885 lines
39 KiB
Plaintext
885 lines
39 KiB
Plaintext
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Computer underground Digest Wed Sep 22 1993 Volume 5 : Issue 74
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ISSN 1004-042X
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Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
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Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
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Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
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Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
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Ian Dickinson
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Cookie Editor: Etaoin Shrdlu, III
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CONTENTS, #5.74 (Sep 22 1993)
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File 1--Phil Zimmerman Comments on Encryption Flap
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File 2--NEW State Dept FLASH on Moby Clipper (Grady Ward)
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File 3--"Secret Science"
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File 4--Comment on Elansky BBS/Conn. Law
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File 5--Fingerprinting Welfare Recipients
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File 6--Gov't Computer Databases & Right to Privacy (Thesis Abst)
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File 7--Revised WH E-mail FAQ
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Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
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available at no cost electronically from tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu. The
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editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-0303), fax (815-753-6302)
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or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL
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60115.
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Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest
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news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of
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LAWSIG, and DL1 of TELECOM; on GEnie in the PF*NPC RT
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libraries and in the VIRUS/SECURITY library; from America Online in
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the PC Telecom forum under "computing newsletters;"
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On Delphi in the General Discussion database of the Internet SIG;
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on the PC-EXEC BBS at (414) 789-4210; and on: Rune Stone BBS (IIRG
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WHQ) (203) 832-8441 NUP:Conspiracy; RIPCO BBS (312) 528-5020
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CuD is also available via Fidonet File Request from 1:11/70; unlisted
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nodes and points welcome.
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EUROPE: from the ComNet in LUXEMBOURG BBS (++352) 466893;
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In ITALY: Bits against the Empire BBS: +39-461-980493
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ANONYMOUS FTP SITES:
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UNITED STATES:
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halcyon.com( 202.135.191.2) in /pub/mirror/cud
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aql.gatech.edu (128.61.10.53) in /pub/eff/cud
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etext.archive.umich.edu (141.211.164.18) in /pub/CuD/cud
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ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in /pub/cud
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AUSTRALIA: ftp.ee.mu.oz.au (128.250.77.2) in /pub/text/CuD.
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EUROPE: nic.funet.fi in pub/doc/cud. (Finland)
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ftp.warwick.ac.uk in pub/cud (United Kingdom)
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
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diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted for non-profit as long
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as the source is cited. Authors hold a presumptive copyright, and
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they should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that
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non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise
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specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles
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relating to computer culture and communication. Articles are
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preferred to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts
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unless absolutely necessary.
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DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
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the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all
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responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not
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violate copyright protections.
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: Tue, 21 Sep 1993 05:36:08 GMT
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From: hugh@GARGOYLE.UCHICAGO.EDU(Hugh Miller)
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Subject: File 1--Phil Zimmerman Comments on Encryption Flap
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Phil asked me to forward this to the Digest. It points up the
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problems of keeping _ANYTHING_ secret in the electronic world (unless,
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of course, it is SECURELY encrypted %;-%).
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It is more or less self-explanatory. Let me square his remark at
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the end, though: whatever happens, Phil is facing some pretty vast
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legal bills. Now is the time for all of us who favor crypto for the
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masses to pony up and put our wallets where our mouths are. I pledge
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$100 NOW, and challenge every one of you to match or exceed me. I'll
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keep it up until Phil's out of the hole. ($100 on a regular basis is
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a lot of money on an assistant professor's salary with 3 kids.)
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Examine your conscience and write that check. Pronto.
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Hugh Miller
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Asst. Prof.
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Dept. of Philosophy
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Loyola University Chicago
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++-------------------
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Date--Sun, 19 Sep 1993 13:38:44 -0500
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From--Philip Zimmermann <prz@columbine.cgd.ucar.edu>
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Subject--Zimmermann statement on PGP investigation
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Some of you may have received my Internet message of a couple of days
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ago about the ongoing U.S. Customs investigation of the exportation
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of PGP, which has now progressed to the level of Federal Grand Jury
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subpoenas. This earlier message was intended by me for distribution
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to a very small group of friends who previously communicated their
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concern about me and the investigation and asked to be kept
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informed. I did not send the message to anyone outside this group.
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Unfortunately, I did not adequately assert my desire that the message
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not be further disseminated. It appears that the message has gone
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completely public. This was not my intention.
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My lawyer, Phil Dubois, has been in touch with the Assistant U.S.
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Attorney (William Keane) assigned to the investigation. We have no
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reason to believe that Mr. Keane is anything other than a professional
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and reasonable person. He made it clear that no decision has been
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made regarding any prosecution of anyone for any offense in this
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matter. Such decisions will not be made for some time, perhaps
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several months. Mr. Keane also made clear his willingness to listen
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to us (me and my lawyer) before making any decision. It appears that
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both Mr. Keane's mind and the lines of communication are open.
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My fear is that public dissemination of my message will close the
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lines of communication and put Mr. Keane into an irretrievably
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adversarial position. Such a result would not serve any of our
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interests. My lawyer tells me that nothing irritates a prosecutor
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more than being the subject of what he perceives to be an
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orchestrated publicity campaign. He also tells me that his
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nightmares involve FOAs (Friends Of the Accused), invariably people
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with good intentions, doing things on their own. I understand that
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the issues involved in this investigation are of the greatest
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importance and transcend my personal interests. Even so, I would
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rather not turn an investigation into a full-scale federal
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prosecution. I ask that everyone keep in mind that the government's
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resources are limitless and that mine are not.
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Speaking of resources, many of you have offered help, and I am
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grateful. Those wishing to contribute financially or otherwise
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should contact either me or Philip L. Dubois, Esq., at dubois@csn.org
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or by phone at 303-444-3885 or by mail at 2305 Broadway, Boulder, CO,
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80304. Mr. Dubois has just got on the Internet and is still learning
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how to use it. Donated funds will be kept in a trust account, and all
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contributions will be accounted for. If this whole thing somehow goes
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away with money left in the account, the balance will be refunded to
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contributors in proportion to the amounts of their contributions.
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This message can be widely circulated on public forums.
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Philip Zimmermann
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prz@acm.org
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303 541-0140
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------------------------------
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Date: Tue, 21 Sep 1993 21:13:17 GMT
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From: Grady Ward <grady@netcom.com>
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Subject: File 2--NEW State Dept FLASH on Moby Clipper (Grady Ward)
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(please edit follow-ups)
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In a fresh (to me, stunning) development, the Austin Code Works
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received a letter today (Tuesday 9/21/93) from the State Department,
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Bureau of Politico Military Affairs, Office of Defense Trade Controls
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advising them, in part, of their need to register as an International
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Arms Trafficker *even if* their crypto material is intended solely for
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*domestic* publication, regardless of whether they are selling
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executables, source, descriptions, algorithms of any crypto (and
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presumably viral detection) software or documentation, as defined by
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ITAR.
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This requirement literally implies that a Cereal manufacturer is
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required to register as an arms trafficker if it wants to include a
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secret de/coder ring in the box, has a cardboard outline of a de/coder
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printed on the box, or even a description how to construct or use a
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de/coder ring.
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Complete text of the letter follows:
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(State Department Seal)
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United States Department of State
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Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
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Office of Defense Trade Controls
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Washington, D.C. 20522-0602
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AUG 31 1993
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Austin Code Works
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11100 Leafwood Lane
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Austin, TX 78750-3587
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Dear Sir:
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It has come to the attention of this office that your company is
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making cryptographic source code and technical data available
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for commercial export claiming a technical data exemption
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from the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.
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Cryptographic software, including source code, is a munitions
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article as defined in 22 CFR # 120.1, category XIII(b). Further,
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the exemptions listed in 22 CFR # 125.4 for technical data do
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not apply to cryptographic software and source code. A valid
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Department of State license is required to export cryptographic
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source code. As such, it would be a violation of the
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International Traffic in Arms Regulations to export
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cryptographic source code without a valid Department of State
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export license.
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We take this opportunity of advise you that any company or
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individual who engages in the United State in the business of
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either manufacturing or exporting defense articles or
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furnishing defense services is required to register for a fee
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with the Office of Defense Trade Controls (DTC) pursuant to 22
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U.S.C. # 2778(b)(1)(A) and 22 C.F.R. Part 122. Furthermore, the
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export of such defense articles and related technical data must
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be licensed by the Department of State in accordance with 22
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U.S.C # 2778(b)(1)(B)(2) and 22 D.F.R. Parts 120-130
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(International Traffic in Arms Regulations). A booklet entitled
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"REGISTRATION: The First Step in Defense Trade" is enclosed.
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If you are unsure whether an article is on the U.S. Munitions
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List, you may send five (5) copies of descriptive literature
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about the product and request a commodity jurisdiction
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determination from this office according to 22 C.F.R # 120.5 of
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the ITAR.
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If you have any questions regarding the matters discussed in
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this letter, please do not hesitate to contact this office at (703)
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875-6650.
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Sincerely,
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(signed) Clyde G. Bryant, Jr., Chief
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Compliance and Enforcement Branch
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++++++++++++++++
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I guess this means that all FTP sites who implement the GET command
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and have anything to do with crypto or viral detection, including
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RFCs, overviews or discussions of specific techniques or algorithms,
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etc. must be registered as International Arms Traffickers *even if*
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they disallow all but domestic FTP connections.
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What to do now.
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My advice to this new twist of the NSA and State Department regulating
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activities *within* the United States is twofold:
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(1) GET and FAMILIARIZE yourself with PGP sources or other crypto
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options NOW and upload it to your local BBS (if you deem it still
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legal for you to do these things) and
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(2) Consider supporting the Electronic Freedom Foundation.
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PGP sites:
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black.ox.ac.uk (129.67.1.165)
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src.doc.ic.ac.uk (146.169.2.1)
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ftp.demon.co.uk (158.152.1.65)
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ghost.dsi.unimi.it (149.132.2.1)
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nic.funet.fi (128.214.6.100)
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soda.berkeley.edu (128.32.149.19)
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Electronic Freedom Foundation
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1001 G Street, NW
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Suite 950 East
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Washington, D.C. 20001
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202/347-5400 voice
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202/393-5509 FAX
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FTP ftp.eff.org
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------------------------------
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Date: 22 Sep 93 19:05:22 EDT
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From: Urnst Kouch <70743.1711@COMPUSERVE.COM>
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Subject: File 3--"Secret Science"
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((MODERATORS' NOTE: Urnst Kouch is editor of Crypt Newsletter, a
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periodic 'Zine of tech information and political satire and
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commentary)).
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"In 1989 the Pentagon classified as secret a set of
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rocks -- Russian rocks gathered by Americans, with Moscow's
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approval -- from below the surface of Soviet territory.
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[According to the classification memorandum] '. . .Those
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who want them must be government-certified to handle
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secret rocks.' Soviet officials said they were ordinary
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rocks . . ."
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--from Herbert N. Foerstel's "Secret Science:
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Federal Control of American Science and Technology,"
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(1993, Praeger Publishers)
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CuD readers following the National Security Agency's attack on Phil
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Zimmerman and the cryptography algorithms involved in Pretty Good
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Privacy might want to stroll over to their favorite library and browse
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Herbert N. Foerstel's "Secret Science," an interesting book which
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reviews the increasingly smothering and anti-democratic government
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control over technology and science in the US. Foerstel is the head of
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the University of Maryland's Engineering & Physical Sciences Library
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and his book expends quite a bit of effort documenting the National
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Security Agency's efforts to control and classify any technology -
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usually cryptography - which falls within its sphere of interest.
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Completely beyond public oversight, the NSA operates almost entirely
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behind the curtain of "deep black" classification, despite, in recent
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years, a cynical facade of public relations efforts and "friendly"
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review of cryptography research.
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Foerstel's book recounts the relentless campaign by the NSA to control
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cryptographic research funding through the National Science Foundation
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and efforts to wrest all independence from the scientific community
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through the idea of voluntary prior restraint. What this translates
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to, according to "Secret Science," is that all scientists engaged in
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cryptographic research should be gentlemen and funnel all findings to
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the NSA for oversight or the agency will use executive mandates to
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intimidate and quash those in non-compliance.
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Foerstel does not candy-coat the story, pointing out when he thinks it
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appropriate, the self-serving agendas and illogic of government
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leaders.
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For example, Foerstel writes:
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"Many in business and government point out the impossibility of
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controlling cryptographic software. Indeed, the U.S. has agreed to
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let its allies decontrol mass market software with encryption
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features, and foreign companies, unencumbered by munitions-type
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restrictions are bringing encrypted software and related services to
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the international market. The British have stated publicly that they
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are permitting the uncontrolled export of such software, but US
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software manufacturers are prevented from selling their products
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abroad."
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Foerstel also compares the price of a brute force solution to the
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current dumbed down NSA compliant DES key: $5,000 as opposed to _$200
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septillion_ using the original IBM 128-bit key.
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The conclusion he draws is simple and ugly: Our government is
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determined to impede the development and dissemination of
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sophisticated cryptographic tools in the private sector, mainly
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because it wants to reserve the right to break the privacy of American
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citizens when deemed necessary. The rationalization that national
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sensitive technology must be kept from foreign hands is a sham.
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It's hard to emphasize how good a read "Secret Science" is! In
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addition to amusing stuff on the above passage dealing with "secret
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rocks," the book covers the explosion of classification during the
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Reagan administration, the drive to lock up general scientific
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material in libraries thought to be sensitive even _after_ widespread
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international publication and the FBI's continuing campaign to comb
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public libraries for imagined revolutionaries, troublemakers,
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foreigners or anyone with foreign-sounding names who accesses the
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technical literature.
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------------------------------
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Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1993 18:05:26 -0400
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From: Doug Luce <doug@FOXHOLLY.PGH.PA.US>
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Subject: File 4--Comment on Elansky BBS/Conn. Law
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<In CuD 5.72, the CuD moderators cite Connecticut laws under
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which Michael Elansky is being charged>:
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> (a) A person is guilty of inciting injury to persons or property
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> when ... he advocates, encourages, justifies, praises, incites or
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> solicits ... any assault upon ... the police force of this or any
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> other state ....
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Public decentralized computer networks are an assault on what we call
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the police force. These information systems furnish easily accessible
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facts and opinions on drugs, criminal acts, criminal psychology,
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police practices, and government policy. They are a new medium which
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disseminates high-quality data currently unfettered by state or mass
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media controls. They force close public examination of the power
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constructs of the government of the United States.
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There isn't a more acute or potentially destructive threat to law
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enforcement agencies as they are today. It is to the advantage of the
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police to round up and permanently detain the people responsible in
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any way for the operation of the networks. Bad publicity generated by
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this effort will be far outweighed by the benefit of nullifying this
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destructive potential.
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------------------------------
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Date: Mon, 20 Sep 93 19:09:57 EDT
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From: joec@CFCSYS.LINET.ORG(Joseph Christie)
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Subject: File 5--Fingerprinting Welfare Recipients
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A further update. Last week the Suffolk County Legislature voted to
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implement a fingerprinting system for welfare recipients. The plan is
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being forwarded to NY State, who hasn't said that Suffolk can not do
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this but they did authorize fingerprinting on a test basis in two
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upstate counties and not in Suffolk. Suffolk County says they don't
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need State approval and the State refuses to comment until they
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formally receive and review the official policy statement from
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Suffolk.
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Opponents claim that the county should go after provider fraud as this
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is a big ticket item whereas recipient fraud is a small ticket item.
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On another note, the Sept. 13th issue of Communications Week mentions
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that ViaCrypt, a division of Lemcom of Phoenix, is preparing to market
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a public key encryption program. They have obtained a sub-license from
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PKP. According to ViaCrypt's president, "What we're going to do is
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marry our family of encryption engines to selected parts of PGP code."
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Further "(It) will be covered by the PKP patent license but from the
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outside will look like PGP."
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They expect to market the MS-DOS version in early Nov. Mac and UNIX
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versions to follow. Cost $199.95 per user but will sell for half price
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through the end of this year.
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------------------------------
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Date: Tue, 21 Sep 1993 12:31:54 CDT
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From: CuD Moderators <cudigest@mindvox.phantom.com>
|
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Subject: File 6--Gov't Computer Databases & Right to Privacy (Thesis Abst)
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ABSTRACT
|
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Computerized Governmental Database Systems
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Containing Personal Information
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And
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The Right to Privacy
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by
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Lewis William Oleinick, M.P.Af.
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The University of Texas at Austin, 1993
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SUPERVISORS: Chandler Stolp and Philip Doty
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This report identifies and examines the potential threats to
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individual privacy created by the collection, aggregation, and
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dissemination of personal information by governmental agencies and the
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role computer systems play in potentiating such threats. Computer
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matching, computer profiling, the national criminal justice database,
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and portfolio creation via data aggregation of personal information
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are the governmental activities stipulated to be potentially
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threatening to personal privacy. These four activities are forms of
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"dataveillance." Dataveillance poses dangers to the security of civil
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liberties in a free society.
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To carry on an intelligible discussion about privacy and how the
|
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collection, aggregation, and dissemination of personal information by
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governmental agencies may threaten individual privacy it is necessary
|
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to first define privacy and personal information. Independence,
|
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autonomy, dignity, and respect create a conceptual framework upon
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which privacy may be defined.
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Privacy is a culturally defined norm. As such a discussion of
|
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the American cultural tradition of privacy is necessary to understand
|
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both how Americans have defined privacy over time and the roles
|
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privacy has played in American society in 1) "starting over," 2) in
|
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interpersonal relationships, and 3) in maintaining the "balance of
|
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power" with the State. Privacy is held to be as important as the
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unalienable rights of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" by
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the majority of the American public. Americans have become more and
|
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more concerned with their privacy as intrusive technologies have
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evolved. Many Americans fear that computers allow the U.S. Government
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too much power over the average citizen.
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Privacy has been protected in the United States by
|
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||
precedents set in court cases, by legislation and by executive act.
|
||
The breadth of cases pertaining to privacy precludes the examination
|
||
of all cases. Supreme Court cases provide a historical overview of
|
||
the evolution of the right to privacy as the questions presented to
|
||
the Court have become more complex with the introduction of new
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||
technologies into the law enforcement process.
|
||
|
||
Congress has attempted to address the public's concerns of the
|
||
government's collection, aggregation, and dissemination of personal
|
||
information by passing legislation designed to protect individual
|
||
privacy. The four major pieces of legislation passed by Congress for
|
||
the protection of the citizen's right to privacy are the Freedom of
|
||
Information Act, the Privacy Act, the Computer Security Act of 1987,
|
||
and the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988. The
|
||
Office of Management and Budget has produced regulations designed to
|
||
enforce the intent of the legislation promulgated by Congress. These
|
||
regulations are contained in OMB Circular A-130 which details federal
|
||
information policy.
|
||
|
||
This report concludes by suggesting the need for the
|
||
implementation of a Privacy Protection Board at the national level.
|
||
Such a board would be based on the model suggested by David Flaherty.
|
||
|
||
The primary conclusion that should be drawn from this report is
|
||
that society as a whole must re-evaluate the existing paradigm of who
|
||
should be in control of personal information; i.e., should it be the
|
||
agency who collects it or should the power of control remain with the
|
||
individual about whom the information was collected. This report
|
||
suggests that a certain modicum of control over the disclosure of
|
||
personal information should revert to the individual about whom the
|
||
information was collected.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Sat, 4 Sep 1993 18:41:02 EST
|
||
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@WASHOFC.CPSR.ORG>
|
||
Subject: File 7--Revised WH E-mail FAQ
|
||
|
||
Revised WH E-mail FAQ
|
||
WHITE HOUSE ELECTRONIC PUBLICATIONS AND PUBLIC ACCESS EMAIL
|
||
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
|
||
|
||
Updated August 30, 1993
|
||
|
||
Table Of Contents
|
||
|
||
I. Signing up for Daily Electronic Publications.
|
||
A. Widely Available Sources.
|
||
B. Notes on Widely Available Sources.
|
||
C. Direct Email Distribution
|
||
|
||
II. Searching and Retrieving White House documents.
|
||
- WAIS
|
||
- GOPHER
|
||
- FedWorld BBS
|
||
|
||
III. Sending Email to the White House.
|
||
- Internet Direct
|
||
- Forwarding From Other Networks
|
||
|
||
I. HOW DO I SIGN UP FOR ELECTRONIC PUBLICATIONS BY THE WHITE HOUSE?
|
||
|
||
The White House Communications office is distributing press releases
|
||
over an experimental system developed during the campaign at the MIT
|
||
Artificial Intelligence Laboratory.
|
||
|
||
You can obtain copies of all the press releases from a wide variety of
|
||
on-line services or discussion groups devoted to either national
|
||
politics in general or President Clinton in particular. These are
|
||
listed in sections I and II.
|
||
|
||
Section Ic explains how you can sign up to receive press releases
|
||
directly from the experimental MIT system by using an automated email
|
||
server. The present system was not designed to handle high levels of
|
||
message traffic. A more powerful system will become available in due
|
||
course, and in the meantime, it would be appreciated if you used this
|
||
service sparingly. One appropriate current use is secondary
|
||
redistribution and archiving. If you use it, you will be carried
|
||
forward when the more powerful system that replaces it.
|
||
|
||
A. WIDELY AVAILABLE SOURCES
|
||
|
||
1. On USENET/NETNEWS, electronic publications are found on a variety
|
||
of groups:
|
||
|
||
Direct Distribution
|
||
|
||
alt.politics.clinton
|
||
alt.politics.org.misc
|
||
alt.politics.reform
|
||
alt.politics.usa.misc
|
||
alt.news-media
|
||
alt.activism
|
||
talk.politics.misc
|
||
|
||
Indirect Distribution
|
||
|
||
misc.activism.progressive
|
||
cmu.soc.politics
|
||
assocs.clinton-gore-92
|
||
|
||
2. On CompuServe: GO WHITEHOUSE
|
||
|
||
3. On America Online: keyword WHITEHOUSE or THE WHITEHOUSE or CLINTON
|
||
|
||
4. On The WELL: type whitehouse
|
||
|
||
5. On MCI: type VIEW WHITE HOUSE
|
||
|
||
6. On Fidonet: See Echomail WHITEHOUSE
|
||
|
||
7. On Peacenet or Econet: See pol.govinfo.usa.
|
||
|
||
B. NOTES ON WIDELY AVAILABLE SOURCES
|
||
|
||
2. CompuServe's White House Forum (GO WHITEHOUSE) is devoted to
|
||
discussion of the Clinton administration's policies and
|
||
activities. The forum's library consists of news releases and
|
||
twice daily media briefings from the White House Office of
|
||
Media Affairs. CompuServe members can exchange information and
|
||
opinions with each other in the 17 sections in the forum's
|
||
message area. The message board spans a broad range of topics,
|
||
including international and United Nations activities,
|
||
defense, health care, the economy and the deficit, housing and
|
||
urban development, the environment, and education and national
|
||
service.
|
||
|
||
3. On America Online the posts are sent to the White House Forum,
|
||
located in the News & Finance department of the service and
|
||
accessible via keywords "white house" and "clinton." The
|
||
White House Forum on America Online contains the press
|
||
releases from the White House, divided into the categories
|
||
"Press Briefings," "Meetings & Speeches," "Foreign Policy,"
|
||
"The Economy," "Technology," "Health Care," and
|
||
"Appointments." The area features a message board so you can
|
||
discuss the releases with other AOL members, and a searchable
|
||
database for easy retrieval of releases in the topic that
|
||
interests you.
|
||
|
||
4. MCI Mail users can access daily information on the administration's
|
||
programs provided by the White House through MCI Mail bulletin
|
||
boards. The available boards are: WHITE HOUSE ECONOMIC, WHITE
|
||
HOUSE FOREIGN, WHITE HOUSE SOCIAL, WHITE HOUSE SPEECHES and
|
||
WHITE HOUSE NEWS. A listing of these boards can also be
|
||
obtained by simply typing VIEW WHITE HOUSE at the COMMAND
|
||
prompt.
|
||
|
||
|
||
C. DIRECT EMAIL DISTRIBUTION
|
||
|
||
If you don't have access to the these accounts or if you would prefer
|
||
to receive the releases via email, then the next section details how
|
||
to sign up for this service. The server is not set up to answer
|
||
email letters, comments or requests for specific information. To
|
||
reach this MIT server, send email:
|
||
|
||
To: Clinton-Info@Campaign92.Org
|
||
Subject--Help
|
||
|
||
The server works by reading the subject line of the incoming message
|
||
and taking whatever action that line calls for. If you want to sign up
|
||
to automatically receive press releases, then your subject line would
|
||
begin with the word RECEIVE. You can then specify what kind of
|
||
information you are interested in receiving. The categories of
|
||
information are:
|
||
|
||
ECONOMIC POLICY
|
||
Get releases related to the economy such as budget
|
||
news, technology policy review, etc.
|
||
|
||
FOREIGN POLICY
|
||
Get releases related to foreign policy such as
|
||
statements on Bosnian airdrop, Haitian refugee status,
|
||
etc.
|
||
|
||
SOCIAL POLICY
|
||
Get releases related to social issues like National
|
||
Service (Student Loan) program, abortion, welfare
|
||
reform, etc.
|
||
|
||
SPEECHES
|
||
All speeches made by the President and important
|
||
speeches made by other Administration officials.
|
||
|
||
NEWS
|
||
Transcripts of press conferences released by the White
|
||
House Communications office, as well as the
|
||
President's remarks in photo ops and other Q&A
|
||
sessions.
|
||
|
||
ALL All of the above
|
||
|
||
So, if you wanted to sign up to get releases related to the economy
|
||
your email message would look like this:
|
||
|
||
To: Clinton-Info@Campaign92.Org
|
||
Subject--RECEIVE ECONOMY
|
||
|
||
When you send a signup message to the clinton-info server, it sends
|
||
you back a status message letting you know what distribution streams
|
||
you are signed up for. If you ever want to check on what groups you
|
||
are signed up for send the following message:
|
||
|
||
To: Clinton-Info@Campaign92.Org
|
||
Subject--STATUS
|
||
|
||
You can stop receiving email releases by sending a REMOVE message to
|
||
the clinton-info server. The word REMOVE would be followed by whatever
|
||
distribution stream you wanted to drop. If you wanted to stop
|
||
receiving message about the ECONOMY then your mail would look like
|
||
this:
|
||
|
||
To: Clinton-Info@Campaign92.Org Subject--REMOVE ECONOMY
|
||
|
||
You could substitute SOCIAL, FOREIGN, SPEECHES, NEWS or ALL for
|
||
ECONOMY in the above message and you would be dropped from that
|
||
distribution list. If you send the subject line REMOVE ALL, then you
|
||
will be taken off the email distribution system all together and will
|
||
not receive further releases of any kind.
|
||
|
||
You can also ask for help from the automated server. Send an email
|
||
query as follows:
|
||
|
||
To: Clinton-Info@Campaign92.Org
|
||
Subject--HELP
|
||
|
||
The server will respond by sending you a detailed form that will guide
|
||
you through the process of signing up for the various distribution
|
||
streams. As you will quickly discover, there is a automatic form
|
||
processing interface that parallel the quick and easy subject line
|
||
commands discussed here. More detailed help is available by sending
|
||
an email query as follows:
|
||
|
||
To: Clinton-Info@Campaign92.Org
|
||
Subject--Please Help!
|
||
|
||
Finally, if you want to search and retrieve documents, but you do not
|
||
have access to the retrieval methods discussed in section II, you can
|
||
do this via email through the MIT server. You can obtain the WAIS
|
||
query form by sending an email query as follows:
|
||
|
||
To: Clinton-Info@Campaign92.Org
|
||
Subject--WAIS
|
||
|
||
Once you have identified the documents that you want, be careful not
|
||
to request them all at once, because you may be sent a message
|
||
containing all the documents and this message may be too big for some
|
||
mail delivery systems between the email server and you.
|
||
|
||
|
||
II. HOW DO I RETRIEVE WHITE HOUSE PUBLICATIONS FROM INTERNET ARCHIVES?
|
||
|
||
Various sites are archiving the press releases distributed . What follows
|
||
is an
|
||
incomplete list of some of the sites containing the documents that
|
||
have been released to date. This FAQ will be updated to reflect new
|
||
sites as they become known.
|
||
|
||
SITE DIRECTORY
|
||
|
||
1. SUNSITE.UNC.EDU
|
||
pub/academic/political-science/whitehouse-papers
|
||
2. FTP.CCO.CALTECH.EDU /PUB/BJMCCALL
|
||
3. FTP MARISTB.MARIST.EDU
|
||
4. CPSR.ORG /CPSR/CLINTON
|
||
5. FedWorld Online System 703-321-8020 8-N-1 or:
|
||
Telnet fedworld.doc.gov
|
||
|
||
Notes: The following are notes on how to log in and get
|
||
information from the above sites.
|
||
|
||
1. Office FOR Information Technology at University of
|
||
North Carolina Maintains the full collection of White
|
||
House electronic release available for search with WAIS and
|
||
also accessible via Gopher and FTP.
|
||
1.a WAIS
|
||
(:source
|
||
:version 3
|
||
:database-name "/home3/wais/White-House-Papers" :ip-
|
||
address "152.2.22.81"
|
||
:ip-name "sunsite.unc.edu"
|
||
:tcp-port 210
|
||
:cost 0.00
|
||
:cost-unit :free
|
||
:maintainer "pjones@sunsite.unc.edu"
|
||
|
||
:description "Server created with WAIS release 8 b5 on
|
||
Feb 27 15:16:16 1993 by pjones@sunsite.unc.edu These are the
|
||
White House Press Briefings and other postings dealing with
|
||
William Jefferson Clinton and Albert Gore as well as members
|
||
of the President's Cabinet and the first lady Hillary Rodham
|
||
Clinton, Chelsea, Socks and others in Washington DC. Dee Dee
|
||
Meyers and George Stephanopoulos. Other good words:
|
||
United States of America, Bill Al Tipper Democrats USA
|
||
US These files are also available via anonymous ftp
|
||
from sunsite.unc.edu The files of type filename used in
|
||
the index were:
|
||
/home3/ftp/pub/academic/political-science/whitehouse-
|
||
papers/1993 ")
|
||
|
||
Folks without WAIS clients or gophers that act as WAIS
|
||
clients may telnet to sunsite.unc.edu and login as swais
|
||
to access this information via WAIS.
|
||
|
||
1.b GOPHER is a distributed menuing system for information access on
|
||
the
|
||
Internet developed at the University of Minnesota. gophers are
|
||
client-server implementations and various gopher clients are
|
||
available for nearly any computing platform. You may now use
|
||
gopher clients to access the White House Papers and other
|
||
political information on SunSITE.unc.edu's new gopher server.
|
||
You may also add links from your local gopher server to
|
||
SunSITE for access to the White House Papers.
|
||
|
||
For gopher server keepers and adventurous clients to access
|
||
SunSITE you need only know that we use the standard gopher
|
||
port 70 and that our internet address is SunSITE.unc.edu
|
||
(152.2.22.81). Point there and you'll see the references to
|
||
the Politics areas.
|
||
|
||
For folks without gopher clients can telnet to sunsite.unc.edu
|
||
to try out gopher access. You need to have access to internet
|
||
telnet and:
|
||
|
||
telnet sunsite.unc.edu
|
||
login: gopher
|
||
|
||
The rest is very straight forward. Browsing options end with a
|
||
directory mark (/), searching options end with an question mark (?).
|
||
There's plenty of on-line help available.
|
||
|
||
2. No special instructions.
|
||
|
||
3. The CLINTON@MARIST log files which contain all the official
|
||
administration releases distributed through the MIT servers
|
||
are available via anonymous FTP. These logs contain in
|
||
addition to the official releases, the posts that comprise the
|
||
ongoing discussion conducted by the list subscribers.
|
||
To obtain the logs:
|
||
FTP MARISTB.MARIST.EDU - the logs are in the CLINTON directory
|
||
and are named CLINTON LOG9208 thru CLINTON LOGyymm where yymm
|
||
stands for the current year and month. Problems should be
|
||
directed to my attention: URLS@MARISTC.BITNET or
|
||
URLS@VM.MARIST.EDU.
|
||
Posted by Lee Sakkas - owner, CLINTON@MARIST
|
||
|
||
4. Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility is
|
||
providing all Clinton documents on technology and privacy
|
||
at the CPSR Internet Library, available via
|
||
FTP/WAIS/Gopher at cpsr.org /cpsr/clinton (and in other
|
||
folders as relevant). For email access, send a message
|
||
with the word "help" at the 1st line of text to
|
||
listserv@cpsr.org.
|
||
|
||
5. The FedWorld Computer System, operated by the National Technical
|
||
Information Service, archives White House papers in a
|
||
traditional BBS type file library. Connect to FedWorld by
|
||
calling (703) 321-8020. No parity, eight data bits and one stop
|
||
bit (N-8-1). FedWorld accommodates baud speeds of up to 9,600.
|
||
It is also possible to Telnet to FedWorld at FedWorld.doc.gov.
|
||
White House papers are located in the W-House library of files.
|
||
To access this library from the main FedWorld menu,
|
||
enter <f s w-house>. Files are named with the first four digits
|
||
being the release month and day (e.g. 0323XXX.txt). Some
|
||
standard abbreviations after the date include:
|
||
|
||
rem - Remarks by the President
|
||
pc - Press Conference transcript
|
||
pr - Press Release
|
||
AM - AM Press Briefing
|
||
PM - PM Press Briefing
|
||
sch - The President's public schedule
|
||
spch- Text of major speeches.
|
||
|
||
These files are saved in ASCII format. Files can be viewed
|
||
online by requesting to download a file and then selecting
|
||
(L)ist as the download protocol. This will display the file a
|
||
screen at a time. White House papers are kept in the above
|
||
format for up to two months. Papers more than two months old
|
||
are compressed using Pkzip into a single file that contains all
|
||
of the files for that month (e.g. 0193.zip contains all papers
|
||
released during January 1993). In addition to White Documents,
|
||
FedWorld also provides a gateway to more than 100 government
|
||
funded BBSs and computer systems.
|
||
|
||
|
||
III. HOW DO I SEND EMAIL TO THE WHITE HOUSE?
|
||
|
||
We are pleased to introduce this new form of communication into the
|
||
White House for the first time in history. As we work to reinvent
|
||
government and streamline our processes, this electronic mail experiment
|
||
will help put us on the leading edge of progress. Please remember,
|
||
though, this is still very much an experiment.
|
||
|
||
The White House email system is under construction. This is a new
|
||
project and suffers from all of the problems common to a startup
|
||
operation. The Communications office is currently working on defining
|
||
what this system will do, as well as trying to come up with equipment
|
||
and staffing to make sure that it works.
|
||
|
||
Nobody wants this new venture to work more than the staff that has
|
||
devoted so many hours to getting it up and running. But much time and
|
||
effort will be required before the system is truly interactive. In the
|
||
mean time, they will need a little patience from the electronic
|
||
community.
|
||
|
||
When you send to the White House you will receive an immediate
|
||
acknowledge that your message has been received. Email messages are
|
||
currently being printed out and responses are being sent out via US
|
||
Mail, so if you send a message to the White House, please include a US
|
||
Post office address for replies.
|
||
|
||
You can send email to the following addresses:
|
||
|
||
Internet Direct: President@WhiteHouse.GOV
|
||
Vice-President@WhiteHouse.GOV
|
||
|
||
Please send corrections, deletion and additions to this FAQ to:
|
||
|
||
Updates@Campaign92.Org
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
End of Computer Underground Digest #5.74
|
||
************************************
|
||
|
||
|
||
|