1031 lines
59 KiB
Plaintext
1031 lines
59 KiB
Plaintext
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Computer underground Digest Sun June 13 1993 Volume 5 : Issue 43
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ISSN 1004-043X
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Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
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Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
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Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
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Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
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Ian Dickinson
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Copy Editor: Etaoin Shrdlu, Seniur
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CONTENTS, #5.43 (June 13 1993)
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File 1--Hacker testimony to House subcommittee largely unheard
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File 2--CPSR Clipper Testimony (6-9-93) in House Subcommittee
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|
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Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
|
||
available at no cost electronically from tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu. The
|
||
editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-6430), fax (815-753-6302)
|
||
or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL
|
||
60115.
|
||
|
||
Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest
|
||
news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of
|
||
LAWSIG, and DL0 and DL12 of TELECOM; on GEnie in the PF*NPC RT
|
||
libraries and in the VIRUS/SECURITY library; from America Online in
|
||
the PC Telecom forum under "computing newsletters;"
|
||
On Delphi in the General Discussion database of the Internet SIG;
|
||
on the PC-EXEC BBS at (414) 789-4210; and on: Rune Stone BBS (IIRG
|
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WHQ) 203-832-8441 NUP:Conspiracy
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CuD is also available via Fidonet File Request from 1:11/70; unlisted
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nodes and points welcome.
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EUROPE: from the ComNet in LUXEMBOURG BBS (++352) 466893;
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In ITALY: Bits against the Empire BBS: +39-461-980493
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ANONYMOUS FTP SITES:
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UNITED STATES: ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in /pub/cud
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uglymouse.css.itd.umich.edu (141.211.182.53) in /pub/CuD/cud
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EUROPE: nic.funet.fi in pub/doc/cud. (Finland)
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ftp.warwick.ac.uk in pub/cud (United Kingdom)
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
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diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted for non-profit as long
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relating to computer culture and communication. Articles are
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preferred to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts
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unless absolutely necessary.
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DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
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violate copyright protections.
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: Thu, 10 Jun 1993 16:53:48 -0700
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From: Emmanuel Goldstein <emmanuel@WELL.SF.CA.US>
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Subject: File 1--Hacker testimony to House subcommittee largely unheard
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What follows is a copy of my written testimony before the House
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Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance. The June 9th hearing
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was supposed to have been on the topic of network security, toll
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fraud, and the social implications of the rapidly emerging
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technologies. I was asked to speak for those who had no voice, which
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translates to hackers and consumers. Instead I found myself barraged
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with accusations from the two representatives in attendance (Rep. Ed
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Markey D-MA and Rep. Jack Fields R-TX) who considered 2600 Magazine
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(of which I'm the editor) nothing more than a manual for computer
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crime. One article in particular that Markey latched upon was one in
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our Spring issue that explained how a cable descrambler worked.
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According to Markey, there was no use for this information outside of
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a criminal context. Fields claimed we were printing cellular "codes"
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that allowed people to listen in on cellular calls. In actuality, we
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printed frequencies. The difference didn't seem to matter - after
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explaining it to him, he still said he was very disturbed by the fact
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that I was allowed to keep publishing. It soon became apparent to me
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that neither one had read my testimony as there seemed to be no
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inclination to discuss any of the issues I had brought up. In a way,
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it was very much like being on the Geraldo show. Somehow I thought
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elected representatives would be less sensationalist and more
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interested in learning but this was not the case here. We got
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absolutely nowhere. Markey in particular was rude, patronizing, and
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not at all interested in entertaining any thought outside his narrow
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perception. It's too bad this opportunity was lost. There is a real
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danger in elected officials who don't listen to all relevant opinions
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and who persist in sticking to old-fashioned, outdated notions that
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just don't apply to high technology. You can look forward to more
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restrictive regulations and higher penalties for violating them if
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this mentality continues to dominate.
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+++++++++++++++++++
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WRITTEN TESTIMONY FOLLOWS:
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Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for the
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opportunity to speak on the issue of the rapid growth and changes in
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the telecommunications industry.
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My name is Emmanuel Goldstein and I am the publisher of 2600
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Magazine, which is a journal for computer hackers as well as anyone
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else who happens to be interested in the direction that technology is
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taking us. We tend to be brutally honest in our assessments and, as a
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result, we do get some corporations quite angry at us. But we've also
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managed to educate a large number of people as to how their telephone
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system works, what kinds of computers may be watching them, and how
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they can shape technology to meet their needs, rather than be forced
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to tailor their existence to meet technology's needs.
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I am also the host of a weekly radio program called Off The Hook
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which airs over WBAI in New York. Through that forum we have
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discovered the eagerness and curiosity that many "ordinary people on
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the street" possess for technology. At the same time we have seen
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fears and suspicions expressed that would be unwise to ignore.
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HOW TO HANDLE RAPIDLY CHANGING TECHNOLOGY
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The next few years will almost certainly go down in history as
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those in which the most change took place in the least amount of time.
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The computer and telecommunications revolution that we are now in the
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midst of is moving full speed ahead into unknown territory. The
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potential for amazing advances in individual thought and creativity is
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very real. But so is the potential for oppression and mistrust the
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likes of which we have never before seen. One way or the other, we
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will be making history.
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I think we can imagine it best if we think of ourselves speeding
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down a potentially dangerous highway. Perhaps the road will become
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slick with ice or fraught with sharp curves. It's a road that nobody
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has gone down before. And the question we have to ask ourselves is
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what kind of a vehicle would we prefer to be in if things should start
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getting out of control: our own automobile where we would have at
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least some chance of controlling the vehicle and bringing it down to a
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safe speed or a bus where we, along with many others, must put all of
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our trust behind a total stranger to prevent a disaster. The answer is
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obviously different depending on the circumstances. There are those of
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us who do not want the responsibility of driving and others who have
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proven themselves unworthy of it. What's important is that we all have
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the opportunity at some point to choose which way we want to go.
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Rapidly changing technology can also be very dangerous if we
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don't look where we're going or if too many of us close our eyes and
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let someone else do the driving. This is a ride we all must stay awake
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for.
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I am not saying we should be overly suspicious of every form of
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technology. I believe we are on the verge of something very positive.
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But the members of this committee should be aware of the dangers of an
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uninformed populace. These dangers will manifest themselves in the
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form of suspicion towards authority, overall fear of technology, and
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an unhealthy feeling of helplessness.
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HOW NEW TECHNOLOGY CAN HURT US
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The recent FBI proposal to have wiretap capabilities built into
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digital telephone systems got most of its publicity because American
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taxpayers were expected to foot the bill. But to many of the
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non-technical people I talked to, it was just another example of Big
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Brother edging one step closer. It is commonly believed that the
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National Security Agency monitors all traffic on the Internet, not to
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mention all international telephone calls. Between Caller ID, TRW
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credit reports, video cameras, room monitors, and computer
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categorizations of our personalities, the average American feels as if
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life no longer has many private moments. Our Social Security numbers,
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which once were for Social Security, are now used for everything from
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video rentals to driver's licenses. These numbers can easily be used
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to track a person's location, expenses, and habits - all without any
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consent. If you know a person's name, you can get their telephone
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number. If you have their phone number, you can get their address.
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Getting their Social Security number is not even a challenge anymore.
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With this information, you can not only get every bit of information
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about this person that exists on any computer from Blockbuster Video
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to the local library to the phone company to the FBI, but you can
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begin to do things in this poor person's name. It's possible we may
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want a society like this, where we will be accountable for our every
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movement and where only criminals will pursue privacy. The American
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public needs to be asked. But first, they need to understand.
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In Germany, there is a fairly new computerized system of identity
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cards. Every citizen must carry one of these cards. The information
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includes their name, address, date of birth, and nationality - in
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other words, the country they were originally born in. Such a system
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of national identity can be quite useful, but in the wrong hands it
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can be extremely scary. For example, if a neo-Nazi group were to
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somehow get their hands on the database, they could instantly find out
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where everyone of Turkish nationality lived. A malevolent government
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could do the same and, since not carrying the card would be a crime,
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it would be very hard to avoid its wrath.
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Before introducing a new technology that is all-encompassing, all
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of its potential side-effects and disadvantages should be discussed
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and addressed. Opportunities must exist for everyone to ask questions.
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In our own country, nobody was ever asked if they wanted a credit file
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opened on them, if they wanted to have their phone numbers given to
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the people and companies they called through the use of Caller ID and
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ANI, or if they wanted to be categorized in any manner on numerous
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lists and databases. Yet all of this has now become standard practice.
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This implementation of new rules has resulted in a degree of
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cynicism in many of us, as well as a sense of foreboding and dread. We
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all know that these new inventions will be abused and used to
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somebody's advantage at some point. There are those who would have us
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believe that the only people capable of such misdeeds are computer
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hackers and their ilk. But it just isn't that simple.
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UNDERSTANDING COMPUTER HACKERS
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To understand computer hackers, it helps to think of an alien
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culture. We have such cultures constantly around us - those with
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teenage children ought to know what this means. There are alien
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cultures of unlimited varieties throughout the globe, sometimes in the
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most unexpected places. I'm convinced that this is a good thing.
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Unfortunately, all too often our default setting on whatever it is we
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don't understand is "bad". Suspicion and hostility follow and are soon
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met with similar feelings from the other side. This has been going on
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between and within our cultures for as long as we've existed. While we
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||
can't stop it entirely, we can learn to recognize the danger signs.
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The best way that I've found to deal with an alien culture, whether
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it's in a foreign country or right here at home, is to try and
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appreciate it while giving it a little leeway. There is not a single
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alien culture I've encountered that has not been decidedly friendly.
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That includes deadheads, skateboarders, Rastafarians, and hackers.
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When we talk about computer hackers, different images spring to
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mind. Most of these images have come about because of perceptions
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voiced by the media. Too often, as I'm sure the members of this
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committee already suspect, the media just doesn't get it. This is not
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||
necessarily due to malice on their part but rather a general lack of
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understanding and an overwhelming pressure to produce a good story.
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Hence we get an abundance of sensationalism and, when the dust clears,
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hackers are being compared with bank robbers, mobsters, terrorists,
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and the like. It's gotten to the point that the word hacker is almost
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analogous to the word criminal.
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Fortunately, the media is learning. Reporters now approach
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hackers with a degree of technological savvy. For the most part, they
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have stopped asking us to commit crimes so they can write a story
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about it. As the technology envelops us, journalists are developing
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the same appreciation and curiosity for it that hackers have always
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had. Any good reporter is at least part hacker because what a hacker
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does primarily is relentlessly pursue an answer. Computers naturally
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lend themselves to this sort of pursuit, since they tend to be very
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patient when asked a lot of questions.
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WHAT CONSTITUTES A HI-TECH CRIME?
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So where is the boundary between the hacker world and the
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criminal world? To me, it has always been in the same place. We know
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that it's wrong to steal tangible objects. We know that it's wrong to
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vandalize. We know that it's wrong to invade somebody's privacy. Not
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one of these elements is part of the hacker world.
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A hacker can certainly turn into a criminal and take advantage of
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the weaknesses in our telephone and computer systems. But this is
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rare. What is more likely is that a hacker will share knowledge with
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people, one of whom will decide to use that knowledge for criminal
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purposes. This does not make the hacker a criminal for figuring it
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out. And it certainly doesn't make the criminal into a hacker.
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It is easy to see this when we are talking about crimes that we
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understand as crimes. But then there are the more nebulous crimes; the
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ones where we have to ask ourselves: "Is this really a crime?" Copying
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software is one example. We all know that copying a computer program
|
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and then selling it is a crime. It's stealing, plain and simple. But
|
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copying a program from a friend to try it out on your home computer --
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is this the same kind of crime? It seems obvious to me that it is not,
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the reason being that you must make a leap of logic to turn such an
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action into a crime. Imagine if we were to charge a licensing fee
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every time somebody browsed through a magazine at the local bookshop,
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every time material was borrowed from a library, or every time a phone
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number was jotted down from the yellow pages. Yet, organizations like
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the Software Publishers Association have gone on record as saying that
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it is illegal to use the same computer program on more than one
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computer in your house. They claim that you must purchase it again or
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face the threat of federal marshalls kicking in your door. That is a
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leap of logic.
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It is a leap of logic to assume that because a word processor
|
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costs $500, a college student will not try to make a free copy in
|
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order to write and become a little more computer literate. Do we
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punish this student for breaking a rule? Do we charge him with
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stealing $500? To the hacker culture on whose behalf I am speaking
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today, the only sensible answer is to make it as easy as possible for
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that college student to use the software he needs. And while we're at
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it, we should be happy that he's interested in the first place.
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Of course, this represents a fundamental change in our society's
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outlook. Technology as a way of life, not just another way to make
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money. After all, we encourage people to read books even if they can't
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pay for them because to our society literacy is a very important goal.
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I believe technological literacy is becoming increasingly important.
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But you cannot have literacy of any kind without having access.
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If we continue to make access to technology difficult,
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bureaucratic, and illogical, then there will also be more computer
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crime. The reason being that if you treat someone like a criminal,
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they will begin to act like one. If we succeed in convincing people
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that copying a file is the same as physically stealing something, we
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can hardly be surprised when the broad-based definition results in
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more overall crime. Blurring the distinction between a virtual
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infraction and a real-life crime is a mistake.
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LEGISLATION FOR COMPUTER AGE CRIME
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New laws are not needed because there is not a single crime that
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can be committed with a computer that is not already defined as a
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crime without a computer. But let us not be loose with that
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definition. Is mere unauthorized access to a computer worthy of
|
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federal indictments, lengthy court battles, confiscation of equipment,
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huge fines, and years of prison time? Or is it closer to a case of
|
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trespassing, which in the real world is usually punished by a simple
|
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warning? "Of course not," some will say, "since accessing a computer
|
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is far more sensitive than walking into an unlocked office building."
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If that is the case, why is it still so easy to do? If it's possible
|
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for somebody to easily gain unauthorized access to a computer that has
|
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information about me, I would like to know about it. But somehow I
|
||
don't think the company or agency running the system would tell me
|
||
that they have gaping security holes. Hackers, on the other hand, are
|
||
very open about what they discover which is why large corporations
|
||
hate them so much. Through legislation, we can turn what the hackers
|
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do into a crime and there just might be a slim chance that we can stop
|
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them. But that won't fix poorly designed systems whose very existence
|
||
is a violation of our privacy.
|
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THE DANGERS OF UNINFORMED CONSUMERS
|
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The concept of privacy is something that is very important to a
|
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hacker. This is so because hackers know how fragile privacy is in
|
||
today's world. Wherever possible we encourage people to protect their
|
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directories, encrypt their electronic mail, not use cellular phones,
|
||
and whatever else it takes to keep their lives to themselves. In 1984
|
||
hackers were instrumental in showing the world how TRW kept credit
|
||
files on millions of Americans. Most people had never even heard of a
|
||
credit file until this happened. Passwords were very poorly guarded -
|
||
in fact, credit reports had the password printed on the credit report
|
||
itself. More recently, hackers found that MCI's Friends and Family
|
||
program allowed anybody to call an 800 number and find out the numbers
|
||
of everyone in a customer's "calling circle". As a bonus, you could
|
||
also find out how these numbers were related to the customer: friend,
|
||
brother, daughter-in-law, business partner, etc. Many times these
|
||
numbers were unlisted yet all that was needed to "verify" the
|
||
customer's identity was the correct zip code. In both the TRW and MCI
|
||
cases, hackers were ironically accused of being the ones to invade
|
||
privacy. What they really did was help to educate the American
|
||
consumer.
|
||
|
||
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the telephone industry.
|
||
Throughout the country, telephone companies take advantage of
|
||
consumers. They do this primarily because the consumer does not
|
||
understand the technology. When we don't understand something
|
||
complicated, we tend to believe those who do understand. The same is
|
||
true for auto mechanics, plumbers, doctors, and lawyers. They all
|
||
speak some strange language that the majority of us will never
|
||
understand. So we tend to believe them. The difference with the phone
|
||
companies, and here I am referring to the local companies, is that you
|
||
cannot deal with somebody else if you happen to disagree with them or
|
||
find them untrustworthy. The phone companies have us in a situation
|
||
where we must believe what they say. If we don't believe them, we
|
||
cannot go elsewhere.
|
||
|
||
This is the frustration that the hacker community constantly
|
||
faces. We face it especially because we are able to understand when
|
||
the local phone companies take advantage of consumers. Here are a few
|
||
examples:
|
||
|
||
Charging a fee for touch tone service. This is a misnomer. It
|
||
actually takes extra effort to tell the computer to ignore the tones
|
||
that you produce. Everybody already has touch tone capability but we
|
||
are forced to pay the phone company not to block it. While $1.50 a
|
||
month may not seem like much, when added together the local companies
|
||
that still engage in this practice are making millions of dollars a
|
||
year for absolutely nothing. Why do they get away with it? Because too
|
||
many of us don't understand how the phone system works. I try to draw
|
||
an analogy in this particular case - imagine if the phone company
|
||
decided that a fee would be charged to those customers who wanted to
|
||
use the number five when dialing. They could argue that the five takes
|
||
more energy than the four but most of us would see through this flimsy
|
||
logic. We must seek out other such dubious practices and not blindly
|
||
accept what we are told.
|
||
|
||
Other examples abound: being charged extra not to have your name
|
||
listed in the telephone directory, a monthly maintenance charge if you
|
||
select your own telephone number, the fact that calling information to
|
||
get a number now costs more than calling the number itself.
|
||
|
||
More recently, we have become acquainted with a new standard
|
||
called Signalling System Seven or SS7. Through this system it is
|
||
possible for telephones to have all kinds of new features: Caller ID,
|
||
Return Call, Repeat Calling to get through a busy signal, and more.
|
||
But again, we are having the wool pulled over our eyes. For instance,
|
||
if you take advantage of Call Return in New York (which will call the
|
||
last person who dialed your number), you are charged 75 cents on top
|
||
of the cost of the call itself. Obviously, there is a cost involved
|
||
when new technologies are introduced. But there is no additional
|
||
equipment, manpower, or time consumed when you dial *69 to return a
|
||
call. It's a permanent part of the system. As a comparison, we could
|
||
say that it also costs money to install a hold button. Imagine how we
|
||
would feel if we were charged a fee every time we used it.
|
||
|
||
The local companies are not the only offenders but it is
|
||
particularly bad in their case because, for the vast majority of
|
||
Americans, there is no competition on this level. The same complaints
|
||
are being voiced concerning cable television companies.
|
||
|
||
Long distance telephone companies are also guilty. AT&T, MCI, and
|
||
Sprint all encourage the use of calling cards. Yet each imposes a
|
||
formidable surcharge each and every time they're used. AT&T, for
|
||
example, charges 13 cents for the first minute of a nighttime call
|
||
from Washington DC to New York plus an 80 cent surcharge. Since a
|
||
calling card can only be used to make telephone calls, why are
|
||
consumers expected to pay an extra fee as if they were doing something
|
||
above and beyond the normal capability of the card? Again, there is no
|
||
extra work necessary to complete a calling card call - at least not on
|
||
the phone company's part. The consumer, on the other hand, must enter
|
||
up to 25 additional digits. But billing is accomplished merely by
|
||
computers sending data to each other. Gone are the days of tickets
|
||
being written up by hand and verified by human beings. Everything is
|
||
accomplished quickly, efficiently, and cheaply by computer. Therefore,
|
||
these extra charges are outdated.
|
||
|
||
SOCIAL INJUSTICES OF TECHNOLOGY
|
||
|
||
The way in which we have allowed public telephones to be operated
|
||
is particularly unfair to those who are economically disadvantaged. A
|
||
one minute call to Washington DC can cost as little as 12 cents from
|
||
the comfort of your own home. However, if you don't happen to have a
|
||
phone, or if you don't happen to have a home, that same one minute
|
||
call will cost you $2.20. That figure is the cheapest rate there is
|
||
from a Bell operated payphone. With whatever kind of logic was used to
|
||
set these prices, the results are clear. We have made it harder and
|
||
more expensive for the poor among us to gain access to the telephone
|
||
network. Surely this is not something we can be proud of.
|
||
|
||
A direct result of this inequity is the prevalence of red boxes.
|
||
Red boxes are nothing more than tone generators that transmit a quick
|
||
burst of five tones which convince the central office that a quarter
|
||
has been deposited. It's very easy and almost totally undetectable.
|
||
It's also been going on for decades. Neither the local nor long
|
||
distance companies have expended much effort towards stopping red
|
||
boxes, which gives the impression that the payphone profits are still
|
||
lucrative, even with this abuse. But even more troubling is the
|
||
message this is sending. Think of it. For a poor and homeless person
|
||
to gain access to something that would cost the rest of us 12 cents,
|
||
they must commit a crime and steal $2.20. This is not equal access.
|
||
|
||
CORPORATE RULES
|
||
|
||
Hackers and phone phreaks, as some of us are called, are very
|
||
aware of these facts. We learn by asking lots of questions. We learn
|
||
by going to libraries and doing research. We learn by diving into
|
||
phone company trash dumpsters, reading discarded material, and doing
|
||
more research. But who will listen to people like us who have been
|
||
frequently characterized as criminals? I am particularly grateful that
|
||
this committee has chosen to hear us. What is very important to us is
|
||
open communications. Freedom of information. An educated public.
|
||
|
||
This puts us at direct odds with many organizations, who believe
|
||
that everything they do is "proprietary" and that the public has no
|
||
right to know how the public networks work. In July of 1992 we were
|
||
threatened with legal action by Bellcore (the research arm of the
|
||
Regional Bell Operating Companies) for revealing security weaknesses
|
||
inherent in Busy Line Verification (BLV) trunks. The information had
|
||
been leaked to us and we did not feel compelled to join Bellcore's
|
||
conspiracy of silence. In April of this year, we were threatened with
|
||
legal action by AT&T for printing proprietary information of theirs.
|
||
The information in question was a partial list of the addresses of
|
||
AT&T offices. It's very hard for us to imagine how such information
|
||
could be considered secret. But these actions are not surprising. They
|
||
only serve to illustrate the wide disparities between the corporate
|
||
mindset and that of the individual. It is essential that the hundreds
|
||
of millions of Americans who will be affected by today's
|
||
all-encompassing inventions not be forced to play by corporate rules.
|
||
|
||
In 1990 a magazine similar to 2600 was closed down by the United
|
||
States government because Bell South said they printed proprietary
|
||
information. Most people never found out about this because Phrack
|
||
Magazine was electronic, i.e., only available on computer bulletin
|
||
boards and networks. This in itself is wrong; a publication must have
|
||
the same First Amendment rights regardless of whether it is printed
|
||
electronically or on paper. As more online journals appear, this basic
|
||
tenet will become increasingly critical to our nation's future as a
|
||
democracy. Apart from this matter, we must look at what Bell South
|
||
claimed - that a document discussing the Enhanced 911 system which was
|
||
worth $79,449 had been "stolen" and printed by Phrack. (Some newspaper
|
||
accounts even managed to change it into an E911 program which gave the
|
||
appearance that hackers were actually interfering with the operation
|
||
of an E911 system and putting lives at risk. In reality there has
|
||
never been a report of a hacker gaining access to such a system.) It
|
||
was not until after the publisher of Phrack was forced to go to trial
|
||
that the real value of the document was revealed. Anyone could get a
|
||
copy for around $14. The government promptly dropped its case against
|
||
the publisher who, to this day, is still paying back $100,000 in legal
|
||
fees. As further evidence of the inquity between individual justice
|
||
and corporate justice, Bell South was never charged with fraud for its
|
||
claim that a $14 document was worth nearly $80,000. Their logic, as
|
||
explained in a memo to then Assistant U.S. Attorney Bill Cook, was
|
||
that the full salaries of everyone who helped write the document, as
|
||
well as the full cost of all hardware and software used in the
|
||
endeavor ($31,000 for a Vaxstation II, $6,000 for a printer), was
|
||
perfectly acceptable. It is very disturbing that the United States
|
||
government agreed with this assessment and moved to put a pre-law
|
||
student behind bars for violating corporate rules.
|
||
|
||
MISGUIDED AUTHORITY
|
||
|
||
I wish I could stand before this committee and say that we have
|
||
been successful in stopping all such miscarriages of justice. While
|
||
the Phrack case may have been the most bizarre, there are many more
|
||
instances of individuals being victimized in similar manners. A
|
||
teenager in Chicago was jailed for a year for copying a file that was
|
||
worth millions, according to AT&T, but was utterly worthless and
|
||
unusable to a kid. A bulletin board operator in California, along with
|
||
his entire family, was held at gunpoint for hours while authorities
|
||
seized his equipment in an unsuccessful attempt to find child
|
||
pornography. Three hackers in Atlanta, after being imprisoned up to a
|
||
year for dialing into a Bell South computer system that had no
|
||
password, were forced to pay $233,000 in restitution so the company
|
||
could install a password system. More recently, a student at the
|
||
University of Texas at Houston was suspended from school for a year
|
||
because he accessed a file that merely listed the users of the system
|
||
(a file which the system allows all users to access). In increasing
|
||
numbers, young people are being sent to jail, not necessarily for
|
||
something they did, but rather for something they could have done in a
|
||
worst-case scenario. Again this indicates fear and misunderstanding of
|
||
technology and its applications. But this time those feelings emanate
|
||
from those in authority.
|
||
|
||
Locally, an ominous happening occurred at a 2600 monthly meeting
|
||
last November. (These meetings occur in public areas in cities
|
||
throughout the nation on the first Friday of every month.) Shortly
|
||
after it began, the Washington meeting was broken up by Pentagon City
|
||
Mall security guards. Without any provocation, people were forced to
|
||
submit to searches and everybody's name was taken down. One of the
|
||
attendees who was writing down an officer's name had the paper ripped
|
||
from his hand, another had his film taken from his camera as he tried
|
||
to document what was going on. Upon questioning by a reporter from
|
||
Communications Daily, the mall security chief claimed that he was
|
||
acting under orders from the United States Secret Service. Subsequent
|
||
Freedom of Information Act requests by Computer Professionals for
|
||
Social Responsibility have yielded more evidence implicating the
|
||
Secret Service in this illegal and unwarranted action. Nothing of a
|
||
criminal nature was ever found in any of the bags that were searched.
|
||
But a full list of the attendees wound up in the possession of the
|
||
Secret Service. It seems ironic that while hackers are conducting an
|
||
open gathering in the middle of a shopping mall in order to share
|
||
knowledge and welcome new people, agents of the Secret Service are
|
||
lurking in the shadows trying to figure out ways to stop them.
|
||
|
||
How can we move forward and talk about exciting new applications
|
||
of technology when we're off to such a bad start? The people that are
|
||
being arrested, harassed, and intimidated are the people who will be
|
||
designing and running these new systems. They are the ones who will
|
||
appreciate their capabilities and understand their weaknesses. Through
|
||
our short-sightedness and eagerness to listen to the loudest voices,
|
||
we are alienating the promises of the future. How many here, who grew
|
||
up in decades past, remember hearing teenagers talk of how the
|
||
government is after them, watching their every move, listening to
|
||
their phone calls, doing everything one might expect in a totalitarian
|
||
regime. Such feelings are the sure sign of an ailing society. It does
|
||
not matter if these things are not actually occurring - their mere
|
||
perception is enough to cause lasting harm and mistrust.
|
||
|
||
PROMISE OF THE INTERNET
|
||
|
||
The future holds such enormous potential. It is vital that we not
|
||
succumb to our fears and allow our democratic ideals and privacy
|
||
values to be shattered. In many ways, the world of cyberspace is more
|
||
real than the real world itself. I say this because it is only within
|
||
the virtual world that people are really free to be themselves - to
|
||
speak without fear of reprisal, to be anonymous if they so choose, to
|
||
participate in a dialogue where one is judged by the merits of their
|
||
words, not the color of their skin or the timbre of their voice.
|
||
Contrast this to our existing "real" world where we often have people
|
||
sized up before they even utter a word. The Internet has evolved, on
|
||
its own volition, to become a true bastion of worldwide democracy. It
|
||
is the obligation of this committee, and of governments throughout the
|
||
world, not to stand in its way.
|
||
|
||
This does not mean we should stand back and do nothing. Quite
|
||
the contrary, there is much we have to do if accessibility and
|
||
equality are our goals. Over-regulation and commercialization are two
|
||
ways to quickly kill these goals. A way to realize them is to have a
|
||
network access point in every house. Currently, network access is
|
||
restricted to students or professors at participating schools,
|
||
scientists, commercial establishments, and those who have access to,
|
||
and can afford, local services that link into the Internet. Yes, a lot
|
||
of people have access today. But a far greater number do not and it
|
||
is to these people that we must speak. The bigger the Internet gets,
|
||
the better it gets. As it exists today, cultures from around the globe
|
||
are represented; information of all kinds is exchanged. People are
|
||
writing, reading, thinking. It's potentially the greatest educational
|
||
tool we have. Therefore, it is essential that we not allow it to
|
||
become a commodity that only certain people in society will be able to
|
||
afford. With today's technology, we face the danger of widening the
|
||
gap between the haves and the have-nots to a monumental level. Or we
|
||
can open the door and discover that people really do have a lot to
|
||
learn from each other, given the opportunity.
|
||
|
||
It is my hope that this committee will recognize the importance
|
||
of dialogue with the American public, in order to answer the questions
|
||
so many are asking and to address the concerns that have been
|
||
overlooked. I thank you for this opportunity to express those issues
|
||
that I feel relevant to this hearing.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Sat, 12 Jun 1993 12:30:38 EST
|
||
From: Dave Banisar <banisar@WASHOFC.CPSR.ORG>
|
||
Subject: File 2--CPSR Clipper Testimony (6-9-93) in House Subcommittee
|
||
|
||
CPSR Clipper Testimony 6/9
|
||
|
||
On June 9, 1993, Congressman Edward Markey, Chairman of the
|
||
House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance held an
|
||
oversight hearing on Rencryption and telecommunications network
|
||
security. Panelists were Whitfield Diffie of Sun Microsystems, Dr.
|
||
Dorothy Denning, Steven Bryen of Secure Communications, Marc
|
||
Rotenberg of the CPSR Washington Office and E.R. Kerkeslager of AT&T.
|
||
|
||
Congressman Markey, after hearing the testimony presented,
|
||
noted that the Clipper proposal had raised an arched eyebrow among
|
||
the whole committeeS and that the committee viewed the proposal
|
||
skeptically. This statement was the latest indication that the Clipper
|
||
proposal has not been well received by policy makers. Last Friday,
|
||
the Computer Systems Security and Privacy Advisory Board of NIST
|
||
issued two resolutions critical of the encryption plan, suggesting
|
||
that further study was required and that implementation of the plan
|
||
should be delayed until the review is completed.
|
||
|
||
At the Third CPSR Cryptography and Privacy Conference on
|
||
Monday, June 7, the Acting Director of NIST, Raymond Kammer, announced
|
||
that the implementation of the proposal will be delayed and that a
|
||
more comprehensive review will be undertaken. The review is due in
|
||
the fall. Kammer told the Washington Post that Rmaybe we wonUt
|
||
continue in the direction we started ous.
|
||
|
||
+-------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Prepared Testimony
|
||
and
|
||
Statement for the Record
|
||
of
|
||
Marc Rotenberg, director
|
||
CPSR Washington Office
|
||
on
|
||
Encryption Technology and Policy
|
||
Before
|
||
The Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance.
|
||
Committee on Energy and Commerce
|
||
|
||
U.S. House of Representatives
|
||
June 9, 1993
|
||
|
||
SUMMARY
|
||
|
||
The cryptography issue is of particular concern to CPSR.
|
||
During the past several years CPSR has pursued an extensive study of
|
||
cryptography policy in the United States. CPSR has organized public
|
||
conferences, conducted litigation under the Freedom of Information Act,
|
||
and has emphasized the importance of cryptography for privacy
|
||
protection and the need to scrutinize carefully government proposals
|
||
designed to limit the use of this technology.
|
||
To evaluate the Clipper proposal it is necessary to look at a
|
||
1987 law, the Computer Security Act, which made clear that in the area
|
||
of unclassified computing systems, the National Institute of Standards
|
||
and Technology (NIST) and not the National Security Agency (NSA), would
|
||
be responsible for the development of technical standards. The Act
|
||
emphasized public accountability and stressed open decision-making.
|
||
In the spirit of the Act, in 1989 NIST set out to develop a
|
||
public key cryptography standard. According to documents obtained by
|
||
CPSR through the Freedom of Information Act, NIST recommended that the
|
||
algorithm be "public, unclassified, implementable in both hardware or
|
||
software, usable by federal Agencies and U.S. based multi-national
|
||
corporation." However, the Clipper proposal and the full-blown Capstone
|
||
configuration that resulted is very different: the Clipper algorithm,
|
||
Skipjack, is classified; public access to the reasons underlying the
|
||
proposal is restricted; Skipjack can be implemented only in
|
||
tamper-proof hardware; it is unlikely to be used by multi-national
|
||
corporations, and the security of Clipper remains unproven.
|
||
The Clipper proposal undermines the central purpose of the
|
||
Computer Security Act. Although intended for broad use in commercial
|
||
networks, it was not developed at the request of either U.S. business
|
||
or the general public. It does not reflect public goals.
|
||
The premise of the Clipper key escrow arrangement is that the
|
||
government must have the ability to intercept electronic
|
||
communications. However, there is no legal basis to support this
|
||
premise. In law there is nothing inherently illegal or suspect about
|
||
the use of a telephone. The federal wiretap statute says only that
|
||
communication service providers must assist law enforcement execute a
|
||
lawful warrant.
|
||
CPSR supports the review of cryptography policy currently
|
||
underway at the Department of Commerce. CPSR also supports the efforts
|
||
undertaken by the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance to
|
||
study the full ramifications of the Clipper proposal. However, we are
|
||
not pleased about the review now being undertaken at the White House.
|
||
That effort has led to a series of secret meetings, has asked that
|
||
scientists sign non-disclosure agreements and accept restrictions on
|
||
publication, and has attempted to resolve public concerns through
|
||
private channels. This is not a good process for the evaluation of a
|
||
technology that is proposed for the public switched network.
|
||
Even if the issues regarding Clipper are resolved favorably,
|
||
privacy concerns will not go away. Rules still need to be developed
|
||
about the collection and use of transactional data generated by
|
||
computer communications. Several specific steps should be taken.
|
||
First, the FCC should be given a broad mandate to pursue privacy
|
||
concerns. Second, current gaps in the communications law should be
|
||
filled. The protection of transactional records is particularly
|
||
important. Third, telecommunications companies should be encouraged to
|
||
explore innovative ways to protect privacy. "Telephone cards", widely
|
||
available in other countries, are an ideal way to protect privacy.
|
||
|
||
|
||
TESTIMONY
|
||
|
||
Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
|
||
opportunity to testify today on encryption policy and the Clipper
|
||
proposal. I especially wish to thank you Congressman Markey, on behalf
|
||
of CPSR, for your ongoing efforts on the privacy front as well as your
|
||
work to promote public access to electronic information.
|
||
The cryptography issue is of particular concern to CPSR.
|
||
During the past several years we have pursued an extensive study of
|
||
cryptography policy in the United States. We have organized several
|
||
public conferences, conducted litigation under the Freedom of
|
||
Information Act, and appeared on a number of panels to discuss the
|
||
importance of cryptography for privacy protection and the need to
|
||
scrutinize carefully government proposals designed to limit the use of
|
||
this technology.
|
||
While we do not represent any particular computer company or
|
||
trade association we do speak for a great many people in the computer
|
||
profession who value privacy and are concerned about the government's
|
||
Clipper initiative.
|
||
Today I will briefly summarize our assessment of the Clipper
|
||
proposal. Then I would like to say a few words about the current
|
||
status of privacy protection.
|
||
|
||
CLIPPER
|
||
To put the Clipper proposal in a policy context, I will need to
|
||
briefly to describe a law passed in 1987 intended to address the roles
|
||
of the Department of Commerce and the Department of Defense in the
|
||
development of technical standards. The Computer Security Act of 1987
|
||
was enacted to improve computer security in the federal government, to
|
||
clarify the responsibilities of the National Institute of Standards and
|
||
Technology (NIST) and the National Security Agency, and to ensure that
|
||
technical standards would serve civilian and commercial needs.
|
||
The law made clear that in the area of unclassified computing
|
||
systems, NIST and not NSA, would be responsible for the development of
|
||
technical standards. It emphasized public accountability and stressed
|
||
open decision-making. The Computer Security Act also established the
|
||
Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board (CSSPAB), charged
|
||
with reviewing the activities of NIST and ensuring that the mandate of
|
||
the law was enforced.
|
||
The Computer Security Act grew out of a concern that classified
|
||
standards and secret meetings would not serve the interests of the
|
||
general public. As the practical applications for cryptography have
|
||
moved from the military and intelligence arenas to the commercial
|
||
sphere, this point has become clear. There is also clearly a conflict
|
||
of interest when an agency tasked with signal interception is also
|
||
given authority to develop standards for network security.
|
||
In the spirit of the Computer Security Act, NIST set out in
|
||
1989 to develop a public key standard FIPS (Federal Information
|
||
Processing Standard). In a memo dated May 5, 1989, obtained by CPSR
|
||
through the Freedom of Information Act, NIST said that it planned:
|
||
|
||
to develop the necessary public-key based security standards. We
|
||
require a public-key algorithm for calculating digital signatures and
|
||
we also require a public-key algorithm for distributing secret keys.
|
||
|
||
NIST then went on to define the requirements of the standard:
|
||
|
||
The algorithms that we use must be public, unclassified, implementable
|
||
in both hardware or software, usable by federal Agencies and U.S. based
|
||
multi-national corporation, and must provide a level of security
|
||
sufficient for the protection of unclassified, sensitive information
|
||
and commercial propriety and/or valuable information.
|
||
|
||
The Clipper proposal and the full-blown Capstone configuration,
|
||
which incorporates the key management function NIST set out to develop
|
||
in 1989, is very different from the one originally conceived by NIST.
|
||
|
||
% The Clipper algorithm, Skipjack, is classified,
|
||
% Public access to the reasons underlying the proposal is
|
||
restricted,
|
||
% Skipjack can be implemented only in tamper-proof hardware,
|
||
% It is Unlikely to be used by multi-national corporations, and
|
||
% The security of Clipper remains unproven.
|
||
|
||
The Clipper proposal undermines the central purpose of the
|
||
Computer Security Act. Although intended for broad use in commercial
|
||
networks, it was not developed at the request of either U.S. business
|
||
or the general public. It does not reflect public goals. Rather it
|
||
reflects the interests of one secret agency with the authority to
|
||
conduct foreign signal intelligence and another government agency
|
||
responsible for law enforcement investigations.
|
||
Documents obtained by CPSR through the Freedom of Information
|
||
Act indicate that the National Security Agency dominated the meetings
|
||
of the joint NIST/NSA Technical Working group which made
|
||
recommendations to NIST regarding public key cryptography, and that a
|
||
related technical standard for message authentication, the Digital
|
||
Signature Standard, clearly reflected the interests of the NSA.
|
||
We are still trying to determine the precise role of the NSA in
|
||
the development of the Clipper proposal. We would be pleased to
|
||
provide to the Subcommittee whatever materials we obtain.
|
||
|
||
LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES
|
||
There are also several legal and constitutional issues raised
|
||
by the government's key escrow proposal. The premise of the Clipper
|
||
key escrow arrangement is that the government must have the ability to
|
||
intercept electronic communications, regardless of the economic or
|
||
societal costs. The FBI's Digital Telephony proposal, and the earlier
|
||
Senate bill 266, were based on the same assumption.
|
||
There are a number of arguments made in defense of this
|
||
position: that privacy rights and law enforcement needs must be
|
||
balanced, or that the government will be unable to conduct criminal
|
||
investigations without this capability.
|
||
Regardless of how one views these various claims, there is one
|
||
point about the law that should be made very clear: currently there is
|
||
no legal basis -- in statute, the Constitution or anywhere else --
|
||
that supports the premise which underlies the Clipper proposal. As the
|
||
law currently stands, surveillance is not a design goal. General
|
||
Motors would have a stronger legal basis for building cars that could
|
||
go no faster than 65 miles per hour than AT&T does in marketing a
|
||
commercial telephone that has a built-in wiretap capability. In law
|
||
there is simply nothing about the use of a telephone that is inherently
|
||
illegal or suspect.
|
||
The federal wiretap statute says only that communication
|
||
service providers must assist law enforcement in the execution of a
|
||
lawful warrant. It does not say that anyone is obligated to design
|
||
systems to facilitate future wire surveillance. That distinction is
|
||
the difference between countries that restrict wire surveillance to
|
||
narrow circumstances defined in law and those that treat all users of
|
||
the telephone network as potential criminals. U.S. law takes the first
|
||
approach. Countries such as the former East Germany took the second
|
||
approach. The use of the phone system by citizens was considered
|
||
inherently suspect and for that reason more than 10,000 people were
|
||
employed by the East German government to listen in on telephone calls.
|
||
It is precisely because the wiretap statute does not contain
|
||
the obligation to incorporate surveillance capability -- the design
|
||
premise of the Clipper proposal -- that the Federal Bureau of
|
||
Investigation introduced the Digital Telephony legislation. But that
|
||
legislation has not moved forward and the law has remained unchanged.
|
||
The Clipper proposal attempts to accomplish through the
|
||
standard-setting and procurement process what the Congress has been
|
||
unwilling to do through the legislative process.
|
||
On legal grounds, adopting the Clipper would be a mistake.
|
||
There is an important policy goal underlying the wiretap law. The
|
||
Fourth Amendment and the federal wiretap statute do not so much balance
|
||
competing interests as they erect barriers against government excess
|
||
and define the proper scope of criminal investigation. The purpose of
|
||
the federal wiretap law is to restrict the government, it is not to
|
||
coerce the public.
|
||
Therefore, if the government endorses the Clipper proposal, it
|
||
will undermine the basic philosophy of the federal wiretap law and the
|
||
fundamental values embodied in the Constitution. It will establish a
|
||
technical mechanism for signal interception based on a premise that has
|
||
no legal foundation. The assumption underlying the Clipper proposal is
|
||
more compatible with the practice of telephone surveillance in the
|
||
former East Germany than it is with the narrowly limited circumstances
|
||
that wire surveillance has been allowed in the United States.
|
||
|
||
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
|
||
There are a number of other legal issues that have not been
|
||
adequately considered by the proponents of the key escrow arrangement
|
||
that the Subcommittee should examine. First, not all lawful wiretaps
|
||
follow a normal warrant process. The proponents of Clipper should make
|
||
clear how emergency wiretaps will be conducted before the proposal goes
|
||
forward. Second, there may be civil liability issues for the escrow
|
||
agents, if they are private parties, if there is abuse or compromise of
|
||
the keys. Third, there is a Fifth Amendment dimension to the proposed
|
||
escrow key arrangement if a network user is compelled to disclose his
|
||
or her key to the government in order to access a communications
|
||
network. Each one of these issues should be examined carefully.
|
||
|
||
|
||
CPSR CONFERENCE
|
||
At a conference organized by CPSR this week at the Carnegie
|
||
Endowment for International Peace we heard presentations from staff
|
||
members at NIST, FBI, NSA and the White House about the Clipper
|
||
proposal. The participants at the meeting had the opportunity to ask
|
||
questions and to exchange views.
|
||
Certain points now seem clear:
|
||
|
||
% The Clipper proposal was not developed in response to any
|
||
perceived public or business need. It was developed solely to address
|
||
a law enforcement concern.
|
||
% Wire surveillance remains a small part of law enforcement
|
||
investigations. The number of arrests resulting from wiretaps has
|
||
remained essentially unchanged since the federal wiretap law was enacted
|
||
in 1968.
|
||
% The potential risks of the Clipper proposal have not been
|
||
assessed and many questions about the implementation remain unanswered.
|
||
% Clipper does not appear to have the support of the business or
|
||
research community.
|
||
|
||
Many comments on the Clipper proposal, both positive and
|
||
negative as well the materials obtained by CPSR through the Freedom of
|
||
Information Act, are contained in the Source book compiled by CPSR for
|
||
the recent conference. I am please to make a copy of this available to
|
||
the Subcommittee.
|
||
|
||
|
||
NETWORK PRIVACY PROTECTION
|
||
Communications privacy remains a critical test for network
|
||
development. Networks that do not provide a high degree of privacy are
|
||
clearly less useful to network users. Given the choice between a
|
||
cryptography product without a key escrow and one with a key escrow, it
|
||
would be difficult to find a user who would prefer the key escrow
|
||
requirement. If this proposal does go forward, it will not be because
|
||
network users or commercial service providers favored it.
|
||
Even if the issues regarding the Clipper are resolved
|
||
favorably, privacy concerns will not go away. Cryptography is a part
|
||
of communications privacy, but it is only a small part. Rules still
|
||
need to be developed about the collection and use of transactional data
|
||
generated by computer communications. While the federal wiretap law
|
||
generally does a very good job of protecting the content of
|
||
communications against interception by government agencies, large holes
|
||
still remain. The extensive use of subpoenas by the government to
|
||
obtain toll records and the sale of telephone records by private
|
||
companies are just two examples of gaps in current law.
|
||
The enforcement of privacy laws is also a particularly serious
|
||
concern in the United States. Good laws without clear mechanisms for
|
||
enforcement raise over-arching questions about the adequacy of legal
|
||
protections in this country. This problem is known to those who have
|
||
followed developments with the Privacy Act since passage in 1974 and
|
||
the more recent Video Privacy and Protection Act of 1988. I make this
|
||
point because it has been the experience in other countries that
|
||
agencies charged with the responsibility for privacy protection can be
|
||
effective advocates for the public in the protection of personal
|
||
privacy.
|
||
|
||
RECOMMENDATIONS
|
||
Regarding the Clipper proposal, we believe that the national
|
||
review currently underway by the Computer Security and Privacy Advisory
|
||
Board at the Department of Commerce will be extremely useful and we
|
||
look forward to the results of that effort. The Panel has already
|
||
conducted a series of important open hearings and compiled useful
|
||
materials on Clipper and cryptography policy for public review.
|
||
We are also pleased that the Subcommittee on Telecommunications
|
||
and Finance has undertaken this hearing. This Subcommittee can play a
|
||
particularly important role in the resolution of these issues. We also
|
||
appreciate the Chairman's efforts to ensure that the proper studies are
|
||
undertaken, that the General Accounting Office fully explores these
|
||
issues, and that the Secretary of Commerce carefully assesses the
|
||
potential impact of the Clipper proposal on export policy.
|
||
We are, however, less pleased about the White House study
|
||
currently underway. That effort, organized in large part by the
|
||
National Security Council, has led to a series of secret meetings, has
|
||
asked that scientists sign non-disclosure agreements and accept
|
||
restrictions on publication, and has attempted to resolve public
|
||
concerns through private channels. This is not a good process for the
|
||
evaluation of a technology that is proposed for the public switched
|
||
network. While we acknowledge that the White House has been reasonably
|
||
forthcoming in explaining the current state of affairs, we do not think
|
||
that this process is a good one.
|
||
For these reasons, we believe that the White House should
|
||
properly defer to the recommendations of the Computer System Security
|
||
and Privacy Advisory Board and the Subcommittee on Telecommunications
|
||
and Finance. We hope that no further steps in support of the Clipper
|
||
initiative will be taken. We specifically recommend that no further
|
||
purchase of Clipper chips be approved.
|
||
Speaking more generally, we believe that a number of steps
|
||
could be taken to ensure that future communications initiatives could
|
||
properly be viewed as a boost to privacy and not a set-back.
|
||
|
||
% The FCC must be given a strong mandate to pursue privacy
|
||
concerns. There should be an office specifically established to
|
||
examine privacy issues and to prepare reports. Similar efforts in
|
||
other countries have been enormously successful. The Japanese Ministry
|
||
of Post and Telecommunications developed a set of privacy principles to
|
||
ensure continued trade with Europe. The Canada Ministry of
|
||
Communications developed a set of communications principles to address
|
||
public concerns about the privacy of cellular communications. In
|
||
Europe, the EC put forward an important directive on privacy protection
|
||
for the development of new network services.
|
||
|
||
% Current gaps in the communications law should be filled. The
|
||
protection of transactional records is particularly important.
|
||
Legislation is needed to limit law enforcement access to toll record
|
||
information and to restrict the sale of data generated by the use of
|
||
telecommunication services. As the network becomes digital, the
|
||
transaction records associated with a particular communication may
|
||
become more valuable than the content of the communication itself.
|
||
|
||
% Telecommunications companies should be encouraged to explore
|
||
innovative ways to protect privacy. Cryptography is a particular
|
||
method to seal electronic communications, but far more important for
|
||
routine communications could be anonymous telephone cards, similar to
|
||
the metro cards here in the District of Columbia, that allow consumers
|
||
to purchase services without establishing accounts, transferring
|
||
personal data, or recording personal activities. Such cards are widely
|
||
available in Europe, Japan, and Australia.
|
||
|
||
I thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before the
|
||
Subcommittee and would be pleased to answer your questions Computer
|
||
Professionals for Social Responsibility
|
||
|
||
CPSR is a national membership organization, established in
|
||
1982, to address the social impact of computer technology. There are
|
||
2,500 members in 20 chapters across the United States, and offices in
|
||
Palo Alto, California, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Washington DC. The
|
||
organization is governed by a board of elected officers and meetings
|
||
are open to the public. CPSR sponsors an annual meeting and the
|
||
biennial conference on Directions and Implications of Advanced
|
||
Computing. CPSR sponsored the first conference on Computers, Freedom,
|
||
and Privacy in 1991. CPSR also operates the Internet Library at
|
||
cpsr.org. The library contains documents from the White House on
|
||
technology policy and a wide range of public laws covering privacy,
|
||
access to information, and communications law and is available free of
|
||
charge to all users of the Internet.
|
||
|
||
Marc Rotenberg is the director of the CPSR Washington office
|
||
and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University Law Center. He is
|
||
chairman of the ACM Committee on Scientific Freedom and Human Rights,
|
||
an editor for the Computer Law and Security Report (London), and the
|
||
secretary of Privacy International, an organization of human rights
|
||
advocates and privacy scholars in forty countries. He received an A.B.
|
||
from Harvard College and a J.D. from Stanford Law School, and is a
|
||
member of the bar of the United States Supreme Court. His forthcoming
|
||
article "Communications Privacy: Implications for Network Design" will
|
||
appear in the August 1993 issue of Communications o0f the ACM.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
End of Computer Underground Digest #5.43
|
||
************************************
|
||
|
||
|
||
|