890 lines
38 KiB
Plaintext
890 lines
38 KiB
Plaintext
Computer underground Digest Sun Aug 14, 1994 Volume 6 : Issue 72
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ISSN 1004-042X
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Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
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Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
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Retiring Shadow Archivist: Stanton McCandlish
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Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
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Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
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Ian Dickinson
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Copywrite Editor: Eatingin Shrdlu
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CONTENTS, #6.72 (Sun, Aug 14, 1994)
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File 1--Jacking in from the "The Good, the Bad and the Ugly" Port (Cyberwire)
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File 2--Jacking in from the "Just Nationalize It" Port (Cyberwire)
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File 3--Police Checkpoints on the Information Highway
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File 4--CyberSpace Forum - ReIntroduction
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File 5--"What Computers Still Can't Do" by Dreyfus (Book Review)
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File 6--Essay Contest - Future of Print
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File 7--GovAccess.043: ACT.ALERT! Two CRUCIAL ITEMS Aug.8th
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Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
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available at no cost electronically.
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CuD is available as a Usenet newsgroup: comp.society.cu-digest
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Or, to subscribe, send a one-line message: SUB CUDIGEST your name
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Send it to LISTSERV@UIUCVMD.BITNET or LISTSERV@VMD.CSO.UIUC.EDU
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The editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-0303), fax (815-753-6302)
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or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL
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60115, USA.
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Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest
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news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of
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LAWSIG, and DL1 of TELECOM; on GEnie in the PF*NPC RT
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libraries and in the VIRUS/SECURITY library; from America Online in
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the PC Telecom forum under "computing newsletters;"
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On Delphi in the General Discussion database of the Internet SIG;
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on RIPCO BBS (312) 528-5020 (and via Ripco on internet);
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and on Rune Stone BBS (IIRGWHQ) (203) 832-8441.
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CuD is also available via Fidonet File Request from
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1:11/70; unlisted nodes and points welcome.
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EUROPE: from the ComNet in LUXEMBOURG BBS (++352) 466893;
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In ITALY: Bits against the Empire BBS: +39-461-980493
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UNITED STATES: etext.archive.umich.edu (141.211.164.18) in /pub/CuD/
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ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in /pub/Publications/CuD
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aql.gatech.edu (128.61.10.53) in /pub/eff/cud/
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world.std.com in /src/wuarchive/doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/
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uceng.uc.edu in /pub/wuarchive/doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/
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wuarchive.wustl.edu in /doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/
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EUROPE: nic.funet.fi in pub/doc/cud/ (Finland)
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ftp.warwick.ac.uk in pub/cud/ (United Kingdom)
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JAPAN: ftp.glocom.ac.jp /mirror/ftp.eff.org/
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
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diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted for non-profit as long
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as the source is cited. Authors hold a presumptive copyright, and
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they should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that
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non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise
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specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles
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relating to computer culture and communication. Articles are
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preferred to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts
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unless absolutely necessary.
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DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
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the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all
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responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not
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violate copyright protections.
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: 5 Aug 1994 11:18:07 -0500
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From: Brock Meeks / CyberWire <brock@well.sf.ca.us>
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Subject: File 1--Jacking in/"The Good, the Bad and the Ugly" Port (Cyberwire)
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CyberWire Dispatch // Copyright (c) 1994 //
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Jacking in from the "The Good, the Bad and the Ugly" Port:
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Washington, DC -- For months now a kind of high stakes privacy poker has
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been played out here behind the closed doors of congressional subcommittees
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as the FBI, telephone industry executives, congressional staffers and civil
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libertarians have played a kind of five card draw with the privacy of all
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your future telephone calls, faxes and electronic mail.
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The betting's all but over now; Congress has "called" the hand and laid
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its cards on the table: A soon to be introduced bill that will mandate
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--forever -- that all the nation's telephone networks be designed to give
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the FBI easy wiretap access. The bill's sponsors, Senator Patrick Leahy
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(D-Vt.) and Rep. Don Edwards (D- Cal.), have fought through a numbing array
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of options, opinions and (FBI) obfuscation in order feel comfortable enough
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to sign their names to a bill that, just years ago, was laughed off Capitol
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Hill because it was severely flawed.
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My how time changes things.
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It's been two years since the FBI first introduced what amounted to an
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"Easy Wiretap America" bill. Now we have a new President, a new FBI
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director and suddenly, a new bill that requires the nation's
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telecommunications providers to reengineer their facilities so the FBI can
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do wiretaps easier.
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The Leahy and Edwards staffs have dumped hundreds of hours of "sweat
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equity" into this bill, which could be introduced as early as today
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(Friday) but certainly before next Tuesday.
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Leahy and Edwards have never been known to tape "kick me" signs on the back
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of American privacy rights. The bill that's been hammered out here -- and
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that phrase isn't used lightly -- by Leahy and Edwards is a damn sight
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better than the FBI's laughable attempts at drafting legislation. In fact,
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it was Leahy and Edwards that stepped into the breach to thwart those early
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FBI proposals from being passed "as is."
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An earlier version of this bill, which, among other things, gave the
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Justice Department the right to shut down any telephone company's network,
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regardless of size, if they didn't comply with the wiretap statute, was set
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to be introduced by Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Del.), with heavy support from
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others in congress. That bill, if introduced, would have passed,
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congressional sources have said.
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But the Leahy and Edwards tag team effort took Sen. Biden off the scent.
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So, we get a more palatable bill. Call it the "cod liver oil act" of 1994.
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It tastes horrible, but it's necessary, considering the earlier
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alternatives. Without this Leahy/Edwards bill our privacy rights would
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have really been fucked over. At least now we get kissed. (Sorry, no
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tongues.)
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Still Got The Power
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====================
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A draft copy of the latest bill, obtained by Dispatch, shows that the
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Justice Department and FBI still have the tools to intimidate and harass
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the future development of the nation's telecommunications infrastructure.
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The bill, as it stands, does keep Justice and law enforcement from
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mandating any "specific design of features or system configurations to be
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adopted." But the requirements to build wiretap capability into all public
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telecommunications carrier systems is steadfast. This means that while the
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FBI can't expressly tell a company "how to get there," it can definitely
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say, "just get there."
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Never again, under the provisions of this bill, will a telecommunications
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provider be able to develop a service or technology without first and
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foremost asking the question: How can I design this so that it pops off
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the assembly line wiretap ready?
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Read it again. The key word there: Never.
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There is an "out" however, and it comes thanks to Leahy. If a new
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technology doesn't fit with the mandate, that is, if you can't make that
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new hand held satellite phone wiretap ready and you've made every
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"reasonable effort" to make it so, it can still be sold. How?
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"The court can enforce the (wiretap) requirement of this act only if
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compliance with the act is 'reasonably achievable' through the application
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of 'available technology,'" said Jeff Ward, director of governmental affair
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for the Nynex telephone company.
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Ward -- who says the bill has been an "albatross" around his neck for 2
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years -- has focused his efforts during this 2 year time frame, on ensuring
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that such "reasonably achievable" provisions allow telephone industry and
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equipment makers to be "good corporate citizens." That is, these
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companies are required to consider [wiretap] design factors, but if after
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"due consideration, we can't do it, we've got to be able to proceed."
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This effort is supported by the bill; however, it is a court of law that
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decides what is "reasonable" or not. Such litigation, brought by Justice
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no doubt, could tie up a new technology for years while the case is
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decided, thus giving Justice and the FBI a kind of de facto control over
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the development of new technologies.
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Make That Check Out To...
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=========================
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Then there's cost. The FBI insists that the cost to industry to retrofit
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all their networks will be only $500 million. But that's a bullshit figure
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and everyone from FBI Director Louis Freeh to the newest line programmer at
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AT&T knows it.
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In fact, so many lines of code will have to be written and maintained to
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comply with these wiretap mandates that one Internet pioneer, Dave Farber,
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has called the FBI proposal "the programmers full employment act."
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Provisions in the bill make it basically a blank check for the FBI. Within
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the first 4 years, there is $500 million approved to be spent on
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"upgrading" all the nation's telephone systems to provide law enforcement
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with easy wiretap access. There are provisions in the bill that require
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the government to repay all costs of installing wiretap software throughout
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all networks forever, with no cap. What's not clear, however, is what
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happens when FBI demands for wiretap capability exceed the $500 million
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mark (and it will) during those first 4 years.
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Maybe we'll get some answers when this bill (in whatever language is
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finally passed) is discussed at joint hearings to be held by Leahy and
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Edwards on it August 11th.
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Take It or Take It
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===================
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Take it or take it. Those are your only choices here. This bill is a slam
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dunk for passage. But you didn't lose everything.
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All electronic systems will be exempt from complying with the bill's
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mandates. But hold on before you cheer...
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This simply means that the FBI can't tap your Email from, say, America
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Online's computers; rather, they can do what they've always been allowed
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to do: Snag it off the telephone company's central switch. But at least
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we don't have the Internet being hung with "FBI: Tap In Here" signs.
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Transactional data, Dispatch has been told, will get some beefed up
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protection. Just how this language shakes out remains to be seen, however.
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Yeah, but Can They Count?
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=========================
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At the very end of the draft we obtained, the FBI is given a curious
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additional reporting requirement under its annual wiretap reports. The
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addition, in our draft copy, says the Bureau must quantify "the number of
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interceptions encountering electronically encrypted communications,
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specifying the number of such interceptions that could not be decrypted."
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Throughout the history of this bill and the now ignominious Clipper Chip
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proposal, the FBI has touted the fact that it's investigations are
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continually stymied by encryption technologies. Small problem: The Bureau
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refuses to provide any kind of documentation to back up those claims.
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At first blush, then, this extra requirement finally means the G- men will
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have to give us some concrete numbers. All well and good... *if* that's
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what this requirement actually is used for.
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There's potentially a much darker use for these stats... yes, I see all you
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Crypto-rebels nodding your anxious heads. You see, such a formal gathering
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of statistics could be used by the Bureau or... say, the National Security
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Agency, to "prove" that private encryption schemes are just too great a
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threat to "catching bad guys."
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Citing these newly gathered statistics the White House could, one day,
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order the banning of private encryption methods. Far fetched you say?
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Yeah, it's far-fetched... something on the order of, oh, say a bill that
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mandates telephone companies give the FBI easy access to all conversations
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from now until forever.
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Meeks out...
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------------------------------
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Date: Mon, 01 Aug 94 13:30:37 EDT
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From: "W. K. (Bill) Gorman" <34AEJ7D@CMUVM.CSV.CMICH.EDU>
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Subject: File 2--Jacking in from the "Just Nationalize It" Port (Cyberwire)
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You might find this of interest.
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>----------------------------Original message----------------------------
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CyberWire Dispatch // Copyright (c) 1994 //
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Jacking in from the "Just Nationalize It" Port:
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Washington, DC -- The most recent draft of the FBI's digital
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wiretap bill turns control of the nation's communications network
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over to the Justice Department.
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It's a twisted policy that, in essence, ponies up more than $500
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million in an effort to nationalize all telephone and electronic
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communications networks, a move that's unprecedented in U.S.
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history. For although private companies retain control over
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profits and revenues, this bill puts them at the technological beck
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and call of the Justice Department. Think of it as Attorney
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General Janet Reno moving her lips, but it's FBI Director Louis
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Freeh making all the noise.
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The July 19 draft of the FBI bill obtained by Dispatch, gives the
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Justice Department the authority to make technological demands of
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the nation's communications networks that must be complied with or
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risk severe penalties.
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However, the bill specifically states that law enforcement agencies
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can't dictate a "specific design or system configurations," but
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that's little comfort.
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The bill gives the government the authority to dictate -- forever -
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-specific capabilities each communications company has to met or be
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held in contempt, forced to pay as much as $10,000 for every day
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they can't met the government's demands of easy wiretap access to
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their customer's conversations, electronic mail messages, faxes or
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file transfers.
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The draft also dramatically expands the scope of the bill, from
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just "common carriers" (which are mainly your local and long
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distance telephone companies) to a new category of
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"telecommunications carriers."
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This new category, penciled in at the insistence of the telephone
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companies facing the threat of having to bear the entire burden for
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making the FBI's job easier, includes "any person or entity engaged
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in the transmission or switching of wire or electronic
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communications for value for unaffiliated persons, but does not
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include persons or entities engaged in providing information
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services."
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This means all networks, including the one that delivered this
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Dispatch article to your electronic mailbox, will now have to be
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"wiretap ready," according to FBI blueprints. The only companies
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that escape are free BBSs and systems that must prove they are
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information services rather than communications services. Just how
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America Online, Prodigy and CompuServe will deal with this is
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unknown, since systems like these split the fence between
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information providers and communications facilitators.
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If this bill is passed, the Attorney General has one year to draw
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up its easy wiretap access battle plan and present it to the
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industry. Included in that plan must be a written notice of the
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maximum capacity required to "accommodate all the communications
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interceptions, pen registers and trap and trace devices" the
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Attorney General "estimates" the government will need.
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All "telecommunications carriers" then have 3 years to comply with
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those requests. The catch is, the Justice Department can
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"periodically" provide updates to that original plan, which
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"increases the maximum capacity" first stated. For each upgraded
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estimate, the industry has 3 years to cooperate or get hammered.
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If a carrier fails to comply, the Justice Department can order
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compliance, up to and including ordering manufacturers to redesign
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their products so they can be installed on U.S. communications
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networks -- yes, that includes the amorphous Internet, at least on
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the U.S. side. Noncompliance carries the possible fine of $10,000
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per day. However, the current bill takes away the veritable
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"Thor's Hammer" authority from Justice, that is, the ability to
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shut down a carrier's network for not complying with the bill.
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Standards? We Don't Need
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No Stinking Standards
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==========================
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Just to make sure that all this "easy use wiretap" software gets
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codified, there will be standards written. This means every public
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telephone network and communications system, will, forever, now
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come with built in eavesdropping capability, courtesy of Uncle Sam.
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The bill doesn't actually demand that wiretap access be written
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into the standards, but the sub-text of the bill clearly intends
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for them to be there. "The absence of specifications or standards
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for implementing" wiretap access won't be considered an excuse for
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carriers to claim noncompliance, the bill says.
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Enter the Federal Communications Commission. Under this bill, the
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FCC is made out to be court of last resort for any wiretap
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standards disputes. "[I]f industry associations or bodies fail to
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issue specifications or standards, any person may petition" the FCC
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to "establish... specifications or standards" that implement easy
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wiretap access, the bill says.
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In other words: If industry tanks on creating specs, Uncle Sam,
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impersonating the above referenced "any person" will compel the FCC
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to write the damn things. The FBI gets its wiretap software
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written voluntarily or by force. They don't care which route they
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have to take.
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Of course, the FCC is woefully equipped to write standards; they
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are enforcers after all of such standards, not creators of them.
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So, in order to help out with this egregious task, the bill allows
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the FCC to assess and collect fees that it will levy against
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telecommunications carriers for, well, there's no nice way to say
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this, doing their fucking job.
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And get this, the FCC gets to use that penalty tax money to help it
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pay for writing the wiretap rules. You gotta love these bill
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writing wonks for creating: Self-help Agency Funding or "Bigger
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Appropriations Through Fines."
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The Bottom Line
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==============
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What's it going to cost to allow the FBI to eavesdrop from
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virtually any "remote" location of their choice, as the bill
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states? The first bite from the taxpayer wallet is a healthy $500
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million in the first 3 years. (Remember, now, FBI Director Louis
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Freeh, as late as last month, was on television telling the world
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this electronic Trojan Horse would cost only $300 million.)
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However, the bill contains a "blank check" clause, which allows the
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government (Hint: This is really you and me) to continue paying
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for upgrades to this wiretap software from 1999 "and thereafter" in
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"such sums as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this
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act." You can thank the telephone companies for this clause.
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Without the endless credit line, they said they would fight the
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bill with all their resources. Now they'll just whimper a lot and
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roll over.
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Although the telephone still oppose the bill on principle -- they
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just don't like the government telling them to do anything --
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they're just happy not to have to pay for this themselves. As long
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as every other telecommunications company gets stung and the
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taxpayer foots the bill, well, hell, they can live with it.
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Besides, they have bigger fish to fry, like squeezing Congress to
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let them into the long distance market where they can really make
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some coin.
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So, what we get now from the telephone industry -- trust me on this
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-- is token opposition to the FBI bill. "This thing is beginning
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to smell like law," said a telephone company executive familiar
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with his industries efforts on the bill. Dispatch suggested a more
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colorful "smells like" phrase. The executive simply smiled.
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All Said And Done
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================
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The bill, while not the final version, is "pretty damn close," a
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congressional staffer said. The fight over language hasn't been
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pretty and it's likely to continue to be ugly until the final bill
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is submitted, which will be before the August recess. "We will
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have a bill one way or another," another congressional staffer
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said. The staffs of Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), Sen. Joe Biden
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(D.-Del) and Rep. Don Edwards (D-Cal.) have all had a crack at
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melding this bill.
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EFF's been in there fighting, too. In fact, EFF's legislative
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liaison cancelled a trip to Japan to stay and "fight" for better
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language in the bill, according to a message he posted online.
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If that's the case, someone needs to fight harder. There is,
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however, some evidence of EFF's fingerprints on this bill.
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The bill specifically states, for example that "any law enforcement
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agency" is NOT authorized to "prohibit the adoption of any feature
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or service by providers of wire or electronic communication
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service." This means that if your "telecommunications provider"
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provides some kind of encryption capability -- even non-government
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approved encryption -- this bill doesn't force you to turn over the
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encryption keys to the cops.
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And in the area of transactional data, the bill limits the cops to
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just getting your telephone number and address, without the ability
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to scavenge through all your private transactions and billing
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records. This ends the threat of the bill having the effect of
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turning the telephone network into "a nationwide surveillance tool"
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of the FBI, as EFF Executive Director Jerry Berman said previous
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versions of the bill would allow.
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Just remember, as this bill stands, the FBI bought your privacy
|
|
rights for a mere $500 million-plus. That cheap at twice the
|
|
price.
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 94 14:14 CDT
|
|
From: jdav@MCS.COM(James I. Davis)
|
|
Subject: File 3--Police Checkpoints on the Information Highway
|
|
|
|
POLICE CHECKPOINTS ON THE INFORMATION HIGHWAY
|
|
|
|
By Jim Davis
|
|
|
|
The so-called "electronic frontier" is quickly turning into an
|
|
electronic police state.
|
|
|
|
New computer technologies provide powerful tools for protecting
|
|
privacy and sharing information. To maintain control over the new
|
|
technology, information and the people who use it, the U.S.
|
|
government is clamping down on several fronts.
|
|
|
|
Here are a few recent developments:
|
|
|
|
-- The FBI wants to require all computer bulletin boards and
|
|
communications carriers and makers of electronic communications
|
|
equipment to give it a way to spy on everyone who communicates.
|
|
|
|
According to draft FBI standards recently obtained by the
|
|
Washington-based Electronic Privacy Information Center, "every
|
|
carrier must ensure that its equipment allows for interception of
|
|
a communication concurrent with a transmission and provide call
|
|
identifying information to a remote government facility.
|
|
|
|
"Manufacturers and support service providers must also assist by
|
|
developing equipment and software with these capabilities."
|
|
|
|
-- The federal government is pushing ahead with its so-called
|
|
"Clipper Proposal," a plan to subvert private communications.
|
|
|
|
New technologies allow people to code messages and conversations
|
|
so that they are virtually impossible for anyone except the
|
|
intended recipient to read. Even the government would have great
|
|
difficulty spying on such mail or conversations.
|
|
|
|
The government's proposal, designed with substantial assistance
|
|
from the National Security Agency, will require people to give the
|
|
government their secret keys to allow it to decipher messages
|
|
whenever a police agency wants.
|
|
|
|
-- The Commerce Department has recommended changes in the
|
|
copyright law that will outlaw the use of technologies that can
|
|
break "copy protection" schemes.
|
|
|
|
In today's economy, information products like music, videos and
|
|
computer software account for billions of dollars in business.
|
|
|
|
Industry associations like the Software Publishers Association
|
|
(SPA) want strict laws against unauthorized copying. Because
|
|
information is so easy to copy, enforcing copyright laws -- and
|
|
preventing people from getting access to culture unless they pay
|
|
for it -- will require a police state. The SPA already encourages
|
|
people to turn in co-workers who make unauthorized copies of
|
|
computer programs.
|
|
|
|
-- On July 28, a Memphis, Tennessee jury convicted a couple who
|
|
ran an adult computer bulletin board in California of 11 counts of
|
|
transmitting obscenity through interstate telephone lines.
|
|
|
|
A U.S. district attorney used conservative Tennessee "community
|
|
standards" against the couple because he was able to copy pictures
|
|
from the couple's computer, 2,000 miles and several states away.
|
|
|
|
With computer networks, what is legal in one state or country can
|
|
still be prosecuted in another place where that same activity is
|
|
illegal.
|
|
|
|
-- In late May, the White House announced plans to start a
|
|
nationwide system for delivering military pensions, food stamps,
|
|
Social Security and other public assistance electronically.
|
|
Instead of receiving a check, the recipient would receive an
|
|
"automated teller machine" card.
|
|
|
|
The system will extend government control over the lives of
|
|
everyone who receives government benefits, greatly increasing the
|
|
government's ability to monitor what they buy and where they buy
|
|
it.
|
|
|
|
The government claims that it needs these proposals to protect us
|
|
from drug dealers, child pornographers, welfare frauders and
|
|
terrorists. However, these proposals are giving the government the
|
|
ability to squelch any activity that it doesn't like or that
|
|
threatens the status quo.
|
|
|
|
Controlling citizens is becoming more necessary as the economy
|
|
worsens and money becomes harder to come by. The government wants
|
|
to use the technology to spy on its citizens. A better solution?
|
|
Putting technology to use for everyone.
|
|
|
|
|
|
For more information on privacy and civil liberties issues on the
|
|
information superhighway, contact these organizations:
|
|
|
|
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
|
|
P.O. Box 717
|
|
Palo Alto, California 94302
|
|
Phone: 415-322-3778
|
|
E-mail: cpsr@cpsr.org
|
|
|
|
Electronic Privacy Information Center
|
|
666 Pennsylvania Ave. S.E. #301
|
|
Washington, D.C. 20003
|
|
E-mail: info@epic.org
|
|
|
|
Electronic Frontier Foundation
|
|
1001 G St. N.W. Suite 950 East
|
|
Washington, D.C. 20001
|
|
Phone: 202-347-5400
|
|
E-mail: info@eff.org
|
|
|
|
|
|
******************************************************************
|
|
This article originated in the PEOPLE'S TRIBUNE (Online Edition),
|
|
Vol. 21 No. 33 / August 15, 1994; P.O. Box 3524, Chicago, IL 60654
|
|
|
|
For free electronic subscription, email: pt.dist-request@umich.edu
|
|
|
|
Feel free to reproduce; please include this message with
|
|
reproductions of this article.
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Sat, 13 Aug 1994 00:17:53 -0600 (MDT)
|
|
From: adunkin@NYX.CS.DU.EDU(Alan Dunkin)
|
|
Subject: File 4--CyberSpace Forum - ReIntroduction
|
|
|
|
(MODERATORS' NOTE: Alan Dunkin resumes his periodic commentary with
|
|
this issue. He's completed the gargantuan task of update the
|
|
CuD cummulative index through Vol. 5, which we'll run in about two
|
|
weeks).
|
|
|
|
THE CYBERSPACE FORUM - AUGUST 13, 1994
|
|
by Alan Dunkin [adunkin@nyx.cs.du.edu]
|
|
|
|
It's been awhile since I've written here last, because of work and
|
|
other problems I have been unable to contribute much of anything for
|
|
the past few months. Now that things have calmed down a bit, I can
|
|
now get back to doing what I had originally planned, making this a
|
|
regular feature of the Computer underground Digest.
|
|
|
|
One of the things I hope to provide is a list of new resources
|
|
available that may be of interest to you. The list may consist of a
|
|
listing of World Wide Web URLs; sites which, by the way, are growing
|
|
exponentially. Sites that are only accessible by telnet, FTP, or
|
|
other forms of connections will also be listed.
|
|
|
|
Another feature I hope to bring are the updates on some of the
|
|
texts I am working on. Constant readers of CuD know that I'm working
|
|
on the new volume of the cumulative index, and I would like to
|
|
announce that there will be a similiar index for EFFector, EFF's
|
|
newsletter that has been going on, in less quantity, since CuD's
|
|
inception. Yes, and there are other things in the works.
|
|
|
|
So, without further ado . . .
|
|
|
|
***
|
|
|
|
Estimated Times of Arrivals for the following projects:
|
|
|
|
Computer underground Digest Cumulative Index
|
|
[Volumes 1 through 5] - Right about now
|
|
EFFector Cumulative Index
|
|
[Volumes 1 through 6] - About three weeks
|
|
|
|
The CuD Index will be posted here first, and the EFFector Index will
|
|
be put straight in the EFF archives.
|
|
|
|
***
|
|
|
|
Those of you interested in cryptography, encryption, Clipper,
|
|
cypherpunks, PGP public key databases, may want to stop by
|
|
Fran Litterio's Cryptography, PGP, and Your Privacy WWW page.
|
|
It contains links to cryptography-related FAQs, information on
|
|
PGP version 2.6
|
|
|
|
As you may guess there's bunch of stuff there, and Fran has done
|
|
a really good job getting everything together and organized. You
|
|
can visit seperate sections on PGP, articles about or by cypherpunks,
|
|
newsgroups related to cryptography, more papers on various topics, and
|
|
even more than that.
|
|
|
|
The URL is http://draco.centerline.com:8080/~franl/crypto.html
|
|
|
|
***
|
|
|
|
That's about it for now. Look for the new CuD Cumulative Index
|
|
in your mailbox or at the EFF site, or it's mirrors within the next
|
|
few days.
|
|
|
|
Next time, a look into the early life of CuD and a few views of the
|
|
Amateur Access BBS case decision. And hopefully the time lag between
|
|
the forum issues will be a few months less :)
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 1994 13:33:09 -0600 (MDT)
|
|
From: "Rob Slade, Ed. DECrypt & ComNet, VARUG rep, 604-984-4067"
|
|
Subject: File 5--"What Computers Still Can't Do" by Dreyfus (Book Review)
|
|
|
|
The MIT Press
|
|
55 Hayward Street
|
|
Cambridge, MA 02142-1399
|
|
USA
|
|
Robert V. Prior, Editor - Computer Science prior@mitvma.mit.edu
|
|
Maureen Curtin, Int'l Promo. - curtin@mit.edu
|
|
|
|
"What Computers Still Can't Do", Dreyfus, 1992, 0-262-54067-3, U$13.95
|
|
|
|
There are two kinds of classics. In one, an important idea is held
|
|
up, explained and illuminated from all sides. This exposure is both
|
|
pleasurable and thought-provoking; so much so, that even an opponent
|
|
of the central thesis still enjoys the work and may be inspired by it.
|
|
|
|
The second type of classic takes an important idea and beats it to
|
|
death. This is what Dreyfus did with his original work, which is
|
|
basically unchanged here. One suspects that his work would not have
|
|
produced such animosity had he not taken the tactic of a direct attack
|
|
on all of the major artificial intelligence work of the time. (And of
|
|
the time since: the introductions to the various reprintings continue
|
|
attacks on each succeeding generation of AI.) After a while, even the
|
|
most sympathetic reader starts to respond, "So it's limited. So it
|
|
doesn't work yet. So what?"
|
|
|
|
That, however, only applies to the introductions, and part one. Parts
|
|
two and three move completely out of the technical realm and into the
|
|
philosophical. The second part looks at the philosophical beliefs of
|
|
the devotees of AI. "Belief" is the correct term. As Dreyfus points
|
|
out at the beginning of part three, committed workers in the field of
|
|
artificial intelligence seem to have, consciously or unconsciously, an
|
|
almost religious assumption that man, and the brain, is a calculating
|
|
device of some kind. Dreyfus points out that these beliefs are
|
|
unfounded, in the sense of not being based upon clearly demonstrable
|
|
evidence or principles.
|
|
|
|
However, as one moves into the last part of the book, it becomes
|
|
evident that Dreyfus is *not* presenting a critique of artificial
|
|
reason or intelligence. He is primarily attacking "cognitive
|
|
simulation". Part three presents an alternative view, not of
|
|
computing or AI, but of cognition. Unfortunately, this part of the
|
|
book, while somewhat interesting, is not as compelling as the negative
|
|
parts.
|
|
|
|
The central thesis of the book, that there are limits to computing and
|
|
that we tend to hold unquestioned beliefs about computing power, is
|
|
still an important one. The failure, however, to update the book in
|
|
terms of current beliefs and aspirations, robs the work of some
|
|
impact.
|
|
|
|
copyright Robert M. Slade, 1994 BKWCSCD.RVW 940519
|
|
|
|
======================
|
|
DECUS Canada Communications, Desktop, Education and Security group
|
|
newsletters Editor and/or reviewer ROBERTS@decus.ca, RSlade@sfu.ca,
|
|
Rob Slade at 1:153/733 DECUS Symposium '95, Toronto, ON, February
|
|
13-17, 1995, contact: rulag@decus.ca
|
|
Date: Sun, 07 Aug 94 18:07:24 EDT
|
|
From: AdamRCohen@AOL.COM
|
|
Subject: File 6--Essay Contest - Future of Print
|
|
|
|
I thought you might like to hear about an essay contest sponsored by
|
|
the Audit Bureau of Circulations. The subject is, "Print: Roadkill on
|
|
the Information Superhighway - Yes or No?" Top prize is $2,500. Essays
|
|
are due 9/7/94.
|
|
|
|
Basic information about eligibility and the Audit Bureau follows. For
|
|
more complete information and entry forms, call ABC's Colleen O'Grady
|
|
at 708-605-0909. Please share this notice with anyone who might be
|
|
interested. Many thanks.
|
|
|
|
Entry Requirements: Entrants must be employees of ABC-member companies
|
|
and have worked in the advertising, marketing or publishing industries
|
|
for 5 years or less as of 9/7/94. Over 4,000 publishers, advertisers
|
|
and ad agencies are members of ABC. To verify your eligibility, call
|
|
Ms. O'Grady at 708-605-0909.
|
|
|
|
The Audit Bureau of Circulations is the first and largest
|
|
circulation-auditing organization in the world. ABC establishes ground
|
|
rules for circulation auditing and provides buyers and sellers of
|
|
print advertising with independent verfication of the circulation
|
|
information needed to make well-informed media decisions.
|
|
|
|
Adam R. Cohen
|
|
Member, ABC Young Media Professionals Committee
|
|
AdamRCohen@aol.com
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Thu, 4 Aug 1994 10:03:08 -0700
|
|
From: Jim Warren <jwarren@WELL.SF.CA.US>
|
|
Subject: File 7--GovAccess.043: ACT.ALERT! Two CRUCIAL ITEMS Aug.8th
|
|
|
|
Aug.04, 1994
|
|
|
|
I *think* I have *finally* purged the GovAccess list of those who do not
|
|
wish to continue to receive these postings. If not, flame me one more time.]
|
|
|
|
|
|
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
|
|
|
|
|
|
Fact: California legislators consider 10 to 15 letters and faxes to be a
|
|
*strong* showing of support for a bill (in a state of 31-million population!).
|
|
|
|
One of the worst things about democracy is that citizens must occasionally
|
|
*act* to inform their representatives of their desires. :-) These are two
|
|
such instances.
|
|
|
|
|
|
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
|
|
|
|
|
|
CRUCIAL VOTE ON MONDAY: PRECEDENT-SETTING EXECUTIVE-BRANCH ONLINE ACCESS
|
|
|
|
Last year, AB 1624 opened California's legislative-branch info to free
|
|
public access, online - a model now being pursued in perhaps a dozen other
|
|
state legislatures. Now, we're afer the executive-branch.
|
|
|
|
On Monday, Aug. 8, California's Assembly Bill 2451 (AB 2451) by
|
|
Assemblyman Tom Bates will face a crucial vote in the Senate
|
|
Appropriations Committee.
|
|
|
|
AB 2451 passed the California Assembly unanimously (to my amazement), but
|
|
some inside sources say it may have trouble in the Senate.
|
|
|
|
*Faxed support letters are needed immediately!* <===!!
|
|
And ... letters arriving on Monday will probably be useless!
|
|
|
|
|
|
This bill would require that already-computerized state information, that
|
|
is already public information under the California Public Records Act,
|
|
be made available to the public via the Internet, without charges by the
|
|
state. (Implementation is contingent on fetching-back some loot from the
|
|
federal government to cover costs, but fed "information infrastructure"
|
|
grants are already splattering around.)
|
|
|
|
Online access to state-agency public records would greatly aid business,
|
|
help local government to be more efficient, and permit a better-informed
|
|
citizenship.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Letters should be *short*, polite and to the point. (And, if there is
|
|
state agency or regulatory information that could be helpful in your
|
|
business or work, it's especially valuable to mention it.)
|
|
|
|
Even if you've written a letter before, supporting this bill, PLEASE WRITE
|
|
AGAIN (these new players need to know you're still interested -- and
|
|
watching!).
|
|
|
|
Our new targets: Senate Appropriations Committee (and their fax numbers)
|
|
|
|
Bob Presley, Chairman (D-Riverside) 916-445-9781 (voice only; no fax?!)
|
|
Bob Beverly, Vice Chairman (R-Redondo Beach) 310-540-2192
|
|
Marian Bergeson (R-Newport Beach) 916-445-9263
|
|
David Kelley (R-San Diego) 916-327-2187
|
|
Bill Leonard (R-Upland) 916-327-2272
|
|
Alfred Alquist (D-San Jose) 916-323-8386
|
|
Ralph Dills (D-Gardena) 916-323-6056
|
|
Leroy Greene (D-Sacramento) 916-327-6341
|
|
Patrick Johnston (D-Stockton) 916-327-4213
|
|
Henry Mello (D-Gilroy) 916-448-0175
|
|
Art Torres (D-LA) 916-444-0581
|
|
Diane Watson (D-LA) 916-327-2599
|
|
Also, be sure to fax a copy of your letter to bill-author Bates' office
|
|
at 916-445-6434.
|
|
|
|
(His aide is Rachel Richman, rrichman@igc.apc.org, but the emerging reality
|
|
is that emailed support letters are proving *NOT* to be very persuasive when
|
|
shown to fence-sitting committee members - "They all look alike." The
|
|
mummies in the legislature still need to see things that *look* like
|
|
letters or faxed-letters! <blegh!>)
|
|
|
|
If you care enough ... send the very best! :-)
|
|
|
|
And email this to all your friends und associates. Pronto!
|
|
|
|
|
|
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
|
|
|
|
|
|
STILL TRYING TO GET CAMPAIGN-FINANCE DISCLOSURES ONLINE (Senate Bill 758)
|
|
|
|
Another crucial precedent-setter - if we can get it passed (and this
|
|
election-year is the time to do it!) - is Senator Tom Hayden's SB 758. It
|
|
would require candidates and campaign committees receiving significant
|
|
loot to file their public disclosures in computerized form (cheap! fast!),
|
|
and would make the info freely available via the Internet.
|
|
|
|
It's stuck in the Assembly Elections Committee, but can be reconsidered *IF*
|
|
the committee Chairwoiman permits it - *soon*! There are some powerful
|
|
insiders working on it, so it has a reasonable chance - *if* there's
|
|
evidence of public interest.
|
|
|
|
A fax to her as soon as possible can help pry SB 758 out of her committee,
|
|
so it could still be passed in this session.
|
|
|
|
Short, polite faxes advocating reconsideration of SB 758 (with a few
|
|
reasons why it's important that citizens have *modern* access to these
|
|
public disclosures) are needed, NOW!, to:
|
|
Chairwoman Diane Martinez, fax/916-324-1393 (D-East Los Angeles)
|
|
with a copy to bill-author Tom Hayden, fax/916-324-4823.
|
|
|
|
And tell your friends!
|
|
|
|
|
|
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
|
|
|
|
|
|
ERRATA: TWO GovAccess.041's <tsk!>
|
|
|
|
On June 11th, I exuded #041 concerning the Peninsula CivicNet Symposium.
|
|
|
|
On June 29th, I sent another #041, having nothing to do with civic
|
|
networking; entirely-concerned with California's computerized campaign-finance
|
|
disclosures. Please consider it GovAccess.042.
|
|
|
|
Hot dang! I neu I'd mak a misteak somedae.
|
|
|
|
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
|
|
|
|
|
|
"If a Nation expects to be ignorant and free in a state of civilization,
|
|
it expects what never was and never will be. ... If we are to guard against
|
|
ignorance and remain free, it is the responsibility of every American to be
|
|
informed." -- Thomas Jefferson from Chris Casey, Sen. Ted Kennedy's staff]
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
End of Computer Underground Digest #6.72
|
|
************************************
|
|
|