879 lines
42 KiB
Plaintext
879 lines
42 KiB
Plaintext
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Computer underground Digest Sun June 27 1993 Volume 5 : Issue 47
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ISSN 1004-042X
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Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
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Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
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Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
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Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
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Ian Dickinson
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Copy Editor: Etaoin Shrdlu, Seniur
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CONTENTS, #5.47 (June 27 1993)
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File 1--Squelching the Rumor of the CuD ftp Sites
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File 2--Another Stupid Rumor Bites the Dust
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File 3--UPDATE #14-AB1624: bill-text as amended (*improved)*
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File 4--Re: Full Disclosure TRIGGERFISH Hassle (CuD 5.46)
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File 5--Response to Interview with a Virus Writer (CuD 5.44)
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File 6--Virus Hits White House
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Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
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available at no cost electronically from tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu. The
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editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-6430), fax (815-753-6302)
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or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL
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60115.
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Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest
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news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of
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LAWSIG, and DL1 of TELECOM; on GEnie in the PF*NPC RT
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libraries and in the VIRUS/SECURITY library; from America Online in
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the PC Telecom forum under "computing newsletters;"
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On Delphi in the General Discussion database of the Internet SIG;
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on the PC-EXEC BBS at (414) 789-4210; and on: Rune Stone BBS (IIRG
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WHQ) 203-832-8441 NUP:Conspiracy
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CuD is also available via Fidonet File Request from 1:11/70; unlisted
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nodes and points welcome.
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EUROPE: from the ComNet in LUXEMBOURG BBS (++352) 466893;
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In ITALY: Bits against the Empire BBS: +39-461-980493
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ANONYMOUS FTP SITES:
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UNITED STATES: ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in /pub/cud
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uglymouse.css.itd.umich.edu (141.211.182.53) in /pub/CuD/cud
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halcyon.com( 202.135.191.2) in /pub/mirror/cud
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AUSTRALIA: ftp.ee.mu.oz.au (128.250.77.2) in /pub/text/CuD.
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EUROPE: nic.funet.fi in pub/doc/cud. (Finland)
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ftp.warwick.ac.uk in pub/cud (United Kingdom)
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
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diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted for non-profit as long
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as the source is cited. Authors hold a presumptive copyright, and
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they should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that
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non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise
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specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles
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relating to computer culture and communication. Articles are
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preferred to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts
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unless absolutely necessary.
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DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
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the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all
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responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not
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violate copyright protections.
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: Sat, 26 June 1993 11:12:19 CDT
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From: CuD Moderators <tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu>
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Subject: File 1--Squelching the Rumor of the CuD ftp Sites
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We have received a number of queries in the past few days regarding
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the future of the /cud directory and files on the CuD ftp site at
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ftp.eff.org. The rumors focused on three basic "facts:" 1) The EFF
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has removed all PHRACKS because of complaints from teleco and other
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corporations; 2) The /pub/cud directory will be removed because it
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does not coincide with the EFF mandate; 3) The EFF continues to sell
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out by distancing itself from its original constituency.
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These RUMORS are FALSE!
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HERE ARE THE FACTS:
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1) PHRACK will be removed for economic reasons. Mitch Kapor explains
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the drain on EFF's limited resources in the following post, but the
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bottom line is that the EFF pays $1,000 a month to make it available
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to the public.
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2) The /pub/cud directory *WILL NOT* be removed. We try to place
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research articles, theses/dissertations, and other material there as
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we obtain them, and the E-'Zines and other documents provide an
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excellent resource for scholars, journalists, and students.
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3) The EFF has not sold out. As soon as the rumors
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began flying in, John Perry Barlow and Mitch Kapor immediately wrote,
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expressing considerable concern over the unfounded rumors. Both
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recognize the value of the CuD and Comp-Academic-Freedom archives on
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the eff.org system, and providing public access to documents not
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readily available elsewhere is a continuation of the EFF goal of
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making on-line information available to the public. Removing PHRACKS
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is not a decision they made lightly, but reducing the costs by
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removing one 'Zine readily available elsewhere (it is our
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understanding the the CuD shadow sites will continue to carry them)
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simply assures that other, less-available documents will continue to
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be provided.
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There are a few points to keep in mind on this issue:
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1) The EFF is under no obligation to provide an ftp site for CuD.
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They do it because they feel it provides a number of different points
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of view on cyberspace issues. As Mitch points out below, the files in
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the /pub/cud directory impose a significant usage burden on the site
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and this burden is not free. In a sense, the EFF is paying to provide
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net-folk with a service that is unavailable elsewhere.
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Perhaps we have all been taking EFF's donation of its system for
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public ftp services for granted. While not a highly visible
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activity, it nonetheless remains a critically important one.
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Now is the time to thank them for their generosity. The CuD
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editors receive numerous compliments from those who have found the
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files in the cud/pub directory useful. It is EFF, as well as the
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shadow sites (and, of course, the Brendan Kehoe and the other
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archmeisters listed in the CuD masthead) who deserve the credit.
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The generosity of those who provide the space and those who fill it
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and keep it well-maintained make the nets a friendlier and more
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productive space.
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We also appreciate the support of those who wrote expressing
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support in case the rumors were true. All of us, from Mitch and
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John to the archmeisters and CuD editors are involved in enhancing
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information flow out of a sense of voluntaristic service, and the
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occasional expressions of support are about the only compensation
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we receive.
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We can more tangibly support the archives by supporting EFF. The most
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obvious way to support them is to join at the relatively low cost of
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$20 a year for students or low income, or $40 for regular membership.
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In addition to the EFF newsletter, EFF members occasionally receive
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"surprises," such as the first issue of Wired and other goodies.
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Joining is one way of thanking them for offering their system for an
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extensive ftp archive for a growing body of documents. So, if you use
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the ftp site, consider sending a few bucks. Whether you agree with all
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of their policies or not, we're certain that there is little
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disagreement that it's not fair that they provide us all with a
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valuable service while we simply leech from it.
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You can send your sub to:
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Electronic Frontier Foundation
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1001 G Street, N.W.
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Suite 950 East
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Washington, DC 20001
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202/347-5400 voice
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202/393-5509 fax
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EFF's e-mail address is: eff@eff.org
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------------------------------
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Date: Sat, 26 Jun 1993 10:17:51 -0600
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From: mkapor@KEI.COM(Mitchell Kapor)
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Subject: File 2--Another Stupid Rumor Bites the Dust
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We have never contemplated removing CuD from the EFF ftp archive. We
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have believed and continue to believe it is important to let all
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voices be heard and we are happy to do what we can. It astounds me
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and saddens me the extent to which unfounded rumor propagates on the
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net. People need to have a little more faith, and, oh, maybe, ask us
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what we're doing before jumping off in paranoid fantasies of EFF
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selling-out.
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Here are the facts. EFF's carriage of Phrack, not CuD, was costing us
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$1,000 per month in additional transmission charges. After an internal
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review, we decided we could not justify absorbing this rather
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substantial expense for a single publication. Monthly downloads of
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Phrack constituted 2 gigabytes or more. We have communicated with the
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editor of Phrack who has accepted our decision and has arranged for an
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alternate site.
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An analysis of the past year of traffic on eff.org revealed an
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interesting pattern. Roughly 40% of the total byte flow was due to a
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single publication -- Phrack. Another 40% was due to all other FTP
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traffic from CuD and other publications. The remaining 20% included
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all of our email, FTP from the EFF archive, USEET, etc.
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EFF contracted with UUNET to provide what is called low-volume T-1
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service. That is, our instantaneous bandwidth to the net is a T-1,
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which enables fast through-put, but the $1,000 per month we pay is
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only intended to give us an average bandwidth of 128 kilobits. UUNET
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measures the 5 minute average load in every segment and sends
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statistics to its customers. Because of the growth of traffic over
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the past year, EFF has been running at as much as twice our
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contractual limit. UUNET has been billing us a surcharge of another
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$1,000 per month and was about to permanently convert us to a full
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T-1 customer at $2,000 per month. We felt we couldn't justify this
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expense, as the $12,000 per year could pay for nearly half of a
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full-time staff member, for instance.
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The solution we chose was to make a decision that we will stop
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carrying Phrack in the near future. This will enable us to continue
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to provide all the rest of the services on our server for a good long
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time without causing us more in the way of expenses.
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People tend to think of FTP as a "free good". It isn't. Both storage
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and transmission cost money. Maybe it's time Phrack started charging?
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Mitch Kapor
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Chairman, EFF
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Mitchell Kapor, Electronic Frontier Foundation
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Note permanent new email address for all correspondence as of 6/1/93
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mkapor@kei.com
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------------------------------
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Date: Sat, 26 Jun 1993 09:04:46 -0700
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From: Jim Warren <jwarren@WELL.SF.CA.US>
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Subject: File 3--UPDATE #14-AB1624: bill-text as amended (*improved)*
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((MODERATORS' NOTE: Through the efforts of Jim Warren, and others,
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California is coming very close to passing a bill that would provide
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on-line access to computerized public records. This is a crucial bill
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and has national implications. It's passage could provide the stimulus
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for other states and provide the public with greater access to crucial
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legislative and other information. See back issues of CuD for the
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history of the bill)).
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June 25, 1993
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This summarizes the latest set of amendments to AB1624 that were done
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by bill-author Debra Bowen on June 17th, and - thanks to Ray of Apple
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- includes the complete bill-text, as amended.
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NEW VERSION HAS SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS
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1. It removes the permission and fee requirements that had been
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placed on anyone who charged anything to "republish or otherwise
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duplicate" the [electronic-only] public records - a requirement
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demanded by John Burton (who, incidentally, may kill the bill when it
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returns to the Assembly for concurrence - unless we can change
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Burton's mind; yes, he has that much clout).
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2. It [generically] specifies that the files are to be available
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via the Internet - as opposed to leaving open the option for the state
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to create its own, closed network (e.g., as Hawaii has done).
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3. It makes explicit that the Legislative Counsel cannot limit how
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many files someone can request, and that there will be no monitoring
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or reporting of who is interested in what files except as it might
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explicitly pertain to computer operations (i.e., normal sysop
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operations monitoring).
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4. It makes explicit that no fees or other charges can be imposed
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for this public access to public records - since it will cost the
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state perhaps $200/month to provide free access throughout the entire
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state (and globe).
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5. It makes explicit that the *complete* print-files will be
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available, as opposed to the possibility of only having some
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dumbed-down, limited version of the data from which page- and
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line-numbers could not be recalculated - though there's no prohibition
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on them *also* offering ASCII-dumbed versions in *addition* to the
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full data-files.
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6. It specifies that the data is to be made available to the public
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*immediately* after being sent to the printing plant - which is
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*after* it has become public record - instead of waiting until it is
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available on the Legislative Inquiry System. (That turns out to
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sometimes be days or even weeks after some of the AB1624-mandated
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records are public.)
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7. It assures that older versions of bills will remain available
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from the Legislature's file-server for at least 90 days they are
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amended.
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8. And, it makes documentation of their data formats available
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online, uh, IF it's available in computerized form at all - a question
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to which I have been unable to obtain an answer.
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++++++++++
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THE NEW BILL-TEXT, AS AMENDED 6/17 [THERE WILL BE MORE AMENDMENTS, LATER]
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From apple!ganymede.apple.com!ray Tue Jun 22 00:13:07 1993
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Subject--AB1624 - newly amended text
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hello jim -
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i just got the new text for AB1624 from Mary today and typed it in.
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I posted it around (alt.etext, ca.politics, comp.society.cu-digest),
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but if you could put it on an ftp server i would be grateful.
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...
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AMENDED IN SENATE JUNE 17, 1993
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AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY MAY 18, 1993
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CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE--1993-94 REGULAR SESSION
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ASSEMBLY BILL No. 1624
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Introduced by Assembly Member Bowen
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Principal coauthor: Senator Torres)
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Coauthors: Assembly Members Areias, Bornstein,
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Goldsmith, Isenberg, Johnson, Karnette, Katz
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Mountjoy, Nolan, Polanco, Speier, and
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Vasconcellos
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Coauthors: Senators Dills, Hayden, Killea, Morgan, and
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Rosenthal
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March 4, 1993
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An act to add Section 10248 to the Government Code,
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relating to the Legislature;
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LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST
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AB 1624, as amended, Bowen. Legislature: legislative
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information: access by computer network.
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Under existing law, all meetings of a house of the Legislature
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or a committee thereof are required to be open and public, unless
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specifically exempted, and any meeting that is required to be open
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and public, including specified closed sessions, may be held only
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after full and timely notice to the public as provided by the
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Joint Rules of the Assembly and Senate.
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This bill would make legislative findings and declarations that
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the public should be informed to the fullest extent possible as to
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the time, place, and agenda for each meeting.
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This bill would require the Legislative Counsel, with the advice
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of the Joint Rules Committee of the Senate and Assembly, to make
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available to the public, by means of access by way of the largest
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nonproprietary, nonprofit cooperative public computer network,
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specified information concerning bills, the proceedings of the
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houses and committees of the Legislature, statutory enactments,
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and the California Constitution.
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Vote: 2/3 majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: yes.
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State-mandated local program: no.
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The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
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1 SECTION 1. Section 10248 is added to the
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2 Government Code, to read:
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3 10248. (a) The Legislature finds and declares that
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4 the public should be informed to the fullest extent
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5 possible as to the time, place, and agenda for each
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6 meeting of the houses and committees of the Legislature.
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7 The Legislature further finds and declares that it is
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8 desirable to make timely information regarding these
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9 proceedings available to each member of the public,
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10 irrespective of where he or she resides, for the least cost
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11 possible.
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12 (b) The Legislative Counsel shall, with the advice of
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13 the Joint Rules Committee, make all of the following
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14 information available to the public in electronic form:
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15 (1) The most recent Assembly Daily File and most
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16 recent Daily Senate File.
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17 (2) The text of each bill introduced in each current
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18 legislative session, including all amended forms of the
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19 bill.
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20 (3) The bill history of each bill introduced and
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21 amended in each current legislative session.
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22 (4) The bill status of each bill introduced and
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1 amended in each current legislative session.
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2 (5) All bill analyses prepared in connection with each
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3 bill in each current legislative session.
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4 (6) All vote information concerning each bill in each
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5 current legislative session.
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6 (7) Veto messages concerning each bill, when issued,
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7 in each current legislative session.
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8 (8) The California Codes.
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9 (9) The California Constitution.
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10 (10) All uncodified statutes enacted on or after
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11 January 1, 1993.
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35 (11) Documentation that is available to the public and
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36 maintained in computerized form by the Legislative
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37 Counsel which describes the computerized digital
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38 formats of the files containing the information specified
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39 in this subdivision.
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40 (c) The Legislative Counsel shall automatically
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1 transmit copies of files of the information specified in
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2 subdivision (b) by way of the largest nonproprietary,
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3 nonprofit cooperative public computer network upon
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4 receiving any computerized request for the files. These
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5 files shall be made available in this manner immediately
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6 after they are transmitted to the Office of State Printing.
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7 The files shall contain all of the text and formatting
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8 information transmitted to the Office of State Printing. In
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9 the event that a technical malfunction prevents these
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10 files from being transmitted immediately after they are
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11 transmitted to the Office of State Printing, the
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12 Legislative Counsel shall report that fact to the Joint
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13 Rules Committee within one business day.
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14 (d) Any file that is available pursuant to subdivision
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15 (c) shall remain available to the public upon request by
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16 electronic digital data transmission until it is updated.
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17 When a file is updated, a copy of the file without the
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18 updated information shall remain available to the public
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19 by electronic data digital transmission for at least 90 days
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20 after the update.
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21 (e) The Legislative Counsel may not control which or
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22 how many files are available to a person who requests the
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23 files nor monitor or keep any records about those persons
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24 who request files, except for the purpose of assuring the
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25 quality of computer operations. No fee or other charge
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26 shall be imposed as a condition to public access to any files
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27 that are made available to the public pursuant to this
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28 section.
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29 (f) No action taken pursuant to this section shall be
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30 deemed to alter or relinquish any copyright or other
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31 proprietary interest or entitlement of the State of
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32 California relating to any of the information made
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33 available pursuant to this section.
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=========
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Ray -
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------------------------------
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Date: Thu, 24 Jun 93 12:49:49 -0700
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From: Phil Karn <karn@UNIX.KA9Q.AMPR.ORG>
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||
Subject: File 4--Re: Full Disclosure TRIGGERFISH Hassle (CuD 5.46)
|
||
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||
In CU Digest 5.46:
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|> Harris Law Enforcement Products
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|>
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|> TRIGGERFISH has a number of cellular phone based applications:
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|> determining a suspects phone number, dialed number recorder, and
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|> wiretapping. According to Harris, 'for the first time, law
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|> enforcement is not at a disadvantage in tracking the high-tech
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|> criminal." Additionally, the unit 'collects and integrates all
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|> relevant data, including voice, directly from the ether."
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|> Reprinted from Full Disclosure, Box 903, Libertyville, Illinois 60048
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I find the phrase "directly from the ether" *most* illuminating given
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a rather heated exchange I had with Mr. Jim Kallstrom of the FBI at
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the recent CPSR Cryptography Conference in Washington DC earlier this
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month.
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Kallstrom is the FBI's chief public advocate for their "Digital
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Telephony Initiative". Among other things, they want the ability to
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intercept suspects' cellular telephone calls at the MTSO (switch).
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Only with a valid warrant, naturally.
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At the meeting, I made the following comments. I had seen the
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standards-setting process for the new digital cellular telephone
|
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systems from the inside as they related to security and privacy. And I
|
||
was wondering why the government (specifically NSA, through its export
|
||
control reviews) was so strongly opposed to meaningful air link
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encryption, even if the encryption were to stop at the switch as it
|
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would have to in order to be compatible with existing telephones on
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the land side of a cellular call. Such encryption would secure the air
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||
link, the most easily intercepted portion of a cellular telephone
|
||
call, while leaving the conversation in the clear at the MTSO where it
|
||
could be tapped, if necessary.
|
||
|
||
In a private conversation, one of the senior members of the committee
|
||
who didn't want his name mentioned told me why. "It's very simple", he
|
||
said. "Anybody can intercept the radio link. It's easy. But tapping a
|
||
call at the switch requires the cooperation of the telephone company,
|
||
and they generally require warrants. And law enforcement says that
|
||
sometimes, warrants are, well, just too damn inconvenient."
|
||
|
||
This really set Kallstrom off. He attacked my unwillingness to name my
|
||
source. I challenged him, unsuccessfully, to back up *his* shrill
|
||
claims for the absolute necessity of Digital Telephony with anything
|
||
more than handwaving. In a one-on-one conversation during a break, he
|
||
insisted to me that the FBI was never interested in intercepting the
|
||
air link portion of cellular calls - "too difficult, too
|
||
labor-intensive", he said. They only wanted the capability to tap in
|
||
at the switch, and he couldn't care less if the air link were securely
|
||
encrypted (though he still wanted the keys to be escrowed for some
|
||
reason...hmmm...)
|
||
|
||
Perhaps it was a desperate attempt to maintain this "we're not
|
||
interested in the air link" fiction that triggered Harris's silly
|
||
overreaction to the public mention of TRIGGERFISH.
|
||
|
||
Phil
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 93 08:45:52 EDT
|
||
From: morgan@ENGR.UKY.EDU(Wes Morgan)
|
||
Subject: File 5--Response to Interview with a Virus Writer (CuD 5.44)
|
||
|
||
Re: CuD 5.44 - Interview with a Virus Writer
|
||
|
||
>We're certainly interested in your reactions, pro and con. Did you get
|
||
>hit by a virus that was more than a minor inconvenience?
|
||
|
||
Yup; our students are hit by viruses on a regular basis. Just last
|
||
week, a student lost 3 months' work in a virus attack from a friend's
|
||
home system. Personally, I'm not hit that often; of course, I burn up
|
||
time scanning every time I boot my system, and I scan *every* floppy that
|
||
goes into my PC...not everyone has the time/resources to do that, and PC
|
||
networks (StarLAN, Novell, etc) make it extremely simple to spread viruses.
|
||
|
||
>GA: Do you want to mention that you are running a BBS (computer
|
||
>bulletin board)?
|
||
>
|
||
>UK: Yeah, sure. Call anytime. It exists for people to come and get the
|
||
>Crypt Newsletter if they are interested in finding it without going
|
||
>through the usual hassles of underground channels like the cool, elite
|
||
>bulletin board systems. The underground world has become very
|
||
>exclusive. In a sense it is cliquey..........
|
||
|
||
Gee, why isn't his newsletter distributed more widely? If it's all
|
||
so innocent, I should be able to subscribe via email, right? Are back
|
||
issues available via ftp? How about an email server?
|
||
|
||
>GA: Aren't they all written in programming languages?
|
||
>
|
||
>UK: Assembly mostly. By far most viruses are written in assembly
|
||
>language.
|
||
|
||
Did this strike anyone else as a rather silly question? Unless
|
||
someone's hacking with DEBUG, they *have* to write in a "program-
|
||
ming language"........
|
||
|
||
>GA: So how many viruses have you made and which ones are they?
|
||
>
|
||
>UK: I don't know all of them. Well, there was the Encroacher. That was
|
||
>in one of the Newsletters. That was a Mutation virus that attacks
|
||
>Central Point Software's anti-virus program. There might have been
|
||
>three variants to that.
|
||
|
||
This guy writes a virus that attacks a specific commercial product,
|
||
and he still has the chutzpah to claim innocence for viruses? Pfui.
|
||
|
||
>GA: What's so exciting about viruses and source codes?
|
||
>
|
||
>UK: [...]
|
||
>I don't think there's a
|
||
>lot of mystery associated with viruses. Viruses, in my opinion, are
|
||
>rather trivial programs that, once you're thoroughly cognizant of what
|
||
>a virus can and can't do, become more like a pest if you ever run into
|
||
>one.
|
||
|
||
Viruses are "trivial," but this fellow keeps cranking them out?
|
||
Sounds like doublespeak to me.....8)
|
||
|
||
>People think it's a major catastrophe when they are
|
||
>hit by a virus. I do not take seriously claims of people being set
|
||
>back for hours. If they are completely ignorant of a virus, yes. But
|
||
>someone in the department or in the household knows about viruses.
|
||
|
||
No, "someone in the department or in the household" does NOT necessarily
|
||
"know about viruses." College and universities are loaded with students
|
||
who, in many cases, never used a PC before their arrival.
|
||
|
||
>GA: That's becoming very interesting to me.
|
||
>
|
||
>UK: Politically incorrect terms. There's always been a great deal of
|
||
>controversy surrounding this. And so for this reason alone, viruses to
|
||
>me are interesting. For example, on Prodigy it is okay for dozens of
|
||
>people to advertise adult bulletin boards, with gigs of pornographic
|
||
>files available for download. These are not expunged from the Prodigy
|
||
>computer club as inappropriate. However, if anyone posted a note on
|
||
>Prodigy saying they want to find a virus, can someone help them locate
|
||
>a virus, that is immediately spiked. Why is that? I'm not sure. But
|
||
>it's interesting.
|
||
|
||
It sounds like this guy gets a charge out of being a gadfly.
|
||
|
||
>UK: Well, I enjoy publishing the Crypt Newsletter. [...]
|
||
>You want to see if you can top yourself and make it more interesting.
|
||
|
||
I believe that this is the crux of the matter. Most virus authors
|
||
seem to look at viruses as a competition. Just pick up a virus family
|
||
tree and check out the derivations; everyone's trying to top everyone
|
||
else, and none of them care about the damage/lost time they cause.
|
||
|
||
>UK: And, so, why is that interesting? Well, he explains why viruses
|
||
>are interesting for a number of reasons. Part of it because of the
|
||
>controversy that the concepts brings up. In a way, I think studying
|
||
>viruses gives you a good understanding of the computer on a really low
|
||
>level basis, and that's worthwhile. For some people that makes the
|
||
>computer much more enjoyable as they start to unlock some of its
|
||
>secrets or understand what is actually going on inside it a little
|
||
>better. Viruses are kind of an indirect way of getting at that
|
||
>information.
|
||
|
||
I'll be the first to agree that viruses are educational in some
|
||
respects; you can certainly pick up a lot of low-level information
|
||
during the programming cycle. My point is (and has always been) that
|
||
release of viruses into the world is completely unnecessary. If you
|
||
were really taking a scholastic bent, you'd never release a live
|
||
virus; you'd write one, test it, say "it works," put it in your logs,
|
||
and move on......
|
||
|
||
>UK: You don't need anti-virus software to get rid of something like
|
||
>Michelangelo or Stoned. You can do it with undocumented commands. If
|
||
>you've talked to someone who does know something about viruses, and
|
||
>you didn't have anti-virus software, you could use that and dispatch
|
||
>something like Michelangelo and Stoned rather quickly.
|
||
|
||
Yeah, we can really expect our secretaries, clerks, and data entry
|
||
operators to be conversant with all those undocumented commands and
|
||
virus scanners.
|
||
|
||
>GA: So you think the reports about problems in other countries are
|
||
>over exaggerated?
|
||
>
|
||
>UK: Well, there's an article which analyzes the media coverage of
|
||
>Michelangelo and I think that really puts it into perspective. It
|
||
>really shows the people that tried to actually come up with hard data
|
||
>after March 6. They just weren't able to come up with anything that I
|
||
>consider serious data.
|
||
|
||
The only reason that our labs weren't hit was that we went on a massive
|
||
eradication mission; we made scanning automatic, and we found several
|
||
hundred infections in the week prior to the target date.
|
||
|
||
>Actually, it is more annoying. It is a
|
||
>boot sector infector like Michelangelo but once you discover it, you
|
||
>usually don't have much time left before it activates. It has a very
|
||
>short activation period after it has been first placed on a disk and
|
||
>then it encrypts the information on a disk which essentially makes it
|
||
>useless to you. So he removed it, but it wasn't Michelangelo, he had a
|
||
>different virus. So where were all the Michelangelo infections? Were
|
||
>there any? I think it was vastly overstated.
|
||
|
||
Of course, this "different virus" doesn't really jibe with UK's earlier
|
||
comment of "I do not take seriously claims of people being set back for
|
||
hours."
|
||
|
||
>UK: No, I think colleges are still pretty vulnerable, don't you? They
|
||
>are always going to have computer labs, where people can bring stuff
|
||
>in indiscriminately. That really hasn't changed and maybe it has
|
||
>moved a little more to the individuals because computers have moved
|
||
>more into the homes of individuals.
|
||
|
||
This guy is talking through his hat. He follows comments about
|
||
the "trivial" nature of viruses with analyses of "vulnerability."
|
||
The comments that "only a few viruses are truly bad" are ludicrous.
|
||
This fellow sounds like every other virus author I've read; he
|
||
comes across with the attitude of "you should be watching out for
|
||
this stuff anyway; it doesn't matter what I do." This strikes me
|
||
as the height of irresponsibility (and immaturity).
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Thu, 24 Jun 93 03:37:40 -0400
|
||
From: ci330@CLEVELAND.FREENET.EDU(Jack McNeeley)
|
||
Subject: File 6--Virus Hits White House
|
||
|
||
((MODERATORS' NOTE: The following was excerpted from a longer
|
||
article from The Washington Post)).
|
||
|
||
The following article moved on the Washington Post news wire
|
||
March 13. I confess that I expected some other CuD reader to go to
|
||
the trouble of passing the thing along, with enough comment and
|
||
criticism to pass muster with the fair-use copyright gods, so I
|
||
neglected to toss the thing your way.
|
||
|
||
Since no one else has done so, and since the on-line shriek
|
||
community has inexplicably let George Bush's vandalism of the White
|
||
House computers pass virtually unnoticed, I must submit the following
|
||
for your perusal. Readers who want the complete article will have to
|
||
visit their local (paper) library, armed with a dime to plug into the
|
||
photocopying machine, so that the Post's copyright may be properly
|
||
violated. Those of you with a social conscience will send some spare
|
||
change to Katy Graham to buy a legal copy of the newspaper.
|
||
|
||
11th-Hour Covenant: Lost Memory Computers to Gain for Bush
|
||
By George Lardner Jr.
|
||
(c) 1993, The Washington Post
|
||
|
||
WASHINGTON -- When President Clinton's top aides moved
|
||
into the White House in January, many of them had trouble
|
||
getting their computers to work.
|
||
|
||
That's because during the night of Jan. 19 and into the
|
||
next morning -- President Bush's last hours in office --
|
||
officials wiped out the computerized memory of the White House
|
||
machines.
|
||
|
||
The hurried operation was made possible only by an
|
||
agreement signed close to midnight by the archivist of the
|
||
United States, Don W. Wilson. The ensuing controversy has
|
||
added to allegations that the archives, beset for years by
|
||
political pressures and slim resources, is prone to
|
||
mismanagement and ineptitude in its mission of preserving for
|
||
the public the nation's documentary history.
|
||
|
||
It also has raised strong doubts about the efficacy of a
|
||
15-year-old law that says a former president's records belong
|
||
to the people.
|
||
|
||
Just what information was purged remains unknown, but it
|
||
probably ranged from reports on the situation in
|
||
Bosnia-Herzegovina to details about Bush's Iran-Contra pardons
|
||
to evidence concerning the pre-election search of Clinton's
|
||
passport files. In the warrens of the secretive National
|
||
Security Council, only a month's worth of foreign cable
|
||
traffic was retained to help enlighten the incoming
|
||
administration.
|
||
|
||
[At this point we must pause for fair-use commentary: It's
|
||
obvious from merely the first five paragraphs of this article that a
|
||
crime of historic proportions has been committed. If some
|
||
cyber-rambling teenager had wiped the hard disks of the White House
|
||
computers, you can bet that legions of doomed SS agents would spare no
|
||
expense to run the scoundrel to ground. The article continues:]
|
||
|
||
Bush and his lawyers had wanted to leave no trace of the
|
||
electronic files, arguing they were part of an internal
|
||
communications system, not a records system. But court orders
|
||
issued a few days earlier required that the information be
|
||
preserved if removed from the White House.
|
||
|
||
So backup tapes were made of the data on mainframe
|
||
computers and carted off to the National Archives by a special
|
||
task force. Hard disk drives were plucked out of personal
|
||
computers and loosely stacked into boxes for the trip. Despite
|
||
such measures, there are indications some material may have
|
||
been lost.
|
||
|
||
[Indications? Tell me more, tell me more! As in "General
|
||
Failure Reading Drive C: (A)bort (R)etry (I)gnore"? Oh, I get it:
|
||
Somebody must have accidentally entered "wipefile *.*".
|
||
[The article continues:]
|
||
|
||
The transfer had been authorized by Wilson, who at 11:30
|
||
p.m. on Jan. 19 put his signature on what would prove to be a
|
||
highly controversial "memorandum of agreement.' It gave Bush
|
||
"exclusive legal control' over the computerized records of his
|
||
presidency as well as "all derivative information.'
|
||
|
||
Critics have denounced Wilson's agreement with Bush as a
|
||
clear violation of a post-Watergate law that made presidential
|
||
records public property. And they fear that the authority
|
||
granted Bush is far broader than officials so far have
|
||
acknowledged.
|
||
|
||
For their part, archives officials say they did the best
|
||
they could under difficult circumstances and contend they
|
||
deserve some credit for getting physical custody of the
|
||
electronic material. Chided days later about the broad scope
|
||
of the agreement in a meeting with outside historians, Wilson
|
||
protested that they just did not appreciate "the political
|
||
environment in which I was operating.'
|
||
|
||
On Feb. 12, Wilson compounded his difficulties by
|
||
announcing he was taking a $129,000-a-year job as executive
|
||
director of the George Bush Center for Presidential Studies at
|
||
Texas A&M University. The Justice Department has said it is
|
||
considering a criminal investigation of a possible conflict of
|
||
interest by Wilson.
|
||
|
||
[Now, that is rich. Not even in Texas could you get this kind of
|
||
nonsense past a grand jury.
|
||
|
||
[The article goes on to say that the archivist agreed with Bush's
|
||
claim that the electronic materials were not records but were internal
|
||
communications. However, the article says, a federal judge had
|
||
already rejected that claim.
|
||
|
||
[Specifically, the article says, U.S. District Judge Charles
|
||
Richey had ruled on Jan. 6, in a case brought at the end of the Reagan
|
||
administration, that information in the White House computer systems
|
||
not only "fit into an everyday understanding' of what a record is,
|
||
but also met the statutory definition in the Federal Records Act. The
|
||
article continues:]
|
||
|
||
Richey said he was worried that the [Bush] administration
|
||
was about to destroy information "of tremendous historical
|
||
value.' He also said that making paper copies of the
|
||
electronic data would not be sufficient, because the paper
|
||
copies would not necessarily show who had received the
|
||
information and when.
|
||
|
||
"The question of what government officials knew and when
|
||
they knew it has been a key question in not only the
|
||
Iran-Contra investigations, but also in the Watergate matter,"
|
||
Richey observed.
|
||
|
||
The judge ordered the defendants, including Wilson and the
|
||
Bush White House, not to delete or alter any of the electronic
|
||
records systems until archivists could preserve the material
|
||
protected by the Federal Records Act.
|
||
|
||
Richey's Jan. 6 order obliged the archives to make sure
|
||
that the "federal' or "agency' records on White House
|
||
computers were preserved, even though they might be commingled
|
||
with "presidential records.' Figuring out the difference is a
|
||
chore affecting primarily NSC computer files.
|
||
|
||
[At this point the article explains that a memo written by the
|
||
national security director to the president would be a presidential
|
||
record, and not disclosable, but that if the president signs it and
|
||
sends it to the Pentagon for implementation, then it is a federal
|
||
record and is disclosable.
|
||
[The article then says:]
|
||
|
||
According to records churned up by the lawsuit, Richey's
|
||
Jan. 6 order precipitated numerous meetings of archives
|
||
officials, often with Justice Department and White House
|
||
representatives. Government lawyers, meanwhile, went to
|
||
Richey to ask if they could make backups and purge the
|
||
computers before Clinton moved in.
|
||
|
||
Richey, uneasy about past foul-ups and what he called
|
||
"inconsistencies' in the backup taping plan, turned them down
|
||
on Jan. 14. But the Bush administration promptly appealed. The
|
||
next day, the U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington said backups
|
||
would be acceptable "so long as the information is preserved
|
||
in identical form' until the appeal could be decided on its
|
||
merits.
|
||
|
||
But the inventories given to the archives task force
|
||
were not complete. "Many dates are missing,' an after-action
|
||
archives memo said of the backup tapes, and more than 100
|
||
had no dates. It was impossible to tell how many erasures
|
||
might have been made after Richey's ruling. And according to
|
||
a certificate from the White House Communications Agency,
|
||
six tapes packed with NSC messages and memos were
|
||
"overwritten due to operator error.'
|
||
|
||
[Holy Ned! Does this sound familiar? Where is Rose Marie Woods
|
||
and her six-and-one-half-minute gap when we need her? The amount of
|
||
information we're talking about here is staggering. Six nine-track
|
||
tapes overwritten "due to operator error"? C'mon.]
|
||
|
||
In all, more than 5,000 tapes and hard disk drives were
|
||
delivered to the archives. Most had to be preserved because of
|
||
the lawsuit, but a number of hard drives were added at the
|
||
last minute because of a grand-jury subpoena related to the
|
||
pre-election search of Clinton's passport files. Once that
|
||
investigation is over, the grand-jury materials, under the
|
||
Bush-Wilson agreement, will become "the personal records of
|
||
George Bush.'
|
||
|
||
[How conveeenient!
|
||
|
||
[The next section of the story details Wilson's background as a
|
||
Reagan appointee and former director of the Gerald Ford Presidential
|
||
Library (beg your pardon?). It says that Wilson (shocking though it
|
||
may seem) declined to comment for this article. It then says,
|
||
however, that in a March 2 deposition, Wilson testified that he didn't
|
||
see the Bush agreement until the night of Jan. 19, was unfamiliar with
|
||
its terms, and signed it only "upon advice of counsel,' namely, one
|
||
Gary Brooks, the archives general counsel. That's some general
|
||
counsel, that Gary Brooks!
|
||
|
||
[The article continues:]
|
||
|
||
The Bush-Wilson agreement went far beyond the presidential
|
||
records law. It gave the ex-president exclusive legal control
|
||
of all "presidential information, and all derivative
|
||
information in whatever form' that was in the computers. And
|
||
it gave Bush the veto power in retirement to review all the
|
||
backup tapes and hard drives at the archives and make sure
|
||
that all the information he considers "presidential' is kept
|
||
secret. He can even order the archivist to destroy it.
|
||
|
||
"It's history repeating itself almost 20 years later,' one
|
||
official close to the case said, alluding to the September
|
||
1974 agreement that gave former President Nixon, who had just
|
||
been pardoned, ownership and control of his White House tape
|
||
recordings and papers and allowed him to destroy the tapes
|
||
over a five-year period. Congress quickly canceled that
|
||
agreement in a law that applies only to Nixon, but to this day
|
||
most of the 4,000 hours of Nixon's tapes remain tied up by the
|
||
maneuvering of Nixon and his lawyers.
|
||
|
||
[The article goes on at considerable length here, and it just
|
||
gets worse and worse. All I can say is, where is the attorney
|
||
general? Where is the FBI? Where is the freaking Secret Service and
|
||
their computer-crime goons? Conspicuously missing, that's where.
|
||
|
||
[The last paragraph of the story is worth reading:]
|
||
|
||
Skeptics are still wondering what's in the [Bush computer]
|
||
tapes. "There must be something important in them,'
|
||
[historian Page] Miller said. "You don't have agreements late
|
||
at night, just like that.'
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
End of Computer Underground Digest #5.47
|
||
************************************
|
||
|
||
|
||
|