1087 lines
57 KiB
Plaintext
1087 lines
57 KiB
Plaintext
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Computer underground Digest Sat Jan 7, 1995 Volume 7 : Issue 01
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ISSN 1004-042X
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Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
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Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
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Retiring Shadow Archivist: Stanton McCandlish
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Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
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Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
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Ian Dickinson
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Copy Reader: Laslo Toth
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CONTENTS, #7.01 (Sat, Jan 7, 1995)
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File 1--Govt. Response to Lamacchia
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File 2--Judge Stearns' Decision in Lamacchia Case Dismissal
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File 3--EFF Personnel Changes Announced
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File 4--EFF Personnel Changes, II
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File 5--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 25 Nov 1994)
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CuD ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL, AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION APPEARS IN
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THE CONCLUDING FILE AT THE END OF EACH ISSUE.
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: Thu, 29 Dec 1994 17:31:00 EST
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From: Dave Banisar <banisar@WASHOFC.EPIC.ORG>
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Subject: File 1--Govt. Response to Lamacchia
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((MODERATORS' NOTE: CuD readers will recall that David Lamacchia was
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indicted last year for alleged acts of "piracy" stemming from
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allegations that he made copyright software available over the
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Internet through an MIT computer (see CuD 6.31, 6.32). Critics of the
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prosecution argued that the charges, based on wire fraud, did not
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match the alleged crime. As the following two articles indicate, the
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judge agreed.))
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STATEMENT OF MASSACHUSETTS U.S. ATTORNEY DONALD K. STERN
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REGARDING THE DAVID LA MACCHIA CASE
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BOSTON, Dec. 29 /PRNewswire/ -- The following is a statement from
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U.S. Attorney Donald K. Stern concerning the Davd La Macchia case:
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"Judge Stearns has granted the motion of David La Macchia to
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dismiss the indictment brought against him. Judge Stearns held that
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La Macchia's prosecution for conspiracy to violate the federal wire
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fraud statute could not go forward. The judge's thoughtful decision
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deserves further study before we decide whether to appeal it to the
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First Circuit."
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"At the same time, the Judge stated that the objective of this
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prosecution 'is a laudable one' and he further observed that, 'if the
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allegations in the indictment are accurate, La Macchia's actions were
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at best...heedlessly irresponsible, and at worst...nihilistic,
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self-indulgent, and lacking in any fundamental sense of values.'"
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"Large scale software piracy remains a serious problem. While we
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believe this indictment to be legally sound and may well appeal, the
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Court's decision suggests that Congress should re-visit this area.
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While it will not have any impact on this case, I intend to raise
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with the Department of Justice whether it should file legislation
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explicitly dealing with willful, multiple infringements of copyrighted
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software, in order to remove any uncertainties."
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/CONTACT: Joy Fallon or Kathleen Griffin of the U.S. Attorney's
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Office, 617-223-9445/
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------------------------------
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Date: Sat, 7 Jan 1995 21:34:01 -0600
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From: jthomas2@SUN.SOCI.NIU.EDU(Jim Thomas)
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Subject: File 2--Judge Stearns' Decision in Lamacchia Case Dismissal
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(MODERATORS' NOTE: The following text was made available by Mike
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Godwin of EFF, and posted on The Well)).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 9410092-RGS
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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v.
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DAVID LaMACCHIA
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MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
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ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
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December 28, 1994
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STEARNS, D.J.
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This case presents the issue of whether new wine can be poured into an
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old bottle. The facts, as seen in the light most favorable to the
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government, are these. The defendant, David LaMacchia, is a twenty-one
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year old student at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).
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LaMacchia, a computer hacker, used MIT's computer network to gain
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entree to the Internet. Using pseudonyms and an encrypted address,
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LaMacchia set up an electronic bulletin board which he named Cynosure.
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[fn 1] He encouraged his correspondents to upload popular software
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applications (Excel 5.0 and WordPerfect 6.0) and computer games (Sim
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City 2000). These he transferred to a second encrypted address
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(Cynosure II) where they could be downloaded by other users with
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access to the Cynosure password. Although LaMacchia was at pains to
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impress the need for circumspection on the part of his subscribers,
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the worldwide traffic generated by the offer of free software
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attracted the notice of university and federal authorities.
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On April 7, 1994, a federal grand jury returned a one count indictment
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charging LaMacchia with conspiring with "persons unknown" to violate
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18 U.S.C. Sec. 1343, the wire fraud statute. According to the
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indictment, LaMacchia devised a scheme to defraud that had as its
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object the facilitation "on an international scale" of the "illegal
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copying and distribution of copyrighted software" without payment of
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licensing fees and royalties to software manufacturers and vendors.
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The indictment alleges that LaMacchia's scheme caused losses of more
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than one million dollars to software copyright holders. The indictment
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does not allege that LaMacchia sought or derived any personal benefit
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from the scheme to defraud.
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On September 30, 1994. the defendant brought a motion to dismiss,
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arguing that the government had improperly resorted to the wire fraud
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statute as a copyright enforcement tool in defiance of the Supreme
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Court's decision in Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985) The
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government argues that Dowling is a narrower case than LaMacchia would
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have it, and holds only that copyright infringement does not satisfy
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the physical "taking" requirement of the National Stolen Property Act,
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18 U.S.C. Sec. 2314.
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THE DOWLING DECISION
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Paul Edmond Dowling was convicted of conspiracy, interstate
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transportation of stolen property [ITSP], copyright violations and
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mail fraud in the Central District of California. Dowling and his
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co-conspirators sold bootleg Elvis Presley recordings by soliciting
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catalogue orders from post office boxes in Glendale, California. The
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infringing recordings were shipped in interstate commerce to Maryland
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and Florida. The eight ITSP counts on which Dowling was convicted
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involved thousands of phonograph albums. "[E]ach album contained
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performances of copyrighted musical compositions for the use of which
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no licenses had been obtained nor royalties paid ...." Dowling, supra
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at 212. Dowling appealed his convictions (except those involving
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copyright infringement) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
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"[T]he [Ninth Circuit] reasoned that the rights of copyright owners in
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their protected property were indistinguishable from ownership
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interests in other types of property and were equally deserving of
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protection under the [stolen property] statute." Id.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari only as to Dowling's convictions
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for interstate transportation of stolen property [fn 2]. The Court, in
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an opinion by Justice Blackmun, held that a copyrighted musical
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composition impressed on a bootleg phonograph record is not property
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that is "stolen, converted, or taken by fraud" within the meaning of
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the Stolen Property Act. Justice Blackmun emphasized that cases
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prosecuted under Sec. 2314 had traditionally involved "physical
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'goods, wares [or] merchandise.'" The statute "seems clearly to
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contemplate a physical identity between the items unlawfully obtained
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and those eventually transported, and hence some prior physical taking
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of the subject goods" Id at 216. In Dowling's case there was no
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evidence "that Dowling wrongfully came by the phonorecords actually
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shipped or the physical materials from which they were made." Dowling,
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supra at 214.
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Justice Blackmun felt compelled, however, to answer the government's
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argument that the unauthorized use of the underlying musical
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compositions was itself sufficient to render the offending
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phonorecords property "stolen, converted or taken by fraud."
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[T]he Government's theory here would make theft, conversion, or fraud
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equivalent to wrongful appropriation of statutorily protected rights in
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copyright. The copyright owner, however, holds no ordinary chattel. A
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copyright, like other intellectual property, comprises a series of
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carefully defined and carefully delimited interests to which the law
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affords correspondingly exact protections. Id. at 216.
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A copyright, as Justice Blackmun explained, is unlike an ordinary
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chattel because the holder does not acquire exclusive dominion over
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the thing owned. The limited nature of the property interest conferred
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by copyright stems from an overriding First Amendment concern for the
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free dissemination of ideas. "The primary objective of copyright is
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not to reward the labor of authors. but '[t]o promote the Progress of
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Science and useful Arts.' Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 8." Feist Publications,
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Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991). Data
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general Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support, 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir.
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1994) (same). Justice Blackmun offered the "fair use" doctrine (17
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U.S.C. Sec. 107) and the statutory scheme of compulsory licensing of
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musical compositions (17 U.S.C. Sec. 115) as examples of ways in which
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the property rights of a copyright holder are circumscribed by the
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Copyright Act [fn 3]. Dowling, supra at 217.
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It follows that interference with copyright does not easily equate
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with theft, conversion or fraud. The Copyright Act even employs a
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separate term of art to define one who misappropriates a copyright:
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"Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
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owner," that is, anyone who trespasses into his exclusive domain by
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using or authorizing the use of the copyrighted work in one of the
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five ways set forth in the statute, "is an infringer of the
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copyright." There is no dispute in this case that Dowling's
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unauthorized inclusion on his bootleg albums of performances of
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copyrighted compositions constituted infringement of those copyrights.
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It is less clear, however, that the taking that occurs when an
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infringer arrogates the use of another's protected work comfortably
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fits the terms associated with physical removal employed by Sec. 2314.
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The infringer invades a statutorily defined province guaranteed to the
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copyright holder alone. But he does not assume physical control over
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the copyright; nor does he wholly deprive its owner of its use. While
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one may colloquially like infringement with some general notion of
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wrongful appropriation, infringement plainly implicates a more complex
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set of property interests than does run-of-the-mill theft, conversion
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or fraud. As a result, it fits but awkwardly with the language
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Congress chose - "stolen, converted or taken by fraud" - to describe
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the sorts of goods whose interstate shipment Sec. 2314 makes criminal.
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Id at 217-218 (citations omited).
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The ITSP statute, Justice Blackmun observed, had its roots in efforts
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by Congress to supplement the efforts of state authorities frustrated
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by jurisdictional problems arising from the transportation of stolen
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property across state lines. Id. at 219-220.
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No such need for supplemental federal action has ever existed,
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however, with respect to copyright infringement, for the obvious
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reason that Congress always has had the bestowed authority to
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legislate directly in this area.... Given that power, it is
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implausible to suppose that Congress intended to combat the problem of
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copyright infringement by the circuitous route hypothesized by the
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government . . . In sum, the premise of Sec. 2314 -- the need to fill
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with federal action an enforcement chasm created by limited state
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jurisdiction -- simply does not apply to the conduct the Government
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seeks to reach here. Id at 220-221.
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A review of the evolution of criminal penalties in the Copyright Act
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led Justice Blackmun to observe that:
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"[T]he history of the criminal infringement provisions of the
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Copyright Act reveals a good deal of care on Congress' part before
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subjecting copyright infringement to serious criminal penalties.... In
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stark contrast, the Government's theory of this case presupposes a
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congressional decision to bring the felony provisions of Sec. 2314,
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which make available the comparatively light fine of not more than
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$10,000 but the relatively harsh term of imprisonment of up to 10
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years, to bear on the distribution of a sufficient quantity of any
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infringing goods simply because of the presence here of a
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factor-interstate transportation-not otherwise though relevant to
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copyright law. The Government thereby presumes congressional adoption
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of an indirect but blunderbuss solution to a problem treated with
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precision when considered directly. Id. at 225-226.
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Finally, noting that the government's expansive reading of the Stolen
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Property Act would have the unsettling effect of criminalizing a broad
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range of conduct involving copyright and other intellectual property
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that had been historically regulated by the civil laws, Justice
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Blackmun concluded that "the deliberation with which Congress over the
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last decade has addressed the problem of copyright infringement for
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profit, as well as the precision with which it has chosen to apply
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criminal penalties in this area, demonstrates anew the wisdom of
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leaving it to the legislature to define crime and prescribe penalties.
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Here, the language of Sec. 2314 does not 'plainly and unmistakably'
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cover petitioner Dowling's conduct" Id at 228 (footnote omitted).
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Dowling's ITSP convictions were reversed.
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THE COPYRIGHT LAW
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Article 1, Sec. 8, cl. 8 of the U S Constitution grants Congress the
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exclusive power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
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by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
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Right to their respective writings and Discoveries." Thus "[t]he
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remedies for infringement 'are only those prescribed by Congress.'"
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Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
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417, 431 (1984) (quoting Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 U.S. 123, 151
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(1889)). Since 1897, when criminal copyright infringement was first
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introduced into U.S. copyright law, [fn 4] the concept differentiating
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criminal from civil copyright violations has been that the
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infringement must be pursued for purposes of commercial exploitation.
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Until 1909, "[t]he crime of copyright infringement was . . . limited
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to unlawful performances and representation of copyrighted dramatic
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and musical compositions." Saunders, Criminal Copyright Infringement
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and the Copyright Felony Act, 71 Denv. U.L. Rev. 671, 673 (1994). The
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1897 Act defined the mens rea of criminal copyright
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infringement as conduct that is "willfull" and undertaken "for
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profit," a definition that remained unaltered until the general
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revision of the Copyright Act in 1976.
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In 1909, the Copyright Act was revised to extend misdemeanor criminal
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sanctions to infringement of all copyrighted material with the
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exception of sound recordings. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 33
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stat 1075-1082. The 1909 amendments also made criminal the knowing and
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willful aiding and abetting of another's infringing activities.
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Performers and producers of musical recordings were not protected under
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the 1909 Act, and composers were given the exclusive rights to license
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only the first recording of their musical works. After that, a
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compulsory licensing provision allowed anyone to record and distribute
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the work so long as a two cent per copy royalty was paid to the
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original composer. Id, Subsec. 1(e), 25(e).
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The framework set out by the 1909 Act remained in effect until 1971,
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when the growth of the recording industry following the musical
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revolution of the 1960's brought the problem of unauthorized
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reproduction and sale of musical works to Congress' attention. See
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H.R. Rep. No. 487, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. 2 (1971). In response, Congress
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passed the Sound Recording Act of 1971, which addressed the perceived
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flaw in the 1909 Act by granting sound recordings full copyright
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protection, including criminal penalties for profit motivated
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infringement. In 1976, Congress revamped the Copyright Act by
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eliminating the crime of aiding and abetting copyright infringement.
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It also eased the mens rea requirement for criminal copyright
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infringement by eliminating the burden of proving that an infringer
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acted "for profit," requiring instead only that the infringement be
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conducted "willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or
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private financial gain." 17 U.S.C. Sec. 506(a). Criminal infringement
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under the 1976 Act was a misdemeanor except in the case of repeat
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offenders (who could be sentenced to a maximum of two years and a fine
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of $50,000).
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After lobbying by the Motion Picture Association and the Recording
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Industry Association, Congress increased the penalties for criminal
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infringement in 1982. Act of May 24, 1982. Pub. L. No. 97-180. 97th
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Cong. 2d Sess., 96 Stat. 91. Certain types of first-time criminal
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infringement were punishable as felonies depending on the time period
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involved and the number of copies reproduced or distributed. [fn 5]
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See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2319. The mens rea element, however,
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remained unchanged, requiring proof of "commercial advantage or
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private financial gain." 17 U.S.C. Sec. 506(a). Most criminal
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infringements remained misdemeanor offenses despite the new penalty
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structure.
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In the decade following the 1982 revisions to the Copyright Act, the
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home computing and software industry underwent a period of explosive
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growth paralleling the expansion in the 1960's and 1970's of the
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recording and motion picture industries. In 1992, the Software
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Publishers Association reported in testimony to the Subcommittee on
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Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House Committee
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on the Judiciary that software manufacturers were losing $2.4 billion in
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revenues annually as a result of software piracy. "Rather than adopting
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a piecemeal approach to copyright legislation and simply adding computer
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programs to audiovisual works, and sound recordings to the list of works
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whose infringement can give rise to felony penalties under [18 U.S.C.]
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Sec. 2319," Congress passed the Copyright Felony Act. [fn 6] Saunders,
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supra, at 680. The Act amended Sec. 2319 by extending its felony
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provision to the criminal infringement of all copyrighted works
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including computer software. [fn 7] The mens rea for criminal
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infringement remained unchanged, requiring prosecutors to prove that the
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defendant infringed a copyright "willfully and for purpose of commercial
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advantage or private financial gain." 17 U.S.C. Sec. 506(a). [fn 8]
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DISCUSSION
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The wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1343 was enacted in 1952. In its
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entirety, the statute reads as follows:
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Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice
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to
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defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
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fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes
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to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication
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in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals,
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pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or
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artifice,
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shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five
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years, or both. If the violation affects a financial institution, such
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person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more
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than 30 years, or both.
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The wire fraud statute was enacted to cure a jurisdictional defect that
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Congress perceived was created by the growth of radio and television as
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commercial media. In its report to the House of Representatives, the
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Committee on the Judiciary explained:
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[T]he measure in amended form. . .creates a new. but relatively
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isolated
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area of criminal conduct consisting of the execution of a scheme to
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defraud or to obtain money or property by means of false or fraudulent
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pretenses, representations, or promises transmitted in writings, signs,
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pictures, or sounds via interstate wire or radio communications (which
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includes the medium of television). . . The rapid growth of interstate
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communications facilities, particularly those of radio and television,
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has given rise to a variety of fraudulent activities on the part of
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unscrupulous persons which are not within the reach of existing mail
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fraud laws, but which are carried out in complete reliance upon the use
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of wire and radio facilities and without resort to the mails.... Even in
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those cases of radio fraud where the mails have played a role, it is
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sometimes difficult to prove the use of the mails to the satisfaction
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of
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the court, and so prosecutions often fail. Because of the greater
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facility in proving the use of radio, this bill if enacted might often
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rescue a prosecution which would otherwise be defeated on
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technicalities.
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H.R. Rep. No. 388, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 102 (1951).
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As the legislative history makes clear, the wire fraud statute was
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intended to complement the mail fraud statute by giving federal
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prosecutors jurisdiction over frauds involving the use of interstate (or
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foreign) wire transmissions. [fn 9] Thus what can be prosecuted as a
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scheme to defraud under the mail fraud statute (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1341) is
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equally susceptible to punishment under Sec. 1343 so long as the
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jurisdictional element is met. Carpenter v. United States. 484 U.S. 19,
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25 n.6 (1987). McEvoy Travel Bureau, Inc. v. Heritage Travel, Inc. 904
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F.2d 786, 791 n.8 (1st Cir. 1990). The concomitancy of the two statutes
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underlies the government's argument that significance should be read
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into the fact that the limited grant of certiorari in Dowling left
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Dowling's convictions for mail fraud undisturbed.
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A scheme to defraud is the defining concept of the mail and wire fraud
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statutes. Because of the conjunctive use of the word "or" in the
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statutory phrase "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining
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money or property by false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
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promises." the federal courts (encouraged by prosecutors) have
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essentially bifurcated mail and wire fraud into two separate offenses;
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the first, the devising of a scheme to defraud, the second, the devising
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of a scheme to obtain money or property by false pretenses. While the
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latter crime comports with common law notions of fraud, "[t]he phrase,
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'a scheme to defraud' came to prohibit a plan, that is, to forbid a
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state of mind, rather than physical conduct." Moohr, Mail Fraud and the
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Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to Watch Over Us, 31 Harv. J. on
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Legis. 153, 161 (1994).
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The incarnation of mail fraud as an inchoate crime has its most
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celebrated expression in federal prosecutions of state and local public
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officials accused of depriving citizens of their intangible right to
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|
honest public service in violation of their fiduciary duty to disclose
|
|
conflicts of interest. [fn 10] See United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d
|
|
1347, 1360-1362 (4th Cir. 1979). Because of the so-called "intangible
|
|
rights doctrine," mail fraud and its sister offense, wire fraud, have
|
|
become the federal prosecutor's weapon of choice. "Mail fraud . . . has
|
|
been expanded to the point that a fiduciary, agent, or employee commits
|
|
an offense when, through a material deception or a failure to disclose,
|
|
a beneficiary, principal or employer suffers even an intangible,
|
|
constructed detriment." Moohr, supra, 31 Harv. J. On Legis. at 163. Wire
|
|
fraud offers an especially pleasing feature from the government's
|
|
perspective that is particularly relevant to LaMacchia's case. Unlike
|
|
the criminal copyright statute, 17 U.S.C. Sec. 506(a), the mail and wire
|
|
fraud statutes do not require that a defendant be shown to have sought
|
|
to personally profit from the scheme to defraud. See United States v.
|
|
Silvano, 812 F.2d 754, 759-760 (1st Cir. 1987).
|
|
|
|
While it is true, as LaMacchia contends, that the denial of a writ of
|
|
certiorari "imports no expression upon the merits of the case," United
|
|
States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923), the more interesting issue
|
|
is whether the Ninth Circuit's mail fraud analysis (the significant
|
|
portions of which the Supreme Court left intact) is applicable to the
|
|
facts of his case.
|
|
|
|
Dowling brought himself within the orbit of the mail fraud statute by
|
|
mailing catalogues advertising his bootleg phonograph records. So, too,
|
|
the government argues, LaMacchia subjected himself to the wire fraud
|
|
statute by advertising infringing software via computer transmissions.
|
|
The government in Dowling (as here) did not argue any more than
|
|
jurisdictional significance for Dowling's mailings, that is, the
|
|
mailings themselves did not make any false or misleading
|
|
representations. They did, however, serve as an obvious means of
|
|
furthering Dowling's scheme to defraud. See Schmuck v. United States, 489
|
|
U.S. 705. 710-711 (1989).
|
|
|
|
The Ninth Circuit nonetheless focused on the fact that Dowling had
|
|
"concealed his activities from the copyright holders with the intent to
|
|
deprive them of their royalties." 739 F.2d at 1449. "It is settled in
|
|
this Circuit that a scheme to defraud need not be an active
|
|
misrepresentation. A nondisclosure or concealment may serve as a basis
|
|
for the fraudulent scheme." Id. at 1448. See also United States v.
|
|
Silvano, supra, 812 F.2d at 759 (same). The Ninth Circult rejected
|
|
Dowling's argument that non-disclosure can serve as the basis of a
|
|
scheme to defraud only when a defendant has a fiduciary duty to make an
|
|
affirmative disclosure. It also rejected the government's contention
|
|
that "the presence of illegal conduct alone may constitute the basis of
|
|
the 'fraud' element." 739 F.2d at 1449. "Rather, we conclude that a
|
|
non-disclosure can only serve as a basis for a fraudulent scheme when
|
|
there exists an independent duty that has been breached by the person so
|
|
charged." Id. This duty, the Ninth Circuit noted, could be fiduciary in
|
|
nature, or it could "derive from an independent explicit statutory duty
|
|
created by legislative enactment." Id. In Dowling's case, the duty
|
|
located by the Ninth Circuit was the duty implicit in the compulsory
|
|
licensing scheme of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. Sec. 115, which
|
|
requires vendors to notify copyright owners of the intention to
|
|
manufacture and distribute infringing records.
|
|
|
|
In conclusion, we stress that the narrowness of our holding permits
|
|
nondisclosures to form the basis of a scheme to defraud only when there
|
|
exists an independent duty (either fiduciary or derived from an explicit
|
|
and independent statutory requirement) and such a duty has been
|
|
breached. To hold otherwise that illegal conduct alone may constitute
|
|
the basis of the fraud element of a mail fraud conviction would have
|
|
the
|
|
potential of bringing almost any illegal act within the province of the
|
|
mail fraud statute.
|
|
|
|
739 F.2d at 1450.
|
|
|
|
The difficulties in applying the Ninth Circuit's Dowling analysis to
|
|
support a wire fraud prosecution in LaMacchia's case are three. First,
|
|
no fiduciary relationship existed between LaMacchia and the
|
|
manufacturers whose software copyrights he allegedly infringed. Second,
|
|
there is no independent statutory duty of disclosure like the one that
|
|
snared Dowling because there is no software equivalent to the compulsory
|
|
licensing scheme. [fn 11] Third, even were I to accept the argument made
|
|
by the government in Dowling, that illegal conduct alone may suffice to
|
|
satisfy the fraud element of [Sec. 1343], the holding would not cover
|
|
LaMacchia's case for the simple reason that what LaMacchia is alleged to
|
|
have done is not criminal conduct under Sec. 506(a) of the Copyright
|
|
Act. [fn 12]
|
|
|
|
The government's second and more plausible argument relies on the
|
|
unobjectionable proposition "that [the] enactment of particularized
|
|
federal interest statutes does not oust a more general interstate
|
|
commerce statute from application." Government's Memorandum at 11. The
|
|
government cites a number of areas of specialized federal law where the
|
|
mail and wire fraud statutes have been held to remain viable enforcement
|
|
tools. This same argument, however, did not impress Justice Blackmun in
|
|
Dowling, as none of the cases cited there (as here) "involved copyright
|
|
law specifically or intellectual property in general." Dowling, supra at
|
|
218 n.8. [fn 13] The government also points to 18 U.S C. Sec. 2319(a),
|
|
which provides that "[w]hoever violates section 506(a). . . of title 17
|
|
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section and such
|
|
penalties shall be in addition to any other provisions of title 17 or
|
|
any other law." The government emphasizes the last four words of the
|
|
statute without apparently noticing the first four. LaMacchia is not
|
|
alleged to have violated section 506(a). See also Dowling, supra at 225
|
|
n.18 ("In the absence of and such indication [that Congress intended to
|
|
approve the use of Sec. 2314 in a copyright prosecution], we decline to
|
|
read the general language appended to Sec. 2319(a) impliedly to validate
|
|
extension of Sec. 2314 in a manner otherwise unsupported by its language
|
|
and purpose"). Finally, the government cites Carpenter v. United
|
|
States, 484 U.S 19 (1987), which holds that intangible as well as
|
|
tangible property interests are protected by the mail and wire fraud
|
|
statutes. "Absolutely nothing in Carpenter," the government argues,
|
|
"distinguishes intangible right to copy, distribute and license computer
|
|
software from other intangible property interests...." Government's
|
|
Memorandum at 13. But see United States v. Riggs, 739 F. Supp. 414,
|
|
422-423 (N.D. Ill. 1990) ("As Dowling . . . recognized, the copyright
|
|
holder owns only a bundle of intangible rights which can be infringed,
|
|
but not stolen or converted. The owner of confidential, proprietary
|
|
business information, in contrast, possesses something which has clearly
|
|
been recognized as an item of property").
|
|
|
|
The issue thus is whether the "bundle of rights" conferred by copyright
|
|
is unique and distinguishable from the indisputably broad range of
|
|
property interests protected by the mail and wire fraud statutes. I
|
|
find it difficult, if not impossible, to read Dowling as saying anything
|
|
but that it is. [fn 14] "A copyright, like other intellectual property,
|
|
comprises a series of carefully defined and carefully delimited
|
|
interests to which the law affords correspondingly exact protections."
|
|
Dowling, supra at 216. If, as the government contends, Dowling stands
|
|
for nothing more than the proposition that one cannot equate copyright
|
|
infringement with a "physical taking" for purposes of the Stolen
|
|
Property Act, [fn 15] it is difficult to explain why Justice Blackmun
|
|
devoted the bulk of his opinion to the issue of "whether the history and
|
|
purpose of Sec. 2314 evince a plain congressional intention to reach
|
|
interstate shipments of goods infringing copyrights." Dowling supra at
|
|
218. [fn 16] Nor can one explain why the same analysis should not be
|
|
applied to the mail and wire fraud statutes, which like the Stolen
|
|
Property Act, were enacted to fill enforcement gaps in state and federal
|
|
law. Why is it not true of mail and wire fraud, as it is of ITSP, that
|
|
"[n]o such need for supplemental federal action has ever existed ....
|
|
for the obvious reason that Congress always has had the bestowed
|
|
authority to legislate directly in this area [of copyright
|
|
infringement]"? Dowling supra at 220. Finally, why would not the
|
|
government's position here produce the same pernicious result that
|
|
Justice Blackmun warned of in Dowling, of permitting the government to
|
|
subvert the carefully calculated penalties of the Copyright Act by
|
|
selectively bringing some prosecutions under the more generous penalties
|
|
of the mail and wire fraud statutes? [fn 17]
|
|
|
|
What the government is seeking to do is to punish conduct that
|
|
reasonable people might agree deserves the sanctions of the criminal
|
|
law. But as Justice Blackmun observed in Dowling, copyright is an area
|
|
in which Congress has chosen to tread cautiously, relying "chiefly . . .
|
|
on an array of civil remedies to provide copyright holders protection
|
|
against infringement," while mandating "studiously graded penalties" in
|
|
those instances where Congress has concluded that the deterrent effect
|
|
of criminal sanctions are required. Dowling, supra at 221, 225. "This
|
|
step-by-step, carefully considered approach is consistent with Congress'
|
|
traditional sensitivity to the special concerns implicated by the
|
|
copyright laws." Id at 225. Indeed, the responsiveness of Congress to
|
|
the impact of new technology on the law of copyright limned earlier in
|
|
this opinion, confirms Justice Blackmun's conviction of "the wisdom of
|
|
leaving it to the legislature to define crime and prescribe penalties"
|
|
Dowling, supra at 228.
|
|
|
|
"The judiciary's reluctance to expand the protections afforded by the
|
|
copyright without explicit legislative guidance is a recurring theme.
|
|
Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to
|
|
Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for
|
|
copyrighted materials. Congress has the institutional authority and the
|
|
institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of
|
|
competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new
|
|
technology."
|
|
|
|
Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
|
|
417, 431 (1984) (citations omitted).
|
|
|
|
While the government's objective is a laudable one, particularly when the
|
|
facts alleged in this case are considered, its interpretation of the
|
|
wire fraud statute would serve to criminalize the conduct of not only
|
|
persons like LaMacchia, but also the myriad of home computer users who
|
|
succumb to the temptation to copy even a single software program for
|
|
private use. It is not clear that making criminals of a large number of
|
|
consumers of computer software is a result that even the software
|
|
industry would consider desirable. [fn 18]
|
|
|
|
In sum, I agree with Professor Nimmer that:
|
|
|
|
The Dowling decision establishes that Congress has finely calibrated
|
|
the
|
|
reach of criminal liability [in the Copyright Act], and therefore
|
|
absent
|
|
clear indication of Congressional intent, the criminal laws of the
|
|
United States do not reach copyright-related conduct. Thus copyright
|
|
prosecutions should be limited to Section 506 of the Act, and other
|
|
incidental statutes that explicitly refer to copyright and copyrighted
|
|
works.
|
|
|
|
3 Nimmer on Copyright, Sec. 15.05 at 15-20 (1993). See also 2
|
|
Goldstein, Copyright, Sec. 11.4.2.2 at 304 n. 67 (1989) ("[A]lthough the
|
|
Court did not directly rule on whether the mail fraud statute
|
|
encompassed the infringing conduct, its reasoning with respect to the
|
|
Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2314, suggests that it would have
|
|
treated the mail fraud statute similarly.")
|
|
|
|
Accordingly, I rule that the decision of the Supreme Court in Dowling v.
|
|
United States precludes LaMacchia's prosecution for criminal copyright
|
|
infringement under the wire fraud statute. [fn 19]
|
|
|
|
This is not, of course, to suggest that there is anything edifying about
|
|
what LaMacchia is alleged to have done. If the indictment is to be
|
|
believed, one might at best describe his actions as heedlessly
|
|
irresponsible. and at worst as nihilistic, self-indulgent, and lacking
|
|
in any fundamental sense of values. Criminal as well as civil penalties
|
|
should probably attach to willful, multiple infringements of copyrighted
|
|
software even absent a commercial motive on the part of the infringer.
|
|
One can envision ways that the copyright law could be modified to permit
|
|
such prosecution. But, "'[i]t is the legislature, not the Court which is
|
|
to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.'" Dowling, supra at 214
|
|
(quoting United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95 (1820)).
|
|
|
|
ORDER
|
|
|
|
For the foregoing reasons, defendant LaMacchia's motion to dismiss is
|
|
ALLOWED.
|
|
|
|
SO ORDERED.
|
|
|
|
[signed, Richard G. Stearns]
|
|
|
|
United States District Judge
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Footnotes
|
|
---------
|
|
|
|
[1] The allusion is presumably to the North Star, a faithful
|
|
astronomical reference point for mariners.
|
|
|
|
|
|
[2] The Court observed a split among the Circuits concerning the
|
|
applicability of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2314 to the interstate transportation
|
|
of infringing articles.
|
|
|
|
[3] Another example is the finite duration of a copyright. See 17
|
|
U.S.C. Sec. 302.
|
|
|
|
[4] Act of January 6, 1897. ch 4. 29 Stat. 481--482.
|
|
|
|
[5] While the offense of criminal copyright infringement remained
|
|
defined by 17 U.S.C. Sec. 506(a), the penalties were moved to a new
|
|
freestanding statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2319.
|
|
|
|
[6] Pub. L. No. 102-561 [S. 893] (October 28, 1992) (enacted after
|
|
amendment). This is not to say that Congress had been inattentive to the
|
|
needs of the emerging software industry. In 1980, Congress added
|
|
"computer program" to the list of definitions of works protected under
|
|
the copyright statute See 17 U.S.C. Sec. 101. The Computer Software
|
|
Rental Amendments Act of 1990 gave further protection to holders of
|
|
software copyrights, although declining to subject violators to the
|
|
criminal penalties of 17 U.S.C. Sec. 506 and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2319. See
|
|
17 U.S.C. Sec. 109(b)(4).
|
|
|
|
[7] The Report that accompanied the Senate version of the bill declared
|
|
that "[t]he only defense against [software] piracy is the
|
|
copyright law." S. Rep. No. 268. 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (emphasis
|
|
added)
|
|
|
|
[8] As Senator Hatch, the Senate sponsor of the Act noted, "the copying
|
|
must be undertaken to make money, and even incidental financial benefits
|
|
that might accrue as a result of the copying should not contravene the
|
|
law where the achievement of those benefits [was] not the motivation
|
|
behind the copying." 138 Cong. Rec. S. 17958-17959 (October 8, 1992).
|
|
|
|
[9] The "interstate" limitation was inserted into the statute both out
|
|
of jurisdictional concerns and to "avoid intrusion on the police power
|
|
of the States." H.R. Rep. No. 388, supra, at 3. The police power of the
|
|
States, of course, does not extend to the regulation of copyright,
|
|
leading one to doubt, as defendant points out, that the statute was
|
|
enacted to supplement state efforts to police copyright infringement.
|
|
Defendant's Memorandum at 18.
|
|
|
|
[10] The origins and contours of the intangible rights doctrine (and the
|
|
short-lived effort of the Supreme Court to reground the mail fraud
|
|
statute in traditional concepts of property, see McNally v. United
|
|
States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987)) are capably portrayed in Moohr, supra, 31
|
|
Harv. J. on Legis at 158-170. The doctrine has been applied with similar
|
|
effect to schemes rising in a commercial context. See United States v.
|
|
George, 477 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1973) (commercial kickbacks, employee's
|
|
duty to disclose).
|
|
|
|
[11] In Cooper v. United States, 639 F Supp. 176, 180 (M.D. Fla. 1986),
|
|
cited by the government, the petitioners did not raise the sufficiency
|
|
of the allegation of a scheme to defraud, but rather the possibility
|
|
that the jury might have perceived the interstate transportation of the
|
|
pirated cassette tapes as the gravamen of the scheme, a theory
|
|
indisputably precluded by the Supreme Court's Dowling decision.
|
|
|
|
[12] I do not believe that the Ninth Circuit's mail fraud analysis
|
|
survives Dowling in any event, as I will explain. Dowling, I note, did
|
|
not contest his conviction for criminal violations of Sec. 506(a) of the
|
|
Copyright Act.
|
|
|
|
[13] The suggestion that the felony provisions of the wire fraud statute
|
|
were enacted with the punishment of copyright infringement in mind in
|
|
somewhat difficult to accept when one remembers that in 1952 the
|
|
Copyright Act authorized only misdemeanor prosecutions, a circumstance
|
|
that continued until 1982. Equally difficult to accept is the idea that
|
|
Congress has in some fashion acquiesced by silence to the utilization of
|
|
mail and wire fraud as copyright enforcement tools. One need only
|
|
contrast the infrequent and, with exception of the Congressional
|
|
reaction to McNally, technical amendments to the mail and wire fraud
|
|
statutes with Congress' exhaustive attention to developments affecting
|
|
copyright law.
|
|
|
|
[14] The government strenuously disagrees with me on this point.
|
|
However, even the dissenters in Dowling (Justice Powell and White) saw
|
|
the issue framed by the majority no differently than I do. As Justice
|
|
Powell characterizes the opinion: "The Court holds today that 18 U.S.C.
|
|
Sec, 2314 does not apply to this case because the rights of a copyright
|
|
holder are `different' from the rights of owners of other kinds of
|
|
property." Dowling, supra at 22 (Powell, J., dissenting)
|
|
|
|
[15] See Government's Memorandum at 8.
|
|
|
|
[16] The government's suggestion "that the legislative history of
|
|
copyright protection serves only to provide additional reason to
|
|
hesitate before extending Sec. 2314 to cover the interstate shipments in
|
|
this case'." and that Dowling simply held that "'Congress has not spoken
|
|
with the requisite clarity.'" seem to me equally applicable to the
|
|
analysis of Sec. 1343. Government's Memorandum at 8 (quoting Dowling,
|
|
supra at 221, 229).
|
|
|
|
[17] For example, a first offender who reproduces fewer than ten copies
|
|
of a computer software program in a one hundred and eighty day period is
|
|
subject to a maximum punishment of one year imprisonment 18 U.S.C. Sec.
|
|
2314(b)(3). The same prosecution under the wire fraud statute would
|
|
entail a maximum prison sentence of five years. As defendant also notes,
|
|
use of the wire fraud statute to punish criminal copyright infringement
|
|
would override the shorter three year statute of limitations of the
|
|
Copyright Act.
|
|
|
|
[18] In 1992, in hearings before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
|
|
Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration, the Vice-President
|
|
and General Counsel of the Computer & Communications Industry
|
|
Association testified as follows: "There are millions of people with
|
|
personal computers to make copies. That is exactly one of the reasons I
|
|
think you want to be very careful. You do not want to be accidentally
|
|
taking a large percentage of the American people, either small business
|
|
or citizens, into the gray area of criminal law." Hearing on S. 893
|
|
(August 12, 1992) at p. 65.
|
|
|
|
[19] The issue presented in this case is one of infringement only.
|
|
Infringement is a technical concept describing interference with the
|
|
statutorily defined rights of a copyright holder. A scheme or artifice
|
|
to defraud, the object of which was to fraudulently obtain possession of
|
|
the copyright itself would, I believe, be clearly punishable under the
|
|
mail and wire fraud statutes. See Dowling, supra at 217 ("[The
|
|
infringer] does not assume physical control over the copyright, nor does
|
|
he wholly deprive the owner of its use").
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Thu, 22 Dec 1994 18:44:08 -0500 (EST)
|
|
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@EFF.ORG>
|
|
Subject: File 3--EFF Personnel Changes Announced
|
|
|
|
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
|
|
|
|
Personnel Announcements at EFF.
|
|
Contact: EFF: Andrew Taubman <drew@eff.org>, +1 202 861 7700
|
|
|
|
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) announced today several
|
|
significant personnel changes. EFF is a non-profit, public interest
|
|
organization that seeks to protect and enhance the growth of "Cyberspace"
|
|
(the Global Information Infrastructure) as a diverse, free, responsible and
|
|
empowering environment.
|
|
|
|
David Johnson has been named Chair of the EFF Board of Directors and Senior
|
|
Policy Fellow of EFF. Johnson, an EFF Board member since 1993, has been
|
|
practicing computer law with the Washington, DC, law firm of Wilmer,
|
|
Cutler & Pickering. He has direct experience with computer networks as
|
|
Chairman of LEXIS Counsel Connect (an on-line system for lawyers). He joins
|
|
Andrew Taubman, Executive Director and Chief Operating Officer, who began
|
|
at EFF in September of 1994.
|
|
|
|
Esther Dyson has been named Vice-Chair and will serve on the EFF Executive
|
|
Committee. Dyson is President of EDventure Holdings Inc., a venture
|
|
capital firm focused on emerging information technologies, particularly in
|
|
Eastern Europe. Dyson is a member of the US National Information
|
|
Infrastructure Advisory Council, has board memberships at the Global
|
|
Business Network, Perot Systems, the Santa Fe Institute, and is a founding
|
|
member of the Software Publishers Association.
|
|
|
|
Johnson and Dyson join David J. Farber and Rob Glaser on the EFF
|
|
Executive Committee. Farber holds the Alfred Fitler Moore Professorship
|
|
of Telecommunications at the University of Pennsylvania, is a fellow at the
|
|
Annenberg School for Public Policy and at the Glocom Institute in Japan and
|
|
was one of the creators of many of the parts that evolved into the modern
|
|
Internet - such as CSNet, CREN, and NSFNet. Glaser is President and CEO of
|
|
Progressive Networks, an interactive media and services company and serves
|
|
on such boards as the Foundation for National Programs and the Washington
|
|
Public Affairs Network.
|
|
|
|
EFF co-founders Mitchell Kapor (immediate past Chair) and John Perry Barlow
|
|
(immediate past Vice-Chair) remain Directors and will continue to
|
|
participate actively in the development and implementation of EFF policy
|
|
programs.
|
|
|
|
Also announced, Jerry Berman, who held the position of Policy Director, has
|
|
left EFF. Janlori Goldman and Daniel Weitzner, who have worked closely
|
|
with Mr. Berman over the years, and other policy staff members, also have
|
|
left to establish with Mr. Berman a new organization to be called the
|
|
Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT). EFF wishes CDT success in its
|
|
new venture and thanks Jerry and his colleagues for their substantial
|
|
contributions over the past three years.
|
|
|
|
In 1995, EFF will continue to pursue its policy mission of protecting the
|
|
health and growth of the global computer networks. The 1995 policy agenda
|
|
includes such projects as an innovative new "State of the Net" report;
|
|
studies of the implications of the global nature of the net for
|
|
jurisdictional and governance questions; a study of the protection of
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intellectual property on networks; and efforts to preserve the free
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flow of information across the Global Information Infrastructure. EFF
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expects to continue to intervene actively to counter threats to
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computer-mediated commmuniations networks, and virtual communities, such
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as limitations on the use of cryptography and intrusions into personal
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privacy, as it has in previous years.
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------------------------------
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Date: Tue, 20 Dec 1994 17:01:12 (PST)
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From: CyberWire Dispatch <brock@well.sf.ca.us>
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Subject: File 4--EFF Personnel Changes, II
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CyberWire Dispatch // Copyright (c) 1994 //
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Jacking in from the "Back to the Future" Port:
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Washington, DC -- The Electronic Frontier Foundation has fired its Policy
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Director Jerry Berman and will soon release a sweeping new agenda for 1995
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that promises to return the organization to its original grassroots
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beginning.
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Asked to comment on his firing, Berman bristles and says: "I think that's
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baloney." Then he quickly adds: "Did you ever think I might have wanted to
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leave?"
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Berman has, in fact, left EFF, to head a new, as yet unannounced, policy
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group called the Center for Democracy and Technology. His departure from
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EFF and the creation of CDT will be made public this week in a joint
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announcement with EFF, sources said. The official line that will be spun
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to the public is that the two came to a "mutual parting of the ways."
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That benign statement, however, doesn't reflect the long hours of the
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behind the scenes deliberations, in which the language of the press
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releases will be a cautiously worded as an official State Department
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briefing.
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Heroes and pioneers always take the arrows; EFF lately has looked more
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like a pin-cushion than its self-appointed role as protector of all things
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Cyberspace. The beleaguered organization has over the course of the past
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two years endured often withering criticism from the very frontier citizens
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it was sworn to uphold and protect.
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The reason: A perceived move away from its grassroots activism to the role
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of a consummate Washington Insider deal maker.
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Berman is the man largely responsible for cutting EFF's policy cloth. He
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wears the suit well. Maybe too well. Although he has the political acumen
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to arm-wrestle inside-the-beltway, it comes at the expense of his
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management style, EFF insiders said. Those shortcomings came at the
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expense of EFF's day-to-day operations and didn't go unnoticed by its board
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of directors.
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The EFF board in October fired Berman for mismanaging the group's
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organizational and fiscal responsibilities. No impropriety or malfeasance
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was alleged, the board was simply dissatisfied with Berman's day-to-day
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managing of the shop.
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In a precursor to the board's October decision, it split Berman's job,
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giving him charge of just the policy arm, which board members said played
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to his strength. They then hired Andrew Taubman as executive director to
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oversee the day to day tasks.
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Separate from the organizational and fiscal misgivings, the board also
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couldn't brook with priority on policy affairs that Berman had engineered.
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Although Berman expertly navigated EFF through the choppy political waters
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of Washington, that course increasingly steered the organization away from
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its original vision as a populist group.
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Never was the hardcore policy-driven slant of EFF more apparent than during
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the two-plus year political firestorm that surrounded the FBIs infamous
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Digital Wiretap.
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The political wrangling during that time, in which Berman brokered the
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influence of EFF with the backing of the telephone, computer and software
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industries, to reach a compromise with legislators and the FBI on the
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bill's language, increasingly drove a wedge between the organization and
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its grassroots membership.
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Nobody within EFF interviewed for this article disagreed with how Berman
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ran his policy tour de force. In fact, the board was generally in
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agreement that Berman did an excellent job in helping to broker a less
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nefarious version of the FBI's wiretap bill than would have otherwise
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passed without his involvement on EFF's behalf.
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As effective as Berman was in shuffling between the political and
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ideological interests of EFF and its members, the "inside baseball"
|
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political bullshit was largely lost on the community of the Net, who viewed
|
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it as a kind of betrayal.
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The fact that there would be a backlash from the Net came as no surprise to
|
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Berman and EFF, who recognized the fine line they had to walk in dealing
|
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with a politically charged issue rivaled only by the Administration's
|
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insipid Clipper Chip encryption policy.
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You see, the Net community is a binary braintrust, a world of ones and
|
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zeros -- either on or off -- in which shades of grey are rarely an option.
|
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Yet it is exactly these shades of grey in which Berman excels and thrives.
|
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It is a skill -- and damn near an art form -- to be able to move among the
|
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shadows and Washington's land of a thousand different agendas. And that's
|
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right where Berman had steered EFF.
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However, it's not where the EFF board thought the organization belonged.
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And so, in a few days the Net community will read a grand announcement in
|
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which EFF and Jerry Berman state they've had a "mutual parting of the
|
|
ways." The announcement will be several fold, including:
|
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-- The formation of Berman's new Center for Democracy and Technology.
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-- That EFF has hired current board member David Johnson, currently a
|
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computer law attorney with the Washington law firm of Wilmer, Cutler and
|
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Pickering, to be its new policy director, although that exact title has
|
|
yet to be finalized.
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-- A new policy agenda for EFF that includes creation of an annual "State
|
|
of the Net" report.
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EFF Executive Director Taubman declined to comment on Berman's firing,
|
|
saying only that the organization and its former director had, indeed,
|
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agreed to a "mutual parting of the ways." He said EFF and Berman's new
|
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group would continue to work closely with each other and that the efforts
|
|
of each would be mutually beneficial.
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Johnson said he was excited about the new policy efforts he would be
|
|
heading up for EFF, which, in addition to the "State of the Net" report,
|
|
includes commissioning papers and studies to help build a more solid idea
|
|
of what exactly constitutes the Net "community" on a global basis and
|
|
helping to define the Net's community as recognizable legal entity.
|
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In addition to the new policy efforts, Johnson will have to restock EFF's
|
|
policy department: All the EFF policy wonks have jumped ship, resigning
|
|
their positions and joining with Berman's new venture.
|
|
|
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The upheaval at EFF -- which included moving the entire operation here to
|
|
new digs in Washington -- apparently hasn't hurt moral which has "never
|
|
been higher," Taubman said.
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Underscoring Taubman's remarks is EFF's on-line legal council Mike Godwin,
|
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who said the changes "create an opportunity for us to return to our more
|
|
populist mission and vision that we started with."
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|
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All Things Being Equal
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=================
|
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Adversity for a political junkie is the warp and woof of Washington
|
|
culture. Berman is no worse for the wear, having parachuted out of EFF and
|
|
into his new organization. He said CDT will be differ from EFF "on what to
|
|
emphasize." That emphasis will be to focus on "on the ground public
|
|
policy," he said.
|
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|
|
And it won't only be Berman's staff that sets the scene for familiarity as
|
|
he jump starts CDT. The former EFF policy staffers will supply him with
|
|
horsepower and his political currency will open doors. But he needs cold
|
|
hard cash to feed the troops and pay the rent.
|
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|
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That means his new organization must have financial backing and here, too,
|
|
there are no strangers. Berman's bringing along a fair chunk of EFF's
|
|
corporate sponsors to his new home.
|
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|
|
Companies providing seed money to Berman's CDT include AT&T, Bell Atlantic,
|
|
Nynex, Apple Computer and Microsoft. These same companies provided a
|
|
combined $235,000 in donations to EFF in 1993, minus Nynex, which wasn't
|
|
listed as a major donor (over $5,000) on EFF's tax returns.
|
|
|
|
It's not known if these companies will continue to fund EFF in full or in
|
|
part or what amount they have pledged to Berman's group. Just how
|
|
well-heeled CDT is and exactly who makes up the full roster of its
|
|
sponsorship remains to be seen. We'll know that after the organization
|
|
files its first tax returns, which will be a matter of public record.
|
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Meeks out...
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|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Thu, 23 Oct 1994 22:51:01 CDT
|
|
From: CuD Moderators <tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu>
|
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Subject: File 5--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 25 Nov 1994)
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------------------------------
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End of Computer Underground Digest #7.01
|
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************************************
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