853 lines
44 KiB
Plaintext
853 lines
44 KiB
Plaintext
Computer underground Digest Sun Apr 17, 1994 Volume 6 : Issue 34
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ISSN 1004-042X
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Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
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Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
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Archivist Le Grande: Stanton McCandlish
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Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
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Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
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Ian Dickinson
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Suspercollater: Shrdlu Nooseman
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CONTENTS, #6.34 (Apr 17, 1994)
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File 1--Bruce Sterling's Remarks at CFP '94
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File 2--"When Copying Isn't Theft" (Internet World/M. Godwin Rprnt)
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File 3--NII & Service to the Poor (fwd)
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Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
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available at no cost electronically.
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CuD is available as a Usenet newsgroup: comp.society.cu-digest
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Or, to subscribe, send a one-line message: SUB CUDIGEST your name
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Send it to LISTSERV@UIUCVMD.BITNET or LISTSERV@VMD.CSO.UIUC.EDU
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The editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-0303), fax (815-753-6302)
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or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL
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60115, USA.
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Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
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diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted for non-profit as long
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as the source is cited. Authors hold a presumptive copyright, and
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DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: Mon, 4 Apr 1994 16:07:11 -0700
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From: Bruce Sterling <bruces@WELL.SF.CA.US>
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Subject: File 1--Bruce Sterling's Remarks at CFP '94
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Bruce Sterling
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bruces@well.sf.ca.us
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LITERARY FREEWARE: NOT FOR COMMERCIAL USE
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Remarks at Computers, Freedom and Privacy Conference IV
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Chicago, Mar 26, 1994
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I've been asked to explain why I don't worry much about the topics of
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privacy threat raised by this panel. And I don't. One reason is that
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these scenarios seem to assume that there will be large, monolithic
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bureaucracies (of whatever character, political or economic) that are
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capable of harnessing computers for one-way surveillance of an
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unsuspecting populace. I've come to feel that computation just
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doesn't work that way. Being afraid of monolithic organizations
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especially when they have computers, is like being afraid of really
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big gorillas especially when they are on fire.
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The threat simply doesn't concur with my historical experience. None
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of the large organizations of my youth that compelled my fear and
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uneasy respect have prospered. Let me just roll off a few acronyms
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here. CCCP. KGB. IBM. GM. AEC. SAC.
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It was recently revealed that the CIA has been of actual negative
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worth -- literally worse than useless -- to American national
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security. They were in the pockets of the KGB during our death
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struggle with the Soviet Union -- and yet we still won. Japanese
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zaibatsus -- Japan Inc. -- the corporate monoliths of Japan -- how
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much hype have we heard about that lately? I admit that AT&T has
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prospered, sort of -- if you don't count the fact that they've
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hollowed themselves out by firing a huge percentage of their
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personnel.
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Suppose that, say, Equifax, turned into an outright fascist
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organization and stated abusing privacy in every way they could. How
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could they keep that a secret? Realistically, given current
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employment practices in the Western economies, what kind of loyalty
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could they command among their own personnel? The low level temps
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have no health insurance and no job security; the high level people
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are ready to grab their golden parachutes and bail at any time. Where
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is the fanatically loyal army of gray flannel organization men who
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will swear lifelong allegiance to this organization, or *any*
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organization in this country with the possible exception of the Mafia?
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I feel that the real threat to our society isn't because people are
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being surveilled but because people are being deliberately ignored.
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People drop through the safety nets. People stumble through the
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streets of every city in this country absolutely wrapped in the grip
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of demons, groping at passersby for a moment's attention and pity and
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not getting it. In parts of the Third World people are routinely
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disappeared, not because of high-tech computer surveillance but for
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the most trivial and insane reasons -- because they wear glasses,
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because they were seen reading a book -- and if they survive, it's
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because of the thin thread of surveillance carried out by Amnesty
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International.
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There may be securicams running 24 hours a day all around us, but
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mechanical surveillance is not the same as people actually getting
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attention or care. Sure, rich people, like most of us here, are gonna
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get plenty of attention, probably too much, a poisonous amount, but in
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the meantime life has become so cheap in this society that we let
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people stagger around right in front of us exhaling tuberculosis
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without treatment. It's not so much information haves and have-nots
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and watch and watch-nots.
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I wish I could speak at greater length more directly to the topic of
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this panel. But since I'm the last guy to officially speak at CFP IV,
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I want the seize the chance to grandstand and do a kind of pontifical
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summation of the event. And get some irrepressible feelings off my
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chest.
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What am I going to remember from CFP IV? I'm going to remember the
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Chief Counsel of NSA and his impassioned insistence that key escrow
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cryptography represents normality and the status quo, and that
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unlicensed hard cryptography is a rash and radical leap into unplumbed
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depths of lawlessness. He made a literary reference to BRAVE NEW
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WORLD. What he said in so many words was, "We're not the Brave New
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World, Clipper's opponents are the Brave New World."
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And I believe he meant that. As a professional science fiction writer
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I remember being immediately struck by the deep conviction that there
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was plenty of Brave New World to go around.
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I've been to all four CFPs, and in my opinion this is the darkest one
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by far. I hear ancestral voices prophesying war. All previous CFPs
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had a weird kind of camaraderie about them. People from the most
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disparate groups found something useful to tell each other. But now
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that America's premiere spookocracy has arrived on stage and spoken
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up, I think the CFP community has finally found a group of outsiders
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that it cannot metabolize. The trenchworks are going up and I see
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nothing but confrontation ahead.
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Senator Leahy at least had the elementary good sense to backpedal and
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temporize, as any politician would when he saw the white-hot volcano
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of technological advance in the direct path of a Cold War glacier that
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has previously crushed everything in its way.
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But that unlucky flak-catcher the White House sent down here -- that
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guy was mousetrapped, basically. That was a debacle! Who was
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briefing that guy? Are they utterly unaware? How on earth could they
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miss the fact that Clipper and Digital Telephony are violently
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detested by every element in this community -- with the possible
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exception of one brave little math professor this high? Don't they
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get it that everybody from Rush Limbaugh to Timothy Leary despises
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this initiative? Don't they read newspapers? The Wall Street
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Journal, The New York Times? I won't even ask if they read their
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email.
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That was bad politics. But that was nothing compared to the
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presentation by the gentleman from the NSA. If I can do it without
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losing my temper, I want to talk to you a little bit about how
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radically unsatisfactory that was.
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I've been waiting a long time for somebody from Fort Meade to come to
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the aid of Dorothy Denning in Professor Denning's heroic and
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heartbreaking solo struggle against twelve million other people with
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email addresses. And I listened very carefully and I took notes and I
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swear to God I even applauded at the end.
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He had seven points to make, four of which were disingenuous, two were
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half-truths, and the other was the actual core of the problem.
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Let me blow away some of the smoke and mirrors first, more for my own
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satisfaction than because it's going to enlighten you people any.
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With your indulgence.
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First, the kidporn thing. I am sick and tired of hearing this
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specious blackwash. Are American citizens really so neurotically
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uptight about deviant sexual behavior that we will allow our entire
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information infrastructure to be dictated by the existence of
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pedophiles? Are pedophiles that precious and important to us? Do the
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NSA and the FBI really believe that they can hide the structure of a
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telephone switch under a layer of camouflage called child pornography?
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Are we supposed to flinch so violently at the specter of child abuse
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that we somehow miss the fact that you've installed a Sony Walkman
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jack in our phones?
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Look, there were pedophiles before NII and there will be pedophiles
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long after NII is just another dead acronym. Pedophiles don't jump
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out of BBSes like jacks in the box. You want to impress me with your
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deep concern for children? This is Chicago! Go down to the Projects
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and rescue some children from being terrorized and recruited by crack
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gangs who wouldn't know a modem if it bit them on the ass! Stop
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pornkidding us around! Just knock it off with that crap, you're
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embarrassing yourselves.
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But back to the speech by Mr. Baker of the NSA. Was it just me,
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ladies and gentlemen, or did anyone else catch that tone of truly
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intolerable arrogance? Did they guy have to make the remark about our
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missing Woodstock because we were busy with our trigonometry? Do
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spook mathematicians permanently cooped up inside Fort Meade consider
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that a funny remark? I'd like to make an even more amusing
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observation -- that I've seen scarier secret police agencies than his
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completely destroyed by a Czech hippie playwright with a manual
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typewriter.
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Is the NSA unaware that the current President of the United States
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once had a big bushel-basket-full of hair? What does he expect from
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the computer community? Normality? Sorry pal, we're fresh out! Who
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is it, exactly, that the NSA considers a level-headed sober sort,
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someone to sit down with and talk to seriously? Jobs? Wozniak?
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Gates? Sculley? Perot -- I hope to God it's not Perot. Bob Allen --
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okay, maybe Bob Allen, that brownshoe guy from AT&T. Bob Allen seems
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to think that Clipper is a swell idea, at least he's somehow willing
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to merchandise it. But Christ, Bob Allen just gave eight zillion
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dollars to a guy whose idea of a good time is Microsoft Windows for
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Spaceships!
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When is the NSA going to realize that Kapor and his people and
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Rotenberg and his people and the rest of the people here are as good
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as people get in this milieu? Yes they are weird people, and yes they
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have weird friends (and I'm one of them), but there isn't any
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normality left for anybody in this society, and when it comes to
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computers, when the going got weird the weird turned pro! The status
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quo is *over!* Wake up to it! Get used to it!
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Where in hell does a crowd of spooks from Fort Meade get off playing
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"responsible adults" in this situation? This is a laugh and a half!
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Bobby Ray Inman, the legendary NSA leader, made a stab at computer
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entrepreneurism and rapidly went down for the third time. Then he got
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out of the shadows of espionage and into the bright lights of actual
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public service and immediately started gabbling like a
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daylight-stricken vampire. Is this the kind of responsive public
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official we're expected to blindly trust with the insides of our
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phones and computers? Who made him God?
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You know, it's a difficult confession for a practiced cynic like me to
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make, but I actually trust EFF people. I do; I trust them; there,
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I've said it. But I wouldn't trust Bobby Ray Inman to go down to the
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corner store for a pack of cigarettes.
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You know, I like FBI people. I even kind of trust them, sort of, kind
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of, a little bit. I'm sorry that they didn't catch Kevin Mitnick
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here. I'm even sorry that they didn't manage to apprehend Robert
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Steele, who is about one hundred times as smart as Mitnick and ten
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thousand times as dangerous. But FBI people, I think your idea of
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Digital Telephony is a scarcely mitigated disaster, and I'll tell you
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why.
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Because you're going to be filling out your paperwork in quintuplicate
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to get a tap, just like you always do, because you don't have your own
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pet court like the NSA does. And for you, it probably is going to
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seem pretty much like the status quo used to be. But in the meantime,
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you will have armed the enemies of the United States around the world
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with a terrible weapon. Not your court-ordered, civilized Digital
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Telephony -- their raw and tyrannical Digital Telephony.
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You're gonna be using it to round up wiseguys in streetgangs, and
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people like Saddam Hussein are gonna be using it to round up
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democratic activists and national minorities. You're going to
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strengthen the hand of despotism around the world, and then you're
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going to have to deal with the hordes of state-supported truckbombers
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these rogue governments are sending our way after annihilating their
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own internal opposition by using your tools. You want us to put an
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axe in your hand and you're promising to hit us with only the flat
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side of it, but the Chinese don't see it that way; they're already
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licensing fax machines and they're gonna need a lot of new hardware to
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gear up for Tiananmen II.
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I've talked a long time, but I want to finish by saying something
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about the NSA guy's one real and actual argument. The terrors of the
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Brave New World of free individual encryption. When he called
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encryption enthusiasts "romantic" he was dead-on, and when he said the
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results of spreading encryption were unpredictable and dangerous he
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was also dead-on, because people, encryption is not our friend.
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Encryption is a mathematical technique, and it has about as much
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concern for our human well-being as the fact that seventeen times
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seventeen equals two hundred and eighty-nine. It does, but that
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doesn't make us sleep any safer in our beds.
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Encrypted networks worry the hell out of me and they have since the
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mid 1980s. The effects are very scary and very unpredictable and
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could be very destabilizing. But even the Four Horsemen of Kidporn,
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Dope Dealers, Mafia and Terrorists don't worry me as much as
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totalitarian governments. It's been a long century, and we've had
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enough of them.
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Our battle this century against totalitarianism has left terrible
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scars all over our body politic and the threat these people pose to us
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is entirely and utterly predictable. You can say that the devil we
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know is better than the devil we don't, but the devils we knew were
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ready to commit genocide, litter the earth with dead, and blow up the
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world. How much worse can that get? Let's not build chips and wiring
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for our police and spies when only their police and spies can reap the
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full benefit of them.
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But I don't expect my arguments to persuade anyone in the NSA. If
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you're NSA and I do somehow convince you, by some fluke, then I urge
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you to look at your conscience -- I know you have one -- and take the
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word to your superiors and if they don't agree with you --*resign.*
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Leave the Agency. Resign now, and if I'm right about what's coming
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down the line, you'll be glad you didn't wait till later.
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But even though I have a good line of gab, I don't expect to actually
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argue people out of their livelihood. That's notoriously difficult.
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So CFP people, you have a fight on your hands. I'm sorry that a
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community this young should have to face a fight this savage, for such
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terribly high stakes, so soon. But what the heck; you're always
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bragging about how clever you are; here's your chance to prove to your
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fellow citizens that you're more than a crowd of net-nattering MENSA
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dilettantes. In cyberspace one year is like seven dog years, and on
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the Internet nobody knows you're a dog, so I figure that makes you CFP
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people twenty-eight years old. And people, for the sake of our
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society and our children you had better learn to act your age.
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Good luck. Good luck to you. For what it's worth, I think you're
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some of the best and brightest our society has to offer. Things look
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dark but I feel hopeful. See you next year in San Francisco.
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------------------------------
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Date: Sun, 17 Apr 1994 22:51:01 CDT
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From: CuD Moderators <cudigest@mindvox.phantom.com>
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Subject: File 2--"When Copying Isn't Theft" (Internet World/M. Godwin Rprnt)
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From: Internet World, Jan./Feb. 1994
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When Copying Isn't Theft:
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How the Government Stumbled in a "Hacker" Case
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By Mike Godwin
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As more and more private individuals and private companies connect to the
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Internet, more and more of them will generate or use their intellectual
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property there. And since not everyone is familiar with the legal
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distinctions between so-called "intellectual property" and everyday
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tangible property, there will be more and more discussion of how
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infringement of intellectual property amounts to "online theft."
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But the law of intellectual property is not so simple as Usenet
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discussions may lead you to believe. Assuming that your information is
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"property" (when in fact it may not be property at all) may lead you to a
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false sense of security about how much the law protects your interest in
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that information. This article discusses one computer-crime case, United
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States v. Riggs, that illustrates how even well-trained federal
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prosecutors can grow confused about how to apply intellectual-property
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law--especially the law of trade secrets. In particular, it shows what can
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happen when prosecutors uncritically apply *intellectual* property notions
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in prosecuting a defendant under laws passed to protect *tangible*
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property.
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Big Phrack Attack
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In the recent case of U.S. v. Riggs, the Chicago U.S. Attorney's office
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prosecuted two young men, Robert Riggs and Craig Neidorf, on counts of
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wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343), interstate transportation of stolen property
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(18 U.S.C. 2314) and computer fraud (18 U.S.C. 1030). Of these statutes,
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only the last was passed specifically to address the problems of
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unauthorized computer intrusion; the other two are "general purpose"
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federal criminal statutes that are used by the government in a wide range
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of criminal prosecutions. One element of the wire-fraud statute is the
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taking (by fraudulent means) of "money or property," while the
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interstate-transportation-of-stolen-property (ITSP) statute requires,
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naturally enough, the element of "goods, wares, merchandise, securities or
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money, of the value of $5,000 or more."
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(I don't discuss here the extent to which the notions of "property" differ
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between these two federal statutes. It is certain that they do differ to
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some extent, and the interests protected by the wire-fraud statute were
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expanded in the 1980s by Congress to include Rthe intangible right to
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honest services.S 18 U.S.C. 1346.. Even so, the prosectuion in the Riggs
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case relies not on 1346, but on intellectual-property notions, which are
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the focus of this article.)
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The computer-intrusion counts against Neidorf were dropped in the
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governmentUs June 1990 superseding indictment, the indictment actually
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used at NeidorfUs trial in July 1990. Probably this was due to the
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government's realization that it would be hard to prove beyond a
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reasonable doubt that Neidorf had any direct involvement with any actual
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computer breakin.
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The Riggs case is based on the following facts: Robert Riggs, a computer
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"hacker" in his early '20s, discovered that he could easily gain access to
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an account on a computer belonging to Bell South, one of the Regional Bell
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Operating Companies (RBOCs). The account was highly insecure--access to
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it did not require a password (a standard, if not always effective,
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security precaution). While exploring this account, Riggs discovered a
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word-processing document detailing procedures and definitions of terms
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relating the Emergency 911 system ("E911 system"). Like many hackers,
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Riggs had a deep curiosity about the workings of this country's telephone
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system. (This curiosity among young hackers is a social phenomenon that
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has been documented for more than 20 years. See, e.g., Rosenbaum, "Secrets
|
|
of the Little Blue Box," Esquire, October 1971; and Barlow, "Crime and
|
|
Puzzlement: In Advance of the Law on the Electronic Frontier," Whole Earth
|
|
Review, September 1990.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
Riggs knew that his discovery would be of interest to Craig Neidorf, a
|
|
Missouri college student who, while not a hacker himself, was an amateur
|
|
journalist whose electronically distributed publication, Phrack, was
|
|
devoted to articles of interest to computer hackers. Riggs sent a copy of
|
|
the E911 document to Neidorf over the telephone, using computer and modem,
|
|
and Neidorf edited the copy to conceal its origin. Among other things,
|
|
Neidorf removed the statements that the information contained in the
|
|
document was proprietary and not for distribution. Neidorf then sent the
|
|
edited copy back to Riggs for the latter's review; following RiggsUs
|
|
approval of the edited copy, Neidorf published the E911 document in the
|
|
February 24, 1989, issue of Phrack. Some months following publication of
|
|
the document in Phrack, both Riggs and Neidorf were contacted and
|
|
questioned by the Secret Service, and all systems that might contain the
|
|
E911 document were seized pursuant to evidentiary search warrants.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Riggs and Neidorf were indicted under the statutes discussed above; Riggs,
|
|
whose unauthorized access to the BellSouth computer was difficult to
|
|
dispute, later pled guilty to wire fraud for that conduct. In contrast,
|
|
Neidorf pled innocent on all counts, arguing, among other things, that his
|
|
conduct was protected by the First Amendment, and that he had not deprived
|
|
Bell South of property as that notion is defined for the purposes of the
|
|
wire fraud and ITSP statutes.
|
|
|
|
|
|
The two defenses are closely related. Under the First Amendment, the
|
|
presumption is that information is free, and that it can readily be
|
|
published and republished. For this reason, information "becomes
|
|
property" only if it passes certain legal tests. This means that law
|
|
enforcement cannot simply assume that whenever information has been copied
|
|
from a private computer system a theft has taken place.
|
|
|
|
|
|
But in Neidorf's case, as it turns out, this is essentially what the
|
|
Secret Service and the U.S. Attorney's office did assume. And this
|
|
assumption came back to haunt the government when it was revealed during
|
|
trial that the information contained within the E911 document did not meet
|
|
any of the relevant legal tests to be established as a property interest.
|
|
|
|
|
|
How information becomes stealable property.
|
|
|
|
|
|
In order for information to be stolen property, it must first be property.
|
|
There are only a few ways that information can qualify as a property
|
|
interest, and two of these--patent law and copyright law--are entirely
|
|
creations of federal statute, pursuant to an express Constitutional grant
|
|
of legislative authority. (U.S. Constitution, Article I, Sec. 8, clause
|
|
8.) Patent protections were clearly inapplicable in the Neidorf case; the
|
|
E911 document, a list of definitions and procedures, did not constitute an
|
|
invention or otherwise patentable process or method. Copyright law might
|
|
have looked more promising to Neidorf's prosecutors, since it is well
|
|
established that copyrights qualify as property interests in some contexts
|
|
(for example, your uncle's copyright interest in his novel can be
|
|
bequeathed to you as "personal property" through a will).
|
|
|
|
|
|
Unfortunately for the government, the Supreme Court has explicitly stated
|
|
that copyrighted material is not property for the purposes of the ITSP
|
|
statute. In Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985), the Court held
|
|
that interests in copyright are outside the scope of the ITSP statute.
|
|
(Dowling involved a prosecution for interstate shipments of pirated Elvis
|
|
Presley recordings.) In reaching its decision, the Court held, among
|
|
other things, that 18 U.S.C. ' 2314 contemplates "a physical identity
|
|
between the items unlawfully obtained and those eventually transported,
|
|
and hence some prior physical taking of the subject goods." Unauthorized
|
|
copies of copyrighted material do not meet this "physical identity"
|
|
requirement.
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Court also reasoned that intellectual property is different in
|
|
character from property protected by generic theft statutes: "The
|
|
copyright owner, however, holds no ordinary chattel. A copyright, like
|
|
other intellectual property, comprises a series of carefully defined and
|
|
carefully delimited interests to which the law affords correspondingly
|
|
exact protections." The Court went on to note that a special term of art,
|
|
"infringement," is used in reference to violations of copyright
|
|
interests--thus undercutting any easy equation between unauthorized
|
|
copying and "stealing" or "theft."
|
|
|
|
|
|
It is clear, then, that in order for the government to prosecute the
|
|
unauthorized copying of computerized information as a theft, it must rely
|
|
on other theories of information-as-property. Trade-secret law is one
|
|
well-established legal theory of this sort. Another is the
|
|
breach-of-confidence theory articulated recently by the Supreme Court in
|
|
Carpenter v. United States, 108 S.Ct. 316 (1987). I will discuss each
|
|
theory in turn below.
|
|
|
|
Trade Secrets
|
|
|
|
|
|
Unlike copyrights and patents, trade secrets are generally created by
|
|
state law, and most jurisdictions have laws that criminalize the
|
|
violations of a trade-secret holder's rights in the secret. There is no
|
|
general federal definition of what a trade secret is, but there have been
|
|
federal cases in which trade-secret information has been used to establish
|
|
the property element of a federal property crime. In the 1966 case of
|
|
United States v. Bottone (365 F.2d 389, cert denied, 385 U.S. 974 (1966)),
|
|
for example, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed ITSP convictions
|
|
in a case involving a conspiracy to steal drug-manufacturing bacterial
|
|
cultures and related documents from a pharmaceutical company and sell them
|
|
in foreign markets.
|
|
|
|
|
|
But the problem in using a trade secret to establish the property element
|
|
of a theft crime is that, unlike traditional property, information has to
|
|
leap several hurdles in order to be established as a trade secret.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Trade secret definitions vary somewhat from state to state, but the
|
|
varying definitions typically have most elements in common. One good
|
|
definition of "trade secret" is outlined by the Supreme Court in Kewanee
|
|
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974): "a trade secret may consist
|
|
of any forumula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is
|
|
used in one's business, and which gives one an opportunity to obtain an
|
|
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula
|
|
for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or
|
|
preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list
|
|
of customers." The Court went further and listed the particular
|
|
attributes of a trade secret:
|
|
|
|
|
|
* The information must, in fact, be secret--"not of public knowledge or of
|
|
general knowledge in the trade or business."
|
|
* A trade secret remains a secret if it is revealed in confidence to
|
|
someone who is under a contractual or fiduciary obligation, express or
|
|
implied, not to reveal it.
|
|
* A trade secret is protected against those who acquire via unauthorized
|
|
disclosure, violation of contractual duty of confidentiality, or through
|
|
"improper means." ("Improper means" includes such things as theft,
|
|
bribery, burglary, or trespass. The Restatement of Torts at 757 defines
|
|
such means as follows: "In general they are means which fall below the
|
|
generally accepted standards of commercial morality and reasonable
|
|
conduct.")
|
|
* A court will allow a trade secret to be used by someone who discovered
|
|
or developed the trade secret independently (that is, without taking it in
|
|
some way from the holder), or if the holder does not take adequate
|
|
precautions to protect the secret.
|
|
* An employee or contractor who, while working for a company, develops or
|
|
discovers a trade secret, generally creates trade secret rights in the
|
|
company.
|
|
|
|
|
|
The holder of a trade secret may take a number of steps to meet its
|
|
obligation to keep the trade secret a secret. These may include:
|
|
a) Labelling documents containing the trade secret "proprietary" or
|
|
"confidential" or "trade secret" or "not for distribution to the public;"
|
|
b) Requiring employees and contractors to sign agreements not to disclose
|
|
whatever trade secrets they come in contact with;
|
|
c) destroying or rendering illegible discarded documents containing parts
|
|
or all of the secret, and;
|
|
d) restricting access to areas in the company where a nonemployee, or an
|
|
employee without a clear obligation to keep the information secret, might
|
|
encounter the secret. (See Dan Greenwood's Information Protection Advisor,
|
|
April 1992, page 5.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
Breach-of-confidence
|
|
|
|
|
|
Even if information is not protected under the federal patent and
|
|
copyright schemes, or under state-law trade-secret provisions, it is
|
|
possible, according to the Supreme Court in Carpenter v. United States,
|
|
for such information to give rise to a property interest when its
|
|
unauthorized disclosure occurs via the breach of confidential or fiduciary
|
|
relationship. In this case, R. Foster Winans, a Wall Street Journal
|
|
reporter who contributed to the Journal's "Heard on the Street" column,
|
|
conspired with Carpenter and others to reveal the contents of the column
|
|
before it was printed in the Journal, thus allowing the conspirators to
|
|
buy and sell stock with the foreknowledge that stock prices would be
|
|
affected by publication of the column. Winans and others were convicted
|
|
of wire fraud; they appealed the wire-fraud convictions on the grounds
|
|
that had not deprived the Journal of any money or property.
|
|
|
|
|
|
It should be noted that this is not an "insider trading" case, since
|
|
Winans was no corporate insider, nor was it alleged that he had received
|
|
illegal insider tips. The "Heard on the Street" column published
|
|
information about companies and stocks that would be available to anyone
|
|
who did the requisite research into publicly available materials. Since
|
|
the information reported in the columns did not itself belong to the
|
|
Journal, and since the Journal planned to publish the information for a
|
|
general readership, traditional trade secret notions did not apply. Where
|
|
was the property interest necessary for a wire-fraud conviction?
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Supreme Court reasoned that although the facts being reported in the
|
|
column were not exclusive to the Journal, the Journal's right--presumably
|
|
based in contract--to Winan's keeping the information confidential gave
|
|
rise to a property interest adequate to support a wire-fraud conviction.
|
|
Once the Court reached this conclusion, upholding the convictions of the
|
|
other defendants followed: even if one does not have a direct fiduciary
|
|
duty to protect a trade secret or confidential information, one can become
|
|
civilly or criminally liable if one conspires with, solicits, or aids and
|
|
abets a fiduciary to disclose such information in violation of that
|
|
person's duty. The Court's decision in Carpenter has received significant
|
|
criticism in the academic community for its expansion of the contours of
|
|
"intangible property," but it remains good law today.
|
|
|
|
|
|
How the theories didn't fit
|
|
|
|
|
|
With these two legal approaches--trade secrets and breach of
|
|
confidence--in mind, we can turn back to the facts of the Riggs case and
|
|
see how well, or how poorly, the theories applied in the case of Craig
|
|
Neidorf.
|
|
|
|
|
|
With regard to any trade-secret theory, it is worth noting first of all
|
|
that the alleged victim, BellSouth, is a Regional Bell Operating
|
|
Company--a monopoly telephone-service provider for a geographic region in
|
|
the United States. Remember the comment in the Kewanee Oil case that a
|
|
trade secret "gives one an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
|
|
competitors who do not know or use it"? There are strong arguments
|
|
that--at least so far as the provision of Emergency 911 service
|
|
goes--BellSouth has no "competitors" within any normal meaning of the
|
|
term. And even if BellSouth did have competitors, it is likely that they
|
|
would both know and use the E911 information, since the specifications of
|
|
this particular phone service are standardized among the regional Bells.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Moreover, as became clear in the course of the Neidorf trial, the
|
|
information contained in the E911 document was available to the general
|
|
public as well, for a nominal fee. (One of the dramatic developments at
|
|
trial occurred during the cross-examination of a BellSouth witness who had
|
|
testified that the E911 document was worth nearly $80,000. Neidorf's
|
|
counsel showed her a publication containing substantially the same
|
|
information that was available from a regional Bell or from Bellcore, the
|
|
Bells' research arm, for $13.to any member of the public that ordered it
|
|
over an 800 number.) Under the circumstances, if the Bells wanted to
|
|
maintain the E911 information as a trade secret, they hadn't taken the
|
|
kind of steps one might normally think a keeper of a secret would take.
|
|
|
|
|
|
BellSouth had, however, taken the step of labelling the E911 document as
|
|
"NOT TO BE DISCLOSED OUTSIDE OF BELLSOUTH OR ITS SUBSIDIARIES" (it was
|
|
this kind of labelling that Neidorf attempted to remove as he edited the
|
|
document for publication in Phrack). This fact may have been responsible
|
|
for the federal prosecutors' oversight in not determining prior to trial
|
|
whethe E911 document actually met the tests of trade-secret law. It is
|
|
possible that prosecutors, unfamiliar with the nuances of trade-secret
|
|
law, read the "proprietary" warnings and, reasonining backwards, concluded
|
|
that the information thus labelled must be trade-secret information. If
|
|
so, this was a fatal error on the government's part. In the face of
|
|
strong evidence that the E911 document was neither secret nor
|
|
competitively or financially very valuable, any hope the government had of
|
|
proving the document to be a trade secret evaporated.
|
|
|
|
|
|
(It's also possible that the government reasoned that the E911 information
|
|
could be used by malicious hackers to damage the telephone system in some
|
|
way. The trial transcript shows instances in which the government
|
|
attempted to elicit information of this sort. It should be noted, however,
|
|
that even if the information did lend itself to abuse and vandalism, this
|
|
fact alone does not bring it within the scope of trade-secret law.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
Nor did the facts lend themselves to a Carpenter-like theory based on
|
|
breach of confidence; Neidorf had no duties to BellSouth not to disclose
|
|
its information. Neither did Riggs, from whom Neidorf acquired a copy of
|
|
the document. The Riggs case lacks the linchpin necessary for a
|
|
conviction based on Carpenter--in order for nonfiduciaries to be
|
|
convicted, there must be a breaching fiduciary involved in the scheme in
|
|
some way. There can be no breach of a duty of confidence when there is no
|
|
duty to be breached.
|
|
|
|
|
|
Thus, when its trade-secret theory of the E911 document was demolished in
|
|
mid-trial, the government had no fall-back theory to rely on with regard
|
|
to its property-crime counts, and the prosecution quickly sought a
|
|
settlement on terms favorable to Neidorf, dropping prosecution of the case
|
|
in return for Neidorf's agreement to a pre-trial diversion on one minor
|
|
count.
|
|
|
|
|
|
The lesson to be learned from Riggs is that it is no easy task to
|
|
establish the elements of a theft crime when the "property" in question is
|
|
information. There are good reasons, in a free society, that this should
|
|
be so--the proper functioning of free speech and a free press require that
|
|
information be presumptively free, and that the publication of information
|
|
be presumptively protected from regulation by the government or by private
|
|
entities invoking the civil- or criminal-law property protections. The
|
|
government in Riggs failed in its duty to recognize this presumption by
|
|
failing to make the necessary effort to understand the intellectual
|
|
property issues of the case. Had it done so, Neidorf might have been
|
|
spared an expensive and painful trial, and the government might have been
|
|
spared a black eye.*
|
|
|
|
|
|
*See, e.g., "Score One for the Hackers of America," NEWSWEEK, Aug. 6 1990,
|
|
page 48, and "Dial 1-800 ... for BellSouth 'Secrets'," COMPUTERWORLD, Aug.
|
|
6, 1990, page 8.
|
|
|
|
===================================================================
|
|
|
|
Mike Godwin, a 1990 guaduate of the University fo Texas School of Law, is
|
|
legal services counsel for the Electronic Frontier Foundation. EFF filed
|
|
an amicus curiae brief in the Neidorf case, arguing that Neidorf's
|
|
attempted publication of the E911 document was protected speech under the
|
|
First Amendment. Godwin received a B.A. in liberal arts from the
|
|
University of Texas at Austin in 1980. Prior to law school, Godwin worked
|
|
as a journalist and as a computer consultant.
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 1994 23:21:55 -0800 (PST)
|
|
From: "Arthur R. McGee" <amcgee@NETCOM.COM>
|
|
Subject: File 3--NII & Service to the Poor (fwd)
|
|
|
|
Original Sender--"Karen G. Schneider" <kgs@panix.com>
|
|
Date--Sun, 27 Mar 1994 20:06:59 -0500
|
|
Subject--NII & Service to the Poor
|
|
|
|
The Poor Will Always Be With Us...
|
|
|
|
I am a librarian in a "poor but proud" city--Newark, New Jersey.
|
|
|
|
Every day we see poor people in this library. Some people are
|
|
*obviously* poor--their personal appearance speaks for their
|
|
situations. But many, many more people are impoverished in ways at
|
|
once only subtly apparent yet highly pernicious: they are poorly
|
|
educated, poorly skilled and poorly prepared for the massive changes
|
|
in informtion-sharing behavior our world is now experiencing.
|
|
|
|
These poor are the children growing up without exposure to
|
|
computers--not at school, not at home, not even, for the most part, in
|
|
our libraries. These poor are the adults with such weak educations
|
|
and limited information-seeking skills that they passively accept the
|
|
quality, quality and media of information we provide them, regardless
|
|
of how limited or antiquated our services. These poor are the people
|
|
who have never heard of the "information superhighway," who will not
|
|
purchase computers with modems, who have never touched keyboards, who
|
|
do not know what the Internet is. Those of you who believe that
|
|
"everyone" is aware of the upcoming information revolution do not work
|
|
with the reality of poor inner-city lives.
|
|
|
|
One of the quandaries of the information revolution is that those who
|
|
are information-poor are unaware of it, so they are unable to
|
|
participate in it. So far, the information revolution has been
|
|
largely waged by highly educated and informed advocates, people who
|
|
often have tremendous resources at their disposal. These advocates
|
|
have spoken quite well on behalf of their own needs; some have
|
|
attempted to speak to the needs of the information-poor (as, in
|
|
essence, I am doing here). But the information-rich, however
|
|
well-meaning, have largely determined and prioritized the issues of
|
|
the information revolution according to their own visions and
|
|
realities.
|
|
|
|
So across our nation and the world, we hear of multimedia cable
|
|
extended to private homes, but not to housing projects; we read about
|
|
public kiosks in wealthy communities, but city schools lack computers;
|
|
in academic communities, nearly everyone seems to have an Internet
|
|
account, but in the middle of a poor city, there is not so much as a
|
|
public-use computer available in the main library. Information access
|
|
as a basic public service is broached only tentatively at the national
|
|
level. There is much discussion of commercializing resources but
|
|
little discussion about ensuring access for everyone, even with
|
|
respect to basic community information. Communities with freenets can
|
|
be lauded for their efforts in public computing, but the
|
|
implementation of these projects invariably assumes a information-rich
|
|
public proactively seeking and demanding such services.
|
|
|
|
Who, then, will speak for the poor? The problem is (at minimum)
|
|
two-fold. The information have-nots need advocates, guides, leaders
|
|
and visionaries to help them understand what it is they are missing
|
|
out on, and why it is important. We who wish to provide such
|
|
advocacy, on the other hand, need information from our disenfranchised
|
|
communities so we can better understand what *we* are missing out on,
|
|
and why it is important--in other words, to understand what goods and
|
|
services we need to provide; to tailor and temper our advocacy with a
|
|
real-world understanding of what people need for survival and growth
|
|
in tomorrow's culture.
|
|
|
|
Here in Newark, we have several groups attempting to do just that: to
|
|
reach out to the disenfranchised, draw them in, and empower them to
|
|
shape tomorrow's information revolution. There are grass-roots
|
|
community organizers speaking to small groups around the city, and
|
|
Newark Public Library is beginning to reach out to both city leaders
|
|
and community organizers to develop a coalition of information
|
|
advocates for Newark. We dream of a network that will ensure that
|
|
every Newark resident will have access to information--and by access
|
|
we mean not only physical availability but *awareness of resources*
|
|
and *resource relevance*--two stipulations which make our paradigm of
|
|
access unusual and, in some ways, extremely progressive. We can only
|
|
hope that other communities join us in repaving the information
|
|
highway to meet the needs of not just its present but also its
|
|
potential travellers.
|
|
|
|
Our efforts demonstrate that unless things change, the information
|
|
revolution will only aggravate the inequities underlying current
|
|
policies for providing basic services in our country. Out of
|
|
necessity, many of us now assume that the funds essential to
|
|
maintaining this network will come from local (city and county)
|
|
resources. (We are hopeful that we are eligible for a special
|
|
infusion of funds to help us initiate this project, but experience
|
|
teaches city workers that we cannot rely on federal resources for
|
|
program maintenance.) This is not new for libraries; in our country,
|
|
the vast majority of funds for public libraries are provided at the
|
|
city or county level. If it is the de facto funding standard for the
|
|
new information resources, however, it bodes poorly for our country's
|
|
future with respect to equity in information access. Jonathon Kozol,
|
|
in _Savage Inequalities_, spoke to the inherent unfairness of using
|
|
local funds to pay for education; just as we will perpetuate
|
|
information poverty if we do not provide people relevant information
|
|
in ways they can access it, so too will we perpetuate poverty in all
|
|
its forms if we persist in funding national policies with local taxes.
|
|
We must not codify inequality for the next generation.
|
|
|
|
The poor will always be with us--and, as working with the poor has
|
|
taught me, they *are* us. The most elaborate networking scheme, the
|
|
fastest computers, the most dazzling graphics are all for naught if
|
|
they are really a private service for a specially-privileged
|
|
population. It is incumbent on those in public service, particularly
|
|
the public information services, and especially librarians, that we
|
|
become aggressive participants in the information
|
|
revolution--lobbying, writing, organizing, or whatever else it takes
|
|
to become equal participants in the desing of the information
|
|
superhighway and all it represents--or we, and those we represent,
|
|
will be left behind as forgotten casualties of a silent battle.
|
|
|
|
Karen G. Schneider kgs@panix.com * * *
|
|
|
|
------------------------------
|
|
|
|
End of Computer Underground Digest #6.34
|
|
************************************
|
|
|