734 lines
34 KiB
Plaintext
734 lines
34 KiB
Plaintext
Computer underground Digest Sun Oct 2, 1994 Volume 6 : Issue 86
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ISSN 1004-042X
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Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
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Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
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Retiring Shadow Archivist: Stanton McCandlish
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Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
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Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
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Ian Dickinson
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Urban Legend Editor: E. Greg Shrdlugold
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CONTENTS, #6.86 (Sun, Oct 2, 1994)
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File 1--GPO Puts Congressional Bills Online
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File 2--A Summary of Electronic Gov't Info for California
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File 3--LA Daily News article on "Outlaw Hackers"
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File 4--Response to LA Daily News Article
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File 5--Three More (of 100) Reasons to Oppose Wiretap Proposal
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File 6--Cu Digest Header Information (unchanged since 10 Sept 1994)
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CuD ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL, AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION APPEARS IN
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THE CONCLUDING FILE AT THE END OF EACH ISSUE.
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: Fri, 30 Sep 1994 17:42:21 CDT
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From: Policy <manage@ACCESS.DIGEX.NET>
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Subject: File 1--GPO Puts Congressional Bills Online
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NEWS RELEASE - U.S. Government Printing Office - no. 94-9
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For release: immediate Contact: John Berger
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September 27, 1994 202-512-1525
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Internet e-mail
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John@eids06.eids.gpo.gov
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GPO PUTS CONGRESSIONAL BILLS ONLINE
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The U.S Government Printing Office (GPO) now has all
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Congressional Bills available online. The Congressional Bills
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database contains all published versions of House and Senate bills
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introduced since the start of the 103d Congress.
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The Congressional Bills database joins the official Government
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versions of the Congressional Record and the Federal Register that
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have been offered in electronic format over the Internet through the
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GPO Access service since June 1994.
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The Bills database is updated by 6 a.m. each day bills are
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published. Bills are available as ASCII text files and in Adobe
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Acrobat Portable Document Format (PDF) file format. Users with
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Acrobat viewers will be able to display and print typeset page
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facsimiles.
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The Federal Register and the Congressional Record are available
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online by 6 a.m. and by 11 a.m. e.s.t. daily, respectively. Documents
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in the Register and Record databases are available as ASCII text files
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with all graphics in TIFF file format.
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Organizations or individuals may subscribe directly from GPO for
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each of the three databases for $35 per month, $200 for 6 months, or
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$375 for 1 year for a single workstation. Special 2rates are
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available for multiple workstations.
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Information about how to subscribe to the Congressional Bills,
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Record, or Register databases is available by calling GPO at
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202-512-1530 or by fax at 202-512-1262. Internet E-mail should be
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sent to help@eids05.eids.gpo.gov.
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Users with full Internet access and local WAIS client software
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will be able to receive both ASCII text and all graphics as individual
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TIFF files or PDF files in the Congressional Record, Congressional
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Bills, and Federal Register databases. This is the first time that
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both text and graphics have been made available electronically via an
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online service. GPO's customized WAIS client software, a
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user-interface program specifically designed for GPO's application, is
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available from GPO for $15.
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Those who do not have full Internet connections can access ASCII
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text files, but not the PDF files or graphics, by using a phone modem
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to dial directly into GPO without additional software. These
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subscriptions provide for unlimited use for a stand alone workstation
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or an individual SWAIS user ID.
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The Congressional Bills and the Record and Register databases are
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also available for free electronic searches to walk-in patrons of many
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of the Nation's 1,400 depository libraries under a "GPO Access"
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program authorized by law and launched in June 1994. The Depository
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Library System includes academic, public, law, and Federal libraries.
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There is at least one Federal depository library in every
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Congressional district.
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The Superintendent of Documents is the official source for the
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sale of information published by more than 100 Federal agencies.
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Approximately 12,000 books or documents, 600 periodicals, and a
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growing number of CD-ROMS, diskettes, and online services are
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available.
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------------------------------
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Date: Sat, 01 Oct 1994 07:24:26 -0700 (MST)
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From: Where's that dongle? <Joel_M_Snyder@OPUS1.COM>
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Subject: File 2--A Summary of Electronic Gov't Info for California
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The California Senate is undoubtedly the most advanced legislature in
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the United States in the range of services it provides to
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Internet-connected users. I've seen a number of fragmented messages
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come out over a variety of lists and thought people might be interested
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in seeing the whole breadth of services they offer. Using the services
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at this site, you can correspond with Senators and their staffs, find
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out about pending legislation, subscribe to information services
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(including the capability to follow a bill), do full-text searches on
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legislative information and more.
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1) Incoming Email.
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All Senate staffers and Senators are on an internal email system. For
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those people to receive email, they have to complete a simple enrollment
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process; most folks have done that. You can try and guess someone's
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name by using this formula: First.Last@SEN.CA.GOV. For example, if you
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wanted to send to Linda Ronstadt, you would send to
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Linda.Ronstadt@SEN.CA.GOV.
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2) Directory Services.
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You can look up email addresses by using the white pages server they've
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set up. NOTE: Every user has the option of NOT being listed in this
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server! To get to the server, you can:
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- use your finger command @sen.ca.gov
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- send mail to finger@sen.ca.gov
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- use your WWW browser to www.sen.ca.gov
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The server accepts the usual sort of fuzzy strings you'd expect a good
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server to handle, as well as the following special cases:
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- "help" (finger help@sen.ca.gov)
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- "senator" - gives you a list of real live senators who
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want to receive email addressed to them directly
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(as opposed to their staff members)
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3) Senator Information Files
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If you don't know who your senator is, you can always look it up by
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FINGERing your ZIP code. For example, if you lived in Beverly Hills,
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you could:
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finger 90210@sen.ca.gov
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to see who your Senator is.
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This server also returns lots of information about each Senator,
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including addresses, biography, committees, etc.
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4) FTP Server
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An FTP server (at FTP.SEN.CA.GOV) is available with information on the
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Senate, Senators, and various senate committees and offices (including
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the Senate Office of Research, which does a lot of cool reports).
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5) Gopher Server
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The Gopher server (at Gopher.SEN.CA.GOV) lets you access everything on
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the FTP server plus the entire California code and statutes and
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constitution, all pending Bills before the legislature, and other Senate
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and Legislative information. This server maintains the most
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comprehensive set of links to other State legislatures available in
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GopherSpace. You can also do full-text searches of the pending bill
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files to find bills which might be of interest to you.
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6) Senate News service (and mail server)
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Senate News is a mail-based service which lets you subscribe to topics
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of interest (such as bulletins from senators, committee reports, etc)
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and be emailed information (or simply notifications about information)
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whenever the system changes. You can also use the mail server to do
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bill topic searches and to retrieve bill files. Send an email message
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to senate-news@sen.ca.gov with a text of "help" to get the help file for
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this.
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A new service in Senate News lets you follow a bill as it passes through
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the legislature. Once you've identified a bill you're interested in,
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you can subscribe to it (through senate-news) and anytime the bill
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changes, is analyzed, or has a status change (e.g., voting, vetoes,
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etc), you'll get mailed the changes (or a notification of the changes).
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7) WWW Server
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The WWW server (at WWW.SEN.CA.GOV) is a new service which lets you do
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full text searches of bills pending before the legislature, access all
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the information available in the Gopher server, and other tasks (such as
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white pages lookups). This is slowly being expanded.
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There are other services available to internal users, such as a full USENET
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news feed and Clarinet news service, but these are not available to
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external users.
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IMPORTANT DISCLAIMERS: I speak in no way, shape, or form for the California
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Senate Rules Committee. They reserve the right to call me a lyin' bastard
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anytime they want. None of this represents a commitment to continue
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service from that site. SEN.CA.GOV site does not operate to satisfy the
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requirements of any law or budget item. If you want to see what AB 1624
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requires, FTP to leginfo.public.ca.gov. If you want this project to be
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continued, call your Senator and tell him or her how cool you think
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SEN.CA.GOV is!
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If you want any advice on the technology or tools used to implement this
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service, I'd be happy to talk to you about it (since I did most of the
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implementation). If you want to congratulate the person who thought this
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up, got the funding, ran the political hurdles, and continues to do the
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real hard work, write to Dennis.Miller@SEN.CA.GOV (or call the pro tem in
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charge of Senate Rules, Senator Bill Lockyer at 916-445-6671 or c/o State
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Capitol Rm. 205, Sacto, 95814). If you have questions about the
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legislative process or want to know something about a bill or whatever ...
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we don't have anyone to answer those questions; call your Senator (see (2)
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above).
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jms
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Joel M Snyder, 1404 East Lind Road, Tucson, AZ, 85719
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Phone: +1 602 324 0494 (voice) +1 602 324 0495 (FAX)
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jms@Opus1.COM Opus One
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------------------------------
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From: CuD Moderators <cudigest@mindvox.phantom.com>
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Date: Thu, 29 Sep 1994 21:43:12 CDT
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Subject: File 3--LA Daily News article on "Outlaw Hackers"
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((MODERATORS' NOTE: The following article first appeared in the Los
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Angeles Daily News in early September. Thanks to the LADN for
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allowing us to reprint it in its entirety. The following version is
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as it was reprinted in the San Francisco Examiner, p. B-12, on Sept 4,
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1994. (Thanks also to person who provided the article)).
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COPS, OUTLAWS GO ON-LINE: CRIME RISES IN CYBERSPACE:
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Spies and thieves prey on national security, public
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safety with only a few keystrokes
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(c) LA Daily News/By Keith Stone
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Los Angeles--"Agent Steal" was captured last week in Westwood, but
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computer crime cop Scott Charney knows cyberspace is crawling with
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other criminals and spies, some more dangerous.
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"The threat is an increasing threat," said Charney, chief of the
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computer crime unit for the U.S. Department of Justice. "It could be a
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16-year old kid out for fun -- or it could be someone who is actively
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working to get information from the United States."
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"Agent Steal," the computer alias for Justin Tanner Peterson,
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belongs to the growing new breed of digital outlaws who threaten
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national security and public safety, Charney said.
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In Los Angeles alone, Peterson is one of at least four outlaw
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computer hackers who in recent years have demonstrated they can seize
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control of telephones and break into government computers.
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"We are out of the realm of the theoretical," Charney said.
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FOREIGN OPERATIVES' HACKING
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Government reports further reveal that foreign intelligence
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agencies and mercenary computer hackers have been sneaking through
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telephone lines into military and commercial computers.
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In Petersen's case, he pleaded guilty to cracking credit bureau
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telephones and computers for get-rich schemes. But FBI agents say they
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believe he also broke into a computer used to conduct legal wiretaps.
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During a telephone interview several weeks before his arrest,
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Petersen alluded to the destruction that hackers like himself can
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cause with a few keystrokes.
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"I wouldn't want the powers I have to be in the wrong hands
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--someone with malicious intentions," he said.
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Top government officials say it is too late.
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Former North Hollywood resident Kevin Lee Poulsen -- known as the
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"Dark Dante" -- is awaiting trial in San Francisco on espionage
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charges for cracking an Army computer and snooping into an FBI
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investigation of former Phillipines President Ferdinand Marcos.
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The cases of Poulsen, Petersen and others illustrate how the
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stereotypical hacker driven by intellectual challenge and curiosity
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is now being replaced by technically sophisticated criminals driven by
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greed.
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A TERRORIST WEAPON?
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"The nature of this changing motivation makes computer intruders'
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skills high-interest targets for criminal elements and hostile
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adversaries," according to a publicly released version of a Department
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of Defense report, "An Awareness Document."
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Hired by terrorists, these hackers could cripple the country's
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telephone system, "create significant public health and safety
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problems, and cause serious economic shocks," the September 1993
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Pentagon report adds.
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Further, as the world becomes wired for computer networks, the
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report says there is a greater threat the networks will be used for
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spying and terrorism.
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"At least one foreign intelligence service is believed to be
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actively engaged in the collection of intelligence through computer
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intrusion," the report says, but does not identify the service.
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EXTENT OF THREAT QUESTIONED
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Some argue the hacker danger is overstated, and that the nation's
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telephone system is in more jeopardy from drunken drivers who take out
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utility poles or someone who breaks into a switching station.
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They say perhaps a greater risk lies in government agencies
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exaggerating the hacker problem to justify the creation of overly
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restrictive laws.
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"Of course there are people who can screw up the networks, and
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people who will sell themselves for a packet of comic books --but I
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think (the government) greatly overstate the threat," said Northern
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Illinois University criminologist Jim Thomas.
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"Where I see the danger is when the goals become hysteria, and the
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answer, I would argue, is not tighter laws but educating the public
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that there are some dangers," Thomas said.
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But the government reports give more weight to the potential for
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destruction.
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The President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory
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Committee warned in a 1992 report that "known individuals in the hacker
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community have ties with adversary organizations. Hackers frequently
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have international ties."
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They include some members of the Chaos Computer Club in Germany,
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who the Pentagon report says have demonstrated their willingness to
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work with foreign governments.
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The Chaos Computer Club is believed to have cracked a National
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Aeronautics and Space Administration computer and supplied the Soviet
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Union's KGB with information obtained from Western military systems,
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the
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Nationwide, telephone companies and government agencies are
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designing new ways to defend against hackers and track down criminals
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who do breach the networks.
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The FBI recently opened its second computer crime unit in San Jose.
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And the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., is adding two more
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computer crime specialists to its staff of four, to guide local
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federal prosecutors in the war on digital crime.
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Pacific Bell spokeswoman Linda Bonniksen said the battle with hackers
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is never ending, but with each attack, the company learns and
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strengthens the system.
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"It is a big house, and we close as many doors as we can, and new
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------------------------------
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Date: Sun, 2 Oct, 1994 17:22:43 CDT
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From: CuD Moderators <cudigest@mindvox.phantom.com>
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Subject: File 4--Response to LA Daily News Article
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A few weeks ago, I was contacted by Keith Stone, a reporter for the LA
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Daily News. Stone was writing a story on the potential of "hackers" to
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threaten national security through spying or espionage activities. It
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was clear that Stone intended to push the angle of the threat, because
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both his questions and his recalcitrance in having some of his
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erroneous factual and conceptual errors challenged suggested that he
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preferred drama to accuracy.
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Stone seemed to be over-inclined to seek out those facts that
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corroborated his view of dangerous hackers lurking amongst us, and
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less inclined to accept opposing views. For example, he seemed
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convinced that the Legion of Doom was plotting circa 1989-1990 to
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bring down the nation's E-911 system. A law enforcement agent, he
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said, told him so. He insisted on arguing the point, and seemed
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impervious to suggestions that either he check his facts or his
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sources.
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Here's why we object to Stone's story and others like it that
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sensationalize the dangers of "computer hackers." State and federal
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legislators are gradually introducing legislation based on an
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exaggerated threat of computer technology. The Digital Telephony (FBI
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Wiretap) Bill (HR 4922) is but one example of how the fear of
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technologically sophisticated criminals generates hyperbole to justify
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laws and policies that some critics argue reduces Constitutional
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protections in cyberspace. We have also noted in past issues of CuD
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that such hyperbole finds it way into exaggerated indictments and
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other documents in criminal proceedings. Such stories, we judge,
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irresponsibly contribute to bad law and judicial injustice.
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We also object to such stories because they are simply poor reporting.
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Most of the U.S. population has little experience with cyberspace and
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the computer culture. When the public obtains its images of cyberspace
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from the whatever "Threat of the Month Club" is current, communicating
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the benefits (and *legitimate* dangers) of computer technology becomes
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more difficult. Whether addressing the dangers of files on anarchy and
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explosives, graphic sexual images, pedophilia, hackers, pirates, or
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similar topics, most media reflect a tendency toward misrepresenting
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the character of participants and inflating the threat to the public.
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Although some stories, such as Stone's, often contain an obligatory
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dissenting quote, the thrust of the stories remains unbalanced. It is
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not that such stories do not conform to some ideal image we'd like to
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see, but that they consistently conform to an image that seems "sexy"
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or that corresponds more closely to law enforcement views than any
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accurate reflection of the topic. More simply, such stories deceive
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the reader.
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What, specifically, do we object to in the Stone story?
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First, the story exaggerates the exploits of such "hackers" as "Agent
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Steal" and Kevin Poulsen. There is no evidence we have seen that
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either posed any significant threat to U.S. security or public safety.
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Nor does Stone report the contents of the indictments, but relies
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instead on the self-serving summary of law enforcement personnel. In
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fact, one Bay Area reporter chided Stone in print for making a
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fundamental error in reporting the charges against Poulsen as pending,
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which were dropped (the story will be excerpted in next week's CuD).
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In short, Stone typifies that breed of reporters who know little about
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the issues underlying many of these cases, and seems to use them
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instead as a convenient hook to spin a yarn of their own.
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Second, Stone, like some other reporters, raises the spectre of the
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"hacker as spy." There has been no evidence that either Poulsen or
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"Agent Steal" were involved in espionage, despite the easy transition
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Stone makes between it and hacking. It would hardly be a surprise if
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computer-wise techies found that espionage pays. No news there. If
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phone technicians, CIA insiders, and journalists sell their integrity
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along with their expertise, where's the story when somebody else does
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it? The story actually would seem that--as far as is publicly
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known--this hasn't yet occurred in the U.S.
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Notice how easily Stone's prose slides through innuendo:
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Government reports further reveal that foreign
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intelligence agencies a mercenary computer hackers have
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been sneaking through telephone lines military and
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commercial computers.
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In Petersen's case, he pleaded guilty to cracking credit
|
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bureau telephones and computers for get-rich schemes. But
|
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FBI agents say they believe he also broke into a computer
|
|
used to conduct legal wiretaps.
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|
|
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During a telephone interview several weeks before his
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arrest, Petersen alluded to the destruction that hackers
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like himself can cause with a few keystrokes.
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"I wouldn't want the powers I have to be in the wrong
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hands -- someone with malicious intentions," he said.
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Now, one could say the same thing about a karate expert, the owner of
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an Uzi, or a night-action photographer. Misused skills are, by
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definition, potentially destructive. The novelty of potential abuse
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may strike some as worthy of hyperbole, but the reality is more
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mundane. In fact, Stone provides no evidence that there is a growing
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cadre of sophisticated "hackers." The bulk of the serious computer
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crimes that we have followed in fact aren't the product of "hackers,"
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but of computer-literate folk who use the computer (instead of
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lockpicks, guns, or fountain pens) to rip-off their victims. It's
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possible, of course, that Stone follows the school of thought that
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conflates "computer criminal" with "hacker." If so, then it's odd that
|
|
he chose two "underground" computer wizards instead of focusing on
|
|
some of the more serious computer crime that has occurred in recent
|
|
years. We also wonder where Stone obtained his quote from "Agent
|
|
Steal." First person? If so, the quote seems deceptively self-serving
|
|
to Stone's slant. Because Stone seems willing to rely on information
|
|
from Phrack, we wonder why Stone didn't allude to the Phrack interview
|
|
in which Agent Steal condemned maliciousness (Phrack 44, File 16). We
|
|
also wonder why Stone also failed to include the allegations that
|
|
Agent Steal was also employed by the FBI. Given the tenor of the
|
|
story, it's unlikely that such an exclusion was impelled by a
|
|
commitment to reporting only verifiable facts.
|
|
|
|
Third, Stone re-discovers the wheel:
|
|
|
|
The cases of Poulsen, Petersen and others illustrate how
|
|
the stereotypical hacker driven by intellectual challenge
|
|
and curiosity is now being replaced by technically
|
|
sophisticated criminals driven by greed.
|
|
|
|
It's old news that computer-literate youth violate the law for
|
|
avaricious reasons. Computer afficianados, like others, are little
|
|
different than anybody else. How about an alternative headline:
|
|
"Journalist Cheats on income taxes," with an accompanying story about
|
|
how some reporters illustrate how literacy leads to greed-impelled law
|
|
breaking? It's a minor point, I suppose, but there's simply nothing
|
|
new that these two cases illustrate. My sense in talking with Stone is
|
|
that he was relatively unfamiliar with the issues of either case. He
|
|
also indicated that he was not on-line, he showed virtually no
|
|
knowledge of events or issues that one would expect from a competent
|
|
reporter writing on such a topic, and he expressed little desire to
|
|
learn. The result is old news wrapped in current hyperbole.
|
|
|
|
Fourth, the terrorist/espionage threat seems closer to science fiction
|
|
than reality. Stone cites several sources for his claim that there is
|
|
considerable potential for destruction.
|
|
|
|
The President's National Security Telecommunications
|
|
Advisory Committee warned in a 1992 report that "known
|
|
individuals in the hacker community have ties with
|
|
adversary organizations. Hackers frequently have
|
|
international ties."
|
|
|
|
They include some members of the Chaos Computer Club in
|
|
Germany, who the Pentagon report says have demonstrated
|
|
their willingness to work with foreign governments.
|
|
|
|
The Chaos Computer Club is believed to have cracked a
|
|
National Aeronautics and Space Administration computer and
|
|
supplied the Soviet Union's KGB with information obtained
|
|
from Western military systems....
|
|
|
|
We're not familar with the report cited, be we are familiar with the
|
|
example adduced. Presumably, it refers to Pengo, et. al., the central
|
|
characters of Cliff Stoll's _The Cuckoo's Egg_. Had Stone bothered to
|
|
read this classic, an inconceivable lapse for somebody writing on
|
|
these issues, or had he read the Hafner and Markoff tome (Cyberpunks,
|
|
Outlaws, and Hackers), he would likely have had a better grasp than
|
|
citing a third-hand source that derived its information from an old
|
|
issue of Phrack.
|
|
|
|
Are we over-reacting to what, is arguably, just another unsurprisingly
|
|
simplistic and inconsequential media distortion of the relationship
|
|
between computer technology and crime? Perhaps. But the issues such
|
|
stories raise are not without consequence. If reporters were to write
|
|
about the law, baseball, or the stock market with the same degree of
|
|
cluelessness that some approach issues of computer culture, they would
|
|
likely be quickly unemployed. There is more accountability for some
|
|
topics than others, and stories of cyberspace do not seem to be among
|
|
those with high accountability.
|
|
|
|
Several issues are at stake here.
|
|
|
|
First, cyberstories, because of their importance in educating the
|
|
public, providing information for lawmakers, policy makers, and
|
|
criminal justice personnel, and contributing to the shared stock of
|
|
social knowledge on which the public comes to understand and adapt to
|
|
a new technology and its social implications, should be accurate.
|
|
Instead, too many seem relegated to a status somewhere between op-ed
|
|
and creative writing.
|
|
|
|
Second, it is not unreasonable to expect reporters who write on
|
|
substantive topics to exhibit at least minimal knowledge of their
|
|
subject, or to at least be willing to demonstrate that they have done
|
|
their homework before writing a story. Some nationally-known media
|
|
reporters have been criticized for their work, and made a demonstrable
|
|
effort to educate themselves to the relevant issues. Our hope is that
|
|
Keith Stone will spend a bit more time researching if he writes on
|
|
similar topics in the future. It is worth noting that Stone, to his
|
|
credit, faithfully quoted my comments both accurately and in context.
|
|
Unfortunately, they seemed irrelevant to his story.
|
|
|
|
Third, the media seem to repeat a pattern of recursive reporting: One
|
|
medium will pick up a story, then others follow, either with tortured
|
|
rewrites from the original or with follow-ups that look for a new and
|
|
dramatic angle to emphasize. This is hardly unique to cyberspace
|
|
stories, as followers of the OJ Simpson coverage might notice. But, it
|
|
does represent a style of journalism that seems to more inclined
|
|
toward marketing than toward providing substantive information.
|
|
|
|
Finally, there are legitimate threats posed by the computer
|
|
technology. As with any technology, predators will find a way to
|
|
abuse it, and reasoned discussion of these threats is necessary.
|
|
Conversely, social accommodation to new technologies, whether in the
|
|
form of responses to unacceptable behaviors or in inculcating
|
|
appropriate norms and values for accommodating accompanying changes
|
|
require accuracy. When the media cry "wolf" too many times, or when
|
|
they distort the facts and present skewed images, adapting to cultural
|
|
change becomes more difficult.
|
|
|
|
The intent here is not to single out a single reporter, but rather to
|
|
use that reporter as an icon (in the same way that he used his own
|
|
subjects) to raise the issue of media coverage. After nearly a
|
|
half-decade of highly visible issues, it doesn't seem unreasonable to
|
|
expect more reason and less hyperbole in the coverage.
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Wed, 28 Sep 1994 09:04:55 -0700
|
|
From: email list server <listserv@SUNNYSIDE.COM>
|
|
Subject: File 5--Three More (of 100) Reasons to Oppose Wiretap Proposal
|
|
|
|
REASON 9: Privacy is a Basic Concept in Business
|
|
|
|
REASON 9: The last time such a sweeping change in wiretap law was
|
|
considered, AT&T recommended *a ban on all eavesdropping* except
|
|
in national security cases.
|
|
|
|
In 1967, when the federal wiretap law was first debated, a vice
|
|
president of AT&T said that the Bell System favored a ban on all
|
|
eavesdropping except in national security cases: "Privacy of
|
|
communications is a basic concept in our busines. We believe the
|
|
public has an inherent right to feel that they can use the telephone
|
|
with confidence, just as they talk face to face. Any undermining of
|
|
this confidence would seriously impair the usefulness and value of
|
|
telephone communications." (Lapidus, Eavesdropping on Trial).
|
|
|
|
Reason 12- Classification
|
|
|
|
REASON 12: The FBI has hidden behind claims of classification rather
|
|
than disclose information that would allow the public to determine
|
|
whether the wiretap plan is needed.
|
|
|
|
Throughout the debate on the wiretap bill, the FBI has been
|
|
unwilling to describe incidents where technology has frustrated a
|
|
court ordered wiretap. FOIA requests are routinely denied. Even
|
|
those agencies charged with independent assessment cannot speak openly
|
|
about the plan. (The General Accounting Office testified at an August
|
|
hearing in the Senate: "Because the details of law enforcement
|
|
agencies' problems and the specific technological challenges are
|
|
classified, I cannot elaborate on them in this hearing"). Secrecy may
|
|
be appropriate for military networks and classified systems, it is
|
|
hardly well suited to the nation's public communications network.
|
|
|
|
REASON 24- "Capacity Requirements"
|
|
|
|
REASON 24:The FBI Wiretap bill allows the Attorney General to
|
|
develop monitoring specs
|
|
|
|
The proposed wiretap law says that the Attorney General will provide
|
|
to telecommunications carrier associations and and standard-setting
|
|
organizations a notice of "maximum capacity" required to accommodate
|
|
all of the communication interceptions, pen registers, and trap and trace
|
|
devices that the Attorney General estimates that government agencies
|
|
may "use simultaneously." Telecommunications carriers will then be
|
|
required to ensure that systems are capable of "expanding to
|
|
the maximum capacity." (Proposed section 2603(a))("legal code")
|
|
|
|
|
|
REASON 43:The development of the Digitial Signature Standard (DSS)
|
|
suggests that standards developed to facilitate wiretapping
|
|
are less robust, and are costly to American business and
|
|
individual privacy.
|
|
|
|
The recent development of the Digital Signature Standard provides a
|
|
case study of what happens when an agency with legal authority to
|
|
conduct wire surveillance is also given authority to set technical
|
|
standards for communications networks. Viewing the role of the
|
|
National Security Agency in the development of the DSS, MIT's Ronald
|
|
Rivest said "It is my belief that the NIST proposals [for DSS]
|
|
represent an attempt to install weak cryptography as a national
|
|
standard, and that NIST is doing so in order to please the NSA and
|
|
federal law enforcement agencies." Stanford's Martin Hellman
|
|
concluded that "NIST's action give strong indication of favoring NSA's
|
|
espionage mission at the expense of American business and individual
|
|
privacy." (Communications of the ACM, July 1992)
|
|
|
|
------------------------------------------
|
|
What To Do: Fax Rep. Jack Brooks (202-225-1584).
|
|
Express your concerns about the FBI Wiretap proposal.
|
|
-----------------------------------------------------
|
|
100 Reasons is a project of the Electronic Privacy Information Center
|
|
(EPIC) in Washington, DC. For more information: 100.Reasons@epic.org.
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 1994 22:51:01 CDT
|
|
From: CuD Moderators <tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu>
|
|
Subject: File 6--Cu Digest Header Information (unchanged since 10 Sept 1994)
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|
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|
Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
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available at no cost electronically.
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CuD is available as a Usenet newsgroup: comp.society.cu-digest
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Or, to subscribe, send a one-line message: SUB CUDIGEST your name
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Send it to LISTSERV@UIUCVMD.BITNET or LISTSERV@VMD.CSO.UIUC.EDU
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The editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-0303), fax (815-753-6302)
|
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or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL
|
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60115, USA.
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Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest
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------------------------------
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|
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|
End of Computer Underground Digest #6.86
|
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************************************
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