937 lines
42 KiB
Plaintext
937 lines
42 KiB
Plaintext
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Computer underground Digest Sun July 18 1993 Volume 5 : Issue 53
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ISSN 1004-042X
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Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
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Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
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Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
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Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
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Ian Dickinson
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Cpyp Editor: Etaoin Shrdlu, Senior
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CONTENTS, #5.53 (July 18 1993)
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File 1--CPSR Urges Revision of Secrecy System
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File 2--CPSR/Berkeley Meeting on access to govt info
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File 3--CU in da Newz
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File 4--More CuD Sources for Non-Interneters --GEnie
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File 5--Hyde For Wiretaps
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File 6--Reply to Ferguson
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File 7--Re: Cu Digest, #5.51 --The AIS BBS Incident
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File 8--Viruses (Reply to Paul Ferguson)
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File 9--Another Reply to Paul Ferguson (RE CuD 5.52)
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File 10--CONGRESS ASKED FOR HEARINGS ON OWENS (INFO ACCESS) BIL
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Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
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available at no cost electronically from tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu. The
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editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-6430), fax (815-753-6302)
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or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL
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60115.
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Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest
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news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of
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LAWSIG, and DL1 of TELECOM; on GEnie in the PF*NPC RT
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libraries and in the VIRUS/SECURITY library; from America Online in
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the PC Telecom forum under "computing newsletters;"
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On Delphi in the General Discussion database of the Internet SIG;
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on the PC-EXEC BBS at (414) 789-4210; and on: Rune Stone BBS (IIRG
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WHQ) (203) 832-8441 NUP:Conspiracy; RIPCO BBS (312) 528-5020
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CuD is also available via Fidonet File Request from 1:11/70; unlisted
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||
nodes and points welcome.
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EUROPE: from the ComNet in LUXEMBOURG BBS (++352) 466893;
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In ITALY: Bits against the Empire BBS: +39-461-980493
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ANONYMOUS FTP SITES:
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UNITED STATES: ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in /pub/cud
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uglymouse.css.itd.umich.edu (141.211.182.53) in /pub/CuD/cud
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halcyon.com( 202.135.191.2) in /pub/mirror/cud
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aql.gatech.edu (128.61.10.53) in /pub/eff/cud
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AUSTRALIA: ftp.ee.mu.oz.au (128.250.77.2) in /pub/text/CuD.
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EUROPE: nic.funet.fi in pub/doc/cud. (Finland)
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ftp.warwick.ac.uk in pub/cud (United Kingdom)
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
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diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted for non-profit as long
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as the source is cited. Authors hold a presumptive copyright, and
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they should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that
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non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise
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specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles
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relating to computer culture and communication. Articles are
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preferred to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts
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unless absolutely necessary.
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DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
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the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all
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responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not
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violate copyright protections.
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: Thu, 15 Jul 1993 16:58:33 EST
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From: David Sobel <dsobel@WASHOFC.CPSR.ORG>
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Subject: File 1--CPSR Urges Revision of Secrecy System
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CPSR Urges Revision of Secrecy System
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Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) has
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called for a complete overhaul in the federal government's information
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classification system, including the removal of cryptography from the
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categories of information automatically deemed to be secret. In a
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letter to a special Presidential task force examining the
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classification system, CPSR said that the current system -- embodied
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in an Executive Order issued by President Reagan in 1982 -- "has
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limited informed public debate on technological issues and has
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restricted scientific innovation and technological development."
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The CPSR statement, which was submitted in response to a task
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force request for public comments, strongly criticizes a provision in
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the Reagan secrecy directive that presumptively classifies any
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information that "concerns cryptology." CPSR notes that "while
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cryptography -- the science of making and breaking secret security
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codes -- was once the sole province of the military and the
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intelligence agencies, the technology today plays an essential role in
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assuring the security and privacy of a wide range of communications
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affecting finance, education, research and personal correspondence."
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With the end of the Cold War and the growth of widely available
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computer network services, the outdated view of cryptography reflected
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in the Reagan order must change, according to the statement.
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CPSR's call for revision of the classification system is based
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upon the organization's experience in attempting to obtain government
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information relating to cryptography and computer security issues.
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CPSR is currently litigating Freedom of Information Act lawsuits
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against the National Security Agency (NSA) seeking the disclosure of
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technical data concerning the digital signature standard (DSS) and the
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administration's recent "Clipper Chip" proposal. NSA has relied on
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the Reagan Executive Order as authority for withholding the
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information from the public.
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In its submission to the classification task force, CPSR also
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called for the following changes to the current secrecy directive:
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* A return to the "balancing test," whereby the public
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interest in the disclosure of information is weighed against
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the claimed harm that might result from such disclosure;
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* A prohibition against the reclassification of information
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that has been previously released;
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* The requirement that the economic cost of classifying
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scientific and technical be considered before such
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information may be classified;
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* The automatic declassification of information after 20
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years, unless the head of the original classifying agency,
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in the exercise of his or her non-delegable authority,
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determines in writing that the material requires continued
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classification for a specified period of time; and
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* The establishment of an independent oversight commission
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to monitor the operation of the security classification
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system.
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The task force is scheduled to submit a draft revision of the
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Executive Order to President Clinton on November 30.
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The full text of the CPSR statement can be obtained via ftp, wais
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and gopher from cpsr.org, under the filename
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cpsr%crypto%secrecy_statement.txt.
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CPSR is a national organization of professionals in the computing
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field. Membership is open to the public. For more information on
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CPSR, contact <cpsr@cpsr.org>.
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------------------------------
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Date: Thu, 15 Jul 1993 11:09:05 -0700
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From: "James I. Davis" <jdav@WELL.SF.CA.US>
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Subject: File 2--CPSR/Berkeley Meeting on access to govt info
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Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
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Berkeley Chapter
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Sunday, July 25, 1993
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BMUG Office: 2055 Center Street
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Berkeley, CA
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2:00 - 4:00 p.m.
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The Federal government produces information in nearly all areas
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of interest. It not only provides information about its own
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activities (Congressional Record and the Federal Register) and about
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the nation (census information), but also in areas of agriculture,
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commerce, science and even the arts. Numerous laws have been
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enacted that mandate public access to Federal information. But the
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fact is that over the last decades, public access to Federal
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information has been steadily decreasing.
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Where is Federal information policy going in an electronic age
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and under a new presidential administration? What is happening to
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the concept of "free access" to government documents in a period of
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economic retrenchment? These and other government information
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issues will be discussed by Gary Peete, UCB Business/Economics
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Librarian and former head of the Berkeley Government Documents
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Department.
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CPSR/Berkeley Chapter welcomes all interested persons to
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join us for this presentation and open discussion of the issues.
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------------------------------
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Date: 08 Jul 93 08:24:17 EDT
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From: Gordon Meyer <72307.1502@COMPUSERVE.COM>
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Subject: File 3--CU in da Newz
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Captain Zap and Information Week
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================================
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The June 21, 1993 issue of Information Week magazine features a cover story
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on "Hackers for Hire: Would You Trust a Convicted Criminal to Test Your
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Network's Security?". Pictured on the cover is Ian "Captain Zap" Murphy,
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president of IAM/Secure Data Systems. IAM/Secure is a firm that employs
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people convicted of computer crimes to form so-called "tiger teams". Murphy
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claims to have made over $500,000. a year from his services. Price
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Waterhouse also offers what it calls "Data Security Penetration Studies"
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although the firm does not employ any ex-hackers. It offers four levels of
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services, ranging from using "demon dialers" to find dial-ins to acting as
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a legitimate user trying to break security from the inside of the system.
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The article includes comments from Dorothy Denning, Donn Parker, and Phrack
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prosecutor Bill Cook. The latter warns that firms hiring hackers may
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inadvertently hire someone who has been targeted by law enforcement.
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Internal Hackers at Dillard's
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=============================
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The Dillard's department store chain reports that five employees of Norstan
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Communications broke into Dillard's automated special events ticket sales
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system. The store was selling tickets for the Phoenix Sun's NBA playoff
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games. The automated system was purchased from Norstan. Dillard's intends
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to press charges and beef up the security of the system.
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(Information Week. June 7, 1993. pg 8)
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Royalty Attack
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===============
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The Information Industry Association (IIA) joined with business, library ,
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public interest, and press representatives to criticize implementation of a
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law that directs a government agency to sell public information for a
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profit. The coalition filed comments to the Federal Maritime Commission in
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response to the FMC's proposed rules to charge royalty fees for access to
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and redistribution of public domain data in electronic formats. Calling the
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approach dictatorial, the IIA says the law "transgresses First Amendment
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principles and distorts the relationship between citizens and their
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government."
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(Communications of the ACM. May 1993. Pg 12 Reprinted with permission)
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Data Breach Shocks Hospital Group
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=================================
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Information Week (June 14, 1993 pg 14) reports that an accidental security
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breach at the American Hospital Association revealed the names of 42
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employees who were scheduled to be laid off the following week. The article
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states "The result of the June 4 security breach was total mayhem. Because
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the layoffs were a surprise to many of the targeted employees, AHA
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officials feared they or others might be a tempted to retaliate. As a
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precaution, the AHA shut down its entire computer system that day, a
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Friday, and sent employees home early". The breach occurred because the
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confidential document was left in an unprotected subdirectory on a Unix
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server in the human resources department.
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Fakeware?
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=========
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After Computer Associates announced that it would give away 1 million
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copies a new finance package for Intel-based PCs, another company topped
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the offer by saying it would give away 2 million copies of its software.
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Unfortunately the other company, Minnesota Software, apparently doesn't
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exist. Many magazines were taken in by the offer, running stories about it,
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including Information Week. The state of Minnesota is investigating but
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says it is a low priority because few complaints have been received about
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the incident.
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(Information Week. July 5, 1993. Pg. 8)
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SRI says 'Shhhh'
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=============
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SRI International, Inc (Menlo Park, CA) has released a report entitled "The
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State of Security in Cyberspace". According to the report the biggest
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security flaws in any computer system are the result of procedural and
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administrative weaknesses, not technical flaws. Most hackers, it says, gain
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admittance to networks by exploiting widely available, non-proprietary, and
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public information. SRI advises that above all else, companies should keep
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information about networks as proprietary as possible.
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(Information Week. July 5, 1993. Pg. 62)
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------------------------------
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Date: Mon, 19 Jul 93 03:43:00 BST
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From: grmeyer@GENIE.GEIS.COM
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Subject: File 4--More CuD Sources for Non-Interneters -- GEnie
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This is part of our continuing series of where non-Internet users can find
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issues of CuD. This installment focuses on GEnie (General Electric
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Network for Information Exchange).
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There are two main CuD repositories on GEnie. The PF*NPC RT and the
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Virus/Security RT.
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PF*NPC (Public Forum/Non-Profit Connection) Roundtable Keyword: PF
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===================================================================
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Issues of CuD can be found in the Computers & Technology section of the
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library (library #2). The library features a complete collection of
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CuD. If you're missing issues from prior years, this is the place to
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find them. All issues are compressing using ARC for cross-platform
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compatibility. The library is kept up-to-date will all new CuDs, but
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there may be several days delay until new issues are uploaded.
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(Uploading is usually done by Gordon, CuD co-mod, who may wait until
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two or three issues are waiting to be sent.)
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If you're looking for a discussion of issues similar to those covered
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in CuD drop in on Category 7 (Technology) in the PF*NPC Bulletin
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Board. The bulletin board features many other topics of political and
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social interest.
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Virus & Security Roundtable Keyword: VSRT
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=========================================
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The Virus Roundtable on GEnie is loaded with files and discussion of
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interest to CuD readers. Issues of CuD are located in the section
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four (publications) of the library. Issues appear here very quickly,
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usually just a day or two, after they are released. They are
|
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compressed in ZIP format.
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The Bulletin Board section of the Roundtable is filled with topics of
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interest. You'll find topics for encryption, security concerns, and
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(of course) viruses. A CuD discussion can be found in category 4
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(Computer Security Discussions).
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Obtaining CuD directly via GEnie
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=================================
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As of July 1, 1993 all GEnie subscribers have access to Internet
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mail. To obtain a subscription to CuD send a one-line message
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('subscribe CuD') to the following address:
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tk0jut2@niu.bitnet@inet#
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Note that the '@inet#' is specific to GEnie and signifies that the
|
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message is to be sent to the Internet gateway.
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You'll be added to the CuD mailing list and begin receiving new
|
||
issues as they are released. Note that CuD issues are typically
|
||
around 50K in length and are sent as regular ASCII text. If you want
|
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to save online time it would be best to download a compressed file
|
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from one of the Roundtables.
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Signing up for GEnie
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====================
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The Virus and Security Roundtable invites CuD readers to sign-up for
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GEnie. Simply follow these directions....
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1. Set your modem for half duplex (local echo), at 300, 1200 or
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2400 baud.
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2. Dial (toll-free) 1-800-638-8369. Upon connection, enter HHH
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(In Canada, dial 1-800-387-8330)
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3. At the U#= prompt, enter XTX99259,GENIE and press RETURN.
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If you need additional assistance, call 1-800-638-9636 (USA or
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Canada) to talk to a GEnie Client Services Representative.
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Postscript/Erratta
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===================
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In CuD 5.49 we ran a transcript of GEnie Virus/Security Roundtable
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conference. We neglected to mention that the complete transcript is
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available for downloading in the Virus RT. Also, the transcript is
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Copyrighted (c)1993 GEnie. It was re-printed with permission.
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------------------------------
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Date: 11 Jul 93 12:51:42 EDT
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From: Gordon Meyer <72307.1502@COMPUSERVE.COM>
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Subject: File 5--Hyde For Wiretaps
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One of the CuD co-editors recently wrote to Representative Henry J.
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Hyde (6th District - Illinois - Republican) and asked his position on
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the digital telephone requirements being sought by the FBI. The
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following is a verbatim copy of his reply.
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Congress of the United States
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House of Representatives
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Washington, DC
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Henry J. Hyde
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6th District, Illinois
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Committee: Judiciary, Foreign Affairs
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Chairman: Republican Policy Committee
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June 30, 1993
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Dear Mr. Meyer:
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Thank you for your letter. I believe that law enforcement agencies
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must be able to conduct wire surveillance over the telephone
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networks. As telephone companies upgrade our nation's
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telecommunications infrastructure, they must make sure that this
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vital investigative tool is not lost. Presently, the Baby Bells and
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the FBI are conferring over how to ensure the future of wire
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surveillance in a way that will not retard the development of the
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phone networks. While I hope these negotiations succeed, I will
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support an appropriate legislative solution if one becomes necessary.
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Thanks again for writing. Your comments were helpful and welcome.
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Very truly yours,
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[sig]
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Henry J. Hyde
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HJH:gmf
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------------------------------
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Date: Tue, 13 Jul 1993 06:32:01 -0700
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From: Frank Tirado <SYSADMIN@ERS.BITNET>
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Subject: File 6--Reply to Ferguson
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((MODERATORS' NOTE: A letter circulated by Jim Lipschultz providing
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in-depth background on the AIS BBS incident as drawn considerable
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attention. Some readers, apparently attributed Jim's letter to Frank
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Tirado. Here, Frank removes any misundersandings)).
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Apparently Fergie attributed Lipschultz's article to me. What follows is
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my response.
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++++++++++++++++++++++++++++Original message++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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AN OPEN LETTER TO PAUL FERGUSON.
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*******************************************************************
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Message from Paul Ferguson to Cory Tucker:
|
||
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"....I find your posts rather humorous, yet at the same time
|
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offensive. If Mr. Tirado wishes to confront the issue
|
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himself, I'd suggest he do so. His absence here in Fidonet
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or Usenet somehow diminishes his credibility. In the
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meantime, please refrain from posting such drivel....."
|
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*******************************************************************
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I went through the back issues of Crypt, as well as anywhere else
|
||
I might have been quoted, to see what I might have said to so raise
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your ire. I'm left with the impression that you ascribe to me the
|
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article written by Jim Lipschultz, an article which I helped edit
|
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and which I personally found quite droll. Sorry, much as I would
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like to take credit for his work, the words are all his.
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You say you found the article offensive? Frankly, that depends on
|
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who's on the receiving end, eh? I'd call it irreverent, at worst.
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Besides, you're a big boy and can handle this sort of thing without
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loosing your cool....... can't you?
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But I digress. I find it fitting that I am called upon to defend
|
||
an issue about which I have strong feelings. But how to go about
|
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it? Anything I might say will simply be rehashing what is now
|
||
history, and will not bring about an ex post facto resurrection of
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Kim's board. Suffice it to say that, for the most part, my
|
||
feelings and opinions, as well as those of most of my colleagues,
|
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parallel those of Jim's (though I doubt if I could get my point
|
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across with such savoir faire).
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Lets take a look instead at what has been accomplished by shutting
|
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down the AIS board:
|
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o The information which was on that board is now on four others.
|
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Obviously part of your carefully thought out strategy to
|
||
eliminate such information from "legitimate" boards. If
|
||
anything, these boards will provide the same services the AIS
|
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board did, but to a greater extent.
|
||
o Kim Clancy is now far more credible than before in the
|
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"underground", and an even more desirable commodity among the
|
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the above-ground interests.
|
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o Closing down the AIS board eliminated a major avenue for the
|
||
propagation of viruses........ Oops! My imagination ran wild
|
||
for a moment. You and I both know that not the slightest dent
|
||
has been made in the flow of information which you and your
|
||
cohorts find so objectionable.
|
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o Now the virus boards cannot point at the AIS board and say:
|
||
"If they're doing it, why can't we?" I'll grant you this one,
|
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but I really can't see virus boards using this defense very
|
||
successfully, should it ever come to that.
|
||
o Those individuals who could "legally" (there was nothing
|
||
illegal about any information obtainable through the AIS
|
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board) obtain useful and pertinent information from the
|
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underground will now probably gravitate towards hacker or
|
||
virus boards. You think not? Let's wait and see.....
|
||
|
||
A major victory for the forces of Good? Not at all. Nothing has
|
||
been accomplished other than to further inflate some people's
|
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already grossly bloated egos (you know who you are).
|
||
|
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Your statement that my "absence here in Fidonet or Usenet somehow
|
||
diminishes (my) credibility" is ludicrous. In other words, I'm
|
||
outside of your control so my opinions don't count. Frankly, I
|
||
reserve the right to disagree with you whenever our views differ.
|
||
If that means that I refuse to be subject to your petty satrapy,
|
||
then so be it. And, by the way, what would you say of the
|
||
credibility of an individual who doesn't have the courage to sign
|
||
his name to a message accusing someone else of excesses? At least
|
||
Jim and I sign our names to our posts.
|
||
|
||
Put into the simplest terms, I see the AV community, with some few
|
||
exceptions, evolving into a kind of priesthood whose Mysteries are
|
||
composed of polymorphic viruses and source code, hidden behind a
|
||
veil of mummery and slight of hand. Never mind that virus authors
|
||
and several hundred thousand people of all ages have access to that
|
||
self-same information; as a security officer I only need to know
|
||
what you tell me. Of course, you only are doing this for my own
|
||
good.....
|
||
|
||
I don't think so. I find it next to impossible to implicitly
|
||
accept the word of a group whose bottom line is the almighty
|
||
dollar. Besides, as a self-regulating group you guys can't even
|
||
police yourselves. I obtained my first 20 viruses from a vendor at
|
||
the same conference where Peter Tippett first proposed not sharing
|
||
viruses. The implications should be "crystal clear", considering
|
||
the plethora live viruses and source code floating around with the
|
||
imprimatur of the major AV software developers.
|
||
|
||
The fact is that the members of the AV community are nowhere near
|
||
the paragons of pulchritude they proclaim themselves to be, and the
|
||
virus underground is not the Evil Empire. If the truth be told,
|
||
there is both good and bad in each group.
|
||
|
||
Quis custodiet custodians? I find this statement apt as applied to
|
||
the AV community in general. Who is watching you? I guess I
|
||
shouldn't worry my little head about this, since you have only our
|
||
best interests at heart.
|
||
|
||
Finally, here's my bottom line: I will do whatever I think best in
|
||
order to accomplish my job effectively. If I must, I will collect
|
||
viruses in order to test the claims of AV products, or source code
|
||
so that I can understand the inner workings of viruses. That
|
||
includes access to 40-Hex, Nuke InfoJournal, and whatever else I
|
||
can get my hands on. That's my decision to make, not yours.
|
||
|
||
I encourage others to make their own decisions based on all
|
||
available information, and not slavishly follow the dictates of
|
||
some self-appointed virus gurus.
|
||
|
||
FRANK TIRADO
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 93 10:30:06 CDT
|
||
From: chris%canary%rio@UUNET.UU.NET(Chris Johnson)
|
||
Subject: File 7--Re: Cu Digest, #5.51 -- The AIS BBS Incident
|
||
|
||
After reading half a dozen articles about the AIS BBS controversy, I
|
||
can't help but think that the whole thing smacks of some sort of
|
||
personal vendetta on the part of Paul Ferguson against Kim Clancy.
|
||
|
||
Perhaps he was only jealous of her growing professional reputation.
|
||
Or maybe he made a pass at her only to be rebuffed for being the
|
||
unethical fink that he is.
|
||
|
||
I'm not as willing as Jim Thomas to believe Paul Ferguson was sincere
|
||
in his concerns. In fact, I don't believe he was at all, but rather
|
||
his entire intent was to cause trouble for someone, probably Kim.
|
||
|
||
Jim Thomas also writes:
|
||
|
||
"Sadly, I must make one final comment. It's said that some
|
||
people, angered at this affair, are planning to retaliate
|
||
against those judged responsible. This would be an ethically
|
||
bankrupt response. Predatory behavior decivilizes
|
||
cyberspace just as it does the "real world." The best
|
||
response to cyber-conflict usually is to air disputes in
|
||
public and debate them aggressively and honestly. We need
|
||
fewer, not more, razorblades in the sand if we're to create
|
||
a civilized environment."
|
||
|
||
I agree, mostly, but the problem is the lack of communications between
|
||
Cyberspace and the rest of the world. No amount of airing disputes
|
||
and debating them here in Cyberspace is going to correct the
|
||
wrong-headed criticism from the print media, congressional members and
|
||
staff, pressure to change from congressional members and staff, or
|
||
any sort of reprimand, criticism or loss of reputation Kim Clancy has
|
||
suffered from her superiors at the Bureau of Public Debt.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Sun, 18 Jul 93 16:58:47 EDT
|
||
From: joec@CFCSYS.LINET.ORG(Joseph Christie)
|
||
Subject: File 8--Viruses (Reply to Paul Ferguson)
|
||
|
||
An open letter to Mr. Ferguson
|
||
|
||
I just could not read your response in CUD #5.52 (July 14 1993)
|
||
without responding. I realize that you are probably quite busy
|
||
reading(or trashing) large volumes of hate mail so I do not expect a
|
||
response to this, I just wanted to share my thoughts on this issue
|
||
with you.
|
||
|
||
In your article you say:
|
||
>I consider myself a proponent of freedom of
|
||
>information, but I also believe there are limits to one's freedom.
|
||
>In fact, I'm most fond of the adage,"The freedom to swing your fist
|
||
>ends when it meets my face." In other words, one's right to a
|
||
>particular freedom ends where it infringes on someone else's rights
|
||
>for safety or privacy, in this instance.
|
||
|
||
Using this logic we should close down or severely restrict access to
|
||
gasoline stations since there is a known correlation between the
|
||
number of gasoline related arsons and the availability of gasoline.
|
||
Society has chosen a different approach, we attempt to teach social
|
||
responsibility to all potential purchasers of this substance rather
|
||
than excessively restricting access to it.
|
||
|
||
Repression or limiting access to anything, be it tangible goods or
|
||
an idea, only creates a black market atmosphere among those who have
|
||
illicit access in spite of the repression. This mystifies the good/idea
|
||
and tends to make it more attractive to anti-social individuals. This
|
||
encourages them to become involved in the activity and even creates or
|
||
amplifies a competition atmosphere among those involved.
|
||
|
||
I would submit that the open exchange of ideas and information in this
|
||
area would help to demystify viruses and their creation and lessen
|
||
it's "fad potential". There will always be those with a curiosity
|
||
about viruses but if anyone can get a kit and whip out a virus in 5 or
|
||
10 minutes, then virus creators will not have the mythical status of
|
||
folk heroes that was once bestowed on practitioners of this activity a
|
||
few years ago.
|
||
|
||
Besides, I still think that some good can come from understanding
|
||
viruses and how they work beyond the field of virus protection. I have
|
||
a sneaky suspicion that one could learn a lot about how to write a
|
||
virus program by studying how file compression programs like Stacker
|
||
and Superstor work. They don't self replicate, but some of their
|
||
operations seem virus-like other than that.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Sun, 18 Jul 93 23:53:52 CDT
|
||
From: buhr@CC.UMANITOBA.CA
|
||
Subject: File 9--Another Reply to Paul Ferguson (RE CuD 5.52)
|
||
|
||
I read your article in the Computer Underground Digest, and I must
|
||
admit that while your whole handling of the issue disgusts me, and I
|
||
am actually approaching a state of violent illness just typing this,
|
||
your pomposity really deserves some form of reproach.
|
||
|
||
Let's skip the preamble about what the distribution of virus code does
|
||
or doesn't do, and let's cut right to the chase:
|
||
|
||
| I certainly claim no "moral high ground" on the issue. I took what I
|
||
| thought was the best venue of approach, which was to bring this topic
|
||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||
| out of the shadows and into the forefront for discussion.
|
||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||
|
||
You did no such thing. "Discussion" was the furthest thing from your
|
||
mind. Call a spade a spade, man. You sent an anonymous message
|
||
giving an inaccurate portrayal of the situation (when you apparently
|
||
should have known better) to people you knew would react---not by
|
||
rationally discussing the issue---but by taking extreme, immediate
|
||
measures.
|
||
|
||
As a result, you've seriously damaged the reputation of someone who
|
||
appears to be a very capable asset to the security community. You've
|
||
removed a source of information on viral infections that---first-hand
|
||
testimony has it---was a valuable tool. And you've set a precedent
|
||
that will undoubtedly seriously skew the information content of that
|
||
BBS's files. Those documented security flaws? Can't have those on
|
||
here---this BBS is government funded. An explanation of the failings
|
||
of such-and-such an encryption scheme? Whoa! Can't let that fall
|
||
into the wrong hands. Congratulations, you've won one (or more) for
|
||
the bad guys!
|
||
|
||
And despite your pretense that you are taking great pains not to tread
|
||
moral high ground, you clearly shot to kill---you manipulated the
|
||
situation to ensure that your morality, and yours alone, would win the
|
||
day.
|
||
|
||
As for your anonymity, in addition to affording you a cheap thrill
|
||
with respect to the whole "cloak-and-dagger" atmosphere, it
|
||
conveniently shielded you from any call to justify your accusations.
|
||
In the end, you've gotten your just deserts---it's made you out be a
|
||
coward, and more people will remember you as such than I'd want were I
|
||
in your shoes.
|
||
|
||
| Although I may not agree with what you may say, I would give my
|
||
| life for your right to freedom of expression.
|
||
|
||
You can't imagine how much I doubt this. Cheap lip service does
|
||
very little for me.
|
||
|
||
For your own sake, I hope you aren't the person your actions (and your
|
||
writings) suggest.
|
||
|
||
| What happened to the hacker ethic? I seem to recall a "no damage
|
||
| clause" which still echoes in my mind, especially with the advent
|
||
| of this fiasco. "Damage?" "Damage," you say, "What Damage?" "AIS
|
||
| only made it available -- they're not responsible for what is
|
||
| done with it!"
|
||
|
||
Maybe you should think about your own "no damage clause".
|
||
|
||
Kevin <buhr@ccu.UManitoba.CA>
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 1993 17:07:01 EDT
|
||
From: love@ESSENTIAL.ORG
|
||
Subject: File 10--CONGRESS ASKED FOR HEARINGS ON OWENS (INFO ACCESS) BIL
|
||
|
||
Taxpayer Assets Project
|
||
Information Policy Note
|
||
June 12, 1993
|
||
|
||
WASHINGTON, June 12. Today 15 citizen groups wrote to
|
||
Representative Gary Condit (D-CA) asking for hearings on HR 629,
|
||
the Improvement of Information Access Act (IIA Act, sometimes
|
||
referred to as the "Owens bill" after its sponor, Rep. Major
|
||
Owens of NY).
|
||
|
||
Condit is the new Chair of the House Subcommittee on
|
||
Government Information. This subcommittee has bottled HR 629
|
||
up for the past two years, due primarily to opposition to the
|
||
bill by lobbyists for commercial data vendors.
|
||
|
||
Groups calling for hearings include the Taxpayer Assets
|
||
Project, Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, Public
|
||
Citizen, Center for Media Education, Association of Research
|
||
Libraries, Center for Civic Networking, the Information Trust,
|
||
Consumer Federation of America, FAIR, Government Accountability
|
||
Project, National Writers Union, Environmental Research
|
||
Foundation, Federation of American Scientists, Essential
|
||
Information, and the National Coordinating Committee for the
|
||
Promotion of History.
|
||
|
||
The letter follows:
|
||
|
||
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
June 12, 1993
|
||
|
||
Representative Gary Condit
|
||
Chair, Subcommittee on Government Information,
|
||
Justice and Agriculture
|
||
Committee on Government Operations
|
||
U.S. House of Representatives
|
||
Washington, DC 20515
|
||
|
||
Dear Representative Condit:
|
||
|
||
We are writing to request that you hold a hearing of the
|
||
Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice and Agriculture
|
||
to consider HR 629, the Improvement of Information Access Act
|
||
(IIA Act). This legislation, first introduced in 1991, is a very
|
||
important proposal that would broaden public access to government
|
||
information resources. The IIA Act reflects the views and needs
|
||
of the research, education and library community. The issues
|
||
addressed in the bill are relevant to public access to government
|
||
information in an era when computers are increasingly important.
|
||
|
||
The IIA Act addresses the following issues:
|
||
|
||
1. AGENCIES ARE GIVEN A MANDATE TO USE MODERN COMPUTER
|
||
TECHNOLOGIES TO DISSEMINATE GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
|
||
|
||
Agencies are required to disseminate information in diverse modes
|
||
and through appropriate outlets, including federal depository
|
||
libraries, national computer networks such as the Internet, and
|
||
other outlets. They must assure free or low-cost public access
|
||
to Government information. Agency dissemination efforts must
|
||
ensure the timeliness, usefulness, and reliability of the
|
||
information for the public. Agencies are given a mandate to
|
||
provide data users with adequate documentation, software,
|
||
indexes, or other resources that will permit and broaden public
|
||
access to Government information.
|
||
|
||
Why are these measures needed?
|
||
|
||
While some agencies have taken bold and imaginative
|
||
steps to broaden public access to Government
|
||
information through the use of modern information
|
||
technologies, other agencies actively resist efforts to
|
||
broaden public access. This bill would give federal
|
||
agencies a mandate to provide the types of information
|
||
services and products that are important to data users.
|
||
|
||
2. STANDARDS
|
||
|
||
Agencies would be required to disseminate information products
|
||
and services in standardized record formats. Agencies would be
|
||
required to report annually on efforts to develop or implement
|
||
standards for file and record formats, software query command
|
||
structures, user interfaces, and other matters that make
|
||
information easier to obtain and use, and also on agency
|
||
provisions for protecting access to records stored with
|
||
technologies that are superseded or obsolete.
|
||
|
||
The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) and
|
||
the National Records and Archives Administration (NARA) would be
|
||
required to develop and periodically revise voluntary performance
|
||
standards for public access to government records.
|
||
|
||
Why are these measures needed?
|
||
|
||
Many federal agencies have not yet developed standards
|
||
for information systems, and thus it is often difficult
|
||
for agencies to share data or for the public to obtain
|
||
access to agency information resources.
|
||
|
||
3. PRICING
|
||
|
||
The IIA Act would set a government wide limit on the prices the
|
||
federal government can charge on information products and
|
||
services. This price limit would be the incremental cost of
|
||
dissemination, which is defined to exclude the costs of data
|
||
collection. Agencies would not be allowed to impose royalties or
|
||
other fees on the redissemination of federal government
|
||
information.
|
||
|
||
Why are these measures needed?
|
||
|
||
As federal agencies are faced with difficult fiscal
|
||
pressures, they are looking at information resources as
|
||
a source of income. Many agencies price electronic
|
||
information products and services far above
|
||
dissemination costs, and impose royalties and
|
||
restrictions on the redissemination of information.
|
||
Such policies erode the public's right-to-know, and
|
||
lead to a society where information is rationed to the
|
||
most affluent. The IIA Act limits user fees on
|
||
information products and services to dissemination
|
||
costs, which is the policy which has long been used for
|
||
information published in paper formats. Limiting the
|
||
prices for information products and services to the
|
||
costs of dissemination is also consistent with the
|
||
recently revised OMB Circular A-130.
|
||
|
||
|
||
4. PUBLIC NOTICE
|
||
|
||
Perhaps most importantly, the IIA Act would make the federal
|
||
management of information resources more democratic. Every year
|
||
federal agencies would be required to publish a report which
|
||
describes:
|
||
|
||
- the plans to introduce or discontinue information products
|
||
and services,
|
||
|
||
- the efforts to develop or implement standards for file and
|
||
record formats, software query command structures and other
|
||
matters that make information easier to obtain and use,
|
||
|
||
- the status of agency efforts to create and disseminate
|
||
comprehensive indexes or bibliographies of their information
|
||
products and services,
|
||
|
||
- the means by which the public may access the agency's
|
||
information,
|
||
|
||
- the plans for preserving access to electronic information
|
||
that is stored in technologies that may be superseded or
|
||
obsolete, and
|
||
|
||
- the agency plans to keep the public aware of its information
|
||
resources, services and products.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Agencies would be required to solicit public comments on this
|
||
plan, including comments on the types of information collected
|
||
and disseminated, the agency's methods of storing information,
|
||
their outlets for disseminating information, the prices they
|
||
charge for information and the "validity, reliability,
|
||
timeliness, and usefulness to the public of the information."
|
||
The agency would be required to summarize the comments it
|
||
receives and report each year what it has done to respond to the
|
||
comments received in the previous year.
|
||
|
||
Why are these measures needed?
|
||
|
||
It is essential that federal agencies become more
|
||
involved with citizens at the grass roots as they
|
||
design information policies. Citizens have important
|
||
information regarding the way Government information is
|
||
used, and they also have important insights regarding
|
||
emerging information technologies. When issues such as
|
||
standards are involved, it is essential to have regular
|
||
and frequent input from citizens regarding the choice
|
||
of standards, particularly since technologies are
|
||
rapidly changing. These public notice provisions will
|
||
empower citizens at the grass roots to shape federal
|
||
policies in ways that benefit the public.
|
||
|
||
|
||
HEARINGS ARE NEEDED ON HR 629
|
||
|
||
|
||
While this important legislation has broad backing from the right
|
||
to know community, and has been endorsed by such groups as Public
|
||
Citizen, the American Library Assocation, Computer Professionals
|
||
for Social Responsibility (CPSR) and the Taxpayer Assets Project,
|
||
the Subcommittee on Government Information should schedule or
|
||
conduct a hearing on this bill.
|
||
|
||
|
||
Sincerely,
|
||
|
||
James Love, Taxpayer Assets Project; P.O. Box 19367, Washington,
|
||
DC 20036; 202/387-8030; love@essential.org
|
||
|
||
Paul Wolfson, Public Citizen; 2000 P Street, NW, Suite 700
|
||
Washington, DC 20036; 202/833-3000
|
||
|
||
Pam Gilbert, Congress Watch; 215 Pennsylvania Avenue, SE,
|
||
Washington, DC 20003; 202/546-4996
|
||
|
||
Marc Rotenberg, Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
|
||
666 Pennsylvania Avenue, SE, Suite 303, Washington, DC 20003;
|
||
202/544-9240; rotenberg@washofc.cpsr.org
|
||
|
||
Tom Devine, Government Accountability Project, 810 First Street,
|
||
NE, Suite 630, Washington, DC 20002; 202/408-0034
|
||
|
||
Prue Adler, Association of Research Libraries, 21 Dupont Circle,
|
||
NW, Washington, DC 20036; 202/296-8656l; prue@cni.org
|
||
|
||
Jeff Chester, Center for Media Education, P.O. Box 330039,
|
||
Washington, DC 20033; 202/628-2620; cme@digex.net
|
||
|
||
Richard Civille, Center for Civic Networking, P.O. Box 65272
|
||
Washington, DC 20035; 202/362-3831; rciville@cap.gwu.edu
|
||
|
||
Page Miller, National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of
|
||
History; 400 A Street, SE, Washington, DC 20003; 202/544-2422
|
||
|
||
Scott Armstrong, The Information Trust, 1330 Connecticut Avenue,
|
||
NW, Suite 220, Washington, DC 20036; 202/296-4833
|
||
|
||
Brad Stillman, Legislative Counsel, Consumer Federation of
|
||
America, 1424 16th Street, NW, Suite 604, Washington, DC 20036
|
||
202/387-6121; bstillman@essential.org
|
||
|
||
Janine Jackson, FAIR, 130 West 25th Street, New York, NY 10011;
|
||
212/633-6700
|
||
|
||
John Richard, Essential Information, P.O. Box 19405, Washington,
|
||
DC 20036; 202/387-8034; jrichard@essential.org
|
||
|
||
Jonathan Tasini, National Writers Union, 739 West 186th Street
|
||
Apartment 1A, New York, NY 10033; 212/927-1208;
|
||
76450.2377@compuserve.com
|
||
|
||
Peter Montague, Environmental Research Foundation, P.O. Box 5036
|
||
Annapolis, MD 21403; erf@igc.apc.org
|
||
|
||
Steven Aftergood, Federation of American Scientists, 307
|
||
Massachusetts Ave., NE, Washington, DC 20002; 202/675-1012
|
||
jstone@igc.apc.org
|
||
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
tap+info postings are archived at cpsr.org. ftp: ftp.cpsr.org;
|
||
gopher: gopher.cpsr.org; wais: wais.cpsr.org
|
||
To receive tap+info, send a note to tap+info+request@essential.org
|
||
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
Taxpayer Assets Project, P.O. Box 19367, Washington, DC 20036;
|
||
v. 202/387+8030; f. 202/234+5176; internet: tap@essential.org
|
||
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
End of Computer Underground Digest #5.53
|
||
************************************
|
||
|
||
|
||
|