851 lines
38 KiB
Plaintext
851 lines
38 KiB
Plaintext
Computer underground Digest Wed Oct 5, 1994 Volume 6 : Issue 86
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ISSN 1004-042X
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Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
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Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
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Retiring Shadow Archivist: Stanton McCandlish
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Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
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Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
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Ian Dickinson
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Urban Legend Editor: E. Greg Shrdlugold
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CONTENTS, #6.87 (Wed, Oct 5, 1994)
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File 1--The Dilemma of Crypto
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File 2--MCI Worker in Phone-card Ripoff (w/obligatory hacker link)
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File 3--Judge Rejects FBI Delay
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File 4--An Invitation to Hear Your Opinion! (Seattle Times)
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File 5--Outlaws on the Net: Criminal Law in Cyberspace
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File 6--The Scary Story of Serdar Argic (EYE Reprint)
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File 7--Cu Digest Header Information (unchanged since 10 Sept 1994)
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CuD ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL, AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION APPEARS IN
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THE CONCLUDING FILE AT THE END OF EACH ISSUE.
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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From: weyker@WAM.UMD.EDU
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Date: Thu, 29 Sep 1994 21:56:09 -0400
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Subject: File 1--The Dilemma of Crypto
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Hi. The following is a little bit dated now (it responds to Bruce
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Sterling's article on crypto some month's back in Wired magazine's
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"Infobahn Warrior" issue), since it has been languishing in my account
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for several months while I waited to see if Wired would run part of it
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as a letter. They didn't.
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It's probably worth noting that I wrote David Chaum the leading
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advocate of Digital Cash and asked for some ideas on how "validating
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authorities" and other stuctures he mentions in his Scientific
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American article might be able to deal with some of the concerns I
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express below. I did this hoping I could revise the article and make
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it more constructive and less alarmist about crypto's possible
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realtionship to future white-collar crime. Unfortunately Mr. Chaum
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never wrote back.
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Much of this piece is raw speculation and I welcome corrections from
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people who are better informed about the intricacies of crypto,
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net.privacy, and computer/financial crime.
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Shayne Weyker
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weyker@wam.umd.edu
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the text of the piece follows:
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Clipper:
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How much privacy can we afford?
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How much security do we need?
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by Shayne Weyker
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weyker@wam.umd.edu
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Three cheers for Bruce Sterling. Finally someone on the privacy
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side of the Clipper debate has the courage to admit that Clipper
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might indeed provide some needed protection against crooks and
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terrorists. I want to try and do a bit more of what Bruce has done:
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to try and pin down what the real dangers are both of strong crypto
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and of bans on strong crypto.
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To date, the anti-clipper faction has tried to deny the force of
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the "law enforcement needs wiretaps" argument. They have claimed that
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wiretaps aren't truly necessary and that law enforcement officers
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will just have to work a bit harder.
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This often-repeated argument has a flaw in it that I've heard no one else
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mention. It doesn't acknowledge the fact that more and more crimes that
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used to be susceptible to discovery through means other than wiretapping
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(witnesses, visual or audio surveillance, physical searches) may soon be
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concealed to all forms of discovery *except* wiretapping and its variants.
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More and more of our life will take place over the wires, so it is no
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surprise that more and more crime will take place there as well.
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FROM PAPER TO DIGITAL VAPOR
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Criminals who wanted to share things like military secrets, monthly
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sales reports for drugs or stolen merchandise, and lists of stolen
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credit card numbers used to have to keep a lot of this stuff on
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paper. But more and more folks own computers and modems, and
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software will eventually make using and sharing the computer files
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even easier than paper. How long will it be before cops long for
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the days when they could arrest someone and search their premises
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for incriminating documents and actually expect to find anything
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that isn't encrypted with RSA or PGP? Cops will be less able to
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find incriminating paper evidence if crooks are smart enough to
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keep things on computers and encrypted. And while I think privacy
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advocates too often tend to make the criminal in their own image,
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the privacy advocates' argument is that crooks are indeed smart and
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careful with incriminating data.
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"IF YOU WANNA ROB A BANK YOU MUST BEWARE,
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YOU'VE GOTTA USE THE COMPUTER UPSTAIRS"
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Criminals who want lots of quick cash now often go stick-up a bank.
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And even if hacking into and diverting money from banks' Electronic
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Funds Transfer (EFT) systems or a company's billing system is more
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their style, they still have to work at it. The hackers who claimed
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to have diverted funds from an EFT system gave an involved story
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about how they went to multiple banks, used phony identities, and
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altered their appearance and handwriting each time when they opened
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an account and again when they went back to withdraw their loot
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over several visits. Somewhere in all those visits they may have
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slipped up and given a clue as to who really picked up the money.
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But if those hackers could bypass all this by just transforming
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other people's bank deposits into their own digital cash with a few
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keystrokes, all these opportunities to screw up and leave clues
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behind go away.
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BACK TO THE FUTURE:
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TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GRIFTERS
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[Con artists' schemes in the 1800s] often presupposed the
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anonymities of a mobile society. Con men slipped from
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place to place; geographically speaking; they also milked
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the fact of social ambiguity. . . . boundaries between
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classes (of every sort) were more porous than before. It
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was possible to pass oneself off as a lord, a professor,
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or a rich investor, which simply could not have been done
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in a tight, controlled, barnacled society where the
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markers of class are more obvious, if not indelible. . .
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. Technology permitted the more obvious forms of
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emulation [of the upper class]: cheap copies of hats or
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dresses; mass-produced artifacts and furniture.
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Lawrence Friedman noted that in 1800s America fraud skyrocketed.
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Two of the reasons he gives for this have fascinating parallels
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with the social environment of the net.
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The first was the anonymity of people in communities with a high
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turnover in their membership. There was no opportunity to develop
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a moral track-record on the community's members which people could
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use when deciding who to trust. The second was the new high-tech
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mass-produced objects, furniture, and fashionable clothes could be
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used to let the con artist appear in all ways to be a member of the
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respected upper class.
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Does any of this sound familiar? Modern people have adapted to the above
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circumstances, but the net society with crypto looks like it's going to
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give us heightened anonymity and entirely new means to simulate
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respectability which will lead to another whole generation getting being
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ripped off.
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Privacy advocates have been saying, with some good reason, how nice
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the anonymity of the net is. And indeed it is good in some ways
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that we judge professors, high schoolers, and street people only by
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their words. It is also empowering for some to be able to use the
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net to create virtual personas for themselves in communication with
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other people that will appear to be real.
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But there's a dark side to this. Yes, anonymity does mean one can
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escape retribution for whistleblowing and avoid unfair prejudices
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of others based on one's appearance and surroundings. But anonymity
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also means one can escape retribution for actions that fully
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deserve punishment like spamming the net, e-mail bombing, or
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forging nasty posts in widely-read newsgroups. This can be done by
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hiding behind chains of anonymous remailers or getting a new
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account with a new name when too many folks have started to warn
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others about you.
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Also, one can create a virtual persona for oneself in e-mail and
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postings, such as that of a cancer victim, designed to elicit trust
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and confidence from those of a similar background who may be
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emotionally vulnerable. This trust is undeserved and subject to
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abuse, while the eventual discovery of the lie damages the tricked
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person's (and others') ability to trust people they meet on the
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net. If this kind of abuse becomes common, the cloud of suspicion
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hanging over people's communications on the net will hinder the
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very trust needed to form those kinds of associations of private
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individuals that Bruce Sterling and others are so fond of.
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Finally, returning to con artists, there may be increased
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gullibility on the users' part once teleconferencing becomes common
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and buying stuff on the net is an everyday practice. Con artists
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could then use set design and image processing for the video end of
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the scam and fancy programming to appear established and credible
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to folks checking out their site on the net. So, the con artist
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never has to meet the victim in person and anonymity based on
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encryption makes it nigh-impossible to connect the grifter with the
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victim's money.
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REACH OUT AND TOUCH SOMEONE
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For an extreme, if unlikely, case, consider the murderer who
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remotely reprograms some victim's household robot to electrocute
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him. No hope of witnesses or physical evidence there. Finding out
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who made the suspect call to the house to plant the code is the
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only hope. Sometimes the cops will be lucky and have a suspect who
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happens to be a programmer, but convicting this person without his
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being caught with the killer program code or being identified as
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party to the suspect communication to the victim's house will be
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tough.
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THE RUN-DOWN
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People interacting with others using cryptography-aided
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telecommunications are currently expected to be able to:
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- be totally anonymous in cyberspace
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- create multiple pseudonymous virtual identities for themselves--
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each with separate and un-crosscheckable personal associations and
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finances
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- secretly conduct financial dealings
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- secretly exchange valuable commercial or government secrets
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- secretly exchange socially-disapproved-of (or illegal)
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information
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Libertarians and anarchists may think all these things sound great.
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They may be excited by opportunities for whistleblowing, anonymous
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political expression, secret political organization for oppressive
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environments, riskless sharing of erotica and other sometimes-legal
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data, and so on.
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But responsible adults should spend equal amounts of time thinking
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about opportunities for easier planning of terrorism, easier
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evasion of punishment for abusing innocent people on the net, and
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very real benefits for con artists, money launderers, embezzlers,
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tax cheats, and other white-collar crooks.
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THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN:
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Remember though, it was said earlier that more and more of human
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life is going to take place over the wires. Clipper advocates may
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well say that they're only trying to maintain the same ability to
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wiretap that the government has had for decades. But if more and
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more of our lives are there to see in our telephone and data
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communications, and those communications remain less protected than
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other forms of communication such as face to face, then our overall
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privacy is going to be eroded.
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Bulletin Board Systems aren't as private as the local coffeehouse
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or bar. 900-number sex lines aren't as private as a visit to a
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lover. Videoconferences aren't as private as face to face meetings.
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E-mail and ftp aren't as private as postal mail. The list goes on.
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This erosion of privacy is rightly thought to be a bad thing in and
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of itself, and unrestricted crypto looks like the only way to stop it.
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THE SEEMING ALL-OR-NOTHING DILEMMA OF CRYPTO
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We seem to have two choices.
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We can let crypto run free. This probably means more terrorism,
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some of it with really impressive body-counts. It means lots more
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white collar crime, and somewhat more distrust on the net. The
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terrorism and crime may mean that the public hastily agrees to give
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up other freedoms if they think the government has suddenly become
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ineffective in protecting them.
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Or the developed nations can get together and ban crypto and watch
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most people's privacy quickly disappear. The technology-elite
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corporations and individuals will still develop their own, and some
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criminals will pay hackers for secure internal communications.
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Meanwhile, in the developing world, oppressive governments gain a
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powerful new weapon. Heavy regulation of crypto will have much the same
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effect.
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It's an ugly choice. And I've heard too many people dismiss the folks on
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the other side as either voyeuristic fascists or paranoid anarchists with
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a "don't worry, be happy" attitude towards public safety. Both sides are
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doing public who depend upon the quality of the debate a disservice. The
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debate should have less fear-mongering about what is goin to happen if
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"the other side" wins, and more brainstorming about exactly what new
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technology, new laws, and new behaviors we can develop which will protect
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us against the very real dangers of a world with too much or too little
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crypto in the public's hands.
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------------------------------
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Date: Wed, 5 Oct 1994 17:33:21 CDT
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From: Anonymous <cudigest@mindvox.phantom.com>
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Subject: File 2--MCI Worker in Phone-card Ripoff (w/obligatory hacker link)
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Source: Chicago Tribune, Oct 4, 1994, p. 4 (AP Wire story):
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MCI WORKER IS CHARGED IN HUGE PHONE-CARD THEFT
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An MCI employee has been charged with stealing more than 100,000
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telephone calling-card numbers that were used to make $50 million in
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long-distance calls, federal investigators said.
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Ivey James Lay was a main supplier of the numbers for an
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international ring operating in Los Angeles, Chicago and other U.S.
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cities, as well as in Spain and Germany, said the U.S. Secret Service,
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which investigates interstate telephone fraud.
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Tens of thousands of customers at MCI, AT&T, Sprint and some local
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telephone companies were victims, the Secret Service said. Those
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consumers won't be billed for fraudulent calls on their phone-card
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numbers, spokesmen for MCI, AT&T and Sprint said.
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Lay, a switch engineer based in Charlotte, N.C., was known as
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"Knightshadow" to computer hackers. He devised computer software to
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divert and hold calling-card numbers from a variety of carriers that
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ran through MCI's telephone switching equipment, said Secret Service
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special agent Steven A. Sepulveda.
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According to MCI officials, the case is the largest of its kind in
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terms of known losses. The theft was far more sophisticated than past
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credit-card and calling-card scams, MCI said. In the others, thieves
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had access to a small number of cards.
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In this ring, the numbers were purchased by computer hackers in the
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United States and Europe, who in turn sold them to Europeans who would
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use them later to call the United States for free, Sepulveda said.
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------------------------------
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From: email list server <listserv@SUNNYSIDE.COM>
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Date: Mon, 3 Oct 1994 13:28:35 -0700
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Subject: File 3--Judge Rejects FBI Delay
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Judge Rejects FBI Delay
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=============================================================
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PRESS RELEASE
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For immediate release
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October 3, 1994
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Contact:
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Marc Rotenberg, EPIC Director
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David Sobel, EPIC Legal Counsel
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202 544 9240 (tel)
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JUDGE REJECTS DELAY ON FBI WIRETAP DATA;
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"STUNNED" BY BUREAU'S REQUEST
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WASHINGTON, D.C.- A federal judge today denied the FBI's request
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for a five-year delay in processing documents concerning wiretap
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legislation now pending in Congress.
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Saying he was "stunned" by the Bureau's attempt to postpone
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court proceedings for five years, U.S. District Judge Charles R.
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Richey ordered the FBI to release the material or to explain its
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reasons for withholding it by November 4.
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The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), a public
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interest research group based in Washington, DC, filed the Freedom
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of Information Act lawsuit on August 9, the day legislation was
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introduced in Congress to authorize the expenditure of $500
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million to make the nation's communications systems easier to
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wiretap. The group is seeking the public release of two surveys
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cited by FBI Director Louis Freeh in support of the pending
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legislation.
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The FBI had moved to stay proceedings in the case until June
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1999, more than five years after the filing of the initial
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request. The Bureau asserted it was confronted with "a backlog of
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pending FOIA requests awaiting processing." The FBI revealed that
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there are "an estimated 20 pages to be reviewed" but said that the
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materials would not be reviewed until "sometime in March 1999."
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Judge Richey rejected the FBI's claims in sharp language from
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the bench. He told the government's attorney to "call Director
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Freeh and tell him I said this matter can be taken care of in an
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hour and a half."
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In court papers filed late last week, EPIC charged that
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the requested materials are far too important to be kept secret.
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"The requested surveys were part of the FBI's long-standing
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campaign to gain passage of unprecedented legislation requiring
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the nation's telecommunications carriers to redesign their
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telephone networks to more easily facilitate court-ordered
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wiretapping," said the EPIC brief.
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Earlier documents obtained through the FOIA in similar
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litigation with the FBI revealed no technical obstacles to the
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exercise of court-authorized wire surveillance.
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The FBI is pushing for quick enactment of the wiretap
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legislation in the closing days of the 103rd Congress. A
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grassroots campaign to oppose the measure is being coordinated by
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EPIC and Voters Telecomm Watch.
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The Electronic Privacy Information Center is a project of
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Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, a membership
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organization based in Palo Alto, California, and the Fund for
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Constitutional Government, a Washington-based foundation dedicated
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to the protection of Constitutional freedoms. 202 544 9240 (tel),
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202 547 5482 (fax), info@epic.org (e-mail).
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------------------------------
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Date: Mon, 26 Sep 1994 08:00:02 -0700 (PDT)
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From: 2020 World <year2020@seatimes.com>
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Subject: File 4--An Invitation to Hear Your Opinion! (Seattle Times)
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The year 2020, what will it be like? By then, the big version of what we
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call the info-highway will have been with us for some time. Society will
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have undergone major adjustments, earthquake-sized shifts. Today's
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journalism about the info-highway misses the point. What difference does
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it make if it's coax or fiber, PC or set-top box, TCI or AT&T. What
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matters is how it will change our world.
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Our world will change dramatically. How? Where? What? Today, if you
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are curious about this stuff, you have two choices; read the Time
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magazine-type "general interest" feature written by someone who hasn't got
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a clue, or read the Wired magazine-type "top ten" Industry-leaders/
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futurists (you know who they are!) lecture us on their particular vested
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interest. Either way, the real changes are not being discussed. Let's
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change that.
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I want to invite you to participate in a global group exploration of life
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in the year 2020. Let me introduce myself and then explain. My name is
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Kurt Dahl and I am currently the Vice President of Information Technology
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at The Seattle Times (Seattle's major metro newspaper). I am writing a
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new weekly column that will be published in the Sunday Seattle Times
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Personal Technology section.
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The column is called 2020world. The idea of 2020world is to explore how
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our lives will change when the information highway is a familiar and
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integral part of our society. The column will *NOT* be about technology,
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that's why I picked the year 2020, by then we can all agree that a
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broadband, fully switched, ubiquitous network will have been in place for
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many years. How that network will change our lives, not how it will work,
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is the question 2020world will address.
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So now you are thinking -- I really don't need to read more simple-minded
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drivel about the information highway. I agree, you don't, and won't.
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2020world will explore ideas that are far outside the typical, boring
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discussions of home-shopping and video-on-demand. Yet it will be written
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for the general reader. Let me show you how. I have included the first
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column from September 25th, as an example. Please read it, then you will
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get the idea.
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Here is where you come in, and this is the most impo~
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To join in, simply reply (as shown below) and you will automatically be
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enrolled as a subscriber to our mailing list. Each week the new 2020world
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column will be e-mailed to you as well as the best and most exciting
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comments and responses. If you want to respond, simply send an e-mail to
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our address (also included below). Any questions, send me an e-mail or
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call.
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But first, read the inaugural column! Here goes...
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Copyright 1994 Seattle Times Company
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2020world column title: Emily is illiterate
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The information superhighway -- aren't you tired of reading about it?
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And it doesn't even exist! But it will. And after it's built, we will
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live in a very different world.
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How different and in what ways? What you have read in the press so far
|
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is a lot of trivial chatter about "home shopping" and movies-on-demand"
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combined with boring technical details. These stories just don't come
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close to capturing the profound changes we will experience. To better
|
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understand where we are going we need a new approach, fresh ideas.
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That's what this column will try to do.
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Let's discover this new world together. Let's use one of the most
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intriguing new capabilities of the information superhighway: the concept
|
|
of group-mind. Here's how: I'll start with an original, sometimes
|
|
outrageous, thought about life in the year 2020, and you send me your
|
|
reaction to that idea. I'll organize the most thoughtful, expansive and
|
|
mind-stretching responses, and we will print them.
|
|
|
|
Your thoughts and questions can lead us in new directions. Over time we
|
|
will follow these "group-mind" wanderings whichever way they go. If we
|
|
succeed, 2020world will be as much your space as mine.
|
|
|
|
It's the year 2020, your daughter Emily is 9 years old, and she
|
|
can't read or write. Is this your worst nightmare about our schools
|
|
come true? Nope, Emily just doesn't need to read or write anymore.
|
|
|
|
The written word is a means to an end and not an end in itself. We use
|
|
it to communicate with large groups and to preserve ideas, but we prefer
|
|
the spoken word. In 2020world, with the ability to create, store and
|
|
send audio and video as easily as written words, why would we need to
|
|
read and write?
|
|
|
|
Look inside your own head. Do you store information as written words?
|
|
Do you dream in written words? No, you don't. Visual images and spoken
|
|
languages are our natural form of information. Writing is nothing more
|
|
than a technology. It can be replaced by something better. In fact,
|
|
some forms of the written word are being replaced right now, like
|
|
shorthand. Can you think of other dead technologies?
|
|
|
|
I'll bet you are now in the "but what about..." stage:
|
|
|
|
But what about education? Video can do anything books can do;
|
|
well-produced video can do many things better. Which is the better way
|
|
to learn about the Civil War -- reading a text for 10 hours or watching
|
|
10 hours of Ken Burns' PBS production on the Civil War?
|
|
|
|
But what about the law? Don't we need the precision implied by written
|
|
rules? Perhaps, but wouldn't videos of the original trials, legislative
|
|
debates, rulings and precedents be a better guide to future generations
|
|
than law books?
|
|
|
|
Send me your own "but what abouts." But make sure to include your
|
|
thoughts about how the 2020world would deal with those situations, too.
|
|
|
|
Does Emily really need to read and write in 2020world? I don't think
|
|
so. Do you?
|
|
|
|
**************************************************************
|
|
* *
|
|
* Kurt Dahl is vice president of information technology at *
|
|
* The Seattle Times. The views he expresses here are not *
|
|
* necessarily those of The Seattle Times Company. *
|
|
* *
|
|
**************************************************************
|
|
|
|
SUBSCRIPTION INSTRUCTIONS:
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2020world is currently an unmoderated list, however, there are plans to
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implement the DIGEST option. All mail sent to this list will be sent to
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all other subscribers.
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To subscribe, mail to:
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majordomo@seatimes.com
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and, include in body of text: subscribe 2020world
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If you choose not to subscribe, but would like to e-mail me directly with
|
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your comments, my address is:
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|
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year2020@seatimes.com
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|
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or, call me at:
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|
|
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206-464-3339
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|
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or, FAX me at:
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206-382-8898
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Thanks for taking the time to read this loonnggg e-mail. Please join in
|
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and help us understand the real nature of our world after the information
|
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highway is built. Send your subscription e-mail right now! I'm looking
|
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forward to adding your thoughts to our discussion.
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|
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One last request, please forward this invitation to those who you think
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would be interested.
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Thanks!
|
|
|
|
Kurt Dahl
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 1994 15:44:33 -0500
|
|
From: Stephen Smith <libertas@COMP.UARK.EDU>
|
|
Subject: File 5--Outlaws on the Net: Criminal Law in Cyberspace
|
|
|
|
District of Columbia Bar Association
|
|
|
|
The New Technology Committee
|
|
of the Computer Law Section, and the Criminal Law and
|
|
Individual Rights Section, invite you to a Panel Discussion entitled:
|
|
|
|
CRIMINAL LAW IN CYBERSPACE: OUTLAWS ON THE NET
|
|
|
|
Speakers: Scott Charney, Chief, Computer Crimes
|
|
Unit of the U.S. Department of Justice
|
|
|
|
Mike Godwin, Counsel to the Electronic Frontier Foundation
|
|
|
|
Mark D. Rasch, Arent Fox Kintner Plotkin & Kahn
|
|
|
|
Moderator: Andrew Grosso, Co-Chair, New Technology Committee
|
|
|
|
|
|
Whenever a new technology becomes prevalent, the law enters a period of
|
|
struggle during which it tries to find adequate means for resolving disputes
|
|
involving that technology, and for protecting the rights of people affected
|
|
by it. We are now in such a period for the Internet and the developing
|
|
National Information Infrastructure (NII). Of all legal fields, the struggle
|
|
concerning the criminal law is the most pronounced, since old statutes
|
|
must be narrowly construed to protect civil liberties, while used in a
|
|
creative fashion in order to deter malevolent acts which have never seen
|
|
before. This program focuses on computer network crime having national
|
|
and international ramifications, including several recent investigations and
|
|
prosecutions.
|
|
|
|
This panel brings together noted experts in the field of civil liberties and
|
|
computer crime to discusses the issues presented by the latest
|
|
developments in this area. Scott Charney is the Chief of the Computer
|
|
Crimes Unit of the U. S. Department of Justice, and is actively involved
|
|
in the formulation of federal policy with regard to computer-related
|
|
crimes. Mike Godwin is the On Line Legal Counsel for the Electronic
|
|
Frontier Foundation who is a respected defender of civil liberties for
|
|
telecommunications users. Mark D. Rasch is prominent defense attorney
|
|
who, while an attorney with the Fraud Section of the Department of
|
|
Justice, prosecuted the "Internet Worm" case in 1989. Andrew Grosso,
|
|
the panel moderator, is a Co-Chair of the New Technology Committee and
|
|
a former federal prosecutor. Written materials by the panelists will
|
|
be distributed.
|
|
|
|
Date: Thursday, October 27, 1994
|
|
|
|
Time: 12:00 Noon
|
|
|
|
Place: D.C. Bar Headquarters
|
|
1250 H Street, N.W.
|
|
|
|
Cost: Box Lunch: $25.00 for Section members and
|
|
students; $30.00 for Non-Members.
|
|
Program Only: $19.00 for Section Members and students;
|
|
$24.00 for Non-Members.
|
|
____________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
REGISTRATION FORM
|
|
____________________________________________________________
|
|
|
|
Mail to: Computer Law Section
|
|
D.C. Bar, 1250 H Street, N.W. 6th Floor
|
|
Washington, D.C. 20005-3908
|
|
|
|
Please reserve ____________ spaces(s) for me at the October 27 program.
|
|
Enclosed is my check for __________ made payable to the DC Bar.
|
|
|
|
Checks must be received by October 25. Sorry, phone reservations cannot
|
|
be accepted.
|
|
|
|
Name(s) Phone(s) Bar No(s). Bar Member?
|
|
|
|
_____________ ____________ ___________ Yes/No
|
|
|
|
_____________ ____________ ___________ Yes/No
|
|
|
|
_____________ ____________ ___________ Yes/No
|
|
|
|
|
|
Please notify the Sections Office (202-626-3463) if you require any
|
|
special dietary or physical accommodations.
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Fri, 2 Sep 1994 11:08:07 -0400 (EDT)
|
|
From: eye WEEKLY <eye@IO.ORG>
|
|
Subject: File 6--The Scary Story of Serdar Argic (EYE Reprint)
|
|
|
|
((MODERATORS' NOTE: We're periodically asked what we know about
|
|
Serdar Argic. All we know is what we read on the Nets and....from EYE
|
|
Magazine, a first-rate arts/culture 'Zine out of Toronto. Argic
|
|
is considered by some to be a finalist for the all-time NetKook
|
|
award. Here's why.))
|
|
|
|
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
eye WEEKLY July 28 1994
|
|
Toronto's arts newspaper .....free every Thursday
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
EYE NET EYE NET
|
|
|
|
HOWLING IN THE WIRES
|
|
-- A net.poltergeist horror story
|
|
|
|
by
|
|
ARMENIAN CRIMINAL/CROOK/WACKO
|
|
K.K. CAMPBELL
|
|
|
|
|
|
Huddle round the fire, little netters ... lend yer ear to hear The
|
|
Scariest Net.Story Ever Told. 'Tis a tale of a creature so hideous, so
|
|
awe-inspiring, so inhuman, so incomprehensible, that none that
|
|
behold it dare sleep without altering their .newsrc again.
|
|
|
|
We speak of none other than "Serdar Argic."
|
|
|
|
The Serdar-thing manifested outta nowhere, terrorized Usenet News
|
|
for two blood-curdling years ... then, just as mysteriously,
|
|
disappeared without trace.
|
|
|
|
So wide was the spectre's swath that nary a Usenetter hasn't
|
|
stumbled into a newsgroup only to be confronted by this wild-eyed
|
|
banshee gnawing at the cables. The Argic.poltergeist posted
|
|
endlessly, reams and reams of repeat-info to irrelevant newsgroups,
|
|
so insatiable was its bloodlust.
|
|
|
|
The entity's purpose? Whitewash Turk genocide against Armenians
|
|
in WWI. The entity's tactics? Snark School of Demagoguery:
|
|
Whatever I say three times is true -- so if I say it 37 million times,
|
|
it must really really be true.
|
|
|
|
And the Argic-entity did just that -- April 29 last, Usenet stats
|
|
indicated "Serdar Argic" had, over two weeks, posted 935 articles
|
|
(66 a day) comprising over 7,100 kbytes of Armenian-hatred. A full
|
|
.5 per cent of Planet Earth's Usenet posts.
|
|
|
|
SMELLS LIKE SERDAR SPIRIT
|
|
|
|
So, who or what is "Serdar Argic"? No one is completely sure. But
|
|
the net.poltergeist has many avid hunters. You think swapping
|
|
"banned" Homolka info is fun, kids? You ain't seen nothing yet.
|
|
Argicology is a Usenet passion without compare.
|
|
|
|
Veteran Argicologist Warren Burstein is certain "Serdar Argic" was,
|
|
originally, Hasan B. Mutlu, an AT&T employee. Burstein brought forth
|
|
several rare specimens of Mutlu's early-'90s Usenet posts. Indeed,
|
|
they're stylistically identical to Argic.chain.rattling -- schoolyard
|
|
taunts like "Hey gum brain"; the famous phrase "Armenian terrorist
|
|
from the ASALA/SDPA/ARF Terrorism Triangle"; and the clever
|
|
segue, "In any event, let me get back to the real issue at hand,"
|
|
namely, denying the Turk slaughter of Armenians.
|
|
|
|
Mutlu disappeared from Usenet after someone scanned a picture of
|
|
him from an AT&T technical digest, and uploaded it to the net. Its
|
|
caption reads: "Hasan B. Mutlu, a member of the technical staff in
|
|
the Computing Technology Department at AT&T Bell Laboratories in
|
|
Napervile, Ill."
|
|
|
|
After this, the Serdar spectre arose through a Minnesota-based
|
|
Internet site run by an Ahmet Cosar. (Type "whois anatolia.org" at
|
|
shell prompt for info.) Some suggest Cosar is Serdar Argic. To back
|
|
the Cosar-is-Argic theory, Argicologists point to a March 22, 1994,
|
|
post where Cosar (probably by mistake) uses the Argic account to
|
|
post a personal reply. He signs it "Ahmet Cosar."
|
|
|
|
Others think the Argic-entity is a "bot" -- an "artificial
|
|
intelligence" that greps (searches) select newsgroups for buzzwords
|
|
(like "Turkey" or "Greece") and responds. (Many contend the U.S.
|
|
National Security Agency has done this for years with phone lines,
|
|
listening for its own obsessive buzzwords.)
|
|
|
|
The latter would explain some truly bizarre Argic-entity replies. For
|
|
instance: Ken Arromdee (arromdee@jyusenkyou.cs.jhu.edu) signed all
|
|
his posts with the line: "On the first day after Christmas my
|
|
truelove served to me ... Leftover Turkey!" Deliberate bot-bait. Sure
|
|
enough, the Argic-entity once responded to this with data on evil
|
|
Armenians, drawn by the word "turkey" but unable to understand the
|
|
difference between country and bird.
|
|
|
|
NOW YOU SEE HIM ...
|
|
|
|
And, just as suddenly, it was gone. Usenet is still stunned. There are
|
|
several rumors: the spook was recalled by secret Turkish
|
|
government handlers, propaganda campaign terminated (Turkey still
|
|
officially denies the Armenian holocaust). Or it was finally
|
|
exorcised by UUNet for extreme breach of user agreement. Or Cosar
|
|
left the University of Minnesota (voluntarily or otherwise), thus
|
|
losing access to the paper's computer.
|
|
|
|
"Anatolia.org was a student machine for a student newspaper --
|
|
Cosar lost access because he was so busy being Argic he didn't have
|
|
time to be a computer science student," contends battle-hardened
|
|
Argicologist Joel Furr (jfurr@acpub.duke.edu). Furr is creator of the
|
|
newsgroup alt.fan.serdar-argic (with a little help from Canada's
|
|
prodigal son, Bruce Becker).
|
|
|
|
"Is the baton just being passed?" Furr asks in a phone interview. "Is
|
|
it an organization, where they decide who is going to be the robo-
|
|
poster for the year? Mutlu started it and recruited, by my theory."
|
|
|
|
So what will be the next manifestation of the net.wraith? Burstein,
|
|
currently in Israel (warren@itexjct.jct.ac.il), told eye he thinks the
|
|
current low-volume Armenian-haters now in soc.culture.turkish are
|
|
just Argic-groupies. "Joel thinks these folks are aliases for
|
|
whoever was behind Mutlu and Argic. I'm not sure, as they aren't at
|
|
all abusive, unlike the real thing -- and they do answer email."
|
|
|
|
THAT CERTAIN SERDAR STYLE
|
|
|
|
Furr has created a popular net.collectible: Serdar Argic T-shirts! We
|
|
kid you not. He's sold 136, from Osaka, Japan, to Lund, Sweden. It's a
|
|
break-even project, not for profit. Write Furr for info: the shirts are
|
|
about $15 in U.S. funds. Furr says his next T-shirt subject will honor
|
|
two-bit, suck-my-left-nut lawyers Canter and Siegel -- net.spammers
|
|
(they posted an ad in 5,000-plus newsgroups) extraordinaire.
|
|
|
|
Serdar shirt art, designed by Furr, Paul Vail and Peter Vorobieff, can
|
|
be downloaded from eye's gopher site "gopher.io.org" in the
|
|
/misc/Argicology directory. You can also find the Argic FAQ
|
|
(frequently asked questions) file, written by Burstein, in the same
|
|
directory, along with the scanned picture of Mutlu.
|
|
|
|
|
|
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
|
Retransmit freely in cyberspace Author holds standard copyright
|
|
Full issue of eye available in archive ==> gopher.io.org or ftp.io.org
|
|
eye@io.org "Break the Gutenberg Lock..." 416-971-8421
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 1994 22:51:01 CDT
|
|
From: CuD Moderators <tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu>
|
|
Subject: File 7--Cu Digest Header Information (unchanged since 10 Sept 1994)
|
|
|
|
Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
|
|
available at no cost electronically.
|
|
|
|
CuD is available as a Usenet newsgroup: comp.society.cu-digest
|
|
|
|
Or, to subscribe, send a one-line message: SUB CUDIGEST your name
|
|
Send it to LISTSERV@UIUCVMD.BITNET or LISTSERV@VMD.CSO.UIUC.EDU
|
|
The editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-0303), fax (815-753-6302)
|
|
or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL
|
|
60115, USA.
|
|
|
|
Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest
|
|
news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of
|
|
LAWSIG, and DL1 of TELECOM; on GEnie in the PF*NPC RT
|
|
libraries and in the VIRUS/SECURITY library; from America Online in
|
|
the PC Telecom forum under "computing newsletters;"
|
|
On Delphi in the General Discussion database of the Internet SIG;
|
|
on RIPCO BBS (312) 528-5020 (and via Ripco on internet);
|
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and on Rune Stone BBS (IIRGWHQ) (203) 832-8441.
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CuD is also available via Fidonet File Request from
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1:11/70; unlisted nodes and points welcome.
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|
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EUROPE: from the ComNet in LUXEMBOURG BBS (++352) 466893;
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In ITALY: Bits against the Empire BBS: +39-461-980493
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In BELGIUM: Virtual Access BBS: +32.69.45.51.77 (ringdown)
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UNITED STATES: etext.archive.umich.edu (192.131.22.8) in /pub/CuD/
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ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in /pub/Publications/CuD/
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aql.gatech.edu (128.61.10.53) in /pub/eff/cud/
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world.std.com in /src/wuarchive/doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/
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uceng.uc.edu in /pub/wuarchive/doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/
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wuarchive.wustl.edu in /doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/
|
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EUROPE: nic.funet.fi in pub/doc/cud/ (Finland)
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ftp.warwick.ac.uk in pub/cud/ (United Kingdom)
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|
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JAPAN: ftp.glocom.ac.jp /mirror/ftp.eff.org/Publications/CuD
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|
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
|
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diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted for non-profit as long
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as the source is cited. Authors hold a presumptive copyright, and
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they should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that
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non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise
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specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles
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DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
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the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all
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responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not
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violate copyright protections.
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------------------------------
|
|
|
|
End of Computer Underground Digest #6.87
|
|
************************************
|
|
|