918 lines
41 KiB
Plaintext
918 lines
41 KiB
Plaintext
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Computer underground Digest Sun Jan 18, 1998 Volume 10 : Issue 04
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ISSN 1004-042X
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Editor: Jim Thomas (cudigest@sun.soci.niu.edu)
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News Editor: Gordon Meyer (gmeyer@sun.soci.niu.edu)
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Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
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Shadow Master: Stanton McCandlish
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Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
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Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
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Ian Dickinson
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Field Agent Extraordinaire: David Smith
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Cu Digest Homepage: http://www.soci.niu.edu/~cudigest
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CONTENTS, #10.04 (Sun, Jan 18, 1998)
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File 1--IP: New Internet Regulations Codify PRC Internet Practice
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File 2--"Underground", Suelette Dreyfus
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File 3--"MS Sucks...."
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File 4--Re: More on "Microsoft Evil?"
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File 5--Contribution In response to "Is Microsoft Evil"
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File 6--Review - Privacy on the Line. The Politics of Wiretapping...
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File 7--Another UNICEF/Mitnick story
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File 8--Eff announces Barry Steinhardt to BoD
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File 9--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 7 May, 1997)
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CuD ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL, AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION APPEARS IN
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THE CONCLUDING FILE AT THE END OF EACH ISSUE.
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---------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: Tue, 6 Jan 1998 15:47:06 -0800
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From: "(--Todd Lappin-->)" <telstar@wired.com>
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Subject: File 1--IP: New Internet Regulations Codify PRC Internet Practice
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Source - fight-censorship@vorlon.mit.edu
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Forwarded from Dave Farber... the full text of the new Chinese regulations
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are included. My favorites:
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(5) Making falsehoods or distorting the truth, spreading rumors, destroying
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the order of society;
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(6) Promoting feudal superstitions, sexually suggestive material, gambling,
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violence, murder,
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(8) Injuring the reputation of state organs;
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--Todd-->
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New Regulations Codify PRC Internet Practice
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On December 30, 1997, the Ministry of Public Security promulgated the
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Regulations on the Security and Management of Computer Information Networks
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and the Internet [Jisuanji Xinxi Wangluo Lianwang Anquan Baohu Guanli
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Banfa]. The State Council approved these new regulations on December 11,
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1997. The new regulations appear to be much more a codification of existing
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practice than an important departure in the management of computer
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information networks in China. The new regulations are more detailed than
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the "PRC Temporary Regulations on Computer Information Network and Internet
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Management" and "Notice on Strengthening the Management of Computer
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Information Network and Internet Registration Information" both of February
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1996 and the "Temporary Regulations on Electronic Publishing" of March 1996.
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.
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The new December 1997 regulations as well as earlier PRC regulations on the
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Internet and electronic puiblishing are to be found in GB-encoded Chinese
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text listed on the web page at <http://www.edu.cn/law>http://www.edu.cn/law
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The full Chinese text of the new regulations are to be found at
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<http://www.edu.cn/law/glbf.html>http://www.edu.cn/law/glbf.html The new
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regulations are translated in full
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below.
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--------------------------------------------------
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Computer Information Network and Internet Security, Protection and
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Management Regulations
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(Approved by the State Council on December 11 1997 and promulgated by the
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Ministry of Public Security on December 30, 1997)
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Chapter One Comprehensive Regulations
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Section One -- In order to strengthen the security and the protection of
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computer information networks and of the Internet, and to preserve the
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social order and social stability, these regulations have been established
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on the basis of the "PRC Computer Information Network Protection
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Regulations", the "PRC Temporary Regulations on Computer Information
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Networks and the Internet" and other laws and administrative regulations.
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Section Two -- The security, protection and management of all computer
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information networks within the borders of the PRC fall under these
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regulations.
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Section Three -- The computer management and supervision organization of the
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Ministry of Public Security is responsible for the security, protection and
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management of computer information networks and the Internet. The Computer
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Management and Supervision organization of the Ministry of Public Security
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should protect the public security of computer information networks and the
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Internet as well as protect the legal rights of Internet service providing
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units and individuals as well as the public interest.
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Section Four -- No unit or individual may use the Internet to harm national
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security, disclose state secrets, harm the interests of the State, of
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society or of a group, the legal rights of citizens, or to take part in
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criminal activities.
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Section Five -- No unit or individual may use the Internet to create,
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replicate, retrieve, or transmit the following kinds of information:
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(1) Inciting to resist or breaking the Constitution or laws or the
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implementation of administrative regulations;
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(2) Inciting to overthrow the government or the socialist system;
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(3) Inciting division of the country, harming national unification;
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(4) Inciting hatred or discrimination among nationalities or harming the
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unity of the nationalities;
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(5) Making falsehoods or distorting the truth, spreading rumors, destroying
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the order of society;
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(6) Promoting feudal superstitions, sexually suggestive material, gambling,
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violence, murder,
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(7) Terrorism or inciting others to criminal activity; openly insulting
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other people or distorting the truth to slander people;
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(8) Injuring the reputation of state organs;
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(9) Other activities against the Constitution, laws or administrative
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regulations.
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Section Six No unit or individual may engage in the following activities
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which harm the security of computer information networks:
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(1) No-one may use computer networks or network resources without getting
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proper prior approval
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(2) No-one may without prior permission may change network functions or
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to add or delete information
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(3) No-one may without prior permission add to, delete, or alter
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materials stored, processed or being transmitted through the network.
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(4) No-one may deliberately create or transmit viruses.
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(5) Other activities which harm the network are also prohibited.
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Section Seven The freedom and privacy of network users is protected by law.
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No unit or individual may, in violation of these regulations, use the
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Internet to violate the freedom and privacy of network users.
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Chapter 2 Responsibility for Security and Protection
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Section 8 Units and individuals engaged in Internet business must accept the
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security supervision, inspection, and guidance of the Public Security
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organization. This includes providing to the Public Security organization
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information, materials and digital document, and assisting the Public
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Security organization to discover and properly handle incidents involving
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law violations and criminal activities involving computer information
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networks.
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Section 9 The supervisory section or supervisory units of units which
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provide service through information network gateways through which
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information is imported and exported and connecting network units should,
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according to the law and relevant state regulations assume responsibility
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for the Internet network gateways as well as the security, protection, and
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management of the subordinate networks.
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Section 10 Connecting network units, entry point units and corporations that
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use computer information networks and the Internet and other organizations
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must assume the following responsibilities for network security and
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protection:
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(1) Assume responsibility for network security, protection and management
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and establish a thoroughly secure, protected and well managed network.
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(2) Carry out technical measures for network security and protection. Ensure
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network operational security and information security.
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(3) Assume responsibility for the security education and training of network
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users
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(4) Register units and individuals to whom information is provided. Provide
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information according to the stipulations of article five.
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(5) Establish a system for registering the users of electronic bulletin
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board systems on the computer information network as well as a system for
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managing bulletin board information.
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(6) If a violation of articles four, five, six or seven is discovered than
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an unaltered record of the violation should be kept and reported to the
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local Public Security organization.
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(7) According to the relevant State regulations, remove from the network and
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address, directory or server which has content in violation of article five.
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Section 11 The network user should fill out a user application form when
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applying for network services. The format of this application form is
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determined by Public Security.
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Section 12 Connecting network units, entry point units, and corporations
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that use computer information networks and the Internet and other
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organizations (including connecting network units that are inter-provincial,
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autonomous region, municipalities directly under the Central Government or
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the branch organization of these units) should, within 30 days of the
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opening of network connection, carry out the proper registration procedures
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with a unit designated by the Public Security organization of the
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provincial, autonomous region, or municipality directly under the Central
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Government peoples' government.
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The units mentioned above have the responsibility to report for the record
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to the local public security organization information on the units and
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individuals which have connections to the network. The units must also
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report in a timely manner to Public Security organization any changes in the
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information about units or individuals using the network.
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Section 13 People who register public accounts should strengthen their
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management of the account and establish an account registration system.
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Accounts may not be lent or transferred.
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Section 14 Whenever units involved in matters such as national affairs,
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economic construction, building the national defense, and advanced science
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and technology are registered, evidence of the approval of the chief
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administrative section should be shown.
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Appropriate measures should be taken to ensure the security and protection
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of the computer information network and Internet network links of the units
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mentioned above.
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Chapter Three Security and Supervision
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Section 15 The provincial, autonomous region or municipal Public Security
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agency or bureau, as well as city and county Public Security organizations
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should have appropriate organizations to ensure the security, protection and
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management of the Internet.
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Section 16 The Public Security organization computer management and
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supervision organization should have information on the connecting network
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units, entry point unit, and users, establish a filing system for this
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information, maintain statistical information on these files and report to
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higher level units as appropriate.
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Section 17 The Public Security computer management and supervision
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organization should have establish a system for ensuring the security,
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protection and good management of the connecting network units, entry point
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unit, and users. The Public Security organization should supervise and
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inspect network security, protection and management and the implementation
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of security measures.
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Section 18 If the Public Security computer management and supervision
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organization discovers an address, directory or server with content in
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violation of section five, then the appropriate units should be notified to
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close or delete it.
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Section 19 The Public Security computer management and supervision
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organization is responsible for pursuing and dealing with illegal computer
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information network activities and criminal cases involving computer
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information networks. Criminal activities in violation of sections four or
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section seven should according to the relevant State regulations, be handed
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over to the relevant department or to the legal system for appropriate
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disposition.
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Chapter Four Legal Responsibility
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Section 20 For violations of law, administrative regulations or of section
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five or section six of these regulations, the Public Security organization
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gives a warning and if there income from illegal activities, confiscates the
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illegal earnings.
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For less serious offenses a fine not to exceed 5000 RMB to individuals and
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15,000 RMB to work units may be assessed.
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For more serious offenses computer and network access can be closed down for
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six months, and if necessary Public Security can suggest that the business
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operating license of the concerned unit or the cancellation of its network
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registration. Management activities that constitute a threat to public order
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can be punished according to provisions of the public security management
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penalties articles. Where crimes have occurred, prosecutions for criminal
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responsibility should be made.
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Section 21 Where one of the activities listed below has occurred, the Public
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Security organization should order that remedial action should be taken with
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a specific period and give a warning; if there has been illegal income, the
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income should be confiscated; if remedial action is not taken within the
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specified period, then a fine of not more than 5000 RMB may be assessed
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against the head of the unit and persons directly under the unit head and a
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fine of not more than 15,000 RMB against the unit; in the case of more
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offenses, the network and equipment can be closed for up to six months. In
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serious cases Public Security may suggest that the business license of the
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organization be canceled and its network registration canceled.
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(1) Not setting up a secure system
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(2) Not implementing security techniques and protection measures
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(3) Not providing security education and training for network users
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(4) Not providing information, materials or electronic documentation needed
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for security, protection and management or providing false information
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(5) For not inspecting the content of information transmitted on behalf of
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someone else or not registering the unit or individual on whose behalf the
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information was transmitted
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(6) Not establishing a system for registering users and managing the
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information of electronic bulletin boards.
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(7) Not removing web addresses and directories or not closing servers
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according to the relevant state regulations.
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(8) Not establishing a system for registering users of public accounts
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(9) Lending or transferring accounts
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Section 22 Violation of section four or section seven of these regulations
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shall be punished according to the relevant laws and regulations.
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Section 23 Violations of section eleven or section twelve of these
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regulations or not fulfilling the responsibility or registering users shall
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be punished by a warning from Public Security or suspending network
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operations for six months.
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Chapter Five Additional Regulations
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Section 24 These regulations should be consulted with regards to the
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implementation of the security, protection and management of computer
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information networks connecting to networks in the Hong Kong Special
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Administrative Region as well as with networks in the Taiwan and Macao
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districts.
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Section 25 These regulations go into effect on the day of promulgation.
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------------------------------
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Date: Tue, 13 Jan 1998 10:17:06 -0800
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From: <Rob.Slade@sprint.ca>
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Subject: File 2--"Underground", Suelette Dreyfus
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BKNDRGND.RVW 970723
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"Underground", Suelette Dreyfus, 1997, 1-86330-595-5, A$19.95
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%A Suelette Dreyfus
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%C 35 Cotham Road, Kew 3101, Australia
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%D 1997
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%G 1-86330-595-5
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%I Reed Books/Mandarin/Random House Australia
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%O A$19.95 +61-2-9550-9207 fax: +61-2-9560-0334
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%O debbie@iaccess.com.au
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%P 475
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%T "Underground"
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This book is yet another gee-whiz look at teenage mutant wannabe-high-
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tech-bandits. The stories revolve around a number of individuals with
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loose links to one particular bulletin board in Melbourne, Australia,
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all engaged in system intrusions and phone phreaking.
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An immediate annoyance is the insistence of the author in referring to
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system breaking as "hacking." ("Cracking" seems to be reserved for
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breaking copy protection on games and other commercial software.) If
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any actual hacking takes place--creative, or otherwise sophisticated,
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use of the technology--it isn't apparent in the book. The
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descriptions of activities are vague, but generally appear to be
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simple "cookbook" uses of known security loopholes. This may not
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accurately reflect the events as they transpired, since the author
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also betrays no depth of technical knowledge, and seems to be willing
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to accept boasting as fact. The bibliography is impressively long
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until you realize that a number of the articles are never used or
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referenced. At which point, you wonder how much material has even
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been read.
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The structure and organization of the book is abrupt and sometimes
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difficult. Social or psychological observations are arbitrarily
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plunked into the middle of descriptions of system exploration, and,
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even though the paucity of dates makes it difficult to be sure, they
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don't appear to be in any chronological sequence, either. Those who
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have studied in the security field will recognize some names and even
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"handles," but the conceit of using only handles for members of the
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"underground" makes it difficult to know how much of the material to
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trust.
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Early chapters foreshadow dire events to overtake "Craig Bowen" and
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Stuart Gill: Bowen never gets mentioned again, and Gill is only
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mentioned twice, peripherally. (In combination with frequent
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allusions to ignorance on the part of law enforcement agencies, one
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might suspect that a kind of Australian version of "The Hacker
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Crackdown" [cf. BKHKCRCK.RVW] was planned, but, if so, it didn't come
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off.)
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The book's attitude is also oddly inconsistent. In places, the
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crackers and phreaks are lauded as brilliant, anti-establishment
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heroes; but, by and large, they are portrayed as unsocialized,
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paranoid, spineless non-entities, who have no life skills beyond a few
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pieces of pseudo-technical knowledge used for playing vicious pranks.
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So thorough is this characterization, that it comes as a total shock
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to find, in the afterword, that not only do these people survive their
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court convictions, but also become important contributing members of
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society.
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The author seems to feel quite free to point fingers in all
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directions. The absurdity of giving "look-see" intruders larger
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prison sentences than thieves or spies is pointed out, but not the
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difficulty of legally proving intent. After repeatedly hinting at
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police incompetence, brutality, and even corruption, the book ends
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with a rather weak statement implying that the situation is getting
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better. The common cracker assertion that if sysadmins don't want
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intruders, then they should secure their systems better, is followed
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up with no discussion of surveys showing only one full-time security
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person per five thousand employees, and only passing mention, by one
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of the ex-intruders, of the extreme difficulty in doing so. Poor
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family situations are used so frequently to justify illegal activities
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that one feels the need to point out that *most* products of "broken"
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homes do *not* become obsessive, paranoid loner criminals!
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It is interesting to see a book written about a non-US scene, and from
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a non-American perspective. Technically and journalistically,
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however, it has numerous problems.
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copyright Robert M. Slade, 1997 BKNDRGND.RVW 970723
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------------------------------
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Date: Wed, 14 Jan 1998 08:16:02 -0600
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From: "Rosebrock, Lester" <ROSEBROCK@UTHSCSA.EDU>
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Subject: File 3--"MS Sucks...."
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I take great offense when you sing the "virtues" of Microsoft because
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they make a cheaper product.
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How can the Windows platform be cheaper when the Federal government is
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having to spend millions/billions of dollars to upgrade their computers
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to overcome the year 2000 thing?
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If cheaper is better, then why don't all of the restraunts close down so
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that only McDonald's, Wendy's and Buger King remain. After all, they
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sell a much cheaper product than a normal restraunt.
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And since we're at it, let's get rid of Mercedes, BWM, and all other
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luxury cars.
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Yugo and the Ford Escort are two cars that have a very attractive price.
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My point is, just because a product is cheaper it doesn't mean that it
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is better.
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Microsoft's products are medicore at best.
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------------------------------
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From: Dave++ Ljung <dxl@HPESDXL.FC.HP.COM>
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Subject: File 4--Re: More on "Microsoft Evil?"
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Date: Mon, 12 Jan 98 11:59:52 MST
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|From--MRand33609 <MRand33609@aol.com>
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|Subject--File 8--US vs Microsoft
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|Is Microsoft Evil?
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|Bill Gates the most productive man in the United States, is actually
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|being persecuted for being productive
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That's one heck of an opinion that I think many would disagree with.
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| To me, this issue should not even be discussed between
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|rational people.
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I've never heard of such an issue. If both sides had points, I can't
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imagine how it shouldn't be discussed.
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Now, I can see some of your points, I myself am actually philosophically
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close to your ideas, being *somewhat* of a laissez-faire capitalist myself.
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However, I can see that you don't believe that there are such things as
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unfair business practices, and you seem to think that anyone at the top
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of a business *must* be providing the best products at the best prices.
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To some it's easy to see that it's not the case with Microsoft, since
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they are up to a *decade* behind in OS technology, yet a huge majority
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of computers use their OS. But I don't really care whether you believe
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this or not, I don't see a point in starting a religious war.
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But I would like to bring forward the point of 'unfair business practices.'
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The world of software and hardware has two features which are enormously
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different than any other business.
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1) The rate of change is incredible - approximately 2x improvement on
|
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all fronts every 18 months (see Moore's law or history for that).
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2) An incredible amount of inertia. It's much harder to change hardware
|
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or software platforms when you decide to upgrade because your equipment
|
|
is obsolete (as compared to say, buying a Chevy after your Ford dies).
|
|
|
|
These factors create a situation ripe for a monopoly takeover. Whoever gets
|
|
in first can start acting in such a way to get a mojority of market share.
|
|
Then the market is stuck - and the company can act with only as much
|
|
competition as required to keep people from getting frustrated enough to
|
|
overcome point #2 above. If you look at history, this is exactly what has
|
|
happened - with Microsoft in the world of software and another company in
|
|
terms of hardware - which I don't need to mention since it's too close the
|
|
business I work in :)
|
|
|
|
I won't go into a list of the things that Microsoft has done to abuse
|
|
market share - just look into it's history and talk to some of the people
|
|
who are opposed to it. Just look at it's original licensing for DOS and
|
|
Windows. Is Bill Gates evil? I doubt that - he is; however, a very
|
|
intelligent man who knows how to get a market and take it over, and I
|
|
would argue that the possibility that Microsoft does NOT provide the best
|
|
products at the best price.
|
|
|
|
Don't take my word - look into the history - look into how Microsoft
|
|
deals with competitors, and maybe you'll start to understand why
|
|
anti-trust legislation exists. Unfortunately the monopoly is (imho)
|
|
the one example of how the market can't take care of itself unattended.
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Mon, 12 Jan 98 17:18:46 EST
|
|
From: Jonathan Olkowski <olkowski@babson.edu>
|
|
Subject: File 5--Contribution In response to "Is Microsoft Evil"
|
|
|
|
This laughable essay (US vs Microsoft - MRand33609@aol.com - CUD #10.02
|
|
Sun, Jan 11, 1998)
|
|
begs an obvious question: Do the Ends justify the Means?
|
|
|
|
Sure, Microsoft has definately made some major contributions to the
|
|
computing industry, albiet it can be argued that those contributions are
|
|
wholly self-serving in the end. But despite this, there are numerous
|
|
documented incidents where Microsoft overstepped its bounds and gained a
|
|
competitve advantage in an unethical and possibly illegal fashion. Yes,
|
|
we're all fully aware that Microsoft didn't create the trend, but we're
|
|
also not going to go jumping off bridges because everyone else is doing it
|
|
too.
|
|
|
|
I'll agree that Microsoft has been helpful in some ways to the computing
|
|
community but that is no justification for its actions. For all we know,
|
|
if Hitler had his way the world might have solved some of its problems -
|
|
but at what price?
|
|
|
|
Balancing methodology with results is a difficult ethical dilemna, but not
|
|
when it comes down to self-serving individuals trying to make a buck at the
|
|
expense of others. That is, unless the most important thing to you is
|
|
money...
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Mon, 12 Jan 1998 14:56:58 -0500 (EST)
|
|
From: Bob Bruen <bruen@genome.wi.mit.edu>
|
|
Subject: File 6--Review - Privacy on the Line. The Politics of Wiretapping...
|
|
|
|
Privacy on the Line. The Politics of Wiretapping and Encryption
|
|
by Whitfield Diffie and Susan Landau. MIT Press 1998. 342 pages.
|
|
Bibliography, index and endnotes. $25.00 ISBN 0-262-04167-7.
|
|
LoC KF9670.D54
|
|
|
|
=============================================================
|
|
Book Review. Copyright 1998 Robert Bruen.
|
|
=============================================================
|
|
|
|
The issue of encryption use by private citizens was pushed into
|
|
the public eye after Phil Zimmerman was placed under threat of
|
|
indictment resulting from the release of Pretty Good Privacy(PGP).
|
|
The indictment threat was withdrawn and the public stopped paying
|
|
much attention to it. It was replaced by the threat of the Computer
|
|
Decency Act (CDA) as the focus of attention. Now that threat has been
|
|
pushed back, so the focus seems to be somewhat diffused. The underlying
|
|
problem has not received the attention it deserves. These two events
|
|
(and a few others) are merely instances of the most serious threat
|
|
to the American way of life since the Civil War. The threat is to
|
|
our right to privacy in our communications with one another. The right
|
|
to privacy is not mentioned explicitly in the Constitution, but it
|
|
falls within the penumbra (shadow) of the rights that are explicit.
|
|
|
|
There has been a constant and continuing effort by various agencies
|
|
of the Federal Government, law enforcement and state governments to
|
|
chip away at this right. These efforts have been resisted by a number
|
|
of groups through legal challenges and media publicity. The battle is
|
|
raging, but it does not appear that most of the citizens in America
|
|
realize the extent of the consequences of this war. It is the difference
|
|
between a police state such as George Orwell envisioned in his novel 1984
|
|
(perhaps as demonstrated in East Germany and the former Soviet Union
|
|
without quite the high tech capability) and a free society as envisioned
|
|
by the framers of our Constitution.
|
|
|
|
The very future of our society is at stake, but in order to understand
|
|
just how serious the threat is, one must understand technical ideas
|
|
such as encryption, computing and networks. There are many good books
|
|
available on these topics, but they are not truly accessible to the
|
|
average citizen because the technical information is difficult and there
|
|
is not a connection to their everyday lives. Moreover the issues are
|
|
clouded by struggles over pornography and free speech.
|
|
|
|
The vacuum has been filled by Mr. Diffie and Professor Landau. He is
|
|
known as the inventor of public-key cryptography and she was primary
|
|
author of the 1994 Association of Computing Machinery report, "Codes,
|
|
Keys, and Conflicts: Issues in US Crypto Policy.'" There is no question
|
|
on their qualifications to speak on this issue.
|
|
|
|
This book is well researched with an extensive bibliography that includes
|
|
not only the expected books and articles, but also government reports, FBI
|
|
memos and Congressional testimony. This is straight-forward presentation
|
|
of just how much of a problem we all have. FBI director Louis Freeh will
|
|
not like this book, nor will the NSA, but anyone who is concerned about
|
|
their privacy and freedom will be grateful for the clear detailing of the
|
|
threat. This loss of our ability to have encrypted communication will be
|
|
an unrecoverable one. It would be the same as if the South had won the
|
|
Civil War and slavery was legal today. The major difference would be that
|
|
all of our citizens will be enslaved instead of just a particular group.
|
|
There is no other issue today that will have as much of an impact on our
|
|
future freedom as this one.
|
|
|
|
Using FBI memos, documents and testimony, the authors bring out the
|
|
fact that the FBI is willing to say just about anything to get a law
|
|
passed that makes the use of encryption by private citizens illegal.
|
|
The history of the NSA's dealings with other government agencies shows
|
|
how they have tried to control the debate and the rules concerning
|
|
encryption. These agencies have determined that encryption is of
|
|
major importance and I believe they are correct. Diffie and Landau
|
|
make this case in such a masterful manner, that you can not read the
|
|
book and not walk away with this conclusion. I think this is one of
|
|
the most important books published on privacy because it pulls together
|
|
all the relevant information in one very readable place.
|
|
|
|
The issues of cryptography, privacy, law enforcement, national security
|
|
and wiretapping are all brought together in an orderly, coherent work,
|
|
that is well written enough to be an enjoyable read that shows no signs
|
|
over-dramatization. But when you are done, the overall effect is powerful.
|
|
As an example, the value of wiretapping is often used a justification
|
|
to control the use of encryption. The authors use government reports
|
|
to demonstrate that the actual value is quite low, limited to a
|
|
few well publicized cases. In many cases the real tool was the use
|
|
of bugs, not wiretaps, which of course has little to do with encryption.
|
|
Wiretaps, new technology and the legal approach to encryption use control
|
|
are just the building blocks for the surveillance society of tomorrow.
|
|
|
|
One of the most important features of the book is the step by step
|
|
history of the attempts to pass laws by the NSA and the FBI. Quotes
|
|
are given by people like National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft
|
|
in 1991 where he refers to an attempt "...to seek a legislative fix
|
|
to the digital telephony problem" and " Success with digital
|
|
telephony will lock in one major objective; we will have established
|
|
a beachhead we can exploit for the encryption fix..." This is
|
|
a clear indication that there is plan to eliminate our rights to
|
|
private communication.
|
|
|
|
I suggest that this book should be considered urgent reading and should
|
|
be widely circulated. It could be the one that wakes everybody up.
|
|
|
|
---------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Dr. Robert Bruen is the Director of Systems and Operations
|
|
at the Whitehead Institute/MIT Center for Genome Research.
|
|
He writes book reviews for Cipher, the Newsletter of the
|
|
IEEE Computer Society Technical Committee on Privacy and
|
|
Security, www.itd.nrl.navy.mil/ITD/5540/ieee/cipher.
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Thu, 08 Jan 1998 17:22:07 -0500
|
|
From: "Evian S. Sim" <evian@escape.com>
|
|
Subject: File 7--Another UNICEF/Mitnick story
|
|
|
|
Source - http://www.news.com/News/Item/0%2C4%2C17931%2C00.html?nd
|
|
|
|
UNICEF site hacked
|
|
By Courtney Macavinta
|
|
January 8, 1998, 12:20 p.m. PT
|
|
|
|
Unknown culprits invaded the home page of the United Nation's
|
|
Children Fund (UNICEF) last night, threatening a "holocaust" if
|
|
famed hacker Kevin Mitnick is not released from prison.
|
|
|
|
The hack is reminiscent of a break-in suffered by Yahoo last
|
|
month in which, for a few moments, hackers were able to post on
|
|
the site a similar message calling for Mitnick's release. Mitnick
|
|
is in a federal penitentiary for a series of high-tech crimes.
|
|
|
|
Those who cracked UNICEF's site intertwined a jargon-filled
|
|
message with the children's rights organization's information
|
|
about the starvation and exploitation of children around the
|
|
world. They also posted photographs of women in bathing suits.
|
|
The page was titled "Starvin' for Kevin."
|
|
|
|
"Drunkz Against Madd Mothers [DAMM] and UNICEF have formed a
|
|
coalition to put an end to the mistreatment of Kevin Mitnick,"
|
|
stated the translated note. "After all, Kevin is just a big kid,
|
|
and that's what UNICEF is all about, helping the children."
|
|
|
|
If Mitnick is not released by Groundhog Day (February 2), the
|
|
hackers said, 100 children per day would be eaten by 20 "starving
|
|
super-models." The threat is even more far-fetched than the
|
|
warning posted on Yahoo.
|
|
|
|
The culprits who broke into Yahoo said the site's recent visitors
|
|
had been infected with "logic bomb/worm" that would detonate on
|
|
Christmas Day, "wreaking havoc upon the entire planet's
|
|
networks." The bomb never went off--which was no surprise to
|
|
computer experts.
|
|
|
|
But the UNICEF site's security was compromised much longer than
|
|
that of Yahoo, as the nonprofit organization can't monitor its
|
|
site around the clock. Some Net users told NEWS.COM they stumbled
|
|
upon the hack last night. The organization said today that it
|
|
discovered the altered home page around 4 a.m., and fully
|
|
restored the site by 8:30 a.m. today.
|
|
|
|
<snip>
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Tue, 13 Jan 1998 12:37:39 -0800 (PST)
|
|
From: Mike Godwin (mnemonic) Tue 13 Jan 98 10:40
|
|
Subject: File 8--Eff announces Barry Steinhardt to BoD
|
|
|
|
eff.43: The EFF in the News
|
|
|
|
eff.43.115: Mike Godwin (mnemonic) Tue 13 Jan 98 10:40
|
|
|
|
For Immediate Release
|
|
|
|
EFF Announces Appointment of Barry Steinhardt as President and CEO, and
|
|
Election of Lori Fena as Chairman
|
|
|
|
SAN FRANCISCO, January 12, 1998 -- The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)
|
|
today announced that its Board of Directors has appointed Barry Steinhardt
|
|
to President and Chief Executive Officer. Steinhardt is currently the
|
|
Associate Director of the American Civil Liberties Union. The appointment
|
|
was made at an EFF Board meeting held today in San Francisco.
|
|
|
|
He replaces Lori Fena, who has been elected Chairman of the Board of EFF.
|
|
Resigning Chairman Esther Dyson remains an active, enthusiastic member of
|
|
the Board.
|
|
|
|
"We are very pleased to appoint Barry Steinhardt as our new President," said
|
|
Esther Dyson, former Chairman of the EFF Board of Directors. "Steinhardt has
|
|
a wealth of experience with both our issues and the operation of non-profit
|
|
organizations."
|
|
|
|
"Barry's background is exactly what we were looking for," Dyson continued.
|
|
"We expect him to be able to help us continue to build EFF as a premier
|
|
organization that can take on the daunting challenge of defending and
|
|
defining civil liberties and structures to protect them in the electronic
|
|
world."
|
|
|
|
As Associate Director of the ACLU, Steinhardt formed and chaired its Cyber-
|
|
liberties Task Force, which coordinates the ACLU's extensive program on
|
|
information technology issues. He was a co-founder of the Global Internet
|
|
Liberty Campaign (GILC), the world's first international coalition of on-
|
|
line rights groups and one of the originators of the Internet Free
|
|
Expression Alliance (IFEA), which was recently formed to monitor issues
|
|
related to Internet content rating and filtering. Steinhardt has spoken and
|
|
written widely on cyber-liberties issues.
|
|
|
|
Most recently he was the co-author of "Fahrenheit 451.2 - Is Cyberspace
|
|
Burning?", the ACLU White paper on Internet content rating and blocking. He
|
|
is currently at work on the ACLU handbook on "The Rights of Persons
|
|
On-line."
|
|
|
|
In addition to his cyber-liberties work, Steinhardt has coordinated the ACLU
|
|
policy development process and efforts to strengthen structure and
|
|
management of the ACLU's 53 state affiliates. He has been with the ACLU for
|
|
17 years and previously served as Executive Director of its Pennsylvania and
|
|
Vermont affiliates.
|
|
|
|
"This is a tremendous opportunity for Barry, who has shown talent and
|
|
imagination in the cyber-liberties arena," said ACLU Executive Director Ira
|
|
Glasser. "It is also an opportunity for the ACLU to work even more closely
|
|
than we have with EFF on many issues where we share common goals and
|
|
values."
|
|
|
|
Steinhardt succeeds outgoing EFF Executive Director Lori Fena, who will
|
|
become Chairman of EFF's Board of Directors, and will resume her career in
|
|
private industry as a venture investment advisor and consultant.
|
|
|
|
|
|
"Lori Fena has done a superb job of building EFF over the past two years,"
|
|
Dyson said. "She demonstrated great vision in her stewardship of TRUSTe and
|
|
a host of other projects and is an excellent choice as incoming Chairman.
|
|
The Board of Directors is very grateful for her leadership and looks forward
|
|
to working with Lori in her new capacity," Dyson concluded.
|
|
|
|
|
|
- - more -
|
|
|
|
page 2
|
|
EFF appointment
|
|
|
|
Fena noted that EFF and ACLU have a long history of cooperative action that
|
|
has ranged from the successful challenge to the Communications Decency Act
|
|
in the 1997 Supreme Court decision in Reno v. ACLU, to ongoing efforts to
|
|
promote the privacy of communications through the use of strong encryption.
|
|
|
|
Most recently, the two organizations joined together to support
|
|
legislation to remove the restrictions on the use of encryption. They also
|
|
have cooperated in Bernstein v. Department of State, in which EFF is
|
|
challenging the constitutionality of the US Government's restrictions on the
|
|
export of encryption technology. Fena further noted that EFF and ACLU have
|
|
been regular coalition partners, including common membership in the GILC and
|
|
IFEA coalitions.
|
|
|
|
"Hiring Barry is a natural step for EFF," Fena said. "It will strengthen the
|
|
bond between two dedicated civil liberties organizations. We expect the two
|
|
groups to work together even more closely to leverage our respective
|
|
strengths to protect free speech and privacy in the information age."
|
|
|
|
Steinhardt said he is "grateful for the opportunity to play a leadership
|
|
role in the next phase of EFF's development."
|
|
|
|
"EFF was the pioneer defender of the rights of on-line users," he continued.
|
|
"With the explosive growth of the Internet and other information
|
|
technologies, the need for a strong and vibrant EFF is greater
|
|
than ever."
|
|
|
|
Steinhardt said that he expected to concentrate his efforts on expanding
|
|
EFF's membership and financial resources, maximizing EFF's already strong
|
|
public presence, organizing grassroots support for cyber rights, enlarging
|
|
EFF's role in the global movement for on-line rights and providing support
|
|
for EFF's pioneering work to adapt traditional concepts of civil liberties
|
|
for new mediums.
|
|
|
|
Steinhardt will formally assume his new role on February 2.
|
|
|
|
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (http://www.eff.org/) is a non-profit
|
|
civil liberties organization working in the public interest to promote
|
|
privacy, free expression, and social responsibility in new media.
|
|
|
|
For further information please contact:
|
|
|
|
Barry Steinhardt
|
|
barrys@aclu.org
|
|
(212)549-2508
|
|
|
|
Lori Fena
|
|
lori@eff.org
|
|
(415)436-9333
|
|
|
|
Esther Dyson
|
|
edyson@edventure.com
|
|
(212)924-8800
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Thu, 7 May 1997 22:51:01 CST
|
|
From: CuD Moderators <cudigest@sun.soci.niu.edu>
|
|
Subject: File 9--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 7 May, 1997)
|
|
|
|
Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
|
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available at no cost electronically.
|
|
|
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CuD is available as a Usenet newsgroup: comp.society.cu-digest
|
|
|
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Or, to subscribe, send post with this in the "Subject:: line:
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|
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SUBSCRIBE CU-DIGEST
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Send the message to: cu-digest-request@weber.ucsd.edu
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DO NOT SEND SUBSCRIPTIONS TO THE MODERATORS.
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The editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-6436), fax (815-753-6302)
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or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL
|
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|
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To UNSUB, send a one-line message: UNSUB CU-DIGEST
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Send it to CU-DIGEST-REQUEST@WEBER.UCSD.EDU
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Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest
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The most recent issues of CuD can be obtained from the
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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------------------------------
|
|
|
|
End of Computer Underground Digest #10.04
|
|
************************************
|
|
|