785 lines
41 KiB
Plaintext
785 lines
41 KiB
Plaintext
|
||
|
||
Computer underground Digest Wed May 19 1993 Volume 5 : Issue 37
|
||
ISSN 1004-042X
|
||
|
||
Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
|
||
Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
|
||
Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
|
||
Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
|
||
Ian Dickinson
|
||
Copy Editor: Etaoin Shrdlu, Senrio
|
||
|
||
CONTENTS, #5.37 (May 19 1993)
|
||
File 1--CPSR Brief in 2600 FOIA Case
|
||
File 2--Response to Russell Brand (Re CuD 5.36)
|
||
File 3--"Clipper" Chip Redux
|
||
File 4--UPDATE #4-AB1624: Legislative Info Online
|
||
File 5--AB1624-Legislation Online - Making SURE it's "right"
|
||
File 6--CU In The News--Singapore Piracy / Ethics Conf.
|
||
|
||
Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
|
||
available at no cost electronically from tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu. The
|
||
editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-6430), fax (815-753-6302)
|
||
or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL
|
||
60115.
|
||
|
||
Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest
|
||
news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of
|
||
LAWSIG, and DL0 and DL12 of TELECOM; on GEnie in the PF*NPC RT
|
||
libraries and in the VIRUS/SECURITY library; from America Online in
|
||
the PC Telecom forum under "computing newsletters;"
|
||
On Delphi in the General Discussion database of the Internet SIG;
|
||
on the PC-EXEC BBS at (414) 789-4210; and on: Rune Stone BBS (IIRG
|
||
WHQ) 203-832-8441 NUP:Conspiracy
|
||
CuD is also available via Fidonet File Request from 1:11/70; unlisted
|
||
nodes and points welcome.
|
||
EUROPE: from the ComNet in Luxembourg BBS (++352) 466893;
|
||
|
||
ANONYMOUS FTP SITES:
|
||
UNITED STATES: ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in /pub/cud
|
||
uglymouse.css.itd.umich.edu (141.211.182.53) in /pub/CuD/cud
|
||
halcyon.com( 202.135.191.2) in /pub/mirror/cud
|
||
AUSTRALIA: ftp.ee.mu.oz.au (128.250.77.2) in /pub/text/CuD.
|
||
EUROPE: nic.funet.fi in pub/doc/cud. (Finland)
|
||
ftp.warwick.ac.uk in pub/cud (United Kingdom)
|
||
|
||
Back issues also may be obtained through mailserver at:
|
||
server@blackwlf.mese.com
|
||
|
||
COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
|
||
information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
|
||
diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted for non-profit as long
|
||
as the source is cited. Authors hold a presumptive copyright, and
|
||
they should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that
|
||
non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise
|
||
specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles
|
||
relating to computer culture and communication. Articles are
|
||
preferred to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts
|
||
unless absolutely necessary.
|
||
|
||
DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
|
||
the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all
|
||
responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not
|
||
violate copyright protections.
|
||
|
||
----------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Tue, 18 May 1993 14:01:53 -0500
|
||
From: sobel@WASHOFC.CPSR.ORG
|
||
Subject: File 1--CPSR Brief in 2600 FOIA Case
|
||
|
||
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) today
|
||
filed its brief in federal district court in Washington, DC,
|
||
challenging the Secret Service's withholding of information
|
||
relating to the break-up of a meeting of individuals affiliated
|
||
with 2600 Magazine last fall. The brief is re-printed below. All
|
||
footnotes and certain citations have been omitted.
|
||
|
||
For information concerning CPSR's litigation activities, contact:
|
||
|
||
David Sobel, CPSR Legal Counsel <dsobel@washofc.cpsr.org>
|
||
|
||
For information concerning CPSR generally, contact:
|
||
|
||
<cpsr@csli.stanford.edu>
|
||
|
||
============================================================
|
||
|
||
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
|
||
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
|
||
|
||
|
||
COMPUTER PROFESSIONALS FOR )
|
||
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, )
|
||
)
|
||
Plaintiff, )
|
||
)
|
||
v. ) C.A. No. 93-0231-LFO
|
||
)
|
||
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE )
|
||
)
|
||
Defendant. )
|
||
_______________________________)
|
||
|
||
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
|
||
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN
|
||
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
|
||
|
||
Plaintiff initiated this action on February 4, 1993,
|
||
challenging defendant Secret Service's failure to release certain
|
||
agency records requested under the Freedom of Information Act
|
||
("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552. Specifically, plaintiff seeks
|
||
disclosure of Secret Service records concerning "the breakup of a
|
||
meeting of individuals affiliated with '2600 Magazine' at the
|
||
Pentagon City Mall in Arlington, Virginia on November 6, 1992."
|
||
The Secret Service filed its motion for summary judgment on April
|
||
19, 1993. Plaintiff opposes the agency's motion and cross-moves
|
||
for summary judgment.
|
||
|
||
Background
|
||
|
||
On November 6, 1992, a group of young people gathered in the
|
||
food court at Pentagon City Mall in Arlington, Virginia, to
|
||
socialize and discuss their common hobby -- computer technology.
|
||
Most of the attendees were readers of "2600 Magazine," a quarterly
|
||
journal devoted to computer and telecommunications issues. The
|
||
gathering was a regular, monthly event promoted by the magazine.
|
||
See "Hackers Allege Harassment at Mall," Washington Post, November
|
||
12, 1992.
|
||
|
||
Shortly after the group had gathered, "they were surrounded
|
||
by a few mall security guards and at least one agent from the
|
||
Secret Service." Officers of the Arlington County Police
|
||
were also present. The security guards demanded that the group
|
||
members produce identification and compiled a list of names. The
|
||
personal belongings of several attendees were confiscated and the
|
||
group was evicted from the mall.
|
||
|
||
Several days later, plaintiff submitted a FOIA request to the
|
||
Secret Service seeking agency records concerning the incident.
|
||
The agency produced several newspaper articles describing the
|
||
incident, but withheld two records which, according to the agency,
|
||
"were provided to the Secret Service by a confidential source, and
|
||
each consists solely of information identifying individuals."
|
||
Defendant asserts that these two documents -- apparently lists of
|
||
names compiled by the mall security guards -- are exempt from
|
||
disclosure under FOIA Exemptions 7(A), 7(C) and 7(D). Plaintiff
|
||
disputes the applicability of these exemptions to the withheld
|
||
material.
|
||
|
||
Argument
|
||
|
||
I. The Withheld Information was not Compiled
|
||
for a Valid Law Enforcement Purpose
|
||
|
||
Under the facts of this case, defendant has failed to meet
|
||
its burden of establishing the threshold requirement of Exemption
|
||
7 -- that the information was compiled for valid law enforcement
|
||
purposes. Without elaboration, defendant merely asserts that
|
||
"[t]he two records being withheld ... are located in investigative
|
||
files maintained by the Secret Service that pertain to and are
|
||
compiled in connection with a criminal investigation being
|
||
conducted pursuant to the Secret Service's statutory authority to
|
||
investigate allegations of fraud." Def. Mem. at 3. This
|
||
assertion falls far short of the showing an agency must make in
|
||
order to invoke the protection of Exemption 7.
|
||
|
||
In Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the D.C.
|
||
Circuit established a two-part test for determining whether the
|
||
Exemption 7 threshold has been met.
|
||
|
||
First, the agency's investigatory activities that give
|
||
rise to the documents sought must be related to the
|
||
enforcement of federal laws or to the maintenance of
|
||
national security. To satisfy this requirement of a
|
||
"nexus," the agency should be able to identify a
|
||
particular individual or a particular incident as the
|
||
object of its investigation and the connection between
|
||
that individual or incident and a possible security risk
|
||
or violation of federal law. The possible violation or
|
||
security risk is necessary to establish that the agency
|
||
acted within its principal function of law enforcement,
|
||
rather than merely engaging in a general monitoring of
|
||
private individuals' activities. ...
|
||
|
||
Second, the nexus between the investigation and one
|
||
of the agency's law enforcement duties must be based on
|
||
information sufficient to support at least "a colorable
|
||
claim" of its rationality. ... Of course, the agency's
|
||
basis for the claimed connection between the object of
|
||
the investigation and the asserted law enforcement duty
|
||
cannot be pretextual or wholly unbelievable.
|
||
|
||
673 F.2d at 420-421 (emphasis, citations and footnote omitted).
|
||
Since the passage of the 1986 FOIA amendments, the court of
|
||
appeals has slightly restated the Pratt test so that the agency
|
||
must demonstrate a nexus "between [its] activity" (rather than its
|
||
investigation) "and its law enforcement duties." Keys v.
|
||
Department of Justice, 830 F.2d 337, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
|
||
|
||
As the court of appeals noted, the reason for requiring the
|
||
showing of a "nexus" is to ensure that the agency was not "merely
|
||
engaging in a general monitoring of private individuals'
|
||
activities." Other courts have also recognized that "[i]f an
|
||
agency 'was merely monitoring the subject for purposes unrelated
|
||
to enforcement of federal law,' a threshold showing has not been
|
||
made." Rosenfeld v. Department of Justice, 761 F. Supp. 1440,
|
||
1444 (N.D. Cal. 1991). See also King v. Department of Justice, 830
|
||
F. 2d 210, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (court not required "to sanction
|
||
agency claims that are pretextual or otherwise strain credulity");
|
||
Shaw v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 749 F.2d 58, 63 (D.C.
|
||
Cir. 1984) ("mere existence of a plausible criminal investigatory
|
||
reason to investigate would not protect the files of an inquiry
|
||
explicitly conducted ... for purposes of harassment").
|
||
|
||
In this case, the agency has not even attempted to make the
|
||
requisite showing. It has not "identified] a particular
|
||
individual or a particular incident as the object of its
|
||
investigation and the connection between that individual or
|
||
incident and a possible ... violation of federal law," as Pratt
|
||
requires. Rather, the circumstances strongly suggest that the
|
||
Secret Service was "merely engaging in a general monitoring of
|
||
private individuals' activities" (Pratt), or conducting an inquiry
|
||
"for purposes of harassment" (Shaw).
|
||
|
||
If, as the agency's representations suggest, the Secret
|
||
Service obtained a listing of individuals lawfully assembled at a
|
||
shopping mall in order to identify computer "hackers," without
|
||
benefit of probable cause or even articulable facts justifying
|
||
such an "investigation," Exemption 7 cannot protect the collected
|
||
information from disclosure. Indeed, as the Second Circuit has
|
||
noted, "unauthorized or illegal investigative tactics may not be
|
||
shielded from the public by use of FOIA exemptions." Kuzma v.
|
||
Internal Revenue Service, 775 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1985), citing
|
||
Weissman v. Central Intelligence Agency, 565 F.2d 692, 696 (D.C.
|
||
Cir. 1977) (other citation omitted). The agency has offered no
|
||
evidence that would rebut the inference that it is improperly
|
||
collecting the names of individuals engaged in constitutionally
|
||
protected activity.
|
||
|
||
The Secret Service has not met its burden of establishing the
|
||
"law enforcement purposes" threshold. Nor has it demonstrated
|
||
that any of the requisite harms would flow from disclosure, so as
|
||
to meet the specific provisions of Exemptions 7(A), 7(C) or 7(D).
|
||
|
||
II. Disclosure Would not Interfere
|
||
with a Pending Law Enforcement Proceeding
|
||
|
||
In support of its 7(A) claim, defendant again asserts,
|
||
without elaboration, that the disputed records were obtained "in
|
||
the course of a criminal investigation that is being conducted
|
||
pursuant to the Secret Service's authority to investigate access
|
||
device and computer fraud." Defendant further asserts that
|
||
disclosure of the information "could reasonably be expected to
|
||
interfere" with that investigation. As plaintiff has shown, the
|
||
existence of a qualifying "investigation" has not been
|
||
established. Nor, as we discuss below, could the disclosure of
|
||
the withheld information be reasonably expected to interfere with
|
||
defendant's vague inquiry.
|
||
|
||
Given the unique nature of FOIA litigation, plaintiff (and
|
||
the court, absent ex parte submissions) must draw logical
|
||
conclusions based upon defendant's representations. Here,
|
||
defendant represents that 1) the records relate to the incident at
|
||
Pentagon City Mall; 2) the records were obtained from a
|
||
"confidential" source; and 3) the records consist "solely of
|
||
information identifying individuals." Given that a list of names
|
||
was compiled by mall security guards and that a record consisting
|
||
"solely of information identifying individuals" is -- by
|
||
definition -- a list of names, plaintiff and the court logically
|
||
can assume that the compilation of names is being withheld.
|
||
|
||
The individuals who were required to identify themselves, and
|
||
whose names were subsequently recorded, obviously know that they
|
||
were present at the mall and that their names were taken. Under
|
||
these circumstances, it is patently absurd for the agency to
|
||
assert that
|
||
|
||
[t]he premature release of the identities of the
|
||
individual(s) at issue could easily result in
|
||
interference to the Secret Service's investigation by
|
||
alerting these individual(s) that they are under
|
||
investigation and thus allowing the individual(s) to
|
||
alter their behavior and/or evidence.
|
||
|
||
In Campbell v. Department of Health and Human Services, 682
|
||
F.2d 256, 259 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the D.C. Circuit reached the
|
||
obvious conclusion that Exemption 7(A) does not apply to
|
||
information that was provided by the subject of an investigation
|
||
-- it applies only to information "not in the possession of known
|
||
or potential defendants." See also Grasso v. Internal Revenue
|
||
Service, 785 F.2d 70, 77 (3d Cir. 1986) (where plaintiff sought
|
||
disclosure of his own statement to agency, "[t]he concerns to
|
||
which Exemption 7(A) is addressed are patently inapplicable").
|
||
Under the facts of this case, defendant's meager assertion of
|
||
"interference" defies logic and cannot be sustained.
|
||
|
||
|
||
III. The Privacy Protection of Exemption
|
||
7(C) is Inapplicable in this Case
|
||
|
||
Defendant next seeks to shield the information from
|
||
disclosure on the ground that it is seeking to protect the privacy
|
||
of the individuals named in the records. Applying the balancing
|
||
test of Exemption 7(C), the agency asserts that there is a
|
||
substantial privacy interest involved and "no public benefit in
|
||
the release of the names."
|
||
|
||
As for privacy interests, defendant claims that the
|
||
disclosure of an individual's name in a "law enforcement file ...
|
||
carries stigmatizing connotations." As noted, there is
|
||
substantial question as to whether the withheld material qualifies
|
||
as a "law enforcement" record. Indeed, the individuals themselves
|
||
believe that their names were recorded for purposes of harassment,
|
||
not law enforcement, and they cooperated with the news media to
|
||
expose what they believe to be improper conduct on the part of the
|
||
Secret Service.
|
||
|
||
As is set forth in the attached affidavit of counsel, a
|
||
number of the young people who were detained at the mall have
|
||
sought plaintiff's assistance in securing the release of relevant
|
||
Secret Service records. By letter dated November 20, 1992,
|
||
plaintiff submitted a FOIA request to the agency seeking
|
||
information concerning eight individuals, and provided privacy
|
||
releases executed by those individuals. The agency claimed that
|
||
it possessed no information relating to those individuals.
|
||
Plaintiff believes it is likely that some, if not all, of those
|
||
individuals are identified in the material defendant is
|
||
withholding. Given that plaintiff provided privacy releases to
|
||
the agency, the invocation of Exemption 7(C) to withhold those
|
||
names is indefensible.
|
||
|
||
The newspaper articles attached to defendant's motion belie
|
||
the claim that there is no public interest in the disclosure of
|
||
the requested information. The front page of the Washington Post
|
||
reported the allegation that the Secret Service orchestrated the
|
||
incident at Pentagon City Mall in order to monitor and harass the
|
||
young people who gathered there. The individuals themselves have
|
||
attempted to publicize the incident and gain the release of
|
||
relevant agency records. The balance between privacy interests
|
||
and public interest clearly weighs in favor of disclosure.
|
||
|
||
IV. The "Confidential Source" Protection of
|
||
Exemption 7(D) is not Available in this Case
|
||
|
||
Finally, defendants invoke Exemption 7(D), emphasizing that
|
||
the statutory definition of "confidential source" includes "any
|
||
private institution." Again, the circumstances of this case
|
||
render the exemption claim absurd -- the shopping mall was clearly
|
||
the source of the information maintained by the agency and it has
|
||
not attempted to conceal its cooperation with the Secret Service.
|
||
|
||
Shortly after the incident, the mall's security director,
|
||
Allan Johnson, was interviewed by Communications Daily. According
|
||
to an article that appeared in that publication, Johnson
|
||
acknowledged that the mall's security staff was working under the
|
||
direction of the Secret Service. "The Secret Service ...
|
||
ramrodded this whole thing," according to Johnson. "Secret
|
||
Service Undercover Hacker Investigation Goes Awry," Communications
|
||
Daily, November 10, 1992, at 2. This admission belies defendants'
|
||
suggestion that "[s]ources who provide ... information during the
|
||
course of a criminal investigation do so under the assumption that
|
||
their identities and cooperation will remain confidential ...."
|
||
|
||
As defendants concede, promises of confidentiality will be
|
||
implied, but only "in the absence of evidence to the contrary."
|
||
In this case, the evidence suggests that the source of the
|
||
information has sought to deflect responsibility for the incident
|
||
by asserting that it was, indeed, acting at the request of the
|
||
Secret Service. The agency appears to be more concerned with
|
||
protecting itself than with protecting the identity of a source
|
||
that is in no way "confidential." Exemption 7(D) can not be used
|
||
for that purpose.
|
||
|
||
CONCLUSION
|
||
|
||
Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be denied;
|
||
plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment should be granted.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Sat, 15 May 93 20:20:07 EDT
|
||
From: Jerry Leichter <leichter@LRW.COM>
|
||
Subject: File 2--Response to Russell Brand (Re CuD 5.36)
|
||
|
||
[Well, maybe more than a line. It grew as I edited. -- Jerry]
|
||
|
||
Russell Brand responds to my recent article on the open vetting of crypto-
|
||
graphic protocols:
|
||
|
||
In CU Digest 5.34, Jerry Leichter <leichter@LRW.COM> attacked Mike
|
||
Godwin's position on the open design principle.
|
||
|
||
While Leichter is correct that in certain environments, an %open
|
||
design' is fact neither partical nor appropriate. CLIPPER is doesn't
|
||
present an instance of this....
|
||
|
||
thus completely missing the point of what I wrote.
|
||
|
||
I think I made it plain that I was *not* attacking Mike Godwin's
|
||
position as such. Mr. Godwin is not, and does not claim to be, an
|
||
expert on cryptography, its history, or its application. He's an
|
||
expert on law, and that was what the bulk of his article dealt with.
|
||
What I *did* attack was the often-repeated contention, which Mr.
|
||
Godwin has simply presented yet another example of, that the Clipper
|
||
initiative represents something fundamentally new IN THAT IT PROPOSES
|
||
THE USE OF A SECRET CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM. It is certainly true
|
||
that there ARE several aspects of the initiative that ARE
|
||
fundamentally new (and hence certainly deserving of debate even if
|
||
only for that reason), but this is absolutely not one of them. In
|
||
fact, what IS new and quite "unproven" in the real world is the notion
|
||
of a cryptographic algorithm that IS public.
|
||
|
||
Mr. Brand continues with the argument that "an open design is
|
||
important ... so that you don't have to worry what advantage someone
|
||
can get by stealing it." This is just what it seems: An argument,
|
||
even a reasonable one. It is NOT an indication that there is anything
|
||
"abnormal" about a cryptographic algorithm whose details are not
|
||
public. As an argument, it can be responded to. I submit, for
|
||
example, that all the evidence available - and there's a fair amount -
|
||
is that the only advantage one gains from the ability to steal the
|
||
design is the ability to create one's own Clipper-compatible chips and
|
||
thus evade key escrow.
|
||
|
||
A claim that something violates "normal procedure" is an attempt to
|
||
remove it from the domain of debate. Bureaucrats LOVE to claim that
|
||
something is "just normal procedure" and as such presumably not open
|
||
to question or modification. Several claims I've seen made about
|
||
cryptography in general, and Clipper in particular, are of this
|
||
general nature. The "open design as a normal procedure" claim is, in
|
||
an academic context in which openness and publication are so central,
|
||
a particularly compelling one. Unfortunately, it's a claim with
|
||
little or no basis in law, history, engineering, or much of anything
|
||
outside of academia.
|
||
|
||
The whole area of cryptography has grown a paranoid mythology around
|
||
it. Just yesterday, All Things Considered ran an interview with a
|
||
"computer expert" - he's published a book on Windows programming, thus
|
||
making him fully qualified to talk about cryptography - who repeated
|
||
some old and hoary chestnuts, which are KNOWN to be false (or, at
|
||
best, for which there is absolutely no evidence). For example, he
|
||
repeated the claim that there is a trap door in DES, and he seems to
|
||
believe that what is escrowed is a MASTER key for all Clipper chips:
|
||
Given the two escrowed halves, you can read any Clipper conversation.
|
||
The interviewer seemed disturbed by this, as well she might be
|
||
(especially when the "expert" claimed that hackers would soon be able
|
||
to determine the master key on their on), and made all the right "oh
|
||
my goodness" noises. What she didn't bother to do was talk to someone
|
||
who knew something about the issue.
|
||
|
||
It's impossible to have a reasoned debate about cryptographic issues
|
||
when one side refuses to say much of anything, and the other lives in
|
||
a paranoid fantasy world. I think is was Edmund Burke who said that
|
||
the first moral imperative is to make sense.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Mon, 17 May 93 11:54:45 EDT
|
||
From: soneill@NETAXS.COM(Steve O'Neill)
|
||
Subject: File 3--"Clipper" Chip Redux
|
||
|
||
My first reaction when I read about the Clipper chip proposed by the
|
||
Feds was how confused the folks who use Intergraph's RISC chip of the
|
||
same name were going to be. Same goes for the people using Clipper to
|
||
compile their dBase programs. But, I digress...
|
||
|
||
I have a couple of basic objections to the way the government is going
|
||
about this whole business of creating a standard for digital telephone
|
||
encryption. First of all, unless you've been away on Mars these past
|
||
25 or so years, you've got to be aware that the Federal Government is
|
||
not the most trustworthy organization around. Do the names Hoover,
|
||
Liddy, Mitchell, North, Poindexter, Watergate, Iran-Contra and BCCI
|
||
ring a bell? My point is simply this: no judicial process known to
|
||
man is going to keep somebody working for the Feds from listening in
|
||
on your conversations if this key escrow business becomes reality.
|
||
It's immaterial whether the keys are held in 2, 10, or 50 different
|
||
agencies. The people keeping them are just that:people. They can be
|
||
bribed, their self-interest can be appealed to, they can be talked
|
||
into turning over the keys because it's an urgent matter of "national
|
||
security". For that matter, if some of the people working for an
|
||
intelligence agency want the keys, I'm sure they'd have no trouble
|
||
stealing the damned things!
|
||
|
||
"All true", you say, "but if you use some other crypto system and the
|
||
Feds REALLY want to find out what you're saying, they'll just sick the
|
||
NSA on you-at that point, it won't make any difference what system
|
||
you're using, they'll eventually crack it". I say: maybe yes and
|
||
maybe no. If the NSA is going to be drawn into busting into your
|
||
encrypted conversations, it's probably going to want a real good
|
||
reason to do so. If the need to find out what you're saying has
|
||
reached that stage, then most likely whole departments are alarmed
|
||
about what you may be up to. At that point, it seems to me that
|
||
you'll have bigger problems than simply the paranoia of one or two
|
||
government employees. Even the NSA doesn't have unlimited resources.
|
||
I'm pretty sure the management of the agency doesn't like diverting
|
||
its personnel, computers, and eavesdropping equipment from what it
|
||
considers its primary cryptanalytic mission without good cause and
|
||
plenty of official authorization. Remember, at the outset of such a
|
||
project, the people involved can have no way of knowing how long it
|
||
will take and how many resources it will consume. If cracking your
|
||
system becomes a big enough pain in the ass, NSA may tell the
|
||
requestors to just go and bug your house! Therefore, barring the
|
||
existence of rogue cryptanalysts in the NSA, it doesn't seem
|
||
reasonable to me to worry about having your totally proprietary and
|
||
cryptographically secure digital phone system broken into on a whim.
|
||
This is the main reason I don't want the government to have any EASY
|
||
means of listening in on my encrypted conversations.
|
||
|
||
Second, the problem I have with the proposed scheme is that it
|
||
probably won't protect us from the really bad guys. I believe that
|
||
if, for example, the Mob, Mafia, Cosa Nostra, whatever name you want
|
||
to give to organized crime, wants to make its telephone conversations
|
||
private, it possesses the resources and the smarts to do so,
|
||
regardless of what becomes the "standard method" of commercial
|
||
encryption. Today, it's no trick to find a programmable, semi-custom
|
||
chip of almost any kind you'd like. They're not expensive, and there
|
||
are any number of engineers floating around who can design with them,
|
||
particularly of the unemployed military kind. It doesn't take much
|
||
imagination to envision the kind of scenario in which one or more of
|
||
these people is hired by a "contract" engineering firm fronting for
|
||
the Mob. His/her/their task is to develop an encryption chip set for
|
||
an "unnamed" manufacturer who wants to get into the commercial phone
|
||
encryption business. Or so they are told. Time to market is
|
||
critical, they're told, so use off-the-shelf programmable arrays and a
|
||
commonly available microprocessor. A cryptology expert is also hired,
|
||
and he supplies the alogrithms, mostly ones he's worked on that his
|
||
former employer, whomever that was, wasn't interested in. And in 6
|
||
months, the Organization has a chip set that can give NSA nightmares
|
||
for a year. Or, even simpler, engineers from the same unemployment
|
||
pool are hired directly, the same way accountants and lawyers are
|
||
hired, given their marching orders, and they're off. The pay would be
|
||
good and, as long as you don't ask too many questions, the working
|
||
conditions would be fine. Far fetched? Maybe: but if so, then what
|
||
are all those unemployed nuclear experts from the former Soviet Union
|
||
doing in places like Iraq? Which brings me to my point: even if the
|
||
Mob doesn't have an interest in such a chip set, I have no doubt at
|
||
all that various foreign governments do. I also have no doubt that
|
||
many of them already have such sets. You and I, on the other hand,
|
||
will be stuck with the "leaky" Clipper chip, which our friends at the
|
||
Fed are so thoughtfully providing for us.
|
||
|
||
Finally, many of you are probably wondering why using the Clipper chip
|
||
should be a problem to you. After all, you're not a criminal, nor are
|
||
you an agent of a foreign government. You simply want a way to keep
|
||
your competition away from your trade secrets. The answer lies in the
|
||
kind of hay the various law-enforcement and intelligence agencies can
|
||
make with ANY private information they collect about you. If you
|
||
become a member of a group that someone or some group of someone's in
|
||
the Fed comes to view with alarm, give a "provocative" speech, or
|
||
publicly express an opinion that a bureaucrat views as possibly
|
||
threatening to something he values, you could find yourself the target
|
||
of surveillance. And remember, your politcal activity of today, which
|
||
is quite acceptable now, can come back to haunt you(ask any activist
|
||
from the '30's about what a wonderful time he had in the '50's). Such
|
||
surveillance will probably not ever result in any kind of criminal
|
||
indictment. Instead, you may find it difficult to get certain kinds
|
||
of jobs; your credit rating might suddenly go sour, for reasons you
|
||
can't fathom; you might discover that your neighbors harbor what seem
|
||
to be unspoken suspicions about you. All of this, and more, has
|
||
happened over the past 40 years to all sorts of people, without the
|
||
help of a supposedly "secure" encryption method that can, in reality,
|
||
be broken into whenever someone in the government feels like it. If I
|
||
use encryption, it's to ensure my privacy: I damn' well don't want to
|
||
be wondering if some government functionary is listening in because he
|
||
has paranoid delusions about what I may be up to.
|
||
|
||
Before you write all of this off as simply the ravings of someone who
|
||
is, to say the least, overly suspicious of the Feds, consider this: in
|
||
the late 70's, the government introduced the Data Encryption Standard,
|
||
or DES. At the time of its introduction, the rumor was bruted about
|
||
that the NSA had a hand in weakening the security of the algorithm for
|
||
reasons of ease of decrypting. This rumor was never confirmed or
|
||
denied by NSA. IBM who developed it, and NBS, the agency that
|
||
sponsored it, said no such thing had happened. Unfortunately, the
|
||
developers had been "helped" by the NSA, in particular, by being
|
||
provided with some of the constants used in various parts of the
|
||
algorithm, and may simply have not been in a position to really know.
|
||
Over the past 15 years, a lot of data has been passed around using the
|
||
DES, some of it commercial, much of it government. In all that time,
|
||
no user of DES has ever had any idea whether any part of that data
|
||
flow has been decrypted surreptitiously by the NSA. If it has, NSA
|
||
ain't talking, so we, out here in the real world, don't know what they
|
||
know about us, or, more accurately, what they THINK they know about
|
||
us. And, all of this uncertainty surrounding an encryption process
|
||
that has NEVER been acknowledged to have any trap doors. Now, the
|
||
Feds propose to create a system that they have specifically said can
|
||
give other, perhaps less scrupulous, agencies easy access to our
|
||
communications(data, as well as voice, remember). Uh-uh, no thanks.
|
||
If I need crytographic privacy, I'll look elsewhere, thank you.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Tue, 18 May 1993 20:03:19 -0700
|
||
From: Jim Warren <jwarren@WELL.SF.CA.US>
|
||
Subject: File 4--UPDATE #4-AB1624: Legislative Info Online
|
||
|
||
[For newcomers: Assembly Bill 1624 would mandate that most current,
|
||
already-computerized, public California legislative information be
|
||
available, online. *IF* sufficient public pressure continues, it
|
||
*appears* like it may pass.
|
||
Send your e-addr to receive updates and panic calls-for-action. :-)
|
||
|
||
AB1624 HEARING RE-SCHEDULED. AGAIN! NOW IT'S MAY 20th
|
||
The Assembly Rules Committee first heard this bill April 19th. Then
|
||
we thought the next hearing would be May 3rd. Then May 6th. On May
|
||
5th, we were told it'd be May 13th at 7:30 a.m. Upon arriving the
|
||
afternoon of May 12th to stay overnight, I was told it would be May
|
||
20th.
|
||
|
||
It's now in the printed schedule -- which means it will probably happen.
|
||
|
||
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS NOW AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW The amendments to AB1624
|
||
that will be proposed when the Rules Committee considers it on 5/20
|
||
became public at 3:46 p.m. on 5/18. (I first saw them shortly
|
||
thereafter.) Key issues:
|
||
|
||
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS MANDATE FREE ACCESS TO THE INFORMATION -- EXCEPT
|
||
... Part of the amendments state, "No fee or other charge shall be
|
||
imposed as a condition to this public access except as provided in
|
||
subdivision (d)."
|
||
|
||
And that subdivision states, "(d) No individual or entity obtaining
|
||
access to information under the system established [by AB1624] shall
|
||
republish or otherwise duplicate that information for a fee or any
|
||
other consideration except with the authorization of the Legislative
|
||
Counsel and the approval of the Joint Rules Committee pursuant to a
|
||
written agreement between the individual or entity and the Legislative
|
||
Counsel that may provide for payment of a fee or charge for this
|
||
purpose." And, "Any amounts received by the Legislative Counsel [go
|
||
to help support] the Legislative Counsel Bureau."
|
||
|
||
Note: The Legislative Counsel runs the $25-million Legislative
|
||
Information System. Thus, such fees would help to reduce its tax-paid
|
||
operating costs.
|
||
|
||
It was obvious in the first committee hearing of AB1624, and has
|
||
been repeatedly reiterated since then, that many of the legislators
|
||
want companies that profit from distributing these public records to
|
||
functionally pay royalties. The word I hear is that the is the only
|
||
way AB1624 has a chance of passage -- not withstanding that the data
|
||
is public information.
|
||
|
||
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS MAKE NO MENTION OF INTERNET ACCESS, BUT IT APPEARS
|
||
LIKELY The bill still states only that the information, "shall be
|
||
made available to the public by means of access by way of computer
|
||
modem," without specifying through what systems. I was pushing for
|
||
requiring that the data be made available by direct connection to
|
||
the largest public networks (i.e., the Internet), however the bill
|
||
makes no such requirement.
|
||
|
||
On the other hand, I discovered that the Legislative Data Center has
|
||
just installed a T-1 (1.544Mbits/sec) Internet connection with a Cisco
|
||
router, and it *seems* likely that they will make the files available
|
||
via that large data-pipe.
|
||
|
||
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS ADD CALIFORNIA CODES [STATUTES] AND CONSTITUTION
|
||
As requested by bill-author Debra Bowen, the proposed amendment
|
||
would add California's codes and Constitution to the information to
|
||
be available, online. Currently these are available on magtape for
|
||
$200,044+. A major addition, if adopted.
|
||
|
||
Part of the amendments state that, "The Legislative Counsel shall,
|
||
with the advice of the Joint Rules Committee, make all of the
|
||
[information] available to the public in electronic form."
|
||
|
||
All in all, it *looks* like it will truly make the Legislature's
|
||
public records publicly available across the nets, without cost -- at
|
||
least to those who don't charge a fee to "republish or otherwise
|
||
duplicate" them.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Wed, 19 May 1993 07:25:18 -0700
|
||
From: Jim Warren <jwarren@WELL.SF.CA.US>
|
||
Subject: File 5--AB1624-Legislation Online - Making SURE it's "right"
|
||
|
||
AB1624 remains undefined or ambiguous on two points. Faxes and phone
|
||
calls are needed *NOW* to clarify these points, before the May 20th
|
||
hearing. Please send [at least] this language (an instance where it's
|
||
okay for all of us to send exactly the same messages):
|
||
|
||
Assembly Bill 1624 is excellent, but needs two clarifications due to
|
||
technical issues of how shared computers and computer networks
|
||
operate:
|
||
|
||
1. Subdivision (c) of the proposed amendments to AB1624 states that
|
||
the legislative information, "shall be made available to the public by
|
||
means of access by way of computer modem."
|
||
|
||
The least expensive, most efficient and most accessible means of
|
||
modem access is by way of the public computer networks. Therefore,
|
||
please clarify AB1624 be appending this phrase to the above amendment
|
||
language: "and by way of the [nonprofit, nonproprietary] public
|
||
computer networks that are connected to the Legislative Data Center
|
||
that is operated by the Legislative Counsel."
|
||
|
||
2. Subdivision (d) of the proposed amendments to AB1624 requires
|
||
approvals, a written agreement and probably charges for individuals
|
||
and entities that "republish or otherwise duplicate [legislative]
|
||
information for a fee or any other consideration ..."
|
||
|
||
Ignoring the issue of whether or not fees should be required of
|
||
for-profit users of public information, the AB1624 language is
|
||
ambiguous on an important operational issue:
|
||
|
||
Many operations - including those of schools, universities,
|
||
libraries, nonprofit organizations, community associations,
|
||
public-access systems, home-based bulletin board systems (BBSs), etc.
|
||
-- require an account or nominal fee for using their services or
|
||
computers, but do not charge for using specific files or information.
|
||
Please clarify that AB1624 applies only to those that charge for using
|
||
legislative files, rather than those that charge for using their
|
||
entire facility, by appending the following sentence to the end of
|
||
subdivision (d):
|
||
|
||
"However, this subdivision shall not apply to those individuals or entities
|
||
that charge a fee or other consideration for use of their overall facilities
|
||
or computer systems but do not account for nor charge for access to or use of
|
||
specific files of information."
|
||
|
||
Now is the time to *push*! Please keep it to one page. Please fax it
|
||
BY MAY 20TH to at least (without the brackets :-): fax number:
|
||
Assembly Member Debra Bowen [D], AB1624 Author ...................916-327-2201
|
||
The Honorable John Burton [D], Chair, Assembly Rules Committee....916-324-4899
|
||
The Honorable Richard Polanco [D], AB1624 Co-Author [on Rules]....916-324-4657
|
||
The Honorable Ross Johnson [R], AB1624 Co-Auth.[Rules Vice-Chair].916-324-6870
|
||
Senator Art Torres [D], AB1624 Principal Co-Author................916-444-0581
|
||
and - especially if you are in their district - also to:
|
||
<The other members of the 9-member Assembly Rules Committee>
|
||
Assembly Member Deirdre "Dede" Alpert [D].........................916-445-4001
|
||
Assembly Member Trice Harvey [R]..................................916-324-4696
|
||
Assembly Member Barbara Lee [D]..<needs constituent messages!>....916-327-1941
|
||
Assembly Member Richard L. Mountjoy [R].....................voice/916-445-7234
|
||
Assembly Member Willard H. Murray, Jr. [D]........................916-447-3079
|
||
Assembly Member Patrick Nolan [R].................................916-322-4398
|
||
<the other AB1624 co-authors>
|
||
Assembly Member Rusty Areias [D], AB1624 Co-Author................916-327-7105
|
||
Assembly Member Julie Bornstein [D], AB1624 Co-Author.............916-323-5190
|
||
Assembly Member Jan Goldsmith [R, male], AB1624 Co-Author...voice/916-445-2484
|
||
Assembly Member Phillip Isenberg [D], AB1624 Co-Author......voice/916-445-1611
|
||
Assembly Member Betty Karnette [D], AB1624 Co-Author..............916-324-6861
|
||
Assembly Member Richard Katz [D], AB1624 Co-Author..........voice/916-445-1616
|
||
Senator Tom Hayden [D], AB1624 Co-Author..........................916-324-4823
|
||
Senator Lucy L. Killea [I], AB1624 Co-Author......................916-327-2188
|
||
Senator Becky Morgan [R], AB1624 Co-Author..................voice/916-445-6747
|
||
Senator Herschel Rosenthal [D], AB1624 Co-Author............voice/916-445-7928
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: 18 May 93 20:27:06 EDT
|
||
From: Gordon Meyer <72307.1502@COMPUSERVE.COM>
|
||
Subject: File 6--CU In The News--Singapore Piracy / Ethics Conf.
|
||
|
||
To: >internet:tk0jut2@niu.bitnet
|
||
Singapore Piracy
|
||
============
|
||
Lotus and Novell have filed criminal charges against a man and wife in
|
||
Singapore after they were found guilty in a civil suit for copyright and
|
||
trademark violations. The companies obtained a court order to freeze
|
||
nearly one million dollars in assets belonging to the pair, who had sold
|
||
thousands of illegal software copies in Southeast Asia. (Information Week.
|
||
May 10, 1993. pg. 8)
|
||
|
||
Computer Ethics Institute Conference
|
||
===========================
|
||
Information Week reports that Congressman Edward Markey (D - Mass.) made
|
||
the following remarks at the above conference. "Just because personal
|
||
information can be collected electronically, can be gleaned off the network
|
||
as people call 800 number or click channels on he television, or can be
|
||
cross-referenced into sophisticated lists and put on line for sale to
|
||
others, does not mean that it has been technologically predetermined that
|
||
privacy and social mores should be bent to that capability. (...) The
|
||
Constitution is a 200-year-old parchment, simply because we digitize the
|
||
words should not suggest their meanings change." Later, Markey commented
|
||
that "Real harm can be done in the virtual world." Refer to "Ethics and
|
||
Cyberculture" , Information Week, May 10, 1993 pg. 60 for more information
|
||
on the conference and Markey's speech.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
End of Computer Underground Digest #5.37
|
||
************************************
|
||
|
||
|
||
|