900 lines
44 KiB
Plaintext
900 lines
44 KiB
Plaintext
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Computer underground Digest Wed Oct 7, 1992 Volume 4 : Issue 49
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Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
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Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
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Shadow-Archivist: Dan Carosone
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Copy Editor: Etaion Jhrdleau, Sr.
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CONTENTS, #4.49 (Oct 7, 1992)
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File 1--Viruses--Facts and Myths
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File 2--Defense Conversion Hearing
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File 3--FBI Wiretap Scheme Examined
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File 4--Intl. Piracy
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File 5--SysLaw Announcement
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File 6--Cu News: Dept Store Fraud / "MY PC PAL"
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File 7--Brazilian Politics in Need of Encryption?
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File 8--Police Charge Toronto Teenager in 911 Case
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Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
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available at no cost from tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu. The editors may be
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contacted by voice (815-753-6430), fax (815-753-6302) or U.S. mail at:
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Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL 60115.
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Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest
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news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of
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LAWSIG, and DL0 and DL12 of TELECOM; on Genie in the PF*NPC RT
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libraries; from America Online in the PC Telecom forum under
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"computing newsletters;" on the PC-EXEC BBS at (414) 789-4210; and by
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anonymous ftp from ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) and ftp.ee.mu.oz.au
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Back issues also may be obtained from the mail server at
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mailserv@batpad.lgb.ca.us
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European distributor: ComNet in Luxembourg BBS (++352) 466893.
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COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
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information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
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diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted for non-profit as long
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as the source is cited. Some authors do copyright their material, and
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they should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that
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non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise
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specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles
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relating to computer culture and communication. Articles are
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preferred to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts
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unless absolutely necessary.
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DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
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the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all
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responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not
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violate copyright protections.
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Date: 25 Sep 92 00:57:29
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From: The Dark Adept <drkadpt@DRKTOWR.CHI.IL.US>
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Subject: File 1--Viruses--Facts and Myths
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Viruses--Facts and Myths
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by The Dark Adept
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This whole virus thing is a joke. Let me tell you why:
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What is a virus?
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----------------
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A virus is a tiny program that attaches itself to other programs. It does
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in fact operate as a biological virus does. It finds a victim program and
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infects it with a copy of itself. Then when the victim program is
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unsuspectingly run, the virus now inside it is activated. At this point,
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it can do one of two things: infect another program, or cause mischief.
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What do viruses do?
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-------------------
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Well, a number of things. Some erase your disks. Others print silly
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messages to your screen. In any case, a virus is not written like other
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programs are. It uses things that other programs normally don't. If your
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computer is infected by a virus, whenever you turn on the machine that
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virus is in the memory, and even if all it does is print "I want a cookie,"
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it can still interfere with other programs since they don't expect it to
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be there.
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How do people catch viruses?
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----------------------------
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Yikes! Here's where all the rumors are! You cannot get a virus from a modem,
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a printer, a CRT, etc. Viruses only come from other programs. So, whenever
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you add a program to your hard disk or run one off of a floppy, you stand
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a chance of catching a virus. Data files (files that are not programs, like
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text for your wordprocessor) cannot contain viruses. Only programs can
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contain viruses. On IBM PC's, programs usually end in ".exe" or ".com" and
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are the files that you run. The programs are the only ones that can contain
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viruses.
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The only way to activate the virus is to run the program. Say for example
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you got a new program called "game.exe". You put it on your hard drive,
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but you never run it (i.e., you never tried it). Even if game.exe has a virus
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in it, you WILL NOT catch it. The program has to be run at least once to make
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the virus active.
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Another thing is batch files. These are files on IBM PC's that end in ".bat".
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These DO NOT contain viruses. However, .bat files run other programs. So
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if the .bat file runs a program that has a virus, the virus WILL be activated.
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The cause is NOT the .bat file, but the program that was run BY the .bat
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file.
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Tell me more about these things...
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----------------------------------
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Ok. Viruses can only be made for specific machines. By this I mean
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that a virus that infects IBM PC's will NOT be able to infect Macs.
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There may be a tiny tiny chance if your Mac is running something like
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an IBM Emulator that a virus may cause problems, but in general, if
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you have a non-IBM compatible computer, and you can't run IBM software,
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then you can't catch IBM viruses and vice-versa.
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For the most part, only personal computers (i.e., IBM PC's and Macs) are
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affected by viruses. On IBM's, they are usually limited to DOS, so if
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you are running Unix on a 386 you don't really need to worry (yet).
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However, various flaws in NFS security and other technical aspects of
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computers mean that viruses could someday appear in other types of
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computers.
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The reason why personal computers have this problem and others don't is
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because of how they are designed. Personal computers of the past were
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designed for one user running only one program. So, they could use all
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the memory since it wouldn't hurt anyone else. On a mainframe or a Unix
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system, the hardware (and software) know that many people will be using
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it, so they are only allowed to use the memory given to them, and if
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they try and use another section of memory, the computer stops them. Viruses
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need access to memory that they shouldn't have, and on a personal computer,
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there is nothing to stop them from getting it.
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How do I *avoid* viruses?
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-------------------------
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That's like asking "how do I avoid VD?" The answer is "don't stick it in
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your slot unless you know where it's been." If you buy the software from
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a computer store, you don't have to worry. Once in a million there might
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be some type of problem, but in general, store purchased software will
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NEVER have a virus.
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If you copy a program from a buddy, then you might have to think twice.
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Where did he get it from? How many times has it been in someone else's
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computer? The same goes for software you download with a modem.
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The only way to complete ensure you never get a virus with 100% certainty
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is to allow no outside contact with your computer. This is called a
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"sterile environment" or a "Kosher komputer". This means that you cannot
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use disks in your computer that have been in other computers, and you cannot
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put any type of software in your computer that has not been purchased
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from a store. In other words, the only "safe software" is "no software".
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If you noticed, computer viruses operate a lot like biological viruses.
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In fact, they mostly operate like venereal disease. So look at viruses
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the same way as you would at VD. The only 100% assurance you have against
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infection is abstinence (from using outside programs and disks). If
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for some reason you cannot do this, then you must protect yourself.
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How do I protect myself? Is there a "computer condom"?
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-------------------------------------------------------
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In a nutshell, the answer is NO NO NO!! Do not believe those
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ads for anti-virus this and that. It's crap. Like a condom, they
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*help* protect against infection, but there are no guarantees. Whenever
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you put something in your (disk) slot, you still run a chance of being
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infected - the "condom" may break or be infected itself.
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Well, what are the different types of protection available?
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-----------------------------------------------------------
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There are 3 main types of "anti-virus" software available:
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o Scanners
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o Detectors
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o Removers
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+++Scanners+++
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--------------
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Each virus has what the anti-virus geeks call a "footprint". What this
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means is that there is a sequence of "characters" that uniquely identify
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the virus. For example, say someone gave you a book with no title or
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description or whatnot and said, "Can you tell me if this is Hamlet by
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Billy Shakespeare?" Being a virus wizard, you would say "Sure!" What
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you would do is then look at all the text for the words "to be or not to be".
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If you found them, then the book would be Hamlet. This is what virus scanners
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do. They are programmed with an identifying "phrase" or footprint for
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all known viruses. Then they look at each of your programs. If one
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of them contains "to be or not to be" then it means that the Hamlet virus
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has infected your program.
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Those of you who have drank your coffee this morning might realize that
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this doesn't help an awful lot. For one thing, what if the text isn't
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Hamlet but a review of Hamlet that has a sentence "Hamlet's soliloquy which
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begins with 'to be or not to be' is the most moving part of the play." Well,
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the virus scanner would see "to be or not to be" and think it is a virus!
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Of course, it would be wrong. Another thing is say I write a new virus,
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and the anti-virus cronies haven't seen it yet. Its footprint wouldn't
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be in the scanner. So the scanner wouldn't know it was a virus.
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A final problem is that the scanner will only really protect you if it
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scans the program *correctly* before you ever run it. Once you run it,
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if you haven't scanned it or the scanner didn't pick anything up, and there
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is a virus inside, you're toast. After you run the program, if you then
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run the scanner, sure it will pick it up, but that's like going to the
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doctor who tells you that you have the clap after you've got it. The
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scanner is most effective when used before ever running the program. It
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is also useful for giving your system a "check-up" every once in a while
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to make sure something didn't slip by. However, again, now you already
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have contracted the virus and now must worry about getting rid of it.
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So, if you're going to use a scanner, remember this:
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+ You must have a current version so that the new footprints are in there.
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+ It works best when you scan programs *BEFORE* they are run for the
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first time.
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+ It might miss some or give you false results, so don't rely on it
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completely.
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+++Detectors+++
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---------------
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What the detectors do is watch for virus activity. For example, some
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viruses try and erase your hard disk. What a detector does is sit in
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the background and watches for an illegal or abnormal attempt to do
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something to the hard disk. Then all sorts of alarms and bells go off
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("Warning Will Robinson! Warning!") and the detector tries to stop
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the virus from doing it. Some will also ask you if you want to allow
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whatever action is taking place since you might actually be trying to
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format your hard disk.
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Another thing that some detectors do is a checksum/byte count check on
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your files. Remember that a virus *adds* itself to another program.
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So what the detector does is make a list of all the programs on your drive
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and remembers what they look like. Then, when a virus changes one, the
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detector notices this, and gives you a warning like "Program games.exe
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failed checksum!" and asks you if you still want to run it.
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You must know that the detector only checks program files. It would be a
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real pain if every time you changed your term paper the detector went off.
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However, this is not a weakness since only program files can contain
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the viruses.
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It may seem that detectors are the answer, but they are not. Remember,
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the detector only detects virus activity. This means that you already
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have a virus running around in your system. It will help stop the damage,
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but the infection is already there. Another problem is that you must
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remember that the detector is hiding in the background watching. Some
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programs don't expect the detector to be there, and freak out (just like
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they don't expect the viruses to be there either). So the detector might
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interfere with other programs. The better detectors are well-written so
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as to avoid this, but even then there might be problems.
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So, if you are going to use a detector, remember this:
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+ Detectors help stop damage caused by viruses.
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+ If it detects virus activity, you are already infected.
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+ You must buy a good one so that all types of virus activity are
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detected.
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+ The detector may interfere with other programs.
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+++Removers+++
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--------------
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Also called "disinfectors." What these programs do is get rid of
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the virus infection in your computer. Once you have detected an infection,
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you have to get rid of it. However, like with cancer, that means cutting
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something out usually. Nine times out of ten, a disinfector will have to
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delete *ALL* the programs that are infected. Gone. Erased. Never to come
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back. Some can get out the virus without deleting files, but this is
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rare. It depends on how good the disinfector is and what type of virus
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it is. The remover is probably the most crucial piece of anti-virus
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software.
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So, if you are going to use a remover (and you should), remember this;
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+ Files (maybe important ones) will be deleted, so you need backup
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copies of your software at all times (you should have this anyhow).
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Who makes this and where can I get it? What do *you* use?
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----------------------------------------------------------
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There are a lot of companies who make this type of software. I've tried
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a bunch, and my *personal* favorite is made by Central Point Software.
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It comes in two types of packages:
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+ PC Tools Deluxe
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+ Central Point Anti-Virus
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PC Tools deluxe has 2 main anti-virus items: PCBackup and VDefend. What
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PCBackup does is backup your hard drive. You should be doing this anyhow.
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What it also does, however, is there is an option to scan as it backs up.
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What this means is before it backs up the program, it checks it for
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a virus like a scanner would. This is important. Say you backup your
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disk every month. Then like 3 weeks later you find that your word
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processor and some other programs are infected by a virus. You disinfect
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your disk, and go to install the back up copies. What if the backups are
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infected? You're back to square one. PCBackup helps to ensure that your
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backups are virus-free. And, like I said under scanners, you need the
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current version. Well, good news. The data file where all the footprints
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are is updated regularly and can be obtained at no cost (last time I checked)
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from Central Point via modem. So you don't need to buy a new copy of
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PC Tools every month, just get the new footprint file.
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VDefend is a virus detector with a lot of neat options. It is also part
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of the PC Tools Deluxe package. PC Tools deluxe is a nice product and
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well written and I like it. If you like Norton's software, that is good,
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too, and so are many others. I just happen to prefer PC Tools. So, you
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get a lot more for your money than virus detection. Check it out at
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your software store.
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Now, the mother of all anti-virus software is Central Point Anti-Virus.
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This is a killer package. All you could want and more. I've used it a
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couple of times, but it is more than I need. Either I'm not paranoid
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or I'm too trusting. However, if you want state-of-the-art TopGrade A-1
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anti-virus protection, this is it. It also has a disinfector built in
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and a lot of other goodies.
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Now, why do I prefer these packages? I'll be honest with you. A lot
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of the other anti-virus companies are in it strictly for the money. The
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bigger the virus scare, the more money they make. Remember the
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Michaelangelo virus? That was a load of crap. It was a simple virus.
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There are a lot more dangerous ones out there, and they are more widespread.
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These companies make *only* anti-virus packages, so they need the hype
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to survive. Central Point and a few others are not in the anti-virus
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industry per se. They are regular software companies who also offer
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anti-virus software. Their programming experience is more widespread
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than those who concentrate on viruses alone, and this means that their
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software should be better in general. Why? Well, look at it this way:
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Say you want to add an equalizer to your stereo. Now, do you want the
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salesperson to know about stereos in general, or just about equalizers?
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Shouldn't he know how equalizers interact with the rest of the system?
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A software company that creates various pieces of software will know how
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they interact and perform.
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Further, an investigation into the history of some of these companies,
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like McAfee and Associates, brings up questions about their competence
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in this type of work. I ask you to draw your own conclusions, but as
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a hint as to what I am referring, try and see what type of work McAfee
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was involved in before viruses.
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However, since I took a shot at McAfee, I must also state this: I have
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known people to use McAfee's software and be 100% satisfied with no
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complaints. They like McAfee's software and continue to use it. It
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works for them and meets their needs. I hate both McAfee and his software,
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and I refuse to use it ever, so you must decide for yourself.
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Out of the general software houses, I like Central Point's goods. So those
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are my reasons for why I chose it: 1) It is one of the reputable companies,
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and, 2) Out of those reputable companies, this software has what I want.
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Some people will say "You are picking on the little guys trying to start out."
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Maybe. I wouldn't if this were a word processor where if something is
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screwy in version 1, you can live til version 2. But this is for your
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protection. Would you rather buy a gun made by Smith and Wesson or
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Uncle Bob's Bullet Co.? When it comes down to protection, you don't
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want any misfirings, and you must rely on reputation.
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So, if you are going to buy "anti-virus" software, remember this:
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+ Well-known, reputable, and experienced companies with good user
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support like Central Point, Norton, etc. are preferred.
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+ Out of those companies, pick the one that best suits *your* needs.
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Everyone's system differs. You might love using Norton's backup
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program, so you just want virus protection and not the full PCTools.
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Etc., etc., etc. Look at all the software and see what you need and
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want.
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Myths
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-----
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Finally, I would like to expose some myths and misconceptions about
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viruses:
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"They threaten net connectivity"
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--------------------------------
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If by "net" you mean the Internet, this is 100% false. The machines
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connected to the net do NOT run programs from other machines, so cannot
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be infected by them. They merely store programs from other machines. It
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would be like if a friend asked you to put that game.exe program on your
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disk and hold it for him until he had space on his. As long as you
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don't use it, you won't be injured by just storing it.
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Another thing to remember is that most viruses are for personal computers
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and most machines on the Internet are NOT personal computers, so the
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viruses won't affect them anyhow.
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The only role that the Internet plays in virus propagation (the spreading
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of viruses) is that if someone gets a program from the Internet for his PC
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and runs it he might get infected. But remember that you could also
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get infected by getting a program from a friend. The Internet, therefore,
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is not threatened by nor the cause of virus contamination.
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However, if by "net" you mean the LAN at work, then this is true. A lot
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of viruses spread rapidly through LAN networks, so if one machine gets
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infected, all of them can. This is because all the personal computers
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on the LAN run the same programs. Again, the cause here is the running
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of the program by computers on the net. Internet computers generally
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do not run the programs that contain viruses.
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If some idiot says that their Internet connection should be severed due
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to virus propagation, that would be like saying we should shut down Lake
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Shore Drive in Chicago since a bank robber might drive down it to get
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away. Sure it provides a path for viruses (bank robbers), but 99% of
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the time it is providing a path for legitimate purposes (law abiding
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citizens).
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"BBS's are the major cause of virus spreading"
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----------------------------------------------
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FALSE FALSE FALSE!! The major cause of virus spreading is LAN's and
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also copying from friends. BBS's merely store programs that you can copy
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and most people who run BBS's try and make sure none of them have viruses.
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A BBS is just copying from a friend over a modem. BBS's do not need to
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be shut down or restricted because of viruses. It is up to *you* to
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protect yourself from *any* program contamination no matter where
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you copy the program from (i.e., a friend or BBS).
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Some of you may have heard of Virus Exchange BBS's. Let me explain what
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this is:
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Any type of program ever written starts out as a "source file". This is
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a regular text file made by a word processor that contains instructions
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for a computer. This source file must be fed into either an "assembler" or
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a "compiler" to become a program that can run. This is true whether the
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program is a spreadsheet or a virus (viruses are programs, just very very
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tiny ones).
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Now the source file can have all of the program in it, or just part. The
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rest would be in other source files. So, for example, if you look at your
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wordprocessor in two parts you might see that one thing it does is let you
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type stuff in, and the other part is it lets you print things out. So
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it might have 2 source files: 1) tells the computer how to let you type
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||
things in, and 2) tells the computer how to print things out.
|
||
|
||
A virus is made up of two basic parts: an infector and a destructor.
|
||
The INFECTOR is the part of the program which hides the virus and makes
|
||
it spread. The DESTRUCTOR is the mischief maker. This is the part
|
||
that draws crazy pictures on your screen or erases a file on you.
|
||
|
||
Now on these virus exchange BBS's, they 99% of the time just have virus
|
||
SOURCE FILES not virus programs. The source files CANNOT cause infection.
|
||
They must be fed to an assembler or a compiler first to become a program.
|
||
Remember that for a virus to become active it must be run as a program.
|
||
These BBS's do not distribute virus programs, but virus source files.
|
||
|
||
Furthermore, most of the source code for viruses on these BBS's is just
|
||
the INFECTOR part. This is what the programmers are interested in. This
|
||
is where the innovation and creativity and "wow! Nice piece of code!"
|
||
happens. The DESTRUCTOR is very basic and any idiot can do one: "del *.*".
|
||
People who run VXB's (Virus eXchange Boards) are interested in code for the
|
||
INFECTOR and the DESTRUCTOR is worthless.
|
||
|
||
In other words, they are merely giving out the blueprints and not the
|
||
bomb itself.
|
||
|
||
Some jerks argue that this in itself should be illegal. Well, another
|
||
article will deal with that, so please hold comments on this
|
||
aspect until after I have presented my position.
|
||
|
||
For right now, let me just say that in a nutshell, Virus Exchange BBS's do
|
||
NOT DIRECTLY cause infections. I think even the so-called "experts" would
|
||
agree with that.
|
||
|
||
"The first virus was written by..."
|
||
-----------------------------------
|
||
No one knows. However, if you were to ask me, I will say the first
|
||
virus was written by the first person who made copy-protection. Why?
|
||
Having the benefit of looking at both copy-protection and virus source
|
||
code, I can tell you that they do things the same way. The infector
|
||
part of the virus wants to hide itself and so does the copy-protection.
|
||
They both use the same types of methods to do so. Both also make programs
|
||
unusable if certain conditions are met. If it is a copy, the copy-protection
|
||
stops it from working properly. If it is an infected program that meets
|
||
the criteria for the destructor part of the virus to start, the virus
|
||
kicks in the destructor and does its job.
|
||
|
||
Again, please notice I am comparing the copy-protection with the infector, and
|
||
not the word processor with the destructor. The copy-protection and the
|
||
infector only differ in that the infector affects more than one program
|
||
and that the actual reason for both being there (the word-processor vs.
|
||
the destructor) are different. They both perform the same job - protection
|
||
and sustenance of the main program.
|
||
|
||
From this idea of small programs that operate to protect a piece of software
|
||
known as copy-protection sprang forth the first viruses. So next time
|
||
you buy a piece of copy protected software you know who to thank for
|
||
your screwed up harddrive ("wah! but we don't write them!" no, but
|
||
you gave them the idea and techniques! Plus, copy protection is for loser
|
||
companies that don't give decent support to registered users thereby
|
||
creating a huge incentive to register a product. Enuff said.).
|
||
|
||
Another important similarity is that the techniques for removing copy
|
||
protection from a program and removing a virus from an infected file while
|
||
retaining the file are very similar (I've done both a few times).
|
||
|
||
"We're all doomed!! It's Michaelangelo!!"
|
||
-----------------------------------------
|
||
Yeah, eat me. I have been using computers for about 11 years. I have
|
||
been on everything from a Timex Sinclair to a Cray. I've had things on
|
||
my system you wouldn't feed to your dog. How many times have I been
|
||
infected by a virus? ZERO
|
||
|
||
I deal with over 100 computer-related people per day (I'm a graduate
|
||
student in Computer Science). Here is what contact I've had with virus
|
||
infection:
|
||
|
||
When I was an undergrad at the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana
|
||
(I started out in Electrical Engineering), the Mac labs got infected by
|
||
a virus. Rumor has it that it was caused by someone using an infected
|
||
copy of MacPlaymate (an X-rated video game for Macs) on one of the computers.
|
||
|
||
Last year, the PC-LAN at Loyola University of Chicago was slightly infected
|
||
by Michaelangelo, and one of the professors' PC's caught it because a student
|
||
handed in his infected programming assignment (it got infected because he
|
||
wrote it on the LAN). So, everyone who handed in their program got infected
|
||
if they reran the program when it was returned. Like 2 more people got
|
||
infected this way.
|
||
|
||
A friend of mine got infected by using an infected copy of a pirated video
|
||
game (serves him right hehehe!).
|
||
|
||
So, for someone who uses a computer every day and knows mostly computer
|
||
people, I have personally know 4 people and 2 sites that were infected
|
||
by viruses, and this is over 11 years.
|
||
|
||
Total damage? Not much. Nothing Anti-Virus and equivalent type software
|
||
couldn't fix and a quick restore from some backups.
|
||
|
||
So next time they yell "The sky is falling," tell them to line their
|
||
pockets somewhere else. You should protect yourself, but it's not the
|
||
end of the world.
|
||
|
||
In fact the only time my harddrive got erased on accident was when I was
|
||
installing OS/2. It was my fault for not reading the directions. Oops!
|
||
|
||
"They endanger National Security and the military!"
|
||
---------------------------------------------------
|
||
Hahahahahahaha! All I have to say is that most viruses (like 99.9%)
|
||
attack only personal computers, and any military or government that depends
|
||
on personal computers for national security and weaponry has more problems
|
||
than viruses. And furthermore, what are they doing letting missile officers
|
||
run MacPlaymate on the missile control computer anyhow?
|
||
|
||
Conclusion
|
||
----------
|
||
I just hoped I made this virus thing clearer. This is not based
|
||
on any virus "expertise" I have, just a thorough knowledge of
|
||
computers and my experience with them (which is extensive). I am not a
|
||
"virus expert" nor am I a virus author. But next time someone tries to
|
||
scare you or calls themselves a "virus professional" call them an idiot.
|
||
Just use common sense, make backups, and maybe get a piece of software from
|
||
a good company. No one is "out to get you". Most of the virus authors
|
||
are teenagers and are actually nice guys who just like to write intricate
|
||
programs -- they don't even spread them around! PHALCON/SKISM is a good
|
||
example. They don't even want to format a hard drive, just have a little
|
||
fun programming. Once in a while one of their "projects" might get out
|
||
of hand, but they're not there to make your life miserable. Sure I'd be
|
||
pissed at em if Flight Simulator got infected, but no biggie. Just clean
|
||
up and reinstall. Don't blame someone else if you don't make backups.
|
||
|
||
So have phun, and: "Don't worry; be happy!"
|
||
|
||
P.S. Sara(h) Gordon: Your rebuttal to Phrack touched me. Right about...
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
...there.
|
||
|
||
NOT!
|
||
|
||
(thanks Sarlo)
|
||
|
||
Tiny Bibliography
|
||
-----------------
|
||
40HEX - the Journal of viruses published by PHALCON/SKISM. Contains
|
||
new viruses by P/S and a lot of source code. Great reading for
|
||
programmers, virus authors, and copy-protection people. I've used some
|
||
of their disk access tricks for utilities I've written for my 386
|
||
system that bypass the device drivers. They also provide an excellent
|
||
and professional analysis of virus code with commented source code
|
||
from time to time. Tells ya how the varmints really tick. 4 stars!
|
||
(When's the next issue, guys?!?)
|
||
|
||
Hell Pit BBS - Of Sara(h) Gordon fame. If you want to see what a
|
||
Virus Exchange BBS is like and why all the screaming, bitching, and whining
|
||
that Sara(h) and the other people who call themselves "anti-virus"
|
||
people is for nothing, give it a call. Just don't run anything you download.
|
||
Most of it is source code, anyhow. Some of it is Sara(h) Gordon's source code.
|
||
I wonder if ACM would approve of her "research" in virus propagation?
|
||
I hope Hell Pit is still up. Sarah(s) crap caused Kato a lot of trouble
|
||
including making people think it was a Fed sting operation (lie).
|
||
|
||
Various hacker nets - like DarkStar, CyberCrime, etc. A lot
|
||
of virus authors can be contacted on these FidoNet type BBS's. Most of
|
||
them will answer any question about viruses you have unless you get
|
||
too specific like "Duh, what did you write?" or too idiotic like
|
||
"Viruses are terrible! Look at what Michaelangelo did!" (not much).
|
||
|
||
That's just a start, but if you're curious about what viruses really are,
|
||
don't ask those "anti-virus" goobers, ask the authors.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 1992 13:29:05 -0400
|
||
From: "(Gary Chapman)" <chapman@SILVER.LCS.MIT.EDU>
|
||
Subject: File 2--Defense Conversion Hearing
|
||
|
||
The Department of Defense has set up a Defense Conversion Commission,
|
||
which is traveling around the country to conduct hearings on local
|
||
conversion requirements. So far there have been hearings in Atlanta;
|
||
Long Beach, California; St. Louis; Dallas; Groton, Connecticut; and
|
||
Seattle. The public hearings last one day, and the commission also
|
||
visits sites of major defense contractors and speaks to the local
|
||
press about defense conversion. The commission is scheduled to
|
||
release a report on its findings no later than December 31.
|
||
|
||
On September 24th, the commission held its hearing in Seattle and
|
||
testifying on behalf of CPSR and The 21st Century Project was
|
||
Professor Philip Bereano, professor of technology and public policy at
|
||
the University of Washington. Phil spoke for ten minutes -- the
|
||
alloted time for each hearing witness -- about The 21st Century
|
||
Project and its program of democratizing U.S. technology policy and
|
||
redirecting research and development programs to peaceful and
|
||
environmentally responsible goals.
|
||
|
||
There were eighteen other hearing witnesses testifying, representing a
|
||
broad range of public interest and business organizations, including
|
||
Washington State SANE/Freeze, Seattle Women Act for Peace, and the
|
||
Washington Association of Churches. Professional organizations
|
||
represented included the Seattle Professional Engineering Employees
|
||
Association and the IEEE Engineering Manpower Committee. There was
|
||
also testimony from the King County Diversification Committee, the
|
||
local commission on economic conversion.
|
||
|
||
There are six members of the commission, most of them Pentagon
|
||
officials; there is one representative from the Department of Labor,
|
||
and one from the President's Council of Economic Advisers. It is
|
||
chaired by David J. Berteau, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
|
||
Production and Logistics, and former director of the DoD's Office of
|
||
Economic Adjustment. The representative from the Department of Labor
|
||
(and the only woman on the panel) is Robin Higgins, Assistant
|
||
Secretary of Labor for Veteran's Employment and Training, a former
|
||
Marine officer, and widow of Colonel William R. Higgns, the Marine
|
||
officer captured and executed by Lebanese terrorists in 1988.
|
||
|
||
For more information about the commission and its work, contact the
|
||
Commission on Defense Conversion, 1825 K Street, N.W., Suite 310,
|
||
Washington, D.C. 20006, or call (202) 653-1664.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 1992 17:05:06 PDT
|
||
From: "(Nikki Draper)" <draper@CSLI.STANFORD.EDU>
|
||
Subject: File 3--FBI Wiretap Scheme Examined
|
||
|
||
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
|
||
Contact: Nikki Draper (415) 322-3778
|
||
|
||
Computer Public Advocacy Group To Examine FBI Wiretap Scheme
|
||
at October Annual Meeting.
|
||
|
||
Palo Alto, Calif., October 1, 1992 -- Computer Professionals for
|
||
Social Responsibility (CPSR), the national public interest
|
||
organization based here, will take an in-depth look at its recent suit
|
||
against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) during CPSR's 1992
|
||
Annual Meeting, October 17th and 18th at Stanford University in Palo
|
||
Alto, Calif. CPSR Legal Counsel, David Sobel, will talk about the FBI
|
||
suit for the first time since it was filed and moderate a panel
|
||
discussion on the politics of cryptography at the annual meeting. The
|
||
CPSR annual meeting is a provocative two-day conference that addresses
|
||
critical issues facing society as a result of information technology.
|
||
|
||
CPSR filed suit against the FBI in September, after the Bureau failed
|
||
to make public documents that would justify the need for its new
|
||
wiretap proposal. The FBI proposal would redesign the telephone
|
||
network to make wiretapping easier. Recognizing the importance of
|
||
cryptography policy, CPSR catalyzed a national debate earlier this
|
||
year, as to whether or not the FBI and National Security Agency (NSA)
|
||
should be involved in setting the technical standards for the computer
|
||
and communications industry.
|
||
|
||
The panel discussion will include a screening and discussion of film
|
||
clips from the movie, Sneakers. Panelists include, Joan Feigenbaum,
|
||
Technical Staff, Computing Principles Research, ATT Bell Labs, John
|
||
Gilmore, founder of Cygnus Support, and Dave Banisar, CPSR Policy
|
||
Analyst.
|
||
|
||
CPSR's annual meeting will bring together computer scientists from
|
||
across the country to examine the relationship between politics and
|
||
technology. Other topics include:
|
||
|
||
* Teledemocracy & Citizen Participation:
|
||
Beyond the Electronic Town Meeting,
|
||
|
||
This session is an election year look at the dangers and the
|
||
opportunities of electronic democracy. Speaker, Susan G. Hadden,
|
||
professor in the LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at
|
||
Austin, an expert on telecommunications and citizen participation.
|
||
|
||
* Everything's Digital! Media Convergence: Hope, Hype or Hell?
|
||
|
||
This session examines the social implications of multimedia
|
||
convergence which is the merging of computer, telephone, and video
|
||
technology. Panel discussion with David Bunnell, Editor, New Media,
|
||
Denise Caruso, Editor, Digital Media, and Howard Rheingold, Whole
|
||
Earth Review
|
||
|
||
* Envisioning Technology Policy in a Democratic Society;
|
||
|
||
A panel of technologists looks at the development of American
|
||
technology policy. Panelists include, Gary Chapman, The 21st Century
|
||
Project, Judy Stern, CPSR/Berkeley, Claire Zvanski, SEIU Local 790.
|
||
|
||
President of Interval Research, Dave Liddle, will be the keynote
|
||
speaker at CPSR's awards banquet Saturday evening. Liddle will be
|
||
speaking on the Computing in the 21st Century. IBM researcher,
|
||
Barbara Simons will be presented with the 1992 Norbert Wiener Award
|
||
for Social and Professional Responsibility in Computing.
|
||
|
||
Founded in 1981, CPSR is a national, non-profit, public interest
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: 05 Oct 92 19:05:29 EDT
|
||
From: Gordon Meyer <72307.1502@COMPUSERVE.COM>
|
||
Subject: File 4--Intl. Piracy
|
||
|
||
Congress Urged to Strengthen International Intellectual Property Laws
|
||
|
||
Foreign copyright piracy of computer software, as well as movies,
|
||
books, and music and audio recordings costs U.S. firms between $12
|
||
billion and $15 billion in trade losses each year, says the
|
||
International Intellectual Property Alliance.
|
||
|
||
The Alliance told a Senate Judiciary subcommittee on patents,
|
||
copyrights and trademarks that losses in Mexico alone -- which were
|
||
not included in the international study -- topped $150 million
|
||
annually.
|
||
|
||
Eric Smith, director of the Alliance, said that although Mexico has
|
||
new intellectual property laws, "the situation in Mexico is still
|
||
quite serious."
|
||
|
||
He urged Congress to increase U.S. anti-piracy teams to crack down on
|
||
foreign copying operations and aid to foreign nations to help them
|
||
write tougher laws and enforce them.
|
||
|
||
Countries where piracy is particularly prevalent include Italy,
|
||
Taiwan, Eastern Europe, Russia, China, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador,
|
||
Guatemala and Honduras. Brazil and Venezuela are considered problem
|
||
nations especially for software piracy.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: 02 Oct 92 11:13:46 EDT
|
||
From: Lance Rose <72230.2044@COMPUSERVE.COM>
|
||
Subject: File 5--SysLaw Announcement
|
||
|
||
NEW SYSLAW BOOK! MASSIVELY REVISED AND EXPANDED!
|
||
|
||
SysLaw, Second Edition: The Legal Guide for Online Service Providers
|
||
by Lance Rose, Esq., and Jonathan Wallace, Esq.
|
||
|
||
SysLaw provides BBS sysops, network moderators and other online
|
||
service providers with basic information on their rights and
|
||
responsibilities, in a form that non-lawyers can easily understand.
|
||
Subjects covered include the First Amendment, copyrights and
|
||
trademarks, the user agreement, negligence, privacy, criminal law,
|
||
searches and seizures, viruses and adult materials. SysLaw not only
|
||
explains the laws, it gives detailed advice enabling system operators
|
||
to create the desired balance of user services, freedom, and
|
||
protection from risk on their systems.
|
||
|
||
SysLaw is available from PC Information Group, 800-321-8285 or
|
||
507-452-2824, and located at 1126 East Broadway, Winona, MN 55987.
|
||
You may order by credit card or by mail. Price is $34.95 plus $3.00
|
||
shipping and (if applicable) sales tax. Price is subject to change
|
||
after January 1, 1993. For additional information, please contact
|
||
publisher Brian Blackledge at 800-321-8285.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: 03 Oct 92 11:54:38 EDT
|
||
From: Gordon Meyer <72307.1502@COMPUSERVE.COM>
|
||
Subject: File 6--Cu News: Dept Store Fraud / "MY PC PAL"
|
||
|
||
DEPARTMENT STORE COMPUTER FRAUD
|
||
|
||
The US Attorney's Office in Sacramento, California has announced an
|
||
indictment against a Fresno department store for using a 'special
|
||
computer program' to alter its financial records. The store,
|
||
Gottschalks, has pled guilty to three criminal counts and has agreed
|
||
to pay 1.5 million dollars in fines for taking illegal tax deductions
|
||
and violating securities exchange laws. The store reportedly
|
||
developed the program to overstate sales, supposedly by nearly half a
|
||
million dollars in one quarter, allowing it to claim a profit when it
|
||
was really operating at a loss. (Information Week, August 3, 1992: 10).
|
||
|
||
MY COMPUTER, MY FRIEND.
|
||
|
||
Logitech, Inc recently completed a "PC's and People" survey in which
|
||
98% of the 300 computer users surveyed indicated that they feel they
|
||
have personal relationships with their machines. In addition, 13%
|
||
said they ascribe personalities to their machines, while 9% admitted
|
||
that they have named them. At least 50% said they consider their
|
||
computers to be extensions of themselves. (CompuServe Magazine,
|
||
October 1992: 8)
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: 7 Oct 92 15:24:01
|
||
From: Moderators <tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu>
|
||
Subject: File 7--Brazilian Politics in Need of Encryption?
|
||
|
||
Sometimes those suspected of massive offenses should either learn to
|
||
use computers properly or else not commit crimes. The current
|
||
Brazilian political scandals, which threaten to topple President
|
||
Fernando Collor de Mello, escalated this week when Brazilian
|
||
investigators began exploring the computer files of a man reportedly
|
||
at the center of the political corruption, Paulo Cesar ("PC") Farias.
|
||
According to an article in England's GUARDIAN WEEKLY (Oct 4, 1992 -
|
||
thanks to Bruce Sterling for sending it over), unencrypted data files
|
||
may provide considerable information describing the extent of his
|
||
involvement in Brazilian corruption. According to the article:
|
||
|
||
Under the filename "Collor", they ((the investigators)) had
|
||
found a list of several of the biggest government ministries,
|
||
beneath each of which were listed in methodical fashion the
|
||
main projects in that ministry, the value of the contracts
|
||
allocated and the commissions charged.
|
||
|
||
One of the most interesting entries concerned the Xingo
|
||
hydro-electric power station--the only large development
|
||
project undertaken by the Collor government.
|
||
|
||
This project, involving a consortium of large Brazilian
|
||
construction companies, including Mendes Junior and Odebrecht,
|
||
has long aroused suspicion, largely because its costs soared
|
||
$1.5 billion over budget. Now, thanks to PC's meticulous
|
||
accounting, the federal police, working with the tax
|
||
inspectors, believe they will be able to find out where most
|
||
of the extra money went.
|
||
|
||
One aspect of the listing remains baffling. At the end of
|
||
each entry PC wrote the name of a star or constellation: the
|
||
Southern Cross, the Great Bear, the Milky Way, Orion. These
|
||
heavenly bodies, the accountants guess but cannot yet
|
||
demonstrate, are probably codenames for sensitive information
|
||
that PC did not want to entrust to his computer--the names of
|
||
the powerful economic groups paying the commissions.
|
||
|
||
...........
|
||
|
||
Though part of the computer files are damaged, the
|
||
inspectors say they are finding enough evidence to establish
|
||
the size of the corruption network and the president's close
|
||
involvement in it.
|
||
|
||
Perhaps somebody could send Brazilian crooks a copy of Phil's Pretty
|
||
Good Encryption program and the investigators a registered version of
|
||
Norton Utilities.
|
||
|
||
------------------------------
|
||
|
||
Date: Wed, 7 Oct 92 17:54:07 EDT
|
||
From: <Nigel.Allen@LAMBADA.OIT.UNC.EDU>
|
||
Subject: File 8--Police Charge Toronto Teenager in 911 Case
|
||
|
||
Here is a press release that I received from the Metropolitan Toronto
|
||
Police. The Toronto Star ran a story (based on the press release) on
|
||
its front page today.
|
||
|
||
1992 October 06, 1950 hours
|
||
Teenage Computer Hacker Nabbed by Police
|
||
|
||
Detectives from the Major Crime Squad at Police Headquarters have
|
||
arrested a 15-year-old North York boy and charged him with a number of
|
||
computer-related crimes. Investigations have revealed that on some
|
||
occasions his pranks paralyzed the Metropolitan Toronto 911 emergency
|
||
telephone system.
|
||
|
||
Last July, a young man called the 911 emergency number from a
|
||
location in the west end of Metropolitan Toronto and reported a number
|
||
of medical emergencies which caused units from the Metropolitan
|
||
Toronto Police, ambulance services and local fire departments to
|
||
respond. All of these calls were determined to be false.
|
||
|
||
On one occasion, he totally monopolized the 911 system and rendered
|
||
it inoperable thereby denying citizens access to the 911 lifeline
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throughout the Metropolitan Toronto area.
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Bell Canada security officers assisted police in their search for the
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source of the calls. Acting on a Criminal Code search warrant, police
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today entered a North York home, seized a quantity of computers and
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arrested a teen-age boy.
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He is to appear in Youth Court, 47 Sheppard Avenue East, North York,
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Friday, November 6, 1992, charged with theft of telecommunications, 24
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counts of mischief and 10 counts of convey false message.
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Investigations are continuing.
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(end of press release)
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Note from NDA: More information may be available from the public affairs
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office of the Metropolitan Toronto Police at (416) 324-2222 or from
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Detective W. Johnston of the Major Crime Squad at (416) 324-6245.
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------------------------------
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End of Computer Underground Digest #4.49
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************************************
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