||
|
||
Ghost Version of DOS-62 [Ghost-C]:
|
||
0x8e 0xd8 0@xa1 0x13 0x04 0x2d 0x02 0x00
|
||
0x90 0xa3 0x13
|
||
|
||
Friday 13th Virus [@Fri13]:
|
||
0xb4 0x4f 0xcd 0x21 0x73 0@xf7 0x58
|
||
|
||
405 virus [405]:
|
||
0x19 0xcd 0x21 0x26 0xa2 0x49 0x02 0xb4
|
||
0x47 0x04 0x01 0x50
|
||
|
||
3066/2930 Traceback Virus [3066]:
|
||
0x14 0x8b 0x4d 0x16 0x8b 0xc1 0x8a 0xcd
|
||
|
||
Pentagon Virus :
|
||
0xeb 0x34 0x90 0x48 0x41 0x4c 0x20 0x20
|
||
|
||
Israeli Boot Virus:
|
||
0xcd 0x13 0xb8 0x02 0x02 0xb9 0x06 0x27
|
||
0xba 0x00 0x01
|
||
|
||
Typo Boot Virus:
|
||
0x24 0x13 0x55 0xaa
|
||
|
||
Datacrime-2 Virus [Crime-2]:
|
||
0x8a 0x94 0x03 0x01 0x8d 0xbc 0x29 0x01
|
||
0x8d 0x8c 0xea 0x06
|
||
|
||
Ohio Virus:
|
||
0xeb 0x29 0x90 0x49 0x34 0x12 0x00 0x01
|
||
0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
|
||
|
||
3551 (Syslock) Virus [Syslock]:
|
||
0x33 0x06 0x14 0x00 0x31 0x04 0x46 0x46
|
||
0xe2 0xf2
|
||
|
||
Dark Avenger virus [Dav]:
|
||
0xa1 0x4f 0x07 0x89 0x07 0x2e 0xa1 0x51
|
||
|
||
MIX1/Icelandic Virus [Ice]:
|
||
0x43 0x81 0x3f 0x45 0x58 0x75 0xf1 0xb8
|
||
0x00 0x43
|
||
|
||
Disk Killer Virus [Killer]:
|
||
0xc3 0x10 0xe2 0xf2 0xc6 0x06 0xf3 0x01
|
||
0xff 0x90 0xeb 0x55
|
||
|
||
AIDS Virus [Taunt]:
|
||
0x42 0xe8 0xef 0xe3 0xbf 0xca 0x03 0x1e
|
||
|
||
Yankee Doodle Virus [Doodle]:
|
||
0x35 0xcd 0x21 0x8b 0xf3 0x8c 0xc7
|
||
|
||
Suriv A Virus [SurivA]:
|
||
0x90 0x73 0x55 0x52 0x49 0x56 0x00
|
||
|
||
Suriv B Virus [SurivB]:
|
||
0x00 0x73 0x55 0x52 0x49 0x56 0x00
|
||
|
||
]============================================================================[
|
||
--
|
||
...uunet!underg!tsf!gnr (GodNet Raider)
|
||
-=[ "Information is the greatest weapon of power to the modern wizard." ]=-
|
||
-=[ "You gotta learn to listen, before you learn to play." ]=-
|
||
|
||
[ Editor's note: This was recently posted to alt.hackers, and comp.viruses
|
||
and is republished for those who missed it, or do not have access to Usenet,
|
||
and for archival purposes. A more devious mind could think of all sorts of
|
||
fun using this information, like fake virus programs, etc. The scan
|
||
signatures themselves are not dangerous.]
|
||
|
||
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
##############################################################################
|
||
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Phun With Character Codes
|
||
by The BBC
|
||
|
||
Sunny day... Bringing the clouds your way... On your way to where
|
||
the minds aren't clean.......... Can you tell us how to get... How
|
||
to get to Hackers street... How to get to Hackers street... How to
|
||
get to Hackers street.........
|
||
|
||
Today on Hackers street... We learn about the control letters...
|
||
S... and G... An the number....... 0....
|
||
|
||
Hello kiddies, An what a dreary day in the neighborhood... [Oops
|
||
sorry wrong show]..... Well any way welcome to Hackers street... We
|
||
are your good friends The BBC... Today we thought.... Why look there
|
||
is Big Hackbird, an he looks depressed, lets find out why...
|
||
|
||
Hackbird Why so down... 'Well BBC it seems that all the
|
||
users\sysop stoped using ANSI [AAAAHHHHHHHH] on their systems'...
|
||
'Now I can't make problem messages'... 'What is a Hackbird to do'...
|
||
Never fear, Hackbird, The BBC is here... Have we ever let you down
|
||
before??? 'Well yes, there was that time you dropped me and a short
|
||
sysop from the world trade center to prove that all objects fall at
|
||
the same rate on last weeks show and...' [Smack] Well anyway...
|
||
|
||
So today then we will learn [Thanks to the new feature of some
|
||
boards that let users [and hackers] upload messages using protocols
|
||
other than ascii]... Yes now you can imbed into messages special
|
||
chars. that can not be typed in, in some cases... Three of which
|
||
are... ^G, ^S, and the null char. [0x00]... An what nasty little
|
||
things they could be used for... Not that We would even suggest
|
||
such things...
|
||
|
||
First we will talk about ^G [0x07] better know as the bell
|
||
char.... 'Me, know about bell. Noisy, don't like'... 'But it bother
|
||
ears to put in and some boards don't take'... 'An what is few beep
|
||
anyway'...That is true Crashy monster... But, Remember there are now
|
||
boards that let us upload large messages... An we are no longer
|
||
talking a few beeps but instead a few thousand beeps... For till a
|
||
paused is reached [80 * 24 or 1920 chars. in some cases] a person
|
||
must listen to our lil' musical... Crash in 'c' minor... 'Yes, me
|
||
see... Me like, me like'... Well if you liked that you will love
|
||
what comes next... But first would like to help us test something...
|
||
'Ya, Ya what... New Virus, Trojan, Password cracker'... No just this
|
||
new trap door and spiked pit... 'What spiked... AHHHHHHHHhhhhhh
|
||
[Splat]'...
|
||
|
||
'Yes, this is Kermit t. Protocol reporting from BBC labs'...
|
||
Today they are hard at work with their new toy ^S [0x13]...
|
||
'Professor BBC tell us about this ^S'... Well lil' green buddy it is
|
||
the infamous Xoff char.... It is used to signal the remote not to
|
||
send anymore chars. till a ^Q [0x11 (Xon)] is received... What this
|
||
will do is make the caller think his keyboard is locked for what he
|
||
types is not sent... Ohhhh if they have any brains they will hit
|
||
the ^Q manually but don't expect much... An to put a few of these
|
||
in a message will cause a bit of a problem... An the quote features
|
||
will carry them forward as well.. 'That is nice, what else is BBC
|
||
labs working on'... We are glad you asked... We have branched out
|
||
into the realm of comedy... Like over here is out latest joke... How
|
||
would you like to be part of this great experiment kermy... 'Well I
|
||
guess... what the blender for?'... Ok, Ready... What is green and
|
||
red n' goes 120 MPH... 'I don't know... Hey! What are you doing...'
|
||
.. Kermit t. Protocol in a blender... [BUZZZZZZZZZZZ]
|
||
'Ahhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh...
|
||
|
||
Finally kiddies, Grover the pirate will help us with... 'Yes! I
|
||
Grover the pirate will help the BBC with their talk about...'
|
||
Groovy... Now, you want to be in next weeks show, right... 'Well
|
||
yes.. but why wouldn't I'... Well you could meet with a nasty
|
||
mishap... 'What kind of mishap?'... Well like someone could hit this
|
||
rope with a knife [Snap]... 'So'... Well that rope supported a 16
|
||
ton weight over your head... 'What 16 to....[Splat]'... Now kids we
|
||
hope you learned from this, an remember never play with knives near
|
||
ropes attached to 16 ton weights... Well now that we will not be
|
||
bothered... The Null char. [0x00] is a funny little thing in that
|
||
some BBS software will not send it in ansii mode... So you ask what
|
||
good is a char. like that... Well there may come the time you need a
|
||
timer... a way to make the host wait a few seconds after sending a
|
||
group of chars. like an Attention signal [in most cases '+++']...
|
||
For to get a message to the host modem you must sent an attention
|
||
signal then wait about 3 seconds before sending the hangup command
|
||
[ATH0] to have the users session bail out in mid message... Of
|
||
course you will have to send about 5 pages worth [no line returns]
|
||
of this char. to get the right delay... But thank to the non ascii
|
||
upload method this will be easy... An we would hope you will not use
|
||
this to send an hangup followed by a call command to a 900 number...
|
||
That would be most evil... An you may grow up to be scum like...
|
||
|
||
The BBC
|
||
----------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
...uunet!underg!tsf!bbc (The BBC)
|
||
-=[ "Anarchy is never HAVING to say you're sorry." ]=-
|
||
----------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
##############################################################################
|
||
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
To: hackers@underg.UUCP
|
||
Subject: All I want is to be is in DFP #3
|
||
From: hardrock@underg.UUCP (hard rock)
|
||
Date: Wed, 15 Apr 92 18:13:56 EDT
|
||
Organization: Underground Computing Foundation
|
||
|
||
******************************************************************
|
||
** WAY TO READ OTHER PEOPLE'S MAIL ON TELEGARD BBS! **
|
||
******************************************************************
|
||
|
||
Well a friend of yours or maybe a enemy, well who ever this person
|
||
is, is a regular caller of the BBS type Telegard v2.7. You out of
|
||
normal curious nature, would like to know what he is writing about
|
||
to the other babes on the system. Well a couple of ways can be
|
||
used, some legal some not:
|
||
|
||
A) Break into the sysop's house when he/she is at work, or on
|
||
vacation and just reading, hoping the neighbors didn't hear
|
||
you use TNT to break down the door. This method can be
|
||
somewhat dangerous, but still possible.
|
||
|
||
B) Find out the working schedule of the sysop and when he/she is
|
||
not home, spend it trying to hack out the privileged accounts.
|
||
This could get kind of boring or tiring after a while. Also,
|
||
if you are a *real* hacker, you live on pizza and chips. Well
|
||
the chip company and local pizza joint will be getting a lot
|
||
of your drug money.
|
||
|
||
C) Use the method I am going to tell you. Can be a little tedious,
|
||
if you want to read a lot of mail from different users.
|
||
|
||
D) And any other scummy forms of hacking.
|
||
|
||
Well, I feel the most logical one is 'C'. Well to get down to how
|
||
to do it, first you must find out the full alias used by the
|
||
victim. For example: Let me pick a name randomly out of my head,
|
||
well how about 'TWO FACE'. Hey, no booing allowed!!! What I
|
||
mean by FULL ALIAS, is don't try it will TWO or 2FACE, basically
|
||
use that thing between your ears. With this name, you would try
|
||
to log on as 'TWO FACE2' or 'TWO FACE1'. The object is to make
|
||
sure a character follows the real name. It will allow you to log
|
||
on, after the logon, go to the message section and start reading.
|
||
|
||
The reason this works is because, simple: In the message section
|
||
the computer looks at the first message FROM:Peter Pan TO:Killer
|
||
Bee. Your name, TWO FACE2, doesn't start with a P or a K so it
|
||
skips that message. The next message it looks at, FROM:Amy Lowell
|
||
TO:TWO FACE. The 'T''W''O'' ''F''A''C''E'' is all equal. It
|
||
allows you to read it. It doesn't check to see that you have a
|
||
extra character.
|
||
|
||
Well enjoy, this small but useful hack. I will be reporting if
|
||
this works on other BBS systems. Maybe, PCBoard has a small error
|
||
like this. (c)1992 Hard Rock
|
||
|
||
|
||
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * NOTE * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
|
||
I am NOT in any way responsible for you getting you ass screwed
|
||
because you attempt to mess around with some local subscription
|
||
system. Don't say to the sysop or cops, well it was HARD ROCK,
|
||
yeah that dude who wrote the document. LAST TIME: THIS IS FOR
|
||
INFORMATION USE ONLY!!!
|
||
|
||
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
##############################################################################
|
||
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
The NNSC Info Server
|
||
by Max Cray
|
||
|
||
The National Science Foundation Network Service Center (NNSC) operates
|
||
the Info-Server for the purpose of providing important Internet
|
||
documents by email.
|
||
|
||
To order the help document, Send a message to info-server@nnsc.nsf.net.
|
||
The Subject field does not matter and may be omitted. Place the
|
||
following text in the body of the message:
|
||
|
||
request: info
|
||
topic: help
|
||
|
||
|
||
For example, this document can be obtained from this service:
|
||
|
||
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
NETWORK PROVIDER REFERRAL LIST
|
||
NSF Network Service Center (NNSC)
|
||
13 April 1992
|
||
|
||
The NSF Network Service Center (NNSC) often receives the initial calls from
|
||
sites wishing to connect to the Internet. The NNSC refers such callers to
|
||
the appropriate contacts for any networks which might be able to serve them.
|
||
The current list of contacts used by NNSC for this purpose follows. If you
|
||
have any updates or corrections to this information, please send a message
|
||
to nnsc@nnsc.nsf.net.
|
||
|
||
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
Network Service Area
|
||
Contact Name Phone Number Mail Address
|
||
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
Providers Based in the United States of America
|
||
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Alternet US and International
|
||
UUNET (800) 4UUNET3 alternet-info@uunet.uu.net
|
||
|
||
ANS US and International
|
||
Joel Maloff (313) 663-7610 maloff@nis.ans.net
|
||
|
||
BARRNET Bay Area, California (CA)
|
||
William Yundt (415) 723-3104 gd.why@forsythe.stanford.edu
|
||
|
||
CERFnet Western US and International
|
||
CERFnet Hotline (800) 876-2373 help@cerf.net
|
||
|
||
CICnet Midwest US (MN, WI, IA, IN, IL, MI, OH)
|
||
John Hankins (313) 998-6102 hankins@cic.net
|
||
|
||
CO Supernet Colorado (CO)
|
||
Ken Harmon (303) 273-3475 kharmon@csn.org
|
||
|
||
CONCERT North Carolina (NC)
|
||
Joe Ragland (919) 248-1404 jrr@concert.net
|
||
|
||
International Connections Manager (ICM) International
|
||
Robert Collet (703) 904-2230 rcollet@icm1.icp.net
|
||
|
||
INet Indiana (IN)
|
||
Dick Ellis (812) 855-4240 ellis@ucs.indiana.edu
|
||
|
||
JVNCnet US and International
|
||
Sergio Heker (800) 35TIGER market@jvnc.net
|
||
Allison Pihl
|
||
|
||
Los Nettos Los Angeles Area (CA)
|
||
Ann Westine Cooper (213) 822-1511 los-nettos-request@isi.edu
|
||
|
||
MichNet/Merit Michigan (MI)
|
||
Jeff Ogden (313) 764-9430 jogden@merit.edu
|
||
|
||
MIDnet Mid US (NE, OK, AR, MO, IA, KS, SD)
|
||
Dale Finkelson (402) 472-5032 dmf@westie.unl.edu
|
||
|
||
MRnet Minnesota (MN)
|
||
Dennis Fazio (612) 342-2570 dfazio@mr.net
|
||
|
||
MSEN Michigan (MI)
|
||
Owen Medd (313) 741-1120 info@msen.com
|
||
|
||
NEARnet Northeastern US (ME NH VT CT RI MA)
|
||
John Curran (617) 873-8730 nearnet-staff@nic.near.net
|
||
|
||
netILLINOIS Illinois (IL)
|
||
Joel L. Hartman (309) 677-3100 joel@bradley.bradley.edu
|
||
|
||
NevadaNet Nevada (NV)
|
||
Don Zitter (702) 784-6133 zitter@nevada.edu
|
||
|
||
NorthwestNet Northwestern US (WA OR ID MT ND WY AK)
|
||
Eric Hood (206) 562-3000 ehood@nwnet.net
|
||
|
||
NYSERnet New York (NY)
|
||
Jim Luckett (315) 443-4120 info@nysernet.org
|
||
|
||
OARnet Ohio (OH)
|
||
Alison Brown (614) 292-8100 alison@oar.net
|
||
|
||
PACCOM Hawaii (HI) and Australia, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Hong Kong
|
||
Torben Nielsen (808) 956-3499 torben@hawaii.edu
|
||
|
||
PREPnet Pennsylvania (PA)
|
||
Thomas Bajzek (412) 268-7870 twb+@andrew.cmu.edu
|
||
|
||
PSCNET Eastern US (PA, OH, WV)
|
||
Eugene Hastings (412) 268-4960 pscnet-admin@psc.edu
|
||
|
||
PSINet US and International
|
||
PSI, Inc. (800) 82PSI82 info@psi.com
|
||
|
||
Sesquinet Texas (TX)
|
||
Farrell Gerbode (713) 527-4988 farrell@rice.edu
|
||
|
||
SDSCnet San Diego Area (CA)
|
||
Paul Love (619) 534-5043 loveep@sds.sdsc.edu
|
||
|
||
SURAnet Southeastern US (WV, VA, SC, NC, TN, KY, LA, MS, AL, GA, FL)
|
||
Jack Hahn (301) 982-4600 hahn@sura.net
|
||
|
||
THEnet Texas (TX)
|
||
Tracy LaQuey Parker (512) 471-2444 tracy@utexas.edu
|
||
|
||
VERnet Virginia (VA)
|
||
James Jokl (804) 924-0616 jaj@virginia.edu
|
||
|
||
Westnet Western US (AZ, CO, ID, NM, UT, WY)
|
||
Pat Burns (303) 491-7260 pburns@yuma.acns.colostate.edu
|
||
|
||
WiscNet Wisconsin (WI)
|
||
Tad Pinkerton (608) 262-8874 tad@cs.wisc.edu
|
||
|
||
WVNET West Virginia (WV)
|
||
Harper Grimm (304) 293-5192 cc011041@wvnvms.wvnet.edu
|
||
|
||
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
Providers Based Outside the United States of America
|
||
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
AARNet Australia
|
||
AARNet Support +61 6 249 3385 aarnet@aarnet.edu.au
|
||
|
||
UKnet United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
|
||
UKnet Support +44-227-475497 postmaster@uknet.ac.uk
|
||
|
||
EUnet Europe, CIS-region, and Northern Africa
|
||
EUnet Support +31 20 592-5124 glenn@eu.net
|
||
|
||
|
||
--------
|
||
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
##############################################################################
|
||
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Well folks, thats all for DFP #3. Information needed for future articles:
|
||
|
||
1. Hacker and Computer Underground Resources: Magazines, Journals, BBSes,
|
||
Archives, etc. If you have any information to share please e-mail
|
||
complete details to hackers%underg@uunet.uu.net. The information
|
||
will be summarized in a future article.
|
||
|
||
2. E-Mail addresses of famous people. If you know of any e-mail addresses
|
||
of famous people please e-mail them. All sources will be kept
|
||
confidential. If you are a famous person, and do not want to be on
|
||
the list please send e-mail (heheh).
|
||
|
||
Keep that e-mail coming!
|
||
|
||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||
-= Max Cray =-
|
||
Internet: underg!max@uunet.uu.net Support
|
||
UUCP: ...!uunet!underg!max Free
|
||
Data: The Underground Computing Foundation BBS Software
|
||
401-847-2603 -=- 9600 baud (v.32) (w/src)
|
||
CI$: 76334,2203
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|