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Computer underground Digest Sun Nov 21 1993 Volume 5 : Issue 88
ISSN 1004-042X
Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
Ian Dickinson
Copy Editor: Etaoin Shrdlu, III
CONTENTS, #5.88 (Nov 21 1993)
File 1--Michael Elansky ("Ionizer") Sentenced / Saga ends
File 2--Electronic Bill Of Rights and Responsibilities
File 3--Student sues to regain Internet access
File 4--Toll Fraud on French PBXs--Phreaking
File 5--Brendan Kehoe
File 6--Advertise your skills!
Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
available at no cost electronically from tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu. The
editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-0303), fax (815-753-6302)
or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL
60115.
Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest
news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of
LAWSIG, and DL1 of TELECOM; on GEnie in the PF*NPC RT
libraries and in the VIRUS/SECURITY library; from America Online in
the PC Telecom forum under "computing newsletters;"
On Delphi in the General Discussion database of the Internet SIG;
on the PC-EXEC BBS at (414) 789-4210; and on: Rune Stone BBS (IIRG
WHQ) (203) 832-8441 NUP:Conspiracy; RIPCO BBS (312) 528-5020
CuD is also available via Fidonet File Request from 1:11/70; unlisted
nodes and points welcome.
EUROPE: from the ComNet in LUXEMBOURG BBS (++352) 466893;
In ITALY: Bits against the Empire BBS: +39-461-980493
ANONYMOUS FTP SITES:
AUSTRALIA: ftp.ee.mu.oz.au (128.250.77.2) in /pub/text/CuD.
EUROPE: ftp.funet.fi in pub/doc/cud. (Finland)
UNITED STATES:
aql.gatech.edu (128.61.10.53) in /pub/eff/cud
etext.archive.umich.edu (141.211.164.18) in /pub/CuD/cud
ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in /pub/cud
halcyon.com( 202.135.191.2) in /pub/mirror/cud
ftp.warwick.ac.uk in pub/cud (United Kingdom)
KOREA: ftp: cair.kaist.ac.kr in /doc/eff/cud
COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted for non-profit as long
as the source is cited. Authors hold a presumptive copyright, and
they should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that
non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise
specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles
relating to computer culture and communication. Articles are
preferred to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts
unless absolutely necessary.
DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all
responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not
violate copyright protections.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Sun, 21 Nov 1993 14:12:31 EST
From: Sue D'Onym <sdo@anon.omous.com>
Subject: File 1--Michael Elansky ("Ionizer") Sentenced / Saga ends
((MODERATORS' NOTE: The Elansky case has ended. Michael Elansky was
sentenced to 28 months in prison, which--with "good time" and credit
for time served--should make him eligible for release under
Connecticut law in about 10 months. The charges relating to First
Amendment issues that bothered many of us were not pursued by the
prosecution, perhaps in part because of the incisive and accurate
reporting by John Moran of the Hartford Courant. Moran's work
established him as one of the rare media reporters whose knowledge of
computers and related issues gives them considerable credibility.
Thanks to the Connecticut readers who sent over the edited story)).
SOURCE: Hartford Courant (Nov. 20, 1993)
By: John M. Moran, Courant Staff Writer
Michael Elansky's volatile mixture of computers and pyrotechnics
backfired Friday when a Superior Court judge sentenced him to 28
months in prison.
Judge Thomas P. Miano said Elansky, a 21-year-old West Hartford
resident, remains dangerous because he still hasn't curbed his impulse
to dabble in explosives.
"You've got to accept responsibility for what you do, it's that
simple," Miano said.
Elansky has been jailed at Hartford Correctional Center since
August on charges of illegally maintaining bomb-making instructions on
his computer bulletin board.
At the time, he also was facing other charges, including conspiracy
to commit burglary and two counts of violating his probation. Bail was
set at $500,000, which Elansky could not meet.
((The article explains that Elansky pled guilty in October, agreeing
to terms that included no more than three years in prison, and that
prosecution and defense attorneys have spend the last few weeks
debating the final sentence)).
In recent weeks, friends and family testified that Elansky was
interested in odd topics, but that he was not dangerous or
destructive. Prosecution witnesses, however, painted a far different
picture of a man they said repeatedly broke the law while
experimenting with explosives.
In reaching his decision, Miano said he was troubled by evidence
that Elansky had lied to police, to the court, to his parents and to
others. But Miano also was disturbed at the prospect of sending to
prison someone who had the potential to straighten out his life.
"I can candidly say... that I have agonized more over this matter
than any other matter that I can remember," the judge said.
((The article explains that the judge decided on imprisonment
and long probation as necessary for Elansky to "change his ways."))
On both probation violations, Elansky was sentenced to 28 months in
prison and probation for five years. Conditions of his probation
include the following:
* A ban on Elansky allowing anyone under 18 years old to use
his computer bulletin board, which was known as "The Ware
House."
* A ban on Elansky, whose computer nickname is the
"Ionizer," placing pyrotechnic information or another other
harmful information on his bulletin board.
* A requirement that a probation officer have complete
freedom to search Elansky's computer system to ensure the
requirements have not been violated.
* Evaluation by a mental health counselor.
* 100 hours of community service for each year on probation.
Throughout the sentencing, a pale and thin Elansky stood silently
at the defense table. His father, David Elansky, and grandmother,
Debra Elansky, sat behind him in the courtroom.
"I know you're not happy with it," Miano told Elansky after the
sentence was pronounced. "I know you expected to walk out with your
parents. No more."
The conspiracy to commit burglary charges and the charges relating
to bomb-making instructions on the computer bulletin board were not
pursued.
Elansky will almost certainly get credit for the 3 1/2 months he's
already served in jail. In addition, he will be able to apply for
parole after he has served half of the prison term.
was surprised and disappointed by the sentencing. "It's not going to
make him a better person by keeping him in jail," he said.
Brown, the defense attorney, said he had asked for a lesser
sentence, but respected the judge's treatment of the case.
"It was obvious to me that the judge certainly spent a great deal
of time on this case, which is all a defendant can really ask for," he
said.
((The article concludes by summarizing the disappointment that the
parents and defense attorney expressed)).
------------------------------
Date: 12 Nov 1993 16:34:28 U
From: "Anne" <harwell@BANDW.PANAM.EDU>
Subject: File 2--Electronic Bill Of Rights and Responsibilities
[I'm forwarding this to CuD with the permission of Frank Connolly of
The American University. Information on how to contact him is at the
end of this document.
-abh]
++++++++++++++++++
The following document might be of interest to members of the Computer
Underground Digest. Called the Bill of Rights and Responsibilities
for Electronic Learners, it is a model policy statement regarding the
rights and responsibilities of individuals and institutions regarding
computers and electronic networks in education. Although the project
was begun as part of EDUCOM, it is now an initiative of the American
Association of Higher Education (AAHE).
Your comments and suggestions for gaining consideration and discussion
of the Bill on campuses, in school districts and professional forums
would be appreciated.
To retrieve the text via ftp do the following:
1. FTP to ftp.american.edu
2. Give your id as . . . . . . anonymous
3. As your password use . . . your email address
Once accepted to the system,
4. Change directories by entering cd au
5. To retrieve the file type get brrec.text
=============== TEXT OF BILL FOLLOWS ===========================
PREAMBLE
In order to protect the rights and recognize the responsibilities of
individuals and institutions, we, the members of the educational
community, propose this Bill of Rights and Responsibilities for the
Electronic Community of Learners. These principles are based on a
recognition that the electronic community is a complex subsystem of
the educational community founded on the values espoused by that
community. As new technology modifies the system and further empowers
individuals, new values and responsibilities will change this culture.
As technology assumes an integral role in education and lifelong
learning, technological empowerment of individuals and organizations
becomes a requirement and right for students, faculty, staff, and
institutions, bringing with it new levels of responsibility that
individuals and institutions have to themselves and to other members
of the educational community.
ARTICLE I: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
The original Bill of Rights explicitly recognized that all individuals
have certain fundamental rights as members of the national community.
In the same way, the citizens of the electronic community of learners
have fundamental rights that empower them.
Section 1.
A citizen's access to computing and information resources shall
not be denied or removed without just cause.
Section 2.
The right to access includes the right to appropriate training and
tools required to effect access.
Section 3.
All citizens shall have the right to be informed about personal
information that is being and has been collected about them, and
have the right to review and correct that information,. Personal
information about a citizen shall not be used for other than the
expressed purpose of its collection without the explicit
permission of that citizen.
Section 4.
The constitutional concept of freedom of speech applies to
citizens of electronic communities.
Section 5.
All citizens of the electronic community of learners have
ownership rights over their own intellectual works.
ARTICLE II: INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITIES
Just as certain rights are given to each citizen of the electronic
community of learners, each citizen is held accountable for his
or her actions. The interplay of rights and responsibilities
within each individual and within the community engenders
the trust and intellectual freedom that form the heart of our
society. This trust and freedom are grounded on each person's
developing the skills necessary to be an active and contributing
citizen of the electronic community. These skills include an
awareness and knowledge about information technology and
the uses of information and an understanding of the roles in the
electronic community of learners.
Section 1.
It shall be each citizen's personal responsibility to actively
pursue needed resources: to recognize when information is
needed, and to be able to find, evaluate, and effectively use
information.
Section 2.
It shall be each citizen's personal responsibility to recognize
(attribute) and honor the intellectual property of others.
Section 3.
Since the electronic community of learners is based upon the
integrity and authenticity of information, it shall be each
citizen's personal responsibility to be aware of the potential for
and possible effects of manipulating electronic information: to
understand the fungible nature of electronic information; and to
verify the integrity and authenticity, and assure the security of
information that he or she compiles or uses.
Section 4.
Each citizen, as a member of the electronic community of
learners, is responsible to all other citizens in that community:
to respect and value the rights of privacy for all; to recognize and
respect the diversity of the population and opinion in the
community; to behave ethically; and to comply with legal
restrictions regarding the use of information resources.
Section 5.
Each citizen, as a member of the electronic community of
learners, is responsible to the community as a whole to
understand what information technology resources are
available, to recognize that the members of the community
share them, and to refrain from acts that waste resources or
prevent others from using them.
ARTICLE III: RIGHTS OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
Educational institutions have legal standing similar to that of
individuals. Our society depends upon educational institutions
to educate our citizens and advance the development of
knowledge. However, in order to survive, educational
institutions must attract financial and human resources.
Therefore, society must grant these institutions the rights to the
electronic resources and information necessary to accomplish
their goals.
Section 1.
The access of an educational institutions to computing and
information resources shall not be denied or removed without
just cause.
Section 2.
Educational institutions in the electronic community of learners
have ownership rights over the intellectual works they create.
Section 3.
Each educational institution has the authority to allocate
resources in accordance with its unique institutional mission.
ARTICLE IV: INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
Just as certain rights are assured to educational institutions in
the electronic community of learners, so too each is held
accountable for the appropriate exercise of those rights to foster
the values of society and to carry out each institution's mission.
This interplay of rights and responsibilities within the
community fosters the creation and maintenance of an
environment wherein trust and intellectual freedom are the
foundation for individual and institutional growth and success.
Section 1.
The institutional members of the electronic community of
learners have a responsibility to provide all members of their
community with legally acquired computer resources (hardware,
software, networks, data bases, etc.) in all instances where access
to or use of the resources is an integral part of active
participation in the electronic community of learners.
Section 2.
Institutions have a responsibility to develop, implement, and
maintain security procedures to insure the integrity of
individual and institutional files.
Section 3.
The institution shall treat electronically stored information as
confidential. The institution shall treat all personal files as
confidential, examining or disclosing the contents only when
authorized by the owner of the information, approved by the
appropriate institutional official, or required by local, state or
federal law.
Section 4.
Institutions in the electronic community of learners shall train
and support faculty, staff, and students to effectively use
information technology. Training includes skills to use the
resources, to be aware of the existence of data repositories and
techniques for using them, and to understand the ethical and
legal uses of the resources.
August, 1993
* Frank Connolly The American University *
* FRANK@American.EDU 119 Clark Hall *
* (202) 885-3164 Washington, D.C 20016 *
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 93 10:51:37 CST
From: peterson@ZGNEWS.LONESTAR.ORG(Bob Peterson)
Subject: File 3--Student sues to regain Internet access
The August 17, 1993 (Volume 5, Issue 62) issue of CuD contained a
brief mention of Microsoft's termination of Mr. Gregory Steshenko,
apparently due to political statements he made in newsgroups and email.
Today's Dallas Morning News (Nov. 14, 1993: Vol. 145, No. 45) published
a front page article, with a jump to an interior page dedicated to the
story, describing Gregory Steshenko's encounter with the University of
Texas at Dallas over essentially the same issue.
Below I quote from the article. I enclosed my summarizations in
square brackets. A sidebar on the interior page describes, at a high
level, how messages flow in the Internet. (I didn't include anything
from that sidebar.)
Free-speech suit focuses on E-mail
Emigre at UTD lost access to network
By Tom Steinert-Threlkeld
Staff Writer of The Dallas Morning News
Gregory N. Steshenko is not sure freedom of expression will survive
the digital age in the Western world.
Twice in the last five months, authorities in the United States have
pulled the plug on his comments on Ukrainian and Russian politics that
he has posted on the Internet, a network of computer networks that
spans the globe.
In June, he was fired from Microsoft Corp. after the big supplier of
personal computer software fielded dozens of complaints that his
messages were offensive and even obscene.
In October, he was disconnected again from the Internet by the
University of Texas at Dallas, where he is a graduate student in
electrical engineering.
[Note: One of Microsoft's regional telephone support centers is
located in the Dallas area, so Gregory probably didn't move after
leaving Microsoft. -BP)
The university withdrew his privileges after a barrage of complaints,
saying his electronic messages strayed from any possible educational
purposes. Mr. Steshenko has countered with a lawsuit that seeks $2
million for damages to his career.
[Here the article jumps to page 28A, with the headline _Student sues
UTD over access to computer network_. -BP)
[... Steshenko asserts this is a First Amendment issue. -BP]
The university says the matter is more basic. Mr. Steshenko simply
did not follow its rules, which limit use of the Internet to exchanges
related to coursework.
+++
"What makes it unique is that we're talking about a brand new
medium," said Shari Steele, counsel for the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, a group that tries to protect the freedom of individuals
who communicate by computer.
She and other legal experts say that government-funded institutions,
such as UTD, can't infringe First Amendment rights, even in electronic
forums.
[... Omitted text describing the school's position that they have the
right to control how their facilities are used, the absence of relevant
court rulings, the issue of permissible language in newsgroups, and the
general anarchy of newsgroups.]
Mr. Steshenko also retaliates against "denunciators." He has sent
copies of what he says are personal attacks by on-line adversaries to
the chief executive officers of their employers, such large industrial
companies as Bell Communications Research Inc. and WilTel Inc.
"I can take a lot in stride, but if someone sends a posting to the
CEO of Bellcore (threatening) a lawsuit about me calling (him) a fool
and it has implications with my position here at the company, then I'm
going to get a little bit upset," said Andre Stynyk, a systems engineer
at Bell Communications Research Inc., the research arm of regional Bell
telephone companies.
Mr. Stynyk responded by complaining to UTD. The university won't
acknowledge the sources of the complaints it received.
"Let's just say he (Mr. Steshenko) was not following the rules and we
received complaints from the outside. After review, we determined that
he should not have the privileges anymore," said UTD president Robert
H. Rutford.
"The rules," in this case are not those of the Internet, but those of
UTD. Like other universities, UTD becomes part of the Internet by
allowing outsiders into its computers and paying for the maintenance of
its on-campus computing and communications network.
When it allows students access to the Internet, the university
requires them to sign an agreement that they only use the resources of
the Internet for instructional, research or administrative purposes.
[... The article quotes (acting executive director of the Internet
Society) Howard Funk's assertion that the university can control how
its facilities are used. Mr. Steshenko, in turn, asserts the
university's interpretation of "instructional" is too narrow. -BP]
In hallways, classrooms and dormitories, for instance, students are
not limited to talking only about the classes they sign up for, notes
Marc Rotenberg, director of the Washington office of the Computer
Professionals for Social Responsibility.
"It's a little bit like taking a classroom for a club meeting after
classes end. Maybe the university doesn't want you doing that," but it
may be hard to say students can't.
This could make the Steshenko case "a good test of free speech on
computer networks," he and Ms. Steele said, because the university not
only is an academic institution, but receives funding from state
government.
[... Comments about current case law extending prohibitions on laws
abridging free expression to "government-run institutions" and how the
Steshenko case may expand the prohibition to electronic exchanges of
ideas. The article then describes the self-regulation of Usenet,
Compuserve, mailing lists, et al.]
The Internet Society's Mr. Funk, for instance, says Mr. Steshenko
would have avoided trouble at Microsoft and the university if he had
only used a personal account to access the Internet. But Mr. Steshenko
rejects that as costly and says the primary issue is the exercise of
First Amendment privileges at a state-run institution.
Regardless, cooler commentary may be inevitable. Mr. Stynyk, the
Bell systems engineer, believes that arguments on the Internet will
have to take on more "politically correct" terminology, as millions of
new, nontechnical subscribers log in to the Internet.
But Houston environmental scientist Larisa Streeter, whose husband's
employer was also contacted by Mr. Steshenko, says the Dallas site's
discourse does not "have anything to do with political correctness at
all. It has to do with civil discussion."
She draws the analogy to allowing a member of the Ku Klux Klan to
participate in a forum on African-American affairs.
"It's fine. You can have the Klan member there listening and
participating and having a discussion," she said. But, Ms. Streeter
says, limits should be set if racial epithets start flying because
nothing is added to the discussion.
Ultimately, canceling access to the Internet altogether is seen by
Mr. Steshenko as an unfair abrogation of his rights as a student.
He maintains that other students using their Internet accounts can
join "news groups" that discuss anything from events in Haiti to sex.
If he is cut off from talking about Russia and Ukraine, he feels other
students shouldn't be permitted to participate in forums not related to
their coursework.
While the university does have a right to provide resources only for
particular purposes, "it really hinges on whether or not they really
don't permit the accounts to be used for anything other than the
studies," Ms. Steele said.
W.O. Shultz, associate general counsel for the University of Texas
system, says he does not know how the accounts are used by other
students or whether they have formed news groups or lists of their own.
If the university consistently enforces its limits on the use of the
Internet for instructional, research and administrative purposes, then
it is likely on safe ground, said Henry H. Perritt Jr., a Villanova
University professor of information technology law.
[... UTD investigates student use of the Internet only when they get a
complaint, which could leave an opening for Mr. Steshenko's suit, which
he drafted and filed himself. -BP]
If the university does not know how its students are using the
Internet, it is "going to have a very hard time saying" it is not
granting students the right to participate in electronic forums on
whatever subjects they please, Mr. Perritt said.
"If the university's argument is that "we claim the power to control
the use of our resources and direct the resources only for certain
purposes," then I don't see what that has to do with the complaints.
Then they have a duty to know what's going on," he said.
[End of article, which also features a four column by 5" photo of Mr.
Steshenko in front of an IBM PS/2. The writer, Mr. Tom
Steinert-Threlkeld, covers technology stories for the paper. -BP]
Bob Peterson Waffle BBS: peterson@ZGNews.LoneStar.Org
P.O. Box 865132 Internet: peterson@csc.ti.com TelCo: 214 995-6080
Plano, Tx USA 75086-5132 BBS: 214 596-3720 @ speeds to 14400 (HST & V.32bis)
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 14:48:59 EST
From: cccf@ALTERN.COM(cccf)
Subject: File 4--Toll Fraud on French PBXs--Phreaking
Toll Fraud on French PBXs - Phreaking
In France it is estimated that PBX trunk fraud (toll fraud) costs
companies over $220 million a year. Criminal phreakers figure out how
to access PBXs owned by businesses and then sell long-distance calling
capacities provided by these systems to the public. In European
markets where PSTN to PSTN connections are illegal it has not to date
been such an issue. However, for a number of reasons this is likely to
change.
Trunk to trunk connection barring through PBXs is expected to be
deregulated throughout Europe.
The telecom industry has done more this year to prevent toll fraud
than any other time. Yet, toll fraud losses will top more than $2
billion again this year. If you aren't doing anything to prevent being
hit, it's not a matter of if you'll be hit, it's when you'll be hit
and for how much. So, here are some low-cost ways to stop toll
fraud-or at least lessen the blow if you do get hit.
Increasing numbers of international companies have private networks
and provide DISA (Direct Inward System Access) access to employees.
Such companies are prime victims for Phreaking. For example, a phone
hacker can access the network in the UK, France, or Germany and break
out in another country where it is legal to make trunk to trunk calls,
and from that point they can call anywhere in the world.
Voice Mail is taking off across Europe. This, together with DISA, is
one of the most common ways phreakers enter a company's PBX.
Raising these issues now and detailing precautionary measures will
enable companies to take steps to reduce such frauds. The following
looks at the current situation in France.
In France a whole subculture, like a real phone underground culture,
of these technology terrorists is springing up on city streets. Stolen
access codes are used to run call-sell operations from phone booths or
private phones. The perpetrators offer international calls for circa
FF 20, which is considerably less than it could cost to dial direct.
When calls are placed through corporate PBXs rather than carrier
switches, the companies that own the PBXs end up footing the bill.
What are the warning signs that your own communication systems are
being victimised by toll fraud? In inbound call detail records, look
for long holding times, an unexplained increased in use, frequent use
of the system after normal working hours, or a system that is always
busy. In records of outbound calls, look for calls made to unusual
locations or international numbers, high call volumes, long duration
of calls, frequent calls to premium rate numbers and frequently
recurring All Trunks Busy (ATB) conditions.
Toll fraud is similar to unauthorised access to mainframe computers or
hacking. Manufacturers such as Northern Telecom have developed
security features that minimise the risk of such theft.
Telecommunication managers, however, are the only ones who are ensure
that these features are being used to protect their systems from
fraud.
Areas of Intrusion Into Corporate Systems
PBX features that are vulnerable to unauthorised access include call
forwarding, call prompting and call processing features. But the most
common ways phreakers enter a company's PBX is through DISA and voice
mail systems. They often search a company's rubbish for directories
or call detail reports that contain a companies own 05 numbers and
codes. They have also posed as system administrators or France Telecom
technicians and conned employees into telling them PBX authorisation
codes. More sophisticated hackers use personal computers and modems to
break into data bases containing customer records showing phone
numbers and voice mail access codes, or simply dial 05 numbers with
the help of sequential number generators and computers until they find
one that gives access to a phone system.
Once these thieves have the numbers and codes, they can call into the
PBX and place calls out to other locations. In many cases, PBX is only
the first point of entry for such criminals. They can also use the PBX
to access company's data system. Call-sell operators can even hide
their activities from law enforcement officials by using
PBX-looping-using one PBX to place calls out through another PBX in
another state.
Holding the Line-Steps That Reduce Toll Fraud
Northern Telecom's Meridian 1 systems provide a number of safety
features to guard against unauthorised access. It is the most popular
PBX phreaked in France. The following information highlights Meridian
1 features that can minimise such abuse.
DISA Security
The DISA feature allows users to access a company's PBX system from
the public network by dialling a telephone number assigned to the
feature. Once the system answers the DISA call, the caller may be
required to enter a security code and authorisation code. After any
required codes are entered, the caller, using push button tone
dialling, is provided with the calling privileges, such as Class of
Service (COS), Network Class of Service (NCOS) and Trunk Group Access
Restrictions (TGAR), that are associated with the DISA DN or the
authorisation code entered.
To minimise the vulnerability of the Meridian 1 system to unauthorised
access through DISA, the following safeguards are suggested:
1) Assign restricted Class of Service, TGAR and NCOS to the DISA DN;
2) Require users to enter a security code upon reaching the DISA DN;
3) In addition to a security code, require users to enter an
authorisation code. The calling privileges provided will be those
associated with the specific authorisation code;
4) Use Call Detail Recording (CDR) to identify calling activity
associated with individual authorisation codes. As a further
precaution, you may choose to limit printed copies of these
records;
5) Change security codes frequently;
6) Limit access to administration of authorisation codes to a
few, carefully selected employees.
Meridian Mail Security
Northern Telecom's Meridian Mail voice messaging system is also
equipped with a number of safeguarding features. The features that
allow system users to dial out; Through Dial, Operator Revert and
Remote Notification (Outcalling) should be controlled to reduce the
likelihood of unauthorised access. The following protective measures
can be used to minimise tool fraud:
Voice Security Codes
Set security parameters for ThroughDial using the Voice Security
Options prompt from the Voice Systems Administration menu. This prompt
will list restricted access codes to control calls placed using the
Through-Dial function of Meridian Mail. An access code is a prefix for
a telephone number or a number that must be dialled to access outside
lines or long-distance calling. If access cides are listed as
restricted on the Meridian Mail system, calls cannot be placed through
Meridian Mail to numbers beginning with the restricted codes. Up to 10
access codes can be defined.
Voice Menus
With the Through-Dial function of Voice Menus, the system
administrator can limit dialling patterns using restricted dialling
prefixes. These access codes, which are defined as illegal, apply only
to the Through-Dial function of each voice menu. Each Through-Dial
menu can have its own restricted access codes. Up to 10 access codes
can be programmed.
Meridian Mail also allows system administrators to require that users
enter an Access Password for each menu. In this way, the Through-Dial
menu can deny unauthorised callers access to Through-Dial functions,
while allowing authorised callers access.
Additional Security Features
The Secured Messaging feature can be activated system-wide and
essentially blocks external callers from logging to Meridian Mail. In
addition, the system administrator can establish a system-wide
parameter that forces user to change their Meridian Mail passwords
within a defined time period. Users can also change their passwords at
any time when logged in to Meridian Mail.
System administrator can define a minimum acceptable password length
for Meridian Mail users. The administrators can also determine the
maximum number of times an invalid password can be entered before a
log-on attempt is dropped and the mailbox log-on is disabled.
Some of the features that provide convenience and flexibility are also
vulnerable to unauthorised access. However, Meridian 1 products
provide a wide array of features that can protect your system from
unauthorised access.
In general, you can select and implement the combinaison of features
that best meets your company's needs.
General Security Measures
Phone numbers and passwords used to access DISA and Meridian Mail
should only be provided to authorised personnel. In addition, call
detail records and other reports that contain such numbers should be
shredded or disposed of in an appropriate manner for confidential
material. To detect instances of trunk fraud and to minimise the
opportunities for such activity, the system administrator should take
the following steps frequently (the frequency is determined on a per
site basis according to need):
1) Monitor Meridian 1 CDR output to identify sudden unexplained
increases in trunk calls. Trunk to trunk/Tie connections should
be included in CDR output;
2) Review the system data base for unauthorised changes;
3) Regularly change system passwords, and DISA authorisation and
security codes;
4) Investigate recurring All Trunks Busy (ATB) conditions to determine the
cause;
5) If modems are used, change access numbers frequently, and
consider using dial-back modems;
6) Require the PBX room to be locked at all times. Require a
sign-in log and verification of all personnel entering the PBX
room.
Two Practical Cases
Bud Collar, electronic systems manager with Plexus in Neenah, Wis.,
transferred from its payphone operations branch. As the PBX manager,
he's blocked all outside access to his Northern Telecom Meridian 1 and
meridian Mail. Just in case a phreaker does again access, Collar
bought a $600, PC-based software package from Tribase Systems in
Springfield, NJ, called Tapit. With Tapit, Collar runs daily reports
on all overseas call attempts and completions. But the drawback to
Tapit is that by itself it has no alarm features, so if a phreaker
does get in, Collar won't know about it until he runs the next report.
Tribase does offer Fraud Alert with alarms for $950, but Collar chose
not to use it.
Erica Ocker, telecom supervisor at Phico Insurance in Mechaniscsburg,
PA, also wanted to block all of her outside ports. But she has
maintenance technicians who need routine access, so she needed a way
to keep her remote access ports open, without opening up her Rolm 9751
to toll fraud. The solution is to buy LeeMah DataCom Security Corps's
TraqNet 2001. For $2,000, Ocker got two secured modems that connect to
her maintenance port on her PBX and to her Rolm Phone Mail port. When
someone wants to use these features, they dial into the TraqNet and
punch in their PIN number. TraqNet identifies the user by their PIN
and asks them to punch in a randomly selected access code that they
can only get from a credit card-sized random number generator, called
an InfoCard. That access code matches the codes that are generated
each time the TraqNet is accused. The TraqNet 2001 is a single-line
model that supports up to 2,304 users for $950. More upscale can
support up to 32 lines and run call detail reports, but they cost as
much as $15,000. InfoCards each cost an additional $50.
Conclusions
The ultimate solution will be, as I read in a French consultancy
review, <to program the PBX ACD agent ports as toll denied.>
The more pleasant story directly linked with French phreaking was the
night that I see on my TV screen in Paris a luxurious computer ad for
the Dell micro-computers. At the end of the ad, a toll-free number
will be present in green: 05-444-999. I immediately phone to this
number... and found the well-known voice of all French Northern
Telecom's Meridian Mail saying in English language: "For technical
reasons, your call cannot be transferred to the appropriate person.
Call later or leave a message after the tune." The dial of 0* give the
open door to more than... Dell informations. My letter to this company
already is without (free voice-) answer!
--
Jean-Bernard Condat, General Secretary
Chaos Computer Club France [cccf]
First European Hacking, Phreaking & Swapping Club
Address: B.P. 8005, 69351 Lyon cedex 08, France.
Phone: +33 1 47874083; Fax: +33 1 47874919; E-mail: cccf@altern.com
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 93 03:08:47 EST
From: gronez@AOL.COM
Subject: File 5--Brendan Kehoe
Hello to everyone behind the scenes at CuD.. For anyone who didn't see
it, I'd like to acknowledge Brendan Kehoe and his excellent appearance
on Computer Chronicle's. Imagine my surprise as the name I have known
for months now was finally given a voice. Great idea-- the more people
on the Internet the better for our virtual communities. I have one
question though. Why wasn't DELPHI, probably the most popular gateway
to the Internet not featured on the show?
I hope that you or one of you colleagues may be able to shed some
light on this,
Thank You
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 1993 22:49:17 +0000
From: 3W - Global Networking Newsletter <3W@UKARTNET.DEMON.CO.UK>
Subject: File 6--Advertise your skills!
3W MAGAZINE OFFERS FREE ADVERTS FOR NETWORKERS
3W Global Networking Newsletter is offering free small ads for
individuals who provide services relating to the global networks.
In an attempt to widen knowledge about how to access and use the
networks, 3W is starting a free adverts section as from Issue 3,
Jan/Feb 1993. This section will be open to any individuals who wish to
advertise their professional skills to potential users. This covers
consultancy, teaching, training, info-searching, research, writing,
development, setup, maintenance, management or any others that pertain
directly to the new global networks.
These ads will run in a section called NETWORKERS within the
(Re)Source section of the magazine.
All ads will consist of a Heading (max 4 words) and text (max 30
words). All ads must contain an e-mail contact address, though they
may contain other contact information. All submissions must have a
subject line of NETWORKERS. Mail ads to
networkers@ukartnet.demon.co.uk
Please note that there is no guarantee of inclusion, due to space
limitations. Publishers decision is final. For information about
other advertising in 3W please mail ads@ukartnet.demon.co.uk
Ivan Pope
Editor
ivan@ukartnet.demon.co.uk
+----------------------------
3W - Global Networking Newsletter +44 (0)81 533 0818
13 Brett Rd Fax: +44 (0)81 533 0818
London E8 1JP 3W@ukartnet.demon.co.uk
UK
++++++++++++++++++++++++
3W is a bi-monthly paper-based subscription newsletter that covers the new
global networks.
------------------------------
End of Computer Underground Digest #5.88
************************************

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