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868 lines
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Computer underground Digest Sun Dec 13, 1992 Volume 4 : Issue 65
|
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ISSN 1066-652X
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|
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Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
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Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
|
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Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
|
||
Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
|
||
Copy Editor: Etaion Shrdlu, Junior
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|
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CONTENTS, #4.65 (Dec 13, 1992)
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File 1--DOJ Authorizes Keystroke Monitoring
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File 2--Teen "Computer Whiz" Strikes Store
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File 3--Enviro. Tech. Policy
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File 4--DELPHI Announces Full Access to the Internet
|
||
File 5--Virus Destroyed Report on Drug Lord
|
||
File 6--COM DAILY ON F.C.C. TRANSITION
|
||
File 7--Virus Conference (ACMBUL) Call for Papers
|
||
File 8--GRAY AREAS -- 'Zine Review
|
||
File 9--Bibliography on codes and ciphers
|
||
File 10--Comments on the Nov. 2600 Disruption in D.C.
|
||
|
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Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
|
||
available at no cost from tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu. The editors may be
|
||
contacted by voice (815-753-6430), fax (815-753-6302) or U.S. mail at:
|
||
Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL 60115.
|
||
|
||
Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest
|
||
news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of
|
||
LAWSIG, and DL0 and DL12 of TELECOM; on Genie in the PF*NPC RT
|
||
libraries; from America Online in the PC Telecom forum under
|
||
"computing newsletters;" on the PC-EXEC BBS at (414) 789-4210; in
|
||
Europe from the ComNet in Luxembourg BBS (++352) 466893; and using
|
||
anonymous FTP on the Internet from ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in
|
||
/pub/cud, red.css.itd.umich.edu (141.211.182.91) in /cud, halcyon.com
|
||
(192.135.191.2) in /pub/mirror/cud, and ftp.ee.mu.oz.au (128.250.77.2)
|
||
in /pub/text/CuD.
|
||
European readers can access the ftp site at: nic.funet.fi pub/doc/cud.
|
||
Back issues also may be obtained from the mail
|
||
server at mailserv@batpad.lgb.ca.us.
|
||
|
||
COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
|
||
information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
|
||
diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted for non-profit as long
|
||
as the source is cited. Some authors do copyright their material, and
|
||
they should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that
|
||
non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise
|
||
specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles
|
||
relating to computer culture and communication. Articles are
|
||
preferred to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts
|
||
unless absolutely necessary.
|
||
|
||
DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
|
||
the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all
|
||
responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not
|
||
violate copyright protections.
|
||
|
||
----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: Mon, 7 Dec 1992 22:48:06 +0000
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From: Dave Banisar <banisar@WASHOFC.CPSR.ORG>
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Subject: File 1--DOJ Authorizes Keystroke Monitoring
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CA-92:19 CERT Advisory
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December 7, 1992
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Keystroke Logging Banner
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The CERT Coordination Center has received information from the United
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||
States Department of Justice, General Litigation and Legal Advice
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Section, Criminal Division, regarding keystroke monitoring by
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computer systems administrators, as a method of protecting computer
|
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systems from unauthorized access.
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|
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The information that follows is based on the Justice Department's
|
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advice to all federal agencies. CERT strongly suggests adding a
|
||
notice banner such as the one included below to all systems. Sites
|
||
not covered by U.S. law should consult their legal counsel.
|
||
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+++++++++++++++++++
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The legality of such monitoring is governed by 18 U.S.C. section
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2510 et seq. That statute was last amended in 1986, years before
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the words "virus" and "worm" became part of our everyday
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vocabulary. Therefore, not surprisingly, the statute does not
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directly address the propriety of keystroke monitoring by system
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administrators.
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|
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Attorneys for the Department have engaged in a review of the
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statute and its legislative history. We believe that such
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keystroke monitoring of intruders may be defensible under the
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statute. However, the statute does not expressly authorize such
|
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monitoring. Moreover, no court has yet had an opportunity to
|
||
rule on this issue. If the courts were to decide that such
|
||
monitoring is improper, it would potentially give rise to both
|
||
criminal and civil liability for system administrators.
|
||
Therefore, absent clear guidance from the courts, we believe it
|
||
is advisable for system administrators who will be engaged in
|
||
such monitoring to give notice to those who would be subject to
|
||
monitoring that, by using the system, they are expressly
|
||
consenting to such monitoring. Since it is important that
|
||
unauthorized intruders be given notice, some form of banner
|
||
notice at the time of signing on to the system is required.
|
||
Simply providing written notice in advance to only authorized
|
||
users will not be sufficient to place outside hackers on notice.
|
||
|
||
An agency's banner should give clear and unequivocal notice to
|
||
intruders that by signing onto the system they are expressly
|
||
consenting to such monitoring. The banner should also indicate
|
||
to authorized users that they may be monitored during the effort
|
||
to monitor the intruder (e.g., if a hacker is downloading a
|
||
user's file, keystroke monitoring will intercept both the
|
||
hacker's download command and the authorized user's file). We
|
||
also understand that system administrators may in some cases
|
||
monitor authorized users in the course of routine system
|
||
maintenance. If this is the case, the banner should indicate
|
||
this fact. An example of an appropriate banner might be as
|
||
follows:
|
||
|
||
This system is for the use of authorized users only.
|
||
Individuals using this computer system without authority,
|
||
or in excess of their authority, are subject to having
|
||
all of their activities on this system monitored and
|
||
recorded by system personnel.
|
||
|
||
In the course of monitoring individuals improperly using
|
||
this system, or in the course of system maintenance, the
|
||
activities of authorized users may also be monitored.
|
||
|
||
Anyone using this system expressly consents to such
|
||
monitoring and is advised that if such monitoring reveals
|
||
possible evidence of criminal activity, system personnel
|
||
may provide the evidence of such monitoring to law
|
||
enforcement officials.
|
||
|
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++++++++++++++++++++
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Each site using this suggested banner should tailor it to their
|
||
precise needs. Any questions should be directed to your
|
||
organization's legal counsel.
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||
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++++++++++++++++++++
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The CERT Coordination Center wishes to thank Robert S. Mueller, III,
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Scott Charney and Marty Stansell-Gamm from the United States
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||
Department of Justice for their help in preparing this Advisory.
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||
|
||
If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the
|
||
CERT Coordination Center or your representative in FIRST (Forum of
|
||
Incident Response and Security Teams).
|
||
|
||
Internet E-mail: cert@cert.org
|
||
Telephone: 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
|
||
CERT personnel answer 7:30 a.m.-6:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4),
|
||
on call for emergencies during other hours.
|
||
|
||
CERT Coordination Center
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||
Software Engineering Institute
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||
Carnegie Mellon University
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Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
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||
|
||
------------------------------
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Date: Thu, 26 Nov 92 10:57:18 CST
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From: ICEMAN@CCU.UMANITOBA.CA
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Subject: File 2--Teen "Computer Whiz" Strikes Store
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|
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From--Winnipeg Free Press (Winnipeg,Manitoba,Canada) on Nov 26,1992:
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STAFF THREATENED, FILES RUINED AS TEEN COMPUTER WHIZ STRIKES
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By George Nikides
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Staff Reporter
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A teen hacker uncovered a hole in a downtown software shop's
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computer system and went on a rampage, destroying every file and
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threatening employees.
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"It's an ego thing. 'Boy look what i've accomplished,' " said
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Sgt. Dennis Loupin of the Winnipeg police fraud unit. "He's very,
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very intelligent. He's got a tremendous future in the computer world."
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An 18 year-old, who can't be named because he's charged under the
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Young Offender's Act, faces fraud charges.
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|
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Police say a hacker discovered a "hole" - an opening that allows
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a user to circumvent a computer system's passwords - in the bulletin
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board program at Adventure Software Ltd., a Hargrave Street software
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shop.
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The computer whiz unlocked the program several times, at one
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||
point destroying every file.
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Bulletin Board
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|
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The hacking is believed to have been carried out with an
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IBM-style computer from a home.
|
||
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Adventure Software offers a computer bulletin board where
|
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customers can communicate, read about news products, or leave messages
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from their home systems. The system has about 400 users, police say.
|
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|
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An Adventure Software employee, who asked not to be identified,
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||
said threatening messages were left in the system, some suggesting
|
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that selling software was immoral. Some messages attacked a store
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employee. The system was out of operation at one point for 3 1/2
|
||
weeks, he said.
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But the employee said police are overstating the hacker's skills.
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"It doesn't take a genius to hear about a 'hole' in the program," said
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the man.
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The system was infiltrated four to six times, he said.
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"It's not crippling. It's just extremely annoying, " the employee
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said. By breaking into the system the computer bandit found home
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phone numbers and addresses, he said.
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Police say they are also investigating the teen in connection
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with break-ins at other systems across North America.
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Mischief
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"He's now going to have to face the consequences of something he
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thought was just a challenge but it's more than that - it's a crime, "
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said Loupin.
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A Victor Street teenager was arrested Tuesday night and charged
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with using a computer service to commit mischief, an offence that
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||
carries a maximum 10-year sentence.
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The teen is now 18, but police say he was 17 when the alleged
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crimes occured.
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------------------------------
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Date: Fri, 4 Dec 1992 14:33:31 EDT
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From: Rick Crawford <crawford@CS.UCDAVIS.EDU>
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Subject: File 3--Enviro. Tech. Policy
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|
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Saw this on the net and found much of it relevant to various
|
||
efforts to develop an explicit national technology policy
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||
(vs. a default, pork-barrel-driven policy vacuum).
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||
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-rick
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++++++++++
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From--tgray@igc.apc.org (Tom Gray)
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Newsgroups--sci.environment
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Subject----Renewables Critical, Says WRI
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Date--2 Nov 92 15:49:00 GMT
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||
|
||
RENEWABLE ENERGY 'ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL', SAYS NEW WRI REPORT
|
||
|
||
Renewable energy technologies are part of a list of "environmentally
|
||
critical" technologies that the federal government should support,
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||
according to a new report from the World Resources Institute, a
|
||
Washington, DC, policy organization.
|
||
|
||
The report, entitled Backs to the Future: U.S. Government Policy
|
||
Toward Environmentally Critical Technology, was authored by George
|
||
Heatton and Robert Repetto, and is billed by the Institute as "the
|
||
first attempt in this country to define and identify areas of
|
||
technological advance that would markedly reduce the environmental
|
||
burdens of economic progress."
|
||
|
||
The authors focus on government policy because it strongly influences
|
||
the development of new technologies, "from research dollars and
|
||
procurement decisions to infrastructure design and standard-setting,"
|
||
an Institute news release added.
|
||
|
||
"Among the most promising environmental R&D areas," it said, " . . .
|
||
are methods of non-fossil fuel energy production and use ... and
|
||
hydrogen and other storage methods. Many such technologies, now in
|
||
early stages of development, would yield large social returns from
|
||
technical advances ... "
|
||
|
||
Backs to the Future's recommendations, the release said, include the
|
||
creating of a national research and development (R&D) institute,
|
||
altering the missions of the national laboratories, and changing
|
||
criteria for funding environmental R&D.
|
||
|
||
Copies of Backs to the Future can be obtained for $9.95 plus $3
|
||
shipping and handling from WRI Publications, PO Box 4852, Hampden
|
||
Station, Baltimore, MD 21211, USA, phone (800) 822-0504.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
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|
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Date: 09 Dec 1992 00:13:55 -0500 (EST)
|
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From: "WALT HOWE, DELPHI INTERNET SIG MANAGER" <WALTHOWE@DELPHI.COM>
|
||
Subject: File 4--DELPHI Announces Full Access to the Internet
|
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|
||
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
|
||
|
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DELPHI Online Service Announces Full Access to the Internet
|
||
|
||
Cambridge MA, December 9, 1992 -- DELPHI, an international online
|
||
service, today announced full access to the Internet including
|
||
real-time electronic mail, file transfers with "FTP," and remote
|
||
log-ins to other Internet hosts using "Telnet." With this
|
||
announcement, DELPHI becomes the only leading consumer online service
|
||
to offer such a wide variety of Internet features.
|
||
|
||
Russell Williams, DELPHI's general manager, explains the significance
|
||
of this announcement. "Prior to now, anyone interested in accessing
|
||
the Internet had a very limited number of options. In most cases you
|
||
had to be connected directly through your company or school. DELPHI
|
||
is now an important low-cost access option available to home computer
|
||
users. Anyone can connect to DELPHI with a local call from over 600
|
||
cities and towns throughout the US and in many other countries."
|
||
|
||
The Internet is considered the world's largest computer network. It
|
||
is comprised of thousands of companies, colleges, schools, government
|
||
agencies, and other organizations. There are currently an estimated 4
|
||
million users. "This incredible collection of resources will mean
|
||
better and more specialized services for all users" adds Mr. Williams.
|
||
"For example, users can take electronic courses conducted by leading
|
||
universities, access databases and reports from government agencies,
|
||
and get product information and support directly from companies. There
|
||
are also mailing lists and discussion groups for almost every special
|
||
interest imaginable. Electronic mail can be used to send private
|
||
messages to anyone on the Internet and even many commercial networks
|
||
like Compuserve and MCI Mail."
|
||
|
||
DELPHI's connection to the Internet works both ways: In addition to
|
||
offering access out to other networks, DELPHI provides value-added
|
||
services to people already on the Internet. Any user of the Internet
|
||
can access DELPHI to use services such as Grolier's Academic American
|
||
Encyclopedia, the Dictionary of Cultural Literacy, Reuters and UPI
|
||
newswires, stock quotes, computer support, travel reservations,
|
||
special interest groups, real-time conferencing, downloadable
|
||
programs, and multi-player games. All these services can be reached
|
||
through the Internet simply by joining DELPHI and then telnetting to
|
||
the address "delphi.com" via the commercial Internet.
|
||
|
||
In order to help new users with questions related to the Internet,
|
||
DELPHI has an area online to provide support. The Internet Special
|
||
Interest Group (SIG) includes an active message forum where members
|
||
and staff can exchange useful information. Comprehensive guide books,
|
||
downloadable software, and information files are also available.
|
||
|
||
DELPHI has two membership plans: the 10/4 Plan is $10 per month and
|
||
includes the first 4 hours of use; additional use is $4 per hour. The
|
||
20/20 Advantage Plan is $20 per month, includes 20 hours of use, and
|
||
is only $1.80 per hour for additional time. The Internet service
|
||
option is an extra $3 per month and includes a generous transfer
|
||
allocation of 10 megabytes (the equivalent of about 3,000 type-written
|
||
pages). Access during business hours via Sprintnet or Tymnet carries
|
||
a surcharge.
|
||
|
||
Through a special trial membership offer, anyone interested in
|
||
learning more about DELPHI and the Internet can receive 5 hours of
|
||
access for free. To join, dial by modem, 1-800-365-4636 (current
|
||
Internet users should telnet to "delphi.com" instead). After
|
||
connecting, press return once or twice. At the Username prompt, enter
|
||
JOINDELPHI and at the password prompt, type INTERNETSIG. DELPHI Member
|
||
Service Representatives can also be reached by voice at
|
||
1-800-695-4005.
|
||
|
||
DELPHI is a service of General Videotex Corporation, a leading
|
||
developer of interactive and online services based in Cambridge,
|
||
Massachusetts. For more information, call either of the above numbers
|
||
or send email to Walt Howe, Internet SIG manager at
|
||
walthowe@delphi.com.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: 05 Dec 92 15:51:46 EST
|
||
From: Gordon Meyer <72307.1502@COMPUSERVE.COM>
|
||
Subject: File 5--Virus Destroyed Report on Drug Lord
|
||
|
||
Virus Destroyed Report on Drug Lord Say Colombian Officials
|
||
|
||
Colombian politicians allege a mysterious computer virus this week
|
||
wiped out conclusions of a Senate investigation into the jailbreak of
|
||
cocaine king Pablo Escobar just hours before the data was due to be
|
||
presented.
|
||
|
||
Reports from various committee members call the virus the "ghost of
|
||
La Catedral," a reference to the prison from which Escobar and nine
|
||
of his lieutenants escaped on July 22 during a bungled military
|
||
operation to transfer them to another prison.
|
||
|
||
"The committee's conclusions, reached after more than two months of
|
||
investigation, supposedly held top military officials, ministers and
|
||
former ministers responsible for the escape." REPRINTED FROM STREPORT
|
||
#8.46 WITH PERMISSION
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Tue, 8 Dec 1992 12:27:28 CST
|
||
From: LOVE%TEMPLEVM@PSUVM.PSU.EDU
|
||
Subject: File 6--COM DAILY ON F.C.C. TRANSITION
|
||
|
||
From Discussion of Government Document Issues <GOVDOC-L@PSUVM.BITNET>
|
||
|
||
* Communications Daily article on Clinton transition
|
||
appointment for Federal Communications Commission
|
||
(F.C.C.)
|
||
|
||
The following article, written by Art Brodsky (202/872-9202, x252), is
|
||
reprinted from the December 7, 1992 issue of Communications Daily,
|
||
with permission. Communications Daily is published by Warren
|
||
Publishing, Inc., 2115 Ward Court, N.W. Washington, DC 20037.
|
||
|
||
%Far End of Spectrum'
|
||
|
||
PLESSER TRANSITION APPOINTMENT DRAWS FIRE
|
||
|
||
Public interest groups friday criticized naming of Washington
|
||
attorney Ronald Plesser to head up communications issues for Clinton
|
||
transition effort (CD Dec4, p1). Groups said Plesser, partner in
|
||
Washington office of Baltimore law firm Piper & Marbury, represents
|
||
clients that characterize Washington special interests. As might be
|
||
expected, Plesser's appointment was defended by Clinton confidants.
|
||
|
||
Plesser will head one of 2 groups in science and technology
|
||
transition section led by ex-astronaut Sally Ride. Other group in
|
||
Ride's section will evaluate hard science agencies such as NASA and
|
||
National Science Foundation. Those transition groups were established
|
||
to assess policies and agencies, not to make appointment
|
||
recommendations. Personnel matters for permanent jobs are to be
|
||
handled by ex-S.C. Gov. Richard Riley (CD Nov 20 p1).
|
||
|
||
Clinton confidants praised Plesser's designation. "He's the
|
||
right guy," we were told. "He'll take a snapshot of the agency,"
|
||
covering budget needs, personnel and similar matters. Transition team
|
||
"will look to Ron for insights. He's the guy." Referring to much
|
||
speculation in press about what Clinton has in mind and who his
|
||
appointments might be, source said: "I wonder what on earth motivates
|
||
some of this stuff...most of which is wildly inaccurate."
|
||
|
||
Most criticism of Plesser centers on his advocacy on behalf of
|
||
Direct Marketing Assn. (DMA) and Information Industry Assn. (IIA),
|
||
particularly for advocating private sector control of databases
|
||
constructed by public agencies. Taxpayer Assets Project Dir. James
|
||
Love said Plesser "himself is the architect of the basic privatization
|
||
policies that came about in the Reagan Administration." Plesser, he
|
||
said, is "most ferocious opponent of librarians, citizen groups and
|
||
the research community, who want to broaden public access to
|
||
government, taxpayer-supported information systems. He's the devil
|
||
himself when it comes to government information policy."
|
||
|
||
Similarly, Marc Rotenberg, dir. of Washington office of Computer
|
||
Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR), said that "while there
|
||
is personal regard for Ron Plesser, there is not happiness about this
|
||
decision." Rotenberg said that Plesser's clients have great deal at
|
||
stake at FCC, including decisions on 800 number portability and
|
||
automatic number identification (ANI) that affect direct marketers, as
|
||
well as on video dial tone and access to networks. Plesser represents
|
||
"a far end of the spectrum in the policy debates," Rotenberg said. He
|
||
said CPSR's main concerns are in areas of privacy protection, public
|
||
access to govt. information, communications infrastructure. In each
|
||
of those areas, "Ron has been from our viewpoint on the opposite side
|
||
of the issue."
|
||
|
||
Rotenberg said that if transition effort is merely to be brief
|
||
fact-finding exercise, Clinton team could have sought out "someone
|
||
with less bias," perhaps in academic community. Jeff Chester, co-dir.
|
||
of Center for Media Education, said his group is "very concerned"
|
||
about Plesser because "of the special interest lobbying baggage he
|
||
carries with him." Chester said his group believes that Plesser's
|
||
appointment "places an extra burden, a double duty on the Clinton
|
||
Administration, to find people for the FCC and other
|
||
telecommunications policy positions who don't come with any kind of
|
||
lobbying baggage and reflect the kind of public interest concerns the
|
||
Commission definitely needs."
|
||
|
||
Transition team still having difficulty deciding how to apply its
|
||
proposed tough ethics requirements for Presidential appointees (CD Nov
|
||
5 p1). There's still been no decision as "to how deep the 5-year
|
||
restriction will be applied," we're told. That means, according to
|
||
sources, restrictions--when they finally come out--may not go below
|
||
Cabinet level. As for FCC appointees and top staffers (such as bureau
|
||
chiefs) brought in, it hasn't been decided whether attempt will be
|
||
made to extend period they couldn't practice or lobby agency to 5
|
||
years from one year. Proposal has been roundly criticized by
|
||
Democrats who are know to be, or expect to be, in line for top jobs in
|
||
Clinton Administration.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Thu, 10 Dec 92 17:28:07 EST
|
||
From: sara@GATOR.USE.COM(Sara Gordon)
|
||
Subject: File 7--Virus Conference (ACMBUL) Call for Papers
|
||
|
||
C A L L F O R P A P E R S
|
||
|
||
ACMBUL's 1st INTERNATIONAL COMPUTER VIRUS PROBLEMS AND
|
||
ALTERNATIVES CONFERENCE
|
||
|
||
April, 1993 - Varna, Bulgaria
|
||
|
||
The purpose of the 1993 International Computer Virus Conference is to
|
||
provide a forum for anti-virus product developers, researchers and
|
||
academicians to exchange information among themselves, the students,
|
||
the public and the industry. ICVC'93 will consist of open forums,
|
||
distinguished keynote speakers, and the presentation of high-quality
|
||
accepted papers. A high degree of interaction and discussion among
|
||
Conference participants is expected, as a workshop-like setting is
|
||
promoted.
|
||
|
||
Because ICVC'93 is a not-for-profit activity funded primarily by
|
||
registration fees, all participants are expected to have their
|
||
organizations bear the costs of their expenses and registration.
|
||
Accommodations will be available at reduced rates for conference
|
||
participants.
|
||
|
||
WHO SHOULD ATTEND
|
||
|
||
The conference is intended for computer security researchers,
|
||
managers, advisors, EDP auditors, network administrators, and help
|
||
desk personnel from government and industry, as well as other
|
||
information technology professionals interested in computer security.
|
||
|
||
CONFERENCE THEME
|
||
|
||
This Conference, devoted to advances in virus prevention, will
|
||
encompass developments in both theory and practice. Papers are
|
||
invited in the areas shown and may be theoretical, conceptual,
|
||
tutorial or descriptive in nature. Submitted papers will be refereed,
|
||
and those presented at the Conference will be included in the
|
||
proceedings.
|
||
|
||
Possible topics of submissions include, but are not restricted to:
|
||
|
||
o Virus Detection o Virus Trends and Forecast
|
||
o Virus Removal o Virus Prevention Policies
|
||
o Recovering from Viruses o Incident Reporting
|
||
o Viruses on various platforms o Emergency Response
|
||
(Windows, Unix, LANs, WANs, etc.) o Viruses and the Law
|
||
o Virus Genealogy o Education & Training
|
||
o The "Virusology" as scientific o Costs of virus protection
|
||
discipline o Communications and viruses
|
||
o Psychological aspects of computer
|
||
viruses
|
||
|
||
THE REFEREEING PROCESS
|
||
|
||
All papers and panel proposals received by the submission deadline and
|
||
which meet submission requirements will be considered for presentation
|
||
at the Conference.
|
||
|
||
All papers presented at ICVC'93 will be included in the Conference
|
||
proceedings, copies of which will be provided to Conference attendees.
|
||
All papers presented, will also be included in proceedings to be published
|
||
by the ACMBUL.
|
||
|
||
INSTRUCTIONS TO AUTHORS
|
||
|
||
[1] Two (2) copies of the full paper, consisting of up-to 20
|
||
double-spaced, typewritten quality pages, including diagrams, must
|
||
be received no later than 28 February 1993.
|
||
|
||
[2] The language of the Conference is English.
|
||
|
||
[3] The first page of the manuscript should include the title of
|
||
the paper, full name of all authors, their complete addresses
|
||
including affiliation, telephone numbers and e-mail addresses,
|
||
as well as an abstract of the paper.
|
||
|
||
[4] Authors willing to submit their manuscripts electronically
|
||
should contact the Organizering Committee at the address below.
|
||
|
||
IMPORTANT DATES
|
||
|
||
o Full papers to be received in camera-ready form by the Organizing
|
||
Committee by 28 February 1993.
|
||
|
||
o Notification of accepted papers will be mailed to the author on
|
||
or before 10 March 1993.
|
||
|
||
o Conference: 5-11 April 1993, St. Konstantine Resort, Varna, Bulgaria
|
||
|
||
WHOM TO CONTACT
|
||
|
||
Questions or matters related to the Conference Program should be directed
|
||
to the ACMBUL:
|
||
|
||
ICVC'93
|
||
Attn: Mr. Nickolay Lyutov
|
||
ACMBUL Office
|
||
Varna University of Economics
|
||
77 Boris I Blvd, 9002 P.O.Box 3
|
||
Varna
|
||
Bulgaria
|
||
|
||
Telephone/Fax: +359-52-236213
|
||
|
||
ICVC93@acmbul.bg
|
||
|
||
+++++
|
||
# "talk to me about computer viruses............"
|
||
# fax/voice: 219-277-8599 sara@gator.use.com
|
||
# data 219-273-2431 SGordon@Dockmaster.ncsc.mil
|
||
# fidomail 1:227/190 vfr@netcom.com
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Sun, 13 Dec 92 20:38:01 EST
|
||
From: Moderators <Cudigest@mindvox.phantom.com>
|
||
Subject: File 8--GRAY AREAS -- 'Zine Review
|
||
|
||
We've come across another new periodical, GRAY AREAS, that promises to
|
||
be a useful resource for anybody interested in counter-culture or
|
||
alternative lifestyles. As the name implies, GRAY AREAS intends to
|
||
focus on a broad range of topics that normally fall between the cracks
|
||
of conventional magazines, especially in the realm of technology,
|
||
music, video, art, and other snippets of (unconventional) culture.
|
||
According to the editorial statement of purpose:
|
||
|
||
GRAY AREAS exists to examine the gray areas of life. We hope
|
||
to unite people involved in all sorts of alternative
|
||
lifestyles and deviant subcultures. We are everywhere! We
|
||
feel that the government has done a great job of splitting
|
||
people up so that we do not identify with other minority
|
||
groups anymore. There are so many causes now that we often
|
||
do not talk to others not directly involved in our chosen
|
||
causes. We believe that the methods used to catch criminals
|
||
are the same regardless of the crime and that much can be
|
||
learned by studying how crimes in general are prosecuted and
|
||
how people's morals are judged. It is our mission to educate
|
||
people so they begin to care more about the world around
|
||
them. Please join our efforts by subscribing, advertising
|
||
your business with us and by spreading the word about what
|
||
we're up to.
|
||
|
||
The first issue (Fall, 1992) includes snippets of news, reviews of
|
||
books, alternative magazines, music, and videos, and other nifty
|
||
esoteria. Two feature-interviews captivated us. The first, with John
|
||
Barlow (by editor and publisher Netta Gilboa), is incisive and ranges
|
||
from The Grateful Dead to the EFF. The second, also by Gilboa, is
|
||
with former "X-rated" movie queen Kay Parker. The latter is a
|
||
sensitive look at the changes she has gone through in the past 20
|
||
years. The tenor of both interviews, as with much of the magazine
|
||
itself, is about personal and social transformation as we, and
|
||
society, move through a succession of phases as we age and change.
|
||
|
||
Upcoming features include an article on Howard Stern (New York
|
||
"shock-DJ"), audio sampling, law enforcement search & seizure,
|
||
interviews with John Trubee about prank phone calls, Jefferson
|
||
Airplane/Hot Tuna guitarist Jorma Kaukonen, porn director Candida
|
||
Royalle, criminal attorney and professional musician Barry Melton (an
|
||
original member of Country Joe & The Fish), and an interview with Bob
|
||
Dobbs. Some of the items reviewed in issue 2 will include a tape sold
|
||
to police departments on how to seize computers, and Bruce Sterling's
|
||
_Speaking_ _For_ _The_ _Unspeakable_, Mystic Fire's _Cyberpunk_.
|
||
|
||
The editors also plan to include an on-going series on viruses
|
||
and offer anonymity to virus writers and software crackers willing to
|
||
discuss their views of the issues.
|
||
|
||
The type of topics--rock music, films, off-beat cultural
|
||
interests--are the type that easily encourage fluff pieces and
|
||
superficial treatment. But, if the first issue of GRAY AREAS is
|
||
representative of what's to follow, there will be no fluff here. The
|
||
'Zine seems targeted to BBWBs (baby-boomers with brains) and appears
|
||
intended to reflect changing times with commentary and analysis by
|
||
those making the changes.
|
||
|
||
A one-year (four issue) subscription is available for $18 (US) or $24
|
||
(foreign), and a twelve-issue sub is $50 (US) or $75 (foreign). The
|
||
editors, Netta Gilboa and Alan Sheckter, can be contacted through
|
||
e-mail at GRAYAREA@WELL.SF.CA.US
|
||
|
||
For subscriptions, submissions, or other information, write:
|
||
GRAY AREAS
|
||
PO Box 808
|
||
Broomall, PA 19008-0808
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Sun, 6 Dec 92 07:47 EST
|
||
From: "Michael E. Marotta" <MERCURY@LCC.EDU>
|
||
Subject: File 9--Bibliography on codes and ciphers
|
||
|
||
number 006 CLACKER'S DIGEST December 6, 1992.
|
||
philosophy and applications for analytical engines
|
||
+++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||
A Cryptography Bibliography by mercury@well.sf.ca.us
|
||
|
||
(Technically, cryptography is MAKING codes while cryptanalysis is
|
||
BREAKING them. Both are subsumed under cryptology. A CIPHER is a
|
||
regular transposition such as A=Z, B=Y, etc., while a CODE is a table
|
||
of arbitrary symbols.)
|
||
|
||
Kahn, David, THE CODEBREAKERS, MacMillan, 1967. The MOST complete
|
||
history with specific examples. Written before public keys, RSA,
|
||
etc., but still THE place to start.
|
||
|
||
Marotta, Michael, THE CODE BOOK, Loompanics, 1987, Overview of history
|
||
and post-1967 developments.
|
||
|
||
Sinkov, Abraham, ELEMENTARY CRYPTANALYSIS: A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH,
|
||
Random House, 1968. Sinkov worked for Friedman on the breaking of
|
||
Purple. First rate.
|
||
|
||
Gaines, Helen Fouche, CRYPTANALYSIS, Dover, 1956. A classic work. The
|
||
first step to breaking codes and ciphers.
|
||
|
||
Lysing, Henry, SECRET WRITING, Dover, 1974. Another reprint of
|
||
another classic.
|
||
|
||
Smith, Laurence Dwight, CRYPTOGRAPHY, Dover, 1955. Ditto.
|
||
|
||
Konheim, Alan G., CRYPTOGRAPHY: A PRIMER, John Wiley, 1981. Textbook
|
||
for mathematicians from IBM's Watson Center. Includes public keys,
|
||
digital signatures.
|
||
|
||
Meyer, Carl H., and Matyas Stephen M., CRYPTOGRAPHY, John Wiley, 1982.
|
||
From IBM Cryptography Competency Center. For computers, includes
|
||
public keys, digital signatures.
|
||
|
||
Weber, Ralph E., UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC CODES AND CIPHERS 1775-1938,
|
||
Precedent, 1979. Not just a history! The appendix contains the
|
||
all the keys!!
|
||
|
||
Chadwick, THE DECIPHERMENT OF LINEAR B, Vintage, 1958. Worked with
|
||
Michael Ventris on unraveling Minoan script.
|
||
|
||
Yardley, Herbert O., THE AMERICAN BLACK CHAMBER, Ballantine 1981,
|
||
Random House, 1931. Yardley broke German ciphers in WWI and then
|
||
Japanese ciphers of 1920, and was fired in 1931 because "Gentlemen
|
||
don't read each other's mail."
|
||
|
||
(anonymous), THE DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD, National Bureau of
|
||
Standards, January 1977, NTIS NBS-FIPS PUB 46.
|
||
|
||
(anonymous), DATA SECURITY AND THE DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD,
|
||
|
||
National Bureau of Standards, 1978, Pub 500-27; CODEN: XNBSAV.
|
||
|
||
Rivest, Ronald L., Shamir, A., and Adleman, L., "A Method for
|
||
Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-key Cryptosystems,"
|
||
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, February, 1979. The last word.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: 13 Dec 92 14:00:21 EST
|
||
From: Emmanuel Goldstein <emmanuel@well.sf.ca.us>
|
||
Subject: File 10--Comments on the Nov. 2600 Disruption in D.C.
|
||
|
||
((MODERATORS' NOTE: Following is a letter to the editor of the
|
||
Washington Post that they chose not to print as a "Viewpoint."
|
||
The author, Emmanuel Goldstein, is editor of the magazine 2600,
|
||
which can be contacted at 2600 Magazine - PO Box 752 -
|
||
Middle Island, NY 11953. A yearly subscription is only $21 (US)).
|
||
|
||
While managing to convey some of the facts concerning the Pentagon
|
||
City Mall hacker incident on November 6, "Hackers Allege Harassment at
|
||
Mall" (November 13, page A1) fails to focus on the startling
|
||
revelation of federal government involvement and the ominous
|
||
implications of such an action. The article also does little to lessen
|
||
the near hysteria that is pumped into the general public every time
|
||
the word "hacker" is mentioned. Let us take a good look at what has
|
||
been confirmed so far. A group of computer hackers gathered at a local
|
||
mall as they do once a month. Similar meetings have been going on in
|
||
other cities for years without incident. This gathering was not for
|
||
the purposes of causing trouble and nobody has accused the hackers of
|
||
doing anything wrong. Rather, the gathering was simply a place to meet
|
||
and socialize. This is what people seem to do in food courts and it
|
||
was the hackers' intention to do nothing more.
|
||
|
||
When mall security personnel surrounded the group and demanded that
|
||
they all submit to a search, it became very clear that something
|
||
bizarre was happening. Those who resisted were threatened with arrest.
|
||
Everyone's names were written down, everyone's bags gone through. One
|
||
person attempted to write down the badge numbers of the people doing
|
||
this. The list was snatched out of his hand and ripped to pieces.
|
||
Another hacker attempted to catch the episode on film. He was
|
||
apprehended and the film was ripped from his camera. School books,
|
||
notepads, and personal property were seized. Much of it has still not
|
||
been returned. The group was held for close to an hour and then told
|
||
to stay out of the mall or be arrested.
|
||
|
||
This kind of treatment is enough to shock most people, particularly
|
||
when coupled with the overwhelming evidence and eyewitness accounts
|
||
confirming no unusual or disruptive behavior on the part of the group.
|
||
It is against everything that our society stands for to subject people
|
||
to random searches and official intimidation, simply because of their
|
||
interests, lifestyles, or the way they look. This occurrence alone
|
||
would warrant condemnation of a blatant abuse of power. But the story
|
||
doesn't end there.
|
||
|
||
The harassment of the hackers by the mall police was only the most
|
||
obvious element. Where the most attention should be focused at this
|
||
point is on the United States Secret Service which, according to Al
|
||
Johnson, head of mall security, "ramrodded" the whole thing. Other
|
||
media sources, such as the industry newsletter Communications Daily,
|
||
were told by Johnson that the Secret Service was all over the mall
|
||
that day and that they had, in effect, ordered the harassment.
|
||
Arlington police confirm that the Secret Service was at the mall that
|
||
day.
|
||
|
||
It is understood that the Secret Service, as a branch of the Treasury
|
||
Department, investigates credit card fraud. Credit card fraud, in
|
||
turn, can be accomplished through computer crime. Some computer
|
||
hackers could conceivably use their talents to accomplish computer
|
||
crime. Thus we arrive at the current Secret Service policy, which
|
||
appears to treat everybody in the hacker world as if they were a
|
||
proven counterfeiter. This feeling is grounded in misperceptions and
|
||
an apprehension that borders on panic. Not helping the situation any
|
||
is the everpresent generation gap - most hackers are young and most
|
||
government officials are not.
|
||
|
||
Apart from being disturbed by the gross generalizations that comprise
|
||
their policy, it seems a tremendous waste of resources to use our
|
||
Secret Service to spy on public gatherings in shopping malls. It seems
|
||
certain to be a violation of our rights to allow them to disrupt these
|
||
meetings and intimidate the participants, albeit indirectly. Like any
|
||
other governmental agency, it is expected that the Secret Service
|
||
follow the rules and not violate the constitutional rights of
|
||
citizens.
|
||
|
||
If such actions are not publicly condemned, we will in effect be
|
||
granting a license for their continuance and expansion. The incident
|
||
above sounds like something from the darkest days of the Soviet Union
|
||
when human rights activists were intimidated by government agents and
|
||
their subordinates. True, these are technology enthusiasts, not
|
||
activists. But who they are is not the issue. We cannot permit
|
||
governmental abuse of any person or group simply because they may be
|
||
controversial.
|
||
|
||
Why do hackers evoke such controversy? Their mere presence is an
|
||
inconvenience to those who want so desperately to believe the emperor
|
||
is wearing clothes. Hackers have a tendency of pointing out the
|
||
obvious inadequacies of the computer systems we entrust with such a
|
||
large and growing part of our lives. Many people don't want to be told
|
||
how flimsily these various systems are held together and how so much
|
||
personal data is readily available to so many. Because hackers manage
|
||
to demonstrate how simple it is to get and manipulate this
|
||
information, they are held fully responsible for the security holes
|
||
themselves. But, contrary to most media perceptions, hackers have very
|
||
little interest in looking at other people's personal files.
|
||
Ironically, they tend to value privacy more than the rest of us
|
||
because they know firsthand how vulnerable it is. Over the years,
|
||
hackers have gone to the media to expose weaknesses in our credit
|
||
reporting agencies, the grading system for New York City public
|
||
schools, military computer systems, voice mail systems, and even
|
||
commonly used pushbutton locks that give a false sense of security.
|
||
Not one of these examples resulted in significant media attention and,
|
||
consequently, adequate security was either delayed or not implemented
|
||
at all. Conversely, whenever the government chooses to prosecute a
|
||
hacker, most media attention focuses on what the hacker "could have
|
||
done" had he been malicious. This reinforces the inaccurate depiction
|
||
of hackers as the major threat to our privacy and completely ignores
|
||
the failure of the system itself.
|
||
|
||
By coming out publicly and meeting with other hackers and non-hackers
|
||
in an open atmosphere, we have dispelled many of the myths and helped
|
||
foster an environment conducive to learning. But the message we
|
||
received at the Pentagon City Mall tells us to hide, be secretive, and
|
||
not trust anybody. Perhaps that's how the Secret Service wants hackers
|
||
to behave. But we are not criminals and we refuse to act as such
|
||
simply because we are perceived that way by uninformed bureaucrats.
|
||
|
||
Regardless of our individual outlooks on the hacker issue, we should
|
||
be outraged and extremely frightened to see the Secret Service act as
|
||
they did. Whether or not we believe that hackers are decent people, we
|
||
must agree that they are entitled to the same constitutional freedoms
|
||
the rest of us take for granted. Any less is tantamount to a very
|
||
dangerous and ill-advised precedent.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
End of Computer Underground Digest #4.65
|
||
************************************
|
||
|
||
|
||
|