640 lines
31 KiB
Plaintext
640 lines
31 KiB
Plaintext
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Computer underground Digest Tue Dec 24, 1996 Volume 8 : Issue 92
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ISSN 1004-042X
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Editor: Jim Thomas (cudigest@sun.soci.niu.edu)
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News Editor: Gordon Meyer (gmeyer@sun.soci.niu.edu)
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Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
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Shadow Master: Stanton McCandlish
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Field Agent Extraordinaire: David Smith
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Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
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Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
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Ian Dickinson
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Cu Digest Homepage: http://www.soci.niu.edu/~cudigest
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CONTENTS, #8.92 (Tue, Dec 24, 1996)
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File 1--Strong crypto can be exported, says judge, at least in SF (fwd)
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File 2--From EFF - Court Declares Crypto Restrictions Unconstitutional
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File 3--CWD-Cooking with Crypto
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File 4--Re: Strong crypto can be exported, says judge, at least in SF
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File 5--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 13 Dec, 1996)
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CuD ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL, AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION ApPEARS IN
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THE CONCLUDING FILE AT THE END OF EACH ISSUE.
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---------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: Thu, 19 Dec 1996 08:04:34 -0800 (PST)
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From: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com>
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Subject: File 1--Strong crypto can be exported, says judge, at least in SF (fwd)
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Source fight-censorship@vorlon.mit.edu
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Date--Wed, 18 Dec 1996 23:44:59 -0500
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From--Dave Banisar <banisar@epic.org>
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Headline: Encryption Restriction Nixed
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Wire Service: APO (AP Online)
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Date: Wed, Dec 18, 1996
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By BOB EGELKO
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Associated Press Writer
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SAN FRANCISCO (AP) -- The State Department's refusal to let a
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mathematician post his encryption programs on the Internet was
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unconstitutional, a federal judge said. The ruling announced Wednesday was
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hailed by computer industry executives who say the export restrictions
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have allowed the rest of the world to take business away from U.S.
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companies.
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U.S. District Judge Marilyn Hall Patel stopped short of forbidding all
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restrictions on the export of codes that allow computer messages to be
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scrambled. But she said the current rules, which treat such computer
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programs as if they were military weapons, go too far.
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The immediate effect of Monday's ruling is that anyone in the federal
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district that includes San Francisco and Silicon Valley can post the
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forbidden cryptography on the Internet, said Mike Godwin, a lawyer for the
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Electronic Frontier Foundation, an online civil rights group.
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<snip>
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------------------------------
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Date: Fri, 20 Dec 1996 04:30:34 -0800 (PST)
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From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@EFF.ORG>
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Subject: File 2--From EFF - Court Declares Crypto Restrictions Unconstitutional
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EFFector Online Volume 09 No. 15 Dec. 20, 1996 editors@eff.org
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* See http://www.eff.org/Alerts/ or ftp.eff.org, /pub/Alerts/ for more
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COURT DECLARES CRYPTO RESTRICTIONS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
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Free Speech Trumps Clinton Wiretap Plan
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December 19, 1996, 16:50 Pacific time.
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Electronic Frontier Foundation Contacts:
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Shari Steele, Staff Attorney
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301/375-8856, ssteele@eff.org
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John Gilmore, Founding Board Member
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415/221-6524, gnu@toad.com
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Cindy Cohn, McGlashan & Sarrail
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415/341-2585, cindy@mcglashan.com
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San Francisco - On Monday, Judge Marilyn Hall Patel struck down Cold War
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export restrictions on the privacy technology called cryptography. Her
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decision knocks out a major part of the Clinton Administration's
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effort to force companies to build "wiretap-ready" computers,
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set-top boxes, telephones, and consumer electronics.
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The decision is a victory for free speech, academic freedom, and the
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prevention of crime. American scientists and engineers will now be
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free to collaborate with their peers in the United States and in other
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countries. This will enable them to build a new generation of tools
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for protecting the privacy and security of communications.
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The Clinton Administration has been using the export restrictions to goad
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companies into building wiretap-ready "key recovery" technology. In a
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November Executive Order, President Clinton offered limited
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administrative exemptions from these restrictions to companies which
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agree to undermine the privacy of their customers. Federal District
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Judge Patel's ruling knocks both the carrot and the stick out of
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Clinton's hand, because the restrictions were unconstitutional in the
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first place.
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The Cold War law and regulations at issue in the case prevented
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American researchers and companies from exporting cryptographic
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software and hardware. Export is normally thought of as the physical
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carrying of an object across a national border. However, the
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regulations define "export" to include simple publication in the U.S.,
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as well as discussions with foreigners inside the U.S. They also define
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"software" to include printed English-language descriptions and
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diagrams, as well as the traditional machine-readable object code and
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human-readable source code.
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The secretive National Security Agency has built up an arcane web of
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complex and confusing laws, regulations, standards, and secret
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interpretations for years. These are used to force, persuade, or
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confuse individuals, companies, and government departments into making
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it easy for NSA to wiretap and decode all kinds of communications.
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Their tendrils reach deep into the White House, into numerous Federal
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agencies, and into the Congressional Intelligence Committees. In
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recent years this web is unraveling in the face of increasing
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visibility, vocal public disagreement with the spy agency's goals,
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commercial and political pressure, and judicial scrutiny.
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Civil libertarians have long argued that encryption should be widely
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deployed on the Internet and throughout society to protect privacy,
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prove the authenticity of transactions, and improve computer security.
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Industry has argued that the restrictions hobble them in building
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secure products, both for U.S. and worldwide use, risking America's
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current dominant position in computer technology. Government
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officials in the FBI and NSA argue that the technology is too
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dangerous to permit citizens to use it, because it provides privacy to
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criminals as well as ordinary citizens.
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"We're pleased that Judge Patel understands that our national security
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requires protecting our basic rights of free speech and privacy," said
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John Gilmore, co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, which
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backed the suit. "There's no sense in 'burning the Constitution in
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order to save it'. The secretive bureaucrats who have restricted these
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rights for decades in the name of national security must come to a
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larger understanding of how to support and preserve our democracy."
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Reactions to the decision
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"This is a positive sign in the crypto wars -- the first rational
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statement concerning crypto policy to come out of any part of the
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government," said Jim Bidzos, President of RSA Data Security, one of
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the companies most affected by crypto policy.
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"It's nice to see that the executive branch does not get to decide
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whether we have the right of free speech," said Philip Zimmermann,
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Chairman of PGP, Inc. "It shows that my own common sense
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interpretation of the constitution was correct five years ago when I
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thought it was safe to publish my own software, PGP. If only US
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Customs had seen it that way." Mr. Zimmermann is a civil libertarian
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who was investigated by the government under these laws when he wrote
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and gave away a program for protecting the privacy of e-mail. His
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"Pretty Good Privacy" program is used by human rights activists
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worldwide to protect their workers and informants from torture and
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murder by their own countries' secret police.
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"Judge Patel's decision furthers our efforts to enable secure electronic
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commerce," said Asim Abdullah, executive director of CommerceNet.
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Jerry Berman, Executive Director of the Center for Democracy and
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Technology, a Washington-based Internet advocacy group, hailed the
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victory. "The Bernstein ruling illustrates that the Administration
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continues to embrace an encryption policy that is not only unwise, but
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also unconstitutional. We congratulate Dan Bernstein, the Electronic
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Frontier Foundation, and all of the supporters who made this victory
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for free speech and privacy on the Internet possible."
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"The ability to publish is required in any vibrant academic discipline,"
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This ruling re-affirming our obvious academic right will help American
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researchers publish without worrying," said Bruce Schneier, author of
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the popular textbook _Applied Cryptography_, and a director of the
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International Association for Cryptologic Research, a professional
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organization of cryptographers.
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Kevin McCurley, President of the International Association for
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Cryptologic Research, said, "Basic research to further the
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understanding of fundamental notions in information should be welcomed
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by our society. The expression of such work is closely related to one
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of the fundamental values of our society, namely freedom of speech."
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Background on the case
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The plaintiff in the case, Daniel J. Bernstein, Research Assistant
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Professor at the University of Illinois at Chicago, developed an
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"encryption algorithm" (a recipe or set of instructions) that he
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wanted to publish in printed journals as well as on the Internet.
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Bernstein sued the government, claiming that the government's
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requirements that he register as an arms dealer and seek government
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permission before publication was a violation of his First Amendment
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right of free speech. This is required by the Arms Export Control Act
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(AECA) and its implementing regulations, the International Traffic in Arms
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Regulations (ITAR).
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In the first phase of this litigation, the government argued that
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since Bernstein's ideas were expressed, in part, in computer language
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(source code), they were not protected by the First Amendment. On
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April 15, 1996, Judge Patel rejected that argument and held for the
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first time that computer source code is protected speech for purposes
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of the First Amendment.
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Details of Monday's Decision
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Judge Patel ruled that the Arms Export Control Act is a prior restraint
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on speech, because it requires Bernstein to apply for and obtain from
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the government a license to publish his ideas. Using the Pentagon
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Papers case as precedent, she ruled that the government's "interest of
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national security alone does not justify a prior restraint."
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Judge Patel also held that the government's required licensing
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procedure fails to provide adequate procedural safeguards. When the
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Government acts legally to suppress protected speech, it must reduce
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the chance of illegal censorship by the bureaucrats involved -- in this
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case, the State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC).
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Her decision states: "Because the ITAR licensing scheme fails to provide
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for a time limit on the licensing decision, for prompt judicial review
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and for a duty on the part of the ODTC to go to court and defend a
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denial of a license, the ITAR licensing scheme as applied to Category
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XIII(b) [i.e., as applied to encryption material] acts as an
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unconstitutional prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment."
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Professor Bernstein is now free to publish his ideas without asking the
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government's permission first.
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She also ruled that the export controls restrict speech based on the
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content of the speech, not for any other reason. "Category XIII(b) is
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directed very specifically at applied scientific research and speech on
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the topic of encryption." The Government had argued that it restricts
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the speech because of its function, not its content.
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The judge also found that the ITAR is vague, because it does not
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adequately define how information that is available to the public
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"through fundamental research in science and engineering" is exempt
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from the export restrictions. "This subsection ... does not give
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people ... a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited." The
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failure to precisely define what objects and actions are being
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regulated creates confusion and a chilling effect. Bernstein has been
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unable to publish his encryption algorithm for over four years. Many
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other cryptographers and ordinary programmers have also been restrained
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from publishing because of the vagueness of the ITAR. Brian
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Behlendorf, a maintainer of the popular public domain "Apache" web
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server program, stated, "No cryptographic source code was ever
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distributed by the Apache project. Despite this, the Apache server
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code was deemed by the NSA to violate the ITAR." Judge Patel also
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adopted a narrower definition of the term "defense article" in order to
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save it from unconstitutional vagueness.
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The immediate effect of this decision is that Bernstein now is free to
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teach his January 13th cryptography class in his usual way. He can
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post his class materials on the Internet, and discuss the upcoming
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class's materials with other professors, without being held in
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violation of the ITAR. "I'm very pleased," Bernstein said. "Now I
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won't have to tell my students to burn their notebooks."
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It is presently unclear exactly where Judge Patel's decision applies --
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in the Northern District of California (containing San Francisco and Silicon
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Valley) or throughout the country. Check with your own lawyer if
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you contemplate taking action based on the decision.
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It is not yet clear from the decision whether the export controls on
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object code (the executable form of computer programs which source
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code is automatically translated into) have been overturned. It may
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be that existing export controls will continue to apply to runnable
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software products, such as Netscape's broswer, until another court
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case challenges that part of the restrictions.
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ABOUT THE ATTORNEYS
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Lead counsel on the case is Cindy Cohn of the San Mateo law firm of
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McGlashan & Sarrail, who is offering her services pro bono. Major
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additional pro bono legal assistance is being provided by Lee Tien of
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Berkeley; M. Edward Ross of the San Francisco law firm of Steefel,
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Levitt & Weiss; James Wheaton and Elizabeth Pritzker of the First
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Amendment Project in Oakland; and Robert Corn-Revere, Julia Kogan,
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and Jeremy Miller of the Washington, DC, law firm of Hogan & Hartson.
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ABOUT THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
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The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is a nonprofit civil
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liberties organization working in the public interest to protect
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privacy, free expression, and access to online resources and
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information. EFF is a primary sponsor of the Bernstein case. EFF
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helped to find Bernstein pro bono counsel, is a member of the
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Bernstein legal team, and helped collect members of the academic
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community and computer industry to support this case.
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Full text of the lawsuit and other paperwork filed in the case is
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available from EFF's online archives at:
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http://www.eff.org/pub/Legal/Cases/Bernstein_v_DoS/
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The full text of Monday's decision is available at:
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http://www.eff.org/pub/Legal/Cases/Bernstein_v_DoS/Legal/961206.decision
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------------------------------
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Date: Fri, 20 Dec 1996 07:53:01 -0800 (PST)
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From: "Brock N. Meeks" <brock@well.com>
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Subject: File 3--CWD-Cooking with Crypto
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CyberWire Dispatch // Copyright (c) 1996 // December 20
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Jacking in from the "Two Flew Over the Crypto Nest" port:
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Washington -- The encryption issue continues to bubble up all
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over the boneyard of D.C. On Thursday, in the wake of the U.S.
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District Court decision in San Francisco, that declared current
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U.S. restrictions on exporting *printed* crypto code violates
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First Amendment rights, crypto came to the fore, if only briefly.
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The following instances, one during a congressional hearing, the
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other during a news conference by U.S. Attorney General Janet
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"Say Hallelujah, I've Saved My Job" Reno, point out the widening
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rift between congress and the Administration over the encryption
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issue.
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During a hearing to discuss the FBI's handling of the bombing in
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Centinneal Park in Atlanta during the summer Olympics, Sen. Arlan
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Spector (R-Pa.) couldn't resist tossing a dart at FBI Dir. Louis
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Freeh when he said:
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"And the very last thing is: I know the federal court decision
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which came down -- on export restrictions on certain encryption
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software --yesterday is not one you may have had a chance to
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review. But, Director Freeh, with my concern on what I have
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thought has been a misguided policy by the administration on
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their export restriction encryption policy, it's probably safe to
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assume that you and I may have a chance to discuss this latest
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court case, and whether it goes up on appeal, or whether we try
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one more time on some -- on a legislative fix."
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Freeh did not respond to Spector's question. But Spector's
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comments are important on two fronts. One, he comes out as vocal
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opponent of the Administration's policy, calling it "misguided"
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and signalling that it's likely he will ally himself with Sen.
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Conrad Burns (R-Mont.) to resurrect pro-encryption legislation
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during the 105th Congress.
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Spector is clearly dialed into the issue; good news for a
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Congress that has, with a few notable exceptions, essentially
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been brain dead on this issue and completely spun by the
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fictitious horror stories that the FBI's Freeh takes every
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opportunity tell on Capitol Hill.
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Sadly, the nation's top cop, Janet Reno, appears to be hopelessly
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lost on the crypto issue. During her weekly news conference,
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she was asked about the court decision and "why does the
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government feel that it's so important to place those
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restrictions on that type of technology, and will you appeal this
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decision?"
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Reno punted on the latter question, saying she hadn't seen the
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opinion. On the meat of the question, she simply muddled
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through. She emphasized wiretaps and how encrypting real time
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conversations can be a threat to law enforcement investigations.
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The problem, according to Reno, is this: "What we're faced with
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now is that there is the developing capacity -- and it will
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become more so --the power to encrypt or to code a system so that
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it cannot be intercepted through new high-tech systems."
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To counter this threat, Reno said, "We have got to have the
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capacity to intercept that." This has always, from day one of
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this crypto debate, been the real jones of the FBI: Real time
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interception and decryption of voice communications. Stored
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data and Email make up the FBI's crypto hat trick, but it's the
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wiretapping and decryption of coded voice communications that
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really gives the FBI a hard on.
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Reno short-hopped a common meme among civil libertarians, that
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being the notion that the FBI is simply looking to expand its
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current wiretap authority. Remember, Freeh has been dogged in
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saying that the Bureau is not looking to expand its authority,
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but simply maintain the status quo.
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Reno answered this "expansion" theory, saying: "What's expanding
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is not our authority, really, but the technology that permits
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such tremendous communication systems in the world. And what
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we've got to be prepared to do is to have a system that will
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permit us to get a court order, just as we do now for simple
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telephones, to intercept the communication and, if it is
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encrypted or coded, to decode it."
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Now... don't we all feel better? It's not "really" an expansion
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of authority. Nope, just an expansion of the technological law
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enforcement capacity. It's typical cheapjack bureaucratic
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Washington bullshit.
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Reno is convinced that people will "appreciate" the FBI's
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capability to do this and then tells this story: "A businessman
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says, 'Well, I don't want you messing with my business,' but if
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his competitor comes in and steals trade secrets and stores that
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in a coded computer, he's not going to like it if the FBI doesn't
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have the capacity to get a lawful search warrant and search that
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computer because they can't decode it."
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However, as Reno's own leutinent, Jamie Gorelick, admitted before
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a congressional panel earlier this year: If the FBI can't crack
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a code, it has, in the past, called on the "technical
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assistantance" of the National Security Agency, the nation's top
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spooks and the world's best equipped code crackers.
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As for the ban on crypto exports? "We're going to continue to
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work with everyone," Reno said, "because I think as people work
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through this issue, they understand that it is in everybody's
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best interest to be able to do it."
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Well, apparently Reno hasn't been in the loop on the industry's
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about face on this issue lately. Where only a few months ago
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the computer and software industry seemed to have turned into
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White House lap dogs by voicing initial approval of the new
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crypto initiatives put forth by the President via executive
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order, now that industry has revolted. Industry now claims that
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the Administration essentially kicked them in the balls, the term
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"bait and switch" has been used.
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Surprise, surprise. Industry got what it deserved for being cozy
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with an Administration famous for having blinders on when it
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comes to this issue. Now industry feels hurt and dismayed.
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Excuse me if I can't gin up any sympathy for these guys... what
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the fuck were they thinking in the first place?
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As Spector and Reno's comments show, this issue isn't likely to
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die a slow quiet death in the coming years. Indeed, it looks
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like battle lines are being drawn already; a kind of digital
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line in cyberspace.
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Who will win? Don't bet on the FBI... even their own turncoat
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spies aren't clever enough to encrypt their self-incriminating
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files. So, Mr. Freeh, tell me again why you need the keys to my
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encrypted messages? Even your own troops let you walk right
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through the digital front door.
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Meeks out...
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------------------------------
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Date: Thu, 19 Dec 1996 19:43:34 -0800
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From: "James S. Tyre" <j.s.tyre@worldnet.att.net>
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Subject: File 4--Re: Strong crypto can be exported, says judge, at least in SF
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Source - fight-censorship@vorlon.mit.edu
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My congratulations to Professor Bernstein, his lawyers, the EFF and all
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who contributed to the side of the angels.
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I do have two nits to pick, however (one not so small), with the
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publicity surrounding Judge Patel's decision. The first is stated twice
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in Declan's post, although later clarified in his post. The second has
|
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not been stated in anything which I have read in the last day or so.
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First, many articles have said that Judge Patel's decision is NOT
|
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binding on courts outside of the United States District Court for the
|
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Northern District of California (roughly, the San Francisco bay area).
|
|
True enough, but most have said that it IS binding within the Northern
|
|
District. Not true. The U.S. District Court, like the Superior Courts
|
|
in most states (New York being the notable exception) is a general
|
|
jurisdiction trial court, not an appellate court. Judge Patel's
|
|
decision, insofar as other courts are concerned, has no binding effect
|
|
at all. Another trial court judge within the Northern District could
|
|
just as easily rule another way as could a federal trial judge in
|
|
Wisconsin or D.C. Declan's post gets to this point well into the text,
|
|
but only after contradictory statements earlier in the post.
|
|
|
|
My second nit, however, is more important. In EFF's release included in
|
|
Declan's post, it is said that: "American scientists and engineers will
|
|
now be _free_ to collaborate with their peers in the United States and
|
|
in other countries. This will enable them to build a new generation of
|
|
tools for protecting the privacy and security of communications." (My
|
|
emphasis on "free".) Judge Patel did NOT rule that Prof. Bernstein
|
|
could "freely" distribute his source code. Instead, she ruled that the
|
|
export restrictions were an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech
|
|
(having previously ruled that source code indeed is speech). This is
|
|
not a mere semantic distinction, but a significant, substantive one. As
|
|
Judge Patel wrote in her decision:
|
|
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> It is axiomatic that the First Amendment is more tolerant of
|
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> subsequent criminal punishment of speech than it is of prior restraints
|
|
> on the same speech.
|
|
>
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|
> The thread running through all these cases is that prior
|
|
> restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and
|
|
> the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights. A
|
|
> criminal penalty or a judgment in a defamation case is subject
|
|
> to the whole panoply of protections afforded by deferring the
|
|
> impact of the judgment until all avenues of appellate review
|
|
> have been exhausted. . . .
|
|
>
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|
> A prior restraint, by contrast and by definition, has an
|
|
> immediate and irreversible sanction. If it can be said that a
|
|
> threat of criminal or civil sanction after publication "chills"
|
|
> speech, prior restraint "freezes" it at least for the time.
|
|
>
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|
> Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (196).
|
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>
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In other words: a government prosecutor or a defamation plaintiff has to
|
|
make a much stronger showing to prevent speech from happening in the
|
|
first instance (a prior restraint) than to impose liability for the
|
|
speech after the fact. Judge Patel ruled that Bernstein could not be
|
|
restrained in advance from speaking his source code. She did not rule,
|
|
however, that that he cannot be prosecuted after the fact if, as and
|
|
when he does speak his code. Specifically, near the end of her
|
|
decision, Judge patel wrote that:
|
|
|
|
> The court notes that an injunction appears hasty given the relative
|
|
> positions of the parties. The government seems to suggest that teaching
|
|
> a class on cryptography, regardless of the nationality of the students,
|
|
> is not the problem; the concern is with posting material on the Internet
|
|
> without limiting access. Assuming the government is sincere about its
|
|
> limited objections and that plaintiff could easily limit access to the
|
|
> class material he posts so that it is not available internationally, it
|
|
> is not clear why the parties could not enter into a stipulation.
|
|
>
|
|
> In view of the fact that the court has ruled on the merits and
|
|
> has found certain provisions of the ITAR invalid, plaintiff cannot be
|
|
> prosecuted _under those provisions_ absent reversal on appeal.
|
|
> Therefore, at this time there is no immediate threat of injury and no
|
|
> need to rule on the preliminary injunction.[15] The motion for a
|
|
> preliminary injunction is denied without prejudice. If plaintiff is
|
|
> threatened with prosecution, he may return to this court and renew the
|
|
> motion.
|
|
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|
(My emphasis on "under those provisions.")
|
|
|
|
Like any good judge, Judge Patel did not speculate on whether Bernstein
|
|
could be prosecuted under existing laws other than the specific ITAR
|
|
provisions held to be invalid, if and when he puts his code on the net.
|
|
Nor did she write that the mere fact that source code is speech would
|
|
prevent Congress from enacting new laws seeking to punish
|
|
crypto-speech. Are there existing laws, other than the invalid ITAR
|
|
provisions, under which Bernstein theoretically could be prosecuted if
|
|
he speaks his code on the net? I believe so. Could Congress enact such
|
|
laws? Certainly. Would such laws be constitutional as applied to this
|
|
type of a case? I won't speculate any more than did Judge Patel.
|
|
|
|
I truly HATE to use OJ I and II and as an analogy for anything, but,
|
|
unfortunately, the analogy is useful here. Because the burden of proof
|
|
is so much higher in criminal cases than in civil cases, OJ's acquittal
|
|
in the criminal case does not prevent the families from suing for
|
|
wrongful death. Because the government has a higher burden when it
|
|
attempts to stop speech before it happens than when it attempts to
|
|
impose liability afterward, Judge Patel's ruling, even if upheld on
|
|
appeal, does NOT mean that Bernstein or others can speak freely, without
|
|
fear of consequence. That may turn out to be the case, but that was not
|
|
decided in this case.
|
|
|
|
None of this is intended to diminish Professor Bernstein's victory. Far
|
|
from it. But let's understand what was decided and what was not. This
|
|
certainly was a skirmish, and may be a good battle, but its not close to
|
|
being the war.
|
|
|
|
Or so I think.
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|
|
|
Jim Tyre
|
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------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Thu, 15 Dec 1996 22:51:01 CST
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From: CuD Moderators <cudigest@sun.soci.niu.edu>
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Subject: File 5--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 13 Dec, 1996)
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------------------------------
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End of Computer Underground Digest #8.92
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************************************
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